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The Elections of 1900 in Utah

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THE ELECTIONS OF 1900 IN UTAH

A Thesis
Presented to the
Department of History
Brigham Young University

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

by
R. Gary Penrod

August 1968
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The scope of this paper is the 1900 Presidential and Congressional elections in Utah. However, in order to make what was going on in Utah understandable, the national political picture must be examined.

In 1900 the Presidential candidates were the incumbent William McKinley for the Republicans and William Jennings Bryan for the Democrats. McKinley had directed a successful war and had seen prosperity return during his term in office. As the incumbent he would have had an edge on any challenger. His running mate was Theodore Roosevelt. Roosevelt was a popular personality and a hero of the recent Spanish-American War. With his war record went a reputation for personal integrity and crusading or reforming zeal in public office.

The Democrats ran William Jennings Bryan and Adlai E. Stevenson. Bryan, a veteran and loser of the 1896 Presidential campaign, was an excellent orator and hard campaigner.\footnote{John D. Hicks. The American Nation (3rd ed.; Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Riverside Press, 1955), pp. 236-237.} He was known as the champion of free silver and spokesman for the common man. Unfortunately for him, the
growing supply of gold had done what he had predicted only silver could do and good times had undercut his position.\(^2\)

Stevenson was a rather colorless individual who had been Vice-President under Cleveland. He had little appeal to the voters.\(^3\) In the national campaign it may be said that personalities were important, but issues were paramount.

The main issue of the campaign was imperialism. The 1900 Presidential election took place shortly after the United States had defeated Spain and taken Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. The treaty annexing this area had very nearly gone down to defeat under the combined attack of Democrats and anti-imperialists in the Republican Party. The treaty was accepted only because Bryan, the Democratic Party leader, favored its passage, probably in order to get a winning campaign issue.

Imperialism was strengthened as an issue because when the Philippines learned they had only exchanged one master for another, they revolted against the American forces. Fighting did not stop until late in 1901.

Anti-imperialists led by the Democrats argued that the United States as a symbol of liberty could not become an oppressor, denying liberty to those who had fought Spain for that very thing. Democrats pointed out that the United States knew nothing of how to rule colonies. They explained

\(^2\)Ibid., p. 246.

\(^3\)Ibid., p. 294.
that to protect those colonies a large standing army and commensurate navy would be necessary with the concomitant possibility of militarism or despotism arising in the United States.5

The Republican Party spokesmen answered the Democratic charges by pointing out that the United States had expanded many times and always been compelled to make some group obey United States' laws even against their will.6 Besides, these people were a fertile field for Christian missionary work. God willed expansion, and, furthermore, the United States could extend its civilized blessings to those poor unblessed foreigners and at the same time reap great profits from this expansion.7 Along with handsome profits, the United States would gain prestige in the eyes of the world. So, said the Republican rhetors, the United States would give good government,8 protection, civilization and Christianity, while in return receiving prestige and wealth. The bargain was a fair one in their eyes.

The Republicans felt, and rightly so, that their positions reflected the attitude of Americans generally.9

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4 Ibid., p. 295.
5 The Salt Lake Herald, November 3, 1900.
6 Ibid.
7 Hicks, op. cit., p. 296.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid., p. 295.
Republican victories in the elections of 1898 had already indicated as much.\textsuperscript{10}

Other issues were present, too. Free silver was still important to western miners and farmers. Accordingly, silver got some attention from Democratic orators who had a traditional position to uphold and voters to placate. However, Republicans favored a single gold standard. Nationally, silver no longer commanded much attention. New gold strikes and new processing methods had increased the world's gold supply so much that most people were satisfied with the expanded easy money supply they had previously hoped to gain with silver.

Tariff also brought a response from both parties. Democrats had traditionally favored a low tariff because it would benefit the workingman, whether farmer or laborer, who would pay less for goods he bought.

Republicans, however, favored a high protective tariff which benefited the Northern manufacturer and increased his profits. Indeed a political coalition of some Northern Democrats and the Republicans had formed in Congress to insure a high tariff. When the Democrats tried to pass a low tariff in 1894, those coalition forces had attached so many riders to it that it came out a protective tariff instead.\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{10}Ibid., p. 294.
\textsuperscript{11}Ibid., p. 233.
It must also be remembered that the United States had recently gone through a depression. The depression had started during the time a Democrat, Cleveland, was President and had ended while a Republican, McKinley, was in office. Republicans were able to point to bad times with the Democrats and good times with them. Indeed, when a multiplicity of issues arose and threatened to confuse the voter, Republicans simplified everything by making prosperity their key 1900 issue.\textsuperscript{12}

Not only did the prosperity of the country give the Republicans an advantage, but the prosperity of the party also helped. Republicans had a large campaign fund and Democrats did not.\textsuperscript{13}

A number of minority parties were also active in this national election. The Populists were present though their party was in the process of dissolution and had been since 1896 when the Democrats had adopted a number of their policies or issues.\textsuperscript{14} By now they had split into two groups, the regulars or fusionists, who favored the Democratic ticket of President - Bryan and Vice-President - Adlai E. Stevenson, and the dissidents, who nominated Wharton Barker and Ignatius Donnelly.

\textsuperscript{12}Ibid., p. 295.

\textsuperscript{13}Ibid., p. 297.

\textsuperscript{14}Ibid., p. 238.
Two Socialist tickets appeared on the ballot. The Social Democratic Party ran Eugene V. Debs and Job Harriman, while the Socialist Labor Party ran Joseph Francis Malloney and Valentine Remmel for President and Vice-President, respectively.

A differentiation between the Socialist Labor Party and the Social Democrats may be in order here. The Socialist Labor Party was an independent Marxian party formed in the United States in 1876. It achieved little success until 1887 when Edward Bellamy published *Looking Backward*, a popular novel dealing with an idealized Socialist state. The book revived or initiated interest in Socialism, and along with that interest came a dynamic leader, Daniel De Leon. De Leon was a militant leader with a vitriolic tongue. In 1894 when Eugene Debs failed in the Railroad Strike, De Leon made a statement summing up the Socialist Labor position.

The Union of the workers that expects to be successful must recognize:

1. The impossibility of obtaining a decent living while capitalism exists; the certainty of worse and worse conditions; the necessity of the abolition of the wage and capitalist system, and their substitution by the socialist or cooperative commonwealth, whereby the instruments of production shall be made the property of the people.

2. The necessity of the conquering of the public powers at the ballot box by the vote of the working class, cast independently.¹⁵

De Leon would not cooperate with trade unions and was so caustic in dealing with others that members favoring different, milder methods split from the party and joined a newly formed group, the Social Democrats. The Social Democrats were influenced by British Fabians and by German Social Democrats. Led by Victor L. Berger and Eugene V. Debs, the party favored "public ownership of means of production and distribution, consonant with Socialist doctrine, plus: public ownership of railroad telegraph, public utilities and mines and reduced hours of work, public works to alleviate unemployment; release of inventions for free use of the public; national labor legislation codes; social insurance codes; equal civil and political rights for men and women; the initiative, referendum, proportional representation, and recall; and abolition of war." The other minority parties were present, but showed very little strength.

The result of the 1900 elections was that McKinley stretched the size of his victory beyond his 1896 record, and the Republicans gained control of both the House and the Senate.

16 Ibid.
17 Hicks, op. cit., p. 297.
18 Ibid.
The Deseret Evening News\textsuperscript{19} was the organ of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.\textsuperscript{20} The paper took no open stand on politics. Its editor was Charles W. Penrose, a prominent Church leader. He maintained a neutral political stand in the editorial pages.

The Salt Lake Tribune was started by apostate Mormons.\textsuperscript{21} It changed hands but continued its anti-Mormon bias.\textsuperscript{22} It also became a Republican paper.\textsuperscript{23} By 1900, little open anti-Mormon statement could be found, but an almost fanatical Republican stance was very evident. The Tribune's editor was C. C. Goodwin. Goodwin had a reputation as an anti-Mormon. He was blamed by some for the crusade that kept B. H. Roberts from his seat in Congress. He also wrote an article for the North American Review in which he favored disenfranchisement of Mormons.\textsuperscript{24} This unusual man had run for the United States Congress in 1890 and lost, and now, in 1900, while editing a Republican paper and making

\textsuperscript{19}The Deseret Evening News will hereafter be referred to as the News.

\textsuperscript{20}That church will be referred to throughout this paper as the Mormon Church or the Church.

\textsuperscript{21}The Salt Lake Tribune will be referred to hereafter as the Tribune.

\textsuperscript{22}S. A. Kenner, Utah As It Is (Salt Lake City: Deseret News Press, 1904), pp. 160-161.

\textsuperscript{23}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{24}Wayne Stout, History of Utah (Salt Lake City: Wayne Stout, 1967), I, p. 392.
strong Republican editorial statements, he ran for Secretary of State on the Social Democratic slate. Yet the Social Democrats got almost no coverage in the Tribune, and Goodwin spoke at Republican rallies for the Republican cause.25

The Salt Lake Herald was an independent Democratic paper.26 The Herald was the Democratic counterpart of the Tribune.27 While lacking as flamboyant an editor as Goodwin, it was as strongly Democratic as the Tribune was Republican.

Other papers were used and some were worthwhile, but none proved as valuable as those three listed above. One value of the three Salt Lake papers is that they represent three positions and watched and commented on each other and on any action of the opposition.

With this necessary background covered, the main question can be considered. That question is, essentially, what occurred in the 1900 elections in Utah, why did it occur, and what did it mean?

25The Salt Lake Herald, November 2, 1900.

26The Salt Lake Herald will hereafter be referred to as the Herald.

27During this period it was in the hands of Alfred W. McCune, R. C. Chambers, Simon Bamberger, Joseph L. Rawlings, and Judge John W. Judd who wanted a Democratic organ according to Loman Franklin Aydelotte, "The Political Thought and Activity of Heber J. Grant: Seventh President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints" (Unpublished Master's thesis, Brigham Young University).
CHAPTER II

THE SPECIAL CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF UTAH

Nineteen hundred was a year of especially great political activity in Utah. Not only was there to be a national Presidential and Congressional election, but also, all state offices were open.\(^1\) In addition, there was a special election to replace B. H. Roberts as Representative to the House of Representatives. This election followed a long and bitter debate in the United States Congress over the seating of B. H. Roberts. Roberts, a Democrat, had been elected to the House of Representatives in 1898. The main objection to seating him was that he was a polygamist and as such had violated the laws of the United States. During this debate the people of Utah were accused of having broken the agreement they had made when statehood was promised, i.e., that they would contract no more polygamous marriages.

Roberts conducted a vigorous defense, but the House denied him his seat.\(^2\) This left Utah without a representative in the House and precipitated a special election in Utah.

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On January 27, 1900, Governor Heber M. Wells called for a special election to be held April 2. The Democrats were the first to meet to choose a successor to Roberts. They met on Thursday, March 1, in Salt Lake City. Judge W. L. Maginnis was named chairman and in a brief speech set what was generally the tone and pattern of the election. He said that in 1896 Utah gave Bryan a majority of over fifty thousand votes; conditions had not changed since then, and it was up to the people to show they were in earnest when they gave Bryan this majority.

This emphasis on the national rather than the local side of things and avoidance of the polygamy issue was generally followed by both parties in the special election. Roberts had been elected by Mormon and Gentile backing and was a popular figure. Neither side cared to bring up the issue of polygamy. In Utah, taking a stand for polygamy might have mobilized the Mormon voters, but would surely have stirred up unwanted attention nationally and possibly would have revived a gentile political party, while taking an anti-polygamy stand would have angered the Mormon voters and lost the local elections. During the special election, both sides (composed of Mormon and Gentile) generally avoided the issue, at least publicly.

Roberts was not often mentioned either. Of course, polygamy and Roberts had come to be almost the same issue.

\(^{3}\text{Ibid.}\)
Most of the Democratic Convention's day was spent in the discussion of candidates for Congress. Interest centered on three men: William H. King, David C. Dunbar, and a "dark horse," Judge Henry P. Henderson.  

The Roberts' resolution was introduced just before the convention adjourned till evening. It offered insight into party feeling on the Roberts "case" because of the party conflict it provoked. As introduced, it read:

The Democrats of Utah in convention assembled deny that the people of this state have broken any covenant or compact entered into with the Nation for the purpose of securing statehood.

We deny as false or malicious the charge of wholesale lawbreaking made against the people of this state and we further declare that Congress in refusing to seat the duly accredited representative of a sovereign state who passed all the constitutional qualifications and presented complete prima facia evidence of his right to be sworn in, violated a fundamental principle of representative government.  

This resolution, a direct rebuttal to the charges of the House of Representatives which had excluded Roberts, was referred to the Rules Committee without debate or reading.

The convention adjourned and then met again in the evening. At that time delegates and alternates to the Democratic National Convention were chosen and instructed to vote for William Jennings Bryan for President.

The platform began with a reaffirmation of the Declaration of Independence. Democrats claimed that this

4Deseret Evening News, March 1, 1900.

5Ibid.
platform was really the Declaration of Independence as adapted to current conditions. With Jefferson firmly behind it, the platform proceeded to deal with free silver, tariff, Monroe Doctrine, direct election of senators, trusts, expansion, Cuba, Philippines, centralization of government, pensions for war veterans, and the Roberts' case. Every one of these areas except the Roberts' case became campaign issues in both the special and the national elections. In essence, the Democratic platform had the following to say about those issues:

Free Silver and Economics

There should be free and unlimited coinage of silver at a sixteen-to-one ratio. The standard silver dollar should be equal with gold as legal tender for all debts. The government was wrong to issue interest-bearing bonds in peace time and to traffic in them. National banks should not have assumed the right to coin money and fix its value, nor should national banks be allowed to control the finances of the nation. All paper money should be redeemed in coin as should all government bonds not in terms payable in gold. The Secretary of State should not be given power to create and perpetuate a national debt.

Tariff

The Democrats were very interested in the tariff question. They proposed the use of tariffs for the raising
of revenues with an equal adjustment countrywide. They felt that taxation should be limited to the needs of the government. They also felt that since Puerto Rico was a part of the United States it should not have a tariff applied to its products. Logically extended, this would have placed Philippine products on a free list, also, a thing the Democrats agitated against during the campaign. The Utah Democrats took the attitude that the Philippines had fallen to the United States during the course of a war fought for the benefit of humanity. The United States should give self-government to the people of the Philippines as soon as what they called the "present" fighting had stopped and a government could be organized.

Monroe Doctrine

The Monroe Doctrine was reaffirmed as a part of United States' policy. Side by side with this doctrine was a disavowal of permanent foreign alliances. When alliances were needed they should be of a temporary type.

Election of Senators

United States Senators should be elected by direct vote of the people. While Democrats favored this, they said little about it during the campaign.

Trusts

Democrats blamed the Republican Party for the existence of trusts. The Republicans, by sponsoring high protective and
prohibitive tariffs, were setting the stage for the force which was stifling small business, corrupting government, controlling courts, electing state and local officers, and dominating business. And, said the Democrats, the people who controlled the trusts also controlled the Republican Party.

Cuba

Cuba should be given complete self-direction immediately. While commercial expansion and progress were good, they should not be achieved by force. Wars of conquest and aggression were wrong. The United States should not try to bring into the Union people who were not ready for freedom.

Centralization of Government

The Democrats felt that they could discern a Republican move toward expanding the power of the executive branch. Such centralization of authority alarmed them, and they warned against it.

In 1896 the Republicans had favored bimetallism; now, said the Democrats, the same Republicans, gone mad with the lust for conquest and power, were crying out for "gold and glory."

The last part of the platform was the so-called "objectionable clause" which read:

Resolved that the Democratic party of the State of Utah, in convention assembled, solemnly affirms that the people of this state have kept faith with the nation, and repels upon their behalf all charges to the contrary
as false and misleading. Therefore we deplore the action of the Congress of the United States in refusing to administer the oath of office to the member elected from this Commonwealth.6

The tender issue was finally in the open and throbbing. Speeches pro and con were delivered. A number of convention delegates began a series of moves to expurgate the clause. Other delegates moved to adopt stronger clauses along the same line as the original. Some strong words passed between the opponents.

The argument was concluded in an interchange between J. R. Letcher, a delegate and former leader of the Liberal Party, and B. H. Roberts. Letcher obtained the floor and stated that he was confident that Roberts himself had regretted the conditions which brought about the recent unpleasant developments. After a roar of applause, yells, and hisses, Roberts stood and said, "The gentleman is grievously and totally mistaken if he thinks that one iota of regret has ever entered my heart."7 To this, the Tribune in reporting the incident said Letcher replied, "Then I say all the more shame and pity for you."8 Then, according to the News, the house went wild and sergeants-at-arms were nearly called to suppress the numerous delegates who insisted upon demanding attention. A standing vote favored the "objectionable clause," but opponents made further efforts to get it dropped.

6The Deseret Evening News, March 2, 1900.
7Ibid.
8Ibid.
The platform was finally adopted as read, with the objectionable clause included.

