Editor's Note

From the President

From the Archives

Articles

In Memoriam

Letter to the Editor

Book Reviews

For our Authors

Call for Papers

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Table of Contents

Editor's Note
Joseph Drew ................................................................................................................................. 1

From the President
Civilizational Analysis and Some Paths Not Taken, Part I
Toby E. Huff............................................................................................................................... 9

From the Archives
Comparative and Civilizational Perspectives in the Social Sciences and Humanities:
An Inventory and Statement
Benjamin Nelson and Vytautas Kavolis
(Ed. from the original by Joseph Drew) ..................................................................................... 16

Quigley's Model as a Model Model
Matthew Melko
Edited by Joseph Drew ............................................................................................................... 23

Peer-Reviewed Articles
Civilization as Self-Determination: Interpreting R. G. Collingwood for the
Twenty-First Century – Part I
Gautam Ghosh ......................................................................................................................... 29

The Concept of a Boundary Between the Latin and the Byzantine
Civilizations in Europe
Piotr Eberhardt............................................................................................................................ 44

Technology in Eurasia Before Modern Times: A Survey
Norman C. Rothman .................................................................................................................. 70

ISIS and Apocalypse:
Some Comparisons with End Times Thinking Elsewhere and a Theory
Michael Andregg ......................................................................................................................... 89

In Memoriam
Remembering Carle C. Zimmerman: A Tribute
Richard Cronk .............................................................................................................................. 99

Some Memories of George Von der Muhll
Michael Andregg ........................................................................................................................ 104

Letter to the Editor
Svealand, Götaland and the Rise of the East-Slavic Kingdom – Response to Piotr Murziónak
(Comparative Civilizations Review, No. 73 Fall 2015)
Bertil Haggman .......................................................................................................................... 107
# Book Reviews


*For Authors*

*Comparative Civilizations Review* Style Sheet............................................... 130

*Call For Papers*

47th Annual Conference of the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations .......................................................... back cover

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[186x650]Table of Contents (cont.)
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The Comparative Civilizations Review publishes analytical studies and interpretive essays primarily concerned with (1) the comparison of whole civilizations, (2) the development of theories and methods especially useful in comparative civilization studies, (3) accounts of intercivilizational contacts, and (4) significant issues in the humanities or social sciences studied from a comparative civilizational perspective.

By “a comparative civilizational perspective” we mean (1) the use of evidence from more than one civilization (the various national traditions of the modern West being regarded, in this respect, as constituents of a single civilization) and (2) a method likely to throw new light either on the origins, processes, or structures of civilizations or on the problems of interpreting civilizations.

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The only thing we can be sure of in life and in history is change. But how can we conceptualize change?

On the one hand, Heraclitus taught us that change is perpetual, unstoppable, and all things are flowing. “This world, which is the same for all, no one of gods or men has made; but it was ever, is now, and ever shall be an ever-living Fire, with measures kindling and measures going out.” As he famously said, “you cannot step twice into the same river, for fresh waters are ever flowing in upon you… The sun is new every day.” But he also pronounced that “We step and do not step into the same rivers; we are, and are not.” According to Plato, Heraclitus taught that nothing ever is - everything is becoming; Aristotle summed it up as “nothing steadfastly is.”

On the other hand, there can be little doubt that it is instinctual to search for that which is permanent; and this is desirable above all else, or so many have thought. Is it true that “whatever is, ought to be?” Hume looked into that proposition, and Belinsky famously converted politically when he changed the emphasis from the second to the first phrase.

I think that it may be true that you can step into the same river twice. There can be change and permanency simultaneously. At least that has to be the logical conclusion when one observes the members of the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations, as each year they give up whatever they are doing, wherever in the world they might be, and flock dutifully to attend the annual meeting. There may be great change occurring in the world from the historical perspective, but you can bet on one thing: next year, like this year, there will be an annual meeting of the ISCSC, held somewhere in the world. Additionally, it will be invigorating, challenging, meaningful. Like Heraclitus’s fire, it always is yet constantly changes.

So it is that we can say with certitude that the annual meeting of the ISCSC survives; simultaneously, like the river of Heraclitus, the content changes.

This year’s meeting was no exception to the rule of history. It was held on the beautiful campus of Monmouth University, ably structured, compact yet explosive with ideas. Organized by the redoubtable duo of scholars and long-time organizational leaders, Mariana Tepfenhart of Monmouth University, the Conference Chair, and Laina Farhat-Holzman of California, the Program Chair, it centered on a beautiful set of sessions. From each lecture and debate one could draw much of value to take away, a great learning experience.

The river of inspiration kept on flowing, sufficient to keep those who attended thinking about great ideas and looking forward to next year’s sessions.
At the meeting, the outgoing president, Dr. David Rosner from the Metropolitan College of New York, where he is a highly productive professor of values and ethics, offered his valedictory remarks. Everyone hailed the fine work he has done during the past several years and congratulated him on a successful presidency, one during which many advances were made in the structure and professionalism of the society.

It was noted by all present that he had led the organization with distinction since his election during the annual meeting held in Washington, D.C., in June 2012. One reason: Dr. Rosner is surely one of the kindest and most dedicated faculty members and comparative civilizationalists anywhere. Everyone on the Board of Directors thanks him for his dedicated, self-less, time-consuming and always thoughtful leadership of the society.

And it should be noted that Prof. Rosner’s scholarship has always been superb: I would point out, from this desk, that his brilliance in analyzing the social and ethical implications of Boccaccio’s Decameron made for one of the most penetrating articles ever carried in the journal. A distinguished graduate of Vassar, with a PhD. from Brown University, this philosopher/president has left an indelible mark of intelligence, courtesy and kindness on the society.

The gavel was handed over at Monmouth to the newly-elected president, Dr. Toby Huff, who was well received by all present. Currently Research Associate in the Department of Astronomy at Harvard University, he was formerly at the University of California, Berkeley; the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey, the National University of Singapore, the University of Malaya, and the Max Weber College in Erfurt, Germany.

President Huff taught sociology for thirty-four years at the University of Massachusetts Dartmouth before becoming Chancellor Professor Emeritus in 2005. Notably, he earned his PhD. at New School University (formerly, the New School for Social Research) under the guidance of the late Dr. Benjamin Nelson, first president of the IS CSC in its United States incarnation.

Prof. Huff’s scholarship is respected worldwide; I have in my hands now his beautiful 2011 book, Intellectual Curiosity and the Scientific Revolution: A Global Perspective, published by Cambridge University Press. In this book he shows that Europe in the 1600s was alive with discovery and invention. There was a scientific revolution in Europe. An enormous flow of discoveries transformed scientific thought. Among these was the telescope. While the invention of the telescope was transmitted from Holland to China, to Mughal India, and to the Ottoman Empire in short order, those civilizations did not respond as Europeans did to the new instrument.

Thus he writes that “But it was not just the telescope’s promise that was passed by: the same thing occurred with the microscope and the study of human and animal microscopy as well as electrical energy and pneumatics.” While in Europe there was a great burst of
innovation in science and technology, the other civilizations were dilatory in their reaction to Europe’s flowering of scientific activity. Its “discovery machine” thus failed to ignite the same spark elsewhere. The result, argues Prof. Huff, was a great divergence, one which granted to Europe 400 years of scientific and economic ascendancy.

This significant work for the comparative study of civilizations was preceded by a number of other books, including The Rise of Early Modern Science: Islam, China, and the West; a co-edited volume with Wolfgang Schluchter entitled Max Weber and Islam; and, from 2005, An Age of Science and Revolutions, 1600-1800.

President Huff announced that he would be working closely in the administration of the society with two others: Lynn Rhodes of California, newly-elected Vice President, and Peter Hecht of Washington, D.C., newly-elected Executive Director.

An easy prediction: Watch for exciting new developments from this leadership team.

One reason that this is an easy prediction is that the three of them have already overseen the development of our new website: www.iscsc.org. Everyone should take a look at this colorful, information-laden site. The home page features a continuously revolving globe and links to the following sections: About Us; Newsletter; the Journal CCR; ISCSC Blog: Civilitas; Civilization Defined – References for Research and Study; Featured Articles; Book Review; Membership; Constitution; By-Laws; and Officer and Director Contact.

Here are four of the most fascinating sections:

First: On the front page is a statement of “Our Society’s Mission and Goals.” It states:

Mission: To provide means of cooperation among all persons interested in the advancement of the comparative study of civilizations.

Creed: Civilizations matter.

Goal: To achieve scholarly recognition by pursuing and publishing knowledge of the comparative study of civilizations.


Note: A somewhat similar statement appears on Page 1 in the revised By-Laws.

Second: Another fascinating section, in my view, is the “Civilization Defined” link. Central to this area of the website is a 21-page paper entitled “Civilization: Definitions and Recommendations.” The paper contains early definitions of civilizations, contemporary definitions of civilizations, and a number of classifications of civilizations.
Among the scholars quoted in this paper are the following: Arnold Toynbee and Carroll Quigley, plus in more or less alphabetical order the following: Philip Bagby, Steve Blaha, Andrew Bosworth, Shepard Clough, Rushton Coulborn, Christopher Dawson, Laina Farhat-Holzman, Felipe Fernandez-Armesto, Dario Fernandez-Morera, Andre Gunder Frank, John K. Hord, Samuel P. Huntington, Edward Tyler, Feliks Koneczny, and Jaroslav Krejci. Also, A. L. Kroeber, Ross Maxwell, William McGaughey, Matthew Melko, David Richardson, W. M. Flinders Petrie, Lee Daniel Snyder, Pitirim A. Sorokin, Oswald Spengler, Andrew Targowski, Roger Wescott, and David Wilkinson.

Following this list of quotes is an article presenting opinions of leading members of the ISCSC in response to the following question posed by the *Comparative Civilizations Review*:

> What literature do you use or recommend in teaching the comparative study of civilizations?

Some short and some extensive answers, with valuable lists, were supplied by Dr. Walter Benesch of Alaska; Dr. David Wilkinson of California; the late Dr. Matthew Melko of Ohio, Dr. Laina Farhat-Holzman of California, Dr. Midori Yamanouchi of Pennsylvania, and myself.

**Third:** A revised set of By-Laws contains much that is new and attractive.

Special recognition for the formulation here must go to the scholar and government leader Dr. John A. Grayzel of New York. Former holder of the Baha’i Chair for Peace at the University of Maryland, Dr. Grayzel, who holds both a J.D. from Stanford University and a PhD. from the University of Oregon, served for many years as a top official of the United States Agency for International Development. As an attorney, he guided the society through the creation of this new set of By-Laws and their unanimous approved by the Board of Directors of the society.

Please note that the By-Laws also contain within Article IV on Page 2 a Code of Ethics, as follows.

The members of this society pledge themselves by virtue of their membership to:

4.1. Assume the responsibility for conduct and behavior designed to serve the cause of truth and justice
4.2. Maintain the highest standards of professional, moral and ethical conduct
4.3. Respect the inherent dignity of mankind and deal justly, fairly and objectively with each individual
4.4. Hold themselves apart from influences intended to benefit their political, personal or financial well-being while influencing their professional judgments
4.5. Actively support the mission and aims and efforts of this society
Can any other scholarly association in the United States boast of a similar statement?

**Fourth:** There is also a direct link on the front page of the website to this journal. Two clicks bring you to the very latest edition.

The most exciting news for *Comparative Civilizations Review* is that we are moving to a new electronic platform. As always, this miracle is occurring thanks to Connie Lamb, the wonderful Editor of this publication and librarian at Brigham Young University in Provo, Utah. In short, what is happening is that the journal is transitioning away from the OJS platform and onto a new one, Digital Commons. Digital Commons is run by Berkeley Electronic Press of California.

As that company notes, “Digital Commons Network brings together free, full-text scholarly articles from hundreds of universities and colleges worldwide. Curated by university librarians and their supporting institutions, the Network includes a growing collection of peer-reviewed journal articles, book chapters, dissertations, working papers, conference proceedings, and other original scholarly work.”

So, to begin with, this is a great resource when you want to undertake study and research. One reason: There are over two million works from nearly 500 higher education institutions included on this platform.

In a future Editor’s Note, I will examine in greater depth the value of the Digital Commons platform to researchers and scholars within the membership of the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations. The following is just a brief introduction to two of the many strengths of this electronic resource which we are now about to receive:

To see the depth of Digital Commons, go to: network.bepress.com/explore. I just did. I typed in the following language in the search box: comparative study of civilizations. A total of 180,177 hits were then listed.

Next, I picked one of the top-listed entries and there got the citation and the abstract. It is easy enough to follow through and obtain the key words and other vital information on this new manuscript. There on the left was a “download” button and I was able to read through the working draft of a new book on political theory.

Another interesting area (you can see them all listed on the left, in a column) is entitled “Theses and Dissertations.” A total of 29,426 dissertations and theses are listed. This is of great interest to me as I am currently a faculty member at Morgan State University in the Community College Leadership Doctoral Program and actually advise on, and edit, many doctoral dissertations.
I pressed on Theses/Dissertations and picked out one that looked interesting. There was the abstract. But in addition, I saw the date the dissertation was awarded, the degree type; the degree name (i.e., Doctor of Philosophy); the department; the four committee members; the number of pages; the number of downloads until now; key words (important for search engines); disciplines related to the topic; language; repository citation; and best of all, a “Download” button.

So, Digital Commons is a library, an institutional repository of considerable depth. It is accessible now to members of the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations and to everyone else.

But more than that, it is going to enable the journal to be handled electronically in a most efficient manner. Articles will be submitted electronically and the peer review process, plus the editing process, will be carried out minus those flaws that can drive a journal wild: where is the article by so-and-so? When was it peer-reviewed? What did the reviewer say? What changes, if any, were suggested? What articles are not back from the authors? Who has edited, when and where?

This transition is a tremendous advance for the journal, a major step forward. Thank you so much, Editor Connie Lamb.

Joseph Drew
Washington, D.C.
Commentary from the President

With regard to the 21 pages of definitions of “civilizations” mentioned above, I suggest a different perspective. The fascination with definitions needs to be balanced by a stress on civilizational analysis and a pluralist conception of civilizations (rather than civilization, singular) focused on actual comparative studies that reveal how such studies can be carried out and what new insights/discoveries they produce.

What we need to focus on is exemplars of civilizational analysis, works that pioneered the comparative study of civilizations that show us how comparative civilizational analysis can be undertaken, and what innovative things they found out.

Whatever orientation current members of the IS CSCC may have, it might be useful to recall the original vision of a “new science of civilizational analysis” that Benjamin Nelson articulated in the early days of the ISCSC in the US. He believed that this new progressive orientation to civilizational study:

will one day—before too long—be found to constitute a ‘new science’ of civilizational analysis [based on anticipations by outstanding scholars of the past such as Emile Durkheim, Marcel Mauss, Max Weber, Henry Sumner Maine, etc.]....Already the evidence is overwhelming that many of the main challenges confronting sociology in our days cannot be met without recourse to civilizational and inter-civilizational perspectives...With others, I have been striving to carry out detailed studies in the comparative historical, differential sociology of civilizational patterns and inter-civilizational encounters.

With these frames as my reference points, I have sought to throw light on the differences in the passages to—and from—modernity in ‘East’ and ‘West’ in the spheres of law, conscience, consciousness, science and in the images people have regarding state, society, community, authority, individual, future, freedom, and so on.

(This statement comes from the “Introduction” written for the German edition of Nelson’s collected papers, Der Ursprung der Moderne: Vergleichende Studien zum Zivilisationsprozess (Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1977), and which I reprinted in On the Roads to Modernity: Conscience, Science, and Civilizations [Roman and Littlefield, 1981], pp. 13-14.)

Surely this framework is broad and open-ended enough to encompass the broad major themes that members of the IS CSCC continue to explore.
ISCSC board member Dr. Grayzel adds the following comment:

Heraclitus' philosophy was an important theoretic hook for my dissertation on ethnic identity among the Fulbe, an African pastoral people. The problem is that most "quotes" from Heraclitus are really quotes from people saying what they think he said.

The seemingly most accurate statement using his words is:

"potamoisi toisin autoisin embainousin hetera kai hetera hudata epirrei."
"On those stepping into rivers staying the same other and other waters flow."

Apparently, the most accurate interpretation of this enigmatic insight is found at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/heraclitus/:

"...not that all things are changing so that we cannot encounter them twice, but something much more subtle and profound. It is that some things stay the same only by changing. One kind of long-lasting material reality exists by virtue of constant turnover in its constituent matter. Here constancy and change are not opposed but inextricably connected. A human body could be understood in precisely the same way, as living and continuing by virtue of constant metabolism – as Aristotle, for instance, later understood it. On this reading, Heraclitus believes in flux, but not as destructive of constancy; rather it is, paradoxically, a necessary condition of constancy, at least in some cases (and arguably in all)."
Civilizational Analysis and Some Paths Not Taken, Part I

Toby E. Huff
Harvard University

These are some preliminary remarks from my Plenary Address to the 46th Annual Conference of the ISCSC held at Monmouth University in June 2016. The paper analyzes three civilizational encounters between “East” and “West” in the fields of law and science but which are too complex to be treated adequately in a short paper.

When I began my preparations for this presentation, I thought I would reflect on the early founders of the ISCSC, especially Pitirim Sorokin and Arnold Toynbee, above all, given the comments on the 50th Anniversary of the Society published by Michael Palencia-Roth but also Joseph Drew’s tabulations of the themes of the Conference.1 As I looked into the issues, however, it became increasingly clear that neither Sorokin nor Toynbee left us with a viable platform for carrying on comparative civilizational analysis and no one articulated a revised vision.

In the meantime, the most sophisticated and ambitious articulation of a new approach to civilizational analysis, drawing on the work of Weber, Durkheim and Mauss (among others), was put forth by Benjamin Nelson in a paper titled, “Civilizational Analysis and Intercivilizational Encounters.”2 Nelson, who had been collaborating with Vytautas Kavolis, brought in historical “structures of consciousness” usually, but not always, defined by religious commitments, along with legal, logical, and scientific modes of thought. Nelson had translated and published the important “Note of the Notion of Civilization” by Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss.3

This foundational conception, according to which civilizations are composed of at least two or more societies sharing fundamental religious, legal, and symbolic expressions, has

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belatedly caught on in some circles, though within the ISCSC mainly by Nelson’s former students such as myself and Donald Nielsen.

Moreover, some members of this Society will recall that the march was stolen with regard to long-term historical-sociological analysis with the appearance of Immanuel Wallerstein’s book, *The Modern World-System.* This happened just when the revivified ISCSC was reconstituted in the United States. Consequently, then President Benjamin Nelson (and other members) saw the challenge of the world-system perspective and invited Wallerstein and/or his supporters to make presentations at the ISCSC Annual Conferences in order to challenge the model. It has to be conceded that the world-system approach did attract a large number of highly competent social scientists who pushed the model forward and some of whom attended meetings of the ISCSC. It now appears, however, that the world-system approach has played out.

In that context it is germane to note that Wallerstein’s system had no place for culture, for such apparently friable human institutions as religion or law. Consequently, neither China nor the Islamic world played any part in the world-system, being relegated at best to the silent “periphery,” whereas in fact, first, “the Four Little Tigers” (Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea) and then China itself were poised to “take off,” in the late 20th century, despite the overburdening world-system postulated by Wallerstein and followers.

Because of this lacuna in Wallerstein’s worldview, his analysis was inherently incapable of recognizing the impact that religion and law had on the making of the West, and plausibly, the retardation of both China and Islamic civilization for very long periods of time (that I shall spell out in part 2 of this paper). Whether or not he thinks modern science, the international legal system, the idea of universal human rights are just “rhetoric” is an interesting question.

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But there is still another theoretical initiative that threatened to undermine the very notion that the histories of civilizations matter. This is the “global” or “globalization” thrust that smacks of utopianism.¹¹ Not coincidentally, it joins forces with the same unworkable Toynbee conception of “civilization,” that is, according to Toynbee, civilization “might be defined as an endeavor to create a state of society [sic] in which the whole of mankind will be able to live together in harmony.”¹² A follower of Toynbee took this claim further: “Today there exists on earth only one civilization.”¹³ In the first two decades of the 21st century, this conception seems to be out of touch with geo-political realities.

At the same time, Robertson and associates argued that increasingly people perceive “our world as a single space.”¹⁴ As a former president of the ISCSC, Vytautas Kavolis understood that position, postulates “an inevitable convergence, sooner or later, toward a universal value hierarchy in which the idea of humanity as a whole subsumes these locally differentiated responses” of subgroups around the world.¹⁵ Here again this vision collides with current geo-political and civilizational realities.

Apart from this challenging background, as I looked into the voluminous writings of Sorokin and Toynbee, I discovered that both writers (as did Wallerstein) deliberately avoided learning from the insights of Max Weber, the great German scholar who has been cited as the most important sociologist of the 20th century. Sorokin in particular railed against Weber when his most gifted student, Robert Merton, took up a foundational question that resulted in a classic and unsurpassed study called, Science, Technology and Society in 17th Century England, published in 1938.¹⁶ Sorokin characterized Weber’s procedure of taking one factor and looking for its effects on another factor, "childish," and thus relegated the whole enterprise of studying the effects of religion, or law for that matter, on other social conditions, to “pseudo-scientism.”¹⁷ And, thus, Sorokin himself veered off in the direction that we can see was counterproductive,¹⁸ while Weber’s (and Merton’s)

¹⁸ There have been many appreciative and critical assessments of Sorokin’s work, the most extensive is Pitirim A. Sorokin in Review, edited by Philip A. Allen (Durham: Duke University Press, 1963). The same
approach became an inexhaustible source of new studies and insights. I shall say more about this below.

Arnold Toynbee, on the other hand, was not polemical. Nevertheless, many of his critics pointed out to him the importance of Max Weber’s insights but Toynbee continued to ignore them. In short, whereas Max Weber centered his attention on the great religions of the world and wrote his famous studies of The Religion of India, the Religion of China, Ancient Judaism, as well as Islam, Toynbee failed to produce a time-tested set of reflections on the world religions. Unlike Weber, he did not see the possibilities inherent in assuming that the great world religions constitute an important starting point for understanding civilizational configurations, just as Sorokin dismissed the whole idea of studying religious effects. In a word, this would be the first of the many paths not taken.

For as it turns out Max Weber did indeed lay out a serious agenda for civilizational analysis back in 1919. That agenda is found Weber’s classic Introduction to his Collected Essays in the Sociology of Religion but which most people have read as the “Introduction” that Talcott Parsons prefaced to the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. But this Prefatory Note is not at all about the Reformation and its significant impact on economic development. It is rather a very broad assessment of Western and world history in civilizational terms that he came to in the last year of his life. It is not about this or that “society,” but about transnational, trans-societal civilization-based developments. In that essay, Weber raised the really big question of historical and sociological analysis, namely, how did the Western world get to be as it is? But neither Sorokin nor Toynbee took up the challenge. At the same time, this is the same window for finding out why the non-Western world went in quite different directions.

So let me recall some critical themes from Max Weber’s extraordinary assessment of the West and its divergence from other parts of the world that he wrote in the last year of his life. Of course, we must bear in mind that many of the terms of reference used by Weber have now been superseded. The fact is that Weber came up with his assessment of these comparative civilizational differences before the discipline called History of Science was even invented, before anyone had coined the phrase, “the scientific revolution,” usually located in the 16th and 17th century. Likewise, Weber was doing comparative sociology of law before there was anything like comparative legal studies in the law schools or in history departments. Here is the way Weber begins:

A product of modern European civilization, studying any problem of universal history, is bound to ask himself to what combination of circumstances the fact should be attributed that in Western civilization, and in Western civilization only,
cultural phenomena have appeared which (as we like to think) lie in a line having universal significance and value.\textsuperscript{20}

He then goes on to mention a number of specific areas in which the Western world developed uniquely, distinguishing itself from others. The first of these that he mentions is science, which had reached a stage of development far beyond that of any other part of the world. While all sorts of religious and philosophical reflections on the world have existed in other parts of the world, Weber noted the uniqueness of systematic theology that European medievals developed into what they called “the queen of the sciences.”

He then attempts to sketch some developmental paths on the roads to modern science. He mentions that Babylonian astronomy lacked certain mathematical foundations that were later added by the Greeks. He notes that Indian geometry (to the extent that it existed), lacked a method of proof, which was also true of Chinese mathematics, though Weber did not mention that.

He mentions a wide difference between Greek and Chinese approaches to historical scholarship.\textsuperscript{21} Likewise, he was aware that Aristotle was the first to develop the modes of logical argument that continue to be recognized to this day.

In the realm of law, he points out that though other legal systems developed in China and the Middle East, none created a formal and rational jurisprudence such as was developed through the combination of Roman Civil Law and the canon law advanced by medieval Christian scholars. He recognized the uniqueness of European universities, the specialized education of bureaucratic servants and their function in a rational-legal state apparatus.

Weber goes on to note the differences in artistic sensibilities, in architecture and music. And finally he accents the unique creation of modern capitalism based on formally free labor and production for the market.\textsuperscript{22}

In short, Weber summarized an extraordinary set of scientific, economic, cultural, legal and artistic differences between “East” and “West” long before such comparative studies were recognized as vital to our understanding of how the world got to be the way it is. Of course, each of these claims needs to be carefully checked in the light of more recent research.

\textsuperscript{20} Max Weber, “Introduction” in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, translated by Talcott Parsons (New York: Scribners and Sons, 1958). This essay was written in 1904/05 but Weber’s “Introduction” to the volume inserted by Parsons comes from Weber’s 1920 Introduction to his Collected Essays of the Sociology of Religion.


So, let me restate just two of Weber’s crucial insights using modern terminology in order that we can see the relevance of Weber’s insights for civilizational comparisons.

In the first instance, Weber was correct, that though one can find earlier forms of scientific inquiry around the world -- in the Muslim world, in China and India -- modern science uniquely arose in the West. It was Weber who flagged this question as a major source of inquiry, yet it was only the biochemist-turned-historian, the late Joseph Needham, who took up the great question in his monumental study, *Science and Civilization in China.*

Needham’s profound work produced what Benjamin Nelson called “Needham’s challenge,” which was to go beyond both Needham and Weber to understand why modern science did not emerge in China (or elsewhere) but only in the West.

Weber described the second great contrast between “East” and “West” as the very different legal system that emerged only in Western Europe. Of course there were other legal systems in other parts of the world, but as I shall illustrate, Europe alone produced a legal revolution in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries that in fact laid the foundations for modern legal development, and even the foundations for globalization. This political-legal transformation was so broad-ranging and deeply ensconced in European culture that even scholars who have studied the European Middle Ages recently have failed to grasp the scope of this enduring transformation.

In broad outline, the European legal revolution of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries laid the foundations for what we now recognize as modern political institutions. These include due process of law, the notion of elective representation in all forms of corporate bodies, the very idea of legally autonomous organizations, and not least of all, legally autonomous professional associations (of doctors and lawyers), charitable organizations, universities, as well as cities and towns. All of these innovations, including the rise of parliamentary governance, arose out of medieval canon law and contributed to the stability of economic enterprises and made local self-government possible. Each of these developments was part of the emergence of constitutionalism as understood in the Western world. But this is to get ahead of the narrative that will follow in part 2.

