A Burkean Logological Analysis of Doctrine and Covenants
Section 88

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A BURKEAN LOGOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF DOCTRINE AND COVENANTS SECTION 88

A Thesis
Presented to the
Department of English
Brigham Young University

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

by
Joann Farias
December 1986
This thesis, by Joann Farias is accepted in its present form by the Department of English of Brigham Young University as satisfying the thesis requirement for the degree of Master of Arts.

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Why Burke?

I have always been interested in the way people relate to one another. Throughout my life, my intended field of occupation has changed many times, from psychiatry to theatre to literature; but these fields have always had to do with human nature and the ways people interact. My most recent interest has been literature, and in literature my area of emphasis is, not surprisingly, rhetoric, which deals with the ways people persuade one another, persuasion being one of the most vigorous and universal components of human nature.

Because of this fascination with human nature and rhetoric, my interests are general; I enjoy reading poets and scholars with similarly broad interests, who consider all of life as their rightful province. Last year I took a course on the history of rhetoric, and at the conclusion of the course read Kenneth Burke's *Permanence and Change*. In it Burke deals with the ways human motives operate and the role of language in motives, with special emphasis on literature, but with broad reference to all communication. I was intrigued, because Burke dealt with the very questions it seems I had been fumbling with all my life. So I began to read more Burke (*Attitudes toward History, A Grammar of Motives, A Rhetoric of Motives, The Rhetoric of...*)
Religion, Language as Symbolic Action), and I tried to read his work in a roughly chronological order, so I could retrace his steps, as it were, and follow the progression of his thought about the basis of human motives.

Reading Burke has been a most fascinating journey, and I hope to continue reading him with pleasure for the rest of my life. But at the same time, I wanted to see if I could in some way incorporate his critical method into my education, my way of thinking, in fact, my entire life; and I don't think Burke would be displeased with this ambition, for he urges his method of criticism not only as a way of analyzing texts, but more important, a way of living well: "The corrective of the scientific rationalization would seem necessarily to be a rationale of art—not, however, a performer's art, not a specialist's art for some to produce and many to observe, but an art in its widest aspects, an art of living (Permanence and Change 66)."

An art of living is what I have sought in Burke, and in my education as a whole. It seems at this point, now that I have read Burke's major works (at least the ones published in book form; I hope to obtain a xerox library of the rest of Burke as soon as I have the nickels and hours), the most important thing for me to do is to incorporate it, to make it my own. One of the ideas that
appeals most to me in Burke is the earning of one's world. Burke says that when people do not invest their time and energy into their world, that is, their world view, which includes occupation, society, values, beliefs, and so on, they become alienated. They have nothing invested in the world, so they become indifferent. And when people become alienated, the world becomes senseless and "basically unreasonable" to them (Attitudes toward History 216). Work is a vital part of earning one's world. By "earning" Burke means possession. And a person only really possesses what he works for: the harder he works, the more he possesses what he works for.

Now that I have found a way of thinking and living that seem an answer and a modus operandi to all my lifelong interests and desires, I want to earn it, to make it truly mine. So for my thesis, I take Burke's critical method, which is broad and goes right to the heart of life by treating the basis of human motives (and it seems that is what the humanities are about), and apply this method to something equally (if not more) important to me, and by doing so, earn them both, for myself, and for anyone who wants to come along with me. This is where Doctrine and Covenants Section 88 comes in.
Because I am a Latter-day Saint, the Mormon scriptures are (I hope) texts very close to the core of my motives, some portions more than others. Doctrine and Covenants Section 88 has always especially appealed to me, and I am fascinated with the way this appeal works. Section 88 contains statements on the universal order, including the natural (planets and heavenly bodies), the human (the various commandments, injunctions, and bits of advice, especially the odd part about the school of the prophets), and the divine (the apocalypse and the arrangements of the kingdoms of glory). I chose Section 88 as my text because I wanted as my thesis to investigate its appeal, examine how the natural, human, and divine orders are integrated for effect, and discover some things about the ways language functions in a particularly Mormon theological setting.

A Burkean logological analysis (the term logology is explained later in the introduction) brings together these two important influences in my life, Burke and Mormonism, harmonizes them, and thereby allows me to emerge with a new synthesis and therefore a more clear and self-conscious rationale for living well. And since the project is written in the context of a Mormon community, I hope that anyone reading my analysis derives a similar benefit, becomes as converted to both Joseph Smith and
Kenneth Burke as I have, and becomes aware of the ways language works in a particularly Mormon setting.
Introduction to Logology

My readers are likely all familiar with what theology in practice is: the study of God and his relation to the world. As the -logy portion of the word indicates, theology relies on logos, words, to describe this relation, and as such, theology exemplifies the ways language works when trying to promote appropriate action. The practical emphasis of theology on appropriate action entails an attempt to influence human motives. As Burke says,

Religions always ground their exhortations (to themselves and others) in statements of the widest and deepest possible scope, concerning the authorship of men's motives. (Religion v)

I intend to investigate the effect of the language of Doctrine and Covenants Section 88 on Mormon motives and action by using a logological analysis. Logology is similar but somewhat different from theology, in that it studies words about God as revealing their nature as words, not so much the nature of God himself:

For regardless of whether the entity named "God" exists outside his nature sheerly as key term in a system of terms, words "about him" must reveal their nature as words. (Religion 2)
The key term logology is explained later in this introduction. Logology, however, is only the most recent step in Burke's journey. Because his journey has been both long and complex, and because Burke is such an eclectic, unsystematic thinker, it is necessary before explaining and applying logology in isolation to acquaint the reader unfamiliar with Burke with the major concepts that have lead up to logology, and made it a natural conclusion thus far in Burke's critical life. These concepts include Burke's definition of man, his theory of language, his theory of dramatism, his theory of order (or hierarchy), and finally his method of logology.

Burke's Theory of Human Nature

Burke's theory of human nature is the crucial foundation for an understanding of his method. All Burke's theories about human motives and the role of language in the creation of human motives have their basis in his theory of human nature. According to Burke's definition,

Man is

1) the symbol-using (symbol-making, symbol-misusing) animal

2) inventor of the negative (or moralized by the negative)
3) separated from his natural condition by instruments of his own making
4) goaded by the spirit of hierarchy (or moved by the sense of order)
5) and rotten with perfection. (Language 16)²

This is Burke's definition of man. Each phrase will now be considered in more detail.

1) "the symbol-using (symbol-making, symbol-misusing) animal."

Man is an animal, a creature of flesh and blood, and because of this he must never underestimate the role his body plays in the creation of his motives. At the same time, man is distinct from other animals because of his symbol-using capacity. Symbols are what define our world for us:

Take away our books, and what little do we know about history, biography, even something so "down to earth" as the relative position of seas and continents? . . . And however important to us is the tiny sliver of reality each of us has experienced firsthand, the whole overall "picture" is but a construct of our symbol systems. (Language 5)
2) "inventor of the negative (or moralized by the negative)."

The most important part of symbolicity is the ability to discount language: the negative. According to Burke, the negative is strictly a function of symbol systems, natural things being only positively what they are (Language 9). With the negative comes the ability to discount language, to realize that the symbols do not refer to positive physical reality. Burke explains the negative function of symbols in terms that anticipated Hayakawa's now famous phrase making the same point: "The map is not the thing":

A road map that helps us easily find our way from one side of the continent to the other owes its great utility to its exceptional existential property. It tells us absurdly little about the trip that is to be experienced in a welter of detail. Indeed, its value for us is in the very fact that it is so essentially inane. (Language 5)

There are two types of negative, the propositional negative ("it is not") and the hortatory negative ("thou shalt not"). Burke considers the hortatory negative prior in human life, both narratively (because children learn the meaning of No! before they learn that something is
not) and logically (because Burke thinks that humans have will and action, and therefore the negative that is a prohibition against action is more basic to human nature than the negative that tells people what is not in the physical world). (Narrative and logical priority are distinctions that will be discussed further later in this introduction.)

3) "Separated from his natural conditions by instruments of his own making."

Because of man's ability to use both types of negative (as Burke says, "negation is the very essence of language" Language 457), man can invent and use symbol systems, which effectively remove him from the world of objects to a realm of symbols. And from his ability to use symbol systems comes the ability to translate those symbol systems into the social world:

The toolmaking propensities envisioned in our third clause result in the complex network of material operations and properties, public or private, that arise through men's livelihood, with the different classes of society that arise through the division of labor and the varying relationships to the property structure.

(Language 15)
4) "Goaded by the spirit of hierarchy."

Because of the ability of the negative to introduce symbolically what is not found in nature, man can invent the systems of symbols that make up his culture. Thus culture, an instrument of man's own making, separates man from nature:

Here man's skill with symbols combines with his negativity and with the tendencies towards different modes of livelihood implicit in the inventions that make for division of labor, the result being definitions and differentiations and allocations of property protected by the negativities of the law. (Language 15)

All these divisions in material condition naturally result in rank, "the spirit of hierarchy" or "the sense of order."

5) "And rotten with perfection."

The sense of order brings a sense that each creature within the order should be perfect within the limits of its kind; this is what Burke means by the phrase "rotten with perfection." Burke compares this to the Artistotelian entelechy (Language 17), "each kind striving toward the perfection of its kind" (Rhetoric of Motives
333). In other words, innate in man is the drive to take things to their most logical and complete conclusion, even if that conclusion is the destruction of the entire species in a perfect atomic blast.³

This, then, is Burke's definition of man. Because this definition relies on man's nature as symbol-using animal, Burke's theory of language—foremost of symbol systems—develops directly from his definition of man.

**Burke's Theory of Language**

The title of Burke's most recent book is *Language as Symbolic Action*, and that title in many ways sums up his view of language. Although Burke is interested in the origins of language,⁴ he comments that

> The ultimate origins of language seem to me as mysterious as the origins of the universe itself. One must view it, I feel, simply as the "given." But once an animal comes into being that does happen to have this particular aptitude, the various tribal idioms are unquestionably developed by their use as instruments in the tribe's way of living (the practical role of symbolism in what the anthropologist, Malinowski, has called "context of situation"). Such considerations are involved in what I mean by the "dramatistic,"
stressing language as an aspect of "action," that is, as "symbolic action." (Language 44)

The idea of language as symbolic action is a dramatistic view. Burke uses the term dramatistic, because he focuses on human action, which entails will, not motion, which does not; and the metaphor of the drama is his way of reminding us of this distinction. The dramatistic view of language also posits that any given terminology is not only a screen that separates language users from the nonverbal world (Language 5), but even more important, a "reflection of reality" inasmuch as it creates reality for us (Language 45): "so much of the 'we' that is separated from the nonverbal by the verbal would not even exist were it not for the verbal" (Language 5).

Our symbolic lives include any type of method or tool, time, culture (including history, poetry, law, and so on), symbol systems such as measurement, and the list goes on. Thus language creates reality by the creation of what Burke calls "terministic screens," or series of terms, which at the same time create one reality and separate us from other realities.5

These terministic screens are persuasive: they choose what we to take into account as reality, and what we ignore. For example, if a language does not have a term for a thing, that thing does not exist for the users of
that language; eleven types of snow exist for Eskimos, but not for Californians. These distinctions are crucial for the Eskimos' actions, because the terms designate the appropriate conditions for such activities as hunting, finding shelter, and so on. The verbal influences even the nonverbal; here Burke uses the example of the psychogenic illness: upon encountering a hex (a token of tribal disapproval), a tribesman will promptly die, whether his strictly animal nature is ailing or not (Religion 18). In a sense, in our use of terms, we are presented with a choice, and our terms in effect say Yes! to some things and No! to others. Thus the hortatory negative is at the basis of a dramatistic view of language, because the hortatory provides connotations of compliance or hostility in language, and these connotations lead to action (Language 44). Burke says,

> Even if any given terminology is a reflection of reality, by its very nature as a terminology it must be a selection of reality; and to this extent it must function also as a deflection of reality. (Language 45)

Thus language is symbolic action: action, because in the use of language, people choose some actions and do not choose others; symbolic, because this action takes place in the realm of the verbal. The three key terms to
remember in connection with language are creativity (because language plays a great part in creating reality), the negative (because it is through the hortatory negative implicit in any set of terms and the discounting of language in any symbol system, like the road map, that allows language to operate over and above the strictly physical world), and the terministic screen (which reminds us that our language is doubly a screen: between ourselves and the nonverbal and between ourselves and other sets of terms).

**Burke's System of Dramatism**

From Burke's view of language as symbolic action naturally comes his system of dramatism. He uses dramatism as his metaphor because it reminds us that through the ability inherent in language to choose, humans create action. Recall the example of the Eskimo: the particular word for snow he uses determines his action, whether he will hunt, fish, or stay indoors (and these actions are crucial to his survival). The symbol system that best illustrates this action is drama. There are five elements that determine the nature of a drama, and Burke takes from drama these five key terms to use in the analysis of symbolic action: act, scene, agent, agency, and purpose. These he calls his pentad of terms. Burke's
A Grammar of Motives treats different combinations of emphasis on these terms.

For example, an emphasis on scene results in a materialistic terminology (which results in a materialistic policy for dealing with life: materialistic "instruments in a tribe's way of living" Language 44), because scene is the environment in which an act takes place. Burke analyzes Hobbes, Darwin, and others for a materialistic terminology to determine how such a terminology operates. Likewise, an emphasis on agent results in idealism; agency, pragmatism; act, realism; purpose, mysticism (Grammar 128). Through this pentad of terms, Burke attempts to analyze the motives underlying the entire range of symbolic action.

These terms are used alone or in combination; a combination of these terms is what Burke calls a ratio. For example, the scene-act ratio emphasizes the relationship between the environment and the action; of this Burke says,

From the motivational point of view, there is implicit in the quality of a scene the quality of the action that is to take place within it. This would be another way of saying that the act will be consistent with the scene. Thus, when the curtain rises to disclose a given stage-set,
this stage-set contains, simultaneously, implicitly, all that the narrative is to draw out as a sequence, explicitly. Of, if you will, the stage-set contains the action ambiguously (as regards the norms of action)—and in the course of the play's development this ambiguity is converted into a corresponding articulacy.

(Grammar 7)

The point of the ratios is that symbolic action does not occur in isolation; it always takes place in context. Humans live in communities. And part of the human condition is, by Burke's definition, a separation from the environment by instruments of human device. These symbolic instruments lead to a difference in material conditions. This difference in material conditions leads to hierarchy. In A Rhetoric of Motives, Burke analyzes the ways the principle of hierarchy operates in symbolic action.

Burke's Theory of Hierarchy

But since, for better or worse, the mystery of the hierarchic is forever with us, let us, as students of rhetoric, scrutinize its range of entrancements, both with dismay and delight. And finally let us observe, all about us, forever goading us, though it
be in fragments, the motive that attains its ultimate identification in the thought, not of the universal holocaust, but of the universal order—as with the rhetorical and dialectical symmetry of the Aristotelian metaphysics, whereby all classes of beings are hierarchically arranged in a chain or ladder or pyramid of mounting worth, each kind striving toward the perfection of its kind, and so towards the kind next above it, while the strivings of the entire series head in God as the beloved cynosure and sinecure, the end of all desire. *(Rhetoric of Motives 333)*

The idea of order is axiomatic for Burke, but as he says *(Religion 174-175)*, implicit in any idea of order is an idea of disorder. But whence cometh the idea of order? Oddly enough, Burke says, from disorder, because it is universally apparent that not all creatures are alike. Somehow, though, we long for unity; as Burke says, we long for God. So somehow a lack or failure of unity is wrong; from this comes the idea of the Fall.

The Fall is another axiomatic idea for Burke. If God is unity, then the Fall is disunity, or the existence of different types of things. And if there are different
types of things, Burke says, these types will be arranged in some type of order, from best to worst, first to last. Law can be defined as the pattern of division, the pattern of order; and disobedience to law is the disruption of order, or chaos.

In the fallen world, law is good, Burke feels, because it preserves order, the closest thing we have to unity, because order is the unity of types of things, of things most alike. Implicit in the idea of law is the idea of infraction; in infraction, punishment; in punishment, redemption; in redemption, a personal redeemer. In the disobedience to law is the possibility of one's saying No! to law or Yes! to a counter-law, part of a counter-order. Opposed to punishment Burke places the idea of blessing, which affirms the order, thereby bringing the obedient closer to unity.

Burke feels there is order in all things: natural, human, and divine. And with order comes rank, or the arrangement of things into an order of best to worst, first to last. Because all things are members of the creation, it is necessary for different things to have intercourse and relations among one another. But since they are different, there arises a corresponding embarrassment about how to deal with a being different from oneself. Thus we have mystery, the awe for things
different from oneself, and the implements of mystery are pageantry (such physical manifestation of rank as special clothing and insignia) and rituals (acts that manifest rank, such as bowing, saluting, and so on).

All things have to relate to one another, and the relation between beings of different classes Burke calls courtship. Because there are many different types of beings, Burke says there are likewise many different types of order and different types of courtship. In this paper these are called configurations of order. The type of order at hand depends on the purpose of the communication or relation. For example, there is a different relation between two people if one is male and the other female than if one is higher and the other lower in the social order; often these configurations overlap and influence one another: there is a different courtship between a high female and a low male than between a low female and a high male. Two types of courtship that appear most are the courtship between God and man and the courtship between man and man. In the relation between orders of beings, courtship employs methods of entreaty, the purest of which is prayer (Rhetoric of Motives 178).

