Cousin Laman in the Wilderness: The Beginnings of Brigham Young's Indian Policy

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Article Summary: Patience and restraint generally characterized Brigham Young’s dealings with the Plains Indians and later with the Great Basin Indians. Both in Nebraska and in Utah other Mormons were more confrontational than their leader.

Cataloging Information:

Names: Brigham Young, Joseph Smith Jr, Hyrum Smith, Big Elk, Hosea Stout, Orson Hyde

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Photographs / Images: Brigham Young, 1853; Hosea Stout; Orson Hyde
Brigham Young, 1853. Courtesy of Church Archives, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.
Cousin Laman in the Wilderness:  
The Beginnings of Brigham Young’s  
Indian Policy

By Richard Edmond Bennett

Historians of the American West have observed that compared with most other mid-19th century American overlanders, whether Oregon-bound farmers or California Argonauts, the Mormons enjoyed a relatively more amicable, more peaceful relationship with the American Indian. Furthermore several contend with cause that Brigham Young was the principal architect of peace with the Ute, Shoshoni, Navaho, Hopi, and other tribes in the deserts and valleys of “Deseret,” the Mormon Zion in the Great Basin Kingdom.

Leonard Arrington, Davis Bitton, James Allen, and other modern writers have argued that Young pursued a conciliatory (if not self-protective and condescending) policy toward the mountain tribes of Utah Territory; that he opposed the customary frontier theory that “the only good Indian was a dead one”; and that he abhorred the resulting practice of indiscriminately killing native people.¹

Young summarized his attitude in an 1854 speech:

I have uniformly pursued a friendly course of policy towards them, feeling convinced that independent of the question of exercising humanity towards so degraded and ignorant a race of people, it was manifestly more economical and less expensive to feed and clothe than to fight them.²

The purpose of this paper is: (1) to show that Young’s policies, benign or otherwise, did not originate in the Great Basin and that the tactics he employed to ensure peace with mountain tribes were first applied years before among the Plains Indians on the banks of the Missouri; and (2) that Young ran far ahead of his own people in terms of popularity with the numerous native tribes.

Little will here be said about the sometimes difficult and often scarred relations between Brigham Young and the various Indian agents, superintendents, and commissioners of the Office of Indian Affairs. Nor will this article explore Mormon and Indian collusion against Missouri and other frontier societies. Both are related but very complex topics and fall outside the immediate perimeters of this study.
Joseph Smith Jr. (1805-1844), the so-called "Mormon Prophet" and founder of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints in 1830, had guided his people from upstate New York to Kirtland, Ohio; later to Jackson County, Missouri; and eventually to Nauvoo, Illinois, in unsuccessful attempts to find a place of refuge for his rapidly growing number of followers. For a time it appeared that Nauvoo, Illinois, on the Mississippi River just north of Quincy would prove if not a lasting headquarters, then at least a comfortable resting place.

However, criticism and persecution of the "Saint" soon developed once more, this time from nearby county residents, for reasons stemming from economic and political might to the peculiarities of the Latter-day Saint religion, including the practice of polygamy. This tide of local disfavor, fueled by the agitation of Mormon defectors, culminated in the murder of Joseph Smith and his brother Hyrum at Carthage, Illinois, in June of 1844. In time Brigham Young, a native of Vermont and head of the Quorum of the Twelve Apostles, the highest governing body left in the church, came to be regarded by most as Joseph's interim or permanent successor. Young decided that the Mormons had to quit Nauvoo and seek refuge in some isolated valley in the Rocky Mountain West or face civil war. Hence beginning in February 1846, the first of several thousand Mormons began their tedious trek across Iowa Territory. For a variety of reasons (including President Polk's June 1846 enlistment of several hundred Mormons for service in Stephen W. Kearny's Army of the West to wrest California from Mexico), Brigham Young decided to interrupt his westward march at the Missouri River and to spend the winter of 1846-47 near Council Bluffs. On the heels of that decision the Mormons established scores of small temporary settlements in western Iowa between the Nishnabotana and the Missouri Rivers near the Pottawattamie Indians of Iowa. They gained permission to establish a city on the west bank of the Missouri in lands occupied by the Oto and Omaha Indian tribes, each suspicious of the other's claims. By January 1847 over 4,000 Mormons were living in Winter Quarters, a city regularly surveyed, laid out in large city blocks with wide streets, and fortified with high picket fences. Another 8,000-9,000 settled across the river. The city served as the primary springboard for the April 1847 trek west that eventually resulted in the Mormon settlements on the shores of the Great Salt Lake. But it was there at Winter Quarters (on land now part of north Omaha, Nebraska, and in surrounding regions) that Brigham Young was compelled to forge his policies toward the American Indian.

