Transfer Restrictions and Misallocation in Grazing Public Range

Keywords

Pastures, Land management, Silvopastoral systems, Fees, Ranches, Ranching, Forest service, Forests, Public land, Rangelands

Abstract

Many publicly owned, productive services in agriculture are sold at administered prices. Often the prices are set below the value of the marginal product of the services, necessitating non-price rationing to users. Generally a permit or quota enables the user to obtain a given quantity of the service for some specified time period. A consequence of this pricing and allocating procedure is that the permit (quota) takes on a value if there is some way that the permit (quota) can be transferred to persons other than the initial recipient. This paper consists of ta methodology which might be used to ascertain whether or not this kind of allocating procedure gives rise to misallocation of the service, assuming that a perfectly competitive market can be used as the optimum allocating devices.

Original Publication Citation

Transfer Restrictions and Misallocation in Grazing Public Range, Journal of Farm Economics, 43:50-63, 1962.

Document Type

Book Chapter

Publication Date

1962-2

Permanent URL

http://hdl.lib.byu.edu/1877/5087

Language

English

College

Family, Home, and Social Sciences

Department

Economics

University Standing at Time of Publication

Full Professor

Link to Full Text

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