As mentioned in Burke's quote at the beginning, the desire and end of all order is perfection of the species and ultimate unity in God. And Section 88 deals with the
breaking down of old orders and the setting up of unity in God, as in the poor and meek inheriting the earth (verse 17) and the saints "receiv[ing] their inheritance and be[ing] made equal with him" (verse 107). However, one should take care not to take too literally mentions of equality. For, as Burke says,

And it reminds us, on hearing talk of equality, to ask ourselves, without so much as questioning the possibility that things might be otherwise: "Just how does the hierarchic principle work in this particular scheme of equality?" (Rhetoric of Motives 141)

This brings the process full circle, with order and therefore disunity, hierarchy and therefore mystery and courtship. As the quote at the beginning of this portion urges, it is probably wisest to accept the existence of the spirit of hierarchy, and enjoy all the variety and entrancements of order.

**Burke's System of Logology**

Logology is a natural outgrowth from the rest of Burke's critical premises. Once it is established that man uses language as a type of symbolic action and that this symbolic action operates in a community which is necessarily goaded by the principle of hierarchy, the next question is, How can one best study the motives behind
symbolic action in the human community? Part of the answer to this question is to locate a field of study in which motives are particularly compelling. Burke has concluded that religion is the best field of study, because

Religious cosmogonies are designed, in the last analysis, as exceptionally thoroughgoing modes of persuasion. To persuade men towards certain acts, religions would form the kinds of attitude which prepare men for such acts. And in order to plead for such attitudes as persuasively as possible, religions always ground their exhortations (to themselves and others) in statements of the widest and deepest possible scope, concerning the authorship of men's motives. (Religion v)

Thus the study of human motives is best conducted on religions, and on theological texts in particular, because "theology is preeminently verbal. It is "words about God"" (Religion vi). Since theology is "words about God," the study of words about "words about God" is logology:

Thus it is our "logological" thesis that, since theological use of language is thorough, the close study of theology and its forms will provide us
with good insight into the nature of language itself as a motive. (Religion vi)

The actual method of logology is the study of theological texts using six analogies that Burke describes in The Rhetoric of Religion, in the context of his other theories (his definition of man, his theory of language, the principle of hierarchy), which he has worked out throughout his career. In a nutshell, these analogies are

1. "words-words": The likeness between words about words and words about the Word.
2. "spirit-matter": Words are to non-verbal nature as Spirit is to Matter.
3. "negative": Language theory, in coming to a head in a theory of the negative, corresponds to "negative theology."
4. "titular": Linguistic entitlement leads to a search for the title of titles, which is technically a "god-term."
5. "time-eternity": "Time" is to "eternity" as the particulars in the unfolding of a sentence are to the sentence's unitary meaning.
6. "formal": The relation between the name and the thing named is like the relation of persons in the Trinity. (Religion 33)

I will now explain each analogy in further detail.
The first analogy, words-Word, posits that because "language by definition is not suited to the expression of the "ineffable"" (Religion 15), "words for the discussion of this realm [i.e., the ineffable] are necessarily borrowed by analogy from our words for the other three orders: the natural, the socio-political and the verbal (or the symbolic in general, as with the symbol-systems of music, the dance, painting, architecture, the various specialized scientific nomenclatures, etc.)" (Religion 15). These three empirical realms are important, not only because they are necessary to express the ineffable, but for what they lend theological texts. Burke explains the influence of each:

First, the sweep and power of the natural (of storms, of seas, of mountains), also the structural consistencies, as with crystals and with the symmetries of biologic organisms. Second, in the socio-political order, the dignities and solemnities of office—and the intimacies of the familial. And third . . . the "symbolicity" of the symbolic. (Religion 37) Their empirical nature is also important because terms borrowed from these into the analogical can then be
borrowed back, with extra meaning (*Religion* 37). Burke compares this with the Platonic dialectic:

First, there is the "Upward Way" from "lower terms" to a unitary transcendent term conceived "mythically" (analogically); and then there is a reversal of direction, a "Downward Way," back to the "lower" terms with which the dialectician began his climb; but now the "lower" terms are viewed as having become modified by the unitary principle encountered en route. The secular, empirical terms are "infused by the spirit" of the "transcendent" term. (*Religion* 37)

**Matter-Spirit**

This analogy states that "Words are to the non-verbal things they name as Spirit is to Matter" (*Religion* 16). That is, on one level there is the thing itself, "nature" if you will, then there is the word, which in a sense "transcends" the thing it names. The comparison Burke uses is the way theologically grace is said to "perfect" nature (*Religion* 8, 16). Words transcend the things they name. Sometimes the symbolic and the natural become merged, as with psychogenic illnesses. But always language pervades the natural, as a sort of "supernatural," hence spiritual (*Religion* 17). (For a further
The Negative

To be used properly, Burke says, language must be "discounted." That is, whatever correspondence there is between a word and the thing it names, the word is not the thing. The word "tree" is not a tree. And just as effects that can be got with the thing can't be got with the word, so effects that can be got with the word can't be got with the thing. But because these two realms coincide so usefully at certain points, we tend to overlook the areas where they radically diverge. We gravitate spontaneously toward naive verbal realism. (Religion 18)

The paradox of the negative is that we discuss "the realm of the non-verbal in terms of what it is not." (Religion 18). Thus at the basis of language is the negative, a spontaneous feeling for what is not. A good example of this, Burke says, is irony: mature language users can distinguish the ironic from the earnest. Burke discusses Bergson's Creative Evolution in relation to the negative; Burke reports Bergson as pointing out that "the negative is a peculiarly linguistic marvel, and that there
are no negatives in nature, every natural condition being positively what it is" (Religion 19). In keeping with his dramatistic view of language, Burke alters Bergson somewhat, placing the hortatory negative ("thou shalt not") prior to the propositional negative ("it is not"). Thus ethics arise from the negative. Theology also has an important stake in the negative, because just as generalized "Being" ends up as God, generalized "non-Being" ends up as the devil (Religion 283). Also, since God is beyond the realm of the senses, he must necessarily be described in terms of what he is not. That is, the metaphors we borrow from the other realms must be constantly discounted (just as language is constantly discounted) when we use them in a transcendent sense. This discounting Burke calls "negative theology" (Religion 22):

The whole problem of negativity in language . . . has its analogue in "negative theology," the defining of God in terms of what he is not, as when God is described in words like "immortal," "immutable," "infinite," "unbounded," "impassive" and the like.

When words such as "Love" or "Father" are applied to God, these must be understood not as positives, but rather as quasi-positives. For they must be understood analogically—and analogy, like
metaphor, makes sense only insofar as we discount for the negative. That is, we must add: "By 'love' we don't mean such love as people have for one another, for that would be merely human. And by 'father' we don't mean father in the literal, legal or naturalistic sense of the term." (Religion 22)

God-term

The fourth analogy is the god-term, or the title of titles. This is a word that encompasses the highest order of generalization, the absolute positive. This is very closely allied with the negative, because they are both absolutes and are nonexistent in nature. Indeed, the god-term is in a sense indistinguishable from the negative, because "there is not a single thing you can point to as an example of 'Pure Being'" (Religion 25). The difference is in emphasis:

Insofar as the third and fourth analogies can be treated separately, the third concerns the correspondence between negativity in language and its place in negative theology, while the fourth concerns the nature of language as a process of entitlement, leading in the secular realm towards an over-all title of titles. (Religion 25)
For an example of a god-term, see the discussion of money in the chapter "Titular," pages 30 through 31.

**Time-eternity**

The fifth analogy deals with the relation between time and eternity. Time is the temporal order of things: what comes first, second, third, etc. Eternity is the unitary meaning or import of the whole. Applying the analogy to language, the sequence of individual words would be the "time" of a sentence, but the meaning would be its "eternity" (Religion 27). Burke illustrates this using the delightful example of the Cheshire Cat in Alice in Wonderland:

So far as sheer **appearances** are concerned, certain motions, postures and the like take place, and these are interpreted as the signs of a smile. The smile is the **essence** of these material conditions, the **form** or **act** of the sheer motions. It is what the motions "mean." Then the cat disappears, all but its smile. The smile's "temporal" aspects vanish, leaving but their **essence**, their **meaning**. (Religion 28)

**Formal**

The sixth analogy deals with "a notable likeness between the design of the Trinity and the form underlying the 'linguistic situation.' And it is built about the
consideration that, as regards the persons of the Trinity, the Father is equated with Power, the Son with Wisdom, and the Holy Spirit with Love" (Religion 29). In other words, the Father is closest to the thing itself because the thing itself has power in its being; the Son to the name for the thing because name implies knowledge about the thing; and the Holy Spirit to the communion or correspondence between the two, which can be termed "Love" because the members of the trinity are persons, and perfect correspondence between persons is "Love" (Religion 29-30).

These are the six analogies. Three others "lying about their edges" are "the 'Creativity' analogy; the 'Courtship' analogy; and the 'Reversible' analogy" (Religion 38). The Creativity analogy reminds us that language creates reality. The Courtship analogy works as follows: in hierarchy there are necessarily different kinds of beings. These different kinds of beings must necessarily communicate. "A persuasive communication between kinds . . . is the abstract paradigm of courtship. Such appeal, or address, would be the technical equivalent of love. . . . love is a communion of estranged entities. . . . When courtship attains its equivalent in the realm of group relations, differences between the sexes has its analogue in the difference between social classes" (Rhetoric of Motives 177). The Reversible analogy is part
of the words—Words analogy, according to which words for the ineffable (the fourth realm of language) must necessarily be borrowed from the three human realms of words: natural, socio-political, and symbolic. This fourth realm of borrowed terms is called the analogical. The Reversible analogy refers to the fact that analogical terms can then be borrowed back (secularized) into the realms of the natural, socio-political, and symbolic, but with extra meaning. For example, the term light comes from the natural, is borrowed and used analogically for the divine, and is then borrowed back from the analogical with meaning clinging to it from its journey from natural to analogical and back to natural.

To sum up, the method of logology is premised on the view of man as a symbol-using animal. The primary human symbol system is language, which employs a terministic screen that creates for language users one reality and at the same time disallows competing realities. Language is based in the twofold negative: the propositional negative ("it is not") and the hortatory negative ("thou shalt not"). The linguistic negative allows man to choose, and choice is action. Hence language is symbolic action. Language contains the very basis of human motive, and the most thorough field for studying human motive is religion, because religion seeks to persuade men on the most
fundamental levels. This thesis attempts to discover the way language as symbolic action works in the Mormon theological text Doctrine and Covenants Section 88 using Burke's method of logology, which uses 6 primary and 3 secondary analogies to discover the ways words about God illustrate a given view of language—in this case, Mormon.

How Logology is Applied to Doctrine and Covenants 88

Doctrine and Covenants 88 proves a very interesting text for a logological analysis, and elucidates some interesting points on the Mormon view of language. However, it is necessary in this thesis to change the order of Burke's analogies: I treat the titular analogy and the Matter-Spirit analogy first because those two analogies are used extensively in my discussions of the remaining four analogies. The titular analogy is first, because of its discussion of the cluster of god-terms runs throughout Section 88. The Spirit-Matter analogy is second, because of its discussion of space, matter, and the interesting ways other terms in Section 88 are grounded in the physical. Thus the analogies are treated in this order:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Burke's order</th>
<th>My order</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. words-Word</td>
<td>1. Titular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Negative</td>
<td>3. words-Word</td>
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Section 88 is an extensive theological statement, 141 verses in all. It can be divided into roughly nine sections, all logically interdependent:

1. Opening
2. A discussion of the heavenly bodies and the physical order
3. A discussion of resurrection and redemption
4. A discussion of law
5. The parable of the lord and the field
6. Various instructions
7. A description of the apocalypse
8. The school of prophets
9. The closing

I refer to all nine sections, but treat some parts more extensively than others: verses 6 through 13, 32 through 50, and 118 through 141. Most readers will be familiar with Section 88; it might be best, however, to reread these particular verses before reading this thesis. For convenience, verses are quoted and requoted as necessary to illustrate the point at hand.

Now we are ready to begin the analysis itself. Burke concludes *The Rhetoric of Religion* with a chapter entitled
"Epilogue: Prologue in Heaven." Burke's epilogue is an example of prophecying after the fact. Because this introduction was written temporally after the body of the thesis (as I imagine most introductions are), but comes logically at the beginning, it is also an example of prophecying after the fact, sort of like the procrastinators' club's predictions for each year, predictions that actually appear near the end of December. I don't want to give away now all the mysteries to be revealed in the conclusion, lest my readers dispense with the journey in favor of the destination; but a few hints about the nature of the route might make the traveling more commodious.

I contend that a logological analysis of Doctrine and Covenants is enlightening because it reveals how thoroughly the text accounts for the way Mormon language providing motives accounts for action. Furthermore, I contend that although Mormons consider themselves Christians, they are goaded by language and motives different from those of traditional Christianity.
Imagine the ideal title of a book. An ideal title would "sum up" all the particulars of the book. It would in a way "imply" these particulars. Yet the particulars would have all the material reality. Similarly with a movement towards a title of titles (the unifying principle that is to be found in a sentence, considered as a "title" for the situation it refers to): such a movement is towards a kind of emptying, it is a via negativa. . . . The stress in the [titular] analogy is not upon this negative element, but upon the search for a title of titles, an over-all term. . . . Such a . . . summarizing term would be technically a "god-term," in the sense that its role was analogous to the over-all entitling role played by the theologian's word for the godhead.

(Religion 25-26)

According to Burke, a god-term is a term that attains the highest levels of generalization but still sums up all the particulars, much the way the word God does: all things can be expanded to mean God. The god-term is oddly aligned with the negative because it is the absolute positive and because, while maintaining such a level of
generality, it has no specificity. The identification of
god-terms is useful in a logological analysis, because a
god-term shows what areas in a religion's terminology are
considered those of greatest generalization, what every­
thing "boils down to" (or up to); these areas are the
basis of motives.

In *A Grammar of Motives*, Burke discusses money as a
god-term:

The monetary motive can be a "technical substi­
tute for God," in that "God" represented
the unitary substance in which all human
diversity of motives was grounded. (*Grammar
111*)

Money is an excellent example of a god-term. Consider:
money has no literal existence other than as metal or
paper, and its material existence as metal or cloth is not
what "inspirits" money. It is purely abstract. Yet we
find money as motive lurking behind everything, a goad
more powerful in our society, it seems, than God and all
the angels (or the devil and all his cohorts). Money as
god-term tells us much about the motives of people in a
monetary society, especially a modern industrial society,
where people are far from the means of production, far
from any material "payoff" for their work (the harvest,
for instance), a society where even money itself becomes
abstracted in the process of banking and credit. Burke wryly comments that in medieval time a "favorable balance of trade" was a state in which more goods came into a town than left it. Now, he says, we shovel our labor and resources into foreign borders faster and more efficiently than any army could conquer them, all on account of the monetary motive, so that we can have more money coming in than leaving. On an individual basis, Burke notes that people rush to do jobs so horrible that formerly slaves could only with difficulty be forced to do these jobs—this is the power of money as a motive, and this is the result of the monetary motive in human life. (Attitudes 148-149)

Money as a motive is an area of great power---magnetism---in modern life. And money is "only" a word: a god-term. The god-terms that appear in any set of terms can be expected to exert similar power and similarly to account for human motives. Several god-terms appear in Section 88, so many that it seems no single one has the pull analogous to that of money; but combined, these god-terms extend over the entire range of motive with a breadth and complexity perhaps greater than that of even money. These god-terms are God, the Son, all things, light, truth, law, eternity, kingdom, and glory. Section 88 explicitly equates these with one another. These all
have corollaries and modifiers. Take law, for example; its corollaries and modifiers are bounds, conditions, governed, preserved, and sanctified. It is imperative to establish these god-terms first in this thesis, because any time any one of these god-terms or its corollaries is encountered, the others (the god-term's own corollaries and modifying terms as well as other god-terms with their own corollaries and modifiers) are lurking in the background. They run through the entire Section 88, and all the other analogies have reference to them.

The scheme of god-terms can be hierarchically diagrammed thus:
Unto what shall I liken these kingdoms that ye may understand? Behold, all these are kingdoms, and any man who hath seen any or the least of these hath seen God moving in his majesty and power.

All kingdoms have a law given. Kingdoms are governed, preserved, perfected, sanctified.

Light is law by which all things are governed. Light is even the power of God who sitteth on his throne in the bosom of eternity in the midst of all things.

The Light of Truth comprehendeth Eternity. Times and seasons courses.

Nevertheless, the day shall come when you shall comprehend even God.

Light shineth, giveth you light, Enlighteneth your eyes, Quickeneth your understandings.

Earth. Power thereof Even the earth upon which you stand.

Sun. Light of sun Power thereof by which it was made.

Moon. Light of moon Power thereof by which it was made.

Stars. Light of stars Power thereof by which they were made.

Fig. 1. Logical diagram of god-terms
This diagram is what could be called the logical representation of the terms, aligned from top to bottom in a hierarchy. And with the terms aligned this way, a person can at a glance see the relationships, even confined as they are to a two-dimensional representation.

