Keywords

quasi-hyperbolic discounting, present bias, sophistication, naiveté, commitment, flexibility, savings, contract design, defined contribution retirement plan, 401(k), IRA

Abstract

Previous research has shown that some people voluntarily use commitment contracts that restrict their own choice sets. We study how people divide money between two accounts: a liquid account that permits unrestricted withdrawals and a commitment account that is randomly assigned in a between-subject design to have either a 10% earlywithdrawal penalty, or a 20% early withdrawal penalty, or not to allowearlywithdrawals at all (i.e., an infinite penalty).When the liquid account and the commitment account pay the same interest rate, higher early-withdrawal penalties attract more commitment account deposits. This pattern is predicted by the hypothesis that some participants are partially- or fully-sophisticated present-biased agents. Such agents perceive that higher penalties generate greater scope for commitment by disincentivizing (penalized) early withdrawals. The experiment also shows that when the commitment account pays a higher interest rate than the liquid account, the positive empirical slope relating penalties and commitment deposits is flattened, suggesting that naïve present-biased agents or agents with standard exponential discounting are also in our sample. Across all of our experimental treatments, higher early withdrawal penalties on the commitment account sometimes increase and never reduce allocations to the commitment account.

Original Publication Citation

“Which Early Withdrawal Penalty Attracts the Most Deposits to a Commitment Savings Account?” 2020. Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 183 (March 2020) (with John Beshears, James J. Choi, Christopher Harris, David Laibson, and Jung Sakong). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2020.104144

Document Type

Peer-Reviewed Article

Publication Date

2020

Publisher

Journal of Public Economics

Language

English

College

Marriott School of Business

Department

Finance

University Standing at Time of Publication

Full Professor

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