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1. Introduction

Several approaches to the explanation of conflict, crisis, and war co-exist in contemporary International Relations (IR) theory. Core among these are power, territoriality, regimes, ethnicity, and the "clash of civilizations" (hereafter civilizations) thesis. Power, territoriality, and regimes explore the specifics of confrontations between and among states. Although the democratic-peace theory (democracies do not make war on democracies) stems from a liberal approach, these three theories accord well with the state-centric world view of the Realist paradigm. By contrast, ethnicity and civilizations do not accept the Realist outlook. Rather, ethnicity focuses on sub-state elements and on the confrontations that they create within one state (as in Chechnya), or as part of an inter-state rivalry (e.g. the protracted Arab-Palestinian-Israel conflict). Ethnicity emphasizes the diversity within and between states, highlighting the fact that states are not unitary actors protected by the abiding principle of sovereignty. The civilizations approach, the topic of our study, transcends national boundaries and points to the binding ties that create much broader grouping than state loyalties.

2. The Clash of Civilizations

According to Huntington's definition, civilizations are cultural entities that involve "values, norms, institutions and modes of thinking to which successive generations in a given society have attached primary importance" [Huntington 1996:41]. More specifically, a civilization consists of a "moral milieu encompassing a certain number of nations, each national culture being only a particular form of the whole" [Huntington 1996:41]. Huntington lists several objective attributes that characterize civilizations: blood, race, religion, language, history, way of life, customs and institutions. He also points to the crucial subjective element of self-identification by people. As such, Huntington presents civilizations as "the biggest 'we' within which we feel culturally at home as distinguished from all the other 'thems' out there" [Huntington 1996:43]. Hence, civilizations are a totality. They have existed in the past and are most likely to exist and affect certain aspects of world politics in the third millennium.
Conflict, according to the civilizations approach, is expected primarily between different civilizations, and not within a civilization. This does not mean that conflict does not exist within civilizations but rather that conflicts of the inter-civilizational type are expected to be the major ones, the most intense and the extremely dangerous confrontations among states [Huntington 1993a: 48, 1996: 266, 291,312].

What is it in civilizations that produces confrontation? Why should we expect more conflict between civilizations than within a single civilization? The logic of the Huntington thesis is based upon social-psychology: in-group cohesion is maintained by the existence of conflict towards an outside group. Diversity leads to a clash of interests and makes compromise hard to reach. Once the road to collision is set, civilizations also add ready-made coalitions that broaden the scope of hostilities by new actors that join the confrontation and raise the prospects of escalation [Huntington 2000: 610]. In short, this outlook divides the world into zones of relative peace within each civilization and zones of turmoil involving adversaries that belong to different civilizations.

Huntington presented his thesis as a paradigm, not as a social science research program that is supported by a systematic analysis of empirical data. His examples help explain his ideas and make them interesting, challenging, persuasive to some and disturbing to others. However, this lack of supportive evidence reduces the salience of the "Clash of Civilizations" as a major theoretical approach in IR because a theory must also contain established regularities, i.e., laws that are derived from a large body of empirical findings. It is therefore essential to test the civilizations hypotheses with data on conflict, crisis and war.

A major step in this direction is the Russett, Oneal and Cox study, though its findings do not support the civilizations thesis. Russett et. al. assess the relative power of Realist, Liberal and Civilizational variables in explaining the incidence of militarized interstate disputes observed annually from 1950 to 1992, focusing on COW (Correlates of War) dyads. Interstate conflict, in their study, ranges from the exchange of threats between two states, through a demonstration of force to the actual use of violence [Russett et. al. 2000: 591]. Taking a close look at different propositions derived from the civilizations approach they conclude that contiguity, alliances, relative power, shared democracy and economic interdependence provide a better account of interstate conflict than the civilizations hypotheses. More specifically, Russett et. al., find that:
• Pairs of states split across civilizational boundaries are no more likely to become engaged in disputes than are other states [Russett et. al., 2000: 594-595, 597, Oneal and Russett 2000:612].
• Among Huntington’s eight civilizations, interstate conflict was significantly less likely only within the West [Russett et. al., 2000: 596].
• As the Cold War waned, interstate conflict became less common not more so, as Huntington claimed [Russett et. al., 2000: 599-600].