Opposition to the clause was seldom aimed at Roberts himself. He seems to have been reasonably above attack. This is quite understandable, since he undoubtedly could pull a number of votes his way. This was a natural internal split for Republicans to exploit to destroy or split the Democrats. Why did they not do it? Perhaps because Roberts was an important leader in the Mormon Church and must have been well thought of by the gentile element to get the nomination and be elected in the first place. No one who wanted his candidate or himself elected could afford to attack such a man directly. However, in the heat of battle, Letcher, who seems to have received a reproof while trying to mediate, did let slip that rather exasperated comment which was probably indicative of the feelings of a number of delegates.9

Opposition to the Roberts Resolution was of two types in diametrical opposition, or what might be labeled ethical and pragmatic.

The pragmatists said, essentially, platforms are designed to get votes. This kind of statement is not going to get any, so let's drop it.

The other side said that if any objection were going to be made, it ought to be stronger. If we really mean what we say in that clause, the thing to do to protest is to elect

9Ibid.
Roberts again and again and again. That would be a protest. If we are not willing to do that, then it would be better to do nothing.

The Tribune of March 2, 1900 said that those who declared that adoption of the resolution meant ruin to the party and further humiliation to the state were led by I. C. Thoreson of Cache, E. W. Wilson of San Juan, Thomas Marioneaux of Sevier, and Thomas D. Dee of Weber. They seem to have based their opposition to the resolution mainly on their fear that it would lose votes.

Thomas Marioneaux later ran for Judge in the Fifth District. A lively campaign developed there, with both sides seeking Church aid. In that campaign Marioneaux was pushed as one who "was always in favor of seating Roberts and held it was unconstitutional not to do so. 'Of course I presume you are aware of this,' said a letter boosting Marioneaux, 'because he was one of the convention that nominated King when he ran . . . against Hammond; that drew up the resolution on the Roberts question.'"¹⁰

Thus one of the men who, the Tribune says, led the fight against the Roberts resolution was, by some rather ambiguous wording, given credit for having drawn up the resolution in the first place and for being a pro-Roberts man. It would not do to oppose Roberts, and he could be useful in getting votes.

¹⁰The Salt Lake Tribune, November 3, 1900.
Moses Thatcher, the apostle, who along with Roberts was censured by the Church because he failed to seek Church approval of his political activity\textsuperscript{11} led the fight to adopt the "objectionable clause" and was assisted by most of the committeemen from the southern counties.\textsuperscript{12} Opposition to the objectionable clause either said that platforms are designed to get votes and the clause will lose them, or that the protest should be stronger even to the repeated re-election of Roberts and probable resultant loss of representation.

Proponents replied that while they were not writing platforms to get votes, but to uphold and maintain the honor and rights of the people, still they did not want to be foolish about it. The opposition lost by about a two-to-one vote and the clause was adopted.

After this stimulating debate, the nomination of candidates to replace Roberts was anticlimactic. The major candidates were the men on whom interest had centered earlier, William H. King and David C. Dunbar. Henry P. Henderson was also nominated. B. H. Roberts favored Dunbar. The vote was King, three hundred thirty-eight; Dunbar, one hundred seventy-five and one-half; and Henderson, zero. That zero is surprising since Henry P. Henderson of Michigan was an associate justice of Utah, and was also among the first delegation sent from Utah to a Democratic national convention when that party

\textsuperscript{11}Bitton, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 29.

\textsuperscript{12}\textit{Tribune}, November 3, 1900.
was organized in the state.\textsuperscript{13} The vote which defeated Roberts' choice may have signified a rejection of Roberts, but was as likely a reflection of King's popularity.\textsuperscript{14} King, a lawyer from Fillmore had been the only Mormon on the Utah Supreme Court preceding statehood. He and Sutherland were often political rivals. Finally in 1916 King beat Sutherland in the race for the U. S. Senate seat and held that position until 1940.\textsuperscript{15}

It is evident that there was friction within the party over the Roberts' matter. This friction does not seem to have been serious, but may really have gone deeper and hurt more than was evident.

The length of the platform presented indicates that the Democrats were making use of the special election to begin their campaign for the national elections coming up in November. The Republican program, as will be seen later, was much less detailed. King speculated that that was one reason that the Republicans lost the special election.\textsuperscript{16}

The Republicans held their convention on March 2, 1900 in Salt Lake City. Reed Smoot, temporary chairman, in a brief

\textsuperscript{13}In this election King carried areas in the state where Democrats generally lost and while he was unsuccessful, he lost by less than most.


\textsuperscript{16}The Deseret News, April 3, 1900.
opening statement, said that he regretted the need for the special election but that he favored putting the blame on the Democrats.\textsuperscript{17} And again we see the restraint shown during the whole course of the election. No one made openly critical remarks about Roberts. They deplored Congressional action, or they "looked askance" at Democratic "incompetence and insincerity" which brought about the need for another election. Publicly, the necessity for a special election was not to either side the fault of Roberts. Whatever private beliefs were held, an open attack on Roberts was evidently highly unwise.

During the morning meeting, resolutions were referred to committee and the convention adjourned until afternoon. When the convention met that afternoon, the platform was presented. It was pointed out in the platform that there had been good times under the Republicans and bad times under the Democrats. This cry (at times worded a little differently) was raised throughout both the special and the national elections. The Republicans claimed in their platform that the period of Republican rule had been one of the most noteworthy in the history of the United States. During that time, the platform said, a great foreign war had been fought and won, thus bringing new glory and territory to the United States. The interests of humanity had been furthered and glory added to the State of Utah by her own volunteers who

\textsuperscript{17}\textit{Ibid.}, March 2, 1900.
had served loyally in the fight. The State Administration had been able, according to the platform, to meet the problems of recent statehood successfully, establishing needed laws and taking necessary actions. President McKinley was warmly endorsed as were the Republican officers of Utah.

A. L. Thomas, the permanent chairman and a former governor of Utah, spoke to the convention and reemphasized the prosperity theme. He also said that though the Democrats did a lot of talking about the evils of trusts, the only effective legislation to combat such combinations had been passed by Republicans. He praised Admiral George Dewey, which evidently pleased the convention as they applauded his statement. Also, he stated that no hard-won foreign territory was going to be turned back to anyone. The people of Utah, he said, would not follow a party that would not follow the Flag. The band struck up the "Star-Spangled Banner."

The platform was then presented for adoption. At this point, motion was made that an amendment for direct election of senators be passed. It was defeated, and the platform was adopted as it had been read.

After this, nominations were made. James T. Hammond and William Glassman were nominated. Hammond, Utah's first secretary of state, was the favorite, and his nomination was

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\(^{19}\) Kenner, *op. cit.*, pp. 408-409.
almost a foregone conclusion. He came away with the position by a good majority, receiving three hundred ninety-eight votes to Glassman's ninety-one. George Sutherland received one vote.  

On March 3, the News mentions almost in passing that the Populists had held their convention. They sustained the Democratic candidate as the one following most closely the basic tenets of their creed. The Populists, according to the News, were a minority, but by no means one to be despised or ignored.

Between that time and April 2, when the election took place, a number of public meetings were held by both parties. On the twenty-fourth and twenty-sixth of March, William Jennings Bryan spoke in Utah. He praised Frank J. Cannon, a Silver Republican who had not switched back to the Republicans, but who kept working for silver from within the Democratic party. Bryan also discussed government, equal taxation, silver, and Silver Republicans.  

On March 27, the Republicans held a meeting and local speakers took part. Governor Heber M. Wells said that the Democrats were fighting windmills and that imperialism was one of them. Since both parties were against trusts, Governor Wells said that another windmill was the anti-trust issue. The only issue, according to him, was whether the people wanted prosperity or adversity.

20The Salt Lake Tribune, March 2, 1900.

21The News, March 26, 1900.
If they wanted prosperity, they would vote the Republican ticket. Wells, a Salt Lake businessman, served a long apprenticeship in Salt Lake City government. He was a member of Utah's Constitutional Convention and became the first governor after statehood. Hammond also spoke and reiterated the stand that no territory would be given up since it had come to the United States in fulfillment of its destiny. He said that the people of the Philippines should, however, be allowed to take as much part in government as they were able.22

It is noticeable here that Democrat and Republican positions tend to converge. When the Democrats are favoring something that is (or might be) popular, the Republicans often concede that it is a good thing, state that they favor the policy, too, and then push the prosperity issue hard. This Republican policy undercuts the Democrats.

Though many other meetings were held and many speeches given, on election day there was a large stay-at-home vote.23

Both parties tried to get out the vote. In Salt Lake City, the Republicans seemed to have an edge, as they took carriages around the streets to bring people to the polls. The Democrats also used this technique, but found that the Republicans, in anticipation of the necessity of a special election, had on the day after Roberts' election reserved most of Salt Lake City's rental carriages.24

23*Tribune*, November 2, 1900.
24*Deseret News*, April 2, 1900.
In Salt Lake and in some surrounding counties, the People's Party and the Socialist Labor Party also appeared on the ticket. However, the People's Party favored King, while the Socialist Labor Party backed John H. Hamlin.25

When the votes were tabulated, William H. King had won by a plurality of 4,247 out of a total of 59,354 votes.26 The Republicans assuaged their grief with the observation that while they had lost, their loss was by much less than it had been the last time.

1898' Congressional Election

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1900 Special Congressional Election

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<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>William H. King</td>
<td>31,446</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>(Dem)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James T. Hammond</td>
<td>27,199</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>(Rep)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John H. Hamlin</td>
<td>2,627</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>(Soc)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of those who voted in 1898, 7,533 people did not vote in the 1900 special election. Why? Had they lost interest when a man other than Roberts was the candidate? Were they simply tired of elections, or was it perhaps a stay-at-home protest vote? There is no way to know, but the Tribune

25Ibid., April 17, 1900.
26Tribune, April 21, 1900.
speculated that it was just voter apathy.\textsuperscript{28} In this campaign Warren Foster, the Populist who tallied 4.2 per cent of the vote in 1898, dropped out and the Populists supported the Democrats. Yet the Democrats only picked up one per cent and Republicans picked up two and two-tenths per cent over their 1898 tally. However, that two and two-tenths per cent was not necessarily from the Populists.\textsuperscript{29} There is no way to know how much of that is attributable to the Populists. It is not likely that Populists voted Republican. More likely is the idea that some Silver Republicans had swung back from the Democratic to the Republican Party, that those Populists who voted had voted Democratic, and that the remaining Democrats and Republicans just did not bother to vote. After all, the campaign had been on a high plane, and there was not much excitement to pull out the apathetic voters.\textsuperscript{30}

The \textit{Ephraim Enterprise} had predicted earlier, "one good thing about the special election is that both candidates

\textsuperscript{28}\textit{Tribune}, November 2, 1900.


\textsuperscript{30}In the national election in Utah, however, the situation was different. As compared on pages one, two, and eighteen of the \textit{Library of Congress Reference Service}, 3,560 more people voted in the national congressional election of 1900 than voted in the special election of that year. There were even 15,394 more than voted in the 1898 election that put Roberts in, or almost in, Congress, and 7,988 more than would vote in the national Congressional elections in 1902. Of course, the Congressional elections of 1900 took place in a Presidential election year, and amid a very interesting local campaign probably brought on by that election and by the Roberts crusade.
are men of good character and there will be no mud slinging during the campaign. . . . The battle will be fought on principle."  

That was generally true, though the Ephraim Enterprise also notes on March 22 that Reed Smoot and companion spoke on "Saturday" and made "a series of extravagant statements and an attempt to throw mud at the Democratic candidate and at B. H. Roberts." It is a pity that what was said was not recorded, for it would be interesting to know how the mud slinging was attempted and what, if anything, was said about Roberts.

The Republicans generally refrained from throwing at a very tempting target. While some mud may have been slung, little stuck. The campaign was very clean and a possibly serious conflict was avoided.

Perhaps it is near the truth to say that the Roberts problem was too potentially dangerous for either side to allow it to become serious. This case involved the old Mormon versus Gentile issue, which if allowed to go too far could conceivably have broken the Democratic party in Utah. This looks like a great opportunity for the Republicans, but, at least in the special election, they avoided it. It is easy to see why the opening was not exploited. The weapon could have destroyed the user, too. Both parties were

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31 Ephraim Enterprise, March 15, 1900.

32 Ibid., March 22, 1900.
Mormon and gentile coalitions and winning one election was not worth breaking up or weakening the party. By the time of the general election, the Republicans had found a way to use the Roberts' case. The constant Democratic charges of Church influence indicate something of the sort. How this was done is discussed in the chapter on church influence. Roberts was kept out of it, but some of the other issues were there.

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CHAPTER III

NATIONAL ELECTIONS OF 1900 IN UTAH

After the special election, the political scene became quiet and remained relatively so until July. The papers did, however, carry a good deal of material concerning the national situation. Finally, on the twentieth of July, the Utah Republicans held a "ratification outing" at Saltair at which they ratified the National Convention.¹

Then on July 22 King announced that he would be a candidate for renomination for the House. A note of interest here is the possibility that King would have liked to run for the U. S. Senate and would have done so if A. W. McCune, who had a previous claim, had not waited so long to make up his mind not to run. The Tribune said that Democrats felt McCune had done so purposely because King forces had given him a hard time earlier.² If this is true, it is another indication of a possible internal division among the Democrats.

September 4 was the date of the Republican State Convention which was held in Provo. Thomas Fitch, who was

¹Tribune, April 21, 1900.
²Ibid., July 20, 1900.
temporary chairman, made the opening speech. The main issues that the Democrats would try to use against the Republicans were, as he saw them: imperialism, free coinage of silver, and repeal of the Dingley Tariff Law. Since both sides opposed trusts, he said, and neither proposed any practical solution, trusts were not going to be an important issue. Of the issues mentioned, Fitch conceived the Dingley Tariff to be the one of major importance; i.e., on this point Republicans could just ask Utah voters if they as wool-growers, cattle raisers and sugar cultivators would vote down their livelihoods just to vote against the acquisition and holding of the Philippines. This was another repetition of the prosperity theme, but in a different dress. It also strikes at the issue of imperialism from a pragmatic angle.

After Fitch's speech, the platform was presented. It was, in the main, a reiteration of the national one. Utah Republicans congratulated President McKinley for his handling of policies and said that the prosperity of the country bore witness to the wisdom of those policies. There was, the platform continued, no worry about the money supply since great quantities of gold had been discovered in the world. As for the silver issue, the Republican position was that Democrats had really abandoned silver, or betrayed it, by choosing an anti-silver man for Vice-President. Also, they

3 Tribune, September 4, 1900.
said, new markets had been opened in China and the Philippines and these markets were vital to the mountain states.

In a phrase strongly reminiscent of Rousseau's "general will"⁴ of the people, Utah Republicans argued that the United States should keep the Philippines in order to further the true interests of the Philippine people. The platform went on to condemn Populist influence in the Democratic Party, especially the advocacy of paper currency which, Republicans said, would ruin the country. Trusts were opposed and a pro-labor stand taken which advocated, in vague terms, shorter hours, higher wages, and social and intellectual advances. Not only that but the soldiers and sailors who took part in the Spanish American War were thanked and pensions promised. In the final policy statement Republicans took a stand favoring water conservation. After a few rhetorical flourishes the platform was presented to convention members and adopted by a standing vote and three cheers.⁵

With the direction of party polemic firmly resolved, the delegates turned to selecting candidates for the national and state offices. The ticket was selected smoothly. The major Republican candidates chosen for 1900 were: Governor Heber M. Wells for another term as Governor, George Sutherland for Representative in the U. S. Congress, __________


⁵Tribune, September 5, 1900.
and James T. Hammond for Utah Secretary of State. A surprise to some was the availability of Sutherland as a candidate for Representative. Rumors to the effect that he would not be available for the nomination had been prevalent. He said earlier that he was not a candidate and hoped he would not be nominated, and that his decision not to accept if nominated was final. He had been nominated for that position in the special election party convention and received one vote.

Since Sutherland could display a good deal of party strength and yet got only one vote for the nomination, he may not have wanted the position. It is also possible that he figured the Democrats would take the special election and he would get his chance in the regular election in November. Whatever his reasons, he did avoid defeat in the special election in April and gained victory in November. From 1905 to 1917 Sutherland was United States Senator. In 1916 his skill as a lawyer was rewarded and he became President of the American Bar Association. In 1922 he was made a member of the United States Supreme Court.

On September 7, the Democrats held their convention. The Democratic platform was essentially the same as the one

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6Ibid.

7Deseret News, September 5, 1900.

8Ahlstrom, op. cit., p. 78.

9The Convention was held on September 9, according to Noble Warrum in Utah Since Statehood, p. 12. Unless the Tribune is off two days from here on, the September 7 date seems more likely.
adopted for the special election, varying only slightly to favor such things as: direct legislation whereby people could vote on the laws they were governed by, reclamation of arid lands, and water storage projects. It opposed, among other things, sectarian control of public schools. As Fitch had expected, Democrats made a point of imperialism, trusts, silver, and tariff.

This convention was a calm one. Nothing like the excitement of the special election convention occurred. Democratic State Chairman James H. Moyle was nominated to run for Governor. During Utah Democracies lean years Moyle's popularity with both Mormon and non-Mormon may have kept his party alive. William H. King, the incumbent, was renominated by acclamation for Representative to the U. S. Congress. With the completion of the rest of the ticket, the convention was concluded.