Section 88, however, is not a diagram; it is a verbal communication, and therefore necessarily bound by temporal sequence. The god-terms in Section 88 appear and are equated with one another in a sequence running through verses 6 through 13 and 35 through 50; and 18 through 31, returning in 107. Let's examine the ways these god-terms are equated with one another. The first god-term is—logically as well as temporally—God: "even God, the holiest of all" (verse 5). Then begins the long chain of association with mention of the Son. In verse 6 the Son is described as being above, below, in all and through all things. Then there is an apposition to this: "the light of truth" (verse 6). Hence there are 4 terms: Son, all things, light, and truth. The terms all things, light, and truth are then described and explained more specifically, Christ being "in the sun, and the light of the sun, and the power thereof by which it was made" (verse 7). This pattern is continued (with little exception) for moon, stars, and earth. This adds to the cluster of god-terms the words light and power, as well as the thing
itself, on a somewhat lower order of generalization. Verse 11 returns to light, and verse 12 describes the light that "proceedeth forth from the presence of God to fill the immensity of space." Thus god-terms include space, as a corollary to all things. Verse 13 rounds out this rhapsody:

13. The light which is in all things, which giveth life to all things, which is the law by which all things are governed, even the power of God, who sitteth upon his throne, who is in the bosom of eternity, who is in the midst of all things. [emphasis added]

This does a good job of equating all these terms: God, Son, light, truth, all things (sun, moon, stars, earth), power, space, life, law, eternity.

Verses 19 through 32 add one more term to the cluster: glory. Recall that in verse 13 (cited above) the term light is described as being in all things, as giving life to all things, being the law for all things, and then being equated with the power of God. Consider the way the term glory operates in verses 19 through 31. In verse 19, glory is equated with "the presence of God the Father." Then verse 22 begins a correspondence of law with glory that continues throughout the rest of the sequence until verse 32: "For he who is not able to abide
the law of a celestial kingdom cannot abide a celestial glory." Verse 28 harks back to the function of *light* described in verse 11: verse 28: "They who are of a celestial spirit shall receive the same body which was a natural body; even ye shall receive your bodies, and your glory shall be that glory by which your bodies are quickened." Compare verse 11: "... which is the same light that quickened your understandings." Thus glory seems to be aligned with *law* and *light* and the other god-terms in the cluster.

In Section 88, what begins in 6 through 13 returns (with extra meaning) in 34 through 50, especially in 41 through 47. Let's look at the god-terms already established to see where these verses affirm, modify, or add. In 34 there is the term *law* in connection with the verbs *governed, preserved, perfected*, and *sanctified*. Then in 36 *law* is connected with *kingdom*: "All kingdoms have a law given." Thus *kingdom* is added to the cluster. Verse 37 is an important affirmation of some already encountered god-terms:

37. And there are many kingdoms; for there is no space in the which there is no kingdom; and there is no kingdom in which there is no space, either a greater or a lesser kingdom.
Thus the new addition kingdom is linked with the already established space, and both are reaffirmed. Verse 38 modifies both kingdom and law with the side notes of bounds and conditions. Verse 41 strongly reaffirms all things, which is repeated 8 times, while 42 links all things to law and law to times and seasons, which are modifiers of eternity, one of the earlier god-terms. Verse 43 reaffirms all things and eternity via the particulars of courses and heavens, earth, and planets. Verse 44 links light with eternity via the particulars of time: times, seasons, minutes, hours, days, weeks, months, years. Then 45 links all things (earth, sun, moon, stars), light, eternity (by day, by night), glory, and power (rolls, giveth, wings). Next 46 affirms kingdoms with the analogical question "Unto what shall I liken these kingdoms, that ye may understand?" By apposition and reference, kingdom is linked to the above; the very next verse (48) links kingdom explicitly to all the courses or planets listed in verses 41 through 45 ("any or the least of these") and to God.12

In review, here is a list the god-terms Section 88 has linked: God, Son, light, truth, all things (heavenly bodies), power, space, life, law (conditions), eternity (courses of time), kingdom, and glory. This is quite an inclusive cluster. And my argument is that because of the
links in this cluster—both implicit and explicit—throughout the Section, when any one of these general terms or its modifications (Law: bounds, conditions, etc.) is encountered, the others are lurking in the background to pull it, the point it is making, and the audience—who are human—back into the framework of order that runs throughout the Section. This order informs the whole, gives it meaning, and tells man—again, explicitly and implicitly—his place within the universal order.

References to man are important, because these references are a point of contact with the audience, and remind them why they should care about all this: "And the earth also, and the power thereof, even the earth upon which you stand" (verse 10). This places man spatially in relation to all things and hierarchically beneath God—the Son—the sun—the moon—the stars. Verse 11 also deals with man:

11. And the light which shineth, which giveth you light, is through him who enlighteneth your eyes, which is the same light that quickeneth your understandings;

This places man in the order in relation to light. Verse 44 also places man within the cluster of god-terms: "all these are one year with God, but not with man." The analogical question in 46 makes specific reference to
man's place in the order: "... that ye may understand." And verse 47 also mentions man: "any man who hath seen any or the least of these hath seen God moving in his majesty and power." Verses 49 and 50 also refer to man:

49. The light shineth in darkness, and the darkness comprehendeth it not; nevertheless, the day shall come when you shall comprehend even God, being quickened in him and by him.

50. Then shall ye know that ye have seen me, that I am, and that I am the true light that is in you, and that you are in me; otherwise ye could not abound.

This puts man in his place, on earth, and points out man's ability to comprehend God.

Because these god-terms exist in Section 88 and because together they illustrate a system of universal order, the question remains, What is the application of this to motives as exemplified by Section 88? Recall the example at the beginning of this chapter of money as a god-term. Money is a universal basis for motive: but motive for what? It seems that the money motive is grounded in the entelechial motive, that is, man's drive to perfection: the perfection of its kind, and so towards the kind next above it" (Rhetoric of Motives 333). Man's drive to perfection necessarily urges him to
perfection within his place and upward in the hierarchy; money is the secular symbol of a person's place in the order, and the acquisition of more money ensures that a person will "move up."

Section 88 offers a divine counterpart to the secular order (what Burke calls "the rat race"), and a divine counterpart to money: glory. The way to "move up" in God's kingdom is to make more glory. Thus glory is the god-term in Section 88 equivalent to money; Section 88 is explicit about this:

107. And then shall the angels be crowned with the glory of his might, and the saints shall be filled with his glory, and receive their inheritance and be made equal with him.

Here glory is equated with inheritance, which is money. In verse 32, the same money motive is discussed, this time in terms of a gift:

32. And they who remain shall also be quickened; nevertheless, they shall return again to their own place, to enjoy that which they are willing to receive, because they were not willing to enjoy that which they might have received.

Thus the entelechial (perfecting) basis for motives is
glory, and the way to obtain glory is to be willing to receive it, to abide by the necessary law.

Now that the basis for motives is clear, what does this illustrate about the use of language in Section 88? In Permanence and Change Burke discusses in relation to psychoanalysis (which is but one secular way of dealing with motives) what he calls "secular conversions":

Psychoanalysis can be treated as a simple technique of non-religious conversion. It effects its cures by providing a new perspective that dissolves the system of pieties lying at the roots of the patient's sorrows or bewilderments. It is an impious rationalization, offering a fresh terminology of motives to replace the patient's painful terminology of motives. (Permanence 125)

In The Rhetoric of Religion Burke lists this as an example of the Creative analogy, the creative power of language. The psychoanalyst can cure a patient by renaming his illness and thereby transforming his terminology of motives. It seems that the god-terms in Section 88 illustrate the Creative analogy also; by taking into account the entelechial motive as embodied by money, Section 88 manages to "steal the show," that is, by the divine counterpart to the secular conversion, the reli-
religious conversion. Section 88 converts the secular money into the religious glory. How does this operate in actual fact? Remember Burke's commenting on the way people rush to do jobs for money they could not be forced to do otherwise? In the Mormon church, people also do unpleasant jobs, but they do these jobs for glory that they could not be paid to do otherwise, such as the job of bishop or primary coordinator; they even choose to do these jobs when they could make money doing other jobs. Thus the glory motive effectively overrides the ubiquitous money motive; this illustrates the way the Mormon use of language informs motives and therefore cultivates the kinds of attitudes that lead to the desired actions.
Matter-Spirit

Words are to the non-verbal things they name as Spirit is to Matter.

That is, if we equate the non-verbal with "Nature" (using "Nature" in the sense of the less-than-verbal, the sort of sheerly electro-chemical motion there'd be if all entities capable of language ceased to exist), then verbal or symbolic action is analogous to the "grace" that is said to "perfect" nature. . . . The realm of the symbolic corresponds (in our analogy) to the realm of the "supernatural." (Religion 16-17)

This is Burke's second analogy, called the Matter-Spirit analogy. It is based on a dichotomy, or at least a duality, between matter and spirit. According to Burke, language operates as the spirit that brings matter to life.

This analogy operates in some interesting ways in Section 88, ways that seem to modify and expand Burke's conception of the analogy. To see how this is so, it is necessary first to recall the titular analogy and the cluster of god-terms identified in Section 88: God, the Son, all things, light, truth, law, eternity, kingdom, and glory. Except for the personal terms (God and the Son),
these god-terms can be roughly divided into two groups along the lines of matter-spirit: all things and kingdom in the matter side; and light, truth, law, and eternity on the spirit side. This division illustrates an interesting merging that runs counter to the analogy according to Burke. For Burke, matter would be the natural and spirit the supernatural, and therefore god-terms for the division would necessarily fall in the category of spirit. But for Joseph Smith, while there is still a distinction between "matter" and "spirit," the spirit does not have the great "supernatural" priority it does in Burke; more important, in the final analysis, it is often difficult to distinguish what in Section 88 is primarily matter and what primarily spirit. While matter and spirit are distinct, the alignment of terms in Section 88 seems to show that matter and spirit are nevertheless inseparable and necessary parts of a unified whole.

Before providing an analysis of the ways in which Burke and Joseph Smith differ, it is necessary to establish the ways Section 88 confirms the Matter-Spirit analogy according to Burke. It is easier to see how Joseph Smith modifies Burke when the two views are put into the same terms than it is to see this difference when the two views are completely distinct. Verse 11 through 13 seem ready-made for the Burkean Matter-Spirit analogy:
11. And the light which shineth, which giveth you light, is through him who enlighteneth your eyes, which is the same light that quickeneth your understandings;

12. Which light proceedeth forth from the presence of God to fill the immensity of space—

13. The light which is in all things, which giveth life to all things, which is the law by which all things are governed, even the power of God who sitteth upon his throne, who is in the bosom of eternity, who is in the midst of all things.

Since the Matter-Spirit analogy posits that matter stands for the non-verbal and spirit stands for the verbal, note the way light operates in the verses above: it acts as the spirit that animates all things. For every use of light in verses 11 through 13, read language. This beautifully illustrates the Matter-Spirit analogy according to Burke.

If the entire Section 88 were similar to verses 11 through 13, Burke and Joseph Smith would be in perfect accord on the Matter-Spirit duality. But via the cluster of god-terms discussed in the previous chapter, other verses in Section 88 modify this view and affirm the union rather than the bifurcation of matter and spirit.
Immediately after the orthodox verse 13 comes 14, which at first does not seem linked to the above:

14. Now, verily I say unto you, that through the redemption which is made for you is brought to pass the resurrection from the dead. From a discussion of light in all things, Smith jumps to a mention of resurrection from the dead. At first glance, the transition seems abrupt. But note the way he develops this line of thought in verse 15:

15. And the spirit and the body are the soul of man.

With verse 15, the line of thought becomes clear: verses 6 through 13 discuss (among other things) the union of matter and spirit with the emphasis on spirit, while verses 14 through 50 discuss (among other things) the union with an emphasis on matter. Thus, while as with Burke, the spirit portion here seems logically as well as narratively prior, nevertheless Smith’s discussion stresses the union and makes clear throughout that matter is entirely necessary.

The Section does not only admit the matter portion as necessary, but goes very far in affirming the physical, further than many philosophies, which grudgingly allow the flesh as a necessary evil. Let’s return to verse 15: "And the spirit and the body are the soul of man." The
verse begins with *And*, which serves as a transition from the verse before, which links resurrection to *all things*. Verse 15, then, explains why resurrection is so necessary: the whole is only the union of the parts. Many philosophies would affirm this much. But note what follows in verse 20:

20. That bodies who are of the celestial kingdom may possess it forever and ever; for, for this intent was it made and created, and for this intent are they sanctified.

This is not just spirits, or even souls, but *bodies*. Here the *physical* is given primary emphasis. Verses 22 through 31 also place the body as the primary entity, which is then conditioned by degree of glory. From this scheme, it seems that the body is the common denominator, the spirit or glory the differentiator. But one should never lose track of the union of the two, a union that is mentioned again in verse 27:

27. For notwithstanding they die, they also shall rise again, a spiritual body.

This is an interesting oxymoron: *spiritual body*; it is explained in 28:

28. They who are of a celestial spirit shall receive the same body which was a natural body even; ye shall receive your bodies, and
your glory shall be that glory by which your bodies are quickened.

In the preceding verses, Smith explains the system of Matter-Spirit; in (roughly) verses 36 through 50 he explains the order behind the system. At the basis (or bottom, depending on the view of order) is space:

37. And there are many kingdoms; for there is no space in the which there is no kingdom; and there is no kingdom in which there is no space, either a greater or a lesser kingdom. All space is kingdom, all kingdom has law ("36. All kingdoms have a law given;")", "and unto every law there are certain bounds and conditions" (verse 38), and "that which is governed by law is also perfected and sanctified by the same" (verse 34), and "39. All beings who abide not in those conditions are not justified." All this exists because like things correspond and love to associate with like things:

40. For intelligence cleaveth unto intelligence; wisdom receiveth wisdom; truth embraceth truth; virtue loveth virtue; light cleaveth unto light; mercy hath compassion on mercy and claimeth her own; justice continueth its course and claimeth its own; judgment goeth
before the face of him who sitteth upon the
throne and governeth and executeth all things.

To sum up, the union of the body and spirit is
completely necessary; indeed, it is only through this
union that the Fall can be redeemed (verse 16: "And the
resurrection from the dead is the redemption of the
soul"). All things are unified, and unified through the
power of God; therefore they are. Unity of spirit and
body is life, and separation is death.

How does this tie in with language?

Burke theorizes that language is the source of
original guilt in mankind, because Burke considers
language in a sense a "Fall" from the original prelingual
unity of reality to the lingual diversity of reality.
That is, before humans had language, all experiences and
ideas were fairly unified in that they were not differen-
tiated by different words and therefore by different
values. When language appeared, this original unity was
splintered, and everything was divided into nonverbal
referent (the thing itself) and word. This splintering
into "thing" and "word for thing" is the "Fall" (Religion
175). With the Fall came terministic screens and hence
the hortatory negative with its distinctions between
"good" and "bad." The sudden existence of "bad" is tied
in with the existence of language. From bad comes guilt.
The propositional negative also plays an important part in this Burkean sense of guilt, because the propositional negative necessarily discusses language in terms of what it is not, and is therefore further from the non-verbal referent than is the positive verbal statement. The further the word is from its non-verbal referent, the more guilt.17

Coming back to Section 88, in the Mormon terminology in the Section, the "Fall" is redeemed through a union of non-verbal referent (thing) and word (verse 14: "Through the redemption which is made for you is brought to pass the resurrection from the dead"), with non-verbal referent (body) as common denominator and word (glory) as differentiator.18 That is, the body holds the place within the order, and the spirit determines that place in relation to others: "even ye shall receive your bodies, and your glory shall be that glory by which your bodies are quickened" (verse 28).

So it has been established that Section 88 affirms the unity of matter and spirit. What does such a unity reveal about Mormon motives as they function in language? Perhaps what is important here is not so much the affirmation of the unity of the two realms (any philosophy could admit as much), but the particularly Mormon merging of Matter-Spirit distinctions, as exemplified in the
cluster of god-terms. In Section 88, it is often hard to tell whether a term is being used for its function as matter or its function as spirit. For example, recall the oxymoron spiritual body. Because of the analytical nature of the English adjective, spiritual goes before body, and a person may therefore tend to think of spiritual as the prior, the primus inter pares. But this emphasis is a function of the temporal nature of language (discussed in the chapter on "Time-Eternity"). What Section 88 seems to say by its merging of categories is that the categories spirit and matter themselves are a linguistic distinction; in reality, spirit and matter are only two words for aspects of a unitary reality. This goes back to Burke's idea of language as a Fall (though a felix culpa).�Perhaps in the scheme of Section 88, language universally is not a Fall at all; rather, language as used and perceived by man is a Fall from unity into splintering, much as the varied distinctions of time listed in Section 88 are a Fall from eternity's "one year with God." If language is not a Fall, then language does not involve man as symbol-user in categorical guilt.

How does all this apply to Mormonism in actual practice? It seems that an emphasis on the Matter-Spirit dyad as a necessary unity leads on one level to an
acceptance of the body and on another level to an acceptance of language, a feeling that although things do not function in this world as they should, nevertheless this world is an accurate model of what to expect in a perfected world. Thus Mormons rely on the physical, trust it perhaps more than some Eastern religions might, who spurn the physical as a deceptive illusion, and even more than other Christian religions, who distrust the flesh. Mormons affirm even sexual relations, considered "unclean" by many religions; and this affirmation extends clear into the next life: our eternal nature includes a sexual life, and God himself has a sexual life. In addition, perhaps because of this feeling for the reliability of language and the reliability of the universal order, an order as revealed (Mormons feel) in even this world, Mormons also rely on their ability to count on the world; this builds into Mormon terminology and therefore motives a self-conscious power of action, of choice. Mormons believe that because of the definite correspondence between matter and spirit, there is a definite correspondence between this world and the next. This temporal world is in many ways close to the spiritual world. Indeed, the righteous will eventually live on this very planet. Thus this world is basically reasonable, and perhaps more important, it is home--our own.22 And a feeling that the world is reason-
able is crucial for people to invest in their world, to possess it, and not to become alienated.
words-Word

Burke believes that language is the essence of human motivation and that because religions seek to motivate men in the most fundamental ways, religion is the best field of study to investigate human motivation via language. In other words, what theological texts say about "God" reveals the way language works. And any text that describes God in terms of language (such as "the Word" in John) is a gold mine for human motivation. From this equation (words about "the Word" equal words about language) Burke derives the analogy he calls "words-Word." The words-Word analogy implies that any statement about "the Word" (or God in general) simultaneously reveals its nature as a statement about language.