In his reply to Russett, Oneal and Cox, Huntington defends the civilizations thesis and explains the discrepancy between his paradigm and the findings based on the MID (Militarized Interstate Dispute) data [Huntington 2000: 609-610]. He asserts that the temporal, substantive and definitional approaches in Russett et. al. do nothing to test, prove or disprove his thesis. From the temporal standpoint, the Cold War constitutes well over 90% of the period they investigate while the civilizations approach is designed to characterize the post-1989 period. Second, from a substantive outlook, the dataset is limited, according to Huntington, to interstate conflicts alone, which are but a small, and possibly quite unrepresentative, sample of the violent conflicts in the world. Third, from a definitional perspective, the core argument of the Clash of Civilizations deals with the escalation dynamics of inter-civilizational conflicts as a cause for concern in contemporary global politics.

Henderson and Tucker 2001 also test dyads between 1816-1992, to assess the relationship between civilization membership and the onset of war. Their conclusions relate to three distinct periods: 1816-1945: when states of similar civilizations were more likely to fight each other than were those of different civilizations (findings that contradict Huntington’s thesis); 1946-1988: when civilization membership was not significantly associated with the onset of war (as Huntington claims for the Cold War period); and 1989-1992: when civilization membership was not significantly associated with the onset of war (though Huntington contends that in this period the clash of civilizations should be most apparent). These results, the authors claim, challenge Huntington’s claims and seriously undermine the policy recommendations that devolve from his clash of civilizations thesis.

In this study we, too, test the civilizations thesis, this time focussing on international crises during the 1918-1994 period. In doing
so, we follow the path set forth by Russett et. al., and present findings from systematic empirical data analysis. Our unit of analysis is the occurrence of an international crisis, not a pair of states in a militarized dispute. Using ICB system-level dataset, we focus on a broader time-span before the Cold War, and cover not only militarized disputes, but all international crises. As such, our analysis also includes interstate escalation processes that do not involve violence at all.

Taking Huntington’s answers into account, we are aware that the civilizations thesis was designed specifically to characterize conflicts in the post-Cold War era. However, we maintain that if civilizations are inherently expected to have an important impact on conflict dynamics, then this impact must have also expressed itself in past cases. For a theory of civilizations to emerge, it is necessary to test its hypotheses with data not only on the post-Cold-War years but also as far back as possible in the pre-Cold War era.

To accommodate the argument regarding the unique characteristics of Cold War and of non-Cold War conflict dynamics, we will distinguish between two groups of crises: those belonging to the protracted East-West conflict, and all other cases that occurred before, during, and after the Cold War. We expect that the Cold War cases that were dominated by an ideological struggle will not support the civilizations thesis. We find it reasonable to expect that, in all other cases that are not subjected primarily to a superpower confrontation at the global level, the “Clash of Civilizations” approach will be supported and that we will find diversity in the core crisis attributes that characterize intra- and inter-civilizational crises.

3. Theoretical Framework

This work follows the Russett et. al., study on civilizations and war and their classification of states into eight civilizations: Western, Latin American, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Islamic, African, Sinic, Buddhist and Lone States.

We created a new variable: “Type of Civilizational Conflict” with three values: 1. Intra-civilizational crises (Intra-CC) — crises that occur within one civilization, that is, a confrontation in which all the adversaries belong to the same civilization group; 2. Inter-civilizational crises (Inter-CC)—crises that involve adversaries from two or more civilizations; and 3. Cold War crises—all ICB crisis that belong to the “East-West” protracted conflict [Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997:332-
A list of these crises is found in the Appendix. This category of cases is created to test the special attributes of the Cold War — a conflict that, according to Huntington, overshadowed the 20th century and will be replaced in the 21st century by a clash of civilizations.

