Outcome based accountability: Theory and evidence
Keywords
Contract theory, Performance accountability, Coach dismissal
Abstract
A firm's payoffs can often depend on whether it exceeds a threshold of performance. In a principal-agent setting, we demonstrate that the optimal contract induces efficient effort by basing firing decisions solely on whether the agent was successful, even though the absolute level of performance is more informative. We test the predictions of our model using thirty seasons of NFL data. We find that a coach is 6 percentage points more likely to be fired after a close loss; beyond this, the margin of victory has no significant impact on firing probabilities despite being more informative about future success. Also consistent with the predictions of our model, coaches maximize team effort (by playing their best players) when doing so has the largest impact on the probability of winning.
Original Publication Citation
“Outcome Based Accountability,” by Lars Lefgren, Brennan Platt, Joseph Price, and Samuel Higbee. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 160:121-137, April 2019.
BYU ScholarsArchive Citation
Lefgren, Lars; Platt, Brennan C.; Price, Joseph; and Higbee, Samuel, "Outcome based accountability: Theory and evidence" (2019). Faculty Publications. 5782.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/facpub/5782
Document Type
Peer-Reviewed Article
Publication Date
2019-4
Permanent URL
http://hdl.lib.byu.edu/1877/8512
Publisher
Elsevier B.V.
Language
English
College
Family, Home, and Social Sciences
Department
Economics
Copyright Status
© 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Copyright Use Information
https://lib.byu.edu/about/copyright/