Keywords
market attention, earnings announcement timing, earnings announcementscheduling, earnings announcement notifications, strategic disclosure
Abstract
We investigate whether managers “hide” bad news by announcing earnings during periods of low attention, or by providing less forewarning of an upcoming earnings announcement. Our findings are consistent with managers reporting bad news after market hours, on busy days, and with less advance notice, and with earnings receiving less attention in these settings. Paradoxically, our findings indicate that managers also report bad news on Fridays, but we do not find lower attention on Fridays. Further, we find negative returns when the market is notified of an upcoming Friday earnings announcement, which is consistent with investors inferring forthcoming bad news.
Original Publication Citation
“Market (In)attention and the strategic scheduling and timing of earnings announcements” (with Ed deHaan and Terry Shevlin). Journal of Accounting and Economics (2015) 60:36-55.
BYU ScholarsArchive Citation
deHaan, Ed; Shevlin, Terry; and Thornock, Jacob, "Market (In)attention and the Strategic Scheduling and Timing of Earnings Announcements" (2015). Faculty Publications. 8587.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/facpub/8587
Document Type
Peer-Reviewed Article
Publication Date
2015
Publisher
Journal of Accounting and Economics
Language
English
College
Marriott School of Business
Department
Accountancy
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