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American and Russian Perceptions of Freedom and Security

Gary L. Browning

Winston Churchill’s characterization of Russia as “a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma” applied reasonably well to the USSR during Stalin’s quarter of a century in power. But today, reliable published information and travel to the Soviet Union are accessible to almost anyone willing to confront the “mystery.” No one can ever completely “know” a nation, but one need not feel that the task of adequately understanding the principal features of a people is beyond reasonable expectation.

Any society, however, will encompass a broad diversity. In temperament, some people will be jovial and kind; others, stern and even mean-spirited. A small percentage will be exceptionally creative, intelligent, and well educated; most others, less so. Some will have acquired wisdom through long years of careful observation and personal experience, while many more will either be less experienced or simply less perceptive.

In the Soviet Union, as elsewhere, one must also carefully consider demographics. Many who reached age twenty during the years 1917–36 (from the Bolshevik Revolution to the Stalinist Purges) still yearn for the fiery and idealistic values of young communism—equality, justice, brotherhood. More are alive from the next group that matured from 1937–55 (the harshest Stalinist years and the Second World War). They suffered as much as a people possibly can. Many tend to regard with clenched teeth all attempts to change that to which they sacrificed so much of their lives and, not infrequently, their integrity. The very large group that reached maturity during the years 1956–73 (from Khrushchev’s speech denouncing the excesses of Stalin through détente) today includes many disillusioned idealists who placed their hopes for a better society in a liberalization of the regime. And the younger group that has turned twenty from 1974–85 tends to be quite cynical about ideology and more materialistic, much like their counterparts in the West. These young Russians are aware of the higher standard of
living not only in the West but even in the other Eastern European countries and recognize that their systems of management, distribution, and worker incentives require fundamental revision. Of course, in all groups, those who live in metropolitan areas (over 60 percent) tend to be somewhat more liberal, while the more conservative values persist in most of rural Russia. Further, education and occupation are also very significant. By far the largest group, the laboring class (factory, construction, menial service workers, and “peasant” farmers), is considerably more traditional than are the relatively fewer skilled white collar workers in science and technology. Another large group is beholden to the system and includes party and government leaders, the military, security forces, teachers, media representatives, lawyers, and managers of factories and other institutions. This group is much more conservative than the smaller but articulate group of creative intelligentsia (writers, dramatists, artists, filmmakers, philosophers, musicians, and careful thinkers in general). And various special interest groups (Ukrainian, Armenian, Baltic and other nationalists, conservationists, and devout believers) create even more ambiguity and stress for the system.

Acknowledging a welter of diversity in the USSR, I will nevertheless present the following perceptions on the thought and behavior of the “average” Russian, that is, of the Russian masses or narod. These do not take into account the USSR’s more than one hundred other nationalities that speak over 130 additional languages. By concentrating on Russians, I will therefore necessarily and regrettably slight citizens of the other fourteen Soviet “republics.” Nor will I refer to Marxist theory as a foundation or gauge, for I believe that Russians, like others, live less according to ideological principles than according to individual human concerns and the traditional mores that supersede present political configurations.

I will argue that most Russians are in most respects very much like people in the West, even though in one very significant ideal they are far more distinct from us than we Americans recognize. Our misperceptions in this regard lead us into several serious errors, among them a false premise about how to “deal with” the Russians.

Although most Russians and Americans are more alike than either side realizes, this point is obscured by the persistent stereotypes that each country maintains about the other. The Russians tend to see the average American as apathetic, permissive, and narcissistic; as intellectually undisciplined, shallow, and irreverent toward important human values and his own cultural heritage. The “American” is
fascinated by an amoral or immoral technology, easily contented with
the trivial and tawdry in the arts, and uncritically swayed by charisma
and rhetoric in politics. Further, the relatively few wealthy Capitalist
masters ruthlessly exploit the American workers. These “bosses”
are irredeemably evil (‘‘class enemies”) and are often the developers
and suppliers of weaponry for the military. Finally, the American
government tends to be proud, even arrogant, uncompromising,
insensitive, self-righteous, hypocritical (demanding a higher standard
of behavior from the USSR than it is willing to abide by), condescending,
shortsighted and unsuited to maintaining a clear and unwavering course
over a long period.

