Degree Name

Department

Economics

College

Family, Home, and Social Sciences

Defense Date

2026-03-05

Publication Date

2026-03-16

First Faculty Advisor

Brian Boyer

First Faculty Reader

Riley Wilson

Honors Coordinator

Joseph Price

Keywords

Corporate Disclosure, Information Asymmetry, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Financial Reporting Timeliness, Regression Discontinuity Design, Firm Valuation

Abstract

Does faster financial reporting increase firm value? I exploit the $700 million public float threshold in SEC Rule 12b-2, which imposes a 60-day Form 10-K filing deadline for large accelerated filers relative to 75 days for accelerated filers. Using a fuzzy regression discontinuity design, I show that crossing the threshold sharply increases the likelihood of Large Accelerated Filer status and reduces filing lags by approximately one week, with no evidence of concurrent changes in mandated audit quality. Despite this exogenous acceleration in information disclosure, I fail to reject the null hypothesis that there are no effects on firm valuation (Tobin’s Q), the implied cost of debt, or audit fees. These estimates are accompanied by large standard errors, limiting their precision. The results suggest that we cannot conclude that capital markets meaningfully price a marginal 15-day reduction in reporting lag into asset values or debt contracting terms.