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25 A crucial dimension of this development is the idea of treating collective actors as a whole body -- a corporation, or corporate entity. This is the fundamental basis for all forms of legal autonomy, both local and national -- that is, the legal autonomy of civil organizations, business enterprises, professional associations and the sovereignty of nation states.
Given these institutional landmarks, I shall sketch out the results of three intercivilizational encounters that reveal how deeply rooted the axial institutions of civilizations are in their contrasting histories, cultures, and metaphysical assumptions. It is to be accented that this kind of analysis is only possible and generally useful if we maintain adequate *civilizational frames of reference*; otherwise it devolves into quaint historical findings.
Comparative and Civilizational Perspectives in the Social Sciences and Humanities: An Inventory and Statement

Benjamin Nelson and Vytautas Kavolis
(Ed. from the original by Joseph Drew)

This paper was drafted for a discussion of the American Association for the Advancement of Science that was to be sponsored by the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations.

The AAAS conference was held in December of 1972; it is not clear that the ISSCC panel was actually held. However, the paper, described on the cover of the original as “An Essay in Progress,” was definitely deposited in the archives of the ISSCC at Dickinson College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, from which it recently has been retrieved.

The authors of this “Inventory and Statement” were two distinguished intellectuals, founders of the ISSCC in the United States.

The lead author was Dr. Benjamin Nelson, a professor at the Graduate Faculty of the New School for Social Research, in New York. There he was a Professor of Sociology. Among other roles, he became a mentor and dissertation supervisor for a successful student who has this summer been elected the latest president of the ISSCC, Dr. Toby Huff of Harvard University; Dr. Nelson also lectured to this editor in a 1970 seminar entitled “Maine, Durkheim, and Weber.”

A graduate of Columbia University, from which he received both the M.A. and the Ph.D., Professor Nelson served as the first president of the American branch of the ISSCC, then known as the ISSCC (US). His life was one of great intellectual contribution in the field of the comparative study of civilizations, and in other domains of scholarship.

After his untimely death in 1977, the Comparative Civilizations Review devoted its Joint Issue Number 10 (1983) and Number 11 (1984) entirely to a hardcover book entitled Civilizations East and West: A Memorial Volume for Benjamin Nelson. In the preface it is written that the “editors want to keep alive the ideas of Benjamin Nelson himself and thoughts about his life and work as well.”

It turned out that one of the authors writing for that Memorial Volume – less than a decade after this present paper was in the process of being prepared – was Dr. Vytautas Kavolis, who held a titled chair as Charles A. Dana Professor of Comparative Civilizations and Sociology at Dickinson College, in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, from 1964 until his unfortunate death in 1996. He was also, from 1977 to 1983, president of the ISSCC, immediately following the death of Dr. Nelson, and a long-time board member of the organization.
Born in 1930, he departed his native Lithuania following the Soviet Union’s “Baltic Offensive” and takeover of the country in 1944, settling first in the Midwest and eventually receiving his master’s and doctoral degrees from Harvard University.

Dr. Kavolis was active both intellectually and politically throughout his life. He wrote prolifically and published more than a dozen books, in English and in Lithuanian. Among his intellectual interests was the conflict between nationalism and liberalism, especially as it related to Lithuania, both in the early 20th century and then after the country received its independence in 1990.

In the diaspora, he founded and edited the Lithuanian-American journal Metmenys, was an active board member of several Lithuanian-American organizations, and functioned as the main ideologist of Santara-Šviesa. After freedom and independence returned to Lithuania, he remained active in both countries; he was the recipient of Lithuania’s 1993 National Prize for Culture and Art and two years later, Professor Kavolis was awarded an honorary doctorate by Klaipėda University in Lithuania.

According to Dr. Leonidas Donskis, another long-time member of the ISCSC, writing in his book Loyalty, Dissent and Betrayal: Modern Lithuania and East Central European Moral Imagination, Santara-Šviesa “raised the idea of Westward-looking, fully emancipated, liberal-democratic, inclusive, and cosmopolitan Lithuanian-ness as their banner.”

His concept of "the polylogue of civilizations" was cited by Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus at a 2001 UNESCO conference to guide Lithuania's future:

As my old friend, Professor Vytautas Kavolis, former President of the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations, said, every civilization has its own denominator of cultural liberalism, which enables different societies to understand each other. He was convinced that this denominator of liberalism along with mutual understanding between civilizations should nowadays be promoted by a modern educational system.

Professor Kavolis maintained that sooner or later the comparative studies of civilizations will become an important part of modern education.

I have attempted to reproduce this essay as faithfully as possible, but this has not been an easy project, because the original is covered with excisions and hand-written additions. Therefore, any mistakes are my own.

Joseph Drew
2016
I.

On close inspection our current ways of carrying on comparative studies of social and cultural processes and institutions prove to reflect different horizons, rest on different assumptions, apply different methods, intend different aims. An exhaustive inventory and characterization of these ways will not be attempted at this time.

Here we must be content to develop a more limited agenda. We undertake first to:

(1) Discriminate two main varieties and eight horizons of comparative analysis.¹
(2) Differentiate out of these eight horizons four main modes of carrying on the comparative study of so-called civilizations. The modes so differentiated are distinguished by the fact that they avowedly are linked to the levels and structures of civilizational process, civilizational complexes, and inter-civilizational relations.

We then proceed to:

(3) Indicate why we favor two of the four more recent ways of identifying research aims and methods in this area. Our sense is that the safest way to protect ourselves from committing excesses too often linked by unsympathetic scholars to the names of Spengler and Toynbee who have engaged in direct comparison of “whole civilizations” is by intensive efforts in the third and fourth indirect—rather than direct—modes of analysis.

Our third and fourth modes we may associate with such men as Sir Henry Sumner Maine, Max Weber, Marcel Mauss, and a number of more recent writers, notably Joseph Needham.

Our essay closes with a delineation of what we describe as the civilization-analytic perspective, which is most fruitfully applied in researches at the highest level of contemporary efforts in the seventh and eighth Horizon-Approaches.

II.

As we have just remarked, the main distinctions in the so-called “comparative approaches” refer to eight horizons and divide into two main groups:

(A) Those directed to the study of “societies” and “cultures”, and
(B) Those directed more properly to the study of “civilizations.”

¹ As editor, I have omitted much of the underlining, check markings, and printer’s symbols in the original version. These are used in so chaotic a fashion as to render reading the article more difficult and were clearly not intended for a final publication.
Speaking first of “societies” and “cultures”, we may distinguish:
(1) The comparative study of total societies as social systems – [a]
(2) The comparative study of analogous institutions of total societies in the social-system perspective – [b]
(3) The study of cultural patterns or “culture-personality” profiles as wholes – [c]
(4) The transcultural study of specific cultural processes and effects – [d]

The four horizons which relate to “civilizations” may be described as follows:
(5) The directly comparative study of so-called civilizations as wholes – [e]
(6) The “comparative” survey of all civilizations for the purpose of establishing irreversible directionalities of development – [f]
(7) The comparative study of institutions and “symbolic designs” against the backgrounds of determinate civilizational settings – [g]
(8) The comparative study of the histories, sociologies, psychologies of civilizational complexes and processes as these are perceived and work in the settings of inter-civilizational relations and encounters – [h]

We shall contend below that the work currently available has contributed greatly to the emergence of what we shall be calling a civilization-analytic perspective.

III.

The first four modes listed above under “Societies” and “Cultures” are often cited as the only promising “hard-scientific” methods for carrying out comparative studies. They do not deserve to be so considered. Our reasons are as follows:

- **Horizon-Approaches** I and II seem to share two limitations:

  (1) They are too closely tied to the social-system perspective to allow full access to the comparative historical and sociological frameworks which are developed in this essay; and
  (2) This last limitation seems regularly to lead to the comparison and attempted measurement of incommensurables.

- **Horizon-Approaches** III and IV also fall short of constituting a civilizational-analytic investigation in our sense. Theory and research in these modes rarely encourage resort to the flexible contentualism (*sic*) of a comparative historical sociology.
Horizon-Approach III: This only too often allows itself to fall into a non-systematic comparison of cultural structures at very different phases in their processual careers as reared in very different social and cultural foundations.

Ruth Benedict’s work is an eloquent evocation of different configurations of so-called patterns of cultures of personalities but her notable efforts fall short of meeting the requirements of contemporary anthropologists or historical sociologists.

Margaret Mead’s work too often lends itself to excesses in its stresses on the primacy of infant-rearing practices, such as swaddling techniques, in the civilizational histories of different areas.

In point of fact, it hardly matters with what apparent thoroughness comparisons in this manner are done. They would fall short of our basic requirements so long as they failed to include the perspectives of a comparative historical sociology.

Horizon-Approach IV: this often has resulted in many excellent studies which have carefully built upon the models and results found in the Human Relations Area Files. Other instances of this approach will be found in the work in Trans-Cultural Psychiatry. Two flaws recur in many works in this vein:

(1) Insufficient attention is paid to the background-foreground relations in the comparisons.
(2) Only too often the comparisons assume what some have called “trait atomism” and an assumption that forms currently dominant in the United States or other corners of rationalized civilization represent the universally warranted form of expression of the trait involved.

It must, however, be acknowledged that many fine studies have been done in this mode.

Horizon-Approach V: The direct form of comparing “Civilizations as Wholes” is the one most familiar to us in the works of many writers of renown, such as Danilevsky, Spengler, and Toynbee.

Who would deny that the direct comparisons of the souls or essences of civilizations only too often allow impressionistic ethnocentric comparisons of loosely-defined entities or structures?

If truly scientific work is to be advanced under this head, great advances shall need to occur in our theoretical understandings, styles of research, and command of our skills and resources.
To promote these desired outcomes, we make recourse to indirect strategies – as well as the apparently direct ones – for studying “civilizations” and “civilizational complexes,” inter-civilizational complexes, and so on.

Horizon-Approach VI: The comparison of civilizations for the purpose of identifying the irreversible directionalities of development goes back a long way.

It has its origin in the ancient images of the succession of monarchies and empires, reappears in the medieval and early modern times, and more recently recurs in more scientific guise. At times the proofs have been climatological, as in the view of Huntington that the course of progress has been coldward (sic).

More recently this Horizon-Approach has been developing in a neo-evolutionist direction and has been given full expression in the language of systems theory. Other forms of expressing this outlook have centered in a sort of technological determinism (originally typed as “determism”).

Whatever the form, however the varieties, of this approach, they all fail to offer approaches to the comparative study of civilizations. The most subtle type of this sort of analysis has recently been put forward by Talcott Parsons in his discussions of the system of states of societies.

Horizon-Approach VII: The comparative study of institutions and “symbolic designs” against the background of determinate civilizational settings has been the approach most favored by contemporary master historians, historical sociologists, anthropologists and others who have wished to have firm grounding in a determinate civilizational setting while they are carrying on comparative analysis.

Up until now the most impressive studies in this mode have tended to be holistic and configurational rather than oriented to specific comparisons of specific institutional or symbolic frameworks.

[Among the best studies of this holistic sort one would need to mention the following authors who have centered on the civilizational structures described below:

[A. Chaudhuri, B. Cohn, L. Dumont, L. and S. Rudolph, N. Srinivas for India;  
[In the same spirit, I must here limit myself to a selected number of names and works which help us find our way to the understanding of “Western Civilization” in the medieval and modern eras.

[The following may prove especially helpful to researchers in these areas:


There is reason to believe that a newer sort of work centering in intensive in-depth studies of institutions and symbolic designs is now coming to the fore.

Major forerunners in this field have been Sir Henry Sumner Maine, Max Weber and Marcel Mauss. In our own time one can point to the recent work of I. M. Lapidus on Moslem cities and A. Bozeman on comparative politics and law – and so on.

Horizon-Approach VIII offers us particularly valuable horizons for relating to actual cases of inter-civilizational relations and encounters. It is only as we see the civilizational complexes in the crucibles of intercultural process that we can perceive the distinctive thrusts and patternings of different civilizational and societal structures.

Exceptionally powerful results have developed in the course of exploring questions arising in the study of civilizational encounters in the era of the Crusades, Hellenistic world, the 16th and 17th centuries, and our own times of abrasive civilizational conjunctions.

Wonderful work has been done in this vein by outstanding scholars of inter-civilizational relations. Among such works one would mention the following: Edwin Hatch, C. N. Cochrane, G. von Grünbaum, A. H. Gibb, R. Kopf. Perhaps the most outstanding achievements have been the works of two men especially devoted to the study of China: the too-soon-departed Joseph Levenson and the ever-active Joseph Needham.

There are a host of special questions which can only be gotten at through asking questions which challenge us at the very roots, questions such as those put by Max Weber in his “Author’s Introduction” (1920) and Needham in his Science and Civilization in China and The Grand Titration.

Our reasons for preferring Horizons VII and VIII shall be given in our next two sections. [Here the manuscript ends.

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2 The typed material italicized above was crossed out in the copy from the archives, but I believe that the listing is valuable for an insight into the orientation of the authors and so this section has been retained here. (J. Drew, ed.)
This brief reflective paper, resting quietly in obscurity for over four decades now in the archives of our society housed at Dickinson College, Pennsylvania, was prepared originally to be presented as part of a 1972 panel discussion entitled "Civilizations as Systems." However, in the notes it is indicated that the results of that conference in part informed the writing of the paper. Further, the author noted that he had not given the paper “because of a shortage of time.”

It was written by the late Dr. Matthew Melko. Dr. Melko went on to become one of America’s most distinguished students of the comparative study of civilizations, a well-respected author and professor, and, ultimately, a much-beloved President of the ISCSC. At the time of the paper’s writing he was a young faculty member at State University College, Geneseo, New York (now, the State University of New York at Geneseo).

The paper addresses a model of looking at the history of civilization developed by another legendary scholar and professor, Carroll Quigley of Georgetown University. It also alludes to what was then an emerging intellectual division amongst those scholars interested in understanding, analyzing and explaining the broad trends and meaning of civilizations in history. Some, in America and abroad, now saw themselves as comparative civilizationalists, while others viewed themselves as scholars of “general systems.”

As a result, the seventies saw the beginning of a rise to importance of “world systems” theorists. These scholars have included such distinguished figures as Immanuel Wallerstein, Andre Gunder Frank, Christopher Chase-Dunn, and Thomas D. Hall. They are not far away in intellectual orientation from comparative civilizationalists, that is, from those theorists who are inspired principally by the points of view or methods of Ibn Khaldun, Toynbee, Sorokin, Spengler and others, who were organized as the result of a meeting sponsored by UNESCO and held in Salzburg, Austria, in 1961, and who were brought together as a permanent entity following the 1961 conference. Indeed, many of the “world system” thinkers have attended, and spoken at, meetings of the ISCSC.

Yet, as with all disciplines, although both groups are interested in much the same material, there remains a difference, however small, between their perspectives. Here, an attempt was made by Dr. Melko to see the two schools of thought as two boats – not racing but sailing together – in the same waters, heading in the same direction, with the difference being that perhaps one, the comparative study of civilizations, had been there a bit longer.
The panel for which Dr. Melko wrote this essay was to be a centerpiece of the Annual Conference of what was by then known as the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations (United States), in 1972. The Annual Conference was planned to be conducted as a part of the mammoth American Association for the Advancement of Science meeting in Washington, which, history records, ran from December 26 to December 31, 1972. Whether the panel actually was ever held is not known to this editor.

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The original idea of this paper was to analyze the civilization as a system. In what ways is it a typical general system, in what ways a typical social system, and in what ways is it anomalous? In order to attempt this (project), it was necessary to take a model of civilizations that is presented crisply and clearly, and that deals with civilizations as recurring phenomena in the tradition of Spengler and Toynbee.

One such model is that presented by Carroll Quigley in the fifth chapter of *The Evolution of Civilizations*. Then, on short notice, the problem came to me, I had to modify it. I am not qualified to evaluate a social model from a general systems perspective, although superficially Quigley's model does not appear to describe a very effective system: lines of authority are nebulous, communications erratic, functions poorly defined -- all in all an overgrown, inefficient sort of specimen.

But looking from a social systems perspective, the original question loses much of its meaning. It is almost impossible to discuss anomalies because Quigley's civilizations model is a social systems model. There is nothing in general systems to compare it to, and no amalgam of Buckley, Berrian, Monane, Deutsch or Theodore Mills can produce anything so useful to the study of social systems. With some slight modification of terminology, Quigley's civilization model can be applied to social systems almost as it is. Consider it as if it were a systems model: the system forms around an unexplained secret ingredient called “culture.” It is this ingredient that gives each system its unique characteristics.

The new system emerges in an area in which there is a mixture of other cultures, often in an area in which two or more interact, but where no one culture is dominant. Usually the new system emerges in a different territory from its predecessors, because the ways of old societies are too strongly established. Whatever happens in them must happen in ways that do not violate established customs and mores.

If the new system is to grow, it must have an instrument of expansion. This instrument may take several forms, but it must encourage and permit the utilization of invention. If this happens, expansion follows, characterized by more stuff, more people, more territory, more knowledge, and more invention.
Ultimately the instrument of expansion becomes an institution, more concerned with its own perpetuation than the further development of the system. When that happens there follows a period of conflict, characterized by decreasing expansion and increasing tension, violence, irrationality and other-worldliness.

The period of conflict may be resolved either by reforming the institution so that it will work as an instrument again or by circumventing it and creating a new instrument. If neither of these resolutions takes place, the system enters a golden age for those who control it, for they have won out and can live off their past successes.

But there is no more vitality in such a system, and eventually it decays, despite all kinds of efforts by members to hold it together by changing the rules, altering procedures, or replacing leadership.

This situation is finally resolved, not from the inside, but from the outside; a new mixture takes place, and out of this mixture perhaps a new system with a new culture will be born. This sequence of mysterious origin, development, conflict, reform or dominance of vested interests, decay and external intervention is the basic model for the study of social systems. It is not one of several competing models, it is already the accepted model in social science. All sorts of social systems, including those primarily expressed in aesthetic patterns, share concerns, have “mysterious periods of origin, rapidly increasing and then decelerating development” crisis periods that are resolved by reform, circumvention, or triumph of the establishment, eventual decay, and replacement by external patterns.

The success of this pattern-phase approach has opened up so many promising areas of research that we are devoting ourselves less to debating its validity and more to its modification and applications. In the study of civilizations, the forties and fifties were characterized by repeated and seemingly divisive attacks on Spengler, Toynbee and Sorokin, but by the end of the 1960's Rushton Coulborn, in one of his last published articles, pointed out that the study of comparative civilizations appears to have entered a normal phase of its paradigm. He was applying, as so many others have this past decade, Thomas Kuhn's approach to scientific paradigms. For Kuhn's work, as C. P. Wolf has observed at a recent general systems conference, has become the “paradigm paradigm.”

Now it is interesting that Quigley published in 1961 and Kuhn in 1962, for it is probable that neither had read nor heard of the other, a common experience in history when a new pattern is emerging. For Quigley's model and Kuhn's correspond closely, even though they are writing about totally different subjects. Kuhn could easily be interpreted in terms of mixture, development, conflict, decay and re-mixture. Kuhn's work has received greater attention, possibly, because it may be more readily applied to specific social movements, as Coulborn has applied it to the study of civilizations.
But Quigley's approach seems to be right at the heart of the study of holistic systems, which is why it provides a better model for the study of social systems at all levels than either Kuhn or various studies of social systems that have attempted to apply general systems theory. It is easy to place the main development of the phase-pattern approach in the study of civilizations. Spengler provided the first widely read model, although he too had his predecessors. Sorokin, I think, gave impetus and respectability to the idea of alternating normal and crisis periods. But A.L. Kroeger made the most significant contribution in pointing out how social development was limited by style-patterns. What Quigley has done is to show us how these patterns apply to total systems. (Kuhn, by contrast, has given us an appealing special case that we are now wildly applying in all directions, which demonstrates, as Kroeber suggested, that style-patterns have ubiquitous applicability.)

While this theory has been developed over a period of time, and modified by spirited opposition, civilizations theory has been blessed by a series of writers who could communicate powerfully across disciplines. General systems theorists, by contrast, have had to work from natural systems theory compounded by the developing of cybernetics. They have had to apply natural science theories and terminology to social systems, and they have had to express themselves through a system of notational expression that is highly efficient if you can understand it, but which does not communicate so effectively to a general audience.

When, under the stress of this situation, they have had to fall back on the English language, they seem to be a bit out of practice. What they do communicate often constitutes the elements for a system without the connecting, testable element of a theory.

And, coming out of natural science, the secret ingredient, culture, is still missing. Small wonder, then, that the most recent meeting of the Northeastern Division of the Society for General Systems Research (Geneseo, September 1972) was largely devoted to discussion of methodological approaches that might be taken when someone wants to approach something and the means of communication to be employed when there is something to communicate (Ed.: language missing here) rather than to the presentation and modification of working models.

It would be ungracious, certainly, to appear to be initiating a conflict between students of general systems and students of civilizations, especially since many, including Quigley, are involved in both areas. I think of sailboats coming around a buoy, not in a race, but sailing together in a fleet. With The Evolution of Civilizations, the civilizations boat came about and is sailing a fair wind on the next leg. The newer general systems boat is among those just reaching the buoy, feeling the crisis of the cross wind, and preparing to come about and follow the others into another phase of clear sailing. Both are good boats manned by capable, earnest, hard-working crews.
But since the civilizations boat has come about, it provides a model that would be useful to
the crew of the general systems boat. And while the crew of the civilizations boat may
watch with interest and empathy the struggles of the general systems boat, it may be that
there is not much they can learn that will be useful to them in solving the problems of
normal sailing they are now encountering.

Notes

The Idea of a General Systems Analysis of a Civilizations Model
Despite the argument of this paper, which of course many will not accept, this still should
be done. T. Downing Bowler of Bradford College was to have attempted the analysis, but
he was unable to attend the AAAS conference in Washington.

Quigley's Model
See the section of the model described that appears on Pages 78-93 of *The Evolution of
Civilizations* (Macmillan, 1961). The papers Quigley presented at the 1972 AAAS
conference were all modifications and developments of the 1961 model. He is practicing
normal science himself. (Ed.: Note that, apparently, Dr. Melko was commenting here in
hindsight.)

The Nature of Culture
If we could discover why a particular pattern takes the form it does, we would have the key
to the nature of culture. The question of why patterns form this way rather than that way
remains unanswered. "For one reason or another," Kroeber said somewhere.

The Replacement of Leadership During Decay
A minister was pressed to submit his resignation recently by trustees who recognized that
general declining church attendance was a phenomenon for which he was not responsible.
But, as one of them explained, "if your team isn't winning, you fire the manager."

Rushton Coulborn on the Civilizations Paradigm
"A Paradigm for Comparative History?" *Current Anthropology*, (X: 2-3)
175-178.

Thomas Kuhn
*The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, University of Chicago Press, 1962. The title refers
to the period of decay and origin, but actually Kuhn, like Quigley, concentrates primarily
on the "normal" period of expansion and conflict.

Kroeber's Conception of Style-Patterns
Developed in *Anthropology*, Harcourt, Brace, 1923, 1948 and (in)
*Configurations of Culture Growth*, University of California Press, 1944.
The Style of Kroeber and Kuhn

Has the Model Been Tested?
This paper was not actually presented at the AAAS session because of a shortage of time. The title was challenged however, on the ground that Quigley’s theory had not been tested sufficiently to be called a model, but the point here is that the theory in its present form contains the main elements of a set of theories that we are currently testing in many ways. This is why it can be perceived as the model model.
Civilization as Self-Determination: Interpreting R. G. Collingwood for the Twenty-First Century – Part I

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Abstract

This article – the first of two – elaborates and endorses the understanding of civilization as advanced by R. G. Collingwood. Particular attention is given to two of his most neglected works, The New Leviathan and "What 'Civilization' Means." The New Leviathan in particular was written in the context of the rise of fascism and the prosecution of World War II. To support the war effort, Collingwood reconceptualized notions of civilization and linked it to a rationality of self-determination. Central to his argument are the distinctions he draws between civilization and barbarism, on the one hand, and between social, economic and legal civilization and their protean interrelationships, on the other.

The second of the two articles analyzes how Collingwood defined the nature and role of force in human relations, both within and among polities. He ultimately advocates a notion of progress that is shorn of utopianism and determinism and is focused on self-determination. This Collingwoodian paradigm provides a unique perspective on the overlaps and antagonisms between Mohandas (Mahatma) Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru's understandings of Indian civilization – understandings of India they developed in the same years as Collingwood developed his arguments.

Civilization and Its Contents

It is perhaps not surprising that how academics invoke "civilization" is often different from how it is invoked in other arenas of discourse. Scholars have, over time, pluralized the idea, so one hears of Western civilization and Egyptian civilization and modern civilization and ancient civilization, and without any overt presumption that one is, or some are, superior to others, or that one is obviously appealing and acceptable and the other(s) repugnant and to be rejected.

Interestingly, Samuel Huntington's famous "clash of civilizations" and its putative counterpoint, Francis Fukuyama's "end of history," both suggest, each in its own way, that civilizations can be evaluated as better or worse. But neither constructs his arguments in explicit relation to a term that scholars once proudly propagated, and which is part of the reservoir of popular, political and public discourse: barbarism.¹

¹ The idea of civilization is less explicit in Fukuyama than in Huntington but not, therefore, less pivotal in his analysis; writing at around the same time, in 1990, V. S. Naipaul is more explicit that a civilizational argument...
In contemporary times scholars have, on the whole, eschewed an understanding of civilization that puts it in relation to the contrary term, barbarism. The relation between civilization and barbarism has varied in academia. One species sees the relation as a dichotomy: all societies can be understood as either entirely civilized or entirely barbaric. According to this view, a society could not and cannot be "almost entirely civilized, but a bit barbaric" or vice versa, any more than a person can be, in how we use our language, a little bit pregnant; one either is, or is not. Moreover, each is the opposite of the other.

Another species puts barbarism at one end of a continuum with civilization at the other end, with all societies placed somewhere along the scale. In nineteenth century Western thought, this idea was accompanied by evolutionism. Where a society was placed on the continuum was an indication of how much it had evolved. How evolution was defined and measured varied. For some it was gauged by mastery over nature in the form of science and technology (Morgan, Raglan); for others, spiritual maturity (Tylor, Toynbee), rationality (Kant), aesthetics (Schiller), manners (Elias, Spalding), fitness (Spencer) or complexity (Toynbee). For some (Spengler, Targowski) this evolution was and is more appropriately understood as a decline, though Oswald Spengler's thinking later emerged in debates about the growth as well at the decline of civilizations.²

Yet ultimately popular and public discourse reminds us of what scholars taught – and what I suspect scholars may still maintain, albeit in muted form – namely, that civilization is often understood in relation to its putatively contrary term, barbarism. Particularly in the wake of shocking actions by humans in relation to other humans, such as terrorist attacks or torture, the discourse of barbarism seems to come out of the civilization's shadow and into public light.³ The distinction proliferates in both its Manichean and evolutionist modes – sending must drive an end-of-history one, an argument he does not critique but endorses. Conversely, the sense of inexorable progress found in Fukuyama and Naipaul is more muted in Huntington than in Fukuyama, but present just the same – and indeed elaborated, I would argue, in Huntington's later work, as reflected in particular in his fear of immigration from the Americas to the United States of America (Huntington 2004). Erich Kolig (2015) echoes Huntington's worries about immigration when he asks, essentially, how much the West can tolerate Muslim immigrants. He broadly and ultimately sees the West as "modern", "enlightened", "progressive", "liberal", "tolerant", "secular", the home of "human rights" and of "religious and cultural freedom" – which is in stark contrast to Islam's exceptional inclination towards a "theocentric world view" that demands adherence to a "total way of life." Kolig worries that the immigration of Muslims to the West could lead to "social disintegration." He rebukes those who espouse a capacious pluralism: "[c]elebrating diversity and avoiding moral judgment is very New Age and post-modernist, but lacks in practical reason." Noting that some states are adopting increasingly strict immigration regimes he states "[s]ome spectacular cases of maladjustment of Muslims have encouraged a revision of rules relating to immigration and asylum seekers". See Kolig 2015.