We recognize much exaggeration in this prejudiced perspective,
but do we understand that our stereotype of the Russians is similarly
deficient? We generally consider the average Russian, and especially
but not only his government leaders,2 to be of a somewhat different
(lower or inferior?) human form: ill-mannered and swaggering; bellicose
and militaristic; dishonest, deceitful, and atheistic. We believe that
he tramples on spiritual values and on all that is humane: on regard
for the individual, on toleration for diverging views, on compassion
for the suffering. We view him as somewhat dense, clumsy, and brutish,
like a bear, and feel that he responds only to strength, and even then
with belligerent reluctance.

While both views contain elements of truth that apply in
some instances to the behavior of some of the people, they are far
less accurate and complete when applied to most of the citizens of
either nation. Fortunately, many misperceptions disappear with
careful study and person-to-person contact. For example, most
of us have heard a common observation from Americans returning
from the Soviet Union: “I was astonished. I liked them very
much! In many ways the Russians seem just like us.” This latter
perception is largely (although, as I will suggest later, not entirely)
true.

Indeed, in most respects Russians and Americans are very similar.
We both spend by far the greater part of our lives confronting nearly
identical human needs. Most mature Russians and Americans direct
the bulk of their waking thoughts and energy not to world ideology
and national aspirations but to problems related to their families:
meeting the immediate and basic requirements of oneself, spouse and
children, including acquiring adequate food and shelter and arranging
for desirable education, employment, health care, transportation, and
leisure-time activities.
As in the U.S.A., most Russians actually engage in very few voluntary political activities. However, on the level of national perception, both peoples do nourish deep and competing “messianic” visions of world responsibility. This burden of a global calling distinguishes our two nations from the 165 or so other countries on this planet. Our respective visions differ markedly, but the psychology of the “ elect,” of the bearer and promulgator of truth, is similar in both peoples.

Specifically, we Yankees view our nation as exemplar to the world and are puzzled that relatively few others have adopted our constitution and political and economic systems. The Russians, on the other hand, generally tend to believe that socialism (purged of the currently pervasive corruption and extensive pockets of privilege, and endowed with the discipline and vision of a Lenin, Bukharin, or even a Stalin) best represents mankind’s future. Americans and Russians are both committed to their respective “grand ideas” and to the obligations they entail, including, for instance, that each maintain a superpower military status. And in both countries today a cautious mentality is ascendant: bedrock values must be defended against an “aggressive” enemy and against dissenters within, who threaten to deny the people their highest traditions and aspirations.³

However, most Russians and Americans prefer, all things being equal, to be polite, cooperative, honest, tolerant, compassionate, and peaceloving. Both peoples definitely prefer to be treated with courtesy, respect, and fairness. Both resent any effort on the part of the other to constrain behavior. “Negotiating from strength” cannot mean forcing the other side to accept conditions it considers unreasonable, for then the “weaker” side feels offended or threatened and is more likely to revert to a lower-level survival strategy that is intentionally offensive and frightening.

Despite significant and continuing efforts by the Communists to discourage religious faith, a relatively high percentage of Russians maintain faith in God. Estimates vary, but most suggest that from a total Soviet population of 275 million, approximately 50 million Russians claim allegiance to the Russian Orthodox church.⁴ Roughly that same number of Soviets are Muslims, not to mention millions of Old Believers and smaller numbers of Jews, Catholics, Lutherans, Baptists, Seventh-day Adventists, and others. Although a higher percentage of Americans are regular churchgoers, apparently more Russians attend church services than do Western Europeans. The proportion of Soviet believers to nonbelievers may not be much
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different from an average of the corresponding ratios for us and our allies. Therefore, it hardly seems fair to characterize the Russians as godless. Even in the extent of their faith in God, the Russians are much more like us than we might expect.