The words-Word analogy works as follows: according to Burke, "language by definition is not suited to the expression of the 'ineffable' (Religion 15); therefore, words for the ineffable must be borrowed from the other three realms: natural, socio-political, and symbolic. Words borrowed from these three realms can then be borrowed back with extra meaning, into a fourth realm, the transcendent. Take the example of grace:

Originally, in its Latin form, it had such purely secular meanings as: favor, esteem, friendship, partiality, service, obligation,
thanks, recompense, purpose. Thus gratīis, or gratīs meant: "for nothing, without pay, through sheer kindness," etc. The pagan Roman could also say "thank God" (dis gratiā)—and doubtless such early usage contributed to the term's later availability for specifically theological doctrine. But in any case, once the word was translated from the realm of social relationships into the supernaturally tinged realm of relationships between "God" and man, the etymological conditions were set for a reverse process whereby the theological term could in effect be aestheticized, as we came to look for "grace" in a literary style, or in the purely secular behavior of a hostess. (Religion 7-8)

The method behind Burke's words-Word analogy is to examine the ways words in theological texts work in order to reveal the motives inherent in the language of a particular text. First, a terministic screen creates for humans a particular "reality." There are four realms of language in each screen: natural, socio-political, symbolic, and transcendent (borrowed from the other three). Then theological texts use terms from that screen to describe the supernatural. Finally, those ineffable
terms are borrowed back to animate secular "reality." An examination of this process reveals the way terms operate in a particular text and community.

The words-Word analogy reveals that Doctrine and Covenants Section 88 uses language in some interesting ways to motivate (goad) Mormons unlike the ways traditional Christian terminology works. In this thesis, the words-Word analogy is divided into four sections: natural, socio-political, symbolic, and transcendent. Each of these portions is treated separately.
Order manifests itself in many ways, among them patterns in the natural world. But according to Burke, "order" is not a "natural" characteristic of the physical world, but a human socio-political idea. Burke's treatment of the first three chapters of Genesis deals with the creation as a manifestation of socio-political order in the natural world:

Logologically, Genesis would be interpreted as dealing with principles (with logical "firsts," rather than sheerly temporal ones). From the very start it is dealing with the principles of governance (firsts expressed in quasi-temporal terms since they are the kind most natural to the narrative style). That is, the account of the Creation should be interpreted as saying in effect: This is, in principle, a statement of what the natural order must be like if it is to be a perfect fit with the conditions of human socio-political order (conditions that come to a focus in the idea of a basic Covenant backed by a perfect authority). (Religion 180)

Thus Burke feels that natural order is man's projection of his own socio-political order upon his environment. An
analysis of ways natural words are used in a theological text helps shed light on the ways God and therefore language works in a given text.

Natural words are an important category in several ways, first of all for their "sweep and power," the appeal they have to earth-bound humans; but also for the "structural consistencies" and "symmetry" (Religion 37) they express, which are, as Burke says, man's projection of socio-political order on the natural world (Religion 180). I will not attempt to analyze all the natural words in the section, because such a task would require too much space, and much has been done on the subject already with mainstream Judeo-Christian imagery: the vineyard, the harvest, the storm, the voice in the wilderness, and so on. Rather, I hope to point out representative natural words that seem peculiar to Mormonism and to this text in particular. Perhaps a discussion of these unusual words may shed light on the ideas Mormonism might be able to add to general Christian thought.

The first natural term to be treated is all things. It has already been identified (in the "Titular" chapter) as one of the cluster of god-terms running throughout the Section. Here I present a more in-depth analysis of the term. It is an odd term, because it is abstract. Thing is the all-purpose English word for an existing entity in
the physical world, as well as a verbal entity, and this abstractness contributes to its utility as a god-term. While a thing can be anything, it is also strictly nothing, and operates on the highest level of generality available in the physical (as opposed to metaphysical) world.

The importance of this term is established very early in the text; it first appears in verse 6, and is mentioned at important junctures throughout the rest of the text. Verse 5 ends with an introduction to the subject of the subsequent verses: "Jesus Christ his Son." And verses 6 through 13 comprise the discussion of the Son. Christ is defined and explained in these verses, and he is defined via all things. Verb-preposition compounds are used several places to indicate the Son's position with respect to all things: "ascended up on high," "descended below all things," "in that he comprehended all things," "that he might be in all and through all things." This entire discussion in verse 6, which serves spatially, almost geometrically, to define Christ's godhood, is summed up in this appositive: "the light of truth."

From here the general term all things is made more specific: "light," "sun," "light of the sun, the power thereof by which it was made," "the moon," "the light of the moon," "the power thereof by which it was made," "the
light of the stars," "the power thereof by which they were made," "the earth" and so on, into a further discussion of light, until the discussion of the Son ends in verse 13 with "who is in the midst of all things" (emphasis added). This same concept and type of discussion is repeated in verse 41:

41. He comprehendeth all things, and all things are before him, and all things are round about him; and he is above all things, and in all things, and is through all things, and is round about all things; and all things are by him, and of him, even God, forever and ever.

And after this verse, another discussion follows of the heavenly bodies and their situations with respect to God and man. Thus the term all things stands for all natural things, which are enumerated and represented by the heavenly bodies, but also for such transcendent things as God, the Son, their power, the creative power in general ("the power thereof by which it was made"), and life. These ideas are brought out directly in the verses. But at the bottom of these transcendent ideas is the homely thing, which (as mentioned before) in English is the all-purpose word for an object, either physical or verbal. In these verses, however, thing seems to be physical. Thus the physical is at the bottom of all things, and as
discussed in the "Matter-Spirit" chapter of this thesis, perhaps all things are grounded in the physical as well, at least as far as man's understanding goes. And anytime the discussion of God threatens to lose the reader in the ineffable, all things asserts itself and brings the concepts back down to "earth."

Light, the second natural term to be analyzed, is one of all things; it is also a term that appears in general Judeo-Christian imagery, and in all religious imagery. It is hard to distinguish whether light should count under the natural realm or the symbolic, because light is of physical phenomena among the least tangible. Nevertheless it is still, by our reckoning at least, a natural, physical "thing." However, the term can be fruitfully analyzed under all four realms of language, particularly the fourth, the transcendent.

Light figures quite importantly in the previous section on all things; indeed, it was impossible to discuss all things without discussing light as foremost among them. Let's review verses 6 through 13. As mentioned before, light is in apposition to all things, which is in apposition to Son. Thus Son and all things and light are in a sense synonyms. And in the exegesis explaining where the Son is (e.g., "in the sun, and the light of the sun, and the power thereof by which it was
made" in verse 7), these four terms are equated: the Son, the individual thing (such as sun or moon), the light, and the power "by which it was made." But light is taken explicitly a step further:

11. And the light which shineth, which giveth you light, is through him who enlighteneth your eyes, which is the same light that quickeneth your understandings;

12. Which light proceedeth forth from the presence of God to fill the immensity of space—

13. The light which is in all things, which giveth life to all things, which is the law by which all things are governed, even the power of God who sitteth upon his throne, who is in the bosom of eternity, who is in the midst of all things.

There is a wonderful parallelism here with things and light. The concept of the thing is taken down to the level of man's understanding as far as it can go: "And the earth also, and the power thereof, even the earth upon which you stand" (verse 10). The concept of light is also taken down to the level of man's understanding, but literally and physically: "...who enlighteneth your eyes, which is the same light that quickeneth your understandings" (verse 11). Light is used
self-consciously in two senses here, both the natural and the transcendent, and in a sense, is borrowed back, since light here refers both to God's power in the transcendent way and to man's understanding, understanding that is borrowed from God's power, both in this transcendent use of the term light and literally, in the rays of the sun.

As with all things, light reappears in verses 41 through 47, and here it is used in much the same way as it is in 6 through 13. But then a shift takes place, and verses 49 and 50 use light in a way reminiscent of the New Testament: "The light shineth in the darkness, and the darkness comprehendeth it not. . . . I am the true light that is in you." But the extra meaning added by the earlier references to light modifies the meaning of this traditional term, because now we know that light is tied with the other key terms in Section 88, such as all things.

To sum up, this portion of the "words-Word" chapter has analyzed the ways the terms all things and light function as analogies borrowed from the natural realm of language into the transcendent. An examination of these two terms reveals that the natural world functions in Section 88 as a high level of generalization, a level comparable with that of the spiritual world. In fact, everything can be placed into either the category of all
things or light; the tangible nature of all things and the intangible nature of light cover all the possibilities, both positive possibilities and the possibilities inherent in a counter-order.24
Since order, as discussed in the chapter "Natural," is primarily a socio-political idea (an idea that is then transferred into the realm of the natural), pronouncements on socio-political order are very important in a logological analysis. However, before analyzing this portion on the verse level, it would be best to review Burke's ideas on order and discuss in detail the ways those ideas appear in Section 88.

As mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, the idea of order comes from the fact of division. Burke is at pains to point out that order has an opposite, disorder, and that for every order there is necessarily a counter-order: the opposite of God is the devil, and by the same pattern but lower in the hierarchy, the opposite of the saint is the sinner. From order comes law, and for law there is either obedience or disobedience, with a corresponding blessing or punishment. Division also includes the fact that there are beings of different orders; and by virtue of their inhabiting the same universe, they have to communicate and relate with one another. This process of relation is courtship, which can occur in many different ways, in many different configurations of order.
The most basic socio-political element of this chapter is the detailed discussions of law and kingdoms. The idea of law and kingdoms relates to the god-terms discussed at the beginning of this thesis (in the chapter "Titular"), because the entire Section seems to be grounded in them: God, the Son, all things, light, truth, law, eternity, kingdom, and glory. These point out (among other things) the close relation between law and the physical world:

36. All kingdoms have a law given;

37. And there are many kingdoms; for there is no kingdom in which there is no space, either a greater or a lesser kingdom.

38. And unto every kingdom is give a law; and unto every law there are certain bounds and conditions.

Thus the very basis of law is space, and all law is grounded in it. Likewise, these verses make clear that law is as necessary as space. This grounds all socio-political relations in the physical and informs the physical with socio-political significance.

If law is grounded in the physical, the converse is probably also true, that the physical also has some obligation with respect to law. Verses 17 through 26 deal
very much with the idea of law, law being more a concept for the realm of possibility than convention: 25

21. And they who are not sanctified through the law which I have given unto you, even the law of Christ, must inherit another kingdom, even that of a terrestrial kingdom, or that of a telestial kingdom.

The subsequent verses then go on to say that only those who can abide by a certain law can exist in a certain kingdom, from celestial to terrestrial on down to "a kingdom which is not a kingdom of glory" (24). Even the earth has part in this citizenship: "the earth abideth the law of a celestial kingdom, for it filleth the measure of its creation, and transgresseth not the law—" (verse 25). This is interesting in connection with verse 10 and the order of things from all things on down through the sun, moon, and stars. Note that in progression, the earth comes right before man. It seems that this is a line of progression in all things, each having a law and obeying that law. This implies that each has a will, that action rather than motion is possible, even for things ordinarily considered inanimate. This emphasis on will ties in with Burke's dramatistic theory of language. But the planets in this case are also players. This is further illustrated by verse 25:
25. Wherefore it [the earth] shall be sanctified; yea, notwithstanding it shall die, it shall be quickened again, and shall abide the power by which it is quickened, and the righteous shall inherit it.

The idea of being able to abide the power by which it is quickened is similar to the idea of the moral ‘Yes!’ If things say ‘Yes!’ they will be able to accept life. Note that law is discussed in verses 32 and 33 in terms of a gift (reward rather than punishment). The accepting of a gift rather than the avoiding of a penalty stresses the positive nature of law:

32. . . . to enjoy that which they are willing to receive, because they were not willing to enjoy that which they might have received.

33. For what doth it profit a man if a gift is bestowed upon him, and he receive not the gift? Behold, he rejoices not in that which is given unto him, neither rejoices in him who is the giver of the gift.

The very next verse brings up the benefits of keeping a law, benefits that are as much a part of law as the restrictions law imposes:

34. And again, verily I say unto you, that
which is governed by law is also preserved by law and perfected and sanctified by the same.

It seems here that law, which is also associated with the natural power, is tied in with gift, as is life. And the only stipulation for the individual's receiving the gift (of life, law, and natural power) seems to be his willingness to enjoy the gift, that is, a willingness to abide a quickening, to abide by a law. Law sanctifies humans just as it sanctifies the earth, and vice versa.

In contrast to the moral Yes! is an extreme example of the moral No! the setting up of an alternate order. Implicit in the establishment of law, Burke argues, is the possibility of infraction (Religion 174). And implicit in infraction is the setting up of an alternate order. Burke discusses this in relation to Hobbes:

... implicit in the idea of a Covenant is the idea not just of obedience or disobedience to that Covenant, but also of obedience or disobedience to a rival Covenant. The choice thus becomes not just a difference between seeking the light and not seeking the light, but rather the difference between eagerly seeking the light and just as eagerly seeking darkness (a "Disorder" having an "Order" all its own, however insistent the orthodoxy must be that the
Satanic counter-realm can exist only by the sufferance of the One Ultimate Authority).  

(Religion 199)

Verse 24 and 35 read:

24. And he who cannot abide the law of a telestial kingdom cannot abide a telestial glory; therefore he is not meet for a kingdom of glory. Therefore he must abide a kingdom which is not a kingdom of glory.

35. That which breaketh a law, and abideth not by law, but seeketh to become a law unto itself, and willeth to abide in sin, and altogether abideth in sin, cannot be sanctified by law, neither by mercy, justice, nor judgment. Therefore, they must remain filthy still.  

[emphasis added]

Note in the two verses above the destiny assigned to members of the counter-order: to "abide a kingdom which is not a kingdom of glory," not to be "sanctified by law, neither by mercy, nor judgment," but to "remain filthy still." Thus members of a so-called counter-order end up (in the cosmogony of Section 88) being members of what is outside the universal order: chaos, filth, and darkness.

By virtue of the god-terms relating law, glory, and the corollaries mercy, justice, and judgment, the creature
denied these is also, in a sense, denied the benefits of the physical and of language. Compare the Christian idea of hell: weeping, wailing, and gnashing of teeth. Even more significantly, compare the Mormon idea of the sons of perdition in outer darkness; they cease to exist in the universal order, that is, in a kingdom of glory; therefore they also cease to have language. If that is the case, this Section reveals something interesting about the Mormon concept of hell as lack of reward rather than positive punishment. And when juxtaposed against the Mormon concept of heaven as higher and higher levels of linguistic capability, this sans-linguistic hell forms an interesting contrast to Burke's state of prelingual, primordial innocence and the Fall that brings a categorical guilt inherent in language. Contrary to Burke, for Mormons, it is the lack of language and not the possession of it that implies guilt.

This is a good place to move from greater chaos into greater order and into probably the most interesting socio-political portion of this Section: the description of the school of the prophets, in verses 119 through 141.

Section 88 as a whole is a pronouncement of God to his saints, but its nature as injunction is often temporarily lost sight of in some of the beautiful discourses on law and nature. The school of prophets
portion, however, is always clearly an instruction from
the Lord. As an instruction from the Lord, it is law, and
contains implications of both blessing and punishment. As
an instance of communication between two different orders
of beings, often concerning different orders of men, it
variously exemplifies courtship and contains the
handmaidens of mystery: ritual and pageantry. And, as
with Section 88 in general, the pronouncement seems aware
of all this. 27

Ubiquitous in the school of prophets discourse is the
idea of order. The discourse itself begins with a call to
order:

119. ... establish a house, even a house
of prayer, a house of fasting, a house of faith,
a house of learning, a house of glory, a house
of order, a house of God.

Order appears again explicitly throughout the discourse:
"the order of the house" (verse 127), "this shall be the
house of order" (verse 128). Thus at the outset the
reader knows that one of the concerns of the discourse is
order.

For Burke, implicit in the idea of order is division,
and the preservation of order is the maintenance of
division. The very next verse of the discourse (verse
120) explicitly mentions division, in a literal way:
"That your incomings may be in the name of the Lord; that your outgoings may be in the name of the Lord."

In respect to persons, division brings rank. There are two types of rank in this portion: differences of rank between God and man and differences of rank between man and man; and the first and higher is a model for the second (recall the Burke quote at the beginning of the chapter on Order: "each kind striving toward the perfection of its kind, and so towards the kind next above it" Rhetoric of Motives 333).

Many differences of rank are mentioned in the school of the prophets discourse. First, of course, both narratively and logically, is God (verses 119-120), who is one type of being. Then there is the next order of being, humanity, the leader of whom is the president or spokesman: "Appoint among yourselves a teacher, and let not all be spokesmen at once" (verse 122). Further down are the officers of the church, "or in other words, those who are called to the ministry in the church, beginning at the high priests, even down to the deacons" (verse 127). Further down--implicitly--are the people who are being ministered to; finally come those who "shall not have place among you" (verse 134).