Planting a large, white man's community, no matter how temporary, in Indian territory among a destitute, well-armed, and suspicious native population was hazardous enough; to do so on disputed lands between two jealous tribes and within easy striking range of the
marauding Sioux was a calculated risk with potentially disastrous con­sequences. Even though treaties had been signed between principals of the Latter-day Saints and the Omaha and Oto, the Mormon people rightly suspected difficulties. Their precarious situation demanded artful negotiations, patience, and unending restraint to preserve harmony and peace. In a short time they faced repeated Indian depredations and intertribal wars. In large measure they were the architects of their own unenviable situation and eventually paid a high price for their deliberate decision to stay on Indian lands. Nevertheless, Mormon relations with the Indians remained surprisingly peaceful.

Young's objective was to live in peace among the Indians while the Mormons regrouped and prepared themselves for the trek farther west. He did not want and could not afford war. But policies are based on philosophies and requirements. Both natives and Mormons shared suspicion and open disdain for a government in Washington which they felt was unsympathetic (if not antagonistic) to their interests. Many Indians, particularly of the Eastern tribes, felt powerless to resist their inevitable displacement to areas farther west. The Mormons meanwhile had suffered Missouri Governor Lilburn W. Boggs's "extermination order" and at the peril of life and property had been forced to leave that state. Nor did Illinois prove more accepting. Pleas for redress to local and state authorities, to Congress, and to the president were unheeded. Thus Indian leaders from the Pottawattamie and other tribes sensed a bond between two peoples in distress, common sufferers in exile, and paid regular visits to Joseph Smith and Mormon leaders in Nauvoo during the early 1840s.

But if the Indians saw in the Latter-day Saints a potential political ally, the Mormons viewed the Indian as their theological responsibility. A central doctrine of the Book of Mormon, regarded by them as additional scripture and a companion volume to the Bible, indicated that American Indians, anciently called "Lamanites," were descendants of the prophet Jacob of the Old Testament, a remnant of the tribe of Joseph through Manasseh, and consequently part of the ancient House of Israel, God's "chosen people." The Book of Mormon further stated that though a fallen and cursed people because of transgression, "there are many promises which are extended to the Lamanites" and "at some period of time they will be brought to believe in his (Christ's) word." According to the accepted revelations given to Joseph Smith, "Jacob shall flourish in the wilderness, and the Lamanites shall blossom as the rose." Although some of the early missions of the Church to the Indians were unsuccessful, it was widely held in camp that the Lord's special promises were about to be fulfilled. The expulsion of the Mormons from their lands in Missouri and most recently in Nauvoo was interpreted, at least by some, that God was
removing his Gospel from the Gentiles and was about to remember his ancient covenant people, the Lamanites.

These beliefs were not only held by camp leaders but pervaded the Mormon community generally. Wrote Fanny Murray, a sister of Brigham Young:

We are here on the banks of the Missouri River. The Omahas are the most degraded and worthless race of beings that ever my eyes beheld.... We do not suffer anything from fear of the Indians, for we know that for their sakes we are suffering all these things, and we are sure that the Lord Our God will not suffer them to destroy us.5

If the Latter-day Saints were not free of fear and prejudice towards the Lamanites, their faith nevertheless demanded a genuine interest in their temporal and spiritual welfare. But regardless of religious convictions, Young made it clear that this was neither the time nor the place for spreading the word. While at Winter Quarters they made few attempts to preach to their Indian neighbors and refrained from manning missions and schoolhouses among the tribes. The converting process would have to wait for a more propitious time.