To conclude, Russians and Americans share with all peoples an identical human and divine heritage that is so massive and enduring that most other differences must seem, from a distance and with greater intelligence, insignificant by comparison.

However, Russians and Americans are essentially dissimilar in ways that are inadequately understood. Underlying these differences is an allegiance to two contrasting and fundamental values, from which many related ideals arise. These values undergird two distinct but tenable answers to a central human concern: what social environment best promotes happiness?

Above all, Americans prefer a society in which freedom flourishes. We generally accept personal responsibility for our lives, the opportunity to rise according to our own choices, and open competition in a free enterprise economic system. We in the West place a very great emphasis on human rights or freedoms of speech, the press, assembly, worship, and others—all of which protect the conscience and person of the individual against the majority or the otherwise powerful.

For many reasons, Russians have enshrined precisely the opposite (but at certain stages and in its best form also positive) value—security and its related components: patriotism and a strong national defense, greater material equality and protection from whims of circumstance, a higher priority on community (collective) needs than on any individual’s claims, continuity and predictability, and domestic cooperation (rather than competition). Instead of placing primary emphasis on human rights that protect freedoms for the one, Russians focus on what they term civil rights: guaranteed employment, free health care and education, low-cost housing, public transportation, basic foods, and similar benefits for all citizens—at least in ideal, if not in practice.5

Much of the conditioning toward these respective values has arisen from history, ancient and recent, and from geography. Early Americans fled from oppressive rulers to a new land in search of freedom. Many, suffering at the hands of state authorities, eventually sought to restrain the power of their leaders. And America was favorably situated to provide for national defense: an ocean separated the colonists from powerful European foes, while populations to the north and south were relatively sparse and generally incapable of mounting, to say nothing
of sustaining, an invasion of either the British colonies or later the United States.

For centuries, the Russian experience has been starkly different. Time and again the Russian people have been attacked from the east and the west (of course they too have done their share of attacking or antagonizing others). Nor is their geography fortuitous. Vast and essentially flat stretches of land provide few natural barriers to invading armies from any direction. Large, hostile forces have always been situated on both the eastern and western borders.6 One wave from the East, the Golden (or Tatar) Horde, conquered and ruled old Russia for nearly two-and-a-half centuries (1240–1480). From the West, Napoleon invaded Russia and occupied Moscow, her capital city. In our century the Germans have twice declared war on Russia and exacted an extremely heavy price in human life and property.

The Russian experience is that, imperfect as it might be, a Russian government is at least "one's own," not foreign. And patriotism and national unity offer the best, perhaps the only, hope for security and peace. Hence not "rugged individualism" but unswerving and unquestioning allegiance to a strong central government prevails. Not only the leaders but also most other Russians feel that those who dissent, who cause schisms and deprive the people of their confidence in the government, are dangerous.7 The dissenters may even be right, but that is irrelevant. What, Russians ask themselves, would happen if their nation were divided by internal strife? Would the ensuing instability not invite yet another, even more powerful, invader?

Of course the peoples of both countries would prefer to be both free and secure, but the more one is committed to either of the two values, the less possible it is to partake as fully of the other. Although unrestrained freedom may degenerate into anarchy, and excessive security quickly becomes tyranny, both freedom and security are, in their most ideal form, highly desirable. However, like many other natural and timeless dichotomies (nature/civilization, the individual/the collective, movement/stasis, competition/cooperation, spirit/intellect, broad knowledge/specialization), they are, in their extremes, mutually exclusive. Perhaps this example will help illustrate my point. Suppose that a pitcher holding one quart of water and two quart-size bottles are standing on a table. One can pour the water in any proportion into the two receptacles, but if more is placed in the one, less will remain for the other.

In terms of public security, Russians prefer a strong, steady leadership that is prepared to exert force if necessary to maintain the
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cohesiveness and security of the state for all citizens. They willingly entrust many important decisions to those in power, that is, to those with the prestige of superior training, experience, or, simply, position. They want to believe in their leaders and readily give them the benefit of the doubt. Perhaps they are less confident in their own ability to provide solutions, partially because the centuries have shown that survival depends on obedience to authority and on unity, rather than on individual and diverse initiative.

