The Distribution of Economic Rents Arising from Subsidized Water When Land Is Leased
Tenants, Economic rent, Landowners, Land leases, Risk aversion, Farmlands, Crop economics, Cash Rental industry
A broad distribution of the benefits of federally "underpriced" water may be best promoted by limiting the size of owned acreage and not the sum of owned and leased acreage as required by the Reclamation Reform Act of 1982. Calculated differences between contractual lease payments and associated tenant-expected economic rents were statistically tested to determine if landowners fully capture the latter. Cash lease markets transferred nearly all economic rents anticipated by tenants to landowners in the study area. Share lease markets do the same if share tenants are assumed to be moderately risk aver
Original Publication Citation
The Distribution of Economic Rents Arising from Subsidized Water When Land Is Leased, (with Ray G. Huffaker) American Journal of Agricultural Economics Vol. 68, No. 2, May, 1986. pp. 306-312.
BYU ScholarsArchive Citation
Huffaker, Ray G. and Gardner, B. Delworth, "The Distribution of Economic Rents Arising from Subsidized Water When Land Is Leased" (1986). Faculty Publications. 2230.
American Journal of Agricultural Economics
American Journal of Agricultural Economics © 1986 Agricultural & Applied Economics Association