McGee on Horwich
theories of truth, minimalism, Paul Horwich, Vann McGee
Vann McGee has argued against solutions to the liar paradox that simply restrict the scope of the T sentences as little as possible. This argument is often taken to disprove Paul Horwich’s preferred solution to the liar paradox for his Minimal Theory of truth (MT). I argue that Horwich’s theory is different enough from the theory McGee criticized that these criticisms do not apply to Horwich’s theory. On the basis of this, I argue that propositional theories, like MT, cannot be evaluated using the same methods as sentential theories.
Original Publication Citation
“McGee on Horwich.” Synthese 193.1:205–218.
BYU ScholarsArchive Citation
Christensen, Ryan, "McGee on Horwich" (2015). Philosophy Faculty Publications. 27.
Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015