As is clearer with each passing year, the American (Western) democratic system based on freedom has the greater overall advantage, especially for those within a society who are gifted, highly skilled, energetic, and otherwise strong. Certainly the principle of free agency bears divine sanction. Greater freedom provides more opportunity for growth through individual responsibility. It promotes the sharing of truth through a free press. It tolerates a broad diversity of opinion, including, importantly, differing religious beliefs. And within the marketplace it frees forces that generate abundance.

Surprising to Americans, most Russians are not entirely oblivious to these advantages of greater freedom, but neither are they fully enough informed to make a careful choice. Russians do know much more about the disadvantages of our system, and they generally conclude that, everything considered, they would prefer their alternative, even with its acknowledged deficiencies. They are frightened by the prospects of unemployment, labor strikes and violence, widespread ownership of guns, political assassinations (the Kennedy brothers and Martin Luther King, and the quite recent attempt on President Reagan’s life), a perceived higher crime rate, an exaggerated concern for the rights of criminals, pornography, drug abuse, media that emphasize the sensational (horrors, violence, sex) rather than matters of substance, the high cost of medical care, housing, education, and public transportation, and other related and tenacious perils of a “free” society. In the Russian view, most of our problems are becoming worse, rather than better. To avoid the undesirable features of a Western society, most Russians unhesitatingly forfeit much of their freedom in order to insure their security.

This is not to say that Americans take no thought for their own security or that Russians are opposed to all freedom. Nor is it to say that Americans do not enjoy an important degree of security or that Russians have no freedom at all8 (or, for that matter, that Russians would not like to have more freedom, especially of greater access to information and increased opportunity for foreign travel). But I do
emphasize that Americans are prepared to tolerate more of the disadvantages of freedom in order to enjoy its greater benefits, while Russians, knowing little about the best sides of freedom, have resigned themselves to fewer personal freedoms and even to a lower general standard of living in order to possess greater security. To the enduring question, "Can most people use freedom well, that is, in a manner that promotes desirable individual growth and societal progress?" the Russians answer, "No," and the Americans, "Yes."

One must spend a great deal of time in the Soviet Union and long hours talking with Russians, preferably in their own language, to discover how deeply most of them feel about the preeminence of security over freedom. As New York Times correspondent David Shipler concluded after four years in the USSR:

This [preference for the Russian "way" over the American] is a hard discovery for Americans, one we often resist, for its implications corrode our creed that freedom is man's natural state, that all other conditions are abnormal, that the innate reflex of human beings is to strive against their bonds. After a time in Russia we become embarrassed at the nakedness of our naiveté. And on some level, perhaps, we hate the Russians for giving the lie to our innermost assumptions about mankind.  

However, as we in the West acknowledge this perspective, a number of problems become easier to understand, although they remain difficult to confront. I list several of these issues below, together with a brief comment on each:

1. **Why do Russians not rise up in rebellion against their rulers?** Because they and their rulers share many essential ideals, most importantly, the value of security. Generally the Russians do not hate their leaders or even sharply disagree with them (at least in foreign affairs), but support them, even in such instances as the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and of Afghanistan in 1979, and the shooting down of the KAL 007 "spy plane" in 1982. These terrible events are rationalized on the basis of national security demands. Today Russians generally appear willing to support the energetic, plain-spoken, unpretentious, and determined General Secretary Gorbachev in his attempts to revitalize Soviet socialism.  

2. **Then are we correct in making a distinction between most Russians and the government?** In the majority of cases, no. It is no more appropriate to distinguish between them
than it is for the Russians to condemn our government while professing a high regard for the American people. In both societies citizens complain about inadequacies while, in the main, supporting their leaders, especially against their respective adversaries. Since both groups often strongly disapprove of the actions of the other's government, we tend to imagine a schism between the people and their leaders. By so doing, we can continue to feel warmly disposed toward the people we have met, while preserving our disdain for the leaders we do not know.

