Keywords
Hume’s argument against miracles, testimonial evidence, laws of nature
Abstract
Hume’s argument against believing the testimony of miracles is the most influential treatment of the topic, but there is not yet a consensus on how to interpret his argument. Two arguments are attributed to him. First, Hume seems to start with the infrequency of miracles and uses this to infer that the testimony of a miracle is exceedingly unlikely, and this then creates strong but defeasible evidence against the testimony of any miracle. Second, perhaps Hume takes the constancy of our experience of the laws of nature as decisive or indefeasible evidence against the testimony of any miracle. I explain the basis for each of these interpretations of Hume’s argument, and then develop a novel criticism of the latter interpretations: namely, any inductive inference depends on the relevant similarity between the observed and the unobserved, but we may have reason for thinking that purported miracles are not relevantly similar, and thus our past experience cannot be used as reliable evidence about the testimony of (some) miracles.
Original Publication Citation
“Two (Failed) Versions of Hume’s Argument Against Miracles,” Faith & Philosophy (2022)
BYU ScholarsArchive Citation
Rockwood, Nathan, "Two (Failed) Versions of Hume’s Argument Against Miracles" (2022). Faculty Publications. 10199.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/facpub/10199
Document Type
Peer-Reviewed Article
Publication Date
2022
Publisher
Faith & Philosophy
Language
English
College
Humanities
Department
Philosophy
Copyright Status
FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY Vol. 39 No. 4 October 2022 doi: 10.37977/faithphil.2022.39.4.4 All rights reserved
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