Differences of rank bring mystery, and the physical manifestations of mystery are pageantry and ritual, which
in turn affirm rank. Frequently in this discourse pageantry and ritual illustrate differences of rank between God and man. One example is the name of the house, "the school of the prophets," presumably with God as schoolmaster. The discourse itself prescribes a God-man ritual:

120. . . . that all your salutations may be in the name of the Lord, with uplifted hands unto the Most High.

But the principle of rank and pageantry appear particularly between man and man:

122. Appoint among yourselves a teacher, and let not all be spokesmen at once; but let one speak at a time and let all listen unto his sayings, that when all have spoken that all may be edified of all, and that every man may have an equal privilege.

128. And this shall be the order of the house of the presidency of the school: He that is appointed to be president, or teacher, shall be found standing in his place, in the house which shall be prepared for him.

129. Therefore, he shall be first in the house of God, in a place that the congregation
in the house may hear his words carefully and distinctly, not with loud speech.

130. And when he cometh into the house of God, for he should be first in the house—behold, this is beautiful, that he may be an example—

131. Let him offer himself in prayer upon his knees before God, in token or remembrance of the everlasting covenant.

132. And when any shall come in after him, let the teacher arise, and, with uplifted hands to heaven, yea, even directly, salute his brother or brethren with these words:

136. Behold, verily, I say unto you, this is an ensample unto you for a salutation to one another in the house of God, in the school of the prophets.

139. And he shall be received by the ordinance of the washing of feet, for unto this end was the ordinance of the washing of feet instituted.

140. And again, the ordinance of washing
feet is to be administered by the president, or presiding elder of the church.

The preservation of order is the function of law, and law appears many times throughout this discourse. The original injunction is law; it is a commandment from God to man. Other commandments also appear, particularly in verses 122 through 126, which are phrased as direct commandments. All the rest, which is the description of a pattern, is also law, inasmuch as it is telling how something is to be before it has been: the description of a pattern, an order. Of special note is verse 125, which uses the metaphor of clothing:

125. And above all things, clothe yourselves with the bond of charity, as with a mantle, which is the bond of perfectness and peace.

This metaphor is noteworthy because clothing is one of the primary implements of pageantry and ritual.

While most of the references to law in this discourse are positive, some mention of punishment is made:

134. And he that is found unworthy of this salutation shall not have place among you; for ye shall not suffer that mine house shall be polluted by him.
This punishment seems to be the punishment of isolation and separation.\(^{28}\) If the punishment involves isolation, the reward must involve inclusion and unity. And indeed it does: the end of order, as mentioned in verse 122, is "that every many may have an equal privilege." Verse 107 also mentions this, and even more explicitly:

107. And then shall the angels be crowned with the glory of his might, and the saints shall be filled with his glory, and receive their inheritance and be made equal with him.

In advising whom to include in the school of prophets, familial terms are used: "salute his brother or brethren" (verse 132), "Art thou a brother or brethren?" (verse 133), "And he that cometh in and is faithful before me, and is a brother, or if they be brethren" (verse 135). The term brother is linked with inheritance in verse 107 by familial associations: the person who inherits is a son, and Christ is the Son, and the saints therefore in receiving an inheritance are made sons and "equal with him" (verse 107).

So what do the socio-political terms in Section 88 say about Mormon use of language? The discussion of law and kingdom in connection with space affirms Burke’s idea that natural order derives from socio-political order; in Section 88, however, the emphasis is more on the unity and
indivisibility of the two rather than the priority of the socio-political over the natural. (This is similar to the unity of matter and spirit, discussed in the "Matter-Spirit" chapter.) The discussion of the school of the prophets points to the reliability of the pattern of the universal hierarchy. This reliability is based on God himself's giving his children a pattern and calling it a "beautiful example" (verse 30). Finally, the familial terms that seem to underlie the other socio-political relations assure Mormons of the nature of the universal order: a family. This family based order simultaneously describes both its types of division (righteous from wicked; man from man, each in his own place) and their eventual unity with Christ ("equal with him"). All these goad Mormons to be concerned with hierarchy and order (the apostles all sitting in proper rank) and with the family and their individual roles within the family. And since the family is the most intimate, most immediate of socio-political metaphors, Mormons' involvement with one another is closer and often more idiosyncratic than some of the relations among other Christian groups. This closeness enables and encourages them to work, to strive, and to invest themselves in the system.
Symbol Systems

The third realm of words is the realm of symbol systems, such as grammar, music, math, and so on. Section 88 contains a scheme of terms borrowed from a particular symbol system: measurement. The choice of this symbol system is appropriate and useful in view of the main themes in Section 88. These terms for measurement serve to reinforce concepts of law and hierarchy and the merging of law with hierarchy.

First, let's examine terms of measure in connection with law. Verses 19 and 25 describe the earth as having "filled the measure of its creation" and having "transgresse[d] not the law":

19. For after it hath filled the measure of its creation, it shall be crowned with glory, even with the presence of the Father;
25. And again, verily I say unto you, the earth abideth the law of a celestial kingdom, for it filleth the measure of its creation, and transgresseth not the law--

The combination of "law" and measures is a constant; the concept of justice is often personified as the blindfolded woman carrying the scales. But this theological application of "law" to an inanimate object is unusual; it serves to reinforce the idea of justice by applying
justice to everything, including the realm of the "insentient."

The phrase in verse 19 "crowned with glory" prefigures the ensuing discussion on measures in verses 29 through 31, a discussion that links measures with hierarchy:

29. Ye who are quickened with a portion of the celestial glory shall then receive of the same, even a fulness.

30. And they who are quickened by a portion of the terrestrial glory shall then receive of the same, even a fulness.

31. And also they who are quickened by a portion of the telestial glory shall then receive of the same, even a fulness.

This discussion of measurement serves to link law—and its corollary concept of obedience—with the universal hierarchy, an order that takes into account the obedience of things as well as people. Thus built into the Mormon terminology is the concept of rank linked with the concept of obedience; the ratio here is as follows: the more obedience, the more rank. This instills in Mormons an attitude of acceptance coupled with the motive (the itch, the urge, the drive) for perfection. And as Burke says,
acceptance is a vital part of a person's owning his world. 30
The fourth realm in which language functions is the transcendent—words taken from the first three realms used to describe the ineffable. Because Section 88 is a theological text, nearly every word used is transcendent, and it goes without saying that the analysis of the first three realms of language (natural, socio-political, and symbolic) deals with those words insofar as they function transcendentally. But distinctions often blur: sometimes words are borrowed back from the transcendent into the realms of the natural, socio-political, and symbolic. In this case, they function on both levels: natural and transcendent. Section 88 uses many transcendent terms and systems: the field, cleanness, the throne, time, and so on. But the distinguishing characteristic of the Section is not the use of the terms, but the self-conscious use of transcendent language. Verses 46 and 47 say,

46. Unto what shall I liken these kingdoms, that ye may understand?

47. Behold, all these are kingdoms, and any man who hath seen any or the least of these hath seen God moving in his majesty and power.

Thus Section 88 is a pronouncement aware of and treating its use as a verbal statement. How does this apply in practice in the Section? Two systems in particular are
used for their transcendent value: the heavenly bodies and light.

Section 88 shows that the things themselves, and not just verbal representations of them, function on both the natural and analogical levels, both as things and as words. Verse 45 (and verses 46 and 47, quoted above) represents the heavenly bodies as both planets and as examples of God's power:

45. The earth rolls upon her wings, and the sun giveth his light by day, and the moon giveth her light by night, and the stars also give their light, as they roll upon their wings in their glory, in the midst of the power of God.

Verses 46 and 47 then pose the transcendent question "Unto what shall I liken these kingdoms?" Concerning light, the Section says,

11. And the light which shineth, which giveth you light, is through him who enlighteneth your eyes, which is the same light that quickeneth your understandings;

Thus light functions on several levels: both the literal and symbolic levels verbally, and the literal natural level.
What does all this say about the use of language in Section 88? The self-conscious use of the transcendent seems to indicate that the Section expects to be treated as a verbal pronouncement, as a transcendent statement. If this is so, then an analysis (such as this thesis) seeking to discover the way the Section functions as a communication is not only proper, but expected, anticipated, even welcomed. Thus, as with the Section's appropriation of the monetary motive into the "glory" motive, the Section incorporates any intellectual objections to it that might arise by approaching them head-on and incorporating them into its own system. This illustrates the power and appeal this scriptural text has, its completeness and the universality of the hold it has on its constituents.
The Negative

Language, to be used properly, must be "discounted." We must remind ourselves that, whatever correspondence there is between a word and the thing it names, the word is not the thing. The word "tree" is not a tree. And just as effects that can be got with the thing can't be got with the word, so effects that can be got with the word can't be got with the thing. . . .

The paradox of the negative, then, is simply this: Quite as the word "tree" is verbal and the thing tree is non-verbal, so all words for the non-verbal must, by the very nature of the case, discuss the realm of the non-verbal in terms of what it is not. Hence, to use words properly, we must spontaneously have a feeling for the principle of the negative. (Religion 18)

Burke seems fascinated with the negative; much of his work discusses the role of the negative in language. He defines the negative as twofold: the propositional negative ("it is not") and the hortatory negative ("thou shalt not"). According to Burke, the hortatory negative is prior in human life, both narratively and logically (Religion 20). Infants learn the concept of the hortatory
negative (No!) much sooner than they can grasp the discounting of language, of something that is not. In keeping with Burke's theory of dramatism, the hortatory negative is important because it creates action and moral choice. Because Section 88 is a theological text, the negative figures prominently. But Joseph Smith gives the negative two interesting twists, and these make the 88th Section a particularly rich area of study in the symbolic action of the negative. First, Smith merges the propositional and hortatory negative by virtue of the cluster of god-terms discussed earlier, particularly the terms space and law. Second, perhaps by way of compensation and counterbalance, Smith weights the moral value of the positive in the concept of order. These two characteristics make Section 88 particularly sophisticated in what it reveals about Smith's view of the nature of man, God, and language.

First let's examine what Smith does with the propositional negative, "it is not." The cluster of god-terms identified earlier links the Son-light-all things-space-kingdom-law. Again, verse 37 informs us that there is no kingdom in which there is no space. Verse 38 links kingdom and law--there is a law for every kingdom, and for every law, certain bounds and conditions. Thus for something to exist positively in a kingdom, it must obey
that kingdom's law. Verses 22 through 24 discuss this in the negative with respect to bodies:

22. For he who is not able to abide the law of a celestial kingdom cannot abide a celestial glory.

23. And he who cannot abide the law of a terrestrial kingdom cannot abide a terrestrial glory.

24. And he who cannot abide the law of a telestial kingdom cannot abide a telestial glory; therefore he is not meet for a kingdom of glory. Therefore he must abide a kingdom which is not a kingdom of glory.

Thus if something is not, we can say that even if that thing does exist in some kingdom, it does not obey the law of this one, and therefore does not exist here. Law implies action: that thing's choice was to say No! to the law of this kingdom. Thus the propositional negative has shades of the moral negative.

Likewise, though the ordinary moral negative exists in abundance in this Section, the moral negative in some areas has shades of the propositional negative, because if a thing says No! to law, it cannot exist in a certain state. The earth, we are told, does not say No! to the
law of its kingdom (celestial); therefore it exists (verse 25: "abideth the law of a celestial kingdom").

There is also the sense of something not being perceived because of a moral negative:

66. Behold, that which you hear is as the voice of one crying in the wilderness—in the wilderness because you cannot see him—my voice, because my voice is Spirit; my Spirit is truth; truth abideth and hath no end; and if it be in you it shall abound.

The voice qua voice is perceived because the sight is not perceived, and the sight is not perceived because of a moral (which becomes a propositional) negative: "The light shineth in the darkness, and the darkness comprehendeth it not" (verse 49). The darkness comprehendeth not because the darkness chooses to say no and subsequently cannot comprehend. In this way, the darkness chooses not to comprehend. Thus the moral negative "I will not" becomes a propositional negative "I cannot." Verse 50 also links the moral and propositional negative: ". . . and that you are in me; otherwise ye could not abound." The could is crucial, because could implies ability. And in this link between moral and propositional negative, ability eventually comes down to choice. If we say No! enough, we literally cannot. But the emphasis in these
two verses is not on the No! but on the Yes! The *nevertheless* in verse 49 makes clear this element of active choice: "Nevertheless the day shall come when you shall comprehend even God, being quickened in him and by him." Hence the first law of heaven is obedience.

Returning to the idea of sight, verse 67 mentions sight, which by virtue of its connections to the god-term light, seems to stand for a higher order of law than hearing does:

67. And if your eye be single to my glory, your whole bodies shall be filled with light, and there shall be no darkness in you; and that body which is filled with light comprehendeth all things.

Recall the cluster of god-terms at the beginning. Both light and all things appear. There seems to be a correlation between what we say Yes! or No! to and what exists for us. The more we say Yes! the more things. Thus law and the soul's individual acceptance of law lead to the possibility of more truth ("and if it be in you it shall abound" verse 66) and the possibility of the soul's perceiving more truth.

This correlation between the moral and propositional negative, or turned around, higher law-higher possibility leads naturally to an emphasis on the positive aspect of
moral choice, the saying of Yes! And this positive aspect appears where traditional Christianity might include a negative emphasis: thus Section 88 has "Therefore he must abide a kingdom which is not a kingdom of glory" (verse 24), instead of the more traditional threat of hell. And this is important in Mormon cosmogony. But the positive emphasis goes beyond the use of "not" before a eulogistic term and beyond commandments for positive action rather than negative "thou shalt nots." ("And I give unto you ... a commandment. ... Also, I give unto you a commandment. ... And I give unto you a commandment." verses 74,76,77). The positive emphasizes the reward of Yes! rather than the punishment of No! Verse 83 incorporates the positive emphasis with mention of punishment: "He that seeketh me early shall find me, and shall not be forsaken." Even the slothful are summoned by reference to the valiant:

85. ... let those who are not the first elders continue in the vineyard until the mouth of the Lord shall call them, for their time is not yet come; their garments are not yet clean from the blood of this generation.

Likewise, verses 35 and 65 emphasize the aspect of positive action with respect to the counter order: (verse 35) "That which breaketh a law, and abideth not by law,
but seeketh to become a law unto itself, and willeth to abide in sin, and altogether abideth in sin. . . ." and (verse 65) "And if ye ask anything that is not expedient for you, it shall turn unto your condemnation." Verses 32 and 33 illustrate this most clearly:

32. And they who remain shall also be quickened; nevertheless, they shall return again to their own place, to enjoy that which they are willing to receive, because they were not willing to enjoy that which they might have received.

33. For what doth it profit a man if a gift is bestowed upon him, and he receive not the gift? Behold, he rejoices not in that which is given unto him, neither rejoices in him who is the giver of the gift.

Here the emphasis is entirely on the positive, using such words as enjoy, willing, gift, rejoice. And the alternative to this gift? "They who remain shall also be quickened; nevertheless they shall return again to their own place." Even the punishment is stated here in attractive terms: life and one's place within the order. This comes back to order. An emphasis on the negative, hellfire and brimstone and all, while perhaps more poignant and moving to the individual, gives the opposing
party just as much limelight as one's own, and perhaps overemphasizes the extent and importance of chaos, which is lower levels of order. The emphasis on the positive broadens the horizon to the possibilities of ever higher order, and these possibilities with respect to the individual soul, ever upward and outward into more and more things, ultimately into all things.

So what does all this say about language, particularly about the motives in Mormon terminology? It seems that Joseph Smith's two modifications on the Burkean theory of the negative--the merging of the propositional and the hortatory negative and the emphasis on the positive--result in a positive emphasis in Mormonism, an emphasis on the good in man rather than the depraved and on eternal rewards rather than punishments. Here Burke would probably contend that the negative--hellfire and all its entrancements--is more vital in getting people to do what the religion wants them to do. But again, the terminology and the underlying assumptions about the nature of man determine how the religion persuades men, not only what it persuades them to do. The positive emphasis in Section 88 seems related to two doctrines in Mormonism that concern the nature of man: the denial of original sin and the concept of man's eventually becoming a God.
Concerning the denial of original sin, recall the discussion of language as fall at the conclusion of the "Matter-Spirit" chapter (pages 50 through 51). Burke considers language to be a division—and therefore a Fall—from prelingual unity to a state of divisiveness and therefore categorical guilt. The merging of matter and spirit discussed in the Matter-Spirit chapter in effect denied the division between language and thing, and therefore denied the idea of (even a fortunate) Fall, invalidating the concept of categorical guilt. The positive emphasis in Section 88 ("it is" as well as creation's saying Yes! to "thou shalt") also denies categorical guilt and invalidates the concept of original sin. For something to exist in a kingdom, it has to say Yes! to the law of that kingdom. Consider the Mormon concept of the first and second estates; it is only through a person's premortal Yes! that he exists as a human in this world anyway.

The emphasis on the positive in Section 88 also illustrates the nature of man via the method of courtship between God and man. Courtship is the communication between two kinds of beings. Section 88 as a theological text, explaining the relation between God and man, necessarily treats courtship. The method of entreaty, it seems, is dependent on the nature of the beings involved. And this is a two-way relation, dependent
largely on what the beings think of each other; if the beings think of one another as naturally "bad" or ill-disposed to their own kind, then the one above will be domineering and the one below will be surly. If the beings think of one another as naturally "good" or well-disposed to one another, then the one above will be benificent, and the one below will be willing. Thus the opinion of both of the disposition and nature of the other affects the nature of the courtship's entreaty. When one being is far above another, and the lower is by nature recalcitrant, then the entreaty generally takes the form of threat and punishment. But when the beings are more nearly equal, and the being below is by nature willing, the entreaty generally takes the form of promise of reward. And when the being below is by nature reasonable, then the promise of reward is generally reasoned. Take the example of the child and the parent. If the parent considers the child naturally recalcitrant, or naturally apt to do bad, and the child considers the parent likewise, an injunction may take the form "Do this or else"; and if the parent considers the child naturally unreasonable, the parent's response to the child's "Why?" may be "Because I said so." However, if the parent considers the child naturally willing and willing to do good, and the child likewise, the injunction may take the
form "Do this and you will receive this"; and if the parent considers the child, who is naturally good, willing to good because good is the most reasonable thing to do more than because the child will receive a reward, the parent's response to the child's "Why?" may be "Because it is good, and this is why it is good . . . ." Thus both come away with increased respect for the disposition and basic reasonableness of one another and the relation between the two.