² We should bear in mind that decline should not be equated with devolution, and neither with what will be referred to below as "de-civilizing" processes. The notion of civilization has also often been counterpoised to "savage" and "primitive"; this will not be addressed in either Part I or II of this project. But it may be noted that, though the term savage has been invoked, primitive has not in the contexts discussed here.

³ I use "public" in the sense of Jürgen Habermas's "public sphere"; see his 1989 work, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, Cambridge,
scholars scattering: protesting, endorsing, or willfully ignoring the idea of barbarism. Among those particularly discomfited are my fellow socio-cultural anthropologists, who developed the notion of culture in significant measure to displace the idea of civilization, as well as those of barbarism, savagery and the primitive.4

In the new millennium, in the West, the comparison of civilization with barbarism re-emerged forcefully after the attacks on the U.S. in September 2001 (9/11). In this context President George W. Bush declared to the United Nations that the attack had not been against the United States, but against civilization itself and a civilization shared by, presumably, those in the audience. The comparison emerged even more forcefully in 2015 with the attacks in Paris, first on the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo in January and then at a number of sites in November. The attacks in Paris, the City of Light and the Enlightenment, colored the distinction between civilization and barbarism with a particular hue, the light of freedom and progress versus that of darkness and destruction.5 These attacks, and attendant concerns about terrorism, migration and challenges to one's "way of life" appear to have animated those who voted for the UK to leave the EU, i.e., the Brexit referendum.6

What follows below is the first (Part I) of two articles that will excavate and interpret R. G. Collingwood's arguments about what civilization and barbarism meant to him. He speaks to these in The New Leviathan or Man, Society, Civilization and Barbarism (1942) and in his "What 'Civilization' Means," which the editors of the 1992 reprint of The New Leviathan

Massachusetts: The MIT Press, see pages 30-31. See also Habermas 1992. I would also add that the worlds of intellectuals and others are never hermetically sealed from each other.

4 For Huntington, however, civilization is not in contradistinction to culture but, rather, seems to mean culture-writ-large: “A civilization is the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species” (1993, p. 24, emphases added). For him culture, in turn, seems to be informed primarily by religion. In all this, what is most notable is that he is moving away from the long-standing position that human history is the history of rationality, whether technological or political, inductive or deductive. His use of culture – civilization as culture – is thus ironically akin to those socio-cultural anthropologists who implicitly or otherwise distill the essence of culture as something that is not rational.

5 That innocents, not soldiers or combatants, were targeted raises an interesting problem: The French Revolution(s) propounded the idea that governments could act only if authorized to do so by the will of the people, which in some way perhaps confounds the distinctions, moral and otherwise, between, e.g., a country's military and its citizens, as well as issues of wars as unavoidable defense versus those of choice. These are far too fraught and complicated a set of topics to be addressed here.

6 Defending a "way of life" is a phrase and concern Collingwood also invokes. Since this article was written there have been what appear to be other events inspired by radical and violent individuals and groups who associate themselves with Islam: the attacks at the Belgium airport, at a Florida nightclub, on Bastille Day in France (a day given unique significance in French and indeed Western history), in Istanbul, in Bangladesh, in Saudi Arabia and in Afghanistan. Interestingly, the Istanbul, Bangladesh, Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan attacks did not generate the civilization versus barbarism distinction to the extent as in the other attacks. In addition, the idea that there were fatalities and injuries to innocents (see footnote 5) was less pronounced in the latter. Is this because the distinction lost force over time – and if so, why? Or is it because when a Muslim majority population is attacked in the name of Islam, the line between civilization and barbarism is seen, somehow, as less bright?
added as an appendix (pp. 480-511). Both elaborate on the issues of barbarism and are – probably for this very reason – among the most neglected of Collingwood's writings.

Collingwood (1889-1943) was Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy at Magdalen College, Oxford University, from 1936 until his death. Among the most learned men of his time, he is best known for his writings on history, logic and art, as well as his work as a practicing archaeologist of the Roman Empire. Yet in his 1939 autobiography one can discern that his thinking on issues of civilization had informed almost all of his work, including what may seem like abstruse and unrelated philosophical arguments. For example, he saw the philosophical school of realism, which was emerging as a dominant paradigm in key philosophical circles in the years leading up to World War II, as a threat to civilization, insofar as he saw realism as undermining much of philosophy itself, including moral philosophy.

*The New Leviathan* (1942) is a remarkably provocative and, at times, mordantly witty tome. It is subtitled "Man, Society, Civilization, and Barbarism," and these correspond to the four parts into which the book is divided. This organization parallels the sections of Hobbes's original *Leviathan*, "Man, Society, Commonwealth, Kingdom of Darkness," as published in 1651. Both *Leviathans* were written in times of rapid change – making them, in broad terms, all the more relevant today. In Collingwood's case, he saw his work explicitly as a contribution to the war effort, i.e., against fascism. Collingwood supported the war and, in that context, saved some of his harshest criticism for British pacifists. He found fascism to be a form of barbarism, and turned to Hobbes to understand how barbarism could arise in the midst, as it seemed to him, of civilization.

Collingwood was an ardent, though critical, admirer of Hobbes. Like Hobbes, Collingwood grounded his theories of ethics and politics in a philosophy of mind and the bases of rational activity. My initial aim for this article was to fully excavate Collingwood on civilization and barbarism. However, I quickly realized that an examination of his understanding of mind and consciousness – and, in particular, intentional action – must be presented first because his arguments about self-determination, rationality, civilization and barbarism each and all have, as their edifice, his understanding of how consciousness evolves in the mind. His approach is one that resonates with actor-centered models in social and cultural analysis.

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7 For example, Collingwood appreciated Hobbes's insight that human activity is collective and consensual, a conjoining of wills oriented towards some goal; from such an understanding of human collective activity – which can, in key regards, be characterized as social contract theory – one can see how collective activity could also come unraveled and, at worst, work against itself. However, Collingwood disagreed with Hobbes's argument that human nature was one of pure self-maximization and thus the only reason collectivities came into existence was to further the individual interests of its members. Hobbes's view of human nature led him to endorse absolutism. Collingwood's revision of Hobbes led him to liberal democracy.
Collingwood defines the process of civilization as the “asymptotic approximation to the ideal condition of civility.” Full and complete civility is a utopian ideal and, in that sense, can never be fully realized. Collingwood understands civilization to have three dimensions: social civilization, economic civilization and legal civilization. The first, social civilization, concerns how humans relate to other humans, i.e., relationships between members of a polity and between different polities. It is this dimension that is, I will argue, the most important for Collingwood, for practical, ethical and theoretical reasons. The second aspect, economic civilization, pertains to how humans relate to nature, where the advancement of science is a crucial gauge, especially insofar as science allows for greater efficiency in productive enterprises that harness the resources of nature. Economic civilization also includes an aspect that requires that humans relate to other humans.

For Collingwood, technological innovation and scientific production is not co-extensive with civilization: even a polity with civilized production and civilized exchange – thus an economically civilized collectivity – may lack in social civilization, which, for him, trumps all other dimensions of civilization. He maintains this on the grounds that civilization is relative to a polity’s particular definition of civility and barbarism, which implies that polities cannot be judged as points on a single continuum, but rather must be understood as each polity follows its own (always multidimensional) trajectory of civilization. Given this approach, a polity is only less civilized than another if it shares the same or similar ideals, or goals, of civility, but has realized these ideals to a lesser degree. It should be noted though that Collingwood is not a cultural relativist, as suggested by his rebuke of pacifism noted above; this will be elaborated in Part II but, for now, we may observe that his position in this regard pivots on the role that force or, conversely, consent, is allowed to play in how ideals and goals come to be recognized and then realized. At the heart of his notion of social civilization is the conviction that dialogue and persuasion are to be pursued over force as much as possible; the attempt to entirely eliminate all forms of force from all social relations, including relationships between polities, is however utopian, i.e., unachievable. This principle is also integral to his critique of cultural relativism.

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9 Accordingly, as we will see in Part II, Collingwood draws an important distinction between "wealth" and "riches" in order to locate the appropriate place of free markets in civilizational pursuits. It also allows us to reconsider how factors such as public works, monumental architecture, occupational specialization and state administration (including considerations of "core" versus "periphery") should be understood in relation to the idea of civilization.

10 Norbert Elias suggests that civilization is intertwined with how different figurations of power, and of power in the form of violence in particular, changes over time, and gives attention to seemingly disparate areas of social life as manners and the state. However, he seems to have remained blinkered by his mentor Alfred Weber (the brother of Max Weber) in not seeing civilization as multidimensional in a robust sense. Elias's position does not allow for as much flexibility and contingency as Collingwood does among the different dimensions. See both Elias 2012 and Mennell & Goudsblom 1998.

11 As will be shown in Part II, the use of force versus dialogue is one criterion, for Collingwood, for judging how well the three dimensions of civilization discussed above – social, economic and legal – are integrated. Also to be elaborated in Part II is his important argument that though utopian ideals such as full civility on all occasions are unachievable, this does not mean that, for example, universal civility should not orient our
The third dimension of civilization, legal civilization, recognizes the importance of law. This can take myriad forms, including civil and criminal law. Cross-culturally, legal civilization refers to the fact that persons and peoples set up something we can call "rules." Although Collingwood does not say so explicitly, rules are not the same as norms, habits and routines – though rules can intersect with any of these. Rules are expressed explicitly and come with the sense that there are persons or institutions that have the recognized role of codifying and adjudicating them.

Collingwood’s gauge of civilization is, accordingly, how these three dimensions of human life (social, economic and legal) are interrelated or 'articulated' each with the other. His concern in the first instance is how these dimensions are related consciously and intentionally by human actors, individual or collective, in different times, places and cultures. However, it is also crucial, for Collingwood, to know what the actual effects of such interrelations are. As discussed below, he finds "civilization" also in the interrelationships between what he calls "social community" and "non-social community." In this unique paradigm, civilization has three aspects, and the civilizing process involves the on-going project of better interrelating these aspects. Insofar, and on those occasions, when a collectivity fails to recognize the difference between these aspects – for all collectivities have them – or fails to properly inter-relate, or integrate, them, such a collectivity can be seen as uncivilized. Insofar as collectivities actively seek to hide the distinctions between these dimensions, and actively work against their constructive interrelation, such activity can be called barbaric, de-civilizing. As will be elaborated in the subsequent article (Part II) it is through this model that Collingwood provides, in my view, a unique model for assessing and comparing the work of Mohandas (Mahatma) Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru on civilization in India.

Collingwood on Action and Agency

For Collingwood, a polity is civilized, or civilizing, to the extent that it promotes self-determination within itself – including both individuals and sub-groups – and also among diverse polities. Self-determination, in turn, is founded on the ability to choose and to act freely, that is, with agency. But what counts as agency? And what if – as is too often the case – one individual's or polity's choices are counter to those of others?

civilizational pursuits. It is in this sense that Collingwood suggests that some notion of universal civilization is defensible – not as a material achievement (buildings or banking systems) or high-cultural ones (ballets or ragas) but a vigilant attitude and aspiration with regard to intra-human relations, and how these relations intersect with other relations (such as the relations and means of production).


13 For example, Collingwood and Gandhi seem to share the understanding that civilization is a process (like "socialization") – and, moreover, an incremental process. The most striking difference between the two is with regard to economic civilization: from a Collingwoodian perspective, Gandhi did not fully grasp the economic dimension of Indian civilization, and thus could not interrelate it with the other dimensions in a sustainable manner. Elias (2012) also saw the civilizing process as incremental, but underscored that de-civilizing processes could occur much more rapidly. These matters will be examined in Part II of this project.
Collingwood's approach to civilization is founded upon his convictions about human agency, i.e., his understanding of human consciousness and human action, with particular attention to action that is explicitly intentional and, to that extent, rational. For him, the essence of self-determination is being able to freely act to shape one's life. Yet this immediately raises questions such as "what counts as an action?" and "how does free choice play out in a world where there are others?" Below, I will present an outline of the fundamental understanding of human nature and human being that underpins Collingwood's answers to these questions, and which underwrites his advocacy for civilization. I select those aspects of The New Leviathan that are most relevant to the broader discussion of what I will call "civilizing action" and "barbarizing action" – matters that will receive more attention in Part II of this project.

Collingwood's New Leviathan follows the format of Hobbes's Leviathan in that it is enumerated and organized with sub-points, etc. When citing Collingwood, I will use this format, with brackets. The discussion below draws exclusively on Part I of The New Leviathan, "On Man."14

Discourse is the activity by which a man seeks to mean anything, such as through the production of a flow of sounds and silences [NL, 6.1, 6.19]. Note that discourse is not a tool but an activity. It is not a thing but an “-ing”; not a hammer, but hammering.

Language is an abstraction from discourse: it is the system adopted, the means employed, the rules followed in the activity of discourse. It is a system of discourse taken as having meaning. Language is not a device whereby knowledge already existing in one man's mind is communicated to another's, but an activity prior to knowledge itself, without which knowledge could never come into existence. As consciousness develops, language develops with it [6.11, 6.18, 6.41]. For Collingwood, the recognition that language precedes thought is one of Hobbes's greatest contributions [6.43].

Language in its simplest form is the language of consciousness in its simplest form; the mere register of feelings, irrational, unplanned, unorganized – what we may, at some risk, call sensation or experience. At this level of consciousness thought is merely apprehensive, or capable of taking what is "given" to it [6.58, 10.51]. When consciousness becomes conceptual thought, language is used to develop abstract terms. Here consciousness is capable of abstracting from what is given [6.12, 6.17, 6.58]. When consciousness becomes propositional thought, language develops the propositional sentence. Here consciousness begins to distinguish truth from error [6.59, 10.51].

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14 Although the formal mathematical layout of the New Leviathan parallels that of Hobbes's Leviathan, David Boucher – a scholar who specializes in the links between British idealism and liberalism – argues that Collingwood follows the Bible instead. (Boucher 2003, pages 68 and 84).
When consciousness becomes reason, language begins to link one propositional sentence with another so as to demonstrate that the later statements are consequences of the former. At this level of consciousness the agent is capable of understanding himself also in relation to other things [6.59, 10.51].

Conceptual thinking is an act of practical consciousness by which a person emerges from a simple state of feeling. Persons make themselves conscious of their sensations and feelings by naming them either by gesture (e.g., a shiver) or in speech (e.g., saying "I'm cold") [6.2, 6.28]. With selective attention a person can focus on and name a particular feeling from amongst a mass of feelings. This selective attention changes both the person attending and the object attended to (the particular feeling selected out for attention) because it changes the nature of the "field" of feeling [7.23, 7.24]. The act of classifying is a practical activity of consciousness which "draws the line" between various (selected) "objects" in the field of feeling, e.g. the point at which one decides to stop calling a color red and start calling it purple.

Thus all classes, i.e., cognitive classifications and categories, are founded in practical activity on the part of the individual and are negotiated in the mutual practical activity of various individuals. The members of a class become so through their resemblance, a resemblance of both kind and degree, which is determined (established) through practical consciousness [19.22-19.35]. This point will be central in Collingwood's reformulation of the notion of "society" and, in turn, of "civilization" and "barbarism."

Propositional consciousness involves the asking and answering of questions. Asking a question implies contemplating alternatives [11.12]. Let's say a person is conscious of certain objects (x, y and z), and then has a consciousness of that initial consciousness. The latter consciousness makes the initial consciousness a first order object [5.26]. A proposition is never about such a first order object [11.34] but about a concept [11.35]. Because propositions are about concepts, any proposition may be mistaken and hence it is contestable [11.35] – which means it can be reassessed and re-proposed.

Here I would like to point out that these various levels of consciousness are closely connected with Collingwood's notion of rational action and of agency – and the difference between the two. Pretty much any level of consciousness can be associated with action. If I stub my toe and say "ouch," that is an action. If I act on an appetite or a desire, that is certainly also an action. But agency is a particular form of action that requires a particular form of consciousness. Indeed, if consciousness is always more or less some sort of activity (for body and mind are not disjoined), it is in agency that consciousness and action come together utterly. There are different forms of action that accompany different forms of consciousness. They not only differ in kind but also in degree. There is, then, some measure of agency in all action. Yet agency exists unquestionably when action is exercised with the consciousness of choice [cf. section 13 of part I, emphasis added].
Consciousness of choice has two preconditions. First, choice entails reflective thought. Reflective thought requires the movement to a "higher" level of consciousness from a "lower" level of consciousness (for no form of consciousness is aware of itself as a form of consciousness). Thus if one is merely acting on the basis of the "desire" level of consciousness, one is not reflecting on that desire. As one moves through higher and higher levels of consciousness (through making the previous level of consciousness the object of the subsequent level) one becomes increasingly reflective, or, more precisely, one has something to be reflective "about." When this reflective action is the outcome of deliberation within a society, no fundamentalist position can be posited as such, i.e., as stable. Through the process of the collective conscious refinement, desires, feelings and emotions are not disavowed, rather they are elaborated, processed reflectively, in new figurations of language and action.

At higher levels of consciousness, propositions, abstraction and indeed rationality develop. Rational thinking begins when a man accustomed to propositional thinking starts making a distinction which is not entailed in propositional thinking: the distinction between "the that" and "the why" [14.1-14.2]. In sections 15, 16 and 17 of Part I Collingwood describes and analyzes the three kinds of reason: utility, right and duty. And with rationality, the ability to choose. Now one can choose without being rational, that is, without being aware of the reason for one's choice. This is capricious agency. But if one has reflected enough to be able to be conscious of one's reason for choosing, then this is agency par excellence. Here consciousness is will, and free will at that. Agency, therefore, describes the actualized capacity for persons to be able to (when they are able to) act freely, willfully and rationally in the world.\

Human beings exist in association with other human beings. Human agency, therefore, always involves interaction with other agents [Ibid.: 23]. If we look for an individual acting in the world according to his or her own determinate nature, a nature that has come to exist without any interaction with other agents, we will not find it. That no human being is "an island" is inspiring in myriad ways. It is also a physical, biological, psychological and social fact.

Thus, to exist in society is to participate with other agents in an enterprise: "every society is formed for the joint prosecution of some exercise" [21.95]. Two or more agents who so come together can constitute a society. Planning and going for a walk with someone is to engage in society, though a relatively temporary one. The process that allows a person to say "I will" is the same that allows a person to say "we will." Thus society, properly speaking, involves the pursuit of common activity by agents who are free to choose that activity.

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15 This capacity includes and in some cases requires the ability to use symbols and signs, but the capacity is not limited to symbols and signs as some socio-cultural anthropologists would have it. One of my central interests in civilizational analyses is that they could allow for bringing the insights of political philosophy, particularly the attention to rationality, into conversation with key strands in socio-cultural anthropology, not least the concept of culture itself.
It is crucial to distinguish society from class [19.37 passim]. A class is a group of things united because of their resemblance, their sharing of some common attribute(s); the creation of a class – i.e., discerning what are the common attributes – is a practical act of some agent’s consciousness (individual or collective agent) as noted above. For Collingwood, a society is not a group of people brought together because of some attribute, however striking, they possess that then causes them to resemble each other. A society is a constituted coming together of two or more agents who together embark – ideally with maximum and mutual consent – on some practical enterprise. True, once a society comes into existence, all the members represent at least one class, share at least one attribute, namely the class of all who belong to that society. However (the class of) belonging to a society as gauged by "external" criteria never creates the society, rather the reverse: the class comes into existence as a consequence of the practical activities of agents.

The notion of class, for Collingwood, is often mistaken as a notion of society. In fact it masks the empirical complexity of agents by treating them as if they were unitary, determinate objects, the manifestations of some underlying essence or the product of some substantialized agent, a pure class of persons who share some permanent "something" despite their actual (dis)organization at any one time or, conversely, perhaps their unobserved unity of purpose.

In any case, society is nothing over and above its members. It is the on-going will and protean activity of its members, which recursively re-shape in relation to both internal and external factors [21.27]. This applies not only in the first instance when society is formed, but also throughout its duration: society is on-going activity. When the activity ceases, the society ceases. In this, Collingwood distinguishes himself from most modernist theorists. The latter see society as the more or less permanent product of a singular move away from nature. Thus for anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss, the moment of the first exchange (of a woman, or a word) creates a social over against a natural distinction, and society is born in that single stroke. For Hobbes, too, the move from the state of nature to society is established with the creation of the Leviathan. Not so for Collingwood.

Collingwood suggests that to see society as a stable entity is to fail to recognize that it is actually the ongoing activity of agents. Hobbes made this mistake when he reified the body politic into a thing that exists like the body, which, in his view, was like that of a self-sustaining machine. For him, once society is constituted, it operates in terms of principles and laws of its own; the members of society are no longer agents consciously participating in a joint enterprise but are now mere components of the system. Boucher [1989:77 passim] says that, for Collingwood, both Hobbes and René Descartes contributed greatly to understanding how humans relate to the natural world and also how humans relate to other humans. One contributed by emphasizing the radically subjective basis of action, the other the same for thought.
However, both failed to move beyond this one-sided subjectivism which separated subject from object. To Hobbes, Collingwood says: action is subjective no doubt, but it is also an elaboration of how actions relate to each other, whether the diverse actions of a single subject in relation to the other, or the diverse actions of other subjects. To Descartes, Collingwood says: thought is subjective too, but all thought elaborates on how the body exists in the world. In fact the subject itself is created by reflection on bodily sensation, feeling, appetite, desire etc., not a transcendental rationalism that constitutes the subject out of thin air. Thus, all conscious action is ultimately borne of what may be loosely called experience.

And experience is ongoing. It doesn't just stop after some singular definitive move from nature to society. Such an egregious view assumes that after an original moment of consciousness (e.g., prudential reason in Hobbes's case), society is created and consciousness disappears. But, as experience is ongoing, so too is consciousness. Thus the move from nature to society is an on-going and dynamic activity of agents, for this is after all the very definition of society: the continuous reiteration or re-invention of agents participating in a joint enterprise.

Collingwood replaces Hobbes's notion of the state of nature, and its perpetual war of each-against-all, with the idea of non-social communities. Any complex polity – "complex" used here in Arnold Toynbee's sense – involves both non-social communities and corresponding social communities. No polity is ever without this mixed character. A non-social community is composed of those who are not fully actualized agents. They do not govern themselves but are governed by those in the governing society, such as children by adults. Thus the relation of society to non-social communities is one of agents who are embarked on a joint enterprise who rule and less-than-full agents who are ruled. There is a range or scale of more or less agentive subjects from those who do not govern at all, all the way up to those who govern themselves entirely. But all are agents of some kind and degree.

To have agency does not mean that one is fully conscious of every aspect of one's actions and its consequences. Nor does it mean that one can create one's reality as one chooses. For agents can be both the patients and the instruments of the agency of others. Many critiques of nineteenth century colonialism and of post-World War II global order show how societies seek to turn other societies, both internal and external, into non-social communities — although not presenting the critique in these Collingwoodian terms (see Jackson 2006).

For Collingwood, civilization or barbarism is to be found precisely in the relations between non-social communities and social communities. Is the latter, the ruling group, using their rule to persuade members of non-social communities into members of the ruling society? Does the social community see the distinctions between social, economic and legal civilization, and the on-going and protean challenge of articulating each with the other, and encouraging its new members to dissent and offer other visions of this articulation? If the answers are yes, then this is a civilizing polity.
Relations between agents can involve either dialogue (persuasion) or domination (force). In dialogue one tries to find a position in which both sides can come to agree, where each can see the partial accuracy of their own and others' views. Here Collingwood evinces his Hegelian heritage, for it was Hegel who enunciated the principle that concepts can never be set in resolute opposition for they will always find a higher synthesis. For Collingwood, however, this dialectical process is not exemplary of an unfolding process of universal rationality, but of the negotiations of historically situated agents. Agents can interact through domination as well, where one party seeks to force the other to abandon its agency. For Collingwood, the two modes of interaction are opposed to each other. Indeed, if one agrees with Collingwood here, one might say that overt domination is a sign of weakness: if you cannot persuade, you trot out the troops.

A social community maintains its non-social community in that position either via dialogue or by domination. Collingwood says that the latter may be maintained by "order" or by the inculcation of particular "ways of life" [21.3]. In any case, the non-social community is not allowed to exercise its free will. But this is not to indicate that there is a fundamental and essential difference in kind (only) between social and non-social aspects of a community.

Thus agents are always overlapping classes. This is a unique notion of social "system" which makes agency central: it assumes systems of this sort are made and not simply found and that they are continually being completed, contested and remade. This is a different notion of system from that projected onto the human world from the natural world. In the taxonomic discourse of natural science, systems are conceived to be composed of mutually exclusive, and opposed and yet interdependent parts. But, a construction such as this immediately raises the question of which part is "more fundamental" or "more important" [ibid.: 18]. Typically some transcendent principle of unity, perhaps one part elevated over the rest, was posited to deal with this dilemma, leading to essentialism [ibid.].

In contrast to taxonomy, for Collingwood, "the world of politics is a dialectical world in which non-social communities (communities of men in what Hobbes called the "state of nature") turn into "societies" [24.71]. This is a processual view of human affairs, but not a disordered view. It is, rather, a different view of order. This is a vision of society as polity, where for the ruling society in particular the "work is never done" [25.23]. From this vantage, what some today see as fragments of culture – fragments to be lamented or celebrated – are perhaps better seen as consequences of a ruling society that does not acknowledge its role and responsibility as such, or has knowingly abdicated it (see Ghosh 2016, 2007). If the latter, and per above, such actions could be characterized as barbaric.

The task of Part II of this project, which will hopefully be published in a subsequent issue of this very journal, is to show that Collingwood's approach to civilization and barbarism,

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16 I will retain the use of "men" and "man" rather than adopting more gender-neutral pronouns as a way to recall that those being presented were unlikely to be gender-neutral in their thinking.
as outlined above, provides a framework for comparing civilizational projects. The specific aim will be to use his framework to re-interpret the overlaps and oppositions in what Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, respectively, envisioned as the civilizing and de-civilizing contents of Indian civilization.

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The Concept of a Boundary Between the Latin and the Byzantine Civilizations in Europe

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Abstract

The article reviews, first, the essentials of the literature devoted to the origins and spatial reaches of the particular civilizations. Then, the boundary dividing Europe into two parts is outlined. This boundary runs from the Barents Sea in the north to the Adriatic Sea in the south. On its western side nations are associated with the Latin legacy, while on the eastern side are those that relate to the Byzantine tradition and later on, to Moscow. Views as to the course of this boundary are discussed.

Keywords: boundaries, civilizations, conflicts, Europe

Introduction

Debate over the emergence of particular civilizations, as seen in historical-geographical perspective, is very popular, both in scientific literature and in journalism. Broad investigations are being conducted, and quite elaborate classifications as well as typologies are being developed. Knowledge of the spatial reaches of different civilizations and of their mutual relations is supposed to constitute the starting point for the analysis of the actual or potential threats, which might – and in the opinion of some scholars inevitably do – lead to the inter-civilizational conflicts.