Amongst the 412 international crises in the ICB dataset, 43% are intra-CC (n=176), 52% are inter-CC (n=215), and 5% are Cold War cases (n=21). Following Huntington’s thesis, we expect to find unique crisis attributes for each of these three groups and differences among them. However, using the ICB dataset, we are able to look not only at violence and war but also at crisis periods and escalation processes within them. Hence we focus on three core phases during an international crisis: onset, escalation to violence and outcome. Our research questions reflect these three phases:

- Do Cold War, intra-CC, and inter-CC differ in their onset?
- Do Cold War, intra-CC, and inter-CC differ regarding violence?
- Do Cold War, intra-CC, and inter-CC differ in their outcome?

The onset of an international crisis focuses on the act that triggers the crisis and marks the beginning of the escalation process. Using the ICB variable of trigger, we can distinguish between several types of crisis onset: 1. political, 2. economic, 3. external change, 4. other: non-violent, 5. internal challenge to regime, 6. non-violent military, 7. indirect military, and 8. violent act.

Escalation to violence in international crises denotes the extent of violent hostilities used by the adversaries during the crisis. Unlike the onset that denotes the opening act, violence is a process that relates to the entire confrontation. The ICB variable viol designates the highest level of violence present during the crisis, falling into one of the following categories: 1. no violence, 2. minor clashes, 3. serious clashes, 4. war.

Crisis outcomes specify the way crises end. Using the ICB variable outfor we identify 1. accommodative outcomes—formal, semi-formal, and tacit agreements and 2. non-accommodative modes of termination—unilateral acts, imposed agreements, crises that fade over time and other ICB type terminations.

Following the three research questions presented above, we spell out the following postulates for our research:
P1. The onset of inter-CC will be more violent than that of intra-CC.
P2. The onset of Cold War crises will be less violent than that of inter-CC.
P3. Violence in inter-CC will be more intense than in intra-CC.
P4. Violence in Cold War crises will be less intense than in inter-CC.
P5. The outcomes of inter-CC will be less accommodative than intra-CC.
P6. The outcomes of Cold War crises will be less accommodative than inter-CC.

These postulates follow the rationale of the civilizations approach and Huntington’s claim regarding the basic difference between the Cold War era and the post-Cold War years. Actually, for every phase of a crisis, postulates 1, 3, and 5 spell out a more severe “clash” for the inter-CC (based on their diversity and overarching hatred) than for the intra-CC (where common “we-ness” is assumed to have a moderating impact).

For Cold War crises, we highlight in postulates 2, 4, and 6 the expectation for diversity in core crisis attributes between East-West cases and both inter-CC and intra-CC. We expect that the existence of rival ideologies will have an impact on the onset, escalation to violence and on the outcomes of crisis that represent the extent of compromise reached at the conclusion of the confrontation. Moreover, due to the danger of global confrontation, we expect that the use of violence in crises between superpowers will be less intense.

4. Findings

In this study we explore the “civilizations” element as a source of turmoil in world politics. Findings on the onset of international crises are summarized in Table 1 below. Some difference between intra-CC and inter-CC exists in every type of crisis trigger but the largest, most noticeable and meaningful category is violent act as a mode of crisis initiation: 50% of all intra-CC start with violence while only 37% of the inter-CC share this trait. Contrary to the Huntington postulate spelled out in P1, the data point to less extreme onset in the inter-CC than intra-CC group. A similar trend is found in the internal challenge to regime type of onset, though with a much smaller gap: 10% of the intra-CC begin this way and only 6% of the inter-CC cases.
There is virtually no difference in the frequency of cases with non-violent military onset: 16% in intra-CC and 15% inter-CC. This, too, does not accord with the civilizations thesis.

All other types of trigger support the civilizations assertion with some diversity in attributes between intra-CC and inter-CC and a higher percent for inter-CC: 24% vs. 18% for political triggers, 3% vs. 1% for economic acts, 6% vs. 2% for crisis that begin with an external change, 3% vs. 0% in other non-violent type acts and 6% vs. 4% in the indirect military group. Given the small percentages in each category we refrain from interpreting each individual category but emphasize the trend: violent onset characterizes intra-CC while less extreme type onset represent the inter-CC.

