Keywords
moral motivation, metaethics, moral objectivity
Abstract
In The Moral Problem, Michael Smith argues that there is an on-going tension in discussions among moral philosophers between the putative objectivity of morality, the practicality of moral judgments, and Hume’s view of motivation.1 From an agent’s point of view, putatively objective claims imply cognitivism, the view that moral judgments express beliefs about the way the world is morally.2 But if moral judgments are practical and on Hume’s view of motivation dependent on the desires of an agent, then from a moral standpoint, we risk making claims that the agent cannot be motivated to act upon.3 In this sense the problem, which Smith calls the moral problem, is a problem of motivation. It is a problem of how beliefs about putatively objective morality considerations can universally motivate individuals with differing motivational psychologies. Smith considers the tension to be metaethical and that its resolution is the primary task of moral philosophers. Secondary to such problems, on his view, are problems of normative ethics.
Original Publication Citation
“Kant and a Problem of Motivation.” Journal of Value Inquiry. 2012. 46.1: 83-96.
BYU ScholarsArchive Citation
Jensen, David, "Kant and a Problem of Motivation" (2012). Faculty Publications. 10175.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/facpub/10175
Document Type
Peer-Reviewed Article
Publication Date
2012
Publisher
Journal of Value Inquiry
Language
English
College
Humanities
Department
Philosophy
Copyright Status
© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012
Copyright Use Information
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