To make war upon the Indians then was not only politically foolish and inexpedient but religiously offensive. And with so many men away in the Army, it was questionable whether the Mormons could have sustained any sort of extended armed conflict. Besides, the Indian might prove a valuable ally in warding off attacking Missouri invaders or Federal soldiers.

But aware of the potential danger in living so close to local tribes, Young took every precaution. This accounts in part for his determination to keep the settlements close together and for his scarcely concealed opposition to Bishop George Miller’s independent, unauthorized establishment among the Ponca Indians on the Niobrara River some 200 miles north of Winter Quarters. Safety lay in showing large numbers and a strong, well-armed defense. The linchpin in his peace policy was to show, but never use, a strong display of force unless in self-defense.

The first real test of Young’s developing policies came in January 1847 when a company of Sioux led by Chief Eagle made a surprise visit to chief cattle herder Asahel Lathrop’s small encampment several miles north of Winter Quarters. Attracted no doubt by the immense number of cattle under Lathrop’s jurisdiction, they represented a band of over 300 warring Sioux then in the neighborhood and clearly posed a serious threat to Lathrop’s small contingent. While in the vicinity they killed 30 of Lathrop’s herd and appeared ready to kill more. Lathrop consequently invited Eagle and many of his braves to a feast, gave them gifts, and endeavored to make peace. Eagle re-
sponded that their purpose was to kill the Omaha and not the white man, but that he sometimes had difficulty restraining his warriors.

Brigham Young, on hearing of this first serious encounter with the dreaded Sioux, immediately sent twenty-three armed men to bolster Lathrop's defenses and prevent any further outbreaks. His instructions to Lathrop were clear and underlined his policy of dealing from strength not weakness:

Let the loss be what it may, but you must be diligent and sleep with one eye open and never again let the Indians or any other enemy within your fort. To do this is to throw yourself in the power of your enemy, as it gives him an advantage you cannot recall, until it is too late ... keep them at respectful distance with the power always in your hands.

Now, Brother Lathrop, you must watch as well as pray, and let the Indians get no advantage of you, or learn your numerical strength again, but do the best you can to give them such an opinion of your resources as to put them in awe ... and at the same time inspire them with confidence in your good intentions (and) promote peace. 6

The Sioux never again returned and never constituted a serious threat to the Mormons even though the opportunities to do so were many.

At Winter Quarters meanwhile it became standard policy to station armed guards near the cattle herds around the city, and in other conspicuous places to discourage Indian prowlers. Occasional cannon firing, military drills, and other conspicuous shows of force were all designed for their defense.

A second and related policy was not to take sides or form alliances with one tribe against another. The Omaha and Oto competed for protection and favor, and for the Mormons to favor one above the other was extremely dangerous. Call for peace among them but let the Indians fight their own battles. In early negotiations with the Omaha, Young agreed to assist in their agricultural endeavors "but would not interfere in any of their difficulties with other tribes." Such a course of action would surely have enbroided the Mormons in a savage cross-fire and would have drawn objections from Indian agents, already concerned that such an impasse might develop.

A third principle was to leave the Indian alone - to shun any social, religious, or economic intercourse, especially with individuals. In reality this was virtually impossible, given the Omaha's natural curiosity and constant visits to the camp and the documented sympathy Mormons had for the begging and forlorn among the tribe, especially for the women and children. This policy coincided with federal regulations, and Young preferred not to break such laws and risk investigation.

When in August several Oto brought roasting ears into camp to sell, Young, supposing they had been stolen from Omaha corn fields, warned his people not to buy them. Trading must be left strictly to
camp leaders and carried out only on a collective basis. Liquor, available in camp, was an especially forbidden trade item, and those found guilty of selling or distributing it among the Indians were punishable by the whiplash. Feeding the Indians out of sympathy or for any other cause was also prohibited. Mormons were constantly reminded to prevent their cattle from ranging on Indian corn fields and not to disturb Indian graves and unexpected burial places. Children who played around the hills and surrounding graves were to be particularly careful and “should be taught to let them alone.”

