Alejandro Amenabar and the Embodiment of Skepticism in Abre Los Ojos
Alejandro Amenabar, Skepticism, Abre Los Ojos
For most philosophers of the Anglo-American tradition, the problem of radi- cal skepticism and its variants - i.e., the possibility that I could be massively mistaken in my beliefs about the external world, other minds, and even myself - no longer has the cachet it once did. Although it maintains a respectable place in contemporary epistemology it is clearly on the periphery of the discipline and no longer claims the attention once devoted to it by philosophers of the stature of Descartes, Hume, and Kant. Pride of place now goes, rather, to the task of naturalizing epistemology, which seeks to interpret questions about the na- ture and scope of our knowledge in terms consistent with those used in the physical sciences.1 Philosophers working within the framework of contempo- rary European philosophy are perhaps even less interested in the problem of radical skepticism. Whether their starting point is broadly phenomenological, hermeneutical, or something else altogether, the fact that the problem of radi- cal skepticism can be formulated at all merely demonstrates the obsolescence of traditional metaphysical programs and the need for a philosophical method- ology more responsive to our lived experience.2
Original Publication Citation
“Alejandro Amenábar and the Embodiment of Skepticism in Abre los ojos.” Hispanófila 153.3 (2008): 65-77
BYU ScholarsArchive Citation
Laraway, David, "Alejandro Amenabar and the Embodiment of Skepticism in Abre Los Ojos" (2008). Philosophy Faculty Publications. 44.