3. But what about the dissidents or refuseniks who do hate their government? The dissidents, in general, are those who espouse our Western values to a greater degree than do their compatriots. They want to significantly alter the balance between security and freedom. Since we in the West mainly hear about the plight of the dissidents (just as the Soviet media principally report on American unemployment, poverty, drugs, and violence), we mistakenly believe that the majority of Soviet citizens are dissidents or that if more Russians would learn about America and our values, they would inevitably become dissidents. In fact, most Russians, the very ones we enjoy meeting when we travel to the USSR, heartily approve of the government's harsh treatment of dissidents.

4. If a free referendum were held in the Soviet Union, would the majority of Russians prefer socialism or capitalism? Most analysts agree that Russians want improvements in the way socialism operates but that they are not yet so dissatisfied with their system that they would vote to replace it with capitalism. Part of the reason is that Russians know both too little (of the good) and too much (of the bad) about capitalism. However, unless economic reforms are soon introduced that improve the performance of the currently sluggish Soviet economy, confidence in Soviet socialism may well diminish to very dangerous levels.

5. If the Soviet borders were completely opened, would many choose to leave the Soviet Union? I would estimate that, except for several hundred thousand, perhaps even a few million (out of 275 million), relatively few would leave. And if the borders remained open, many of those who left would
eventually return. Most Russians are inveterate romantics, sentimental, self-sacrificing, and patriotic. Love for one’s family and the motherland (and her rich cultural heritage and traditions) is so strong that most Russians would remain or return.\(^{14}\)

6. *Why do the Soviets then not open their borders and let whoever wishes depart?* That is exactly what many Westerners wish they would do. The problem is that among those leaving would be many of the most capable and best trained Russians—those who completed their education in the best Soviet schools. They are the ones who could live much better in the West. The Soviet Union knows that it cannot have an internationally competitive and domestically viable economy and culture if its strongest citizens continually emigrate. The “best and the brightest” tend to prefer a free society where the professional and monetary opportunities are greater, while the less endowed and accomplished typically opt for greater security.

7. *How can we in the West best promote greater freedom and more human rights in the Soviet Union?* Recent history suggests that the USSR generally allows its dissidents and “satellite” countries more freedom when it feels itself most secure and that conditions worsen as the Russians feel more threatened.\(^{15}\) It is no more likely that we in the West could coerce the Soviet government into allowing its people greater freedom than the Russians could compel us in America to guarantee every citizen a job or free medical care. Excessive external pressure may actually make the resolution of internal problems more difficult. Ironically, the more hostile and threatening America may appear, the more fully most Russians rally around their leaders in opposition to dissidents at home and harmful Western “propaganda” from abroad.

In Dostoevsky’s *The Brothers Karamazov*, Ivan recites his “Legend of the Grand Inquisitor” set in sixteenth-century Catholic Spain. He characterizes the Spaniard’s ecclesiastically dominated society as follows: “At last they have vanquished freedom and have done so to make men happy. . . . Freedom and bread enough for all are inconceivable together.”\(^{16}\) In turn, the British novelist D. H. Lawrence provides a sobering commentary on the “Legend,” specifically on the reason the community had forfeited Christ’s truth of free agency for the Grand Inquisitor’s comforting deception of security:
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The inadequacy of Jesus lies in the fact that Christianity [freedom] is too difficult for men, the vast mass of men. It could only be realized by the few "saints" or heroes. For the rest, man is like a horse harnessed to a load he cannot possibly pull. . . . Christianity, then, is the ideal, but it is impossible. It is impossible because it makes demands greater than the nature of man can bear. . . . Jesus loved mankind for what it ought to be, free and limitless. The Grand Inquisitor loves it for what it is, with all its limitations. And he contends his is the kinder love. 17

Freedom is at times more difficult to bear than security. But security beyond real need lessens our ability to act responsibly, courageously, and creatively. Clearly each of us needs to move from the relative dependence of security to the maturity of freedom, but we must do so gradually and carefully, through a growing confidence in our abilities and a belief in the fairness and goodwill of others. We should encourage this development through both example and precept. As we continue to address and solve or at least lessen the problems inherent in freedom, and as we manifest integrity and sensitivity in foreign relations, our model will attract many—perhaps, over time, even the Russians.

