The Distribution of Economic Rents Arising from Subsidized Water When Land Is Leased

Keywords

Tenants, Economic rent, Landowners, Land leases, Risk aversion, Farmlands, Crop economics, Cash Rental industry

Abstract

A broad distribution of the benefits of federally "underpriced" water may be best promoted by limiting the size of owned acreage and not the sum of owned and leased acreage as required by the Reclamation Reform Act of 1982. Calculated differences between contractual lease payments and associated tenant-expected economic rents were statistically tested to determine if landowners fully capture the latter. Cash lease markets transferred nearly all economic rents anticipated by tenants to landowners in the study area. Share lease markets do the same if share tenants are assumed to be moderately risk aver

Original Publication Citation

The Distribution of Economic Rents Arising from Subsidized Water When Land Is Leased, (with Ray G. Huffaker) American Journal of Agricultural Economics Vol. 68, No. 2, May, 1986. pp. 306-312.

Document Type

Peer-Reviewed Article

Publication Date

1986-5

Permanent URL

http://hdl.lib.byu.edu/1877/5101

Publisher

American Journal of Agricultural Economics

Language

English

College

Family, Home, and Social Sciences

Department

Economics

University Standing at Time of Publication

Full Professor

Link to Full Text

Share

COinS