The n-person Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution under pre-donations
Bargaining, Concession, Pre-donation, Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
This study examines the behavior of simple n-person bargaining problems under pre-donations where the Kalai-Smorodinsky (KS) solution is operant. Pre-donations are a unilateral commitment to transfer a portion of one’s utility to someone else, and are used to distort the bargaining set and thereby influence the bargaining solution. In equilibrium, these pre-donations are Pareto-improving over the undistorted solution; moreover, when the agents’ preferences are sufficiently distinct, the equilibrium solution coincides with the concessionary division rule.
Original Publication Citation
“The n-Person Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution under Pre-Donations,” by S. Nuray Akin, Brennan Platt,and Murat Sertel. Review of Economic Design, 15:147-162, June 2011.
BYU ScholarsArchive Citation
Akin, S. Nuray; Platt, Brennan C.; and Sertel, Murat R., "The n-person Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution under pre-donations" (2011). Faculty Publications. 5791.
Review of Economic Design
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