This kind of reasoning is based on the assumption that cultural or ideological differences between civilizations must bring about enmity and wars. Such confrontations are usually held to be determined by the essential differences of religious systems, worldviews or philosophy.

There has been a recent surge of interest in this topic associated with the book by Samuel P. Huntington, published in 1996 in the United States, entitled The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order, a worldwide bestseller. This book, translated into numerous languages, has stirred a vivid scholarly and journalistic discussion.

It is generally thought that this book not only tries to explain a lot of historical events but also proposes a rational basis for political evolution. According to many, it may also constitute the foundation for the development of geopolitical projections into the future. Initial opinions of its correctness and universality turned soon afterwards into attacks concerning its scientific value. The intellectual stir caused by this book has proven to be creative, since numerous studies and reports have appeared; these relate to the philosophy of history, geography, political science and sociology.
Civilizations as a subject of historical studies

Huntington’s book, despite its popularity and influence, was by no means a pioneering work. The work concerned the types, spatial reaches, and influence of various civilizations on the political history of the world. Huntington himself clearly stated that he was continuing the work of his great predecessors, scholars whose writings formed the basis of his views on the civilizational diversity of the world’s population.

He mentioned and praised the works of Arnold Toynbee (1946), Philip Bagby (1958), Carroll Quigley (1961), Fernand Braudel (1980), and Johan Galtung (1992). On the other hand, though, Huntington referred only slightly to the concepts and work of the German scholars Oswald Spengler (1926-1928), Alfred Weber (1951), and his brother, Max Weber (1968).

On the top of this, he did not mention at all two significant pioneers in the study of the origins of different civilizations and their development.

- The first of these two was the Russian geographer Nikolay Danilevskiy1, who proposed back in 1871 a list of essential civilizations of the world.

- The second great scholar unmentioned by Huntington was the Polish historian Feliks Koneczny; he developed the idea of the superior role of civilizations in the advance and social transformations of societies, states and empires (Koneczny, 1935).

Danilevskiy was undoubtedly the true pioneer in the study of the multiplicity of civilizations and their influence on the course of world history. Although his views do not form a coherent theoretical structure, he was the first to indicate that world history is associated with a succession of emerging and disappearing civilizations.

According to Danilevskiy, these civilizations differed significantly as to their spiritual and material cultures, as well as the ways in which reality was perceived within them. He classified civilizations on the basis of well defined criteria and pointed out that differences among civilizations may lead to conflicts. Differences lead to rivalry, which may turn into a struggle for superiority and domination. The drive to enforce one’s own civilization while holding a negative attitude towards the alien one is inalienably linked with relations between civilizations.

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1 The very first edition of the book by Danilevskiy, “Russia and Europe” (“Rossiya i Evropa”) appeared in 1871 (Danilevskiy, 1871) in Russian. It was re-edited many times over, and then translated into German (1920) and English (1955).
Danilevskiy dealt mainly with the antagonism between the Russian and the Western European ("Germano-Roman") civilizations. Based on their relations over time he was able to draw certain generalizing conclusions of a universal character. Danilevskiy assumed that this type of struggle conforms to the laws of nature, governing the development of states and nations.

Even if one asserts that the content and the form of the discourse presented by Danilevskiy had a superficial and partisan character, with subjective assumptions and emotions taking the upper hand over pragmatism, and argumentation being tendentiously selected, we must recognize his originality and broad historical and geographical knowledge.²

The somewhat simplified but nonetheless pioneering concepts of Danilevskiy were creatively developed by the Polish scholar Feliks Koneczny. In his first major study, which was devoted to the issue of civilizations, Koneczny developed a method for the classification and typology of civilizations (Koneczny, 1926). In the study he showed, using the example of the Slavic nations, the usefulness of the concept of civilization in terms of science and politics. He laid the foundation for his synthetic approach in 1934 and published his work a year later (Koneczny, 1935)³. This original – indeed, breakthrough – study presented the variety and the multiplicity of civilizations and cultures of the world population. The author tried to determine the influence exerted by civilizations on the course of historical and political events. The book was published in Polish and it remained unknown for a long time to the broader scholarly world. It was published in English well after the World War II, in London, with a foreword written by Arnold J. Toynbee, who made a positive recommendation of the study (Koneczny, 1962). Thus, the English language version of the book by Koneczny appeared 35 years ahead of the one by Huntington. The work of Koneczny was not mentioned in the Huntington book even though the Polish scholar was by that time cited in the relevant American literature on the subject, and even earlier within the German literature (see, e.g., Hilckman, 1952).

Koneczny considered, in particular, the important issue of whether race, language, or religion implies membership in a definite civilization. He stated unambiguously that there is no distinct causal relation between race and civilization, nor between language and civilization.

² The Russian-language literature on Danilevskiy is very ample. He is not only treated in Russia as the founder of the science of civilizations, but also is seen as a pioneer of Russian geopolitics (see, e.g., A. Makayunov, 1993, B. Gubman, 1997, B. Baluyev, 1999). From the international literature one should mention the classical work by R. MacMaster (1967), who categorised Danilevskiy among the philosophers representing extreme views, characterized by a typical Russian mentality.
³ Koneczny dealt until his death in 1949 with the civilization-wise diversity of the world. During the period of the Nazi occupation he remained in Poland and wrote – in particular – ample texts on Byzantine, Latin and Jewish civilizations. These texts could not be published after the war insofar as they were inconsistent with Communist orthodoxy. They were published only in London late in the 1970s and 1980s, and that solely in Polish, so that, again, their reception was very limited (Koneczny, 1973, 1974, 1981).
In his opinion, though, the relation between civilization and religion turned out to be more difficult to assess. Koneczny distinguished sacral, semi-sacral and non-sacral civilizations. He argued that religion forms a civilization only when religious laws encompass all the norms of social life, including ethics, arts, knowledge, customs, economy, etc. Koneczny classifies, for instance, Jewish civilization as sacral, while stating that for Christianity in general there is no convergence of religion and civilization.

In this context, the Byzantine world, dogmatically very close to Roman Catholicism, differs from it in terms of civilization. On the other hand, Protestantism, which rejects a large part of the Catholic dogmas, is still, in terms of civilization, closer to Catholicism. As to the criteria related to the legal and systemic aspects, Koneczny concluded that an essential difference separates, civilization-wise, the Eastern and Western Christianity.

He wrote a lot about Russia, classifying this country, despite her having received Christianity from Byzantium, as belonging to the Turanian civilization\(^4\). That is why the boundary between Poland, belonging to Latin civilization, and Russia, being a part of the Turanian world, is so important for Koneczny. An essential feature of the Turanian civilization is to underestimate spirituality, and even morality, to the advantage of politics, or power plays, to which everything must be subordinated.

The Western European civilization differs deeply from the Turan civilization, he thought, in terms of its perspective on the dignity of the individual. In Eastern Europe an individual is just an element of the state organization\(^5\). In the Turanian civilization, and especially in its Muscovite-Russian variety, the civil society has not developed – a citizen is fully subordinated to the omnipotent state. The feeling of freedom and of a citizen’s dignity developed in Western Europe. It is characterised by the fact that its law refers to ethics, and its legal development consists in application of moral principles to law.

\(^4\) Notwithstanding the issue of whether or not Koneczny’s concept of “Turanian civilization” had negative undertones, the separate character of that civilization which arose on Euro-Asian territory subordinated to the Russians has been accepted by numerous Russian intellectuals. This is very clearly expressed in the article by Lev Gumilev (1973).

\(^5\) In this view, the Turanian civilization’s society and state are organised as a military camp. The state is the army, and the state institutions serve the purposes of the army. This is because that civilization sees the true essence of social life as struggle. It is struggle that determines the sense of political activities, and the entire state is organized to conduct war. The state, similarly, is but the property of the leader, while the primary social virtues are obedience and bravery. These two virtues determine one’s place in the structures of the state. Since struggle is the primary objective of the state, its activity is concentrated upon preparations for and the conduct of war. Hence, the state does not build a civil culture, the institutions needed for civil life, or infrastructure that is different from the military one. That is why the sole skills deployed in such a structure are linked with fighting the enemy.

In such a structure, intellectual independence or holding of own convictions is seen as a potential source of disloyalty. One can, of course, have some convictions, but they cannot be binding. They may turn out to be useful, if effectively employed to manipulate the enemy, but never as obligations conditioning one’s conduct. The Soviet Union, geared towards the conquest of the world, was a typical archetype of such a civilization, almost a perfect rendition.
On the other hand, according to Koneczny, Byzantine civilization stands at the border between the Latin and Turanian civilizations. Byzantium adopted the notion of private law, as separate from public law, but, at the same time, it was centralist, formalized and inimical to individualism. With the omnipresence of its etiquette and the rich court ceremonial, Byzantium dominated for centuries over the medieval West. The formal element overshadowed the content, while widespread universalism and standardization limited the free development of society. Consequently, the Byzantine bureaucratic state developed, and in order to maintain the unity and coherence of this state, autocratic methods of rule were applied.

Even though he was not the first author to write of the diversity of cultures and civilizations, undoubtedly F. Koneczny was the first to provide a consistent explanation for the emergence and development of the great civilizations of modern world.\(^6\) And though his ideas were published about half a century before Huntington’s, the latter does not even mention the work of Koneczny, whose pioneering ideas should not have gone unnoticed by English-speaking authors concerned with comparative civilizational studies.

What scholars were the inspiration for the book by S. P. Huntington? What assumptions adopted by them may be helpful in the determination of the boundary between the Western and the Eastern civilizations in Europe?

Based on a definite set of criteria, P. Bagby classifies nations as belonging to various “cultures” or “civilizations.” The latter are also classified as to their hierarchy – the most important ones are the so-called “major civilizations.” Bagby proposes that the Western European civilization dominates the world. He is decidedly against the concept of a homogeneous “Christian civilization” that includes Eastern Christianity. The latter, in his opinion, belongs as an integral part of what he calls the “Near East civilization.”

The views of Bagby are characteristic of many in that they neglect the spatial aspect – typically, anyway, for many scholars dealing with the development of civilizations. This is, namely due to the fact that historians and philosophers dealt with this subject first, rather than the geographers, and so the spatial aspect was usually perceived as secondary (Bagby, 1958).

Among the few who have taken into account the geographical dimensions of the emergence, development and fall of civilizations has been the French scholar F. Braudel (1980). His concepts were elaborated with geographical sciences constantly in mind. He referred very clearly to the French geographical school of Vidal de la Blache, and so accounted explicitly for the role of the natural environment, treating natural conditions as one of the formative factors in the emergence of cultures and civilizations. In his essay on problems in the history of civilizations, Braudel emphasized that studies concerning

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\(^6\) Koneczny had an intellectual predecessor, Polish philosopher Erazm Majewski, who argued that studies of the development of civilizations do in fact constitute a separate domain of knowledge (E. Majewski, 1911).
civilization must have an interdisciplinary character and should encompass the entirety of the political, religious, ethnographic and economic life.

The most significant influence on the basic ideas of Huntington, and on the more recent work of other Western scholars, was exerted by Arnold Joseph Toynbee. The work of Toynbee appeared from 1946 until his death (1975) and indeed marked a deep imprint on several domains -- including history, sociology and political science. All of the followers of Huntington’s concepts have referred to Toynbee. In the book by Huntington, the marked influence of the great predecessor is frequently encountered.

Toynbee distinguishes 23 “full” civilizations, adds to them three “aborted” ones and five that are “undeveloped.” In terms of time, he distinguishes phases – the civilizations of the first two phases no longer exist.

On the European continent the Hellenist civilization arose, followed by those which have persisted until today, namely the Western Christian civilization and the Eastern Christian (Orthodox) civilization, with a distinct Russian branching. A definite similarity thus can be seen with the classification proposed by Koneczny.

Yet, Koneczny distinguished also the Jewish civilization. Until the Second World War, this civilization played a specific culture-forming role. Shockingly, all of the prominent scholars dealing with civilizations neglect the Jewish civilization, yet it played a very important role in Central and Eastern Europe up until the war.

Toynbee considers relations between civilizations on several levels, but his analyses are devoid of territorial precision. Toynbee is, thus, little interested in the geographical lines of separation of the European nations and states that belong to different civilizations. On the other hand, he presents interesting analyses of the similarities and differences between the Russian Orthodox civilization and the Bolshevik order which was installed after the Communists came to power.

Toynbee notes also the ideological opposition between Russia and the Eastern Orthodox countries of the Southeastern Europe, lands that were liberated from Turkish domination owing to Russian interventions.

This anti-Russian feeling in non-Russian Orthodox Christian countries might seem at first sight surprising at a time when Orthodox Christianity was still the established religion of the Russian state and when the ‘Old Slavonic’ dialect still provided a common liturgical language for the Russian, Romanian, Bulgarian, and Serbian Orthodox Churches. Why did Pan-Slavism and Pan-Orthodoxy prove of so little avail to Russia in her dealings with these peoples, to whom she had also given such

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7 The philosophical and historical concepts of Toynbee became the object of wide interest, and then of sharp criticism. Among the most known opponents were J. Ortega y Gasset (1964) and J. Roberts (1985).
effective help in their struggles to extricate themselves from Ottoman toils? (Toynbee, 1960, pp.716-717).

While Toynbee writes a lot on the contacts and conflicts between civilizations in the spatial-temporal setting, he omits the question of the territorial division on the European continent between the Orthodox Russian civilization and the Western civilization. Polish-Russian antagonism and confrontations of the Polish and Russian cultures on the Ukrainian and Belarusian territories have been completely marginalized by him. Thus, Toynbee has neglected entirely the centuries of confrontation between Roman Catholic Poland, belonging to the Latin civilization, and the Eastern Orthodox, and thereafter Bolshevik, but always despotic and imperial Russia. Yet, he emphasizes the Polish-Ukrainian and Polish-Lithuanian conflicts, which appeared much later, were of local reach, and did not influence in a significant manner the course of history.

It is often held that Huntington’s ideas and concepts constitute a breakthrough in the perception of the role played by civilizations in history. Still, even if we omit the work of Koneczny, there have been numerous publications before Huntington concerning main civilizations and confrontations between them in the struggle for power and domination. The best known publications, referred to here just as examples, contain rich bibliographies, witnesses to the popularity of the subject. Before the book by Huntington had appeared, knowledge of the rise and fall of the great civilizations of the world had been common and did not cause any significant controversies. Yet, in spite of this, the book by Huntington gained widespread fame and brought about broad scholarly discussions (see H. Köchler and G. Grabher, 1999; L. Harris, 2004; A. Tusicisny, 2004; C. Venn, 2008).

Let us note that the majority of opinions since Huntington published his work have been highly critical; some have classified it as mythology (see, e.g., Çağlar, 2002, or Wheen, 2004). On the other hand, there have also been critics who have held high the inspiring significance of the book and have forwarded counter-proposals.

We can mention in this group the German scholar Harald Müller (1998, 2001). He has argued that in global political developments we deal not so much with the “clash of civilizations” as with a more universal historical process, consisting in the “cohabitation of civilizations” (das Zusammenleben der Kulturen). Simultaneously, Müller shows – like many of Huntington’s opponents – that throughout history military conflicts within and not between different civilizations have dominated. Despite all these analyses and opinions, the concepts formulated by Huntington have many followers. There are numerous reasons for this fact.

8 The book by Danilevskiy, with its proposal for the typology of the world civilizations, preceded the work of Arnold Toynbee by 75 years and that of Samuel Huntington by 110 years, while Koneczny outlined in his studies the causes and the consequences of confrontations between the great civilizations ten years ahead of Toynbee and more than 50 years before the book by Huntington attracted global attention.
First of all, the book was written in a witty and attractive style, easily read. On the other hand, it appeared at a time when political events took place making apparent the importance of the issues discussed in the book. The ideological confrontation between the “communist” and the “capitalist” blocks ended with the victory of the West. At the same time, conflicts surfaced, having essential ethnic backgrounds. Sharpening of the Israeli-Palestinian antagonism, the war in Chechnya, as well as fighting between Catholic Croats, Eastern Orthodox Serbs and Muslim Bosnians showed that the differences of civilizations and cultures may be put in motion by political forces and provoke military conflicts.

The rise of the orthodox Islamic movement in Asia, fighting against the model of life shaped after the Western European model (such as seen today in Iran and in Iraq), have demonstrated that the problems Huntington discussed are not only of purely academic, but also of political importance⁹.

**Boundaries between Civilizations in Europe**

Huntington and Koneczny both believed that history consists of the succession of civilizations, which, over centuries, have constituted for humanity the framework for defining the identity of people. Civilizations undergo evolution, are dynamic, have rises and falls, join together and separate, but do persist and determine the evolution of the world as a whole. According to Huntington, the future of humanity depends upon the interactions that take place between the civilizations.

After the termination of the confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States, the differences between civilizations led to new political constellations, depending upon culture and civilization-based identities. That is why, in place of the bi-polar world, the setting of the main civilizations of the world is postulated, involving the Western civilization, the Latin American, the Eastern Orthodox, the African, the Islamic, the Hindu, the Buddhist, the Chinese and the Japanese ones.

In his book, Huntington comments on the particular great civilizations of the world from a spatial perspective. Of interest from the point of view of the present study are his thoughts concerning the territorial boundary between the Western and the Byzantine civilizations. These divide Europe into two parts: Western and Eastern.

How does Huntington examine this issue? The following excerpt helps explain his vision of Europe today.

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⁹ A more recent case is that of the “Arab Spring”, and the ensuing internal conflicts in Egypt and in Turkey have a distinct character of “local” clashes of civilizations.
Establishing that line in Europe has been one of the principal challenges confronting the West in the post-Cold War world. During the Cold War Europe as a whole did not exist. With the collapse of communism, however, it became necessary to confront and answer the question: What is Europe?

Europe’s boundaries on the north, west and south are delimited by substantial bodies of water, which to the south coincide with clear differences in culture. But where is Europe’s eastern boundary? Who should be thought of as a European and hence as a potential member of the European Union, NATO, and comparable organizations?

The most compelling and pervasive answer to these questions is provided by the great historical line that has existed for centuries separating Western Christian peoples from Muslim and Orthodox peoples. This line dates back to the division of the Roman Empire in the fourth century and to the creation of the Holy Roman Empire in the tenth century. It has been roughly in its current place for at least five hundred years.

Beginning in the north, it runs along what are now the borders between Finland and Russia and the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) and Russia, through western Belarus, through Ukraine separating the Uniate west from the Orthodox east, through Romania between Transylvania with its Catholic Hungarian population and the rest of the country, and through the former Yugoslavia along the border separating Slovenia and Croatia from the other republics. In the Balkans, of course, this line coincides with the historical division between the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires. It is the cultural border of Europe, and in the post-Cold War world it is also the political and economic border of Europe and the West.

The civilizational paradigm thus provides a clear-cut and compelling answer to the question confronting West Europeans: Where does Europe end? Europe ends where Western Christianity ends and Islam and Orthodoxy begin.” (Huntington, 1996, p. 158).

This description was complemented by a map (Figure 1) showing the boundary separating Western Christendom from the Eastern Orthodox and Islamic areas. According to the information appended, this map refers to the year 1500.
The concept of boundary between Latin and Byzantine civilisations in Europe (after S.P. Huntington)

Fig. 1. Eastern boundary of western civilization in Europe, following S. P. Huntington
Source: S. P. Huntington (1996), p. 231
Both the map and the fragment quoted call for a response. The text says that the division “has been roughly in its current place for at least five hundred years”, but one can hardly agree to this statement.

Around the year 1500 the division, then running largely across the territory of Poland, was considerably more to the West than shown on the map. The area dominated by Orthodox Christianity, in terms of the numbers of the faithful, reached in Poland the towns of Rzeszów, Zamość and Białystok. After the Union of Brest (1596) and the establishment of the Uniate (Greek-Catholic) Church, for two successive centuries the area stretching up to the Dnieper River in the east was -- in denominational terms -- subordinate to the Vatican, while the political administration of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had an enormous influence on the cultural identity of this area.

It can therefore be assumed that between 1596 and 1772/1795 the boundary between Western and Eastern European civilization ran along the Dnieper River, with all of Belarus and a large part of Ukraine belonging to the Western civilization. Over these vast territories, the Eastern Orthodox Church gradually disappeared in favor of the Uniate (Eastern-rite) and Roman Catholic churches; the upper layers of society underwent “Polonization” and lived in a universe dominated by Western values.

After the downfall of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, in the 19th century, the situation changed radically. Liquidation of the Uniate, i.e., Greek Catholic, Church and a fight against Polish culture gave rise to an extensive zone of confrontation between the western and eastern European cultures. The expansion of the Eastern Orthodox Church became a fact, though, along with the associated gradual retreat to the West of the Polish cultural influences and Roman Catholicism. The subsequent 20th century was also marked by a consecutive wave of the political confrontations, which brought about major cultural and civilizational consequences.

During the inter-war period (1920-1939) the Polish-Soviet boundary, established through the Treaty of Riga, constituted a division, which, as it turned out, was merely temporary. It can therefore be said that it was only the year 1945 that brought a true historical shift, as it introduced the division that has been in force until today\textsuperscript{10}.

In Southeastern Europe there have been similarly significant movements of the boundaries during the last 500 years involving Catholicism, Orthodoxy and Islam. Islamic expansion had a distinct phase-like character, and the ethnic boundaries within the Romanian-Hungarian borderland have also been undergoing changes owing to colonization and wars.

\textsuperscript{10} Division of Europe into the western and eastern parts is still a subject of debate in the literature. The opinions of Western authors are quite diversified and three main stances are usually taken. The first of these, very simplified, identifies the dividing line with the western boundary of the former Soviet Union, the second with the reach of usage of the Latin alphabet, and the third considers, in addition to the alphabet, also the denominational criterion.
The map, presented by Huntington does not, in fact, show the current dividing line of the civilizations, and it is excessively simplified. This is particularly evident when we consider the segment between Dvina river in the North and the Carpathians in the South, where it is constituted by a straight line cutting across Ukraine and Belarus. This simplification calls for verification and a more precise delimitation, based on well defined criteria, taking into account the actual ethnic and cultural reality of this part of Europe\(^\text{11}\).

It is assumed here that the European continent is divided in terms of culture and civilization into two parts. The western part refers to the philosophy and the vision of the Latin Christendom. The political and social order in the West developed from the mutual influence of Roman law and the Christian religion. A distinct separation took shape between the spiritual life and the political system. This distinction resulted, ultimately, in the Enlightenment and the appearance of liberal democracy. Eastern Christianity, associated with Byzantium, having afterwards, due to a succession of political events, found its main protector in Russia, was subordinated there to the despotic state authority\(^\text{12}\).

The issue of the differences and similarities in ideology and values between these two, produced over centuries, in the material and the spiritual spheres is not the subject of the analysis here presented. Here we are looking at the territorial boundary dividing Christianity, one based on Roman tradition and one based on Byzantium.

The fundamental prerequisite for the delineation of the boundary dividing Europe into that living in the world of Western values and the one that clings to the so-called legacy of the East, is simple: to determine the denominational character of the population inhabiting the territories at the interface of Catholicism – or Protestantism – and Orthodoxy\(^\text{13}\).

It is commonly known that the line in question passes approximately between the Barents Sea and the Adriatic Sea, but its precise course gives rise to numerous controversies\(^\text{14}\). This great cultural divide, even though most important, is not the only one. It is, for instance,

\(^{11}\) Geographical definition of the Central-Eastern Europe and the variability of its boundaries have not been the object of great interest among English-speaking scholars. That is why it was important that two Polish specialists, living in the United States and writing in English, published informative studies on the subject. See O. Halecki (1952) and P. Wandycz (1992). Likewise, two atlases deserve attention from this point of view: *Historical…* (1995), and *Atlas…* (1997).

\(^{12}\) Numerous scholars still neglect cultural criteria when considering the division of Europe, treating the economic criteria as the primary ones. With these criteria, the continent of Europe is split along the Elbe river, meaning that the territories to the East of this divide constituted for centuries an undeveloped area of agrarian character, with numerous feudal relics. Note that this criterion leads to a gross simplification, with numerous and important exceptions left out on both sides of the divide (provincial Portugal and Spain, southern Italy, Bohemia and Silesia, etc.).

\(^{13}\) The denominational divisions in Europe have been recently the subject of interest of the newly developing geography of religion. Similarly, human geography might be of assistance in this respect, as it emphasises the role and place of people and of their relation to the various ideas they developed.

\(^{14}\) The present author analysed the ethnic diversity of the Central-Eastern Europe in an extensive study, see Eberhardt (2003a).
possible, and perhaps even advisable, to mention the boundary separating the Eastern Slavonic Orthodox population from the Orthodox but Romanian-speaking population.\footnote{It would be much easier to say that we in fact deal with a broad borderland, forming a North-South belt of variable width, but this would also amount to overlooking quite important local differentiation.}

The great divide, stretching from Lapland to the Dalmatian coast is roughly four thousand kilometres long. In the north it starts with the Norwegian-Russian borderline, to then follow the boundary separating Protestant Finland from Orthodox Karelia, the latter being a part of the Russian Federation.

The areas to the East of this boundary, which was established in 1945, are mainly inhabited by the Russian population. The ancient inhabitants of these lands – including natives of Karelia – gradually adopted Orthodox Christianity and underwent Russification. Nowadays there are only a few of them, living in dispersion. The Finnish-Russian boundary, therefore, is today simultaneously a political, ethnic and economic barrier. The line separating Orthodox Christianity from Protestantism reaches the Finnish Bay of the Baltic Sea to the West of the town of Vyborg.

The vicinity of Vyborg, which is placed on the map of Huntington’s to the west of the boundary, after inclusion in the Soviet Union, following World War II and the resettlement of the Finnish population – both Protestant and Orthodox – took on a purely Russian character. It differs only marginally in ethnic and cultural terms from the remaining Russian territories situated near St. Petersburg.

The subsequent course of the divide is relatively easily determined. It can be assumed, in a simplified manner, that the line runs between Estonia and Latvia on the one side, and the Russian Federation on the other. On the western side of the line the traditionally Protestant countries are situated, associated with Latin civilization, while on the eastern side – the Orthodox Russian population lives.

Yet, owing to the long-lasting inclusion of the Estonian and Latvian lands in the Russian (and Soviet) Empire, essential demographic and ethnic changes took place in these areas. Both of these countries, sovereign again for about two decades, host quite important Russian minorities, which actually dominate within some border-adjacent regions (such as in the vicinity of Narva). Moreover, the south-eastern part of Latvia, Latgale, is a peripheral area, within which five ethnic territories come together: Latvian, Polish, Lithuanian, Belarusian and Russian. This area is inhabited by the Roman Catholic Latvians, Poles and Lithuanians, who form a slight majority, but also by numerous Protestant Latvians, as well as by the Orthodox Russians and Belarusians. One should add to that the Ancient Orthodox Russians. The capital of the region, historical Dyneburg (Daugavpils), had been inhabited before the World War II by Jews, Russians, Poles, Latvians, Germans and Belarusians. Nowadays, the city is populated by Latvians and Russians, with a relatively numerous Polish minority.
It can be expected that owing to the fact that Latgale belongs to Latvia, it shall get over time more tightly integrated with the core of the country. Thus, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the emergence of independent Estonia and Latvia, conditions arose for the strengthening of the Estonian-Russian and Latvian-Russian boundaries, not just in political and economic terms, but also in the ethnic and cultural domains, as a part of the divide between Western and Eastern Europe. Roman Catholic Lithuania belongs beyond any doubt to the Western European culture.

