Degree Name
BS
Department
Electrical and Computer Engineering
College
Ira A. Fulton College of Engineering
Defense Date
2023-08-04
Publication Date
2023-08-11
First Faculty Advisor
Jeff Goaders
First Faculty Reader
Scott Lloyd
Honors Coordinator
Derek Hansen
Keywords
Cryptography, FPGA, Side-channel attack
Abstract
As field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) perform increasingly critical cryptography, researchers study the safety of these computations. One such compromise on the safety of cryptography is the side-channel attack. These attacks exploit sources of information called leakage that escape a cryptographic system in ways the original design did not intend. One dimension of a successful side-channel attack is the collection of leakage. This research configures the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) on an FPGA and demonstrates strategies for collecting three types of side-channel leakage: power consumption, temperature emissions, and ring oscillations.
BYU ScholarsArchive Citation
Makechnie-Hardy, Kaden, "SIDE-CHANNEL LEAKAGE FROM THE ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD ON FIELD PROGRAMMABLE GATE ARRAYS" (2023). Undergraduate Honors Theses. 317.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/studentpub_uht/317