Title

McGee on Horwich

Keywords

theories of truth, minimalism, Paul Horwich, Vann McGee

Abstract

Vann McGee has argued against solutions to the liar paradox that simply restrict the scope of the T sentences as little as possible. This argument is often taken to disprove Paul Horwich’s preferred solution to the liar paradox for his Minimal Theory of truth (MT). I argue that Horwich’s theory is different enough from the theory McGee criticized that these criticisms do not apply to Horwich’s theory. On the basis of this, I argue that propositional theories, like MT, cannot be evaluated using the same methods as sentential theories.

Original Publication Citation

“McGee on Horwich.” Synthese 193.1:205–218.

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2015-07-19

Publisher

Synthese

Language

English

College

Humanities

Department

Philosophy

University Standing at Time of Publication

Associate Professor

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