Degree Name

Department

Philosophy

College

Humanities

Publication Date

2026-03-16

First Faculty Advisor

Derek Haderlie

First Faculty Reader

Taylor-Grey Miller

Honors Coordinator

Ryan Christensen

Keywords

Philosophy, metaphysics, ground

Abstract

It is widely held that true grounding claims are general. That is, individual grounding facts are subsumable under general patterns or principles of ground. In this paper, I advocate a novel position in the theory of ground on which particular grounding facts do not generalize to yield patterns of ground. This is not an argument for grounding pluralism, but is analogous to particularist views in metaethics which hold that moral principles are not general, but particular. If true, particularism about ground dissolves a serious challenge to the theory of ground, Louis deRosset's connection problem for non-reductivism. However, rejecting the generality of ground undermines our tests for the plausibility of grounding claims and prevents an inference from grounding facts to general explanations, thus threatening the utility of ground for metaphysical theorizing.