The situation is more ambiguous and complex on the territory of Western Belarus. The Belarusian areas adjacent to the border with Lithuania, constitute a part of the historical region of Vilna. These areas are dominated by the Catholic population, still largely of Polish nationality. Even though they speak in everyday life the dialects of Belarusian, or, perhaps, have undergone during the Soviet era language Russification, yet, they are traditionally attached emotionally to Polish culture, and to the Latin Christianity. The course of the boundary between Eastern Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism, associated with the difference of civilizations, is more complicated than shown on the map, and then commented by Huntington. In the vicinity of Vilna, namely, we deal with a distinct shift of the ethnic boundary to the East.

As a result of World War II, significant ethnic changes took place on the territory of historical East Prussia. Until 1945, this province belonged to Germany. It was inhabited primarily by Germans (with ethnic minorities speaking Polish and Lithuanian). The population was mainly Protestant (except for the Catholic province of Warmia and partly the areas along Vistula river). Thus, beyond any doubt this whole area belonged to the Western European civilization.

After World War II, East Prussia was divided into a northern part, which was incorporated into the Soviet Union, and a southern part, which was incorporated into Poland. As the German population was resettled, the southern part was filled with Poles, of the Catholic religion; meanwhile, the northern part received Russians of Orthodox traditions, subject, though, like everywhere in the Soviet Union, to the official atheism.

Consequently, the whole area of the former East Prussia took on a dichotomous character: the southern part belongs still to the western Latin Christianity, while the northern part (the District of Kaliningrad) has ties to the Eastern European culture, not just politically, but in the civilizational sense as well. An enclave took shape, therefore, differing as to denomination, customs and culture, from the surrounding area. Nowadays, this relatively small territory should be considered as belonging to the Eastern Slavonic Orthodox civilization\(^\text{16}\).

\(^{16}\) A symbolic fact is constituted by the new construction of a great Orthodox temple in Kaliningrad. This is closely associated with the subordination of this area, until quite recently almost totally lay, to the authority of the Moscow patriarchate.
Ukraine, as is the case with Belarus, has been over centuries more an object than a subject of international politics. It was an area of military rivalry between Catholic Poland and Orthodox Russia. Ukrainian lands became, due to the Union of Lublin (1569), an integral part of the Polish Kingdom. This brought basic ethnic, cultural and civilizational consequences. The apex of the dynamics of these transformations was marked by the religious Union of Brest (1596), which gave rise to the Greek Catholic Uniate Church. After the eastern territories of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth were incorporated into Russia at the beginning of the 19th century, the tsarist authorities formally liquidated the Uniate Church in Russia through a decree in 1839. It persisted, though, and maintained its influence and significance in the Austrian part, Galicia. Consequently, a distinct religious boundary arose between the Orthodox Volhynia, belonging to Russia, and the Uniate Galicia.

At the same time, another divide took shape, separating the Roman Catholic region of Lublin from Orthodox Volhynia. This allows for the drawing of the boundary between Catholicism and Orthodoxy from Drohiczyn along the Bug River down to Hrubieszów, then away from the contemporary Polish-Ukrainian border towards the Zbrucz River, following the line of the boundary that separated the empires of the Habsburgs from that of the Romanovs in the 19th century.

Quite a complicated ethnic and cultural situation exists within the Transcarpathian Ukraine (called until World War II “Subcarpathian Ruthenia”). Ukrainians, inhabiting this area, were called Ruthenians at the beginning of the 20th century and are mostly Uniates. This province had belonged for close to 1000 years (until 1918) to Hungary, and then, during the inter-war period, to Czechoslovakia. In 1945 it was incorporated into the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

The geographical and economic conditions existing there caused the appearance of a certain separate cultural identity. This area had been for centuries subject to Hungarian influence.

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17 In view of the usage of the Cyrillic, or Greek, and not the Latin alphabet, and preservation of the Byzantine liturgy and rites, the Uniate (Greek-Catholic) Church is usually not classified as part of the so-called Latin civilization. Yet, the strong antagonism between the Uniate and the Orthodox churches, the administrative subordination of the former to the Vatican, as well as the very pronounced doctrinal affinity of this Church with the Roman Catholic one, justify the inclusion of the territories inhabited by the Uniate faithful into the Western (Latin) civilization. This is particularly appropriate given that the actual centre of the Eastern Orthodox world moved from Byzantium to Moscow (the so-called third Rome).

18 Formation of the Catholic-Orthodox boundary along the middle stretch of the Bug River resulted from quite a complex series of political events, bringing complete Polonization of the eastern part of Lublin Province. The process took place in several phases, with the turning points being (1) 1875 (inclusion of the Uniate faithful into the Orthodox Church), (2) the decree on religious tolerance of 1905 (possibility of converting to Catholicism), and (3) the years 1945-47 (resettlement of the Ukrainian Orthodox population).

19 The historical region of Galicia had a dichotomous ethnic and language setting; the western part had a Polish and Roman Catholic character, while in the eastern part the Ukrainians dominated, primarily belonging to the Greek-Catholic Church. Until the end of the World War II Orthodoxy had not played much of a role, and even now its reach is not very important. This province had a generally Catholic character and remained under the influence of Western values (Eberhardt, 2002).
with the southern, lowland part inhabited by Hungarians who live there still today. The Greek Catholic Ukrainian population preserved the traditional Byzantine liturgy\(^{20}\). They belonged to the Uniate diocese in Uzhgorod, formally subordinated to the Holy See\(^{21}\). After the collapse of communism and the re-establishment of religious freedom, the Catholic Church of the Greek rite could recreate its organizational structures.

To the East of the Transcarpathian Ukraine lies the region of Bukovina. During the 19\(^{th}\) century it constituted, as a whole, a Crown Land of the Austrian Empire. In the inter-war period it belonged to the Kingdom of Romania. It was split in 1940, and then, ultimately, after the Second World War, into two parts. The northern part, in which Ukrainians dominated, was incorporated into the Ukrainian SSR, while the southern part, with its dominant population being Romanian, remained a part of Romania.

Bukovina was traditionally dominated by a population of the Orthodox faith. Yet, this peripheral region was also home to descendants of numerous Central European nations: Ukrainians, Romanians, Jews, Germans, and Poles. The capital of the province – Chernivtsi – was in the 19\(^{th}\) century a town of Jewish, German and Polish population. A well-known university functioned in the city; until World War I the language of instruction was German, then in the inter-war period it was Romanian-speaking; and after the city was incorporated into the Soviet Union, the languages of instruction became Ukrainian and Russian.

It is obvious that Bukovina always constituted a crossroad of various cultural influences. The majority of scholars pay closest attention, though, to the dominating role of Orthodoxy among the native Ukrainian and Romanian populations. The capital was the seat of the independent Orthodox metropolitan diocese in 1875. This church, which played a very pronounced cultural role, strictly followed Byzantine traditions.

Christianity reached what is today Romania from Byzantium and this became decisive for the denominational character of the region. Eastern Orthodoxy played a dominant role over the entire history of both Walachia and Moldavia. Several attempts to introduce the Greek Catholic rite ended in failure. On the other hand, the Roman Catholic or the Protestant

\(^{20}\) The Ruthenian population is of a similar ethnic origin as the Transcarpathian Ruthenians. It has inhabited the northern (nowadays: Polish) and southern (nowadays: Slovak) slopes of the Carpathians up to the town of Poprad in the West. On the Polish side of the border the Greek Catholic and the less numerous Orthodox population was resettled from 1945 to 1947.

\(^{21}\) As in Brest in 1596, and also in Uzhgorod, in 1646, a Union was established, leading to formation of the Greek Catholic Church, subordinated to the Vatican.
creeds were identified as Hungarian and were therefore unacceptable for the Romanian population.

The hierarchy of the Orthodox Church in Romania, continuously functioning over the centuries, rigorously kept to the principles of faith and liturgy as inherited from Byzantium. However, after the united Romanian kingdom was established in 1861, with the capital in Bucharest, a political transformation occurred; Romania evolved close civilizational ties to western countries.

Dramatic emphasis started to be put more on the Romanian (Dacian) national origins, with the religious heritage being treated as less important in the shaping of identity of the Romanian state and nation. The Greek alphabet was abandoned and the Latin alphabet adopted. This had important consequences in terms of cultural awareness and identity. The Romanian elite and then the entire nation were becoming more strongly integrated with the western civilization. French culture became the model pattern, adjusted to the Romanian environment, and Romania saw itself, increasingly, as a Latin land surrounded by Slavic nations. The attitude of the Romanians with respect to the Orthodox countries, and especially to Russia, was one of alienation; Romanian culture started to slight the cultural and civilizational achievements of these countries – as it increasingly looked solely to the west.

This is why Romania, given its Latin alphabet and Romance language, and its adopted way of life, belongs without doubt to the western European civilization. On the other hand, if the religious, denominational criterion is taken into account, it cannot be gainsaid that Christianity came to Romania from Byzantium; it is Orthodox churches that dominate the landscape in Romania, and not Catholic or Protestant ones. Thus, if we consider the denominational criterion and draw the boundary as one which runs between eastern and western Christianity, Romania ought to be placed to the East of the religious divide. Note that, though, owing to secularization, such a distinction loses its formerly blatant character.

The Hungarian-Romanian ethnic borderland is vast. It is associated with the history of Transylvania, which belonged to Hungary for about 1000 years up until the Treaty of Trianon in 1920. This province was inhabited by Hungarians, Romanians and Germans. Inclusion of Transylvania in Romania during the inter-war period and after the World War II weakened the position of Hungarians there, and they preserved their ethnic identity only in the eastern part of Transylvania.22 Hence, there exists an enclave of Western Christianity, located in the very center of Romania, separated from Hungary by an area inhabited by Orthodox Romanians. This enclave has been gradually shrinking, mainly as a result of emigration of the Transylvanian Germans to Germany. On the other hand, the Hungarian-

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22 Ethnic relations within the Slovak-Hungarian, Ukrainian-Hungarian, Romanian-Hungarian and Serbian-Hungarian borderlands are presented by Hungarian scholars in a very well documented monograph of Kocsis and Kocsis-Hodosi (1998).
speaking Szeklers of Transylvania maintain their separate identity and have not undergone Romanization.

As a result, we can assume that the boundary between Latin and Byzantine Christianity runs approximately along the present-day Hungarian-Romanian state border, with an “island” inhabited primarily by the Hungarian-speaking minority in Transylvania classified as belonging to the West.

The demographic-ethnic situation of the Banat – a province in South-eastern Romania – was determined by its strategic location. Depopulated during the Hungarian-Turkish wars, it was then settled by Germans, Hungarians, Romanians and Serbs -- re-colonization. Now its population belonged to various denominations. After World War I a distinct Romanization process took place there. The Banat, therefore, is a typical borderland area, subject to different cultural influences.

To the south of the present-day Romania and Hungary are situated areas inhabited by Southern Slavs. During centuries, or, actually, for more than a millennium, the boundary ran across these areas, separating the reaches of influence of Rome and Byzantium. To the west of this boundary Catholic nations developed of Croats and Slovenians, while to the east of it three Orthodox nations grew: Serbs, Bulgarians and – having relatively recently appeared – Macedonians. Cultural and political conditions within these areas were unstable. Ethnic relations were, in addition, severely disturbed as a result of the long period of subordination to the Ottoman Empire, a time which left there numerous Muslims. They were concentrated mainly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, around Sarajevo, as well as in Bihać and Cazin. The Dalmatian Coast is inhabited by Croats, but until the World War II many Italians lived there, as well.

As a result of recent military conflicts and mutual ethnic purges on what was formerly the territory of Yugoslavia, what had become a truly poly-ethnic region underwent a significant constriction. Nonetheless, the boundary between Catholic Croats and Orthodox Serbs still plays a very important role.

There is, particularly, a quite cumbersome course of the eastern border of Croatia. This results from the fact that the Croats inhabit two geographically almost separate lands – Slavonia in the North and Dalmatia along the Adriatic coast. Between these two historical regions are found not only Croat and Serb areas but also Muslim ones. Ethnically Serb areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina do not form a compact whole because the Serbs here are surrounded from the south, west, and partly from the north by Croats. Their area is composed of two parts, linked by the narrow “Passavin” corridor just five kilometres of width. The entire central part of Bosnia and Herzegovina has a Muslim character, not only in religious, but also in ethnic terms.
The blood-shedding war between Serbs, Croats and Muslims in the late 20th century brought about the establishment of a relatively small, but quite ethnically homogeneous state of Bosnian Muslims, opposed to both the Catholic Croats and the Orthodox Serbs.

The northern province of the former Yugoslavia is called Vojvodina. It had been until World War I politically and ethnically Hungarian. Nowadays it is dominated by Serbs, although in the north Hungarian Catholics still prevail, while Slovaks and Romanians are also quite numerous.

The long Turkish domination of the territories of South-eastern Europe brought about the development of important areas of a Muslim character outside of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Most of these areas are populated today by the Muslim Albanians (except for small communities of Albanian Catholics in the vicinity of Škodra in northern Albania and the Orthodox population close to the border with the Greek Epirus). Similarly, almost the entire Yugoslav province of Kosovo, now a separate political entity, after the flight of Serbs, is inhabited by Albanians. Members of this nationality are also concentrated in western Macedonia.

Thus, quite a significant community of Muslims live on the Balkan Peninsula. They are of an Albanian nationality, differing quite importantly as to their culture and civilization from their Christian neighbors. These, though, are not the sole Muslims of Europe. After World War I Turkey preserved a part of its territory to the north of the Dardanelles and Bosporus, inhabited by Muslim Turks. There is also an important Turkish minority in Bulgaria (in the Rodope Mountain area and in the north-eastern part), and there are also Bulgarian-speaking Muslims in Bulgaria (the so-called Pomaks). These two groups amount together to just ten percent of the Bulgarian population; this does not change, therefore, the overall Orthodox cultural character of Bulgaria. In south-eastern Serbia areas dominated by the Muslim population do exist, as well (for example, Sanjak). The Albanian Muslim minority plays also a significant role in eastern Montenegro.

However, except for the Muslim areas mentioned above, the population of South-eastern Europe, from the Adriatic to the Black Sea, belongs integrally to the Byzantine-Orthodox civilization. This population includes Slavonic Serbs and Montenegrins, Macedonians and Bulgarians, Romanian-speaking nations of Romanians and Moldavians, as well as Greeks.

There are significant differences, especially regarding the Orthodox inhabitants of the Slavonic Ukraine, Belarus and Russia. The boundary which separates these two populations can be drawn along a line approximately equivalent to the course of the Dniester River.

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23 Albanians tend to be quite indifferent as to the religious questions, but in the framework of their ethnic community they are extremely united and hermetic with respect to foreigners.

24 Until World War I, in the northern part of Greece, the Slavonic Orthodox population dominated. Owing to Greek policy in the region, however, the population of the Greek Macedonian province underwent a linguistic Hellenization.
To the west of this boundary the Romanian-speaking population dominates, using a Latin alphabet, while to the east are the Orthodox Ukrainians and Russians. The culture of the latter has been largely shaped by the long period of existence of the Russian Empire, in which the Byzantine civilization was associated with the Turanian one.

The discussion so far has shown that the entire territory to the south of the Carpathian Mountains is extensively fraught, divided in terms of nationality, language and religion, and the spatial distribution of the particular ethnic groups form a mosaic.

This delimitation poses problems, muddies the water a bit, especially in view of existence of numerous multi-cultural areas. Thus, in all fairness the people of this region cannot always be unambiguously classified into the civilization of the East or of the West.\textsuperscript{25} This, of course, does not change the fundamental fact of the division between the two, one which crosses the European continent. The areas, situated on both sides of the divide have, as well, lost their homogeneity over time. Reformation has brought a disintegrating element into the cohesion of the nations of the West. On the other hand, appearance of the centralist Russian Empire caused the character of that portion of Orthodoxy subordinated to the authority of Moscow to differ from which has stayed faithful to the succession of Byzantium.

At the same time, owing to the changes of political boundaries which took place during the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, two important enclaves appeared, separated from their cultural core areas: the District of Kaliningrad, belonging now to Russia, and the region in central Romania inhabited by Hungarians. One should add the areas inhabited by Muslims on the Balkan Peninsula, clearly distinct against the background of their neighboring Christian areas (Fig. 2)\textsuperscript{26}.

\textsuperscript{25} The description here provided neglects the ethnic groups living in considerable dispersion, but which have played an important role in the history of the countries and nations mentioned. This applies in a particular manner to the Jews, who constituted for centuries an important cultural factor.

\textsuperscript{26} The course of the boundary as proposed by the present author is shown on the map of Europe having the same scale as the boundary proposed by Huntington. Even though these are not extremely precise maps, the differences in the courses of the boundaries suggested are clearly visible and might constitute the starting point for a more detailed analysis.
Fig. 2. Current boundary between the Latin and the Byzantine Christianity in Europe (author’s elaboration)
Closing remarks

The ideas contained in the book of Samuel Huntington gained widespread popularity and provoked interesting journalistic and scholarly discussions. This took place notwithstanding the rigid perspective and simplifications of Huntington’s work.

His views belong certainly among the extremely deterministic concepts of the philosophy of history and geography. Huntington assumes that all great civilizations always struggle for domination and are bound to get into conflicts in the future. Although he attempts to demonstrate this proposition, the evidence is not convincing. The image provided is, in principle, abstract, in many cases in disagreement with history or the reality of the contemporary world.

The experiences of recent centuries do not provide convincing proof that the reasons for all kinds of antagonisms and wars stemmed mainly from differences between civilizations. Political rivalries, which still exist, have been to a large extent conducted by states, entities whose objectives have not been identical with the interests of the civilizations they represent. The two world wars of the 20th century were – from this point of view – fratricidal, fought largely within the framework of one, Western European civilization.

To predict the future is difficult. The vision of humanity doomed to fight ideological wars is hardly probable. Samuel Huntington does not take into account, in particular, the development of science and technology, leading currently to advanced unification, globalization, universalization, and all-embracing consumerism. The shrinking influence of religious motivations in many parts of the world shall alleviate potential religious differentials.

Under such circumstances struggles between particular civilizations will become an anachronism. This, of course, does not mean that the world will be free of local and regional wars, in which cultural differences shall play an important causal role.

The proposition of the nascent threat of conflicts between civilizations, or their varieties, which might have a decisive influence on the future fate of the world, is very strongly emphasised in the book by Huntington. Hence, it may be worthwhile to consider the possibility of appearance of crisis situations in Europe, brought about by the presence of different cultures or religions. It seems to this author that in the present phase of integration processes any kind of conflict between different Christian denominations in Europe is increasingly improbable. Yet, this statement might be challenged, since not so long ago we witnessed the military clash between Catholic Croats and Orthodox Serbs. The antagonism between these nations is still very strong, but a new war in Bosnia and Herzegovina appears to be little probable, also because the multicultural areas, which were the fuel for the conflict, have largely disappeared owing to the recent ethnic purges.
Within the other Catholic-Orthodox borderlands the situation is more normalized and does not give rise to apprehensions of armed conflict. The antagonisms between Catholics and Protestants are also fading away.

It can therefore be expected that differences in customs and cultures between the formally Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox communities shall have a tendency to disappear in an integrating Europe. The situation within the post-Soviet territory (except for the Caucasus) shall also rather be stable.

On the Balkan Peninsula, which is still dominated by the Eastern Orthodox Church, there is an increasingly important Muslim community. It is composed, primarily, of Albanians, Bosnians and Turks. Relations between these groups and the Orthodox Serbs, Macedonians, and, to a lesser extent, Montenegrins and Bulgarians, do bear a character of confrontation.

A total of ten million Muslims live in this region of Europe. The biggest group (roughly six million) is composed of Albanians. The Islamic populations are characterised by high demographic dynamics and territorial expansion. Thus, for instance, Muslim Albanians push gradually away from Serbs and Macedonians, broadening the ethnic Albanian territory. An instance is provided, of course, by Kosovo, becoming Albanian, meaning, in this context, Muslim. An important part of western Macedonia has also been dominated by the Albanians.

The evolution of contemporary attitudes tends toward confrontation and struggle for domination between Albanians, on the one hand, and Serbs and Macedonians on the other. Of course, the reason for this is not only the clear religious and cultural differences, but, first of all, political. Yet slogans based on religion are easily understood and emotionally charged, and so are commonly used. A definite causal mechanism arises, based on differences between ethnic groups, and these are associated with various civilizational values.

Thus, Huntington’s prophecy of unavoidable conflict along this boundary may in fact be fulfilled.

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Technology in Eurasia Before Modern Times: A Survey

Norman C. Rothman

Introduction

Technology is typically defined by the following sentence. “The integrated system of knowledge, skills, tools, and methods developed within or used by a culture to successfully carry purposeful and productive tasks.” 1 Although many scholars date the advent of continuous technology and related scientific applications to early modern times, the groundwork was laid well before the modern period in 1400 C.E. 2

This paper will focus on the role of technology and related applications of science that occurred in the world island of Eurasia (specifically in the Middle East, China, India, and Europe) with occasional reference to areas outside of the world island before this period.

Ancient Times—Adjustment and Accommodation with Nature and the Environment

Ancient history is usually dated from 8000 to 500 B.C.E. The products taken from the natural world subdivide the period. The Neolithic period begins in the first date wherein the tools that were used came directly from the environment—usually stone which gave its name Neolithic or new Stone Age to the period. In the latter half of the period, copper began to be used. When it was combined with other metals (chiefly tin), the Bronze Age began. Bronze was more durable than stone and was suited for a wide variety of uses. After 1500 B.C.E., iron gradually replaced bronze throughout the world. 3

If the technological conversion of raw materials gave its name to an age, it also forwarded trade since metals unlike stone were not available everyone. Therefore, some degree of specialization was required to trade products (usually farm produce) for the desired metals. Trading places were established, then markets, and then cities which grew up around them, then recognizable states when cities combined for protection. Most historical states were based on trade and fertility of soil that produced food (agricultural) to grow and led to a settled society as opposed to hunting and gathering.

Therefore, environments that started the process were usually river valleys such as the Tigris-Euphrates valley in Mesopotamia (land between two rivers) and its extension westward to the Jordan River as part of the overall Fertile Crescent. 4

Technological development was advanced in the last part of the period as iron produced iron weapons as well as iron tools, so that there were both craftsmen and soldiers who now became prominent. Iron hoes and later the iron plow competed with iron weapons as the exemplars of society at this time. This led to both expansions of populations due to greater farming output as well as military expansion. A classic example was the spread of Bantu-
speaking populations from their original home in northern Cameroon/Nigeria (Nok) throughout much of central and southern Africa after 500 B.C.E.

Iron had also been produced in the present-day republic of Sudan and also spread southward to what is now Ethiopia, which helped that country in later centuries preserve its independence from Muslim attacks.\(^5\)

Technology, especially the use of metallurgy in China, for example, allowed the Han Chinese to expand from their northern nucleus around the Hwang-Ho or Yellow River southward. Overall, the environment was important in ancient times and societies organized through dams and irrigation works to avoid extremes of too much and too little water.

This age saw the beginning of technological use and a sociological subsystem as societies were organized into farmers, craftsmen, soldiers and related occupations derived from nature such as fishing and animal husbandry (developed in India to a 4-part caste system with occupational sub-castes by 1000 B.C.E.)\(^6\) and as the agricultural revolution included the domestication of animals especially, along with the plow and eventually the concept of the wheel. However, the ideological system was unchanging.

Nature and the deities that represented it were unknown, unknowable, and objects of fear and veneration. Societies had deities which represented the sun and water among other natural elements, since society depended upon the benevolence of nature. The natural world was linked to the supernatural through ancestors who had passed and joined nature in the next world. These gods and their ancestral links were accordingly worshipped. In this manner, the pharaoh of Egypt was a representative of supernatural deities as a god on earth. Egypt, actually the upper Nile River Valley, was a theocratic socialist society as land was held in the Pharaoh’s name, and he issued commercial licenses in his name.\(^7\) The major constructional enterprises were in the building of tombs or pyramids to ensure the afterlife of the monarch.

In the Mesopotamian city-states, the central building was the temple or ziggurat.\(^7\) The settled societies in the Americas such as the Olmec and the Mississippian also had religious buildings as the center of their cities.\(^8\) In China, dynasties received the mandate of heaven. If through wrongful action they injured their subjects, the mandate of heaven was withdrawn and the dynasty came to an end.\(^9\) The later Hindu trinity of gods of creation, preservation, and “creative” destruction as well as the pantheistic belief that divinity lies in nature dates from Indus River Valley civilization, while the later devotional works (the Vedas) are attached to the Aryan or Indo-European arrivals and date from 1500 to 500 B.C.E. as the center of Indian culture moved eastward to the Ganges plain. Monotheism was only practiced by a small people, the Hebrews, and during one brief period in Egypt.\(^10\)

The specific developments in regard to the applied use of technology had direct links to the sociological and ideological aspects of society as new segments arrived. In global societies,
increased interaction that began during this period led to increased segmentation in the
society undergoing technological change. The simple small-scale nomadic life of hunter-
gatherers gave way to more complex socio-economic patterns as new methods of
production led to a specialization of labor. This ultimately led to an exchange of goods and
services that necessitated places where this trade could take place, or urban centers.
Technology intermingled with religion as the use of improved tools still depended on the
abundance of natural elements – the sun, water, etc. – that provided the raw materials in a
society dependent on the elements for agricultural bounties (even with improved tools) and
whose representatives had to be placated.

The technical expertise which produced irrigation works and dams meant to mitigate the
excesses of too much and too little water, for instance, also somewhat paradoxically made
the societies that used them feel more dependent upon the raw material in these hydraulic-
based societies. They continued to believe that the natural world which furnished these
raw materials was governed by the extra-natural world dominated by deities which must be
propitiated. Innovation in technology thus was not isolated from other sectors of culture
and society.

The Classical Period: Observation of Nature and New Methods

The classical period -- which dates from approximately 500 B.C.E. to 500 C.E. -- saw the
emergence of cultural patterns which have become characteristic of societies to this
day. Some scholars have termed this age “the axial age,” as many of the great religions or
theological concepts emerged at this time or soon after.

Buddhism and Christianity emerged, high Brahmanism led to Hinduism in its final form,
and Islam emerged a century later. Confucianism and Daoism became dominant ideologies
in China. It was an age which saw the emergence of great empires. Quite often,
technological as well as scientific research were results of the emerging Chinese (Han),
Indian (Mauryan, Gupta) and Mediterranean (Hellenistic states and Roman Empire)
population centers with specific state needs. The noted scholar Dr. Joseph Needham in his
Science and Civilization in China series noted advancements during the Han Dynasty such
as the start of systematic study in botany and zoology, as well as work in astronomy and
calendar calculation. There was even a rather abortive attempt at a rational analysis of
science.11

The Han ruled from approximately 200 B.C.E. to 200 C.E. and came to power just after
the short lived Ch’in dynasty which united the country. They were in control except for a
very short period in the middle of their rule that facilitated change. The technological
developments were meant to be practical. Seismography was meant to measure and predict
earthquakes—a wise invention since natural disasters often presaged a change of
dynasty.12 Iron was developed and used as elsewhere for tools, utensils, and weapons.13
A paper making process that produced goods for export along with silk and other textile
goods via the process of spinning and weaving developed in the pre-Han period. 14 The
water wheel and water clock were developed for agriculture and China became famous for its ceramics and porcelain products which could be used for containers and domestic use. By the end of the period, the Great Silk Road (named after the most famous Chinese product traded) began in China and included many Chinese finished products; it became the major overland link between China, the Mediterranean, and parts in-between. As a result, urban centers already extant at the beginning of the period multiplied, as did the existing classes already associated with urbanization such as tradesmen, weavers, and iron workers.

