Freedman v. Maryland, due process, Supreme Court
In recent years, federal courts eroded the procedural safeguards required for prior restraint licensing schemes established in Freedman v. Maryland. The Supreme Court of the United States stated that the dangers of prior restraint were accounted for by content neutrality. But a close examination of federal courts of appeals opinions since 2002 reveals that erosion of procedural safeguards may threaten speech interests. First, procedural safeguards have not been required, in some cases, even for content-based prior restraints. Second, courts of appeals have held that, in the context of content-neutral prior restraints, the First Amendment no longer requires a time limit on the initial administrative censor's decision about whether to allow speech. This limit was key to ensuring due process, and its absence allows government to stifle speech it disfavors even while maintaining the appearance of content neutrality.
Original Publication Citation
Carter, Edward L., Clark, Brad. "Death of Procedural Safeguards: Prior Restraint, Due Process and the Elusive First Amendment Value of Content Neutrality." Communication Law and Policy (26).
BYU ScholarsArchive Citation
Carter, Edward L. and Clark, Brad, "Death of Procedural Safeguards: Prior Restraint, Due Process and the Elusive First Amendment Value of Content Neutrality" (2006). Faculty Publications. 960.
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Fine Arts and Communications
© 2006, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. Contact publisher for additional reprinting or re-use. http://www.routledge.com/
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