The final ballot in Utah shows the presence of the Republican Party, the Democratic Party, the Socialist Labor Party, the Social Democratic Party, and the National Prohibition Party. Each of the above-mentioned parties had a

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10 That platform was examined in some detail earlier. It is found on pp. 3-6 of the Special Elections Section of this thesis.

11 Ahlstrom, op. cit., p. 78.

12 Tribune, September 7, 1900.
national ticket and, in varying degrees of completeness, a state ticket.\textsuperscript{13}

Only one other party, the Populist, received much press attention. Yet they did not put up a ticket in Utah except in Salt Lake County.\textsuperscript{14} Indeed, 1900 marks the last year for organized Populism in Utah.\textsuperscript{15} They do not appear on the ballot, because they did not run state-wide, and when they did run in the county they fused with the Democrats\textsuperscript{16} as they had done on a state-wide basis in 1897.\textsuperscript{17} On September 12, the Populists met and formed a committee to meet with the Salt Lake Democrats who were holding their county convention at that time also.\textsuperscript{18} The News says that the Populists offered five hundred votes to the Salt Lake County Democrats in return for the following: W. Lawrence - state senator, Joseph E. Edmunds and James Thompson - state representatives, and August Stern - recorder.\textsuperscript{19}

The News says that the Democrats turned down the Recordship and made a counter proposal which was turned

\textsuperscript{13}See Appendix B.


\textsuperscript{15}ibid., p. 105.

\textsuperscript{16}News, September 14, 1900, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{17}Dimter, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 92-93.

\textsuperscript{18}News, September 14, 1900, p. 1

\textsuperscript{19}ibid.
This report of what the Populists wanted does not quite jibe with what the Democrats reported they wanted. Democrats were told that the Populists were asking for a State Senator, two State Representatives, the Recordship with one-third of the patronage of that office, plus one deputy in the sheriff's office.  

Democrats generally laughed at the offer of five hundred votes in Salt Lake County, saying that the Populists did not have over two hundred voters at most. Other Democrats agreed but pointed out that two hundred votes might be the difference between defeat and victory. They evidently recognized that this was going to be a close election.

The County Democrats were said to have made a counter proposal that the Populists accept a State Senator, the Chief Deputyship in the Salt Lake recorder's office, and one deputy in the office of the sheriff. An agreement was reached and fusion occurred, but it is difficult to tell what the Populists finally gained. It appears that at the least, final agreement consisted of one State Senatorship - Henry W. Lawrence, and one State Representative - James Thompson.  

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20 Ibid.  
21 Ibid.  
22 Ibid.  
23 Ibid.  
Apparently, when the silver cause died, so did Utah Populism, though for Utah, silver continued to be an issue until 1932.25

Although party conventions were held in Utah in September, real campaigning did not start until late October. Indeed, a careful reading of Utah newspapers indicates that most activity seems to have occurred between October 31 and November 6, the day of the election.

This relatively short period of approximately six days carries the whole feeling of the campaign and shows issues and personalities at fever pitch. Under the pressure of the impending election, a concentration occurred which allows a thorough examination of the relevant factors involved in the 1900 elections. The major Utah newspapers followed the parties' movements in great detail. The Herald reported favorably and at length on Democratic developments while the Tribune did the same for the Republicans. Both papers watched the other side with great interest, reporting any weakness in or deviation from what they considered correct conduct. The News provided a generally neutral coverage of both Democratic and Republican activity and also spoke for the position of the Mormon Church. Some other Utah papers gave good coverage of local elections, but unfortunately many were so neutral that very little of what occurred is mirrored by their writing.

The three Salt Lake City papers carried statewide reports on the speeches and activities of the campaign that are unavailable elsewhere and provide the best primary source available in that line. Using those and other papers plus other material, a look will now be taken at the campaign activities and issues of the 1900 national elections in Utah.

To cover the campaign in other than a chronological system, each important question will be presented and in turn, followed and evaluated. Only the major problems can be discussed since so many points were raised in the campaign. At one time or another over sixty different issues were presented by Democrats and Republicans. Since some questions were inter-related, they have been combined where possible and covered as one point. Mostly they have to be ignored. The most vital issues covered are silver, trusts, prosperity, imperialism, and the question of Church influence. These issues occur over and over and a count of articles or space devoted to them by the papers puts all but Church influence in the top three of items of party interest for either Republicans or Democrats. Their rank varies, but they are the most important factors in the Utah election. Church influence as a factor evidently excited only the Democrats. Why that was so will be shown in the section on Church influence.

The first campaign issue discussed is silver. It had been the issue in the previous Presidential campaign of 1896.
Silver

Nationally, silver was not much of an issue in 1900, but in Utah the situation was strongly otherwise. Probably this was because silver mining was a major economic factor in Utah and the Democrats could make a point very easily. On the other hand, Republicans who had gone into the Democratic ranks on the 1896 silver question, the so-called "Silver Republicans" were finding their way back into the Republican party in 1900. C. C. Goodwin, explained his return by saying that he had asked everyone to vote for Bryan in 1890 since we needed more money and higher prices and silver looked like the way to do it. Since that time, though, increased gold production had solved all those problems. Besides, Goodwin said, Bryan was not really for silver.

The Utah Democrats approached the silver issue variously. Senator King said the Republicans of Utah had left silver, but that Bryan was still for it. If the United States got free coinage of silver, that would give miners higher wages and farmers better markets. As will be seen, both parties tied the mine and farm vote together this way. King asked the Republicans if those who voted for silver four years

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27Ahlstrom, op. cit., p. 22.

28The Salt Lake Tribune, November 1, 1900.
ago could get it by voting for a single gold standard party now. He ignored the Republican stand that increased prosperity and abundance of gold had made silver unnecessary.29 Other Democrats warned that if the Republicans got control for four more years, every silver mine in Utah would close.30

Generally, the Democrats argued the following: Free coinage of silver will not make us a dumping grounds for other nations' silver.31 It was not the tariff on lead that lowered silver's price and threw eleven thousand miners out of work in Utah, but the price of silver, which had declined, had helped cause the mine closures. In any case Democrats claimed less than one hundred miners were out of work, not eleven thousand.32

Democrats told the miners of Park City that Democratic victory meant bimetalism with silver at sixteen to one. After all, they explained, although the increase in money had helped some, trusts had moved the cost of living upward while wages had stayed down.33 In the west, continued the Democrats, the major issue was bimetalism. They said demonitization of silver was a crime. The miner, producer,

29Herald, November 1, 1900.
30Ibid., November 2, 1900.
31Ibid.
32Herald, November 4, 1900.
33Ibid.
laborer, and farmer could not prosper until silver was again money and coined at the ratio of sixteen to one.

Governor Wells, Democratic spokesmen charged, had been for silver in 1896, but had now changed his mind and favored gold. They also said that Wells would probably work to get National Bank Notes accepted as money, thus ruining silver mining. 34

In summary, the Democratic position was that silver was still a very live issue affecting the livelihood of farmer and miner and by extension producer. They said that Bryan was in favor of silver and his election definitely would mean a return to bimetallism and greater prosperity for the nation and especially for Utah. Since Utah was a major silver producing state, silver meant more to Utah. Silver was the money of the people and would bring better prices for goods and increased prosperity. They closed with a pertinent question: why settle for half a loaf when you could have a whole one?

The Republican stand was with one foot in each camp. In brief they said that changes in the currency situation and in the circulation of money had done all anyone could hope silver would do, 35 so there was no need to have silver. On the other hand, the Republicans were as good silver men as the Democrats and would probably do more for silver than the

34 Ibid.
35 Tribune, November 2, 1900.
Democrats could, since Bryan was not for silver. Anyway free silver would probably come through the Republicans. 36 The Democrats just talked about silver to catch votes, the Republicans said,37 and by the way, they added, as parthian shot, how would you like to have lead on the free list? Not that the Republicans contemplated putting silver on the free list, but they accused Bryan of making that promise.38

Bryan was, they said, a fanatical free trader,39 and worse than that, he was really a Populist, not a Democrat and might even favor paper money which would destroy silver altogether.40 It did not really matter, though, said the Republicans, because silver was a dead issue and neither party really favored it.41 The waters got pretty muddy!

So, Democrats said that silver meant prosperity and the Republicans said it did not, but that they favored silver also (at least as much as the Democrats, anyway). The score would seem to go to the Republicans on that one.

Trusts

The Republicans did not do badly on any of the major questions. Even on the trust issue where they

36 Ibid.
37 Ibid., November 1, 1900.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid., November 2, 1900.
appeared quite defensive, Republicans did a good job and came off quite well.

Trusts were primarily a Democratic issue and will be discussed from their viewpoint first. B. H. Roberts put the topic in the clearest terms when, echoing the Democratic national platform, he said essentially that high tariffs lead to trusts, which fix prices on the raw materials they use and the finished product they sell. Such organizations have no soul and care nothing about suffering. They lead to the destruction of both republican institutions and Republics. Roberts blamed the Republicans for the growth of trusts.41

Usually, both parties put the questions in terms that appealed more directly to the economic or physical needs of the voter and adjusted them to the class or region being wooed. For instance, in Park City, Democrats claimed that the trusts had raised prices so high that they had hurt wool and lead more than the tariff had helped it. At the Working Men's Democratic Club, the Democrats used the example of Kearney, Nebraska, where the trusts were said to have closed down eight private or city controlled businesses. They closed a paper mill, cracker factory, cereal mill, electric supply works, plow factory, locks and castings foundry, woolen mill, and a meat packing plant. There was something there to scare almost any workingman. All these factories which, said the Democrats had helped to

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41The Deseret Evening News, October 29, 1900.
provide a home market and to supply work for that city were closed by trusts.42

The beet growers in the state were told that they were in danger and that the danger they faced came from the possibility that trusts would gain control of tropical areas and duty free sugar produced by cheap foreign labor would be introduced into the United States. When that happened, said the Democrats, sugar growers would work for peon wages, and it would not be long until Utah sugar would be controlled by trusts.43

For the young man thinking of going into business on his own, the Democrats put it in the following terms: A young man looks about him and finds a few grown rich by government connivance. If he wants to go into business on his own, he is limited by the trusts. If he tries to compete with the trusts, they crush him. Should he decide to go into mining, he finds he must pay a toll on the smelter trust. If he turns to farming, he discovers that he must buy his machinery from trusts. When he goes to sell his produce, he finds that often he must sell to trusts. Republicans favor the trusts that limit a young man's future.44

The trust question was not all untroubled sailing, for Democrats found themselves in an anomalous position on

42 The Logan Journal, November 1, 1900.
43 Herald, November 4, 1900.
44 Ibid., November 5, 1900.
anti-trust laws. They proudly claimed to have passed the only effective anti-trust law on Utah's books, but nationally Democrats had voted against such a law. Democrats excused themselves for voting against a national anti-trust law on the grounds that it could also be used against labor. Unfortunately, the Republicans were using the same excuse locally and when they did so, the Herald editor called the explanation "balderdash, tommyrot, and futile piffle." Coordination seemed to be lacking among the Democrats. Another example of this coordination lack was the claim by some Democrats that protective tariffs produced trusts and the apparently approving attitude toward tariffs by other Democrats. This is one of the problems Democrats had in Utah. They projected a sort of uncertain or vacillating attitude.

Republicans seemed much better coordinated and sure of themselves. On the trust question they simply said, some trusts are good and some are bad; it is not a party, but an individual issue. However, they said, trusts should be under the control of the Congress and the Republicans would have gotten a Constitutional amendment to do this if

45Tribune, November 3, 1900.
46Herald, November 2, 1900.
47News, October 29, 1900.
48Herald, November 4, 1900.
the Democrats had not voted against it. Yet, after taking that anti-trust stand, the Republicans with just a hint of menace added that one must be careful not to completely destroy trust, for if one does, where will one get a job? And there again Republicans brought the voter up against the hard facts of life. The Republican position of attack was thus taken care of.

As a defense, they tried to undercut the Democratic position. They said the Democrats were insincere about being against trusts. Some Democratic leaders were even trust owners.\textsuperscript{49} Are we to believe said they that Republican trusts are evil and Democratic ones are good?\textsuperscript{50} Besides, Democrats had never done anything about trusts.\textsuperscript{51} They even voted against the Constitutional amendment to give Congress power to regulate trusts.\textsuperscript{52} Democrats were not really against trusts, or they would not have done that.

As on the silver question, the Republicans seemed to be saying that the issue was no issue but that they were for it, too; or that trusts were both good and bad, and they were against the bad and for the good.

Democrats were hard pressed to explain why they had voted against an anti-trust amendment to the constitution,

\textsuperscript{49}\textit{Tribune}, November 4, 1900.
\textsuperscript{50}\textit{Ibid.}, November 3, 1900.
\textsuperscript{51}\textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{52}\textit{Ibid.}, November 4, 1900.
but they could counter with the claim that they had passed the only effective anti-trust law on Utah's books. Republicans countered this by ignoring Utah and stressing the nation, or by saying that the Democratic law would ruin Utah. This might be counted a Republican stumble; for once, smoothly and just in passing, the Republicans mentioned that their man Sutherland helped pass the only effective anti-trust law on the Utah books. ⁵³ Here they claimed authorship of a law they degraded in other places. Still, Sutherland, a Republican, and one who had voted for the law the Democrats claimed as their own, could be used to infer Republican authorship and so get some credit from what should have been a bad labor position.

Trusts are one of the big three of the Democrats' campaign points, but the Republicans pulled up so close to the Democratic position that there did not seem to be much choice between the two. Republicans blurred the issue and then either insinuated something that promised personal advantage, a job, etc., to those who supported them or threatened people with a loss of something they valued, such as their job, if they opposed them. This particular issue was more clear cut and except for the position maintained or explained by B. H. Roberts, i.e., tariffs lead to trusts and trusts lead to destruction of the Republic, the Democrats hit almost entirely on how trusts hurt the

⁵³Ibid., November 5, 1900.
individual economically. They counted on this to swing votes to Bryan. On this position, the Republicans were definitely on the defensive, but their campaign was effective. They were probably able to blunt the Democratic attack.

**Imperialism**

Another of the issues in the campaign is imperialism or expansion. It was called by either term, depending on whether a Democrat or a Republican was speaking. Since the expansion or imperialism spoken of consisted mainly of United States occupation of the Philippines, a discussion of one necessitates reference to the other. Because Philippine resistance resulted in a larger army held in arms for a longer time than the Americans were used to, Democrats claimed that militarism was an issue too.

Nationally, imperialism was the Democratic issue. When the Treaty of Paris was presented to the Senate for ratification, enough Democrats and Republicans were opposed to it that, but for Bryan, it probably would have failed. Bryan said he voted for it so that the issue of imperialism could be considered separately from the treaty. He maintained that the proper course was to accept the treaty and

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then to vote to free the Philippines. Some people thought he voted as he did to get a winning campaign issue because silver would not be convincing in 1900. Whatever the reason, imperialism was the prime campaign item for the Democrats in 1900. Said their platform:

We condemn and denounce the Philippine policy of the present administration. It has embroiled the republic in an unnecessary war, sacrificed the lives of many of its noblest sons, and placed the United States, previously known and applauded throughout the world as the champion of freedom, in the false and un-American position of crushing with military force the efforts of our former allies to achieve liberty and self government.

The Filipinos cannot be citizens without endangering our civilization; they cannot be subjects without imperiling our form of government; and as we are not willing to surrender our civilization, or to convert the republic into an empire, we favor an immediate declaration of the nation's purpose to give the Filipinos, first, a stable form of government; second, independence; and third protection from outside interference such as has been given for nearly a century to the republics of Central and South America.

