propositions, names, Deflationism
I propose that an adequate name for a proposition will be (1) rigid, in Kripke’s sense of referring to the same thing in every world in which it exists, and (2) transparent, which means that it would be possible, if one knows the name, to know which object the name refers. I then argue that the Standard Way of naming propositions—prefixing the word ‘that’ to a declarative sentence—does not allow for transparent names of every proposition, and that no alternative naming convention does better. I explore the implications of this failure for deflationism about truth, arguing that any theory that requires the T biconditional to be a priori cannot succeed.
Original Publication Citation
“Propositional Names,” Philosophia 39.1: 163–77.
BYU ScholarsArchive Citation
Christensen, Ryan, "Propositional Names" (2010). Philosophy Faculty Publications. 31.
Springer Science+Business Media B.V.