Title

Kant and a Problem of Motivation

Keywords

Moral Judgment, Psychological Problem, Moral Philosopher, Normative Reason Moral Problem

Abstract

n The Moral Problem, Michael Smith argues that there is an on-going tension in discussions among moral philosophers between the putative objectivity of morality, the practicality of moral judgments, and Hume’s view of motivation.Footnote1 From an agent’s point of view, putatively objective claims imply cognitivism, the view that moral judgments express beliefs about the way the world is morally.Footnote2 But if moral judgments are practical and on Hume’s view of motivation dependent on the desires of an agent, then from a moral standpoint, we risk making claims that the agent cannot be motivated to act upon.Footnote3 In this sense the problem, which Smith calls the moral problem, is a problem of motivation. It is a problem of how beliefs about putatively objective morality considerations can universally motivate individuals with differing motivational psychologies. Smith considers the tension to be meta-ethical and that its resolution is the primary task of moral philosophers. Secondary to such problems, on his view, are problems of normative ethics.

Original Publication Citation

“Kant and a Problem of Motivation.” Journal of Value Inquiry. 2012. 46.1: 83-96.

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2012-04-20

Publisher

The Journal of Value Inquiry

Language

English

College

Humanities

Department

Philosophy

University Standing at Time of Publication

Associate Professor

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