Keywords

cross-national interactions, coordinate, nationality

Abstract

In a period marked by extensive cross-national interactions, nationality may present an important focal point that individuals coordinate on. This study uses an experimental approach to study whether nationality serves as a coordination device. We let subjects from Japan, Korea, and China play coordination games in which we vary information about their partner. The results show that nationality serves as a coordination device if common nationality is the only piece of information available to the subjects. The strength of this device is nationality-dependent and diminishes when participants are provided with additional information about their partner. We also find that subjects are likely to coordinate on the Pareto-dominant equilibrium at about the same rate if the partner has a different nationality than if nationality is unknown.

Original Publication Citation

“An experimental study on the relevance and scope of nationality as a coordination device” (with Andreas Leibbrandt). Economic Inquiry, 52:4, 1392-1407, 2014.