Keywords
philanthropic torture, ticking time bomb, trolleys, torture
Abstract
One potentially morally justified use of torture is found in philanthropic torture of a perpetrator (PTP): scenarios in which a perpetrator has instigated significant pending suffering against innocents and in which the suffering can be prevented by means of the perpetrator’s cooperation. These situations involve a clash of two intuitions: that torture is in some strong and obvious sense absolutely morally wrong, and that torture or harm of an immoral perpetrator may be permissible to prevent equally abhorrent, if not greater, moral wrongs. My view is that a dually grounded view—permissible on theoretical grounds but wrong on practical grounds—can do justice to the conflicting intuitions we have about torture in cases of PTP. Further, I hold that practical “absolutism” will only be “mostly” or “likely” absolute, but that we should accept as adequate this “near absolutism”—it will give us the practical result we seek while also satisfying the intuition that we may act in otherwise untoward ways to prevent horrific moral harms.
Original Publication Citation
Jensen D. 2024. Torture and Trolleys: Accepting the Nearly Absolute Wrongness of Philanthropic Torture of a Perpetrator. Moral Philosophy and Politics. 11(1):141-167.
BYU ScholarsArchive Citation
Jensen, David, "Torture and Trolleys: Accepting the Nearly Absolute Wrongness of Philanthropic Torture of a Perpetrator" (2024). Faculty Publications. 10159.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/facpub/10159
Document Type
Peer-Reviewed Article
Publication Date
2024
Publisher
Moral Philosophy and Politics
Language
English
College
Humanities
Department
Philosophy
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