The n-person Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution under pre-donations

Keywords

Bargaining, Concession, Pre-donation, Kalai-Smorodinsky solution

Abstract

This study examines the behavior of simple n-person bargaining problems under pre-donations where the Kalai-Smorodinsky (KS) solution is operant. Pre-donations are a unilateral commitment to transfer a portion of one’s utility to someone else, and are used to distort the bargaining set and thereby influence the bargaining solution. In equilibrium, these pre-donations are Pareto-improving over the undistorted solution; moreover, when the agents’ preferences are sufficiently distinct, the equilibrium solution coincides with the concessionary division rule.

Original Publication Citation

“The n-Person Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution under Pre-Donations,” by S. Nuray Akin, Brennan Platt,and Murat Sertel. Review of Economic Design, 15:147-162, June 2011.

Document Type

Peer-Reviewed Article

Publication Date

2011-6

Permanent URL

http://hdl.lib.byu.edu/1877/8521

Publisher

Review of Economic Design

Language

English

College

Family, Home, and Social Sciences

Department

Economics

University Standing at Time of Publication

Full Professor

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