Discounts and Deadlines in Consumer Search
Keywords
Deadlines, Discounts, equilibrium search model, consumers
Abstract
We present a new equilibrium search model where consumers initially search among discount opportunities, but are willing to pay more as a deadline approaches, eventually turning to full-price sellers. The model predicts equilibrium price dispersion and rationalizes discount and full-price sellers coexisting without relying on ex ante heterogeneity. We apply the model to online retail sales via auctions and posted prices, where failed attempts to purchase reveal consumers’ reservation prices. We find robust evidence supporting the theory. We quantify dynamic search frictions arising from deadlines and show how, with deadline-constrained buyers, seemingly neutral platform fee increases can cause large market shifts.
Original Publication Citation
“Discounts and Deadlines in Consumer Search,” by Dominic Coey, Bradley Larsen, and Brennan Platt. American Economic Review,110:3748-3785, December 2020.
BYU ScholarsArchive Citation
Coey, Dominic; Larsen, Bradley J.; and Platt, Brennan C., "Discounts and Deadlines in Consumer Search" (2020). Faculty Publications. 5780.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/facpub/5780
Document Type
Peer-Reviewed Article
Publication Date
2020-12
Permanent URL
http://hdl.lib.byu.edu/1877/8510
Publisher
American Economic Review
Language
English
College
Family, Home, and Social Sciences
Department
Economics
Copyright Use Information
https://lib.byu.edu/about/copyright/