Journal of Undergraduate Research
Keywords
strategic interaction, game theory, equilibrium behavior
College
Family, Home, and Social Sciences
Department
Economics
Abstract
Abstract: We present a win-loss game between players with explicitly-modeled cognitive limitations. Differences in the players’ abilities to analyze the available actions and deduce the optimal choices induce preferences over the complexity of the environment and hence incentives to manipulate that complexity. More skilled players are always at an advantage. In a class of long-horizon games with constant complexity, greater complexity favors the less- skilled player when the more-skilled player is the last mover. When the less-skilled player moves last there are countervailing effects. Finally, when complexity can be manipulated over the course of the game, the benefits of strategic manipulation of complexity can override objective considerations about best move choice, resulting in purposeful departures from subgame perfect Nash equilibrium behavior.
Recommended Citation
Lambson, Val and van den Berghe, John
(2015)
"Skill, Complexity, and Strategic Interaction,"
Journal of Undergraduate Research: Vol. 2015:
Iss.
1, Article 11.
Available at:
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/jur/vol2015/iss1/11