During the campaign, Democrats argued that: it was inconsistent with American principles to keep others from freedom; McKinley was like George III and Aguinaldo like George Washington; the United States was not familiar with the problems of governing a colony, especially since the colony was so large and far away; the oceans used to be our protection, now our military power would have to be expanded

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56 Hicks, op. cit., p. 289.
57 Paul W. Glad, The Trumpet Soundeth (University of Nebraska Press, 1960), p. 73.
58 Ibid.
across them; to protect a big empire, we would need a big army and navy. 59

Republicans simply replied in the following manner: The Philippines were a good place for Christian missionary activity; the United States would bless the Philippines with civilization; the Philippines were not capable of governing themselves, so to prevent anarchy, the United States had to stay there, the United States could not leave the islands because some predatory nation like Germany would grab the area in that event; the United States was great and must assume the duties that came with greatness; she must take up "the white man's burden" and help the Philippines, there were great profits to be made in the Philippines; to be really great, the United States must have colonies. 60

Utahns did not stray far from those national issues. There were some interesting variations, though. Look first at the Democratic viewpoint. A Democratic speaker at Provo, explained that he thought expansion was good and that he wanted to see the flag float over every nation on earth. But he wanted the people to come to us because of love, not at the point of a bayonet. What we want, he said, is citizens, not subjects. 61

59 Ibid., p. 295.
60 Ibid., pp. 295-296.
61 Herald, November 4, 1900.
At Payson, Congressman King added an interesting allusion to the fall of Rome. He felt that our Republic was becoming an Empire and "we can't have two classes of citizens under one flag, for if everyone doesn't have the same rights, we will go as Rome did." The second speaker of the evening agreed with that idea, and traced the growth of Republican institutions from the signing of the Magna Carta back to "the history and decay of Rome and Greece". Using those examples he drew an analogy between them and the United States in 1900. He saw the Republic threatened by the same dangers as those that destroyed Greece and Rome, and declared, "The Republican party is drifting away from the constitution of our country."64

B. H. Roberts said that expansion was the only issue in the campaign. His assessment was that the Republicans wanted to make the United States a world power. To do that, he believed they were after colonies which would make the United States look great and over whom she could exercise dominion. Since Roberts was a very important figure in Utah and because he took a position very near the national one, a large portion of his speech is

62Ibid., November 1, 1900.
63Ibid., November 3, 1900.
64Ibid.
65News, October 29, 1900.
66Ibid.
included here. Roberts said the Republicans evidently want to exchange the simplicity of the republic . . . for the clamor and splendor of an empire so that we shall become a world power. We shall have colonies of which we are the Master! People subjected to our rule! We shall lord it over subjected people who shall only have such measure of self government and freedom as we may consider wisest and best for them and in keeping with our own dignity as a masterful nation! What can be greater than this! How splendid to cast aside the swaddling bands of our national infancy made up of such doctrines as "governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed," and assume among the monar- chies of the world that high station which shall bring to our feet conquered provinces and subjected peoples! What could be greater than this glory?

The question reminds me of a passage in Hugo's great work "Les Miserables" in which he makes one of his characters, Marius, extol the grandeur of the first Napoleon's reign. The passage is one of the most splendid in modern literature and is as follows:

"What a splendid destiny it is for a people to be an empire of such an emperor . . .

"To conquer, rule and crush; to be in Europe a people gilded by glory, to sound a titanic flourish of trumpets through history; to conquer the world twice, by conquest and by amazement - all this sublime, and what is there greater?"

And one answering the question said, "To Be Free!" That was greater than all this glory - to be free! And so I say with reference to this policy of imperial- ism proposed to us in the event of Republican success. Better than your wars of conquest. Better than ruling over subjected peoples; better than enlarged armies and navies; better than the spirit and pride which comes of being accounted a world power - better, far better it is for us to be ambitious of being a just nation, true to those principles of government made sacred to us by the sacrifices of the fathers and time honored by more than a century of practical application to the affairs of government in our nation. Adherence to those principles can be trusted to bring us all the glory that a nation can covet.
The force of our success and an example has already given a continent to republican institutions; it has consecrated a hemisphere to freedom. In every land and cline our constitution has stood a star of hope to those who would flee from the wars of despotism. Shall we resign this proud station of honor? Destroy the force of the object lesson our example constitutes? Shall we by proving recreant to our own principles, and traditions and by adopting the imperialist tendencies and policies now tendered us by the Republican Party allow free government to perish from the earth?

If not then cast your vote for W. J. Bryan and the Democratic Party, for this is the issue - aye, the paramount issue - in this campaign.67

For B. H. Roberts, the issue clearly was more than political. He even pleaded with Utahns to vote for Bryan because he was the man "God had provided to guide the ship of state from shoals that designing men were steering it for."68

The Republican answer to the charge that they were imperialists varied. The following are some of their responses: A Republican orator at Eureka said he agreed that imperialism was the primary issue of the campaign as the Democrats claimed. The United States was beginning a new century and would do great things. The oceans would be linked by a canal through Nicaragua. He was proud of the country and its expansion from thirteen colonies, and felt that Providence intended the country to expand.69

The next speaker said that we would not leave the Philippines to themselves or to other countries. We had

67News, October 29, 1900.
68Tribune, November 3, 1900.
69Ibid., November 1, 1900.
to keep them. As far as the consent of the governed was concerned, we ought to remember that when Jefferson said all men are created equal, he meant all Anglo Saxons. Jefferson did not worry about consent of the governed when he bought Louisiana, nor did Lincoln worry about it in the Civil War. So, McKinley is following in the footsteps of Jefferson and Lincoln. Besides, we do not want our flag dishonored.70

In this same meeting C. C. Goodwin said that imperialism and militarism as terms used in this election were an insult to the flag. No man who fought for his flag and no President who took the oath of office could be an imperialist. Goodwin was indulging in what as an intelligent man he must have recognized as meaningless circular reasoning. He is also making a highly effective statement emotionally. He closed with the idea that the flag should stay in the Philippines and be "the light of Asia."71

In Provo, George Sutherland said there was only one issue in the campaign and that was imperialism. The silver issue was dead. He then, said the Tribune, spoke on the Philippines "without appeal to sentiment, prejudice, or patriotism."72 Just what he said was not printed, possibly because such a speech was without appeal altogether.

70ibid.
71ibid.
72ibid., November 2, 1900.
In Mercur, Republicans explained that the same old arguments were being used against the acquisition of the Philippines as were used every time the United States expanded. Their view was that all that would happen in the Philippines was that seven million people would get freedom, and the young men of the United States would get a chance to develop the minerals, timber, and agriculture of the region. This argument made a Democratic reply awkward. The Republicans were saying that if the Democrats were right, then men like Jefferson and Lincoln were wrong. It is difficult to fight long-dead heroes and patriotic appeals. The Republicans were also saying that besides being in the stream of American destiny, the acquisition of the Philippines would enrich America. To all this, the Democrats seemed to say, "But it is wrong and we ought not to do it;" and the Republicans rebutted with something like, "We always have done it and besides we will give good government to an alien race." Or as Senator Brown said at Mercur, "... Jefferson did not include Negroes or Indians among those whose consent was needed for government and people of New Orleans and people of Civil War South were governed without their consent." Freedom would come to the Philippines when they were ready

73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
and in the meantime they would get "free schools and true liberty."76 What that "true liberty" consisted of, the Senator did not say, but it sounds like either the German "freedom from freedom," or Rousseau's idea of forcing the people to be free. That roused a number of the audience to the point that they were threatened with expulsion if they did not quiet down.77

In Manti, Governor Wells praised the work of that county's volunteers who fought in the Philippines. The way to preserve their work, said he, was to vote Republican in this crisis.78 The appeal to support the party in power in a crisis is interesting and brings to mind Napoleon I, Napoleon III, Alphonso XVIII and Brave New World. The idea was that to insure support, have a crisis.

A November 4 editorial of the Tribune dismissed imperialism as a point and called it a "merely fictitious outcry,"79 because every United States expansion has been by the same methods and character. One cannot be called imperialism and the other expansionism. As for militarism, the Tribune said, it is so unsubstantial a cry that Bryan had not even defined it. At first he seemed to mean that it was a desire to change the government to a despotism, but

76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid., November 3, 1900.
79 Ibid.
then he changed his mind and spoke of the increased size of the army. The editor said the first charge was just laughed at and the second was of no importance since both sides had helped make it what it was. The editor said, further, that the idea that a region cannot be controlled without the consent of the governed is foolish since it would have stopped the growth of the United States and destroyed the union at the time of the Civil War. He said, "... since the time of the fathers no one had even suggested such a doctrine till now. ..." 

Republicans said the idea that the constitution follows the flag was a Democratic cry designed to let them carry slavery into the territories in the time preceding the Civil War. That doctrine was destroyed in the Civil War. It is interesting to note how often the Democrats are put on the spot by reference to the Civil War and by implication or explicit statement to their party's general southern sympathy or siding at that time.

At Farmington the Republicans charged that the war would have been over long ago had it not been for Democratic sympathy for the rebels. At every step the Democrats

80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid., November 4, 1900.
found their position attached as unpatriotic. The reply, "No, I'm not," is ineffectual. The defensive looks, at best, weak.

In Salt Lake City on November 3, the Republicans put on a brilliant propaganda show. They reviewed the Civil War issue and tied it to the Philippines. This took place at a rally of Civil War and Philippines veterans. Colonel M. M. Kaighn accused the Democratic Vice-Presidential candidate of being a copperhead. He went on to say that expansion is good and that there was no danger from militiamen, since there was only one soldier per every one thousand citizens. A Colonel Logan explained that the Democratic Party was always hostile to the country. Major F. A. Grant said that most Filipinos were in favor of United States annexation and that those that were not were killing our boys. On both grounds it sounded like the United States ought to take the Philippines. Grant added that we ought not to let the "tears of the mothers of those boys of ours who died in the Philippines be shed in vain." 84

Any attempt to answer that argument would likely be met by a fist. One can always argue that the United States should not go into a place to fight, but after the place is entered and American boys have died, then to so argue is to open to the charge of cowardice or heartlessness.

84Ibid.
At that rally, J. Gordon McPherson, a colored soldier appeared in uniform and told the gathering that the analogy between the freed Negro to vote and so allowing the Filipino was faulty. He said the Negro had not shown ingratitude or fought their deliverers as the Filipino had. "For," said McPherson, "... when the Negro was set free he did not stab his friends in the back, but was loyal and in a few years after, fought to liberate the Cubans from Spanish oppression." His wording is interesting. The Negro fought to liberate the Cuban, but he must have fought for some other reason in the Philippines. Why did he not fight to liberate the Filipino? Because when he fought to liberate them, they did not appreciate it and "stabbed their friends in the back." That must be the reasoning anyway. The Republicans were not overlooking any votes and used a very emotional appeal when they reopened the Civil War issue and bound it and the Philippines together.

However, probably the most emotional article carried by the Tribune came out of California and was under the title, "To the Women of Utah," with the by-line of Beatrice Harmon. She began by stating that California is great, but Utah is greater, for there women can vote. On the Spanish-American War she said that Utah women should remember that President McKinley was pushed into the war by the American people against his wishes. She said that before that war,

\[85\text{Ibid.}\]
foreigners sneered at us and said we would not fight, but we showed them. Our trouble in the Philippines, Beatrice Harmon thought, was the result of dictatorial ambition in Aguinaldo and the mixed blood Togals who followed him. He wanted to set up a dictatorship of his fifty thousand over the ten million others. Further, said she, any Togal with ability was part white. The others had no ability at all. The Filipinos had to be educated and prepared for freedom. The United States had to do the educating and preparing of these people for "this is the white man's burden," and God meant us to do it. Other people said similar things, but usually not so explicitly. Perhaps she felt that with women you had to spell it out. It was an appeal to racial feelings but in the form of "the white man's burden" which gave it at least a paternal or humanitarian look.

This article contrasts well with the material coming out of the Civil War and Philippine Veterans' rally where the Negro vote was courted. It is apparent that whether Republican or Democrat, men supported their side for many differing and conflicting reasons. For instance one Utah Republican declared that those island must be prepared for self-government. Not only that, but the trade possibilities with that area were magnificent and would enrich the state.

86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
Utahns, said he, were born expansionists who will surely not throw away the prosperity of the state.\textsuperscript{88}

Imperialism, the issue which Bryan declared, was the primary one of the campaign and one which Utah Democrats later echoed was obviously vulnerable to appeals to self-aggrandizement, to patriotic pleas and citations of historical precedents set by "the fathers."

Little wonder that the Democrats did not rely solely on that issue. Such an issue had intellectual and humanitarian appeal, and there was even some scare value, but the rebuttal was too powerful emotionally. This was especially so when Americans were still proud of having defeated a European power and intent on having an Empire. The Democratic stand was essentially a rub against the grain. In 1900 an anti-imperialist stance was going to be registered in terms of protest votes and not victory.

**Prosperity**

The prosperity point was important to Republicans and Democrats alike. For the Republicans, prosperity was probably their most potent issue. In Utah, both parties agreed that the key to prosperity was mining. Both agreed that when mines were prosperous, miner, laborer, and farmer all prospered.\textsuperscript{89} Farmers were said to benefit because mines

\textsuperscript{88}Ibid., November 5, 1900.

\textsuperscript{89}Herald, November 1, 1900.
provided an expanded home market not otherwise available. This line of reasoning is reminiscent of a natural science lesson in the ecology of animal life. Remove one link in the chain of life and the next organism in line perishes. Several advantages accrue from this line of reasoning. First, two sometimes mutually exclusive groups, farm and labor, can be bound together by what appears to be mutual need, though the mine is supposedly more important to the farm than vice versa. Secondly, since the Mormon Church had early discouraged her people from mining, the miners were mostly non-Mormon, while the farmers were probably Mormon. A political party obviously wants to swing as many votes as possible and must find a way to attract divergent groups. While probably not the whole answer, this idea that farm prosperity depends on mine prosperity might be counted on to bring Mormons to the support of non-Mormon miners. Especially could this be so if the Populist issue of cheap money or silver could be pointed to as a necessity for ease in debt payment and better prices for farm goods. Both parties saw the advantage of convincing farmers that they needed the miners, but the Democrats could better add the idea that miners would be more prosperous (and hence, farmers have better markets) if silver was made a money metal.

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90 *Tribune*, November 3, 1900.
92 *Herald*, November 4, 1900.
That had the added impact of making a neat line of logic in the field of economics, i.e., when silver was made money, more silver would be mined, miners would prosper, farmers would sell more goods, and because silver was a cheaper money, prices would go up and the amount received by the farmer for his goods would be greater. Further, debts contracted in a hard money time would be more easily paid in cheaper, more readily available silver. To avoid reminding anyone of the preceding, the Republicans, in speaking of mining, spoke of lead, not silver, wherever possible. The impression often gained from reading Republican prosperity talks is that only lead was mined in Utah. Even national speakers, when addressing a Utah audience, usually referred only to lead mining. The Democrats, on the other hand, ignored lead and talked only about how silver would benefit one and all when it was made legal money at sixteen to one. As was seen from the section of this work dealing with silver as a separate question, the Republicans landed some shrewd blows. They said, it will be remembered, Democrats were not really for silver,

93Ibid.


95Tribune, November 3, 1900.

96News, September 13, 1900.

97Herald, November 4, 1900.
that McKinley had helped it greatly in his term in office and that the Republicans were as good silver men as the Democrats and would probably do more for it than the Democrats ever would. All these issues, silver, imperialism, prosperity, and trusts can be interrelated. The Democrats linked prosperity, in a sort of tenuous chain, with the issue of imperialism. They claimed that the Republicans wanted the Philippines in order to set up trusts run by cheap foreign labor. The goods thus produced would be introduced into the United States duty free and would ruin the United States workingman who could not compete with the Asiatic.\textsuperscript{98} Anyone, said they, who produced a raw product such as sugar or cotton was in danger from those Asiatic possessions.\textsuperscript{99} Democrats often used a reverse prosperity issue when they warned Utahns about the danger of trusts which fixed prices on raw materials and products and would one day run Utah sugar factories.\textsuperscript{100}

In the broad view, Republicans made the tariff issue central to prosperity. They claimed that lead, cattle, sheep and sugar all needed a protective tariff if they were to prosper. As proof of that idea, they pointed to the Wilson Tariff put in by the Democrats. When that tariff was introduced, cheap Mexican lead flooded the

\textsuperscript{98}ibid.
\textsuperscript{99}ibid.
\textsuperscript{100}According to Ahlstrom this actually did occur.
country and many Utah mines were forced to lay off miners and close. This, of course, hurt the farmers, but they were further hurt when Mexican cattle came in, bringing lower prices and rinder pest. Then, Argentine wool raised by low paid workers came in undercutting United States wool, and wool growers went under, leaving wool unsheared and herders and shearers unpaid. Republicans cinched their argument by pointing out that though bad times came when the Democrats' "tariff for revenue only" was put in operation, when the Republican McKinley took office and replaced the Wilson Tariff by the Dingley protective tariff, good times came again. Now, they said, mines were prosperous, cattle and sheep were doing all right, and so was the farmer.