Under no circumstances would mating between races be permitted. Such a practice had already caused difficulties and would not be countenanced. All forms of friendly camaraderie must be guarded against. Shooting, stealing, and every other form of vengeful activity were likewise prohibited. “It was wrong to indulge in feelings of hostility and bloodshed toward the Indian, who might kill a cow, an ox or even a horse,” Young counseled. “To them the deer, the buffalo, the cherry and plum tree or strawberry bed were free. It was their mode of living to kill and eat.” But if they persisted in robbing and stealing, “after being warned not to do so, whip them.” Mormons must refrain from shooting Indians even “if they did catch them skinning their oxen.” At all costs bloodshed must be avoided. If anyone killed an Omaha for stealing, he was guilty of murder and would be delivered to the appropriate Indian chief “to be dealt with as the Indians shall decide, as that was the only way to save the lives of the women and children.”

Yet despite their policies of a strong defense, strict neutrality, and noninvolvement, many meaningful and helpful exchanges between peoples occurred. In December 1846 an unsuspecting party of sleeping Omaha was attacked by either a band of Sioux or Iowa within gunshot range of Winter Quarters. The wounded Omaha, including Chief Big Head (shot in the arm, hand, and head) and several others, were brought into camp and their wounds immediately dressed. For a time many of the Omaha, fearing further attack, were allowed to pitch their tents next to Brigham Young’s home. “They would weep and howl, cry, writhe and twist and make every gesture that could be imagined,” recalled Hosea Stout, and “they made such a noise that President Young had them stopped (sic).”

Accounting for their outburst was the even worse news that just sixty miles north an Omaha hunting party had been attacked at night by the Sioux (likely Chief Eagle’s warriors), and seventy-three of their number had been killed. When the survivors passed through town, they took with them Big Head’s party and encamped near Winter Quarters. Having pity on the Omaha in their tenuous circumstance, the Winter Quarters High Council decided “to build them a house at a spot naturally well fortified and from which they could discern the approach of any enemy at some distance.” Eventually many Omaha crossed
the river to seek safety among the Pottawattamie. The Mormons symp­
thpathized more with the Omaha than with any other tribe. Said Appleton Milo Harmon, “The sufferings of these poor miserable beings was immense [sic] and excited the sympathy [sic] of our people who gave them several beef cattle and a great amount of bread.”

As a result of deliberate attempts to deal justly and peaceably with the Indians, Indian agents were initially complimentary. “With regard to their intercourse with the Indian tribes in particular,” wrote R. B. Mitchell, “I would remark that it has been greatly more circumspect and unexceptionable than is usually found to be the case with emigrant bodies passing through this region of country.” Later Mitchell remarked, “So far as I know, the general conduct of the Mormon people has continued irreproachable.”

But as time passed, relations deteriorated. Unsuccessful buffalo hunts and corn and other crop failures compelled the Omaha either to steal or to starve. Said Horace K. Whitney, “They have had for some time in contemplation a grand buffalo hunt, which they have aban­
doned in expectation of living and sustaining themselves by the killing of our cattle instead.” The increased fear of Indian encroachment persuaded the High Council to fence the city’s southern perimeter and to picket most of the town. Despite their labors, by mid-October the Indians were allegedly killing “two or three oxen per day.”

While concerned with the economic losses, Young worried more about restraining his people from overreacting. Believing dialogue better than confrontation, he called for a series of meetings. “We want such an understanding with the Omaha,” he wrote, “as to prevent any collision or trouble for our feelings are kind toward them and all men.”

Chief Elk in response admitted, “I cannot guide all of my people; they are wild; they are just like the wolves of the prairie for when they are hungry they don’t know better than to take what is handist [sic].” Big Elk confessed that his tribe called him “a liar” when he told them the Mormons would do them well. As a partial solution, he and Logan Fontenelle, a local translator and mountaineer, recommended they build fences around every cattle herd, large or small, in or out of the city, and that they whip any stealing Indian. They further advised that Mormons neither socialize with nor befriend loiterers and that they stop selling dogs to the Omaha. The Indians would kill them “so that they could more easily pilfer from us.”

