Title

Locke on Knowledge of Existence

Keywords

Locke, epistemology, knowledge, external objects

Abstract

The standard objection to Locke's epistemology is that his conception of knowledge inevitably leads to skepticism about external objects. One reason for this complaint is that Locke defines knowledge as the perception of a relation between ideas, but perceiving relations between ideas does not seem like the kind of thing that can give us knowledge that tables and chairs exist. Thus Locke's general definition of knowledge seems to be woefully inadequate for explaining knowledge of external objects. However, this interpretation and subsequent criticism ignore a special category of knowledge Locke calls 'real knowledge', which is Locke's own account of how we can have knowledge of the real world. Rather than evaluating whether Locke's definition of knowledge in general can get us knowledge of external objects, we should instead focus our attention on whether Locke's account of real knowledge can explain how we have knowledge of external objects.

Original Publication Citation

“Locke on Knowledge of Existence,” Locke Studies vol. 16 (2016)

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2016

Publisher

Locke Studies

Language

English

College

Humanities

Department

Philosophy

University Standing at Time of Publication

Assistant Professor

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