The concept of basic reasonableness is tied in with Burke's idea of possessing one's world. A person only possesses his world if he works for it and considers it basically reasonable; a person is alienated when he considers his world basically unreasonable. The nature of man and God is at the basis of man's world view. The Mormon view thus inherently contains the goad for members to work, to choose, to invest in their world, and to believe in its ultimately reasonable nature. Hence Mormons are goaded to accept every calling they receive. And Church standing is reckoning not by a quality of "being" (a person's "being" good, holy, and so on) but by a person's actions, his activity. Our terministic screen accounts only for this: so-called "good" and "bad" Mormons are termed "active" and "inactive." The more busy we are, the better we think ourselves and are thought by
our peers. This concept of activity fends off alienation and keeps members strongly anchored within the Mormon world. Some say that a person once thoroughly converted who leaves for good the Mormon world, "the one true church on the face of the earth," never again finds another "one true church." Often alienation sets in because he has left behind not only a world view, but a world view that provides dividends for the investment even as the investor is paying, rewards both in this world (in the form of possession of a world, therefore a feeling of reasonableness, utility, and order) and in the next (all that and, according to the promises in Section 88, much more).

The method of entreaty in Section 88 has another implication for Mormon doctrine: the idea of man's ability eventually to become a God in his own right. Recall the example of parent and child. What are the underlying assumptions for each type of relationship, the threat-based and the reward-based. In the unreasonable threat-based relationship, the parent assumes that the child will continue to need to be told what to do, that is, continue to be a child; the threat method of entreaty does not leave any channels open for initiative on the child's part. In the reasonable reward-based relationship, however, the parent assumes that the child will in time
not require the parent's injunctions; the method of reason and reward (not to mention contract) prepares the child to assume control and responsibility for his own life and eventually for the lives of his own children. The parent-child relation brings us back to Section 88, which is a communication between God and his children. Through the emphasis on the positive, Section 88 illustrates and anticipates (perhaps even creates) Mormons' attitudes toward the nature of God, the nature of man, and the nature of the relationship between the two.
The succession of words in a sentence would be analogous to the "temporal." But the meaning of the sentence is an essence, a kind of fixed significance or definition that is not confined to any of the sentence's parts, but rather pervades or inspirits the sentence as a whole. Such meaning, I would say, is analogous to "eternity." In contrast with the flux of the sentence, where each syllable arises, exists for a moment, and then "dies" to make room for the next stage of the continuing process, the meaning is "non-temporal," though embodied (made incarnate) in a temporal series. The meaning in its unity or simplicity "just is." (Religion 27)

The time-eternity analogy recognizes that because humans are time-bound, some things outside of time (i.e., eternal) must of necessity be expressed in terms of time. This expression of eternity in terms of time has two results, stemming from two types of "eternity": unitary meaning and logical priority. Both these extra-temporal aspects of communication appear in Section 88, not only separately, but in a synthesis based in the moral Yes! a
synthesis that ultimately takes form in the universal hierarchy. But before discussing that synthesis, it is first necessary to trace the way the two ideas are developed separately, first the concept of eternity as unitary meaning, then the concept of eternity as hierarchy.

In respect to the eternity of "unitary meaning," the time-eternity analogy according to Augustine (Confessions 4.10) considers the difference between the unitary meaning of the whole pronouncement and the splintering of meaning necessary in the statement of the pronouncement. Augustine uses this duality in his metaphor of time versus eternity in the idea of "syllables of time" as opposed to the unity of eternity. Burke adopts this analogy and uses it to deal with language in general in theological texts. For Burke (as for Augustine), the particulars of the sentence (or pronouncement) are time-bound, but the unitary meaning of the whole is eternal. This analogy provides a way to analyze the sequential limitations of language vis-a-vis the unified aims of communication and persuasion in a theological text. That is, a theological text attempts to reveal the eternal, unitary meaning in terms of the temporal.

For the "eternity" of logical priority, the time-eternity analogy deals with what Burke calls "the
ambiguous relation between terms for 'logical priority' and terms for 'temporal priority' (Religion 29). Temporal priority structures events according to their sequence in time: this, next this, finally this. Logical priority structures events and ideas according to their relative importance for the meaning of the entire sequence. It would seem that logical priority should supersede narrative priority; but in a world necessarily constrained by time, the two have to share the same territory: for time-bound humans, the most effective way to express logical priority is to phrase it in terms of temporal priority. Hence our instinctive feeling of the first being the foundation. And it is not far from the link of first-as-foundation to first-as-best. Thus temporal sequence is linked with hierarchy as well as logical order.36

Thus the time-eternity analogy touches on two dichotomies: time as mortal and eternity as immortal; and temporal versus logical priority in respect to the spirit of hierarchy. In Section 88 these two dichotomies are unified in an interesting way, but before discussing that synthesis, it is necessary to trace the way the two ideas are developed separately in Section 88, first the idea of time as syllables and eternity as unitary meaning,
then the concept of time as temporary, worldly order and eternity as the everlasting order.

In Section 88 time is linked with mortality and eternity with immortality. This leads to a distrust of time, or at least a recognition of its variety and perhaps instability. This distrust is apparent in the abundance of different types of reckoning listed in verse 44:

44. And they give light to each other in their times and in their season, in their minutes, in their hours, in their days, in their weeks, in their months, in their years—all these are one year with God, but not with man. The last clause makes especially clear that for eternity, the concerns of time are perhaps superfluous. And to humans trying to comprehend the distinctions, those differences may be confusing.

Verse 79 amplifies all the things that verse 78 introduces as "expedient for you to understand," and all those things are described as a mixing and overlapping of categories reminiscent of verse 44:

79. Of things both in heaven and in earth, and under the earth; things which have been, things which are, things which must shortly come to pass; things which are at home, things which are abroad; the wars and perplexities of the
nations, and the judgments which are on the land; and a knowledge also of countries and of kingdoms.

It is significant that time is listed in connection with events, especially troubling and confusing events: "things which are at home, things which are abroad; the wars and the perplexities of nations, and the judgments which are on the land." In verse 79 time is described in terms of events: "things which are, things which must shortly come to pass."

In verses 95 and 110, time is described in terms of space: "there shall be silence in heaven for the space of half an hour" (95) and "for the space of a thousand years" (110). Granted, "extent of time" is a traditional usage for space, but space has already been used quite strongly as physical space (e.g., verse 37: "for there is no space in the which there is no kingdom; and there is no kingdom in which there is no space").

In the midst of all this temporal instability, the end of time is promised:

84. Therefore, tarry ye, and labor diligently, that you may ... go forth among the Gentiles for the last time ... to prepare the saints for the hour of judgment which is to come; [emphasis added]
The hour of judgment is also described:

108. And then shall the first angel again sound his trump in the ears of all living, and reveal the secret acts of men, and the mighty works of God in the first thousand years.

109. And then shall the second angel sound his trump, and reveal the secret acts of men, and the thoughts and intents of their hearts, and the mighty works of God in the second thousand years—

110. And so on, until the seventh angel shall sound his trump; and he shall stand forth upon the land and upon the sea, and swear in the name of him who sitteth upon the throne, that there shall be time no longer; and Satan shall be bound, that old serpent, who is called the devil, and shall not be loosed for the space of a thousand years. [emphasis added]

Thus it seems that time is linked with confusion and even disobedience. Recall the earlier citation of "the wars and perplexities of the nations" (verse 79). In verse 108 and 109, time is related to "the secret acts of men." And in verse 110, the end of time is linked with the end of disobedience in the binding of Satan; and time is again
mentioned in reference to the loosing of Satan ("the space of a thousand years").

So how does all this relate to Burke's (Augustinian) analogy? Note that in verses 108 through 110, time and its tie to wicked events is linked with a revealing of some sort; and earlier in verse 79, these times and events are described as something for the obedient to learn. Thus it seems that time is tied in with a record, a record of events on earth. If this is so, the events on earth are in an oddly literal way "syllables of time" in the book of the history of humankind.

The book is a particularly good metaphor for eternity, because it seems to be one of the ways humans can approximate eternity. That is, the first time a person reads a book, he is bound by the temporal sequence in that he knows only the past. But in the subsequent readings a person can enjoy the book "eternally," knowing all the events and the way they develop, but also knowing the themes and the meaning of the whole. But to arrive at an "eternal" reading, one must first pass through a "temporal" reading. From verses 108 to 110, it seems that the necessity of first passing through "time" before arriving at eternity applies to human events as well as to the reading of a book, because the beginning of humans' eternity is connected with the end of their time and their
"rereading" of the book. A book of the history of mankind thus brings together the temporal and eternal characteristics of human life.\(^{39}\)

The merging and dissolving of temporal and logical priority and the dichotomy between time and eternity appear throughout Christianity, and Section 88 shares many of these characteristics. But as the other analogies have demonstrated, Section 88 modifies these traditional distinctions in some interesting ways, ways that illustrate the differences in language use and therefore worldview (and therefore action) between Mormonism and traditional Christianity.

Traditional Christianity recognizes that temporal priority and hierarchy are merged in men's minds, and Burke says that Christ's "the first shall be last and the last shall be first" is a recognition of this and a communication of the differences between the two. Burke says Christ upsets the traditional hierarchy in favor of his own order: masters being servants, poor inheriting the earth, etc. (Rhetoric of Motives 138).\(^{40}\)

Section 88 also recognizes the merging of hierarchy and temporal sequence:

85. . . . Let those who are not the first elders continue in the vineyard until the mouth of the Lord shall call them, for their time is
not yet come; their garments are not clean from the blood of this generation.

In this verse first is explicitly equated with best (or most righteous). The equating of the two in this verse should probably influence the interpretation of the parable of the master and servants in the field. And verse 60 affirms the order:

60. Every man in his own order, until his hour was finished, even according as his Lord had commanded him, that his Lord might be glorified in him, and he in his Lord, that they all might be glorified.

But note the confusion of sequence in verse 59:

59. Beginning at the first, and so unto the last, and from the last unto the first, and from the first unto the last.

This verse leaves a person's head spinning, and it is unclear who is ending up where. Thus Section 88 seems to recognize temporal sequence as a way of representing hierarchy, but also recognizes the Lord's prerogative (as in traditional Christianity) to turn the hierarchy on its head.

In contrast to the confusion and variety of time—both time as event and time as order—is the stability of eternity: "one year with God" (verse 44) "in
the bosom of eternity" (verse 13). (Recall the chart of
god-terms on page .) The stability of eternity is
linked with "the everlasting covenant":

131. Let him offer himself in prayer upon
his knees before God, in token or remembrance of
the everlasting covenant.

133. Art thou a brother or brethren? I
salute you in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ,
in token or remembrance of the everlasting
covenant, in which covenant I receive you to
fellowship, in a determination that is fixed,
immovable, and unchangeable, to be your friend
and brother through the grace of God in the
bonds of love, to walk in all the commandments
of God blameless, in thanksgiving, forever and
ever. Amen.

The concept of eternity is very important in the
time-eternity analogy, because eternity is where all the
confusions of time (syllables of time as well as the
confusions of order among men) come together in both
unitary meaning and universal order (hierarchy). Recall
the earlier discussion of events as syllables of time and
eternity as unitary meaning; the individual acts in the
history of mankind form a series of syllables of time, but
the unitary meaning of all is in its end (both logically
and temporally, in the sense of end as aim and in the sense of end as result): the setting up of God's kingdom when "time shall be no longer" (verse 110). In verses 108 through 110 (as well as in verse 79), the history of mankind, its "syllables of time," is expressed in terms of events, often events contrary to God's will: "the wars and the perplexities of the nations," "the secret acts of men," and "the thoughts and intents of their hearts." It seems from the relation between the disobedient events in the syllables of time that time is linked with disobedience and eternity with obedience, the moral Yes! of the covenant.

And it is in this synthesis, time-eternity with No!-Yes! and thereby with temporary hierarchy versus eternal hierarchy (implicitly through the relation discussed in earlier chapters between obedience and one's place in the universal order) that Section 88 makes its contribution to the Burkean analogy. Recall the cluster of god-terms discussed at the outset; the duality of time versus eternity was one of the major branches in the diagram. Thus time and eternity are integrated with all other things.

What significance does this have for Mormon use of language? Mormons have in their terms a remarkably clear idea of the relation between time and eternity and the
importance of time versus eternity to the universal order: marriage for time and all eternity (significantly called "the new [temporal] and everlasting [eternal] covenant" in Doctrine and Covenants 131:2). Mormons are always aware of the difference between time and eternity by the value of the marriage covenant: the "time" marriage lasts only as long as human life, and the configuration of order in the time-only marriage is dissolved with death. The "time and eternity" marriage (the best of both worlds), however, preserves the particular configuration of order beyond time and its connotations of disobedience conditioned on the couple's own obedience. Thus time and eternity are always merged in Mormons' minds with the Yes! of the covenant and with its practical temporal manifestation, Church activity. This link of the eternal order and its analogue, the family (as discussed in the "Socio-political" section of the "Words-Word" chapter) with Mormons' sexual relations (marriage) serves as a powerful goad to Church activity. Thus the time-eternity analogy works in the traditional Christian way, as a consolation for the chaos of this world, but additionally as a goad to investment in this world and in the order and work of the Church.
Think first of the relation between the thing and its name (between a tree and the word "tree"). The power is primarily in the thing, in the tree rather than in the word for the tree. But the word is related to this power, this thing, as "knowledge" about that thing. Hence, derivatively, it has a kind of power, too (the power that is in knowledge, in accurate naming). But primarily power is in the materials, the things, that we can build with, or heat with, or strike with and so on.

Note also that whereas the first moment (the thing) provided the ground for the second moment (the appropriate name), both of these moments, taken together, form the "correspondence" between them. (Religion 29, 30)

Burke's analogy of the trinity (called the "formal" analogy) states that words and the way they relate to their referents closely parallels the relation among the persons in the trinity: the Father stands for the thing itself, the power; the Son stands for the name of the thing, the wisdom; and the Holy Spirit stands for the
place of correspondence between the two, which because they are persons, is love.

This relationship among members of the trinity Burke names the formal analogy. Although Section 88 does not specifically refer to the trinity, or even to the Mormon term for the trinity, the godhead, all three persons of the trinity are explicitly mentioned, and the relation among them is represented in ways not unlike Burke's analogy. However, a comparison of the traditional trinity and the Mormon godhead—especially as described in Section 88—reveals that the Mormon formal analogy and use of language has some interesting distinctions from the Burke's use of the traditional trinity.

Section 88 recognizes a trinity, but does not explicitly stress the relation among its members. But a trinity does appear. Note, for example, the characteristics of the heavenly bodies in the following verses:

7. Which truth shineth. This is the light of Christ. As also he is in the sun, and the light of the sun, and the power thereof by which it was made.

8. As also he is in the moon, and is the light of the moon, and the power thereof by which it was made;
9. As also the light of the stars, and the power thereof by which they were made;

10. And the earth also, and the power thereof, even the earth upon which you stand.

Note that three characteristics are mentioned in each example: the thing itself, the light, and the power by which it was made. This grouping is the trinity. These three, however, comprise a different formal analogy from Burke's, because they correspond with the three members of the trinity, but in ways different from Burke's conception of the trinity. In Section 88, the father is the generating principle, "the power by which it was made"; and the Son is specifically equated with light; but the Holy Spirit, the place of correspondence between the two of these, seems to be the thing itself, which is the convergence of the power by which something is made and the power (light) that the thing itself makes.

Thus the trinity is discussed in Section 88; and although the entire trinity is implicit in a mention of any one member, the one member particularly emphasized in Section 88 is the Son—the light. And while Section 88 mentions first the Holy Spirit (verses 3 and 4) and then the Father (verse 5), the next few verses (6 through 13) describe the Son in particular. (Refer to 7 through 10 on
Verses 11 through 13 and 49 through 50 deal with the light of Christ:

11. And the light which shineth, which giveth you light, is through him who enlighteneth your eyes, which is the same light that quickeneth your understandings;

12. Which light proceedeth forth from the presence of God to fill the immensity of space—

13. The light which is in all things, which giveth life to all things, which is the law by which all things are governed, even the power of God who sitteth upon his throne, who is in the bosom of eternity, who is in the midst of all things.

49. The light shineth in the darkness, and the darkness comprehendeth it not; nevertheless, the day shall come when you shall comprehend even God, being quickened in him and by him.

50. Then shall ye know that ye have seen me, that I am, and that I am the true light that is in you, and that you are in me; otherwise ye could not abound.

Earlier in this thesis verses 11 through 13 were quoted in respect to the Matter-Spirit analogy, matter being the
nonverbal referent and spirit being language (page 46). Compare the verses directly above with the first chapter of John:

1. In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.
2. The same was in the beginning with God.
3. All things were made by him; and without him was not any thing made that was made.
4. In him was life; and the life was the light of men.
5. And the light shineth in the darkness; and the darkness comprehended it not.

