Author Date

2025-6

Degree Name

Department

Philosophy

College

Humanities

Defense Date

2025-04-11

Publication Date

2025-06-06

First Faculty Advisor

Justin White

First Faculty Reader

Derek Haderlie

Honors Coordinator

Ryan Christensen

Keywords

Philosophy of Action, Ambivalence, Wholeheartedness, Moral Psychology

Abstract

In this thesis, I examine Harry Frankfurt’s account of the will and its implications for ambivalence, particularly in the context of moral striving. I begin by outlining Frankfurt’s hierarchical model of desires and his view that ambivalence represents a failure of agency. I then explore his proposed solution—wholeheartedness—which aims to resolve inner conflict by rejecting incompatible desires. Drawing on David Velleman and Justin Coates, I argue that Frankfurt’s view faces both agential and ethical challenges, especially for individuals engaged in upward mobility, or “strivers.” I suggest that the experiences of strivers—those who must navigate competing ethical commitments—pose a unique challenge to Frankfurt’s model. By drawing on Jennifer Morton’s discussion of strivers, we gain a fuller understanding of what is at stake in cases of ambivalence, particularly those involving unique ethical trade-offs. To highlight this dimension, I turn to Morton’s concept of a clear-eyed ethical narrative. I flesh out her view to illuminate how a clear-eyed narrative helps strivers understand their relationship to what they have given up. In the end, what matters is not simply the act of sacrifice, but how agents relate to the goods and desires they sacrifice.