The Republicans' cause-and-effect argument was used effectively and often. They did not always keep it simple by just claiming that good government brings good times and bad government brings bad times. Still, they very commonly asked voters to look at history and see that when a Democrat was elected, hardship followed, and when a Republican replaced him, things got better. The Democrats obviously squirmed under that and spent some time in

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101 Tribune, November 3, 1900.
102 Ibid.
103 News, September 13, 1900.
104 Tribune, November 4, 1900.
rebuttal. Their major argument on prosperity claimed that miner, laborer, farmer, and rancher could not know good times until silver was made money again.\textsuperscript{105} The problem was, of course, that all those groups seemed to be prospering without silver. The Democrats' answer to this is perhaps best given by paraphrasing B. H. Roberts, who said essentially, why settle for a half a loaf when you can have it all.\textsuperscript{106} That was not as strong an answer as might have been desired and Moses Thatcher went at it from a different angle. He also admitted to good times, but argued that they were not brought by Republican policies. He said the men responsible for the prosperity of the day were Chamberlain of England, and the man who blew up the Maine. In other words, the costs incident to war had put more money into circulation, but there was no need to rejoice. The bills were yet to be paid.\textsuperscript{107} Republicans in direct reply to Thatcher and to others who often used this argument simply asked why two hundred million dollars borrowed by McKinley to fight a war brought good times when two hundred sixty million borrowed by Cleveland in peace time had had no such effect.\textsuperscript{108}

\textsuperscript{105}\emph{Herald}, November 4, 1900.
\textsuperscript{106}\emph{Ibid.}, November 5, 1900.
\textsuperscript{107}\emph{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{108}\emph{Tribune}, November 2, 1900.
On a more direct and specifically local level, Republicans made some effective looking promises and predictions. In Brigham City people were told that the new markets now available in the Orient would mean that more goods would be transported from the West to the East Coast. All of that would be going by railroad through Utah. This would cause expansion of facilities and a need for more rail line, both of which meant prosperity and growth for the state.\textsuperscript{109}

Ogdenites were assured that the cutting in on the rich Oriental trade and its subsequent shippage across Utah to the East meant that Ogden would be made the largest city in Utah; that so much additional coal would be needed, that five thousand more miners would have to be employed and additional wheat would have to be grown to feed them.\textsuperscript{110}

In Cache County Republicans either planned an excellent move or were blessed by more luck than one party can rightly expect. Shortly before the November election, Charles Nibley, a Republican and well-known businessman, said that if McKinley were elected, he, Nibley, would build a sugar factory.\textsuperscript{111} If McKinley lost, however, the business climate would be so bad that no factory would be built.\textsuperscript{112}

If the coverage both parties gave that announcement meant

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{109}\textit{Ibid.}, November 5, 1900.
  \item \textsuperscript{110}\textit{Semi-Weekly Standard}, Ogden, Utah, November 6, 1900.
  \item \textsuperscript{111}\textit{Tribune}, November 1, 1900.
  \item \textsuperscript{112}\textit{Logan Journal}, October 27, 1900.
\end{itemize}
anything, it hit pretty hard. Mr. Nibley felt that the only things holding up the proposed sugar factory in Cache County were McKinley's re-election and a needed rail line. The Tribune said that a Mr. S. H. Babcock, traffic manager of the Rio Grande Western, felt that if McKinley were elected, the Rio Grande might extend a line into Cache Valley.\textsuperscript{113}

The Republicans claimed that businessmen all over the country felt just as did Mr. Nibley, that if Bryan were elected a panic would ensue so they would not expand until they knew that McKinley was going to be the next President.\textsuperscript{114} This was a very persuasive argument, let the Democrats fume as they might about bribery. In simple terms, a prominent businessman said that if McKinley were elected, a sugar factory would be built, and if he were not, then it would not be built. Such a promise can put a lot of pressure on a community, especially if the man making the promise is respected. Nibley probably was. He was not only a businessman, but a Church man. On the same day the announcement of his sugar factory scheme hit the Salt Lake papers, the Logan Journal carried one article on that and another reporting a speech made by Mr. Nibley in the local Latter-day Saint Quarterly Conference. He spoke on the topic "All Things Are Spiritual."\textsuperscript{115}

\textsuperscript{113}Tribune, November 1, 1900.

\textsuperscript{114}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{115}Logan Journal, November 1, 1900.
Of course, even the best plans do not always run smoothly and a hitch certainly developed in this one, and in the following manner. Mr. Nibley evidently backed up his promise of a sugar factory by saying that he was willing to bet ten thousand dollars to one thousand dollars that if McKinley were elected, the factory would be built within a year.116

On November 1, the following letter appeared in the Logan Journal:

Editor Logan Journal:

Dear Sir:

I note in the Logan Nation of Saturday, October 27 that Mr. Charles Nibley offers to bet $10,000.00 that if McKinley is elected, there will be a sugar factory built in Logan within a year. I hereby offer to take this bet. Mr. Nibley my money is ready. I will meet you any day you designate at Thatcher Bros. Bank, and there put up my $1,000.00 Now Mr. Nibley, let us see less wind, and more hard cash.

Soren Hansen,
of Hyrum117

The Democratic chuckle is almost audible over all these years. The next day, evidence of a swift Republican effort to save the day was seen. Hansen sent another, very different letter to the editor of the Journal. This was a Democratic paper, however, and that letter was not printed until a day later when a rival paper twitted the Journal.

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116Logged Nation, October 27, 1900.
117Logged Journal, November 1, 1900.
about not having carried it. The editor said he had not refused to print the Hansen letter. To say that, said he,

... is a deliberate, unqualified falsehood; the Journal has not refused to publish anything written by Mr. Hansen. Mr. Hansen's first letter has been printed and its contents are familiar to Journal readers. A day or so after its appearance was received this letter:

"Editor Journal: - As my article in the Journal of yesterday has created considerable comment, in explanation of the same, let me say my idea of offering to take Mr. Nibley's bet was that I felt perfectly willing to lose $1,000 for the sake of getting a sugar factory in Cache Valley. I figure I can make more by taking stock than I can lose by the bet.

"I believe, myself, as Mr. Nibley does that if McKinley is elected, a sugar factory will be started in this valley within the time he states and I would subscribe $25,000 stock of the same event.

"On the other hand I am certain that if Mr. Bryan is elected there will be no sugar factory here within a year, and I am willing to bet $1,000 even money to that effect.

Yours Respectfully
Soren Hansen"

Now Soren Hansen did not write a single sentence of that letter. It was written in Republican headquarters from the dictation of Arthur Pratt of Salt Lake. Not a line of it is Soren Hansen's. It was delivered to us by a messenger from Republican headquarters, and upon the envelope was the cheirography of Herschel Bullen, Jr., not Soren Hansen. The fact of the matter is, Hansen's call down of Nibley created consternation in the Republican camp and they have used their customary tactics in trying to get out of a bad hole.118

From the sound of the second letter, it is difficult not to agree with the editor. It is difficult to believe that any person who used the reasoning attributed to Mr. Hansen in letter two could even come by one thousand dollars

118 Logan Journal, November 6, 1900.
with which to bet. Both the second Hansen letter and sugar factory proposal sound like Republican Party plans; the latter a good deal more shrewd than the former, however. It is not necessary to attribute C. W. Nibley's proposal to a "Republican Planning Commission," of course. Any businessman who wanted to advance his party and who also had thought about starting a business anyway might choose just such a way of announcing his intentions.

It would not take a lot for the party organization to see its advantages and to attempt to dull any attack against such a made-to-order issue. The Logan Journal located in the middle of all this, replied that it was strange that Mr. Nibley brought this up just now. If Mr. McKinley's influence is so great in business, the Journal asked, why did not Nibley build a plant three years ago? As to the sudden talk about building a railroad branch into Cache County, the Journal finds that even stranger since one year ago, it claims, the Tribune said that such a move must not be looked for and even listed reasons for its argument; and a closer look at what Babcock said regarding the extension of a rail branch into Cache County reveals that he is only saying he thinks it would be nice, but he does not really know what his company thinks.120

119 Ibid., November 3, 1900.

120 Tribune, November 1, 1900.
Timing of these newspaper articles is interesting. Some thought had obviously gone into an effort to get the greatest impact just before the election. The Tribune printed its first articles several days before the election. On the fifth, the Tribune printed a back-up article in which David Eccles said he agreed with Nibley about the sugar factory. "The reelection of McKinley would permit the continuation of the preliminary work looking to the establishment within a year of the contemplated sugar factory."\(^{121}\) But he did not think it would be good business to invest in such a thing if there were a change in administration. A change might disturb the present prosperous conditions. Eccles was a partner of Nibley in two sugar factories, one in LaGrande, Oregon and one in Ogden.\(^{122}\) In the November 1 issue, Eccles had already been set up for Tribune readers as Mr. Nibley's partner, and thus established as a man whose word on a sugar plant was to be listened to when his statement was printed on the fifth of November. It was on the same day that the above statement was printed that the Journal of Logan countered with the release of Soren Hansen's second letter. The delay is suspicious. If it is true, as the Journal claims, that the letter was written at Republican headquarters by Arthur Pratt of Salt Lake City, then the Republicans in sending it

\(^{121}\)Ibid., November 5, 1900.  
\(^{122}\)Ibid.
to the Journal felt it would help their cause. However, the almost gleeful comments of the Journal editor in putting the letter in the paper on the fifth suggests he does not think so and that he had been holding it for release until just before the election when its somewhat foolish sounding explanation and the editor's "exposure" of its "real" origin would have the greatest likelihood of influencing a voter. It may even have been intended to nullify the last bid of the Republicans, the Eccles statement. After reading these Utah papers in conjunction, it is hard not to feel that they all seem to know what the other is going to say before it is printed.

Another interesting point on coverage of this issue is that while the Journal, a Cache County Democratic paper, and the Tribune, a Salt Lake City Republican paper, both carried quite a lot on this issue, the Herald, the Democratic organ of Salt Lake City, seems almost to be ignoring the thing. Perhaps there was a desire on the part of the Democrats to limit coverage to just the immediate area involved, at least as much as possible. Surely that seems wiser than giving it the type of coverage the Tribune sometimes did with their reprints of opposing articles and accompanying comments. Many readers would not be likely to hear of some of the issues from the opposition unless their own paper chose to air them, too.

Still, the Democrats did reply. Their comment was that if climate and soil are right and the people work for it,
Cache County will have a factory regardless of who wins. That may be correct, but it hardly provides a reason to vote Democratic. If the Democrats are correct in their argument, it does not matter who wins; however, if the Republicans are right, no factory will be built unless they win. If a man really wanted that factory, his best bet would be to go with Republicans. Republicans seem more astute in coming up with issues that would swing votes their way. Possibly, the shake up in the Democratic party on the B. H. Roberts problem left that party a little bit in limbo. They may not have felt completely united, and so had a more difficult time planning strategy for this campaign.

On the prosperity issue, Democrats made some shrewd points, but they were essentially on the defensive. Their main issue, silver, had ceased to be a rallying point, since prosperity of a sort had returned without it. They countered well by telling the people that "greater" prosperity could be theirs if silver were set up again as money, but that argument was weak compared with the Republican scare tactic which declared that any disturbance in the balance of things would be likely to bring another depression like the one that came when the Democrats were elected last time and which went away when the Republicans got in office. High or low tariff, bribes, silver, sugar factories or anything

123Herald, November 1, 1900.
else were probably superfluous in the face of existent prosperity. This existant prosperity was hard to argue with, and with imperialism as popular as it was nationally, any attempt to link prosperity with imperialism in an attempt to discredit it was probably doomed. In any case, Republicans said that the new acquisitions meant money in the pocket of Utahns, and any man who would vote "... against the comfort and happiness of his wife ought to be banished from her soft arms forever, and be compelled for the balance of his days to lodge with a Democratic platform." The economic factor can be a strong one.

124Tribune, November 3, 1900.
CHAPTER IV

CHURCH INFLUENCE IN THE 1900 ELECTIONS IN UTAH

1900 was unavoidably a year in which church was an issue. When a special election was held to replace B. H. Roberts in Congress, most people must have wondered if religion would play a part in the election of his successor. Probably people outside Utah expected and looked for church influence to be used. Since politics is an effort to elect your man to office, leaders inside Utah probably carefully examined the likelihood of obtaining or of fighting church influence. Only a short time had passed since some sort of balance had been struck politically in Utah,\(^1\) and no one knew how it would work out.\(^2\)

Probably in an effort to avoid interparty split, the special elections were held with almost no mention of religion or of the reason for Roberts not gaining his seat in Congress. There were Mormons in both parties\(^3\) and raising

\(^1\)Shipps, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

\(^2\)According to Shipps some sort of apportionment was evidently made between Mormon and non-Mormon as to number of offices held by each.

\(^3\)Shipps, p. 94.
a religious issue might tend to amalgamate them into one or the other, or even give rise once again to a Mormon party and a Gentile party that would again fight each other for control of local politics. Both party and sect probably wanted to avoid that. The Mormon Church on its part most likely wanted only to let things quiet down and to give evidence of its good intentions by staying judiciously out of politics. For whatever reason, the Special Election went quietly enough. It is true that in December of 1899 William Glassman, editor of the Ogden Daily Standard charged that the whole issue of Roberts' fitness for office would not have come up had "Judge" C. C. Goodwin, editor of the Tribune, been more even tempered about his defeat when running for Senator. Glassman charged that Goodwin had "started this whole crusade which has aroused the country." This charge is based on politics and is not overtly religious, however, and goes no further. Nationally, the situation varied markedly from that in Utah. On the national level the church issue was raised in an attempt to gain votes by arousing an anti-Mormon feeling. Both the Herald and the News charge that the Reverend Josiah Strong, a Presbyterian minister, tried to arouse the nation

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4Deseret Evening News, December 11, 1899.

5Josiah Strong was active in the anti-Roberts crusade and in efforts to obtain an anti-polygamy amendment to the constitution and in distributing anti-Mormon literature.
to the dangers of letting any Congressman active in the anti-
Roberts effort be defeated. He was, said both the News and
the Herald, trying to have letters mailed to every signer of
the anti-Roberts petition. These letters were said to con-
tain a message to the effect that the people ought to
reward all public servants who actually perform public ser-
vice. Besides, and more to the point, the Mormons were
said to claim that those who oppose them are struck by
divine retribution; witness the assassination of Lincoln and
the Galveston flood. To allow the defeat of anyone who had
fought Roberts would simply add fuel to the flames of Mormon
fanaticism. If Strong got letters out to all of the signers
of that petition, there was a pretty large segment of the
U. S. population watching Utah with special interest. The
Roberts case alone would have alerted national political
parties to the possibility of Church influence in Utah
elections, and, of course, it would be natural for Gentiles
to suspect that Mormons would vote as told. This makes any
later charges of such activity more understandable.

This crusade by the Reverend Josiah Strong is an
interesting example of church influence, not by or for the
Mormons, but against them. Other examples of much the same

6The Salt Lake Herald, November 6, 1900.
7Ibid.
8There were seven million signers, but, as Roberts
pointed out, people could sign more than once.
thing can be shown within the state. Since influential authors have seen the purported use of Church influence as the critical factor in this election, a good deal of time is going to be spent examining some seemingly minor events which bear on the issue. Further, because part of the supposed "bargain" between the Church and the Republican Party had to do with delivery of the out-of-state Mormon vote and for other reasons (which are listed in their place) a glance will be taken at an Idaho event.

First we shall consider local events. Non-Mormons in Utah were not above attempting to use Church influence for personal or party advantage, nor would it have been amazing if individual Mormons tried to gain election for themselves or their friends in the same way. Two cases may stand as excellent examples of just that attempt to use or arouse Church influence to advantage by both Gentile and Mormon.

The first case is that of I. J. Steward and William M. McCarty. Steward, a Democrat, opposed McCarty, the incumbent Republican Judge of the Sixth District. A Tribune dispatch said that Steward was "whispering" that his opponent would be very hard on the Mormons if re-elected. According

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to the *Tribune*'s source, Stewart was showing an affidavit indicating that McCarty had already judged "... a certain class of cases which may come before him ... and had announced and stated what judgments he intends to impose and penalties he intends to inflict in such cases," and that McCarty "... made use of certain profane, coarse, opprobrious language against the Mormon people, who compose a majority of the voters of ..." the district. So Stewart was charged with trying to get votes by playing on Mormon fears and arousing prejudice against a gentile judge. The way the *Tribune* handled this story, Stewart looked very bad. He not only seemed guilty of playing on prejudice, but of doing it in an underhanded manner by a whispering campaign.

To this point, we have dealt only with one man's charge that his opponent was anti-Mormon and in a position to harm Mormons; but with I. J. Stewart's reply there came a different and more interesting aspect of the affair. The "expose" of Stewart's methods appeared in the *Tribune*, but Stewart's answer was carried by the *Herald*. Here again party organ aligned against party organ. Stewart emphatically denied that he had acted as charged, but did say:

> I admit having in my possession an affidavit setting forth utterances of Judge McCarty to certain non-Mormons in this city, and that the affidavit shown

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10. That source was W. P. Willis of Henriville.


Mr. Willis was called forth by reason of his telling me why he had settled in the town of Henryville, [sic] and which was to the effect that he had been an "undergrounder" and that his conversation led to the calling of a grand jury in Panguitch some time ago by Judge McCarty, and of his charging it regarding unlawful cohabitation offenses.13

It now becomes clear that the cases Judge McCarty might have prejudged were polygamy cases, a point the Tribune did not make, and that Stewart seemed to be showing his affidavit to people likely to be closely connected with such cases. Suddenly the small local affair takes on a broader aspect. Mr. Stewart went on to say: "The affidavit I have was given me to counteract and offset stories circulated here by certain persons working for the election of Judge McCarty, to the effect that the Church authorities desired his re-election because of the good he had done the Mormon people, and also that the Judge had shown letters to that effect."14 Stewart did not say whether the purported letters used against him were genuine or not, he just tried to show the people interested that McCarty was an enemy and not a friend. "Had it not been for the methods employed by Judge McCarty, the affidavit referred to would have never been made: but since despicable methods were resorted to for the purpose of defeating my election, I was under the necessity to protect myself against them."15

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13Herald, November 1, 1900.
14Ibid.
15Ibid.
In an area as isolated and rural as this one, it must have been possible to determine who the "certain persons" were who had "circulated stories" as to what the "Church authorities" desired.\textsuperscript{16} That Stewart does not name them may mean they were unimportant or that it would not have done his cause any good to publicize the names. If men were spreading such stories and if those men were Church officials, credence would have been lent to the stories. Whatever the reason, and perhaps just because he did not know the names, Stewart did not name the men involved. That the Republicans played down that phase is not surprising. If they were using Church influence without Church authority, it had to be done quietly, and if there was a secret agreement by the Church to help the Republicans, that had to be handled carefully also.