Although Huntington’s argument regarding the need to differentiate between intra-CC and inter-CC is somewhat supported, his claim—spelled out in P1—that inter-CC are the most violent confrontations of all, is rejected. Intra-CC are found to be more extreme in their onset.

Table 1 also includes data on Cold War crises. As Huntington claims, these crises are significantly different from intra-CC and inter-CC. While violent acts was the largest type of trigger for both intra-CC and inter-CC, with 50% and 37% of the cases respectively, only 14% of the crises in the protracted East-West conflict were initiated by violence. P2 is therefore supported by evidence from international crises. Actually, for every type of onset, the data prove that Cold War cases are a distinct group that is triggered by political acts - 38% of the cases, or external changes that are regarded as an escalation by the adversaries -19% of the cases.

On the whole, data on the onset of crisis manifests that the three groups of crises differ and that while intra-CC are the most violent in their onset, Cold War cases are the least violent.

Findings on the escalation to violence in international crises are presented in Table 2 below. Diversity in intra-CC and inter-CC cases appears in two levels of violence: war and minor clashes.
Supporting the civilizations claim, as expressed in postulate 3, inter-CC war cases are almost double those in the intra-CC group—29% to 16%. Supporting the same trend, but with a smaller gap between the two groups of crises, intra-CC escalated via minor clashes in 34% compared to only 23% of the inter-CC cases.

### Table 2 - Escalation to Violence in International Crises

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>Minor Clashes</th>
<th>Serious Clashes</th>
<th>War</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intra civil.</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter civil.</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>412</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

% May not add to 100 due to rounding.

It is also interesting to note that in about one fourth (105 of 412) of all international crises no violence is used at all. This is true with respect to both intra-CC and inter-CC. Similarly, serious violence—a level higher than minor clashes, but short of full-scale war—is near identical for intra-CC and inter-CC and once more characterizes about a quarter of all cases in each group of crises.

In sum, diversity and similarity between intra-CC and inter-CC attributes co-exist. Postulate 3 is supported by findings for escalation to war cases, the most severe category of violence in world politics, as well as those with minor clashes in both types of crises. However, similar trends in the two groups are found in the cases with no violence or serious clashes.

Escalation to violence in Cold War cases is significantly different from both the intra-CC and the inter-CC, as in the onset phase. Strongly supporting P4 and Huntington’s claim regarding the differences between Cold War confrontations and all other clashes, the largest category of Cold War cases—65%—involves no violence, and a mere 5% escalate to war. In fact, a descending trend appears: the higher the level of violence, the smaller the percentage of Cold War crises—65% of the cases with no violence, 20% with minor clashes, 15% with serious clashes and only 5% with full-scale war.

Findings on the outcome of international crisis are provided in
Table 3. Our analysis focuses on accommodative and non-accommodative outcomes for the three groups of crises.

Table 3 - Outcomes of International Crises

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Formal agreement</th>
<th>Semi-formal agreement</th>
<th>Tacit understanding</th>
<th>Unilateral act</th>
<th>Imposed agreement</th>
<th>Other/Faded</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N %</td>
<td>N %</td>
<td>N %</td>
<td>N %</td>
<td>N %</td>
<td>N %</td>
<td>N %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intra-Civil</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-Civil</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>412</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

% May not add to 100 due to rounding.

An unilateral act is the most frequent type of outcome for all international crises: 36% of the intra-CC, 44% of the inter-CC and 75% of the Cold War cases. These findings support postulates 5 and 6. As postulate 5 suggests, more inter-CC than intra-CC end in a unilateral/non-accommodative mode. As postulate 6 argues, Cold War crises appear to be a class apart - with nearly twice as many unilateral act cases, compared to both intra-CC and inter-CC. With this high proportion of unilateral-type termination, all other outcomes are of marginal importance, due to the limited number of crises in each one of these groups.

