Many avenues exist to insert malicious circuitry into an FPGA designs, including compromised CAD tools, overwriting bitstream files, and post-deployment attacks. The proprietary nature of the Xilinx bitstreams precludes the ability to validate an implemented design. This thesis introduces the BitRec and IPRec projects in an effort to support trojan detection tools. BitRec provides a novel approach to mapping of the Xilinx bitstream format into FPGA features in order to recreate the original design's netlist. BitRec supports the 7 Series, UltraScale and UltraScale+ architectures. IPRec then provides a novel approach to recognizing parameterizable IP within a flattened netlist in an effort to eliminate large sections of trusted circuitry from needing to be analyzed by a trojan detection tool.
College and Department
Electrical and Computer Engineering
BYU ScholarsArchive Citation
Simpson, Corey Ryan, "Towards Trojan Detection from a Raw Bitstream" (2022). Theses and Dissertations. 9456.
FPGA, bitstream, Xilinx, trojan, IP