Though Big Elk often returned items his people had stolen from Winter Quarters, tensions increased, straining goodwill almost to the breaking point. By late October at least fifty oxen and many sheep had been killed. By April 1847 Hosea Stout estimated that “the amount of cattle killed by them the past winter and spring is incredible.” “Incredible,” according to Young, meant “from three to 5,000 dollars
worth of cattle,” probably enough to prevent the camp from moving en masse to the mountains in spring. 

What had happened? It would be easy and not necessarily incorrect to say that the Omaha were running scared. Their numbers had been decimated. They felt themselves the victims of both Sioux and Oto depredations and were taking out their frustrations on peaceful neighbors. Without a supply of buffalo meat, beef would do.

But the Mormons, too, had been guilty of indiscretions despite counsel by their leaders. After the above-described slaughter by the Sioux of over seventy Omaha, Henry W. Miller and Arza Adams, while leading a cattle-grazing company, had inadvertently stumbled onto the massacre site some days after the gruesome tragedy. Most of the dead bodies had been stripped of buffalo robes, moccasins, and leggings by the Sioux, while tents and lodges had also been taken. But Miller, after nursing the wounds of one dying squaw, inappropriately took some tattered robes, two ponies, and between twenty and forty beef hides, which he suspected had been stolen from the Mormons. Hearing of it, an anxious Young bolted off a letter saying, “If you have committed any such overt act in any degree, give not sleep to your eyes . . . till you have replaced every article which has been removed.” He urged Miller “to appease the wrath of an ignorant but insulted people and therefore, if possible save your lives.” Though the goods were all returned, an insult had been carelessly made.

And while the Mormons had been careful not to use much of the already scarce surrounding timber, the small amounts they did consume gave provocation. The Omaha were jealous of the many guns in the Mormon camp and of the sizeable number of wild turkey and other small animals lost to Mormon hunters. And the efforts of the Mormons at keeping out the Omaha, especially during the winter, and preventing them from enjoying their fires and shelters were resented.

In an April conference of all interested parties, Chief Big Elk gave his side of the matter as reported by W. W. Phelps:

Said we were not wise in complaining so. “You cut hay but people must buy it if one wants to warm can’t do it but you can take our wood and it won’t grow up tomorrow – our father will not buy our lands so good . . . your head men said you would shelter us, but you come among us and first we know up rises a city eat up our grass kill our game scare it away come to live where we used to hunt and find pea vines and plenty of cattle must not kill your cattle but our game all scared away – vines all trodden down – You were here to protect us, but down comes the Sioux and murders [sic] us that your fault . . . . You can’t raise up our timber can’t raise up our dead men so you are the aggressors.”

By the time Brigham Young and his advance pioneer company had departed westward in April 1847 on their long postponed journey to the Rockies, relations between Mormons and Indians were at their
Hosea Stout. Courtesy of Church Archives, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.
Orson Hyde. Courtesy of Church Archives, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.
lowest point. With Young gone, leadership eventually fell to Orson Hyde, the only apostle left at Winter Quarters after John Taylor and Parley P. Pratt had led out a large company in June in Young's wake. Hyde, only recently returned from Great Britain, relied heavily on the impetuous Hosea Stout, leader of the town police.

It soon became manifest that some of Young's underlings were certainly less popular than he had been with the Indian. After an acrimonious confrontation in late May with Stout and Cornelius Lott, Big Elk wished that the "Big Red headed chief [Young]" were back "for he would treat them better." Ten days later eighty Omaha came to Winter Quarters to negotiate peace, but Stout met them on horseback and in armed fashion "according to the Danite system of horsemanship." Young's dialogue was being replaced with Stout's intransigence and belligerence and with Hyde's ambivalence.

Matters came to a dangerous climax in June when word was received back at Winter Quarters that Omaha Indians had shot and killed Jacob Weatherby, unarmed, a few miles east of the Elkhorn River in the first apparent case of bloodshed between Mormons and Indians at the Missouri. The Omaha were also charged with killing four or five other whites on assignments from various local Indian agencies.

Responding to Weatherby's death, Stout tried to round up an army of 150 men to mete out justice upon the guilty Omaha. On 22 June Stout rode out at the head of a slightly smaller posse of fifty-three men "with the intention of making war on the Omahas in case they did [not] give up the murder[er]."

