Bayes methods, decision theory, probability
The basic concepts of Levi's epistemic utility theory and credal convexity are presented. Epistemic utility, in addition to penalizing error as is done with traditional Bayesian decision methodology, permits a unit of informational value to be distributed among the hypotheses of a decision problem. Convex Bayes decision theory retains the conditioning structure of probability-based inference, but addresses many of the objections to Bayesian inference through relaxation of the requirement for numerically definite probabilities. The result is a decision methodology that stresses avoiding errors and seeks decisions that are likely to be highly informative as well as true. By relaxing the mandatory requirement for unique decisions and point estimates in all cases, decision and estimation criteria that do not demand more than is possible to obtain from the data and permit a natural man-in-the-loop interface are obtained. Applications are provided to illustrate the theory.
Original Publication Citation
Stirling, W. C., and D. R. Morrell. "Convex Bayes Decision Theory." Systems, Man and Cybernetics, IEEE Transactions on 21.1
BYU ScholarsArchive Citation
Stirling, Wynn C. and Morrell, Darryl, "Convex Bayes decision theory" (1991). All Faculty Publications. 724.
Ira A. Fulton College of Engineering and Technology
Electrical and Computer Engineering
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