On the fourth of November the \textit{Herald} carried another story from Richfield. In it Stewart said that McCarty was not favored by the Church because of an alleged warding off of polygamy prosecution as McCarty's supporters claimed. In fact, said Stewart, the Church was neutral. Stewart was said to have had printed and distributed a number of statements with affidavits testifying to Church neutrality.\textsuperscript{17}

Stewart's statement had been very damaging, however, and the \textit{Tribune} was not willing to stop on that note. In

\textsuperscript{16}Ibid., November 5, 1900.

\textsuperscript{17}Ibid.
the November 6 issue, the Tribune carried a long article on the Democratic rally at Richfield at which Stewart spoke. It is unlikely that the paper would carry such an extended story of a minor rally in a part of the state far removed from most of its circulation and from the bulk of Republican voters unless something more than the ordinary were involved, even though as a newsstory the closing scene was a dramatic confrontation and fist fight. In discrediting Stewart, the Tribune could help scotch his charges and they had statewide importance. The Tribune said that at the Democratic rally, I. J. Stewart used his speech "in repetition of his sickly appeal for Church influence to help him win out and in attempting to tear down the character and honor of Judge McCarty, by accusing him and his friends of doing things that have never been done."18 During the meeting John S. Rollo, an ardent Democrat, but holding office as McCarty's stenographer, interrupted I. J. Stewart when Stewart said, "I have never anywhere said that I have seen letters that Judge McCarty sent to polygamists or that he has sent letters to polygamists."19 Mr. Rollo said, "You said so at Glenwood."20 Stewart denied it, but after the meeting there was a confrontation between the two men. Rollo produced a transcript of his own shorthand notes taken

18 Tribune, November 6, 1900.
19 Herald, November 5, 1900.
20 Ibid.
at Glenwood in which Stewart is shown to say, "I saw two letters that he had written in Wayne County when I was over there circulating all over the county. I read them. I am not asking for the letters he has been using against me and sending to certain polygamists."21 A long conversation followed and Rollo said that the transcript he had taken at Glenwood contained every word Stewart had spoken and the transcript was correct. "Mr. Stewart retorted, 'I don't believe it.' Mr. Rollo said, 'Do you mean my shorthand notes and transcript are not correct?' Mr. Stewart said, 'I mean to say that very thing.' Mr. Rollo answered, 'I mean to say you lie.' At that Stewart hit Rollo a vicious blow in the face, and that while said Rollo had his overcoat on and his hands in his pockets. So the Democratic candidate for Judge of the 6th Judicial District will be in police court tomorrow."22 With that neat, vivid scene the Tribune leaves Mr. Stewart branded as a liar, coward and law breaker.

A parallel case indicating the possibility of a coordinated Republican plan to obtain and benefit from Church influence occurred in the Fifth Judicial District adjoining the Sixth District in central and southern Utah. In this instance, Judge E. V. Higgins was embroiled in a political controversy with his court stenographer W. L. Cook. This

21Ibid., November 4, 1900.
22Ibid., November 5, 1900.
case is particularly instructive as it shows how the game of Church influence was played by both sides when neither appeared to have Church sanction.

Probably no light would have illuminated this "sly game" if Judge Higgins had not gone to his court reporter and asked for campaign help which the man was unwilling to give. Cook said he got his job by examination, non-politically. In such a case he felt it was wrong to take an active part for one side or the other, though he promised to vote for Higgins. That was not quite enough, however, for Higgins told Cook that he would not be appointed stenographer again, explaining that since Cook gave him no support, he felt no need to support Cook. This angered Cook and he determined to get even. Publicly he said, "After acting so underhandedly with me by selling me out for a few votes . . . and knowing as I do how he hates the Mormons, and how during this campaign he has fawned around them and tried to give out the impression that he was their friend, I concluded to write several letters to my friends, stating what I knew of Judge Higgins." Cook said the judge had told him it was a relief to get out of Utah awhile and just be able to speak as he wished. "He hoped soon to be able to leave this state and go to some

23Ibid., November 4, 1900.
24Ibid.
25Ibid.
place where he hoped he would not hear the word 'Mormon' again," said Cook.26

When we couple this to Cook's support of Higgins' opponent, it is definitely an appeal for Church support for one man or for the withholding of it from another. Of course, in the article just quoted, the plea is to the individual Mormon, with the hope that he will react negatively to a man who is exposed as a Mormon hater. However, a look at one of those letters sent out by Cook makes it clear he envisioned something more effective than that. A letter quoted in the Tribune and alluded to by Cook in the Herald article was addressed to Bishop Adams, Parowan, Utah27 and said:

Judge Higgins's friends are claiming that he should be elected by the people of this district for the reason that they know him, and that he is a friend to the people. Now I want to say to the people that they don't know Judge Higgins because if they did he would not get a solitary vote from the members of the Mormon church, because I know that he is not a friend to them. I know that he was strongly in favor of passing a constitutional amendment at the time of the Roberts contest for a seat in Congress, providing for the punishment of polygamy and kindred offenses by the Federal Government, and when I told him that such an amendment would give Utah a black eye forever, he said he did not care if it did, if it only effectively killed the system.

26 Ibid.

27 The Tribune said other letters were sent, one of them to William Houchan, an influential Democrat of Cedar City, and another to Bishop James Andrews of St. George, and, said the Tribune, probably to others, also. Tribune, November 3, 1900.
I have heard him say repeatedly he would go to some country where he would never hear the word "Mormon" again and that he did not intend rearing his children among a lot of Mormons. . . .

On the other hand I know Marioneaux, his opponent, is a friend to the people, he was always in favor of seating Roberts and held it unconstitutional not to do so. Of this I presume, however, you are aware, because he was one of the convention that nominated King, at least the one on the committee of that convention that nominated King when he ran for Congress against Hammond; that drew up the resolution on the Roberts question. . . .

Now if the report is being circulated in your town, that Higgins is a friend to the people, I hope you will let them know the truth of the matter.

Yours very truly,
W. L. Cook. 28

Higgins replied to all of this that it was a lie designed to defeat him and motivated by Cook's anger over the potential loss of a job. He said, "You can brand such statements as false without qualification or equivocation. It is written by Cook because I refused to pledge him appointment as reporter in case of my election." 29

While the last charge by Higgins is almost certainly true, the first is not so nearly likely. But regardless of the truth or falsity of Cook's attack on Higgins, what is clear is that Cook made his move in a manner calculated to bring Church influence to his aid in a political situation. If all that Cook said were true, then both sides were trying to enlist Church aid. Without Church sanction, and as in

28Ibid.

29Ibid.
the Stewart versus McCarty case, a Gentile judge was attacked on the polygamy issue. In Cook's attack on Higgins, the further element of the Roberts case appeared. Higgins was not only unfriendly to the Mormons, but he was an enemy to Roberts and to the State of Utah.

The first paragraph of Cook's letter to Bishop Adams raised a further interesting question. When Cook says Higgins's friends are claiming the judge is "a friend to the people" does this refer to the warding off of polygamous prosecutions as it does in the McCarty case in District Six? If it does refer to polygamy, and it seems likely that it does, then in two cases in the central and southern part of Utah, the Republicans were following the same pattern in their campaign to get possibly unpopular Gentile judges elected. These cases take on more importance when seen in the light of the Democratic claim that the Church had bartered its votes in return for a softer national line on polygamy and the dropping of the anti-polygamy amendment mentioned by Cook. This possibility will be further examined in another chapter.

Meanwhile, in Idaho something very like these two cases was occurring, but with an added element of genuine exercise of Church officials' influence to achieve political goals. Several cogent reasons compel the use of the Idaho case in a study of the Utah election. First, news of what was occurring there was printed in Utah papers and could
influence Utah voters, and, second, men involved in Idaho were involved in the same way in Utah. A third reason for going out of the state to understand the state is that methods used in Idaho by men from Utah are seen more clearly in the northern state and cast light on activities in the more southerly one. Finally, and most compellingly, Idaho needs to be examined because men charged that a bargain was made between Republicans and the Church to deliver the Utah and Idaho vote. Surface evidence seems to corroborate that charge in Idaho and thus to impinge on the Utah scene.

In Idaho Senator Fred T. Dubois charged that the Republicans had printed and distributed a circular containing extracts from speeches made by him during the time when the "fight between the Mormons and Gentiles was most bitter." Dubois claimed that this "trick" of the opposition would not injure him and that the Mormons would vote their convictions and not "be controlled by their leaders or by prejudice." He said further that the Republicans based all their hopes on carrying the south-east part of the state on the basis of a Mormon vote dictated by the Church but that he did not believe that the Church would order the vote or that if it did, the Mormon people would obey it. Interestingly, Dubois did not claim

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30 Herald, November 2, 1900.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid., November 6, 1900.
that the Mormons had printed and circulated the anti-Mormon speeches, but only that his enemies had done so. His enemies were probably the Republican State Committee.33

To this point, then, we have much the same situation in Idaho as occurred in Utah with the non-Mormon judges. The opposition was trying to discredit a non-Mormon in the eyes of the Mormon majority and was using about the same method to achieve its aims. Here, though, there is Dubois' statement that he did not believe the Mormon Church would attempt to deliver the vote one way or another, or that if it did that the members of the Church would follow the direction given. Unfortunately, he does not sound really convinced himself. As likely as not, he is trying to shame or flatter the Mormons into acting as he wants them to.

He admitted that he had made the speeches but said they were ten or twelve years old. In between, he said, he had been of great help to the Mormons and Utah by helping Utah to become a state. He had assured Congress that Utahns were sincere when they issued the manifesto. Furthermore, he claimed, he had assured Congress that Church officials really would not try to influence elections, an important factor in Utah's becoming a state. In fact, Dubois claimed that he had been told by Church officials that his efforts had been a powerful factor in getting statehood for Utah.

He explained that he had not said much about the circulars

33Ibid., November 3, 1900.
printed against him because he believed the Mormons would reply to them by voting against the perpetrators.\textsuperscript{34}

However, the situation took a different and more serious turn. On November 2, William Budge, President of Bear Lake Stake in Idaho, called a meeting of "Bishops, High Councilors and prominent \textit{sic} Mormons . . ."\textsuperscript{35} and apparently told these men that "the Brethren" wanted Idaho Mormons to vote Republican in order to switch the state to the Republicans.\textsuperscript{36}

This meeting led to two clarifying developments. First, Senator Dubois made a statement that disclosed just who he thought the "brethren" responsible were and with what authority he thought they spoke. Said he:

\ldots it is broadly rumored that the Mormon Church authorities are dictating in politics to their followers in Idaho. I am safe in saying that Apostle Cowley and Apostle John Henry Smith and President Budge of the Bear Lake Stake have attempted by open speech and documents to convince voters that the Mormon Church counsels the voting of the Republican ticket by the Mormon people. I wish to state again, as I have often ever since the manifesto was issued, that I believe these expressions are simply the wishes of the individuals uttering them and they do not emanate from the first Presidency.\textsuperscript{37}

Dubois said that he believed the Mormons would vote their convictions and vote Democratic and sincerely hoped

\textsuperscript{34}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{35}Ibid., November 6, 1900.

\textsuperscript{36}Ibid., November 5, 1900.

\textsuperscript{37}Ibid.
he was not wrong on this. There is just a hint of threat in that comment. One gets the feeling that if he does turn out to be wrong about that voting, the speeches made ten or twelve years before would be nothing in comparison to those he would make in the future.

Dubois was not alone in his alarm at the meeting held by Budge or at the politicking of the two apostles. Judge J. C. Rich of the Fifth Idaho District sent a telegram to the head of the Mormon Church, President Lorenzo Snow, explaining what had happened. President Snow replied that he had asked Budge what had gone on in that meeting and that Budge replied that he had asked the men to come for a casual talk at which he had expressed his personal views as he would on the street. All he had done, according to Budge, was to ask them to support him as they saw fit and in line with their personal views. And, said President Snow, "... this is strictly in accordance with the position which the First Presidency has maintained in politics."38

Shaken Democrats quickly chose one of their number to make a personal call on the First Presidency. James E. Hart of Paris, Idaho was sent to Utah. He succeeded in seeing and talking with Presidents Snow, Cannon and Joseph F. Smith. Hart explained that everyone present had taken Budge to mean that the "Brethren" who wanted to see the Republicans elected were the leaders of the Church. "President Snow said at the conclusion of Mr. Hart's statement

38Herald.
that Budge was entirely unauthorized to make any such statements as coming from the First Presidency." 39

President Snow further told Hart that he was entirely right in coming down to find out where the Church stood and in not being bound by such statements as Budge's. President Cannon added in classic litotes that it was not wise to ask Democrats to support Republicans. 40 Thus the word of Church neutrality was published in Idaho and, naturally, in Utah.

The Dubois story broke in Utah on November 2 and the Budge story on November 6. Understandably, major coverage came in the Herald. One other paper devoted a large amount of space to the story. In the northern part of the state, an area likely to be affected by Southern Idaho doings, the Logan Journal carried a long article reviewing the subject of President Budge and his special meeting and concluding with the comment that "the Mormon Church is maintaining a strictly neutral attitude to this campaign." 41 But even if the Church were officially trying to maintain neutrality, it is obvious that certain high officials in the Church were not. In the Dubois and Budge affairs, for the first time certain highly non-neutral "brethren" are named. A Stake President, William Budge, and two apostles, John Henry Smith and Matthias F. Cowley, seem to have been

39Ibid.
40Ibid.
41Logan Journal, November 6, 1900.
actively working to convince Mormons that the Church wanted the Republicans elected.

Budge, as a Republican candidate to the Idaho legislature, had at least one clearly understandable reason for his action. Apostles Cowley and Smith were motivated by other factors. There was more than party partisanship involved in this. John Henry Smith spoke in Ephraim on November 2. He spoke on polygamy and the action by the Federal government to suppress polygamy. He told his audience that while Republicans had molded the bullets used on Utah, Democratic "guns had fired them; that the Democratic party had filled the penitentiary with Mormon people; and had compared women of Utah with the inmates of the harem of the Sultan of Sulu [sic]." Obviously, he refers to the anti-polygamy campaign.

The polygamy issue was perhaps the issue that made Apostle Smith go into active campaigning. It may also have motivated Apostle Matthias F. Cowley in his political activities as evidenced by a report from Logan. The information from Logan indicates that the goal may actually have been to get polygamy re instituted by delivering the vote for the Republicans, or, if not that, at least to get better treatment of polygamists. The report said:

There is ample evidence of Republican desperation in the nefarious campaign methods employed by that party

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42Salt Lake Herald, November 3, 1900.
43Ibid.
in this county. Throughout the county they are quietly but industriously at work urging Mormon Democrats to vote for McKinley giving us a reason for so doing the statement that McKinley will stand by the Mormons. In some instances they have come out squarely, telling the people that the election of McKinley will mean the restoration of polygamy in Utah.

From every quarter of the county there comes this story and from Idaho also. In this city and also in Idaho this talk can be traced to Apostle M. F. Cowley. National Committeeman Dunbar who is here today, has been investigating the matter and while he has yet secured no affidavit, he has abundant verification of the fact that this disreputable work is being resorted to.44

Even if the hopes attributed to Cowley and Smith were too sanguine, those men probably hoped to stop an anti-polygamy amendment from being made part of the U. S. Constitution. For evidence of that, notice a Republican rally at Mendon, Utah where a Bishop Anderson and a Patriarch Hughes were said to have advised the people to vote Republican and, by the way, to have phrased it so it sounded like the Church authorities desired it. They gave us the reason for so voting the "fact" that it was in the interest of the Church to do so. It was in the interest of the Church because, said Patriarch Hughes, ". . . McKinley and the Republican party were pledged against the anti-polygamy amendment to the Constitution and to protect polygamists against arrest and imprisonment in exchange for the Republican electoral vote of Utah."45

44Ibid., November 4, 1900.
45Ibid., November 6, 1900.
This is probably the "secret message" that was being whispered over Utah by prominent men,\textsuperscript{46} that McKinley or his party would stop the anti-polygamy amendment and protect polygamists against prosecution. For men who still dreamed that one day the Church would go back to polygamy an amendment against it in the U. S. Constitution would have been a great blow and its suppression an offer of hope that one day polygamy could be legal and hence reinstated.

One is led to believe that there may well have been such a pledge made by the Republican party. It is unlikely that men of the caliber of Smith and Cowley would have acted as they did otherwise. There is even a strong suspicion that Cowley or Smith may have made the opposite bargain, Utah's vote for such pledges, if it was made at all. In the light of the reaction of the First Presidency, the Church officially was no part of it. For instance, if the Mormon Church was to be swayed in great numbers, most Mormons would have to believe that the word came directly from the First Presidency and specifically from the President himself acting as a prophet. The consistent reaction of the First Presidency when asked about its position in politics was such that it is obvious that the instructions to vote Republican did not come from them.