India also applied scientific concepts in technology. During the Mauryan and Gupta eras between 300 B.C.E and 500 C.E., with an interregnum of about three centuries in-between, they also developed iron and textile industries based on scientific breakthroughs. In order to help farmers, they used astronomy to calculate both lunar and solar years. As in the case of China, they used the availability of iron and other applied aspects of metallurgy to strengthen roads.

It was in the mathematical sciences that India made its most lasting contribution in applied technology. In addition to the application of astronomy mentioned previously in terms of plotting the seasons for agricultural purposes, India developed coinage based on weights and measures for trading purposes. It also developed the concept of zero as well as the decimal system –although the use of the latter does date back to the Babylonians. India developed it further for practical purposes. The rudiments of algebra were imported from India via the Middle East as were aspects of geometry. The most long-lasting achievement from India during this period was in the creation of ordinal numbers of 1 to 9. Originally called Indian numerals, when transferred to the Middle East and then to Europe, it became Arabic numbers and is the basis for numeracy today. These imports from India had an enormous effect on commerce and business particularly, as they replaced the cumbersome Roman numeral system and made transactions such as double-entry book-keeping much easier.

It was the Greeks, or Hellenes as they termed themselves, who made the greatest shift in scientific thought in the classical period. They were the first to observe nature on a systematic basis. Even before the start of the classical period, Pythagoras had developed the basic geometric notion of the right triangle.

Afterward, Anaxagoras studied the eclipse of the sun and the moon; Theophrastus wrote on features of plants and animals; Thales of Miletus wrote on the atom; Aristarchus observed that the earth rotated on its axis and revolved around the sun; and Eratosthenes calculated that the world was round and the distance between the sun and the earth. Hippocrates developed the medical oath which is still administered today.

The major philosophers who were to dominate the succeeding Middle Ages, Plato and Aristotle, brought a new perspective to what is science. Although Plato claimed that the natural or material world was composed of a mere reflection of eternal unchanging forms
which are the true reality (the famous allegory of the cave), he did bring reasoning to his observations and considered mathematics with its abstract figures as the central discipline.²⁵

But it was Aristotle who was the first world-famous natural scientist. Although he agreed that there was a central eternal truth, he maintained that the material world constituted reality for the individual. He spent a lifetime in observation of natural sciences and developed a system of reasoning based on use of the inductive method of individual observation and experimentation followed by general conclusions based on deduction—the building blocks of the future scientific method. He further maintained that the world is in flux and we cannot make eternal generalization based on the ever-changing material world.²⁶

The succeeding Hellenistic and Roman periods, 320 B.C.E. to 27 C.E., and 300 B.C.E. to 476 C.E., respectively, put to practical use the ideas developed by the Greeks. Archimedes laid the basis of pre-Newtonian physics with its applied aspect of motion and Euclid, a founding father of geometry, applied his findings to levers and pulleys. Other Hellenistic applications included the Greek form of architecture based on human needs not on the metaphysical world, and with graceful columns in perfect symmetry which are universally recognized today.²⁷ The Hellenistic rulers of Egypt went even further as they built the largest library and museum of the known world at that time.²⁸ One unfortunate result was the tenet that the earth was the center of the universe, which was to dominate Western thinking for fifteen centuries.²⁹

The Romans were the engineers and architects of the classical age as they built a whole series of public buildings in the Greek style throughout their empire. They were famous for their roads, bridges, and aqueducts – some of which are in use today.³⁰ Science writing tended to be classifications of previous Greek writings. Galen, a Roman citizen of Greek extraction, compiled known writings of anatomy and physiology. Pliny collected Greek descriptions of the physical to write an encyclopedic book that described the known world.³¹

The Classical period brought changes to the socio-economic roles identified with large-scale empires such as the Han, Mauryan, Gupta, Hellenistic, and Roman Empires (also the Persian Empire, which developed an international phalanx of administrators) through employment of engineers, architects, scientists, educators, and administrators to serve the needs of empire, as well as craftsmen and artisans who produced goods for these large-scale empires.

Facets of cultures reflected the emerging technological and economic innovations including ideology. Classical Hinduism, for example, connected the spiritual aspects of Brahmanism in terms of the creator deity, Brahma, and his various parts with the caste divisions which were used to justify the emerging economic order. The Brahmins, the scholarly priestly class represented the often technically trained individuals versed in Classical Sanskrit who
were the bureaucrats in the Mauryan and Gupta empires as well as in the regional states in the Deccan and the South. They were said to represent the spiritual head of the creator deity. The Kshatriya or warrior caste represented the heart of the deity, and they used advanced weaponry composed of iron tools as well as the traditional cavalry. The loins which dealt with worldly concerns were represented by the commercial and artisan classes (Vaishya). The feet which supported the other elements were the sudras or peasants. As technology developed and called for specialized skills, sub-castes or the jati system appeared whereby occupational groups such as spinners and weavers came underneath the overall Vaishya caste.

Chinese philosophy in its various forms, especially Daoism (or Taoism) and Confucianism, emphasized harmony among the elements of the universe, nature, and the universe in search of order. In the realm of worldly affairs, this harmony was interpreted as the selection of individuals of high intelligence and ability who could enforce this cosmic order. These individuals would be revealed through a series of written examinations that included religious and philosophical knowledge. Those few who passed became an aristocracy of merit or mandarin class of wealth and influence sanctioned by Chinese spiritual underpinnings.33

The Greeks married the Hebrew concept of the high God or Yahweh (later Jehovah) to the Platonic ideal of universal forms that were reflected in everyday life. Thus, for instance, the form of justice would be mirrored by a just government. The rational system of the good based on the deductive ideas of Plato and the inductive observations of Aristotle was transformed from good to god as Greek rationalism was added to Hebraic faith so that natural philosophy became the term for science until the fifteenth century. 34 This fusion passed to the Hellenistic and Roman empires and then to their successors in the Middle East and Europe.

The Medieval World – 500 - 1400: Consolidation and Synthesis

This long period was characterized by the building upon what had gone on before. China under the Tang, Song, and Yuan dynasties developed earlier ideas to create the compass, gunpowder, an early version of napalm, and movable print. These inventions were to be fully realized elsewhere. Nonetheless, the Chinese did develop a considerable array of astronomical instruments. Labor-saving devices were started, such as the watermill and wheelbarrow.35 India, which lacked a central dynasty until 1526, tended to develop products that could be sold via the Indian Ocean and the Great Silk Road such as refined sugar, spun textiles, and indigo dye. They had developed advanced medical technical practices such as surgery, which found its way to the world.36

During this period, Europe retreated from the classical heritage and elevated faith over reason as the source of all knowledge. The Catholic (Universal) Church combined Platonic teachings with the idea of a high god from the Hebrews via Christians. In fact, Plato’s form of good as the greatest of forms had been converted to god. Knowledge including scientific
theory and technology was available through unquestioned faith, not through reason. The material world would inevitably decay but the eternal truth lay not in the environment but in the heavens or not in the physical world but in the metaphysical world beyond the senses. Life on earth, including the environment, was transient but beyond the human sphere it was eternal. The hereafter, not the here and now, was to be cherished. As most of the scholars and educators were churchmen, it was an easy equation.

A more conducive environment for the development of science and technology came with the arrival of Greek texts, especially Aristotle, which re-emerged via the Muslim-occupied Iberian Peninsula and Southwest Asia by 1200. The Muslims had salvaged and translated classical texts and they were one reason that this period was called the Golden Age of Islam.

With the availability of these texts, the dominant view that faith in Holy Scriptures came before rational inquiry and was superior to an empirical examination of the environment was challenged. This challenge came to be called scholasticism. The High Middle Ages saw a group of churchmen such Abelard, Ockham, and especially the greatest scholar of the age, Thomas Aquinas, who argued that reason could be used. They attempted to synthesize classical and Christian learning. They still used faith as superior to reason but argued that reason, especially that proceeding from the empirical observation of nature and from logic, was compatible with the eternal truths that revelation brings. Human reason was the servant of faith and was part of the understanding of god.

Within Christendom, there was a break between the Catholic West and the Orthodox East but both put their beliefs into elaborate architecture in magnificent structures which were meant to signify their allegiance to the Almighty. Based on Roman architecture, the churches and cathedrals were first called Romanesque then Gothic in the west; in the east, they were designated as part of Byzantine architecture.

The Golden Age of Islam occurred between approximately 800 and 1200 C.E. For these four centuries, Muslim culture including scientific endeavor was probably the most vibrant in the world. This Golden Age was a perfect example of how a synthesis of two cultures (in this case Greek and Indian) could enrich the recipient culture.

Geographically, the Islamic world was perfectly positioned to take advantage of more than one culture as it stretched from the Atlantic Ocean to Central Asia. It was itself influenced by a number of strains: Arab with an admixture of Persian, and Byzantine Greek. As it spread, it came into contact with other cultures—Turkish in central Asia and then Anatolia; South Asian/Indian and Malay/ Southeast Asian. As it expanded west, there were Berber influences in North Africa and Roman/Gothic influences in the Iberian Peninsula.

Quite often, synthesis involved syncretism between local culture and imported Muslim culture. The Swahili culture, for example, combined local primarily Bantu customs with imported Muslim ideas. Geographically, the central Muslim lands of Syria and Egypt had
been centers of Hellenistic Greek culture; after 750 as the caliphs or religious heads of Islam, who often also had political power, established their capital at Baghdad, Indian and Persian influence became greater.\textsuperscript{41} 

The Golden Age would not have been so golden if there had not been official support between the 9\textsuperscript{th} and 13\textsuperscript{th} centuries. Early in the 9\textsuperscript{th} century, the Bayt al-Hikma or House of Wisdom was established to translate foreign texts especially from Greek.\textsuperscript{42} At first, the goal was practical. Greek (including Aristotle’s writings) texts on medicine (as well as Indian texts) on medicine and pharmacology were imported to maintain the health of the elite. There was the medieval quest to turn base metal into gold so that the elite eagerly translated works on Alchemy.\textsuperscript{43} 

The greatest and most lasting work, as indicated earlier, was in mathematics. The Arabs imported Indian numerals which, when introduced to Europe, were called Arabic numbers. The concept of zero as well as decimals was borrowed from India, as well as the notion of linear and quadratic equations which form the basis of elementary geometry. Algebra—an Arabic word originally—was introduced to Europe via the Middle East. The abstract concepts of mathematics had a practical side, as they could be used for banking, bookkeeping, and probate issues.\textsuperscript{44} 

The translation of Greek and Latin works introduced rationalism as a philosophical strain by the 10\textsuperscript{th} century when Arabic itself became the language of philosophical and scientific inquiry. Well in advance of the scholastics, Muslims argued for the use of reason as well as faith in addressing worldly problems and in the search for knowledge. Some even went so far as to maintain that reason was superior to revelation. The scientists of the golden age not only translated classical works but did pioneering work in epidemiology in areas such as measles and smallpox. The comprehensive \textit{Canon of Medicine} was used in European medical schools as late as the 17\textsuperscript{th} century. Other scholars did work in physics and astronomy, with treatises on light refraction and reflection, the radius of the earth, the calculation of the solar year, as well as mathematic adjustments to astronomy. When classical theories were reintroduced to Europe, it was often through the translation of Arabic into Latin. 

Even when the golden age had passed after 1200, the Muslim world with an earlier tradition of rationalism was more advanced than Europe in areas of astronomy (until the 16\textsuperscript{th} century) and thus was more accepting of the Copernican theory of the solar system being sun-centered rather than earth-centered than both Catholics and Protestants who often looked upon this theory as a refutation of their own theology.\textsuperscript{45} 

\textbf{China} 

China, located at both the beginning and end of the major trading land route, the Great Silk Road, and newly expanded to the Indian Ocean with ports located on its south, had been a center of technological developments for much of its history. As early as 3500 B.C.E., the
people of what became China had been producing silk. By 1000, they had begun a tradition of bronze-casting and ceramics that were used to decorate tombs of rulers and the nobility. Even before the Middle Ages began around 500 C.E., they were using various media such as gold, jade, and lacquerware for various products such as urns and tools. Not long before this period, which is often called their classical period because of its influence on Chinese culture (The Han Era of 210 B.C. to 220 C.E), the Chinese had developed a cartography tradition for use in travel and had produced a seismograph to warn of the ever present danger of earthquakes; the crossbow for military purposes; and the horse collar and wheel barrow for agricultural purposes.

These advances in technology led to economic advances which stimulated trade that began in earnest during this period. While the Chinese imported from the West such items as wool, linen, and silver, the West, beginning with the Romans, desired gems, spices, and above all, Chinese silk which gave its name to the whole trading network.

One of the enduring mysteries about Chinese technology is that while China developed many inventions first, other regions made greater use of them through the widespread use of Chinese inventions, whether it was gunpowder combined with ordnance in Europe and the Islamic World or movable print combined with the printing press. The prevailing Chinese philosophies of Confucianism and Daoism, which emphasized individual harmony in accordance with nature, may have acted as a barrier to scientific and technological applications which emphasize the use of nature and the environment to produce a desired result.

Confucianism stressed conformity to tradition while Daoism put the emphasis on tranquility with the understanding that follows the unity inherent in nature. The net effect was to discourage the experimentation and empiricism that are part of scientific applications and technology.

In spite of the previously mentioned inhibiting factors, China during this period did build upon previous efforts of the Han Dynasty with the goal being the application of principles found in nature to the production of labor-saving devices. To this purpose, the watermill was developed not only to provide power for machinery but to grind tea leaves. Other efficient inventions extended some of the previous innovations of the Han period such as the foot stirrup and stem-post rudder. The Chinese, perhaps independently perhaps borrowing from India, began iron and steel casting.

These innovations were adopted in a basically orderly society. Even during moments of weakness that presaged the decline of the long-lived Tang Dynasty (618-906) and the Song Dynasty (960-1279), China was governed by a bureaucratic class (the mandarin system) selected on the basis of examinations derived from traditional texts on conduct, religion, history, and religion including the teachings of Confucius. This system was instituted in 605 and was to last until 1905. The examinations never changed but held the country...
together. At the same time, it was not a system that encouraged the innovations associated with applications of science and use of technology.\(^{51}\)

Whatever the climate of the times, it is clear that the four greatest inventions of this time were built upon earlier developments. These were the compass, printing, papermaking, and gunpowder. All of these breakthroughs had made an earlier appearance, but were put into operation during the Tang and Song periods.

They had immediate practical uses. The compass was useful for river and ocean navigation, papermaking as a means of communication, printing for mass dissemination of information, and gunpowder and “Greek fire” (an early form of napalm) for the same purpose.

Nevertheless, the Chinese never made full use of these breakthroughs.

- Although the Chinese did use the compass to locate the magnetic North Pole in their astronomical work, long-term use of the compass and their early version of the astrolabe really occurred widely only early in their brief period of exploration in the early 15th century.
- Paper was not widely used for printing as the Chinese became famous for the aesthetic value of their calligraphy imprinted on both paper and ceramics.
- The number of Chinese characters—by some calculations 1,500 in number—made movable type impractical so that it was not until Gutenberg in the 15th century that there developed a machine for movable type.
- Gunpowder was used (as was Greek Fire) for firearms but mostly for fireworks or explosives.\(^{52}\) It took the Europeans and the Muslim world to make use of gunpowder in conjunction with the appearance of new ordnance such as cannon and muskets at the end of the period with their use by the Iberians in the Americas and by the appearance of the “Gunpowder Empires” centered on the Muslim empires of the Ottomans, Safavids, and Moghuls.

Essentially Chinese applications had two uses during the period: practical uses and export potential so as to bring in specie. Under the first category were matches, the double-action piston pump, the iron plough, the horse collar, the multi-tube seed drill, the suspension bridge, the parachute, natural gas as a fuel, the raised-relief map, the sluice gate, and the pound lock. Under the second category—export potential-- came currency.\(^ {53}\)

Trade flourished both within China and overseas, and the encouragement of technology led to breakthroughs in currency as mints were set up in the cities of Kaifeng and Hangzhou. They gradually increased production so that by 1080, the mints produced five billion coins (roughly 50 per Chinese citizen). In addition, the first banknotes were produced in 1023. These coins were so durable that they would still be in use 700 years later, in the eighteenth century.\(^ {54}\)

As a result, in spite of silver and gold from America, after 1500, China still had the largest supply of specie in the globe. During this period, China also became the world’s leading exporter on the basis of its desirable goods, which made it the largest holder of wealth (as
well as population) until 1700. It became especially notable for its luxury goods. Its preeminence in woven silk produce which gave the name to the largest trade outlet at this time was joined by other products of the loom and wheel such as wool, cotton, and linen.

It made progress in turning its long-sought ceramics – through a technology which glazed through high heat and imparted colors that were impervious to water – into a new product of porcelain which soon equaled the demand for silk on a global basis. The various objects made of porcelain, such as bowls and utensils, became so dominant in the marketplace that the generic term “china,” usually coupled with the adjective “fine,” dominated the world marketplace. Chinese porcelains, silks and other woven textiles which were based on technology (along with spices, carved ivory and lacquerware itself produced through applied science) ensured China a favorable balance of trade long after its Middle Ages had come to a close.\(^{55}\)

The period of medieval innovation and invention gradually declined after 1279, when the native Song Dynasty was overthrown by the Mongol Yuan Dynasty. This foreign dynasty was more involved with adapting to Chinese culture than in embarking upon any new uses of applied science and technology of its own. It was replaced by the native Ming Dynasty in 1368. This dynasty except for its global expeditions in the Indian Ocean and to Africa in the early 15th century was basically inward looking and conservative.\(^{56}\) As a result, innovations and inventions that involved scientific and technological applications were not encouraged.

**India**

After 500, except for a brief period in the early 7th century, India lacked a central government which might encourage science and technology. However, it had a number of flourishing regional states where such applications of science and technology were encouraged. In addition, its caste system gave a high place to the Brahmin scholar caste, which included mathematicians and scientists as part of the learned elite. The sub-continent’s location athwart both the great Silk Road and the Indian Ocean encouraged trade, which in turn encouraged the development of new products.

Culturally, India, through the extension of both Buddhist and Hindu culture, vied with China for influence in Southeast Asia. It also directly joined the World of Islam, which in fact occupied portions of the sub-continent during this period and, as has been seen, was influenced by it.

As recounted earlier, Indian innovations in mathematics were translated to the Middle East and then to Europe and applied to business with a resultant stimulus to commerce.\(^{58}\) Mathematical discoveries in northern India and later in Kerala which explored the concept of \(\pi\) were applied to astronomical observations. The Kerala School of mathematics revised the discoveries of the great Indian mathematician Aryabhata in the late fifth century to accurately trace the paths of Venus and Mercury around the Sun well before Kepler.\(^{59}\)
passing it should also be noted that the nature of the atom was explored by Buddhist scholars just before this time). 60

On a more practical level, Indian chemists developed the world famous dye indigo and exported it globally. They were pioneers in cotton textiles. The origins of the spinning wheel may have been in India, among other places. The device certainly reached Europe from India by the 14th century. The cotton gin was invented in India as a mechanical device known as charkhha, the “wooden-worm-worked roller.” 61

India was active in metallurgy. It was the first to produce wootz, a form of steel. It was also active in the extraction of metals such as zinc, which was used for both manufacturing and medical purposes. During this period diamonds were produced and exported.62 Another luxury product that was the product of applied science and technology during this period was the refining of sugar. Candied sugar was also refined in India at this time for those who had a sweet tooth and as an aid to dentistry.63 Kashmir produced the world-famous Cashmere wool during this period with its most famous item being the Cashmere shawl. Jute from what is now Bengal was also produced. The final product of Muslin, although identified with the city of Mosul in Iraq, was actually produced in Dhaka in what is now the republic of Bangladesh (formerly east Bengal).64

Other technological advancements at this time included the diffusion of Indian and Persian irrigation technologies, which gave rise to an advanced irrigation system, thus bringing about significant economic growth. It was particularly vital to the rise of the Cashmere wool industry.

New techniques made possible varieties of glass molding and decoration for Indian products that were exported.65 As was the case for China, gunpowder and naphtha were used for fireworks and after this period, the province of Gujarat exported saltpeter for gunpowder to Europe. However, the full use of firearms was delayed until the arrival of the Moghuls in 1526. India also produced silver and gold coins in northern and southern India respectively.66 Indo-Islamic architecture, which combined indigenous Indian patterns with Muslim influences, also developed.

Islamic architecture was highly diverse by culture and climate and can be typically marked for its love of geometrical pattern, arabesque ornamentation and innovative patterns. There were variations among different regions. However, it still stands as an example of a synthesis of different styles built upon previous foundations as represented by mosques, tombs, forts, and palaces. 67

India was fortunate in that after the unification of northern and central India with the coming of the Moghuls in 1526 many of the applied scientific and technological developments were continued. In fact, for another century and a half many of them were extended. This trend was especially true in the areas of metallurgy, textiles, architecture, and gunpowder. Only with the encroachment of outside European powers such as the
Portuguese, Dutch, French, and English did India as a center of scientific and technological applications decline, as Moghul power gradually disintegrated.

Even then, many Indian technological innovations were transmitted through these same powers to Europe. A number of Indian industries, however, did last longer, such as Indian cottons, Cashmere wool, and Bengal jute and muslin, until they were overwhelmed by machine-made products of the British Industrial Revolution during the course of the nineteenth century (although somewhat ironically the names still exist, such as Cashmere sweaters and Muslin dresses even if not entirely or mostly made in India, so powerful is the brand name and heritage.)

Europe

If there is one area that is characteristic of synthesis and consolidation in the Middle Ages it is Europe, which blended classical traditions, Germanic customs, and the Christian heritage in its overall culture, including applied science and technology. Often, the early part of the Middle Ages in Europe is depicted as the “Dark Ages” for learning, including the uses of science and technology. In fact, this is a relative term. It is true that a period of disorganization set in after the collapse of the Roman Empire at the end of the 5th century and Europe continued to be unsettled by a series of invasions and migrations through the 10th century.

However, there were always exceptions. The Byzantine Empire centered in the southeastern part of Europe (and often called the East Roman Empire) continued in some ways both the Latin and Greek heritage and ultimately helped to convert the Balkan Peninsula and Russia to the Eastern Orthodox version of Christianity, as well using the Greek alphabet to transliterate Slavic languages just as Latin was used for both the Romance and Germanic languages in western and central Europe.

Roman influences did remain in parts of Spain, especially on the Mediterranean coast and much of southeastern Gaul (France). Much of Italy, except for the northern and north-central parts, had remnants of Roman culture. The Roman heritage also brought the Catholic heritage with it, so that German invading tribes after some initial divergences centered on Arianism adopted the Catholic tradition.

There were also glimmers of “light” in these Dark Ages. Charlemagne established the Carolingian empire over France and much of Germany and Italy briefly in the late 8th and early 9th century and attempted to reinstitute the Roman tradition with a German overlay but this “Carolingian Renaissance” was brief. A similar Renaissance in Anglo-Saxon England under Mercian hegemony in the eighth century was also brief. Even on the fringes of western Europe, which had never been formally Romanized or Christianized, the “Celtic Renaissance” centered on Ireland and Wales was brief, as these areas joined the orthodox version or Roman Catholic version, and the latter prevailed.
The early Middle Ages (500-1000) is considered “dark” because other areas of the globe—the Islamic world, China, and India—were undergoing periods of enlightenment in which new information including technological and scientific thought was coming forth. In addition, unlike much of Europe which had lapsed somewhat into rural isolation and lacked the critical mass of urban centers that were always centers of information and innovation, other areas of the globes had thriving urban centers.

Finally, the tradition of higher learning had lapsed so that officially there were no formally recognized ‘universities’ in this period and therefore what passed for higher learning took place in monasteries (often in basements) and cathedral schools. 70 Myths or rather shibboleths have grown up in regard to the acceptance of science information and its uses. Due to the preeminence of church teaching, any theories which challenged church beliefs regarded as dogma could be derogated and its proponents might suffer consequences in this world—and the next!

Some claim that church propositions could never be challenged in regard to nature. Thus, it is maintained that church intellectuals and their followers held that the earth was flat and to argue otherwise was heresy. In fact, this was never central to church belief. Beginning with Boethius, scientists argued (often quoting Aristotle) that the earth was spherical (some of Aristotle’s writings were available even at this time, as were those of other classical writers). Less challenged but not unquestioned was the geocentric theory that the earth not the sun was the center of the universe (or the Heliocentric theory). Again, classical writings based on observations cast doubt on this as did later scholasticists who coupled observations with logic and reason.

Thinkers such as Abelard, Ockham, and Thomas Aquinas intimated that there were grounds to question the geocentric theory but did not directly refute it. It took Copernicus on his deathbed to affirm what had become obvious if not spoken in the minds of many people. The Protestant Reformation made it easier for northern European writers such as Kepler and Brahe to put forth their views on planetary information as well as other writers on science such as Pascal in later times.71

In addition, throughout the period, although the presentation of technological and scientific breakthroughs did accelerate after 1000, there were new developments in Europe. These developments can be divided into three categories: early technological innovations which existed throughout the period, internal European innovations, and external scientific and technological applications that were made more effective after arrival in Europe.

The watermill, although in existence elsewhere, was resident in Europe throughout the period. The uses of hydraulic power were manifold. In mining, it multiplied the sources of energy. It could be used for sawmills and timber mills on the same principles. Its major usage was in farming where it was much more efficient in growing more crops on less land with greater efficiency and in less time. Other applications in farming were the cutting of weeds and the increasing of drainage.
Also present throughout the period were stirrups, which made a difference in warfare as they allowed more mobility in close cavalry engagements. Found throughout the period, if available elsewhere earlier, was the iron plough whose strength and flexibility in agriculture was evident in Europe as elsewhere. 72

Many technological and scientific applications appear to have originated or made their first appearance in Europe. Spectacles, for instance, were in existence by 1300 in Europe. With the growth of towns and universities after 1000 C.E. people often worked into the night so that this application of the refraction of light was very valuable. Also making their appearance during the “High Middle Ages” (ca. 1000-1300) were the mechanical clock and the longbow. A magnetic clock had existed elsewhere, but it had been directed to astronomical calculation. This version of the clock standardized time and allowed individuals the opportunity to schedule their activities appropriately. The longbow also made its appearance during this period. The crossbow had been used elsewhere, but this weapon, which was first observed in use in Wales and then England, made use of both mathematics and physics and was the most effective weapon in terms of accuracy and efficiency. It proved very effective for the English during the earlier phases of the Hundred Years’ War. 73

The third category consisted of technological innovations elsewhere which received additional improvements in Europe as well as added usage. The religious crusades brought Europe directly in contact with the Islamic World for over a century which made easier the acquisition of improvements via practical applications such as “Arabic numbers.” 74

These improvements came in the later Middle Ages (1300-1400/25), which seems appropriate as they were related to sea navigation that was a hallmark of the transformational 15th century -- a century of exploration and related technological development which marks the division between medieval and early modern times. In this vein, ships using the lateen sail whose purpose was to sail for and against the wind were converted into a three or more sail ship called the caravel which could sail into the stormier Atlantic Ocean as opposed to the calmer Mediterranean Sea. 75 The rudder used for steering was strengthened with an iron attachment to the stern. 76 The compass which plotted direction to the north and south magnetic poles was converted from a “wet compass” to a “dry compass” without dependency upon a bowl of water so it could be used for land as well as navigation by sea, plus use for surveying. 77 Finally, the astrolabe, which measured sailing by latitude and for time by utilizing a ship’s relationship to sun, moons, and the stars, was strengthened by using metal as the material, not wood, which might be affected by water. 78

Obviously, later in the 15th century, the innovation of movable type and ordnance to go with gunpowder were revolutionary, but those developments belong to the next period of early modern times.
The one development in Europe which epitomized both synthesis and consolidation during this time in terms of synthesis and consolidation of classical, Christian, and Germanic influences was in medieval architecture, particularly church construction. Romanesque architecture followed the Roman model in terms of both form and material of stone. It had round arches, barrel vaults and cruciform floors which supported vaults.\(^7\) It was succeeded after 1100 C.E. by Gothic architecture, which reflected the Germanic tendency towards verticality with skeletal stone structures in addition to pointed arches and clusters of columns. It was topped by sharply pointed spires and pinnacles. Its windows were of stained glass which showed biblical stories and illustrated lives of the saints.

