Degree Name

Department

Economics

College

Family, Home, and Social Sciences

Defense Date

2023-11-29

Publication Date

2023-12-01

First Faculty Advisor

Dr. Joseph McMurray

First Faculty Reader

Dr. Brennan Platt

Honors Coordinator

Dr. John Stovall

Keywords

RCV, Voting Models, Spatial Competition, Ranked Choice Voting, Citizen-Candidate Model, Duverger's Law, Two-Party System, Political Polarization, Polarization, Political Parties, Political Candidates

Abstract

This paper expands on a citizen-candidate model of electoral competition under both plurality rule and ranked choice voting. The paper finds that ranked choice voting nominally avoids Duverger’s Law by accumulating many identical candidates but yields fewer viable equilibrium policy positions than plurality rule. Additionally, ranked choice voting favors moderate candidates and policies, increasing the probability of their implementation compared to plurality rule. This moderate bias leads to lower polarization in equilibrium than is possible under plurality rule.