To Violate or Not Violate the Law: An Example from Egyptian Agricultu
Rice, Farmlands Cotton, Maximum likelihood estimation, Agricultural legislation, Land economics, Market prices, Free markets, Land ownership, Crop economics
Egyptian agriculture is heavily regulated by laws and administrative regulations. This paper explores some of the economic implications of two laws that are widely violated: the land allotment to cotton and the imposed quota for rice. Logit and probit models are utilized to assess factors which are associated with law violations in two villages. Violators of both laws tend to be poorer, have less owned land, have fewer number of land pieces, have fewer cattle, and are located nearer the free village markets than the nonviolators.
Original Publication Citation
To Violate or Not Violate the Law: An Example from Egyptian Agriculture. (with Dyaa K. Abdou and Richard Green) American Journal of Agricultural Economics Vol. 68, No. 1, Feb. 1986. pp. 120-126.
BYU ScholarsArchive Citation
Abdou, Dyaa K.; Gardner, B. Delworth; and Green, Richard, "To Violate or Not Violate the Law: An Example from Egyptian Agricultu" (1986). All Faculty Publications. 2228.
American Journal of Agricultural Economics
American Journal of Agricultural Economics © 1986 Agricultural & Applied Economics Association