The bulk of these structures demonstrated the primacy of the Universal Church since they were mostly cathedrals and churches. During this period, civic buildings and palaces exhibited these trends but the outstanding examples were clerical structures.\(^8\) With the advent of the Renaissance and the new emphasis on the here and now instead of the hereafter, architecture became more secular and less dominated by religious symbolism.

The Medieval period witnessed the advent of global trade facilitated by new forms of technology. This development fostered the growth of cities. In turn, growing urban centers served as the incubator of discrete business and professional classes as well as further specialization in the occupational professions. When coupled with improved business practices previously covered, the basis of an emerging middle class was established.

Notes

8 Ibid., p.7.
9 Ibid., p. 21 and Ibid., p. 25.
10 http://www.culturalindia.net/indian-history/ancient-india/vedic-civilization.html and retrieved on June 21, 2016 and Fiero, p.93
14 Fiero, pp. 86-87.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Luce Boulnois, Silk Road. (New York: Norton & Company, 2005), Chapter One.
18 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
27 Buckley, Chapter III.
28 Fiero, pp. 59-60.
29 Buckley, chapter V.
30 Fiero, pp. 73-79.
31 Buckley, Chapter V.
33 Fiero, pp. 25-26; 43; 137-138.
34 Consult, for example, http://www.bibleorigins.net/HellenismSeedBedChristianity.html, retrieved on June 26, 2016.
36 http://www.crystalinks.com/chinascience.html
38 Fiero, p. 152.
39 Ibid., pp.153-156.
40 Ibid., pp. 157-173.
43 Ibid.
44 Egger, pp. 128-29.
Ibid.
Huff, pp. 34-39.
http://education.asianart.org/explore-resources/background-information/science-tang-618%E2%80%9393906-and-song-960%E2%80%93931279-dynasties See also http://www.rationalargumentator.com/index/blog/tag/inventions/, both retrieved on May 1, 2016.
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceza/eng/zt/zgabc/t165406 retrieved on May 1, 2016; Huff goes extensively into the reasons for the lack of Chinese initiative in Chapters 7 and 8 and makes the point that the groundwork for the later emergence of Europe as the center of scientific inquiry and use of technological applications was laid during the previous two to three centuries before 1400, while China stagnated.
Boulnois, Chapters 1,2; Fiero, pp. 18-139.
See also, Egger, pp.129-130.
Ibid.
See, for example, http://score.rims.k12.ca.us/score_lessons/cotton_gin/, retrieved on April 27, 2016
https://playcreatelearn.wordpress.com/2012/07/24/indian-textiles-part-1/ See also http://char.txa.cornell.edu/IndianTex.htm, both retrieved on May 1, 2016.
Fiero, Chapters 5,6.
Ibid., pp. 150-151.
73 https://prezi.com/c1i0yft5jvd7/medieval-europe-inventions/, retrieved on May 4, 2016.
74 Egger, pp. 129-130.
76 Lawrence V. Mott, “The Development of the Rudder AD 100-1600,”
80 Ibid., pp.157-162.
ISIS and Apocalypse: Some Comparisons with End Times Thinking Elsewhere and a Theory

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Abstract

This paper will review “End Times Thinking” in Jewish, Christian and Islamic cultures to identify some common themes among myriad differing details. Simply put, some people have believed for hundreds or thousands of years that their prophets will return someday to rescue humankind from sin (or in a common Shi’ite version, a son of the Prophet Mohammed will return, named or called the “Mahdi”). Some Christians think that Jesus will return to administer vast changes, ranging from “rapture” to annihilation; some Jews that a “Messiah” is destined for those tasks, but focused on saving the Hebrew people of Israel. Generally, the earth is supposed to be purified by these processes, so that some “true” religion can be manifest on the entire earth, which would then be free of war, famine and perhaps suffering of all kinds.

I then present a theory based on behavior genetics and the “selfish gene” hypothesis. This suggests that such beliefs may reflect an ancient template that encourages some to believe that they alone are the center of both the universe and God’s love. Some think that God wants them alone to populate the earth, or rule everyone else. Such people are easy prey for demagogues who abound in desperate places and royal courts. This is demonstrated today in ISIS. In the early history of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS or Mormons), a group of Mormons killed some 120 people from the East who were on their way to California. This shows that a belief system of exceptionalism can arise in churches of much more recent origin. Today, a radical group of Mormons that follows this idea is exemplified by the Bundy family of Southern Nevada, USA. ISIS is still killing hundreds of people, but the LDS Church made some changes in the late 1800s that helped them coexist better with others. How the LDS Church came to grips with modernity and literally decided to coexist agreeably with others provides some clues to how any church or religion might moderate so that a real “end” to civilization (and possibly humankind) can be avoided. The presence and spread of WMDs (Weapons of Mass Destruction) lends urgency to this fix.

Introduction

In 1979 I encamped with a “Christian Patriots Defense League Freedom Festival” surrounded by armed militia (‘protecting’ us from … someone). I was prepared to learn about reloading ammunition, long term food storage, Bible study with non-traditional Bibles, and other survival skills useful for the Apocalypse they believed was soon to come. But I actually came to study that kind of thinking, common in the deserts of my youth, and significant to causes of war I had now decided to study seriously. Forty-seven years later
end times thinking remains common today, and is not confined to Christianity. To some degree it is eternal, surviving every projected deadline for apocalypse to come (so far!). I have seen dozens of cults rise and fall since with their leaders’ predictions about divinely ordained “End Times” that are always close, but never arrive.

Such end times thinking is often associated with violent behaviors and ‘militant religion.’ The modern gang or death cult ISIS expresses a particularly virulent Islamic version. They think the world is destined to transform at a decisive battle between good and evil (unbelievers) in Dabiq, Syria where Western “Crusaders” will be defeated and a global Islamic Caliphate will be born. In their dreams of course. But dreams are enough to inspire suicide bombers, mass rapes of captured women, and beheadings of hundreds (maybe thousands) of people including a great many Muslims not “pure” enough for ISIS. They subscribe to a particularly harsh ‘Wahhabi’ school of Sunni Islam, so Shi’ites are as much at risk as Christians and Jews where ISIS rules.

While much less publicly brutal, and far fewer, there are Jewish enthusiasts among settlers in the territories occupied by Israel who are just as committed to ruling the whole world in due time. But first they must establish “Eretz Yisrael” stretching roughly from the Nile in Egypt to the Euphrates River in current Iraq. They work on that diligently, confiscating a few hectares every day from Palestinian land on the West Bank of the Jordan River, slowly digesting it. There are millions of “Christian Zionists” who have a similar interpretation of scriptures that they think are infallible. If you dig deep, you can find hundreds of versions of allegedly infallible scriptures and interpretations of scripture. An especially violent version I heard at the Christian Patriot’s Defense League Freedom Festival claimed that the one ‘god’ of all these faiths would kill one third of all Jews promptly, another third more slowly, until the surviving third renounces Judaism and converts to Christianity. This is a very strange way for a ‘loving’ and ‘omnipotent’ god to treat ‘his’ ‘favorite’ peoples. Could there be something else behind such thinking?

I think so and perhaps even know what that is. Selfish genes may be even more powerful than we thought. So after briefly reviewing varieties of apocalyptic thinking among “peoples of the books,” I will introduce a theory about origins based on behavior genetics.

First: some solutions, because describing problems often crowds out time for solving them. Modern terrorism begs to be solved right away. Millions of unemployed teen-aged males are maturing today in desperate circumstances. Demagogues and WMDs await them. Dialogue among civilizations is one solution to frictions that are inevitable when civilizations encounter each other. Dialogue can make the difference between destructive clashes and productive encounters with fertile consequences for all. The IS CSC is a pillar of that paradigm, so kudos to its members. Youth who have vision can also help, so cultivation of enlightened youth who are searching for wisdom instead of memorizing dogma and learning to fight for “god” is another solution. But we cannot expect them to come to us; we must go to them, even into deep deserts and favelas of the world.
End Times Thinking

End Times Thinking, or beliefs that the world is destined to “end” in some global war of good against evil ordained by a ‘God,’ has many roots. Sometimes it is called Apocalyptic thinking, because one root is ancient scriptures in the Jewish Torah and the Christian New Testament. “Apocalypse” actually derives from ancient Greek and means uncovering hidden truths about the world, but its meaning has been conflated with Armageddon, named for the place where Jewish mythology puts the decisive battle where good defeats evil and multitudes of humans including many Hebrews die young by violence. Interestingly, that place is a biblical hill called Megiddo, south of Haifa in modern Israel. Why such thinkers often expect the end of the world to ignite in their neighborhood may be one clue, as is the persistence of such stories even when hundreds of deadlines are passed without the earth or even human civilization self-destructing. Yet.

Michael White of the University of Texas, Austin, claims this idea began when the Temple of Solomon was destroyed and Hebrews were enslaved by the Babylonian Empire in 586 BCE. He then summarizes 600 years of repression culminating in a four year war with the Romans who crushed them and destroyed the rebuilt Temple again. Then he writes:

“The destruction of Jerusalem in the year 70 C.E. leads to yet another stage of apocalyptic reinterpretation. They have to retell their story. They have to rethink their own past. ... In the period between roughly 75 and 100 C.E. we have a proliferation of new Jewish apocalypses, documents like Fourth Israel, or Second Baruch, or the Apocalypse of Abraham.”

Therefore many scholars conclude that prophecies of doom in scripture often reflect historical consequences of the clash between Rome and both Jews and Christians from this period, not predictions of events thousands of years in the future. Many Christian theologians think the same about the “Book of Revelation.” This book of the New Testament is filled with highly symbolic images, an Antichrist, with active angels and demons engaged in a final war between good and evil where multitudes are slaughtered. “Revelation” is often cited by Christian fundamentalists as a historical guide to the future. But a different “historical-critical” school of Biblical interpretation says these are just codes for conflicts that ended almost 2000 years ago.

A famous public intellectual Noam Chomsky said in an interview on Jan. 31, 2016 that:

There are not too many countries in the world where two-thirds of the population awaits The Second Coming, Chomsky said, adding that half of them think it is going to be in their lifetimes. “And maybe a third of the population believes the world was created 10,000 years ago, exactly the way it is now. Things like that are pretty weird, but that is true in the United States and has been for a long time.”

Such beliefs endure to this day. The end of the second millennium after the birth of Jesus (2000) focused many such anxieties, inspiring the “Christian Patriots” I camped with, and
authors like Hal Lindsay. Lindsay (along with Carole Carlson) wrote “The Late Great Planet Earth” in 1970, which was reprinted by Zondervan dozens of times and ultimately sold about 35 million copies. He wrote a sequel, “The 1980’s: Countdown to Armageddon,” and Lindsay was followed by Tim LaHaye and Jerry B. Jenkins who wrote another best-selling series called “Left Behind.” There appears to be a big market for such ‘prophesies.’ The technical term “eschatology” was created for the study of end times alleged by a myriad of faith traditions. Hal Lindsay’s version has been labeled “premillennial, dispensational eschatology” for example, but there are many others, few of which die when deadlines pass without global destruction and visions go unfulfilled.

As noted earlier, Islam has versions of its own, both Sunni and Shia. Here the Mahdi is assisted by Jesus, who by inference is a secondary figure, but still respected and powerful. Some versions have Moses helping too. One can find rough analogues among the Hindu, Buddhist and Taoist traditions. End times thinking resonates with something, and desperate people have needed hope for a long time. With millions of poorly educated and unemployed youth pouring out of failed or failing states today, we cannot safely watch this process forever. Demographics is destiny, and a volcanic pressure is building. So I turn now to a simpler hypothesis of how such behaviors might come to be, and a search for what that might suggest for solutions.

Selfish Genes

Behavior genetics considers something called the “selfish gene” hypothesis, which posits that natural selection will encourage behaviors that promote aggressive propagation of those genes indifferent to anything like human morals, unless they are constrained by other factors like kin selection for altruism, group selection for more general cooperative behaviors, or laws, social norms and police with big batons who declare that people cannot kill their neighbors just because they want their stuff, or think they are better than others. Another label for this idea is secular government instead of theocracy. So that is another solution to this problem, if you can establish and protect secular governments. And those must be committed to protecting minorities, all minorities including the ultimate minority – individuals – lest they degenerate into police states.

The essence of “selfish genes” is to promote selfish ideas among individuals and groups with ideas that contribute to group cohesion when faced with a world of problems and human competitors. Models of group behaviors that result can be found in the territorial competitions of chimpanzees and baboons. The phenomena of in-group / out-group double standards and demonizing “others” reflects this ancient pattern. When uncontrolled by conscience or effective social actions this selfishness animates both psychopaths and demagogic leaders of death cults.

A great deal of thought and commentary about a possible “Clash of Civilizations” followed a paper (and subsequent book) by former ISCSC member Samuel Huntington in 1993. Current events, and the rise of militant religious terrorism, provide practical reasons to
revisit this topic now. The clash is not just philosophy or social science theory; it’s real and intersects with other important clashes like tradition vs. modernity, and wealth vs. poverty. On November 21, 2015, the BBC World News reported that apocalyptic thinking is integral to ISIS organizing in Syria and Iraq, and has such appeal that it is attracting thousands of European and other youth to join the ISIS cause to create a modern Caliphate.\textsuperscript{10} Millions of teenaged males are now maturing in desperate circumstances in many more places than Iraq and Syria, and they are very vulnerable to demagogues. These are problems that need to be solved sooner rather than later.

This is a solvable problem, albeit hideously expensive and awkward for professors. It cannot be solved just from classrooms, because most of the people who believe such things do not come to our classes or read our books. Someone must go into the field and tame them. After a few days at that Christian Patriots gathering, I had enough courage to ask a KKK speaker if it was really true that the Bible taught that all Jews are evil and all blacks were born to be slaves, as he claimed. He quoted from Luke 29, a section I read in his Bible that does not occur in mine! So to actually rebut the guy, I would have had to pull out a Bible of my own to point out differences. One only goes so far when undercover in remote locations surrounded by armed militia! But the practical point is, religious extremism is taught, and the solution to that is better, non-extremist teaching.

Moments later a tiny old man pulled my ear down to whisper “The funny thing is, they always forget that Jesus was a Jew!” Perhaps I was not the only person there to study them that day.

\textbf{The Bundy Clan of Southern Nevada, USA}

Cliven Bundy was a fairly ordinary and therefore unknown rancher on lands near Bunkerville, Nevada who decided changes in federal grazing fees on Bureau of Land Management (BLM) administered land were excessive and stopped paying them in 1993. Bundy continued to graze his cattle on these federal lands for 20 years, while courts and other bureaucracies moved slowly, and his debts piled up. On March 27, 2014, the BLM closed some of that land and on April 5 started to roundup trespass cattle. Self-styled “militia” enthusiasts gathered, and on April 12 a group of armed protesters confronted the men employed by the feds to round up the cattle. The BLM then backed down to avoid bloodshed.

This made Cliven Bundy a mini-hero in the “Sovereign Citizens” movement, one of dozens of names used over the years for conflicts between rural folk and the federal government extending over generations and to many other parts of the USA. “Posse Comitatus,” the “Oath Keepers,” and “Freemen” are other groups in this diffuse network of discontent. At that time national press seldom if ever noticed that Mr. Bundy had 14 children and subscribed to a fundamentalist wing of the LDS Church. This is relevant to the genetic theory noted here. Two of his seven sons made news again on January 2, 2016, when they occupied the headquarters of the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge in eastern Oregon with
armed militia in support, allegedly, of two other ranchers from that area who had been convicted of arson and sentenced to prison. Ammon Bundy claims he began leading this occupation after receiving a divine message ordering him to do so.\textsuperscript{11, 12}

This time the Federal government waited weeks, but not years, to try to contain the situation and persuade the armed occupiers to go home. There were many initiatives including town hall meetings where the public expressed respect for common concerns but also asked the occupiers to go home peacefully. But those efforts failed and the patriarch Cliven Bundy even served the Oregon Harney County Sheriff with a legal notice from Nevada, by registered mail, on February 1, 2016 that the county and federal officials had to stand down because “The People” owned both Malheur National Wildlife Refuge and a whole lot more.

A neighbor of Mr. Bundy, Robert “LaVoy” Finicum, 54, had joined the Bundy sons in Oregon and swore never to be arrested if the occupation turned violent. Armed, and after resisting arrest at a traffic stop in Grant County, Oregon, Finicum was shot and killed on January 26, 2016, and became a martyr for this cause. Ultimately, even Cliven Bundy was arrested at the Portland, OR airport on February 10, 2016,\textsuperscript{13} trying to get to his sons to support their part of the revolution against federal authorities.

Now here is the point of this long digression. Mormonism did not exist 2-3,000 years ago when Jewish and Christian scriptures were written, or 1400 years ago when Islam’s Qur’an was made. The LDS Church was formally organized by a man named Joseph Smith in 1830 in Upstate New York. It became known for polygamy, aggressive proselytization, and block voting, which alienated enough neighbors that they were run out of New York to points west, and then from Missouri to Nauvoo, Illinois where the founder and his brother were shot dead in 1844. Surviving Mormons fled west under a new leader Brigham Young and eventually settled in the Salt Lake Valley of Utah. Young eventually had 55 wives, 59 children (from 16 wives), and, according to Bagley, approved the Mountain Meadows Massacre trying to protect his chosen people from potential genocide by the US Army,\textsuperscript{14} although the Church disputes this point (that Young approved or ordered the massacre; after years of denial the murders of about 120 Christians heading for California has been thoroughly documented and admitted by the Church). Mormonism is less than 200 years old, but it expresses behaviors institutionally that one would expect of selfish genes, driven by arithmetic and scripture to try to outnumber everyone else who is not a ‘pure’ member of God’s chosen elect.

Dig under the skin of ISIS and you can see another example of the selfish gene theory. ISIS rose from disaffected Sunni’s in Iraq and Syria. And it was fueled by Saudi money. Ask why the founding King of modern Saudi Arabia, Abdulaziz Ibn Saud, had 45 sons from more than one wife and many “consorts” and you can see a similar belief system wrapped in totally different scriptural justifications. King Saud and his ancestors made a deal with imams of the ultra-strict Wahhabi branch of Sunni Islam that he would subsidize their proselytization massively, if and only if they would agree to cause trouble only OUTSIDE of the Kingdom. So today they fund thousands of extremist religious schools, called madrassas, in Pakistan and in scores of other countries, which teach that unbelievers will
ultimately submit to Sharia Law administered by clerics authorized by conservative guardians of orthodoxy, like current Saudi Arabia and Iran are ruled, except that Iran has Shiite and even deeper Persian roots. It bears emphasis that the bitterest active rivalry in that area today is between Sunni Saudi Arabia, and Shi’ite Iran. Both include minorities of the other, who suffer from that fate.

This belief system encourages perpetual wars and occasional genocides, because frictions between “true believers” in theological purity and neighbors can easily turn lethal. And when people have 45 sons and even more daughters like Ibn Saud did, or just 14 children like Cliven Bundy did (or 11 as LaVoy Finicum had) they inevitably want (in their eyes “need”) more land, which is usually owned by someone else on our crowded earth today. Hence the endless conflicts in western North America (and in deserts everywhere) over water and arable land.

You see the same belief system among the settler movement in Israel which has been colonizing occupied territories since 1948 but more aggressively since 1967. “Settlers” have a birth rate about twice the already high base, and this combined with migration encouraged by both policy and ideology leads to a 5-6% increase in Jewish residents of West Bank territories per year since 2001. A sustained 5% growth rate means doubling every 14 years. They “need” more land too, and they are taking it from loser Palestinians, millions of whom were already displaced to Gaza, Lebanon and other neighbors where they animate very violent and extreme political movements like Hamas and Hezbollah dedicated to destruction of Israel and the Jews therein.

Such demographic and ideological wars have been fought before. Consider the “Religious Wars” between Catholics and Protestants in 15th and 16th century Europe. And the colonization of both North and South American by people of European ancestries. In Minnesota USA, the population changed from 1% European and 99% Native American in the year 1800 C.E., to 99% white Europeans in 1900 C.E., with the remaining 1% divided about equally between Native Americans and blacks. That is a total demographic transformation in just one century, and a belief called “Manifest Destiny” was integral to that. Selfish genes, religious language. The history of humankind is littered with such conflicts including thousands of wars, genocides and near genocides. Some are happening in the Middle East today where Christians are at risk, and a close read of the Bible shows that they happened all too often thousands of years ago as well.

We turn now to how Mormons adjusted to such pressures, and how the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints even changed doctrines to better coexist with other cultures in the deserts and mountains where my relatives killed each other over selfish genes wrapped in religious language.
Implications of the “Selfish Gene” Hypothesis for Solutions to Current Dilemmas

The Selfish Gene hypothesis suggests that in addition to simpler forms of selfishness that are better understood, evolution may have produced a behavioral template for mass violence against conspecifics (other humans) from “other” groups, under conditions of stress and encroachment. Considered alone, this would have severe implications for war and genocide. It would suggest they are inevitable, but they are not.

The history of human life on earth also provides contrary examples of peaceful existence, and even coexistence with other groups. Former ISCSC President Matthew Melko wrote about “52 Peaceful Societies” in 1973. And despite over 3,000 wars and hundreds of genocides, many civilizational conflicts once thought inevitable have quietly calmed down over time. Stephen Pinker of Harvard notes that the actual frequency of wars and casualties of war have been slowly declining since about 1994 (year of the Rwandan genocide).

The Mormon experience provides these clues to why, and how peace can be promoted even among “chosen peoples.” Having suffered enormously from living a “strange” religion and proselyting it to others, LDS Church leaders made three major changes. They moderated the aggressive proselytization that got them in such trouble during the early days (no one wants strangers trying to convert their children by threats). They accepted the superior political authority of the US government (without yielding their claim to supreme religious authority, as many other churches and others claim to this day). And they renounced polygamy as church doctrine in 1890 so that Utah could become a formal US state in 1896.

Of course there were some who rejected these changes, but the desert west of North America still was big enough, and empty enough, for them to find places of refuge like the polygamous towns of Hildale Utah and Colorado City, Arizona. Change comes slowly to fundamentalist groups, but even they can change if circumstances require it. The selfish gene hypothesis urges us to never forget that the template for mass, ethnic or religious conflict remains even if not expressed today. But we already know that men can kill each other, for rage or profit or other base reasons, despite our constant efforts to educate the young to better ways.

The LDS Church still has one of the best organized outreach programs of any church, with a requirement that young Mormon males who wish to advance in the hierarchy as respected “Elders” are expected to serve two-year missions, often in other countries. But unlike the early years, these missionary efforts are carefully negotiated with destination governments, and often with other religious authorities in those countries. This is done expressly to minimize frictions that would otherwise be inevitable, as evidenced by the rich Mormon history to date.
ISIS is just the latest aggressive, religiously motivated group to capture the world’s attention by its violent efforts to create a new institution to dominate the entire world. They will not be the last, because that drive may be eternal, rooted in a primal lust of men to out populate each other. But so is rape, rooted in ancient drives, and despite millions of failures, polite society has learned ever better how to train young men to control that urge, and to deal effectively with those who will not or cannot control themselves. Of course much remains to be done, but that should not obscure the fact that much has already been done to solve these problems. We overcome human “nature” every day when we teach children to pee in toilets and wear clothes. It is not impossible.

In a previous work, which won a small but meaningful national award, I dealt more thoroughly with human nature and the idea that war is inevitable. The end of that chapter has the most quoted passage of the entire book which I would like to repeat here.

War is not inevitable. Human conflicts are inevitable, but war is not. War is a social institution. Institutions have been created by people; therefore they can be changed.23

I conclude with a phrase from the Lakota Sioux who were almost eliminated in Minnesota: Mitakuye Oya’sin, which means “We are All Relatives.” This too is confirmed by genetics, very thoroughly confirmed by population genetics, but politicians do not act that way yet.


3 Olidort, Jacob. “What is Salafism? How a Nonpolitical Ideology Became a Political Force” in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 94, No. 6, November 24, 2015, accessible at:
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2015-11-24/what-salafism. It should be noted that “Wahhabism” is a particular version of Salafism, based on an 18th century imam from what is now Saudi Arabia, named Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab.

4 The ISCSC is the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations, for whom this paper was written. Website: http://www.iscsc.org.


Wikipedia on “End Times” with sections on each major and several smaller faith traditions can be accessed at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/End_time.

One author associated with this idea is Richard Dawkins, who wrote The Selfish Gene in 1976, republished by Oxford University Press in 1990, and 2006. But the roots of this idea go much further back to the genesis of the modern, synthetic theory of evolution.


Sepulvado, John. “Mormon Faith Serves as Powerful Symbol for Oregon Protesters,” an interview with Audie Cornish on “All Things Considered,” National Public Radio, January 4, 2016. I note here also that Mormonism is rare in affirming direct revelations from “God”, for the whole church, to potentially any Mormon “Elder”, but do affirm revelation to their President who is an equivalent to the Catholic Pope in authority and alleged access to “infallible” insights.


“Utah Becomes a State” from the “I love History” website of the Utah Division of State History, accessible at: http://ilovehistory.utah.gov/topics/government/statehood.html


Comparative Civilizations Review

Remembering Carle C. Zimmerman: A Tribute
Richard Cronk

Conversations I had at the 46th ISCSC conference at Monmouth University this past summer have fed my memory and admiration for those giants that living memory is losing quickly. At the 2009 meetings I asked who may have known Carle C. Zimmerman, author of *Family and Civilization*. Many knew of Zimmerman and I came away with the name of Palmer Talbot. I was able to locate Professor Talbot and we spoke on the telephone over the next few months.

He shared that he was a graduate student in school in California when Zimmerman came and delivered a lecture that Talbot was able to hear. Talbot linked Zimmerman with Sorokin immediately, as is hard not to do, in his interest and study. In a formal project of the ISCSC in 1996 – resulting in the book, *Sorokin and Civilization* – Talbot connects Sorokin’s philosophy with rural and regional roots and his comfortable early collaboration with Zimmerman.

Zimmerman grew up in Missouri and his family address in the material I have been able to find is listed only by the name of the county. This county apparently did not have a city to support a post office. His parents were teachers in truly frontier conditions and the learning that was at the center of that life was not lost on their son Carle.

