Keywords
tanking, NBA, tournament theory
Abstract
Taylor and Trogdon found evidence of shirking under some, but not all, draft lottery systems used in three different National Basketball Association (NBA) seasons. The authors use data from all NBA games played from 1977 to 2007 and a fixed effects model to control for unobservable team and season heterogeneity to extend this research. The authors find that NBA teams were more likely to intentionally lose games at the end of the regular season during the seasons where the incentives to finish last were the largest.
Original Publication Citation
Price, Joseph; Brian Soebbing; David Berri; and Brad Humphreys. “Tournament Incentives, League Policy, and NBA Team Performance Revisited” Journal of Sports Economics, 11(2): 117-135, 2010
BYU ScholarsArchive Citation
Price, Joseph; Soebbing, Brian P.; Berri, David; and Humphreys, Brad R., "Tournament Incentives, League Policy, and NBA Team Performance Revisited" (2010). Faculty Publications. 7187.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/facpub/7187
Document Type
Conference Paper
Publication Date
2010
Publisher
Sage Publications
Language
English
College
Family, Home, and Social Sciences
Department
Economics
Copyright Status
© The Author(s) 2010
Copyright Use Information
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