Keywords
automatic information sharing, compliance costs, data quality variation
Abstract
In recent years, governments across the globe have implemented automatic information-sharing measures as a revolutionary tool to combat offshore tax evasion. Using hand-collected and private Internal Revenue Service data on participation in the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, we provide some of the first evidence of the costs and quality of information shared via automatic information sharing. We estimate that the aggregate costs borne by foreign financial institutions (FFIs) were $31–$52 billion. Furthermore, although 97 percent of FFIs have committed to sharing information with US tax authorities, there is significant variation in quality. Quality is lower for accounts held by business entities and by firms with more offshore US accounts but higher for accounts in tax havens, treaty countries, and countries with a model 1 intergovernmental agreement. Our findings suggest that, despite US efforts to induce FFIs to share information, opportunities remain for hiding wealth abroad.
Original Publication Citation
“Hidden Wealth and Automatic Information Sharing” (with Andrew Belnap and Brady Williams). Forthcoming, Journal of Law and Economics
BYU ScholarsArchive Citation
Belnap, Andrew; Thornock, Jacob; and Williams, Braden, "Hidden Wealth and Automatic Information Sharing" (2024). Faculty Publications. 8578.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/facpub/8578
Document Type
Peer-Reviewed Article
Publication Date
2024
Publisher
Journal of Law and Economics
Language
English
College
Marriott School of Business
Department
Accountancy
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