Speaking of the same matter, Orson Hyde indicated they intended to demand of agent John Miller that he get the Omaha to turn over the offender, "but if not we intend to go prepared to chastise the (Omaha) nation according to their just deserts. I must now stop and prepare my rifle and shooters for a campaign." Stout wanted at least Miller's assistant, R. B. Mitchell, to lead the expedition against the Omaha.

But Mitchell told Hyde and Stout that since he was only the sub-agent and had responsibilities only for the Pottawattamie, not the Omaha, he had no authority to act in behalf of the absent senior agent, Major John Miller. Stout, thinking Mitchell a prejudiced, spineless "inveterate enemy" and "a most infamous rascal," saw what he considered a conspiracy to justify federal interposition. Said Stout:

It would have therefore been very easy for him to played [sic] the game to engage us in a war with the Omahas and leave us in the difficulty...in case he led us into an engagement and did not maintain [sic] his position or attempt to desert or betray us we would have put him to death.

John D. Lee, who went along for the ride to Bellevue, recalled that Mitchell discouraged any armed foray against the Indians and told them to stop their hunt for the murdered. "Jesus Christ," he said,
"could not hinder them from killing the cattle." Like Stout, Lee concluded that Mitchell was deliberately uncooperative and was cleverly trying to goad them into armed conflict "to justify them in calling the militia on us."40 Frustrated by Mitchell's determination not to pursue the criminals, Stout's posse returned home, and "the whole expedition came to naught."41

The Hyde-Stout-Mitchell incident is cited as evidence of a smouldering prejudice and animosity that several secondary Mormon leaders held toward the Indian in spite of political and theological considerations. The murder of one innocent teamster and a winter full of stolen property was enough for them to start their own Indian war of extermination. While Stout was more hot tempered than most of his colleagues and was hated by many of his own people, this episode proves that without Young's steadier, calmer hand, serious conflicts could and did erupt.

During the second and final year of Winter Quarters, relations between the Omaha and Mormons greatly improved, largely because Young's sense of diplomacy and justice replaced the impetuousness and lack of common sense that afflicted some of his over-zealous lieutenants.42 The Mormons planted and harvested large corn crops for the Omaha, transported many of their shipments, and in other ways worked diligently at fostering and maintaining peace.43 In light of the generally positive climate between the two peoples, Young's benign policies toward them, and effective protection of a small tribe which the Sioux in all likelihood would have destroyed, it is difficult to agree with one recent writer who argued that "if the Mormon encampment was not positively harmful to the Indians, it did them little good."44 And though Young was not convinced that the initial agreements with the Omaha extended to their possessing all improvements on the Winter Quarters site after its abandonment, when Young and the High Council finally agreed in November 1847 to leave it, he demanded that the Omaha inherit as much of the city as possible. He also urged the government to take immediate steps to protect them by moving the Council Bluffs agency from Bellevue to Winter Quarters to serve as a buffer between the Omaha and the Sioux.

In conclusion, Young's policies of neutrality, negotiating from strength, benevolent detachment, patience, and restraint fostered a generally healthy social climate. Cooperation, not confrontation, was imperative. These policies formed the basis of his future contacts with Indian tribes in the mountain West. And while it may be argued that he had as much difficulty in controlling his own people's attitudes towards the Indian as he did the Indian himself, Young was comparatively successful in piloting a peaceful course.45
Brigham Young’s Indian Policy