As an example of official Church reaction let us follow from beginning to end the following political tableaux.

\textsuperscript{46}Ibid., November 3, 1900.
On November 2, the Herald carried a story about Republican attempts to use the Church. The article said that

For some weeks the voters of Utah have been advised by officious Republican politicians that the Mormon Church wished to see the Republicans carry the state. They had no authority to show for their whispered words and when cornered admitted they were speaking for themselves alone. Yesterday in Salt Lake, the whisper rose to a rumble and its chief disseminator was said to be the owner of a Republican newspaper that has fought the Church, its individual leaders, and its material interests without ceasing for years - except during recent political campaigns.47

The Herald then quoted from a News story of November 1 in which Church members are told to vote as free people. After all, the News said, Mormons are not radishes tied in bundles waiting to be delivered. There are Mormons in both parties and the Church is not telling anyone how to vote.

The Herald continued:

Nothing more explicit than that could be asked or desired by any friend of the church or people of Utah. It reiterates what the well-informed know is the sentiment of President Snow and it is exactly such an injunction as was needed to stop the unauthorized whisperings of the politicians who perpetually abuse the church in off years and fawn upon it when an election is pending. Mormons and non-Mormons alike will appreciate the attitude of the News and the organization for which it speaks.48

The Tribune was stung by this and replied by calling the Herald or its editor a "professional originator of lies and scandals" quoting the article and retorting with an answer that makes no attempt to reply in detail, but merely discredits the whole Herald article. It was followed by an

47Ibid., November 2, 1900.

48Ibid.
editorial just as heated and ambiguous, but offering no real factual rebuttal. Yet that reply charged the Herald with a "... cowardly fawning on the church ..." and "a lickspittal eagerness to make an utterance of the church organ the News twist to the advantage of the Bryan ticket. ..."49

Everyone charges everyone else with courting Church favor and they are probably all correct in so charging. Utah, after all, contained a large group of people who, the Gentiles thought and the Church hoped, shared strongly similar ideas. If that group, Mormon Church members, could be swayed into one party or the other, the election was assured for the party so favored.

To this point we have seen instances of both non-official Church influence and of Gentile attempts to win the favor of Mormon voters. The Democrats seemed to have felt the pinch the hardest. On November 4, a Democrat County Chairman, E. W. Wilson, said that as usual the Gentiles were frantically trying to "drag the Church into politics."50 While on November 4, D. C. Dunbar, a National Committeeman for the Democrats just returned from an investigation of political activity in Cache County, was reported to have told a friend that he had wired the National

49Ibid.

50Ibid., November 5, 1900.
Committee stating that Apostles of the Church were exercising unacceptable influence on the Church members in an effort to get a Republican victory in Utah.\footnote{Ibid.} Probably as a result of the telegram sent by National Committeeman Dunbar, a Mr. Jones, Chairman of the Democratic National Committee seems to have asked Committeeman Dunbar and Judge O. W. Powers\footnote{Powers was a prominent Utah Democrat and a well-known anti-Mormon. Kenner, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 145-146.} to visit the First Presidency.\footnote{\textit{Herald}, November 6, 1900.}

The results of that meeting were printed in the \textit{Herald}, re-published in other papers and wired to Democratic chairmen in the state. The \textit{Logan Journal}, for instance, printed a telegram to J. M. Blair, Chairman of the Logan Democratic Committee. The telegram said in part that after Dunbar and Powers had informed the First Presidency that it was rumored that the Church wanted McKinley elected, a conversation ensued during which

\ldots President Cannon said that it would be deplorable for a man to vote contrary to his political convictions, because some one alleges that it is the wish of the Church authorities. President Cannon authorized the statement to be made that no one has any authority to say that the Mormon Church or the First Presidency of the Church desires the people to vote for McKinley or the Republican ticket, and if any person has stated that such is the fact, this statement is a falsification. He declared that the First Presidency desires the people to vote their own convictions uninfluenced by anyone.\footnote{\textit{Logan Journal}, November 6, 1900.}
After the Herald posted the bulletin in its window, word got around fast. H. B. Clawson, whom the Herald called the most partisan of the bishops, \(^{55}\) and "Colonel" Trumbo \(^{56}\) together went to the home of P. H. Lannon, Tribune owner, and then to the Herald office to copy the bulletin in the window. From there, their course lay directly to the Church offices where they spent about one-half hour, and then they returned to Lannon's home for a very brief visit. \(^{57}\) The result of all this seems to be an article in the Tribune. In its strange way, the Tribune reprinted the offending Herald bulletin, thus giving it double coverage, and then commenting on it.

According to the Tribune, President George Q. Cannon had been asked about the interview and promptly discredited it. Further, he said he wanted the Republicans to win, though that was only his personal viewpoint, since the Church was not telling anyone how to vote. \(^{58}\)

It is difficult to see just what President Cannon was discrediting, since in essence or meaning he repeated what the bulletin claimed he told Dunbar and Powers, i.e., that the Church was not telling anyone how to vote.

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\(^{55}\)Herald, November 6, 1900.

\(^{56}\)Trumbo, according to the Herald, was rumored to be in Utah to swing the Mormon vote. Herald, November 6, 1900.

\(^{57}\)Ibid.

\(^{58}\)Tribune, November 6, 1900.
About all that the *Tribune* article did was to throw dust in the air and obscure what had been said by the *Herald*. The *Tribune*'s headlines were "They Seek Church Aid," "Dunbar and Powers Appeal to President Cannon," and "His Statements Garbled." If a reader did not finish the rather long articles below those titles, he was left with a very different impression of what both sides admitted or claimed as true. Also, if a reader skimmed and looked for a summary of the article at the end, he got the following:

Another member of the First Presidency was approached yesterday and asked what he thought of the authorization published in the *Herald* windows and the effect of it. He said the statement was unworthy of notice. "The effect of it upon our people of course," he said, "will be nothing. They will hardly believe the First Presidency will talk to the Mormons through O. W. Powers and D. C. Dunbar." 59

That strange statement merely obscures the issue also. It would be understandable by the unnamed member of the First Presidency to make just such a statement if he prefaced it with a denial of what Dunbar and Powers were said to have been told in their interview, but neither he nor President Cannon did that. There had been interviews; the men had been told that the Church was neutral and they had so announced the results of that discussion.

One is hard put to explain why this attitude would be taken by President Cannon and the other unnamed member of the Presidency. It may be that the *Tribune* did some

59Ibid.
garbling itself or that while the Church was neutral, two Republicans hated to see their party lose any votes because of that neutrality. Perhaps they had spoken without thought of being quoted. It is worth noting that no disclaimers about the Tribune interview appeared in either the Herald or the News. It is more noteworthy, however, that on the same day the interviews were held and the bulletin posted in the Herald window, and one day preceding the reports of it which appeared in the Herald and Tribune, the News published what seemed an official declaration of the Mormon Church's political stand. The Herald predictably reprinted it on the same day it printed the Dunbar and Powers story.

The article is the definitive statement of Church policy in the 1900 elections and possibly beyond 1900. Further, by what it says, it tells us much of what had been occurring in that election and clarifies the Church's stand on it. In it the question was posed, had men gone secretly out and tried to get votes by telling others that the Church wanted one party or the other elected? The answer was yes, without doubt this had been done, though probably not to the extent some had thought. In consequence, some doubtful voters were influenced unduly in selecting a candidate for whom to vote. This was done by important men who convinced others that they were conveying secret instructions from "the Brethren" or First Presidency. However, the article also says the Church was emphatically neutral and
sent no one to anyone with voting instructions. All Mormons should "go to the polls and vote as free men or women." 60

This statement leaves no room for equivocation; it is absolute. It appears in the Church newspaper as an authentic Church pronouncement and must reflect the Church's official attitude. Church policy was sometimes arrived at in a general council of the First Presidency and the Twelve Apostles. At least, this had happened in 1896 when after free discussion it was decided to avoid favoring either silver or gold "in the public capacity." 61

If a political policy had been arrived at in a similar way in 1900, it is obvious that not everyone could be counted on to abide by it. The Mormon Church was certainly not such a monolithic, totalitarian hierarchy as the non-Mormons probably thought. Reed Smoot might almost have had the 1900 elections in mind (it would not be surprising if he did) when, in 1908, he wrote to E. H. Callister that

If we expect to carry the state this fall we certainly cannot have President Smith map out a policy and then a number of the Twelve and the First Presidents of Seventies travel through the state in opposition to it and also with the Deseret News every week or so claiming the church is out of politics and that President Smith has no desires or wishes in the matter. 62

60 Herald, November 6, 1900.


62 Ibid., p. 82.
Among men of strong character, that not everyone agreed on one policy is not surprising. What is surprising is the direction the opposition took and its apparent connection with polygamy. Perhaps this should not be surprising since the Roberts' case had revived national interest in polygamy and was leading to the proposition of a constitutional amendment on this subject. This may have made a revival of the doctrine look hopeless to formerly hopeful men. Possibly these men tried to salvage what they could and fight off an amendment by taking an agreement that national party leaders may have thought was official.

On a local level, to elect definite men Republicans attempted to show Mormon voters they should vote Republican. Democrats countered the attempts and tried to get a backlash that would work to their advantage. There was nothing sinister in this and while it was discreditable, it could be expected in a state where the majority of the voters were of one church. Republicans were probably just trying to find a way to keep non-Mormon judges in office after they had tried polygamous cases in communities believing in polygamy.

On the state scene, however, something darker was hinted at. At that level, the Mormon Church was charged with delivering the vote of its people in a *quid pro quo* arrangement. There is always the possibility that the Church had decided to send out two or more members of the
Quorum of the Twelve to secretly spread the word that the people were to vote Republican. If the Church were willing to adopt Machiavellian tactics, it could then always deny it had done any such thing and publicly repudiate the two brethren involved. Thus, if the scheme worked, good; but if the men were caught, it would just look like a couple of over-zealous brethren had overstepped their bounds. This could be what happened. However, to the author of this work that does not seem the best explanation.

One wonders whether the Mormons could have bartered the vote of Utah for McKinley's promise to drop an anti-polygamy amendment to the constitution or whether Gentiles only attempted to use the Mormons, to steal their votes by spreading such a story. Possibly the Democratic Gentiles raised the Church influence issue hoping for a backlash vote when it was discredited by Church authorities. One or two apostles could actually have made a deal with the Republicans without Church sanction and attempted to deliver the vote of not only Utah but also of Idaho.

Some things are more likely than others. There is little doubt that two members of the Quorum of the Twelve were vigorously conveying the word that the "Brethren" wanted McKinley elected. They, Matthias F. Cowley and John Henry Smith, wanted a Republican Utah and probably Idaho. They were probably working on their own without authorization from the First Presidency or from the Quorum of the
Twelve Apostles. Whether they had made a deal with the Republican Party or the United States President is conjectural. It is possible that something of the sort was done and any Gentile dealing with one or two Mormon Apostles would probably believe he was dealing with the whole Church.

These two apostles, Matthias F. Cowley and John Henry Smith, may have given the impression to Stake officials that they were carrying secret instruction from the President of the Church. The case of President Budge of Idaho seems to imply this. The same case also tends to make it unlikely that they spoke for more than just themselves. On every occasion recorded by the papers, the reaction of Church officials makes it seem unlikely that any general conspiracy headed by the First Presidency or Quorum of the Twelve actually existed. The way the Church hierarchy responded to all charges of Church intervention indicates that no official decision had been made to support one political party. Continual statements urging Mormons to vote their consciences and stating emphatically that no party was favored were more than was necessary just to clear their skirts if such a conspiracy had existed unless, of course, another decision had been made to give the whole thing up as a bad idea.

The idea of a Church agreement to swing the vote to the Republicans must be partly true, but could not have
come from the Presidency. It seems to have come from quite high up, however, as a Stake President in Idaho and others in Utah seem to follow. Probably Matthias F. Cowley and John Henry Smith did some political horse trading. The First Presidency kept coming out flatly against it though Cannon sounds more feeble in his denials, possibly because as he stated he would like to see the Republicans win. The Republican Party probably believed the idea that they had a deal and if so, their representative sent back from the east probably brought such word and may have been the source for even the Mormon party leaders believing the idea and spreading it as if from the top of the Church.

There seems no likelihood that the word came from the Church President. He denied that it had. He did not use weasel words and knew that a direct statement such as issued by him would be taken as the word by his people. He could have handled the question differently if he had made a deal and not run a risk of killing it or of having to lie. Add to this, the strong effort by the Church to stay out of politics and to keep to agreements or balance reached only lately with the Gentiles in Utah politics and it is even more doubtful that such a potentially dangerous step was taken by the Church President.\textsuperscript{63} It may be reasonable to believe that the National Republican Party thought that they had a deal.

\textsuperscript{63} Jonas and Jones, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 29.
CHAPTER V

THE RESULTS OF THE 1900 ELECTIONS

With the coverage of the Church issue, the examination of the last large question in the election is complete. At this point, the emphasis can shift to the results of the election. In both national and state offices, Utah went Republican. In the coverage of the regular state election, very little was said about the men involved. This was so because the issues of the national election were so dominating that personalities were obscured. Furthermore, because the regular party conventions of 1900 were uninteresting and the platforms were either a rehash of those presented in the special election or could be better presented in context of the campaign, nothing was said of them either. For a needed overview of the results of the national and state elections, see Appendix B.

The rather complete Republican victory is obvious from the chart. Because the vote for President was generally paralleled by the vote for Governor and other state offices, a state map showing the county-by-county vote tally for President usually shows how the state broke for the major parties. Map 2 shows how each county voted in the
Presidential race. Of course, personalities did sometimes intrude and a man, a local boy, perhaps, ran far ahead of his ticket in a specific area and a few men did consistently better than their party. Still, the trend in Utah was for the party to pull the men with it, and the Presidential map serves quite well to indicate county votes for the party.

The map shows that well populated counties like Utah, Salt Lake, and Weber Counties went Republican. This discovery demands a check on what happened in rural sections. The obvious dicotomy of rural versus urban predisposes the searcher to expect a Democratic rural vote, but no such results show themselves. The rural areas display a schizoid tendency to go either way. However, a pattern is visible. About three-fifths of the rural areas voted Republican also. So the trend of the state was to the Republicans.

Utah can be divided into other than rural and urban, however, and an examination of the mine versus agricultural vote might help explain why the remaining counties voted Democratic. In a survey of county voting habits in Utah in the 1900 national elections, it appears that mining areas trended strongly in a Republican direction, but occasional island of discontent voted strongly Democratic. Agricultural areas were less predictable than the mining areas with some voting one way and some the other, but usually they showed a slight Republican tendency. Both
mine and farm areas probably reflect the national trend toward the Republicans. Why, however, did places like Mercur and Park City, both important mining areas, diverge so markedly from the pattern of other mining regions of the state? A better question might be why did the mining regions go Republican when it was the Democrats who seemed to offer the most to metal mining? One answer may be that since 1897 the average yearly output of ore had been rising steadily in Utah.\(^1\) Value had indeed risen sharply since 1896 and was on a steep upward swing in 1899.\(^2\) That and the national Republican swing may explain the average mining vote, but does nothing to define the vote of Park City and Mercur.

It may be that good times in the mines had weaned Silver Republicans away from the Democrats, but that in places like Park City and Mercur, some especially compelling force held them firm to the Democrats. The force could have been local conditions, especially good Democratic orators, an excellent local political organization, some one man active in a local union, or even a breakdown on the Republican part in one or more of those areas. Park City did have a strongly Democratic newspaper and that may be a big factor. On the other hand, Park City was primarily a silver-producing region, one of the two largest in the

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\(^1\)Butler et al., op. cit., p. 133.  
\(^2\)Ibid., p. 287.
state. The largest silver-lead producers stayed open, but the miners were probably shaken. It is quite likely that a Democratic emphasis on silver found a ready response among those men. This explanation may hold for Park City, but Mercur was a gold center and the price of gold was up. There the file must remain open with the cause or causes unknown.

This hypothesis of the reasons for a Republican mine vote naturally leads to the final section of this thesis in which an evaluation of the whole election trend must be analyzed and some final conclusions drawn.

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3Ibid., p. 133.
4Ibid., p. 287.
5Ibid., p. 132.
Map I

Margin of Victory in the U.S. House of Representatives

1898 = Election of 1898
1900 = Special Election of 1900
1900 = Election of 1900

Adapted from a map in the Tribune, November 6, 1900, with information for the regular election of 1900 from the United States Elections Papers, 1896-1917 and 1900-1908.
Map II

Margin of Victory in the Presidential Election of 1900

R = Republican
D = Democrat

The information on this map was obtained from the Utah State Elections Papers, 1896-1917 and 1900-1906.
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

From the beginning to the end of the 1900 elections in Utah, whether in the Special Congressional, the Presidential, or the regular Congressional and State Elections, there were a multiplicity of minor themes which tended to confuse the voter. For the Democrats, however, both nationally and in Utah, imperialism was the major point. In Utah, nationalism shared its position with the silver issue. However, good times had robbed silver of its impact, and pride of conquest and expectation of gain had weakened the anti-imperialism stand.

