Keywords
Smart water systems, Water distribution systems, Cyber-security, Cyber attacks, Data analytics
Start Date
25-6-2018 2:00 PM
End Date
25-6-2018 3:20 PM
Abstract
The combination of advanced metering hardware with controllable networked devices provides a unique opportunity to improve the reliability, efficiency, and level of automation of water distribution systems. The flipside of this technological development is their vulnerability to cyber attacks: smart meters, sensors, PLCs, and SCADA represent an ‘attack surface’ that can be exploited by hackers to access private information or even disrupt system operations. What are the most vulnerable components? How do water distribution networks respond to cyber attacks? Is it possible to detect them?
To answer these questions, we first provide an overview of the mathematical modelling approaches available to simulate the behavior of water distribution systems undergoing cyber attacks. We show that most approaches focus primarily on the simulation of physical processes, thereby overlooking the exchange of information between cyber and physical components. We thus continue by presenting epanetCPA, a toolbox that extends EPANET’s features to model explicitly these complex interactions. We then review the attack detection algorithms, which typically rely on data analytics, and discuss about their strength and weaknesses: existing techniques show appealing performance in controlled, simulated environments, but may misguide operators when implemented in real-world settings—which feature variable demand patterns, and noisy, larger datasets. We conclude this presentation by touching upon three topics that should be investigated in the near future: the development of repositories containing data and information on cyber attacks, scalability of detection algorithms to large-scale systems, and optimal control of water systems under cyber attacks.
Cyber-security of water distribution systems: current challenges and future directions
The combination of advanced metering hardware with controllable networked devices provides a unique opportunity to improve the reliability, efficiency, and level of automation of water distribution systems. The flipside of this technological development is their vulnerability to cyber attacks: smart meters, sensors, PLCs, and SCADA represent an ‘attack surface’ that can be exploited by hackers to access private information or even disrupt system operations. What are the most vulnerable components? How do water distribution networks respond to cyber attacks? Is it possible to detect them?
To answer these questions, we first provide an overview of the mathematical modelling approaches available to simulate the behavior of water distribution systems undergoing cyber attacks. We show that most approaches focus primarily on the simulation of physical processes, thereby overlooking the exchange of information between cyber and physical components. We thus continue by presenting epanetCPA, a toolbox that extends EPANET’s features to model explicitly these complex interactions. We then review the attack detection algorithms, which typically rely on data analytics, and discuss about their strength and weaknesses: existing techniques show appealing performance in controlled, simulated environments, but may misguide operators when implemented in real-world settings—which feature variable demand patterns, and noisy, larger datasets. We conclude this presentation by touching upon three topics that should be investigated in the near future: the development of repositories containing data and information on cyber attacks, scalability of detection algorithms to large-scale systems, and optimal control of water systems under cyber attacks.
Stream and Session
Stream B: (Big) Data Solutions for Planning, Management, and Operation and Environmental Systems
Session B1: Modelling and Managing Urban Water and Energy Demands in the Era of Big Data