Meanwhile, we should carefully reexamine the common perception that "the only thing a Russian understands is force" (or that "the only thing a Russian respects is strength"). On the human relations level, this attitude is far too simplistic and demeaning. As human beings, Russians have the same range of feelings and rational responses as do Americans or anyone else. They react to compulsion just as other humans do: with a sense of deep humiliation and resentment. On the foreign relations level Russians consider America's determination to negotiate from strength (superiority) a fearsome threat to their national security. Under these circumstances they may well unite behind hawkish leaders and forego other important priorities in order to rise to the challenge of maintaining what they consider security through military equivalence or parity. And the arms race will continue to escalate. 18

Fortunately, Russians in general (excepting someone like a mentally deranged Stalin) also respond to intelligent, frank, firm, just, decent, and sensitive discussion, as do we all. 19 One may still hope that men and women of goodwill and integrity might recognize their respective myths about each other, abandon hatred and fear, "renounce war and declare peace," and reunite father and son (all mankind) while there is still time: "If it were not so, the whole earth would be utterly wasted at his [the Messiah's] coming" (D&C 98:16; D&C 2:2–3). 20
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2If we really sympathized with the Russian masses and disliked only the relatively few in the government, would we prepare for massive nuclear attacks or retaliation, knowing that in the Soviet Union, as in the U.S.A., the people (whom we claim to like) would perish, while the leaders would more likely survive the initial blast in their “secure” and well-provisioned shelter?

3Compare Kaiser, Russia: The People and the Power, 226: “A sort of hard-hat mentality dominates the Soviet system and Russian society. Hostility toward non-conformists, intolerance of the frivolous or the avant-garde, fierce public puritanism (often accompanied by private licentiousness) and rigid patriotism all seem typical of the USSR. These attitudes infect even the intellectual dissidents, some of whom—Solzhenitsyn is an obvious example—are nearly as intolerant of liberal democracy as are the country’s leaders.”

4For example, see Paul A. Lucey, “Religion,” in The Soviet Union Today, 295.

5Compare Stephen F. Cohen, Rethinking the Soviet Experience: Politics and History Since 1917 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 151: “The Western view that most Soviet citizens are utterly cynical about the official ideology is wrong, partly because it confuses that ideology with the millennial tenets of original Marxism. The real meaning of Soviet Communism at home, as it has evolved in modern times, involves five more earthly appeals, or ideological promises, to Soviet citizens. Those official promises are vigilant national security—the country will never again be defenseless, as it was in 1941; state-sponsored nationalism of some popular variety; law-and-order safeguards against the internal ‘anarchy’ that so many Russians fear; cradle-to-grave state welfare; and a better material, or consumer, life for each generation.” See also Smith, The Russians, 251: “Russians prize order and security as much as Americans prize freedom.”

6At times, threats also came from the north (Sweden) and the south (Turkic tribes and Byzantine Empire).

7See Joshua Rubenstein, “Dissent,” The Soviet Union Today, 65–80: “The conservative, authoritarian streak in traditional Russian nationalism has a broader appeal in the Soviet Union today than does the human rights movement.” See also Cohen, Rethinking the Soviet Experience, 146: “Indeed, public opinion polls in recent years suggest that ordinary Soviet citizens—or at least the Slavic majority—are even more conservative than some segments of the ruling elite.”

8Compare Shiplet, Russia: Broken Idols, Solemn Dreams, 4: “As the illusions and images are peeled away one by one, Soviet society reveals itself as having grown more complex than it appears from outside. The variety of political thought is more extensive, the literature and theater and film more creative and truthful, the press more critical than many Americans imagine.”

