Title
Is Truth Valuable?
Keywords
truth, intuition, entailment, morality, reason, logical theorems, justified beliefs, syntactic theory
Abstract
This paper examines a puzzle about whether truth is a valuable property: Valuable properties, like beauty and moral goodness, come in degrees; but truth does not come in degrees. Hence, the argument concludes, truth is not valuable. This result is puzzling since it seems to conflict with a deep intuition that truth is valuable. It is suggested that a roughly Platonic theory, on which truth is distinguished into two different concepts, gives a satisfying answer to the puzzle. One of these concepts can be had in degrees, which, it is suggested, may be determined by the true proposition's explanatory power.
Original Publication Citation
“Is Truth Valuable?” Philosophy 88.3: 433–450.
BYU ScholarsArchive Citation
Christensen, Ryan, "Is Truth Valuable?" (2013). Philosophy Faculty Publications. 30.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/philosophy_facpub/30
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2013-7
Publisher
Philosophy
Language
English
College
Humanities
Department
Philosophy
Copyright Status
The Royal Institute of Philosophy