A quite similar trend is evident in imposed agreement outcomes, but with fewer cases: 10% of the inter-CC and only 6% of the intra-CC end this way.

Accommodative outcomes comprise formal and semi-formal agreements, and understandings. The distribution of accommodative-type endings is similar: a near identical percentage of inter-CC and intra-CC end in formal agreements—21% and 23% respectively, and 12% and 13% of semi-formal agreements as well as 5% and 4% of tacit understanding.

The “other/faded” type ending involves non-accommodative acts often carried out by allies of the adversaries and situations where confrontation fades over time because a clear termination does not exist. In this type the intra-CC group takes the lead with 16% vs. 7% for inter-CC. It seems reasonable to argue that the harshness of the clash, as postulated in the civilizations thesis, makes it harder for such cases to fade away over time.

5. Conclusions

Our study presents a first cut of crisis findings on intra-CC and inter-CC cases as well as Cold War crises. The data point to a clear dis-
tinction between Cold War crises on one hand and both intra-CC/inter-CC on the other. This diversity is more striking than that between intra-CC and inter-CC for which differences and similarities are found.

More specifically, P1 states that an inter-CC will be more violent than an intra-CC. Our findings lead us to reject this hypothesis. The data on the onset of crisis confirms that intra-CC are the most violent, intra-CC are less so and that Cold War cases are the least violent of all.

P2 expects the onset of Cold War crises to be less violent than that of inter-CC. This postulate is supported by findings from ICB data on international crisis. In fact, Cold War cases appear to be a category apart in all crisis attributes tested in this study.

P3 on violence in crisis contends that inter-CC will be more violent than intra-CC. As noted earlier, this postulate is supported primarily for war and minor clashes.

P4 postulates that Cold War will be less intense in escalation to violence than inter-CC. As was the case with onset, so too for violence; the findings support this postulate on the unique attributes of Cold War confrontations.

P5, on the outcomes of crises, holds that inter-CC will be less accommodative than intra-CC cases. This postulate is supported by unilateral acts (the most frequent type of crisis termination in all international crises) and imposed agreements.

P6 asserts that the outcomes of Cold War crises will be less accommodative than inter-CC. Once again, as with postulates 2 and 4, this expectation is supported by ICB findings on international crises.

On the whole, our study supports Huntington’s claim on the diversity between Cold War confrontations and other types of rivalry. However, our research also accords with the Russett et. al., study. The attributes that characterize intra-CC and inter-CC reveal much less profound differences than we would expect to find if a “Clash of Civilizations” is regarded as a major driving force for conflict in world politics. We did find some differences, and the inter-CC cluster is somewhat more severe in some aspects—i.e. escalation to violence; but in other crisis attributes—i.e. crisis outcome, both types of crises are rather similar; and in crisis onset intra-CC are actually more violent than inter CC.

Where do we go from here? Why are the findings partial and weak? One could conclude that based on these findings, the Clash of Civilizations thesis does not carry the explanatory power it was believed to hold. In contrast, it can also be argued that the lack of sup-
portive results derives from insufficient operational measures of civilizations as a theoretical concept. Given these mixed trends and partial support for the civilizations thesis derived from ICB findings on crises as well as from other studies mentioned earlier on enduring rivalries, we suggest a cautious approach.

Before we dismiss the idea raised by Huntington, future research should clarify the research question at hand and concentrate on more data analysis. Theoretically we need to focus on two core aspects: first, what is a civilization and what are its multifaceted operational characteristics, and second, what are the unique attributes of inter-CC and intra-CC conflicts? What is the rationale for the differences among these two types of conflict? Once these conceptual–methodological topics are addressed, it will be necessary to take a fresh look at the empirical evidence. More in-depth comparative inquiries should also follow, using various databases (MID, ICB, MAR) to generate more reliable conclusions on civilizational diversity and conflict in world politics.