9Shiplet, Russia: Broken Idols, Solemn Dreams, 349. See also, Kaiser, Russia: The People and the Power, 297: “Russian subservience to arbitrary authority frustrates an American inclined to be optimistic about humanity. We have convinced ourselves that it is in man’s nature to strive for the kind of freedom we cherish, to honor the fruits of pure reason and the benefits of justice. The Russian people defy that theory; they probably even disprove it.”

10Compare Smith, The Russians, 704: “Russians, for all their carping, accept Soviet ideology unquestioningly the way a Western schoolchild accepts Euclidean geometry. For them, that is the way the world works”; and Kaiser, Russia: The People and the Power, 288: “The most important fact is that the Soviet regime succeeds. Nearly all Russians accept its leadership... Only a tiny fraction of the population ever dreams of living in a different kind of society, under a different kind of regime.”

11Compare the statements of two human rights advocates who relatively recently left the Soviet Union: Alexander Zinoviev, “The West Sees the Russia It Wants to See,” Christian Science Monitor, 7 January 1983, 23: “The Soviet regime is not a political body forced upon the population from above. The people themselves constitute and uphold the regime”; and Valery Chalidze, “Solzhenitsyn’s Authoritarian Russian Nationalism,” Russia, no. 3 (1981): 14: “Do the People Hate the Soviet Regime? This is another myth: no such hatred exists. Discontent, on the other hand, may be found in almost all sectors of the society; and it is expressed more or less openly, which is a sign of the regime’s stability.” See also Pond, From the Yaroslavsky Station, 56: “Zinoviev’s final damning judgment is that ‘The Soviet system is eminently suitable for the Soviet people.’ ” And Zinoviev again: “They say that the Russians are slaves. That is true. But they are slaves that love their chains” (Novoe russkoe slovo, 27 January 1983, 3).

12Compare Smith, The Russians, 309: “This positive heroic devotion to country, however, has its negative McCarthyite side in rigid intolerance and persecution of mavericks and dissenters whom the clan regards as
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unpardonable renegades.” See also Zinoviev: “The overwhelming majority of Soviet citizens despise the dissidents” (Novoe russkoe slovo, 27 January 1985, 3).

13Compare Kaiser, Russia: The People and the Power, 307: “I think Amalrik was probably right—that if an election were held, the majority of Soviet citizens would align themselves with the hard-hats.” See also Zinoviev: “If free elections were held in the USSR, the overwhelming majority would cast their ballots for the Communist party” (Novoe russkoe slovo, 27 January 1985, 3).

14Compare Smith, The Russians, 307: “If emigration were suddenly totally free, I am confident that very few Russians, as distinct from Jews and some other minorities, would leave their country permanently.”

15For only one example, see Joshua Rubenstein, “Dissent,” The Soviet Union Today, 71, wherein he discusses “the emigration of more than a quarter million Soviet Jews since 1970.” Virtually all of this emigration occurred during the years of détente. Since relations have dramatically worsened between the US and the USSR, only a few hundred Jews have been allowed to leave the country each year (in 1984, fewer than 900).


18Compare Cohen, Rethinking the Soviet Experience, 157: “The lesson is that cold-war relations abet conservative and even neo-Stalinist forces in Soviet officialdom and that Soviet reformers stand a chance only in conditions of East–West détente. Our own cold warriors have always insisted that détente must await the reform of the Soviet system. But that ill-conceived policy serves only to undermine the reformist cause in the Soviet Union.”

19Emphatically, we should not forget Russia’s terrible recent past or pretend that no serious problems exist in the present, but neither should we exaggerate her failings. And we should acknowledge improvements where they have occurred and, where possible, facilitate even more change.

20I have brought the two scriptures together because they both emphasize the necessity of turning the hearts of the children to their fathers and of the fathers to the children. In addition to a central message about genealogy and ordinances, these verses speak about an imperative to peace rather than to war and, by implication, about the grim consequences of disregarding the responsibility to bond mankind through love.