The similarity between the Doctrine and Covenants verses and John 1 not only affirms the formal analogy in Section 88, at least with respect to the Son as the Word, but Section 88 modifies John by the addition of the promise that "you shall comprehend even God" and the explanation of comprehension, in verse 50, which seems to act almost as an appositive to comprehend: "Then shall ye know that ye have seen me, that I am, and that I am the true light that is in you, and that you are in me; otherwise ye could not abound." This seems to explain the way light (language, the Word) leads to comprehension not only of God but of the relation between God and man as
well as the relation among God, man, and all things. Because of the link between the Word (and man's comprehension), light, all things, and the promise of comprehension, this Mormon modification links the formal analogy back to the universal hierarchy and the Mormon acceptance of the physical. This link is possible because of the cluster of god-terms discussed at the beginning of this thesis. The promise of man's comprehending Christ and the light (which is in all things) includes man's ability to comprehend the universal order. And the link between light and all things brings this comprehension into the physical aspect of the order as well.

Verses 66 through 68 add another concept to this Mormon modification of Burke's analogy: the moral Yes! The verses are as follows:

66. Behold, that which you hear is as the voice of one crying in the wilderness—in the wilderness, because you cannot see him—my voice, because my voice is Spirit; my Spirit is truth; truth abideth and hath no end; and if it be in you it shall abound.

67. And if your eye be single to my glory, your whole bodies shall be filled with light, and there shall be no darkness in you; and that
body which is filled with light comprehendeth all things.

68. Therefore, sanctify yourselves that your minds become single to God, and the days will come that you shall see him; for he will unveil his face unto you, and it shall be in his own time, and in his own way, and according to his own will.

Verses 66 through 68 make explicit the extent of comprehension: all things. These verses also expand on the relation between God and man. In 49 through 50 man was promised that he would be able to comprehend God; these verses promise that man will comprehend God, but in God's own time, way, and will.

Related to God's own time, way, and will is the moral Yes! Note that in verse 66 voice seems to be a lower level of comprehension, and this lower level of comprehension is linked with a lower level of obedience.48

To sum up, Section 88 affirms the formal analogy in some ways, but alters it in others; and these alterations describe some important differences between the Mormon use of language (and therefore world view) and the traditional Christian use of language. The first Mormon modification as described in Section 88 verses 6 through 13 is the difference of referent for the members of the trinity.
That is, for traditional Christianity, the Father stands for the thing, the Son stands for the name, and the Holy Spirit stands for the relation between the two. But for Mormonism, the Father stands for the power by which all things were created, perhaps the power to create language; the Son stands for the Word, the light that all things generate; and the Holy Spirit stands for the thing itself, as the locus of convergence for the two.

What implications does this difference have for Mormonism? I now examine this question for each member of the trinity separately. Instead of the Father standing for the thing, which Burke calls the "power," which engenders the word (because a person can do things with a tree he cannot do with the word tree: see the quote at the beginning of this chapter), for Mormons the Father stands for the power of creating the Word, a power that is logically prior to the actual verbal referent (which in the Mormon scheme represents the Holy Spirit). Thus the Father creates the Word, which is prior to the thing. Compare the Mormon idea that all things were created spiritually before they were created physically: the word comes before the nonverbal referent, both logically, as in this analogy, and temporally, as the Mormon idea about the creation implies (Moses 3: 5,7).
The Son being the Word is not new to Mormonism, as the citation of John 1 illustrates, but the changed functions of the Father and the Holy Spirit modify the position of the Son. Instead of the Word arising from the thing, the thing in a way arises from the combination of the creative power of the Word (see the discussion of the "Creativity" analogy in the introduction, pages 25 through 26) and the willingness of the creature to say Yes! to the Word, the willingness of the creature to comprehend. This attributes a creative power to language beyond what Burke seems to imply in his treatment of the analogy. Hence the first principle of the gospel is "faith in the Lord Jesus Christ." Through such faith, the moral Yes! man comprehends. And as discussed in the "Negative" chapter (page 89) and earlier in this chapter (pages 116 through 117), it is through greater comprehension that man achieves more glory and thereby fulfills "the measure of his creation" to give the Father more glory (Moses 1:39).

The third member of the trinity, the Holy Spirit, is probably the member most modified by the Mormon view. In the Mormon view, instead of being a spirit, the Holy Ghost has a body, a "spiritual body" (see verses 20 through 31 on bodies and glory), with the understanding that, at some time in the future, he will have an actual physical body:
that is his promise. And his function is as a symbol of promise; recall the way he is described in verse 3: the Holy Spirit of promise. His promise is to have a glorified body throughout the eternities. This is a potentiality, as man's place in the hierarchy is a potentiality, dependent on individual conduct. The Holy Ghost also represents potentiality and place in that he is now a spirit and therefore can occupy a place, and this function as the place of convergence between God and man allows man to receive of God's glory and God's word, thus allowing man to comprehend more and more. Thus the Holy Ghost's being the thing, which is the locus of convergence between God and man and the symbol of man's promise and potentiality, is a concept particularly necessary for Mormonisms' emphasis on the positive and the affirmation of the physical.

This seems to argue for two ideas (and hence attitudes and from attitudes, actions): first, the Mormon trust in the physical; second, the transitory nature of the linguistic situation as we know it. If the Holy Ghost is the potential correspondence between the Father and the Son, and this correspondence is called "Love," then "Love" in the Mormon view is in the last analysis a physical state—that is, a spiritual state that includes the physical. Hence the Mormon view that physical—even
sexual—relations among people will potentially (conditioned on obedience) continue in the eternities; and the Mormon view that even the Gods have physical bodies and sexual relations. The second idea, the transitory nature of the linguistic situation, is reminiscent of the discussion in the chapter of this thesis entitled "Matter-Spirit." The conclusion of that chapter suggested that the linguistic situation as we know it is but a faulty model of the linguistic situation that is eternal (and that the dichotomy between matter and spirit is a faulty temporal—into—logical emphasis on an eternal unity). That is, when we speak of the individual parts that make up this unity, matter or spirit, we must necessarily say one before the other, and the one we say first has for us perhaps a mistaken logical (rather than temporal) priority. This unity of matter and spirit in the linguistic situation leads to a reliance on language (as opposed to some philosophies' distrust of language, Plato, for instance), but an anticipation of another, more perfect linguistic situation. However, for Mormons the formal analogy synthesizes and unifies the dichotomy, for if the Holy Ghost is represented by the potential of the thing itself, and is potentially to have a body, then language itself must in some close way be tied to the physical, perhaps via a perfect language (compare the
Mormon idea of the Adamic language), which has a perfect physical correspondent in its referent.

The further development of the formal analogy leads into the passage in Section 88 (verses 49 and 50) on darkness not comprehending light. Earlier in this chapter comprehension was linked with the moral Yes! Thus the more obedience, the more comprehension. Comprehension seems to be tied with levels in the hierarchy: the more comprehension, the higher a creature is. The Father has the power to create words, the Son to comprehend that power, the Holy Ghost to embody them and be created by them. This seems curiously like the three degrees of glory (recall the tie between light and glory discussed in the chapter entitled "Titular"). Those in the celestial kingdom partake of God the Father's full presence, in this scheme, the power to create words. Those in the terrestrial kingdom enjoy only the Son, that is, the ability to comprehend words and things. Those in the telestial kingdom enjoy only the Holy Ghost, that is, the world that is created by the power and the Word. Mormons believe that the earth is in a telestial state at present; translated into this analogy, this means that the world is created by words, an idea very much like Burke's concept of the terministic screen creating reality for a person and controlling a person.
What does all this translate into in actual practice? Language, it seems, is one of the essential characteristics of both God and man (who may become a God). Obedience, as Mormons believe, is the first law of heaven. From obedience comes comprehension (verse 49: "nevertheless the day shall come when you shall comprehend even God"). God comprehends all things (verse 40: "He comprehendeth all things. . . ."). From comprehension comes the power to create language (as illustrated in the formal analogy), from the power to create language comes the ability to become a God (the representation of the Father in verses 7 through 10: "the power thereof by which it was made"). Thus it seems that one of the basic essential characteristics of both man and God is language, not language in isolation, but as this analogy's corporeal Holy Ghost and the god-term cluster relation of language to all things implies, the ability to create and unite language and the physical, both the tree and the tree.
Conclusion

At the conclusion of one of my freshman composition themes, my professor wrote, "I am tempted to say, So what?" His little praeteritio hit the mark, and ever since then, at the conclusion of anything I read or write, those two little words have asserted themselves: "So what?" In this thesis I have applied Kenneth Burke's logological method to Doctrine and Covenants Section 88. A lot of interesting bits of information have come out of the analysis, but what does it all in essence mean? And how can a person use this information in enhancing an art of living?

Before applying this information to life, I briefly review the four main themes that have appeared repeatedly throughout this analysis: first, the cluster of god-terms that modifies every individual concept and places it within the universal hierarchy; second, the grounding of all things—even abstract things—in the physical; third, the emphasis on the positive; fourth, the implications all these have for language as it goads Mormons' action, with examples of this in Mormon behavior.

The cluster of god-terms identified in this analysis forms a network that includes (or excludes) everything. This network not only includes everything, but places each thing in "its own place" within the order.
Thus this cluster, as a terministic screen, determines the way everything is perceived, and from the attitude created by the perception, also determines the appropriate action for each situation. This cluster of god-terms in turn engenders the other main themes brought out in this analysis.

The most obvious departure from traditional Christianity implicit in the cluster of god-terms is the unity of matter and spirit, not only this unity, but the grounding of all things in the physical. This grounding eases the traditional proscriptions against the flesh. It also ties in with the Mormon disavowal of original sin and corresponding reliance on patterns in the physical world. Mormons have an attitude of reliance on physical reality in the face of abstract philosophy, and this strain appears in the unity and therefore comprehensibility of matter and spirit. As Samuel Johnson said, "I refute it thus."

A reliance on the physical and a feeling that the world is predictable lead to an emphasis on the positive, a feeling that man's actions have some value. This third main theme is the emphasis on the positive implicit in the cluster of god-terms and in the modifying discussions on law. Joseph Smith replaces Burke's traditional Christian concern with No! and punishment with a new emphasis on
Yes! and reward. In Section 88, the positive emphasis is linked even to possibility, so that the more Yes! the more reality.

All these ideas about God and the cosmos have a correspondence with the way language works. In Burke's system, all these themes deal indirectly with language, because anything that can be said of "the Word" can also be said indirectly about words. First, the cluster of god-terms implies that there is an order, a hierarchy, in language, and that the system is self-enclosed and as such defines the limits of the possible, at least as far as people can imagine. This cluster has appeared in every chapter of this analysis and is the unifying principle behind the whole analysis. Second, the grounding of everything in the physical implies that language has some substantial existence outside its temporal existence as sound and its spatial-symbolic existence in writing. As discussed in the "Formal" chapter, "the Word" is eternal and is even the precedent for its nonverbal referent. At the same time, the unity (not the bifurcation) of word and thing is the most important element of their relation. Third, the emphasis on the positive stresses the creative power of language and hence the possibility of man's acting and taking responsibility for his actions.
How does all this apply to an art of living? We Mormons can take stock of all the advantages (and problems) that are inherent in our worldview and therefore our action because, I contend, these advantages (and liabilities) are embedded in our language. And this is exactly what the preceding one hundred pages of this thesis have illustrated: using a Burkean logological method of inquiry, a person can analyze language in the Doctrine and Covenants (and any Mormon text) and recognize motives underlying our worldview and therefore the hold Mormonism has on us. We can understand the power of "the (w/W)ord" and the ways it orders and inspirits life. We always feel its tug implicitly; with the help of a logological scrutiny, we can better rationalize that pull, appreciate the sense of it, delight in its order and variety, and more fully enjoy "our own place."

The advantages of Mormon language and therefore worldview can be summed up in the concept of earning one's world. Of earning one's world, Burke says,

There is no state of leisure. Every inheritance must be earned anew (otherwise, you get alienation and demoralization). . . . The opportunities for employment, in the wider sense, are best when the co-ordinates of the society seem most reasonable to its members. At
such a time one can perform even a menial task with satisfaction, since he locates it by reference to the social purpose as a whole. He "identifies" his minor role with relation to the aims of the collectivity. (Attitudes 247)

The alternative to "earning" and therefore owning one's world is alienation, which Burke defines as that state of affairs wherein a man no longer 'owns' his world because, for one reason or another, it seems basically unreasonable .... A compensatory increase in sensuality generally accompanies a loss of faith in the reasonableness of a society's purposes. People try to combat alienation by immediacy, such as the senses alone provide. (Attitudes 216-218)

This extreme indulgence in sensuality—dissipation—is the world view and lifestyle a great many people in contemporary society have come to. Mormons, for the most part, have not. Why? The complete and ingenious thoroughness of the language and therefore motives as exemplified in the Section 88 make the earning of one's world possible for Mormons.

The language is complete because it accounts for everything. Consider the cluster of god-terms discussed throughout this analysis. This cluster is a net that lets
nothing through; it not only lets nothing through, but refers everything to everything else and integrates the whole in a universal order. The cluster is also complete in that it does not deny or deprecate the physical—even the sensual—but affirms and incorporates the physical into the order. Thus "compensatory sensuality" is almost not an alternative; Section 88 leaves no ground here for the competition. This completeness means that Mormons can do almost anything, religious or secular, and feel it is a "calling." They can also within certain limits enjoy the pleasures of the body. For the "active" Mormon, alienation is not possible (or at least not likely), and the flesh cannot lure the Mormon away from his religion, because his religion encompasses and exonerates the flesh. The language is ingenious because it manages to incorporate all things in a way that goads men to positive and not defensive action. That is, built into the language is an emphasis on rewards rather than punishments, the greatest of rewards being the possibility for man to become equal with God. Thus Mormons have something to work for, something to anticipate, rather than something far-off and unpleasant to avoid. This emphasis on the positive and on action goads Mormons to work, and work is the way one earns his world and escapes alienation.
The danger of this wonderful completeness is that Mormons become involved in their own world view to the extent that they neglect or dismiss as irrelevant anything outside their particular scope. This absorption can lead to fanaticism, which Burke considers the counterpart to dissipation: "By fanaticism I mean the effort to impose one doctrine of motives abruptly upon a world composed of many different motivational situations" (Rhetoric of Motives 318). But the antidote to this extreme policy is also contained within Section 88, which promises that "you shall comprehend even God" (verse 49); Mormons have to remember, however, that this promise is in the future tense, not in the present, and that Christ also commands us to learn about our world on its own terms:

78. Teach ye diligently and my grace shall attend you, that you may be instructed more perfectly in theory, in principle, in doctrine, in the law of the gospel, in all things that pertain unto the kingdom of God, that are expedient for you to understand;

79. Of things both in heaven and in the earth, and under the earth; things which have been, things which are, things which must shortly come to pass; things which are at home, things which are abroad; the wars and
perplexities of the nations, and the judgments which are on the land; and a knowledge also of countries and of kingdoms—

A thorough knowledge of all these can hardly fail to modify fanaticism.

In the preface to this thesis, I described my goal in undertaking this project: to bring together Burke and Mormonism, harmonize them, and be able to emerge with a new synthesis and therefore a more clear and self-conscious rationale for living well. I feel reasonably certain that, within its own limitations, this project has achieved the goal of synthesis, inasmuch as that goal is a static, temporal ideal. But it is not static; this ideal is an objective with implications that broaden more the further a person pursues it. The more Yes! the more comprehension. And while this is the conclusion of my thesis, it is not the conclusion of "living well," which extends into greater scrutiny and greater action. I hope that anyone else who has come this far with me will also continue to trace the implications of this synthesis, not only in study, but in work, in leisure, in the affairs of the community that most Mormons share, and in the contemplation of the sacred texts that form the foundations of our motives—in short, into all things.
Notes

1 Burke says of "the good life":

Distrust hypertrophy of art on paper. More of the artistic should be expressed in vital social relationships. Otherwise, it becomes "efficient" in the compensatory, antithetical sense. So completely do we now accept capitalist standards that we test everything as a commodity for sale. Hence we feel that "a mere artist at living" has "wasted his talents." Rather let him "release" his artistry through a total social texture. Let it take more "ecological" forms, though its "use value" as a commodity is thereby lessened. (Attitudes 259)

2 A detailed explication of this definition appears in Burke's essay "Definition of Man" (Language as Symbolic Action 3-24).

3 This is a topic that concerns Burke; the subtitle of A Grammar of Motives is "Ad bellum purificandum." Burke says,

The dreary likelihood is that, if we do avoid the holocaust, we shall do so mainly by bits of political patchwork here and there, with alliances falling sufficiently on the bias across one another, and thus getting sufficiently in one another's road, so that
there's not enough "symmetrical perfection" among the contestants to set up the "right" alignment and touch it off. (Language 20)

Burke's final essay in Language as Symbolic Action is "A Dramatistic View of the Origins of Language."

According to Burke, it is impossible to escape the biases inherent in a terministic screen (and still use language), because every terminology has these. And anyone who ignores his biases runs the risk of what Burke calls "trained incapacity," the use of one terminology and world view in a situation where that terminology is inappropriate and inefficient. The closest a person can come to "objectivity," Burke says, is an awareness of the ways one's biases work. This can be done by what Burke calls "perspective by incongruity," the putting together of different perspectives--different terminologies--in order to see how the biases run counter to one another. Hence Burke's fascination with the oxymoron, as, for example, "decadent athleticism" (Permanence and Change 90): decadent belongs to one terminology and athleticism to another; the combination gives a perspective on both "realities." On the one hand, athleticism is intended to stave off decadence, but on the other, athleticism taken to an extreme is decadent. (For a further discussion, see Permanence and Change 71 through 163).
The ensuing discussion, which is a summary of Burke's ideas, may be found in more detail in *The Rhetoric of Religion* 172-201.