### Appendix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CRISIS</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>ACTORS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russian Civil War I</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Civil War II</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kars-Ardahan</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish Straits</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Turkey, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Civil War II</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communism in Hungary</td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>USSR, Hungary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truman Doctrine</td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>Greece, Turkey, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshall Plan</td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>USSR, Czechoslovakia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communism in Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>USSR, Czechoslovakia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin Blockade</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>USSR, France, UK, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>Guatemala, USA, Honduras</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria/Turkey Confrontation</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Turkey, USA, Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin Deadline</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>France, UK, USA, West Germany,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bay of Pigs</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Cuba, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin Wall</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>East Germany, USSR, France, UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuban Missiles</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>USA, Cuba, USSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC-121 Spy Plane</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cienfuegos Submarine Base</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan Invasion</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>USSR, Afghanistan, Pakistan, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Able Archer</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>USSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua MIG-21s</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
End Notes

1. Power as the core realist variable explaining war in international relations appears in the classical work of Morgenthau, 1948/1956; as well as Claude, 1962; Kissinger, 1957; Levy, 1987; and Waltz 1979. Still in the realist domain, studies on territoriality, conflict, and war include Diehl, 1991; Gleditsch, 1995; Huth, 1996; Mitchell, and Brandon, 1999; Russett, Oneal, and Cox., 2000; and Vasquez, 1993, 1995, 1996. The literature on regimes and the democratic peace, such as Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 1997:803-819; Chan, 1997; Gleditsch, 1995; James, Solberg and Wolfson, 2000; Maoz,1998; and Russett, O’neal, and Cox., 2000; adds liberal theoretical ideas and integrates them into the state-centric explanation of violence and war. By contrast, studies on ethnicity such as Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 1997:779-802; Carment and James, 1995, 1997, 1998; Connor, 1994; Forbes, 1997; Gurr and Moore,1997; as well as Smith, 1971; investigate the sub-state domain.

2. See fn. 1 in Russett et. al., 2000: 584.

3. Fox, 2001, tests two civilizations—Islam and the West—but only with respect to ethnic conflict, thereby reducing the meaning of civilizations from a broad concept to the more operational term of ethnic violence using Gurr’s MAR3 data. The state level rather than international foci used in his study, as well as the more narrow—ethnic and not comprehensive—civilizational attributes of these confrontations, make Fox’s findings of limited relevance for evaluating the controversial “clash of civilizations” thesis.

4. A summary of their findings is presented in Russett et. al., 2000:602.

5. The Cold War era is a unique period that is not characterized by a clash of civilizations, according to Huntington. But this classification, actually, requires that we define what we mean by the concept of a civilization. If it encompasses a collective with a common culture, religion, a distinct political system, values, and norms (as noted on page 2), then the East-West rivalry can indeed be placed within the context of a civilizational struggle between two civilizations, but with different crisis behaviours than Huntington expects for such a clash.

6. Not all crises during the Cold War period were primarily related to the East-West conflict. Though the Cold War may have exacerbated many regional conflicts, its effects can be traced to both
intra-CC and inter-CC clusters, thereby preserving the distinct crisis attributes of each group of cases.

7. Russett et.al., 2000:606-608. These categories follow the maps that appear in Huntington’s *Clash of Civilizations*, 1996: 22-27; see also Russett et.al., 2000:591-92. We used identical groupings so that our findings can later be compared with those from MID on enduring rivalries.

8. Given the scope of variables involved in this study we refrain from testing other sources of explanation such as regime, territoriality, and ethnicity. These will be integrated into future research to supplement this study on the civilizations approach.

9. This finding may seem to contradict the percentages described previously regarding violent onset of crisis. No real contradiction exists because the two describe distinct phases in a crisis. Escalation is not automatic in all phases. A crisis may erupt with violence and its management may be non-violent (as in the 1952 Catalina affair between Sweden and the USSR, or the 1955 Gaza raid-Czech arms deal between Egypt and Israel). By contrast, a crisis may be triggered by a non-violent act but escalate to war (as in the 1967 Six-Day War case between Israel and its Arab adversaries). Hence the different percentages and trends that characterize violent onset may or may not manifest themselves with follow-up violence in the next escalation to violence phase of the confrontation.

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