Democrats also attacked with such minor themes as the trust and tariff questions. A jarring note was the Democratic cry that their Republican rivals were using Church influence to gain votes.

For Republicans, one motif, prosperity, was primary. When Utah Republicans used other issues they were usually just counterpoints to Democratic themes or attacks; however, Republicans did pick up such Democratic issues as trust, tariff, and silver, and with a little adaptation they made them their own.
The result of the 1900 campaigns was that Utah Democrats won the Special Congressional Election but lost the National and State Elections that followed. Bryan had done so well in Utah in the 1896 Presidential Election that when McKinley won there in 1900 it seemed shocking and incongruous. Commentators offered various explanations for the unexpected change in Utah's vote.

In "Utah Presidential Elections, 1896-1952," Jonas and Jones point out that Utah has only twice departed significantly from the national pattern. In 1896 Bryan lost to McKinley nationally by less than a percentage point. In Utah he pulled 82.7% of the vote; nationally he drew 49.4% of the total vote. A drastic change occurred in 1900 when Bryan dropped 43.4% nationally and 48.1% in Utah. McKinley rose from 17.2% in 1896 to 50.7% in 1900. In chart form this would be:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1896</th>
<th>1900</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Utah</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bryan</td>
<td>82.7</td>
<td>49.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McKinley</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>50.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Jonas and Jones feel that the elections went as they did because Utah was changing politically and economically. The economic situation was changing from one marked by the idealistic communal ideas of the Mormon Church to another

1Jonas and Jones, op. cit., p. 289.
characterized as capitalistic. The Church had started the sugar industry of the west and had borrowed money in the eastern markets. Important church members were also engaging in mining. In 1896 the Democrats put up a silver platform and the Republicans held to gold. The result was that mining interests, Populists, Mormons and non-Mormons merged and supported the Democrats. Mormons were affected by the tariff issue also since they were heavily engaged in sheep and cattle raising. The 1896 election was seen as a reflex vote along pre-statehood lines. Mormons had traditionally been Democrats, partly because it seemed Republicans were pushing anti-polygamy issues and the only help came from Democrats. Certain powerful leaders among the Mormons were working for the Republicans, however, men such as Reed Smoot, George Q. Cannon, Lorenzo Snow, Joseph F. Smith, Francis Lyman, and John Henry Smith. From 1896 to 1900 the state and the officials of the Mormon Church were caught up in the spirit of "nationalism and expansionism." Further, gold came to be associated with good times.

Jonas and Jones credit Milton Merrill with attributing the change in the vote to Mormon Church direction.\(^2\) He is said to claim that among politicians and editors it was a common belief that the Mormon Church had made a deal with the Republican Party. The belief was that Mark Hanna directed the Republican National Committee to make a deal with

\(^2\)Ibid., p. 294.
Lorenzo Snow, President of the Church. Said Merrill: "The quid pro quo of the deal was never fully specified, nor the charges corroborated by substantial evidence," but, he continued, the charges were repeated and believed in both the nation and Utah. The Republicans supposedly offered the Church assurances that no constitutional amendment or tough legislation would be aimed at the Church if the Church in return would deliver the vote of Utah and influence that of surrounding states. When Bryan lost his 1896 majority of fifty-three thousand votes, that was accepted as absolute proof of Mormon political control. Church defenders retorted that in 1895 Heber M. Wells pulled the same vote for Governor that he got in 1900. Beyond that defenders said that the Church leaders were gold standard men in 1896 and had been unhappy with the silver victory.  

Jones and Jonas say that Merrill attributed the move the Republican camp made in 1900 and 1902 to "the cooperative effort of all the diverse elements included in the Republican party, aided slightly by certain non-partisan forces in the Mormon Church."  

3If the deal was never proven to have taken place and if in fact, it did not, then of course the quid pro quo of the deal would not likely be specified or specifiable.  

4Jonas and Jones, op. cit., p. 294.  

5Ibid.
Ahlstrom, on the other hand, offers the following in explanation:

In 1896 the Silver issue split the Republican party and the silver Republicans joined with the Democratic Party in voting for Bryan. The Populists of Utah also voted for Bryan. However, for both groups the loyalty to Democratic candidates held for only the Presidency. The Democratic candidate for Congressman got only sixty-one per cent of the votes compared to Bryan's eighty-five per cent win.6

In 1898 the silver issue was still alive, but Silver Republicans and Republicans generally combined to vote against a Mormon official who was running for Congress on the Democratic ticket. By 1900 the silver issue and the depression had faded, and Roosevelt had become very popular.7 The issue of the trusts was weakened in Utah because the Church was active in business in large corporations and lent it a certain sanctity. Besides, Mormons respect hard work and accomplishment, and where the big business showed no sign of corruption, they saw little need to change or fight big business.8 For these reasons the Republicans carried the state by two thousand one hundred thirty-three votes.9

JoAnn Barnett (Shipps) concludes that the Republican victory resulted from "the internal chaos and resulting

6Ahlstrom, op. cit., p. 22.
7Ibid., p. 24.
8Ibid., p. 96.
9Ibid., p. 24.
breakdown of the Democratic party machinery following the Moses Thatcher incident and the Congressional rejection of B. H. Roberts. ... This temporarily sapped the strength of Utah's Democratic party." Laurens Dimter cites the following as causes for Bryan's 1896 victory in Utah. The importance of silver mining in Utah had made silver of primary concern during the 1890's. Many miners had gone Populist in behalf of silver, and the Populists went Democratic in 1896 to favor pro-silver Bryan. The Democratic Party favored free coinage of silver at a sixteen-to-one ratio. Bryan was familiar to Utahns as a lecturer for the American Bimetalic League.11

The conclusions reached in this thesis are not in complete harmony with the above explanations. Moreover, since the scope of this thesis is broader, covering the Special Election as well as the national election, elements not found in the above-cited conclusions must be touched upon.

The Special Election is a good place to start. King probably won the Special Election for two reasons. First, as a Democrat he stood for the man who represented Utah and had been denied his seat in Congress. Second, the strongest Republican candidate may not have run in the April Special Election. Sutherland held off until November, and King

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10 Barnett (Shipps), op. cit., p. 97.
11 Dimter, op. cit., pp. 81-82.
faced a possibly weaker candidate and won. Still, he did not win by the margin that his predecessor Roberts had.  

Utah Democratic political predominance was diminishing even on an issue with emotional or religious overtones. 

So the change in the vote for McKinley between 1896 and 1900 is dramatic, but not as dramatic as it seems if it is noted that a trend was moving that way all along. The Special Election showed that Republican power had already reached sizeable proportions. No sudden, interpolated element, Mormon Church conspiracy or what have you, accounts for McKinley's Utah victory. Bryan lost and McKinley won because prosperity had returned to Utah and the nation, and silver had consequently faded as an issue. That brought Silver Republicans back into the party and lost the Democratic vote from miners. For Utahns, Bryan stood for silver, and silver now stood for less. Prosperity alone would probably have won the election for the Republicans, but it was not alone. 

The Republican campaign gave the impression of being better directed than the Democratic. Where Democrats were strong, as for instance on silver, Republicans cut in on their possible vote gain by almost adopting the same position. It did not matter that nationally Republicans

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12See Map 2, p. 112.

13Dimter, op. cit., pp. 81-82.
were gold standard men; in Utah, Republicans liked silver and gold. If Democrats trumpeted against trusts, Republicans answered with the same sound. Democrats spoke sharply about imperialism, but even on imperialism they found Republicans not so far from their position. What the Utah Democrats usually favored was a continuing of the fighting until victory was won. After that they promised to set up a local independent Philippine Republic and get out. Basically, they were not a peace party, but they only differed from Republicans on what should be done with the Philippines after conquest. Their humanitarianism did not cover killing rebels, but only the political aspects of the government of a conquered Philippines, and if some Democrats did want to stop the fighting, they only looked unpatriotic. Utah Republicans wanted to conquer the Philippines, too and then to let them have as much self-government as they were ready for. They would educate the people there and give them the benefits of American civilization. They would also stay and develop the resources of the islands and let the flag be a beacon to Asia. Put that way, it does not sound like colonialism.

Utahns had seen prosperity return without silver and were probably as proud of beating Spain as any people in the United States. Probably the big difference between Democrats and Republicans on imperialism was that Republicans made acquisition of the Philippines sound lucrative and God
guided, and Democrats favored censuring the government for getting into the Philippines in the first place and wanted to get out as soon as possible. The Democratic position on imperialism was a negative one and not likely to be appealing to great numbers of voters right at that time.

On the tariff issue Republican orators warned Utah that a low tariff such as Democrats proposed would ruin Utah. Mine and ranch would both suffer as they were said to have done under a previous Democratic tariff. Leave well enough alone, they were warned. Do not tamper with something that is moving well. In Utah that is probably a powerful inducement to vote Republican.

Another deciding factor in Utah's elections was probably money or campaign funds. Time after time, Democrats in Utah complained that the Republicans were hiring their workers away from them. Republicans reputed to have received ample money from the national organization seemed to be in a better financial position than the Democrats who had received nothing. Money or its lack can be critical in a campaign. Republicans had money; Democrats did not.14

Finally, the Democrats saw two members of the Quorum of the Twelve working diligently to defeat them. As private individuals they had every right to do so, and other high

14Herald, November 5, 1900.
church officials were working for the Democrats. What hurt, however, was that the Democrats thought that these two, Apostles John Henry Smith and Matthias F. Cowley, were hinting that the Church wanted a Republican victory. There is a strong possibility that they were, in fact, doing this. However, the President of the Church was not and made a firm denial of any Church interest in the race and, alluding directly to those two apostles, said no one had been sent out with secret instructions to swing the vote. Some waver- ing voters may have been influenced to the Republican side by Apostles Cowley and Smith, but likely not many.

Church influence did not elect McKinley. Good times and a fortuitous meld of minor issues defeated Bryan and carried McKinley to victory in Utah. With few exceptions, all parts of Utah and all walks of life tended to vote Republican. There was apparently neither a mine versus agricultural vote nor a rural versus urban vote. Some areas were apparently more strongly Republican than others, but usually the plurality was McKinley's everywhere, and Utah had simply followd the national trend.
APPENDIX A

BALLOT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th>Republicans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>For President and Vice President</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William J. Bryan</td>
<td>William McKinley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adlai E. Stevenson</td>
<td>Theodore Roosevelt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>For Presidential Electors</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexander H. Tarbet</td>
<td>Wesley K. Walton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orlando W. Powers</td>
<td>C. Ed. Loose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. C. Thoresen</td>
<td>John R. Murdock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>For Representative in 57th Congress</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William H. King</td>
<td>George Sutherland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>For Justice of the Supreme Court</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. W. N. Whitecotton</td>
<td>George W. Bartch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>For Governor</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James H. Moyle</td>
<td>Heber M. Wells</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>For Secretary of State</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisher S. Harris</td>
<td>James T. Hammond</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>For Attorney General</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. J. Weber</td>
<td>M. A. Breeder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>For Superintendent of Public Instruction</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nathan T. Porter</td>
<td>A. C. Nelson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>For State Treasurer</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert C. Lund</td>
<td>John DeGrey Dixon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>For State Auditor</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry N. Hayes</td>
<td>C. S. Tingey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>For District Judges 3rd Judicial District</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>William C. Hall</td>
<td>Morris L. Ritchie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph T. Richards</td>
<td>Thomas D. Lewis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samuel W. Stewart</td>
<td>Charles W. Morse</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\)Deseret Evening News, Monday, October 29, 1900.

123
Democrats

For District Attorney
David B. Hempstead

For State Senators 6th District
Henry P. Henderson
Henry W. Lawrence
David O. Rideout, Jr.

For State Representatives 8th District
Rulon S. Wells
D. O. Willey, Jr.
W. B. LaVeille
Mahonri Spencer
John A. Maynes
Elizabeth M. Cohen
John Hansen, Jr.
James Thompson
John C. Hayes
Joseph S. Hyde

(The remaining were county officers and have not been included herein.)

Social Democratic Party

For President
Eugene V. Debs

For Vice President
Job Harriman

For Presidential Electors
Joseph Ward
C. B. Hobbs
W. B. Clays

For Representative to 57th Congress
A. B. Edler

For Justice of Supreme Court
A. Saxey

For Governor
Martin Wright

For Secretary of State
C. C. Goodwin

Republicans

Dennis C. Eichnor

Hoyt Sherman
George N. Lawrence
Stephan H. Love

Fred T. McCurrin
Archibald Stuart
Orson A. Hewlett
John T. Axton
Benner X. Xmith
A. L. Hamlin
W. G. Van Horne
William N. Williams
Nephi L. Morris
William McMillan

National Prohibition Party

For President
John G. Woolley

For Vice President
Henry B. Metcalf

For Representative to 57th Congress
A. Saxeay

For Governor
Jacob S. Boreman

For Secretary of State
Byron F. Ott
Social Democratic Party

National Prohibition Party

For Attorney General
Charles D. Savery

For Superintendent of Public Instruction
Byron Wheelock
Francis C. Smith

For State Treasurer
John F. Osborn
C. E. Smith

For State Auditor
Charles E. Strong
Amelia B. Gatrell

For State Senators, 6th District
Charles Stewart
No more offices shown
J. A. MaHan
for National Prohibition Party.
William Brown

For State Representative, 8th District
Matthew Wilson
Joseph Hanson
E. L. Powell
J. G. Hocking
John Tadlock
C. J. Johnson
O. E. Parson
William Burleigh
William Whiting

Socialist Labor Party

For President
Joseph Francis Malloney

For Vice President
Valentine Remmel

For Presidential Electors
James P. Erskine
S. R. Wheaton
E. J. Smith

For Representative to 57th Congress
D. F. Porter

For Justice of Supreme Court

For Governor
P. E. Nelson

(No more offices up by Socialist Labor Party.)
## APPENDIX B

### RESULTS OF ELECTION

(Results of elections for major offices are included. Minor offices have been dropped.)

**For President**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R.</td>
<td>William McKinley</td>
<td>47,099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.</td>
<td>William J. Bryan</td>
<td>44,944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.D.</td>
<td>Eugene V. Debs</td>
<td>717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.P.</td>
<td>John G. Woolley</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.L.</td>
<td>Joseph Francis Malloney</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Scattering</td>
<td>9</td>
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</table>

**Representatives to 57th Congress**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R.</td>
<td>George Sutherland</td>
<td>46,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.</td>
<td>William H. King</td>
<td>45,939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.D.</td>
<td>A. B. Edler</td>
<td>627</td>
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<td>S.L.</td>
<td>D. F. Porter</td>
<td>83</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Scattering</td>
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**For Judges of Supreme Court**

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<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R.</td>
<td>George W. Bartch</td>
<td>47,443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.</td>
<td>J. W. N. Whitecotton</td>
<td>44,472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.P.</td>
<td>A. Saxey</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Scattering</td>
<td>5</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**For Governor**

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<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R.</td>
<td>Heber M. Wells</td>
<td>47,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.</td>
<td>James H. Moyle</td>
<td>44,447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.D.</td>
<td>Martin Wright</td>
<td>641</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---


126
### For Governor (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N.P.</th>
<th>Jacob S. Boreman</th>
<th>207</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S.L.</td>
<td>P. E. Nelson</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
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</table>

### For Secretary of State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>R.</th>
<th>James T. Hammond</th>
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<td>D.</td>
<td>Fisher S. Harris</td>
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<td>S.D.</td>
<td>C. C. Goodwin</td>
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<td>N.P.</td>
<td>Byron F. Ott</td>
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Theses and Dissertations


THE ELECTIONS OF 1900 IN UTAH

An Abstract of
A Thesis
Presented to the
Department of History
Brigham Young University

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

by
R. Gary Penrod
August 1968
ABSTRACT

The 1900 elections have been little touched in historical studies of Utah. However 1900 was a year of special interest and deserves an examination. In that year a Special Election was held, all state offices were up for renewal and a Presidential Election took place.

The Special Election was necessary because B. H. Roberts had been denied his seat in the United States Congress. Roberts was excluded because he was a polygamist. The Roberts case threatened to revive gentile versus Mormon antipathies in Utah. However, the most puzzling aspect of the 1900 elections is connected with the presidential vote. In 1896 Bryan, a Democrat, received 82.7% of the Utah vote for President. His Republican opponent, McKinley, polled only 17.2%. Yet nationally Bryan received 49.4% of the total vote while McKinley took 50.6%. In 1900 in Utah Bryan only received 48.1% and McKinley polled 50.7% of the vote. Their national percentages were little changed from 1896. Because there was a vote change of 34.6% men searched for some reason to explain such a dramatic shift of votes. Some people charged that the Mormon Church had entered politics and made a deal with the Democratic Party. People said this was done in return for
assurances that the Federal government would not press too hard on polygamy prosecutions and would stop the proposed anti-polygamy amendment to the Constitution.

This thesis will attempt to determine what happened in the 1900 elections in Utah. The thesis will also search for reasons for the results of the elections.

APPROVED

[Signatures]

Chairman, Advisory Committee

Member, Advisory Committee

Chairman, Major Department