NOTES

2 Ibid., 148.
3 The Book of Mormon, translated by Joseph Smith, Jr. (Salt Lake City: The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 1959), Alma 9:16-17.
4 The Doctrine and Covenants of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book Company, 1967), 49:24.
5 Helen Mar Whitney Kimball, “Scenes and Incidents at Winter Quarters,” Woman’s Exponent 14 (1885-86), 82.
6 Journal History of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 13 February 1847. The Journal History is a massive, chronologically arranged collection of newspapers and other items relating to the history of the Church since its earliest days. It was compiled by the late Andrew Jenson and is available in the reading room of the LDS Church Archives in Salt Lake City. Hereafter referred to as Journal History.
7 Ibid., 7 August 1846. “The Omaha frequently deposited their dead in the branches of trees, wrapped in buffalo robes and blankets leaving with them arrows, pipes, and other trinkets, which they considered sacred and they should not remove them.”
8 See the author’s article, “James Emmett at the Vermillion, 1846 Mormon Renegade,” The Karl E. Mundt Historical and Educational Foundation Series No. 13, 16th Dakota History Conference, April 12-14 1984 Papers 2:519-30. Some writers have argued that Young taught and encouraged interracial marriages. See James S. Brown, Giant of the Land: Life of a Pioneer (Salt Lake City: Bookcraft, Inc., 1960), 320; and William Hall, Abominations of Mormonism Exposed (Cincinnati: I. Hart and Company, 1851), 59. Whether he ever did consent to it before or after, Young was resolutely opposed to it at the Missouri.
9 Winter Quarters High Council Minutes, 7 August 1846, LDS Church Archives, Salt Lake City, Utah.
11 Journal History, 18 October 1846.
12 Ibid., 25 March 1847.
13 Ibid., 9 December 1846.
14 Diary of Hosea Stout, 9 December 1846, 1:216.
15 Ibid., 12 December 1846, 1:217.
16 Ibid., 7 January 1847. The initial report was of 40 deaths, but the number increased as more information trickled into camp. See Journal History, 12 December 1846, and 4 January 1847.
17 See Journal History, 12 December 1846; and Journal of Horace K. Whitney, 14 December 1846, LDS Church Archives. Fighting between the Sioux and the Omaha eventually drove the Omaha and the Oto tribes into an alliance. William W. Major to Brigham Young, 10 June 1847, Brigham Young Papers, Brigham Young Collection, LDS Church Archives.
18 Diary of Appleton Milo Harmon, LDS Church Archives, 10.
19 Journal History, 21 July 1846.
20 Ibid., 19 September 1846.
22 Journal History, 15 October 1846.
23 Brigham Young to Logan Fontenelle, 17 October 1846, Brigham Young Papers.
24 Journal of Heber C. Kimball, 25 October 1846, LDS Church Archives. It was Big Elk’s suggestion that a picket fence be raised on the southern line of Winter Quarters.
See Journal History, 18, 24 October 1846; and Journal of Horace K. Whitney, 18 October 1846. Alpheus Cutler, president of the Winter Quarters High Council, thought it best for the people "to live close together in small groups enclosed by a strong fence [sic]."

Diary of Hosea Stout, 18 October 1846, 1:205.

Logan Fontenelle to Brigham Young, 12 November, 28 December 1846, Brigham Young Papers. In December these included a tent, two poles, a kettle, and a dress.

Journal History, 24 October 1846.

Diary of Hosea Stout, 18 April 1847, 1:250.

See Journal of History, 8 May 1847; and Winter Quarters High Council Minutes, 19 April 1847.

Journal History, 25 March 1847; also 8 January, 1 and 7 February 1847.

Winter Quarters High Council Minutes, 19 April 1847.


Ibid, 5 June 1847, 1:259.

Journal History, 19 June 1847.

Orson Hyde to Nathaniel H. Felt, 21 June 1847, Brigham Young Papers.

See Diary of Hosea Stout, 22 June 1847, 1:262; and Manuscript History of Winter Quarters, 24 June 1847, LDS Church Archives.

Orson Hyde to Nathaniel Felt, 21 June 1847, Brigham Young Papers.

Diary of Hosea Stout, 24 June 1847, 1:262.


Diary of Hosea Stout, 24 June 1847, 1:262.

Journal History, 23 January 1848.

G. D. Grant to Brigham Young, 17 April 1847, Brigham Young Papers.


Journal History, 19 November 1847. Young, no doubt to reclaim part of the Winter Quarters investment, also made overtures to missionaries at Bellevue. He urged them to move north of Winter Quarters, which they could buy "at a very moderate price."

Brigham Young and Council to the "Chief Missionary at Bellevue," 19 November 1847, Brigham Young Papers.

Neither invitation was acted upon. After the Mormons left, the Sioux again attacked, and the desperate Omaha scattered in the Pottawattamie and Pawnee Indian lands.