Keywords

disclosure, patents, innovation

Abstract

The patent system grants inventors temporary monopoly rights in exchange for a public disclosure detailing their innovation. These disclosures are meant to allow others to recreate and build on the patented innovation. We examine how the quality of these disclosures affects follow-on innovation. We use the plausibly exogenous assignment to patent applications of examiners who differ in their enforcement of disclosure requirements as a source of variation in disclosure quality. We find that some examiners are significantly more lenient with respect to patent disclosure quality requirements, and that patents granted by these examiners include significantly lower-quality disclosures and generate significantly less follow-on innovation. Overall, our evidence suggests that highquality patent disclosures create knowledge spillovers that spur follow-on innovation.

Original Publication Citation

“The Effect of Patent Disclosure Quality on Innovation” (with Stephen Glaeser, Mark Lang, and Caroline Sprecher) Journal of Accounting and Economics 77, no. 2-3 (2024): 101647.

Document Type

Peer-Reviewed Article

Publication Date

2023

Publisher

Journal of Accounting and Economics

Language

English

College

Marriott School of Business

Department

Accountancy

University Standing at Time of Publication

Associate Professor

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