Courtship is discussed in greater detail in the portion of this introduction entitled "Burke's System of Logology," pages 16 through 27.

Burke says,

In the case of my earlier writings, there has been my concern with the 'creative' nature of the word, in the connection with my speculations on orientation, transformation, 'perspective by incongruity,' 'exorcism by misnomer,' and resimplification (in *Permanence and Change*); on 'secular prayer' (in *Attitudes toward History*); on 'rebirth' (in both these books and *The Philosophy of Literary Form*); on 'god-terms' (in *A Grammar of Motives*); on 'glamor,' 'romance' and 'beauty' as purely secular, social analogues of 'divinity' (in *A Rhetoric of Motives*); on 'pure persuasion' (also in the *Rhetoric*) and on catharsis (in current attempts to decide how poetry 'purges' the edified customer." (*Religion* 34-35.)

By "theological text" I do not mean a systematic logical analysis starting from first principles. Here
Theology means practical theology, the illustration of how God works in the world and therefore how humans should act. Burke himself is not systematic, and the texts he analyzes in *The Rhetoric of Religion* are not systematic theological texts, either: Augustine's *Confessions* and the first three chapters of Genesis.

This chapter is a dialogue between "the Lord" and "Satan" about "logology, theology, symbolizing, and dramatism" (Rueckert 238); Rueckert calls this chapter the "satyr play" that follows the three tragedies (the first three chapters of the book) (Rueckert 238). This chapter is an "example of what Burke calls 'prophecyng after the fact'" (Rueckert 238). Prophecyng after the fact ironically illustrates the differences between temporal priority (first, second, third in time) and logical priority (first principle, second principle, and so on).

For a citation of these verses, see Appendix 1.

See Appendix 1 for a citation of these verses.

At this point in history, there seem to be conversions accumulating on top of other conversions.

See Appendix 1 for a citation of these verses.

For a citation of verses 36 through 50, see Appendix 2.

See also the discussions of the natural world in the "Natural" portion of the chapter entitled "Words-Word"
According to Burke, irony is the most sophisticated form of language, because it is furthest from the nonverbal referent. Burke says,

We cannot use language maturely until we are spontaneously at home in irony. (That is, if the weather is bad, and someone says, "What a beautiful day!" we spontaneously know that he does not mean what the words say on their face. Children, before reaching "the age of reason," usually find this twist quite disturbing, and are likely to object that it is not a good day. Dramatic irony, of course, carries such a principle of negativity to its most complicated perfection. (Language 12)

The steps from referent to irony are as follows:

1. The word refers to the thing: day stands for "day"
2. The word is discounted via the negative ("the map is not the thing"): day is not literally "day." Hence we understand the statement "What a beautiful day!" in its basic sense.
3. The phrase "What a beautiful day!" is again
discounted with the addition of the explicit negative: "What a not beautiful day!"

(4) The explicit negative is removed, so that the phrase "What a beautiful day!" is again discounted via the negative to mean "What a not beautiful day!"

The idea of the body occupying a "place" in the order and the spirit acting as the differentiator is discussed in the chapters entitled "Matter-Spirit" (pages 48 through 49) and "Formal," (pages 119 through 120). See also verse 28:

28. They who are of a celestial spirit shall receive the same body which was a natural body; even ye shall receive your bodies, and your glory shall be that glory by which your bodies are quickened.

See Burke's idea of the fall in "On Covenant and Order" (Religion 174-183).

For a more detailed discussion of this idea, see the chapter entitled "Time-Eternity."

Hence the emphasis on the positive discussed in the chapter entitled "Negative."

Although this world is home, it is not home in its present state. There is still the sense that we are "strangers and pilgrims," or rather, that everyone else is
a stranger and pilgrim, since "we" are the rightful heirs of this planet.

Section 88 has some interesting comments to make on this relation between socio-political order and the natural world; this relation is discussed later, in the socio-political partition of the chapter "words-Word" that treats law and kingdoms (pages 67 through 69 particularly).

For a discussion of a counter-order, see the Socio-political portion of the "words-Word" chapter, pages 70 through 72. See also the chapter on the "Negative," pages 91 through 92.

See also the chapter entitled "Negative."

Compare the discussion of higher and higher levels of possibility, in the "Negative" chapter, pages 92 through 93.

This self-awareness is discussed more fully in the "Transcendent" portion of the "Words-Word" analogy.

Compare this idea of isolation with the earlier portion of this chapter dealing with a kingdom that is "not a kingdom of glory."

This idea of natural things having will and obeying law is discussed in the "Socio-political" portion of the "words-Word" chapter.
In the chapter entitled "The Destiny of Acceptance Frames," Burke discusses acceptance of contradictions:

Play, love, war, work--these are names for the ways in which a man is engrossed. The putting of them all together, the "allocating" of them, is "religion," leading to some manner of transcendence or other.

One confronts contradictions. Insofar as they are resolvable contradictions, he acts to resolve them. Insofar as they are not resolvable, he symbolically erects a "higher synthesis," in poetic and conceptual imagery, that helps him to "accept" them. . . . Each frame enrolls for "action" in accordance with its particular way of drawing the lines.

Out of such frames we derive our vocabularies for the charting of human motives. And implicit in our theory of motives is a program of action, since we form ourselves and judge others (collaborating with them or against them) in accordance with our attitudes.

(Attitudes 92)

This correlates with the Mormon emphasis on intelligence and study. It would seem that we have the logological basis at least for a great intellectual
tradition. Perhaps a logological investigation could be carried out to discover why such a tradition has not taken root more firmly. But that is a project for another time.

32 See also the discussion of law and kingdom in the "Socio-political" portion of the "Words-Word" chapter.

33 Compare the Mormon idea of intelligence as obedience to God, and intelligence that has always existed because it has always said Yes! to God.

34 Courtship is discussed in the introduction under "Hierarchy," pages 15 through 16.

35 And the attitude of the one above generally sets the tone for the whole relation.

36 See part of introduction dealing with Burke's idea of hierarchy, pages 12 through 16.

37 Burke deals with temporal and logical priority under the sixth analogy, but also mentions it under the heading of the fifth analogy:

This distinction between two ideas of "eternity," or between terms for "temporal" orders ["time extended forever"] and terms for "fixed" orders ["principles, universals, definitions of essence"], also involves an ambiguous relation between terms for "logical priority" and terms for "temporal priority"—but
perhaps that point can best be considered in light of our sixth analogy. (Religion 29-29)

My analysis deals with temporal and logical priority in just the converse fashion: I treat it fully under the fifth analogy and mention it under the sixth. This uncertainty of where to treat temporal and logical priority seems to indicate that the concept falls somewhere between the fifth and sixth analogies.

38 Note that in these three verses, events in human history are attributed either to God's "mighty works" or to the "secret acts of men" and the "thoughts and intents of their hearts." This illustrates an emphasis on choice and action, an emphasis that fits well with Burke's theory of dramatism and human action (rather than motion).

39 This idea of the temporal and eternal characteristics of life in the book of the history of humankind is similar to the idea of the potentiality of the Holy Ghost, as discussed in the "Formal" chapter. Just as humans potentially may have glorified bodies in the eternities (the Holy Ghost physically represents this promise), they may potentially read the book of history eternally. This comparison emphasizes two dimensions of human potentiality: space in eternity and time in eternity. And the function of the Holy Ghost in the linguistic situation as the place of convergence between the Father (the power of creation) and the Son (the Word, the light, that which
creation is inspired by and emits) is similar to the book of human history as the space of convergence in the situation of logical and temporal priority. Perhaps this comparison is better suited to the "eternal" rather than the "temporal" reader of this thesis: someone who has already read the "Formal" chapter.

Burke says some interesting things about the first-last doctrine in Christianity:

The Christian doctrine that the first shall be last and the last shall be first is often interpreted as a pattern of social revolution couched in theological terms. But looking at it from the present standpoint, we should interpret its rhetorical appeal as a dialectic more roundabout, thus: The state of first and last things, the heavenly state, is the realm of principle. In this state (a mythical term for the logically prior) the reversal of social status makes as much sense as its actual mundane order. For on this level, all that counts is the principle of hierarchy, or levels, or developments, or unfoldings, per se (the dialectic principle in general, which is "prior" to any particular kind of development, a kind of priority that can be stated mythically either in terms of a heavenly society before the world
began, or one after the world has ended, or one outside of time). (Rhetoric of Motives 138)

41 See Appendix 3 for a citation of verses 51 through 60.

42 Thus the "new and everlasting covenant" of marriage appeals to man as symbol-using animal: symbol-using in terms of the symbols of the sequential (animality, or man's life as a being of flesh and bones, extended forever, as explained in Religion 28) and logical relations (hierarchy) in marriage; animal in terms of the sexual relations in marriage.

43 For a review of the traditional view of the trinity, see Appendix 4, a citation of the Nicene creed.

44 Other Mormon scriptures do, such as Doctrine and Covenants 76 and 93.

45 Although these scriptures refer specifically to the second member of the godhead, the Son, there is the belief in Mormonism that the Son acts only under the direction of the Father and the Holy Ghost under the direction of both the Father and the Son. Hence it is possible for the Son to represent the other members.

46 The two analogies—Matter-Spirit and Formal—are very much alike in that they deal with the relation between the referent and the name. Hence the citation of these verses with light as language works well as illustration in both analogies.
This is implicit in light as god-term related to all things: see the way comprehension works in the diagram on page 34.

See discussion of these verses on the chapter entitled "Negative," page 89.

Burke defines dissipation as

... the isolationist tendency to surrender, as one finds the issues of the world so complex that he merely turns to the satisfactions nearest at hand, living morally and intellectually from hand to mouth, buying as much as one can buy with as much as one can earn, or selling as much as one can sell, or in general taking whatever opportunities of gratification or advancement happen to present themselves and letting all else take care of itself. (Rhetoric of Motives 318)

Some critics might compare this completeness with the so-called self-referential nature of language. But such a comparison is invalid, because this completeness does not culminate in chaos and meaninglessness, but in order and higher and higher levels of comprehension. Recall Burke's quote at the conclusion of A Rhetoric of Motives:

... the motive that attains its ultimate identification in the thought, not of the universal holocaust, but of the universal order... the strivings of the entire series head in
God as the beloved cynosure and sinecure, the end of all desire. (333)

Recall also verse 49:

49. The light shineth in the darkness, and the darkness comprehendeth it not; nevertheless, the day shall come when you shall comprehend even God, being quickened in him and by him.

And Burke says that people are happiest and work best when they consider their "jobs" to be "callings" (Permanence and Change 82).
19. For after it hath filled the measure of its creation, it shall be crowned with glory, even with the presence of God the Father;

20. That bodies who are of the celestial kingdom may possess it forever and ever; for, for this intent was it made and created, and for this intent are they sanctified.

21. And they who are not sanctified through the law which I have given you, even the law of Christ, must inherit another kingdom, or that of a telestial kingdom.

22. For he who is not able to abide the law of a celestial kingdom cannot abide a celestial glory.

23. And he who cannot abide the law of a terrestrial kingdom cannot abide a terrestrial glory.

24. And he who cannot abide the law of a telestial kingdom cannot abide a telestial glory; therefore he is not meet for a kingdom of glory. Therefore he must abide a kingdom which is not a kingdom of glory.

25. And again, verily I say unto you, the earth abideth the law of a celestial kingdom,
for it filleth the measure of its creation, and transgresseth not the law—

26. Wherefore, it shall be sanctified; yeah, notwithstanding it shall die, it shall be quickened again, and shall abide the power by which it is quickened, and the righteous shall inherit it.

27. For notwithstanding they die, they also shall rise again, a spiritual body.

28. They who are of a celestial spirit shall receive the same body which was a natural body; even ye shall receive your bodies, and your glory shall be that glory by which your bodies are quickened.

29. Ye who are quickened by a portion of the celestial glory shall then receive of the same, even a fulness.

30. And they who are quickened by a portion of the terrestrial glory shall then receive of the same, even a fulness.

31. And also they who are quickened by a portion of the telestial glory shall then receive the same, even a fulness.

32. And they who remain shall also be quickened; nevertheless, they shall return
again to their own place, to enjoy that which they are willing to receive, because they were not willing to enjoy that which they might have received.
Appendix 2

36. All kingdoms have a law given;
37. And there are many kingdoms; for there is not space in the which there is no kingdom; and there is no kingdom in which there is no space, either a greater or a lesser kingdom.
38. And unto every kingdom is given a law; and unto every law there are certain bounds also and conditions.
39. All beings who abide not in those conditions are not justified.
40. For intelligence cleaveth unto intelligence; wisdom receiveth wisdom; truth embraceth truth; virtue loveth virtue; light cleaveth unto light; mercy hath compassion on mercy and claimeth her own; justice continueth its course and claimeth its own; judgment goeth before the face of him who sitteth upon the throne and governeth and executeth all things.
41. He comprehendeth all things, and all things are before him, and all things are round about him; and he is above all things, and in all things, and is through all things, and is
round about all things; and all things are by him, and of him, even God, forever and ever.

42. And again, verily I say unto you, he hath given a law unto all things, by which they move in their times and their seasons;

43. And their courses are fixed, even the courses of the heavens and the earth, which comprehend the earth and all the planets.

44. And they give light to each other in their times and in their seasons, in their minutes, in their hours, in their days, in their weeks, in their months, in their years—all these are one year with God, but not with man.

45. The earth rolls upon her wings, and the sun giveth his light by day, and the moon giveth her light by night, and the stars also give their light, as they roll upon their wings in their glory, in the midst of the power of God.

46. Unto what shall I liken these kingdoms, that ye may understand?

47. Behold, all these are kingdoms, and any man who hath seen any or the least of these hath seen God moving in his majesty and power.
48. I say unto you, he hath seen him; nevertheless, he who came unto his own was not comprehended.

49. The light shineth in the darkness, and the darkness comprehendeth it not; nevertheless, the day shall come when you shall comprehend even God, being quickened in him and by him.

50. Then shall ye know that ye have seen me, that I am, and that I am the true light that is in you, and that you are in me; otherwise ye could not abound.
Appendix 3

51. Behold, I will liken these kingdoms unto a man having a field, and he sent forth his servants into the field to dig in the field.

52. And he said unto the first: Go ye and labor in the field, and in the first hour I will come unto you, and ye shall behold the joy of my countenance.

53. And he said unto the second: Go ye also into the field, and in the first hour I will come unto you, and ye shall behold the joy of my countenance.

54. And also unto the third, saying: I will visit you;

55. And unto the fourth, and so on unto the twelfth.

56. And the lord of the field went unto the first in the first hour, and tarried with him all that hour, and he was made glad with the light of the countenance of his lord.

57. And then he withdrew from the first that he might visit the second also, and the third, and the fourth, and so on unto the twelfth.
58. And thus they all received the light of the countenance of their lord, every man in his hour, and in his time, and in his season—

59. Beginning at the first, and so on unto the last, and from the last unto the first, and from the first unto the last;

60. Every man in his own order, until his hour was finished, even according as his lord had commanded him, that his lord might be glorified in him, and he in his lord, that they all might be glorified.
The Nicene Creed gives a succinct view of the traditional trinity:

We believe in one God, the Father Almighty, maker of all things visible and invisible.
And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, begotten from the Father, the only-begotten, that is, from the substance of the Father, God from God, light from light, true God from true God, begotten not made, of one substance with the Father, through Whom all things came into being, things in heaven and things on earth, Who because of us men and because of our salvation came down from heaven, and was incarnate from the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary and became man, and was crucified also for us under Pontius Pilate, and suffered and was buried and rose again on the third day according to the Scriptures and ascended into heaven, and sits at the right hand of the Father, and will come again with glory to judge the living and the dead, of whose Kingdom there will be no end.
And (I believe) in the Holy Spirit, the Lord and Giver of life, who proceeds from the Father, who with the Father and the Son is together glorified, Who spoke through the prophets; in one holy Catholic and apostolic Church. We confess one baptism to the remission of sins; and we look forward to the resurrection of the dead in the life of the world to come.

Amen. (Lohse 64)
Works Consulted


Lohse, Bernhard. *A Short History of Christian Doctrine.*


A BURKEAN LOGOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF DOCTRINE 
AND COVENANTS SECTION 88

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ABSTRACT

This thesis applies Kenneth Burke's method of 
logology as exemplified in The Rhetoric of Religion to 
analyze the Mormon text Doctrine and Covenants Section 88. 
This method of logology is based on the assumption that 
what is said about God in theology reveals a religion's 
use of language to influence human motives. The logolo-
gical method uses six analogies to discover the motives 
implicit in religious terminologies. These six analogies 
are as follows: words-Word, Matter-Spirit, the Negative, 
the Titular, Time-Eternity, and the Formal.

This study revealed that the terminology contained in 
Doctrine and Covenants uses motives far different from the 
motives of traditional Christianity as described by Burke. 
Primary differences include the existence of a cluster of 
god-terms that describes a universal hierarchy, an 
emphasis on and affirmation of the physical, and an 
emphasis on the positive. An examination of these terms 
and motives can help Mormons better appreciate the 
advantages inherent in their terminology as exemplified in 
Section 88.

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