Keywords
IPO, entrepreneurial finance, impression management, corporate governance, camouflage, underpricing
Abstract
Entrepreneurs attempt to persuade potential investors that their new ventures are both credible andworthy of funding. A long line of research on entrepreneurial impressionmanagement establishes that the ability to present their ventures in a favorable light is a key attribute of successful entrepreneurs. In this study, we examine the opposite side of the issue and test to determine if some entrepreneurs obscure corporate governance information.We create a newmetric tomeasure the level of camouflage used in governance documents for initial public offerings (IPOs). We find that entrepreneurs are less likely to use camouflage during periods of high scrutiny, as measured by industry analyst following, industry concentration levels, and IPO clustering. We also find that greater use of camouflage is associated with raising more capital, due to both greater offer proceeds as well as less underpricing. This effect is most pronounced in corporate charters which are difficult for shareholders to change.
Original Publication Citation
Strategically Camouflaged Corporate Governance in IPOs: Entrepreneurial Masking and Impression Management, with Dave Benson, Jim Cicon and Steve Ferris, Journal of Business Venturing, Vol. 30, Iss. 5, November 2015, 839-864.
BYU ScholarsArchive Citation
Benson, David F.; Brau, James C.; Cicon, James; and Ferris, Stephen P., "Strategically Camouflaged Corporate Governance in IPOs: Entrepreneurial Masking and Impression Management" (2015). Faculty Publications. 9187.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/facpub/9187
Document Type
Peer-Reviewed Article
Publication Date
2015
Publisher
Journal of Business Venturing
Language
English
College
Marriott School of Business
Department
Finance
Copyright Status
© 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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