Palmer Talbot and I found time to think about how these men had affected both of our lives. We did share that we both felt richer for it. Palmer now too is missed.

In 1974 I had left a mind-numbing M.A. program in sociology with my new wife and we took our first steps into adulthood. My interest had been developing around family sociology; at that time, I moved to the very rural Copper Country in Michigan’s upper-peninsula on the shores of Lake Superior. I had time to read and my collection of Sorokin’s books were on the top of the pile. I reached a point where I thought I could send a letter without sounding like too much of a bumpkin. I wrote to Sorokin.

It was in a very short time that I came home to a hand-written letter with the return address carrying the name “P. Sorokin.” I excitedly opened the envelope to find a note from Sorokin’s son, Peter. I was informed of Sorokin’s death and he kindly suggested that Carle Zimmerman might be of some help to me. News like this took much longer to get to the provinces in the 1970s. I began my research by trying to find any works by Zimmerman. In the 1970s we still had to go to a library and hope that it housed what was sought. No work by Carle C. Zimmerman had made it to the stacks of the Copper Country libraries.

I did take the time to write a long introduction and request for an academic consultation. He sent some of his monographs for me to study. I told him about my interest in the study of the family and that I had left school and taken a job working for the welfare department. In those days that is what it was called. I thought this would give me a window into the
topic of family dysfunction and some real experience to ground further studies. He wrote that he began his serious work with field studies, too. I was happy to accept an invitation when I was invited to visit at his home in the White Mountains of New Hampshire.

My visit spanned three days over the Labor Day holiday in 1978. I stayed in the local small town and spent from late morning to late afternoon in conversation with Zimmerman. When I first pulled into the drive of an older country home Zimmerman was in yard clothes and bent over a lawn mower. When he stood up, he stood straight up. He was now in his 80s and moved slowly and deliberately as he took me into his home and his study/library. His wife Madeline greeted me as well and I was taken by the Boston urbanity and gracefulness that she carried. That day she provided fresh squeezed lemonade and cookies and it felt like the house of my grandparents in the 1950s.

The study was lined with books and his continued reading could be seen lying about. Not in disarray but within reach. The stuffed chair that I sat in had doilies with crocheted covers for the arms and backs of chairs. Again I was in my grandma’s house. I think that helped me to not be overwhelmed at the whole event. But it did not last so for very long.

As he settled in his chair we confirmed that he had never heard of my provincial state university or any of my instructors before. I was aware that he did not expect me to have waist-long hair and that I looked like the students that he had opined did not belong on a university campus. He slowly picked up a stack of academic journals from the table next to him and put them in his lap. He picked up the first one and asked, “Do you read this?” It was a leading journal in sociology. I answered that I had read some articles I had looked up. He set it on the arm of his chair. He picked up the next journal and asked the same. I answered the same. Soon I did not even know of the journal he held in his hand. Before he finished with the eight or nine journals he had stacked up, I wished I had never gone there.

With one hand resting on the stack he said, “Don’t worry about it.” Then he pushed the entire stack off the arm of the chair and the journals scattered across the floor. He said, “It is mostly a lot of #$@*+! anyway.” This let me begin breathing again and it marked the beginning of the time he graciously shared.

There is lot I did not know, could not have known, and can only begin to appreciate at this later point in my life. Carle Zimmerman’s bibliography shows his last publication in 1977, well after retirement from Harvard, and yet he would still set aside precious time for an anonymous student from the provinces in 1978. T. Lynn Smith’s tribute to Zimmerman was carried in the International Journal of Sociology of the Family. In it, Smith recalled “…his untiring efforts to stimulate, guide, and encourage young men and women seeking to master the way and means of developing their own professional competency.” When I read this some years later it rang so true because I was stimulated, guided and encouraged by him more than by any other scholar at that time in my life.
I was privy to some very personal stories and I am a good listener if there is a great story teller with great stories to tell. He had many things to say about his friendship with Sorokin, one that lasted their adult lifetimes. He explained in what ways his thinking was like that of Sorokin and where their thinking was not the same. One difference was his skepticism about the cyclical pattern of recurrence and he was open to a more linear development of society, culture and civilization.

It was also clear, however, that within the contemporary period they agreed that civilization went through phases and that we were in a phase of decline, corruption, and social disintegration. Zimmerman saw this most clearly in the structures of the family and what that can mean to society.

This is what he presented so clearly and in such depth in *Family and Civilization*. His more linear model traces the key functions of law, religion and economy as they formed in primitive social structures and the family. He sees over the ages the functions of law directed by the family as being moved to the jurisdiction of the ‘civitas,’ the government or the state. He sees the functions of religion moved from the confines of family religions and into the power of religions, faiths and churches as institutions. The final primary institutional power and responsibility that remains is in the economic sphere, where most workers must depend upon themselves for economic survival and security. The authority of the family has been removed by this analysis and the family has been doomed to the discontinuities that are common today.

Zimmerman did agree with Sorokin’s diagnosis of an “overripe sensate system” that was headed for a crash, as culture and civilization fracture and fragment and lead to dissociation. This is far from the socio-ecosystem that can nurture love and altruism. But that is what should happen in the family. Right?

Zimmerman was clearly disappointed in the lack of attention that was paid to his serious work. I am struggling not to be trite if I call it “monumental scholarship.” His dedication to the methods of science were clear and induction, he contended, was more important than deduction. Henri Poincaré put it this way: “Science always speaks in the indicative; never in the imperative.” If I understood correctly, making the move from scientific indicatives to ethical and/or pragmatic judgments is where sociology meets philosophy. Zimmerman was also a product of his times and his attitudes reminded me of those of my grandparents and my parents. I did not always agree with the imperatives common to those generations of immigrant Americans, but his methods of study remain scientific, empirical and important today, even if mostly unknown.

He did say he was especially hurt that Sorokin did not review his book and that a review from Sorokin would have been a great help. Sorokin never did make any comments in print that I have been able to find about *Family and Civilization*. There was one edition printed and there are no references to be found in the leading books on family sociology beginning in the 1970s.
Nonetheless, a member of the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations, Sigurd Skirbekk of Norway, made good use of Zimmerman’s typologies in his work, *Dysfunctional Culture* (2005). This is a rare encounter that I am sure would have pleased him.

In 1976 Zimmerman published a monograph titled, *Family & Civilization in the East and in the West*. He offered this comparative study of civilizations as represented by India and the USA as a model for future studies. His theoretical model was set in his classification and description of family types and how they appeared across civilizations. Like Sorokin, he was deeply concerned that present social trends and patterns were concurrent with social disorganization and human strife.

I left this long weekend with three things: I asked for help with finding a school to continue my education in sociology. I was told that there is “not one good school left in North America.” So what can a poor boy do? “Find a teacher.” He then added that there was “one good one” he would recommend and that was Don Martindale, who was in Minnesota at what they called “the U.”

With that I did find a teacher and I found a school and I found a career. We also discussed case study and institutional analysis from the perspective of field research. Zimmerman confirmed some value in my study that accompanied my work in the welfare office. He told me about Frédéric Le Play who influenced his own family studies and who completed deep and detailed empirical studies of family life and economy. Le Play was a mining engineer who managed mining operations in several parts of Europe. He completed his family studies by way of his travels and stops as an active engineer.

To put all that together I proceeded to take a course change into social work that focused on family violence and particularly child abuse and neglect. Here I encountered many of the worse symptoms found in social decay of the altruistic family. Many of the most important therapeutic insights I had were centered on the institutional analysis I learned from Zimmerman. As luck would have it, one of the oldest and most respected agencies for child protection services in the country was in Hennepin County and the city of Minneapolis. All this was across the Mississippi River from “the U” and Don Martindale’s office.

With the trusting support of my wife and by now two young children and two cats we packed out of Michigan for Minneapolis. I had a plan. I would get a job at Hennepin County and I would find Don Martindale. The timing and the sequence were a bit off but I did both of those things and they filled the next twenty-some years of my life. With my first contact with Don Martindale his return note was cordial and we planned a meeting. His note to me ended with, “How do you know Zimmerman?” As I found out, Zimmerman had taken the time to send Martindale a word on my behalf before I even arrived and without my request or knowledge. He was a generous man.
Next year will be 70 years since the publication of *Family and Civilization*. As I left my visit in 1978 Zimmerman gave me a copy of his book that I had not been able to locate. It is the most important single volume I have read in the sociology of the family and helps to define what is “universal” among civilizations and where love and altruism can be nourished between and among civilizations.

I want to honor the man and the memory as we approach the 70th anniversary of this publication and the rich contribution Carle C. Zimmerman has made to the comparative study of civilizations and to the understanding of the institutional structure of the family.
A member of the IS CSC for many decades, our dear friend George Von der Muhll passed on February 8, 2016, of natural causes. He was beloved by many because of his phenomenal knowledge of civilizations past, present and debatable, and because of his relentlessly positive and erudite advocacy of civilizational perspectives on global problems.

This marks the departure of another Titan of our small and ever aging crew. The decline of national support for humanities, much less classical studies of civilizations, has dried up the stream of junior faculty who used to replace our Titans when they retired or moved on.

George studied at Oberlin College, the London School of Economics, and Harvard before teaching at Swarthmore College, the University of Chicago, briefly in Ethiopia, in New Zealand (1977-78) and in Uganda from 1965-66 and 1972-73 (before he had to flee with his young family due to dangers posed by then-ruler Idi Amin). George was a remarkably fearless man for a tiny professor of government and governance. But his main academic home became the University of California at Santa Cruz where he taught politics and rose to become provost of Merrill College at UCSC. After retirement, he also taught and administered programs at Utrecht, Leiden and Maastricht Universities in the Netherlands from 2000-2002.

George was different from many scholars in that he actually walked on the ground of most of the modern, ancient, large and small civilizations he studied. He had fairly pronounced scoliosis, so in his later years we would expect him to limp up, bent over with ever new and fascinating stories of his latest adventures in far off places. To the end he was still planning excursions near war zones like Egypt, Jordan and Syria.

George was a remarkable example of an ancient, and, I fear, vanishing kind of scholar. He was a person filled with wonder at the world and a never-ending curiosity about the human condition and how we got there. And he did not just read books, of which he had thousands, but walked on the ground that books attempt to represent.

George is survived by two sons and his second wife, Lydia Blanchard Von der Muhll, whom he had met at a military high school in Germany shortly after World War II. His dad had been in the OSS and the CIA and her dad was a diplomat in Brussels. A story fit for a Hollywood movie follows because they did not marry right away, but rather decades later, and in fact, she ‘stole’ him from another woman, who had been Mayor of Santa Cruz. That is a private adventure. But they ended up together in Santa Cruz for most of their later years. Lydia first joined our conference in Dublin, Ireland in 1994, came occasionally thereafter, and remains a scholar in her own right.
I was very fond of George Von der Muhll. I will remember him and Lydia forever, so I greatly regret the passing of one of our truly world-class civilizational scholars. Life is too short to capture all the dimensions that George shared with us for at least 30 years. May our remaining Titans stay as healthy and as filled with wonder as they can be. The young can still be inspired, even though colleges don’t help budding scholars as much as once they did.
Svealand, Götaland and the Rise of the East-Slavic Kingdom – Response to Piotr Murzionak (Comparative Civilizations Review, No. 73 Fall 2015)
Bertil Haggman

Introduction

There are traditionally four lands of Sweden:

- **Scanialand** (Skane, “Land of the Scanians”) is the southernmost land with provinces conquered by Sweden from Denmark in 1658.
- **Götaland** (Gothia, ”Land of the Götar”) is between Scanialand and Svealand. Traditionally the Goths are seen as having emigrated from Gothia.
- **Svealand** (Svealand, ”Land of the Swedes”) is the central core part of Sweden. It is named after the Svear (Swedes). After the Swedes had conquered the Götar, Sweden has since the Middle Ages been administered and ruled from Stockholm in Svealand. Rurik is believed to have left the Roslagen area north of Stockholm to go to Rus with his Varangians.
- **Norrländ** (literally ”Northlands”) is the northern part of Sweden. It is territorially the largest of the four lands, covering 60 percent of the total Swedish territory.

For the past 260 years, scholars have been interested in the rise of the East-Slavic kingdom. The Normanists and Anti-Normanists have confronted each other.

Interestingly enough, there is also a Gothic theory, suggested by Friedrich Heinrich Strube de Pyrmont in 1785 and by Roger Latham (1812 – 1888) in 1863. This hypothesis is based on the view that the East Slavic kingdom was founded by the Goths. It could actually be a plausible explanation.

The Swedish scholar Dr. Stefan Söderlind (1911 – 2003) developed this thesis into what he called the Red-Blond-People hypothesis. It is based on the Old Russian forms Rus and Rud derived from the Proto-Slavic stems rusu and rudu, which began to spread in the period 150 – 350 AD. In the palatinized form rusu the form rus was according to Söderlind borrowed directly into Arabic as Rus.

In 370 AD the Goths in what is now Ukraine were defeated by the Huns and migrated westwards. Many Goths, however, remained in what is today southern Ukraine. After the Huns were defeated a new Gothic kingdom was formed in 450 AD. In the *Nestor Chronicle* there is a passage, which has not yet been deciphered in which Khagan Svjatoslav (d. 972) says:

> I do not care to remain in Kyiv, but I should prefer to live in Pereyaslavets on the Danube since that is the center of my realm.
Rus later became the common Slavic term for all Varangians and Kolbjazi and was used for all peoples living in the new kingdom.

Wherever the Goths migrated they demonstrated one specific trait: an extraordinary military and organizational capacity together with a high ability to absorb cultural development that was higher than their own. Historically their states did not last long. Gothic states fell apart in Italy rather quickly. As late as the eleventh century a major Gothic element was still discernable where the Goths had lived (Gothia on the Crimean Peninsula) but later the cultural process of Slavization prevailed. The endless internal conflicts in the short-lived Gothic states also contributed to the downfall of the second Gothic kingdom. Modern Gothic studies after the Second World War have concluded that the Goths inhabited the Lower Vistula around the Birth of Christ. In the beginning of the third century they lived in the Black Sea area, founding the first Gothic kingdom.

The kingdom of the Rus reached its peak power and influence between 700 and 1050 AD. Rus was by the Icelandic historian Snorri Sturluson still called “Sweden the Great and the Cold (Heimskringla 4.9). The Normanists claim that the great military and commercial activities of the Scandinavian Vikings lead to the foundation of the East Slavic Kingdom. They were, however, few and their influence of limited nature. In the view of Dr. Soederlind the creation of Rus was only possible within the framework of the Gothic kingdom of the Rus, which existed long before the Swedish Vikings arrived in Russia.

A few words on the origin of the Goths and their migration from what today is southern Sweden seems to be in order.

The Origin

One of the great controversies in European barbarian history is the question of the origin of the Goths. The notes presented here are mainly based on A. Bell-Fialkoff’s work The Role of Migration in the History of the Eurasian Steppe.

Bell-Fialkoff and others have placed the original home of the Gothic people (or tribe) in southern Scandinavia in the late Bronze Age, an area where no pre-Germanic linguistic substratum has been found. From there some Germanic tribes spread along the Baltic coast, toward the River Oder in Germania. Others followed the coast of the North Sea, toward the River Weser. By 1000 BC, according to Musset, Germanic habitat stretched from the River Ems to central Pomerania. French scientist Demougeot dated their appearance in Pomerania much later, from 400 BC. If we follow Musset, by 800 BC Germans reached Westphalia in the West and Vistula in the East. And 300 years later they could be found on the lower Rhine, in Thuringia and Lower Silesia.

Both Lucien Musset, Les invasions: les vagues germanique (1965) and Emilienne Demougeot, Le formation de L'Europe et les invasions barbares (1969-1974) are important concerning this theory of the origin of the Goths and other East Germanic tribes.
Bell-Fialkoff argues for the existence of the Gotho-Gepidian culture in Pomerania and the lower Vistula region in what is now Poland at this time (the so-called Wielbark culture) and links it to seven specific elements. Only one of these elements can be archaeologically traced to Scandinavia. Even more significant is the fact that the Wielbark culture had already acquired its distinctiveness by the time of the putative Gothic migration from Scandinavia. These considerations make some scholars doubt the veracity of the Gothic tradition.

And yet, there are several factors that support the traditional version. First, East Germanic languages (of which Gothic was one) were closer to North Germanic (i.e., Scandinavian) tongues than to West Germanic ones. Such affinity implies a close relationship, if not direct derivation. The toponymics of the island of Gotland, as well as the modern Swedish provinces of Öster- and Västergötland, where the Goths had supposedly originated, also show linguistic affinity. Secondly Count Oxenstierna excavated incineration burials in Öster-and Västergötland that, numerous in the second and first centuries BC, suddenly became rare after about 50 BC. This would suggest a disappearance of a significant portion of the previous population. Of interest here are Carlo Alberto Mastrelli in Volker Bierbauer et al, I Goti, (1994) and Graf E.C. Oxenstierna, Die Urheimat der Goten. Leipzig, Mannus-Buecherei 73, 1945 (later printed in 1948).

The Exodus

There have been many variations of a number of theories that explain the reason for the Gothic exodus. No doubt there was no pressure from non-Germanic groups. An outright famine due to deteriorating climatic conditions is presented in Bell-Fialkoff as the most likely reason, and I must say I concur. There was likely a limited migration of a few aristocratic clans. They might then in turn have organized the local population and given their name to it. But the disappearance of incineration burials, so Bell-Fialkoff argues, makes it more probable that all population strata were affected in the South Swedish region Götaland (comprising a number of provinces including Östergötland and Västergötland). The local provenance of the Wielbark culture in Poland may be caused by rapid assimilation of the Goths. This can be compared to a similar evolution in Normandy and Rus.

Why did the Goths migrate to the southern coast of the Baltic? One possible reason presented by Bell-Fialkoff is that the migrators followed the traditional Amber Way, the old trade route linking southern Scandinavia with the eastern Mediterranean as early as 1800 BC (see on this Demougeot, p. 20, referred to earlier).

As others before him Bell-Fialkoff also points to the fact that Sweden historically "looked" east and south, not west (which was the way Norwegians "looked," for instance). The other side of the Baltic was the traditional area of interest. The natural thing, which is so obvious that it is not mentioned by Bell-Fialkoff, is that if you want to go southeast from Götaland you end up in the Vistula delta and the surrounding area. The following ethnogenesis occurred between the rivers Oder and Vistula.
Arrival in the Area North of the Black Sea

In the pathbreaking work edited by Bell-Fialkoff it is concluded: “They were equally effective on the sea. They had probably learned their maritime skills on the Baltic for it would be impossible for a land-borne people to adapt to maritime warfare so fast.” (p.124.) The reference here is to the Barbarians’ naval activities in the Black Sea and the Easter Mediterranean (see below):

The Gothic name is etymologically derived from the same root as Swedish götar and gutar from Västergötland, Östergötland and the Island of Gotland (Thorsten Andersson, Götar, goter, gutar in Namn och Bygd - Tidskrift för nordisk Ortnamnsforskning, Vol. 84, 1996, pp. 1 - 21 with an extensive bibliography). At the beginning of the First Century AD the Goths migrated from the area of the lower Vistula to north of the Black Sea (Russia and Ukraine) and created the First Gothic Kingdom. (This is described in Jordanes, The Origin and Deeds of the Goths (1908, p. 8) as taking place under Gothic King Filimer "he decided that the army of the Goths with their families should move…In search of suitable homes and pleasant places they came to the land of Scythia, called Oium in that tongue. Here they were delighted with the great richness of the country…"). Jordanes described Scythia, mentioning the Greek colonies on the Black Sea coast ("it is [the Black Sea] dotted with towns of no mean fame: - Borysthenis, Olbia, Callipolis, Cherson, Theodosia, Careon, Myrmicion and Trapezus. These towns the wild Scythian tribes allowed the Greeks to build to afford them means of trade." (Jordanes, p. 10).

The Ostrogothic kingdom reached its greatest extension under King Ermanarik. It was destroyed between 370 and 380 A.D. in battles with the Huns. During 250 to 500 AD the Gothic peoples became separated and some moved to the West. Others remained in the East. They initiated the Second Gothic Kingdom in Oium after the fall of the Huns. The Slavic neighbours called the Goths by a common name: the rus, 'The Red-Blond People.' From 150 to 350 AD the Slavic name for the Goths was formed in two variants from Proto-Slavic stems *Rusu and *Rudi, 'the Red-Blond People.' Later around 450 AD the palatalized Proto-Slavic forms *Rus and *Rud became a common name among the Slavs for the Goths and the Eruli, irrespective of the ethnic origin of the latter two. The Proto-Slavic name *Rus corresponds to the western denotation of the Goths (Ostrogoths, Visigoths), but it is different from the latter in that it is of Slavic origin.

A Short Chronology of the Goths and their (H)erulian Allies 253 – 277 AD

253 AD
The Goths became masters of the Crimea, having captured the Bosporan fleet and the capital of the Bosporan kingdom, Panticapaeum, although the kingdom is said to have lasted until 343 AD.

255-57 AD
Major sea-raids in the Black Sea area.

256 AD
The Goths push into Greece. Their confederates, the Eruli, sack Athens in 267 AD.
268 AD
   A huge sea-borne expedition of the Goths and their allies spilled into the Aegean. They were robbing and looting at will.

271 AD
   A Gothic defeat by the Romans.

276-77 AD
   Raids reach as far as Galatia and Cilicia in spite of the 271 defeat.

Further Reading


Mohini Mullick and Madhuri S. Sondhi (eds.), Classical Indian Thought and the English Language: Perspectives and Problems
New Delhi: Indian Council for Philosophical Research and DK Printworld, 2015

Reviewed by Michael Palencia-Roth

I have heard it said more than once that every western generalization about Indian culture, religion and thought turns out to be inaccurate. Such a statement might well summarize the main issue explored in the book under review here: the translatability of classical Indian thought.

In December 2011, a group of interdisciplinary scholars from India and beyond, convened by Mohini Mullick and Madhuri Sondhi, gathered in New Delhi to present essays and debate the issues of “classical Indian thought and the English language”. The scholars are: Sudipta Kaviraj, S.N. Balagangadhara, D. Prahlada Char, Claus Oetke, Vivek Dhareshwar, P.K. Mukhopadhyay, Aloka Parashar Sen, K.D. Tripathi, Wagish Shukla, and Ramakrishna Bhattacharya. The neutral title conceals the startling premise that classical Indian thought cannot be adequately interpreted in English. Why? Indian scholars educated and trained in the English language are incapable – consciously or unconsciously – of rendering Sanskrit thought accurately. On the one hand, one thinks differently in English and Sanskrit. On the other, some Sanskrit terms have no equivalents at all in English, and attempts to find substitutes result in misinterpretations. Some of the differences between the two languages do not depend only on differences in historical and philosophical traditions. These differences stem also from the “rupture” (15) that English colonialism produced in the Sanskrit tradition.

That “rupture” created a before and after in India’s history that is different from the before and after brought about by other invaders or colonizers, for instance the Mughals. This is the undeniable premise of Sudipta Kaviraj in the important lead essay, “Why and How Should We Read Ancient Texts?”. The English imposed their language and, with that, governmental structures, bureaucracies, and educational practices. In doing so, Britain altered the ways in which India’s history and literature would be understood, taught, translated and transmitted. Thus, for example, Kalidasa, now widely accepted as the greatest Sanskrit poet and dramatist, would be first appreciated by the West as “the Indian Shakespeare” through Sir William Jones’ 1789 translation of Shakuntala, which then was translated from English into German and delighted poets and thinkers of the “Goethezeit”. Entranced, Goethe even wrote, „Nenn’ ich, Sakuntala, Dich, und so ist Alles gesagt”.

The book is divided into two parts, the first being more theoretical in orientation than the more practical second part, which deals with more specific topics. In the first part, the main questions are the following. Kaviraj asks, “Is translation necessary” (10-47)? Balagangadhara maintains that methods and perspectives imported from western social
sciences are inadequate tools for understanding India (48-104). Char insists that the English language itself distorts Sanskrit thought (105-124). Oetke takes issue with this position, and, while not disagreeing that distortion does occur, insists that the same problem exists in the translation into English from any language, even from languages more closely related to English (125-168). Dhareshwar maintains (169-208) that the problems with the translation of Sanskrit into English are not merely linguistic; they are “conceptual and cultural” (169). Moreover, the problems are complex, for they point to difficulties in both directions, Britain and India. For example, even if they do not admit it, Indians have been “enslaved” by English culture. A complex “enslavement.” A case in point is Gandhi, who first read the Bhagavad Gita in England in Edwin Arnold’s translation (189). That translation inspired him to move toward India’s independence through the concept of satyagraha and the practice of Hind Swaraj. The Gita, in Dhareshwar’s words, enabled Gandhi “to remove structures that were occluding [his] experience” (190).

In the second part of the book, scholars focus on specific texts or concepts. Tripathi explores the Bharata’s Natyashastra and its famous commentary, the Abhinavabharati by Abhinavagupta in the 11th century (271-290). The issue he discusses is how to understand Indian aesthetics in the context of its profound differences with western aesthetics and the difficulties in establishing both a textual and a “living” tradition in India (288-290). Mukhopadhyay discusses “ethics” in India and how differently moral thought and moral dilemmas are viewed in India and the West (210-237). He focuses on multiple aspects of dharma which refers to “duty” and one’s obligation to act in conformity with it, with divine law and with nature. The complexity of the idea of dharma is not covered by any single term in English, or even by a set of terms. For instance, Mukhopadhyay comments on the famous beginning of the Bhagavad Gita, in which Arjuna is faced with the dilemma of being placed in-between two opposing armies and asked to fight. The injunction, if followed, would result in the death of his family members, his teacher and his friends, and Arjuna refuses to fight. Krishna explains, in subsequent chapters of the Gita, that refusal is not “moral” (for he would be shirking his “duty”). Arjuna has the moral obligation to fight. Sen looks at the terms varna and jati, in relation to the history and meaning of “caste” (238-270), a word, he points out, that is not even an Indian word but is originally from a Portuguese word, “casta”. Thus one of the most central categories of Indian culture is refracted through a foreign term. The potential for misunderstanding and misinterpretation is enormous. Perhaps the most original contribution is that by Wagish Shukla (291-308), who maintains that the Indian classical tradition is “performative,” while the western tradition is “referential” [think of Erich Auerbach’s now canonical Mimesis], and that therefore we in the West, says Shukla, cannot help but misunderstand Indian aesthetics, thought and texts.

English is generally acknowledged to be the most common language of academic analysis. How, then, does its use impact the analysis of traditions in languages other than English, and especially of traditions in non-western languages? For scholars who are stubbornly and even blithely monolingual, this question is sometimes classified as trivial. Consciously or unconsciously, they maintain that thought, regardless of the language in which it is
expressed, is not culture specific. But this position is not only wrong. It is willfully blind. For scholars who have studied even one foreign language at some depth, and especially a language from a different civilizational and linguistic tradition, the difficulties adumbrated by issues explored in this book ring true. The difficulties are compounded when the culture being interpreted is translated into the language and traditions of thought of the culture that conquered, colonized, or ruled it.

Is there a solution to these difficulties? In his essay “On the Availability of Ethics in India,” P.K. Mukhopadhyay reformulates the question, in the context of moral thought, which concerns all of the authors in this book of essays. Given the difficulty of “translating” ethical concepts central to Indian thought (210), as per his example of Arjuna’s dilemma in the Bhagavad Gita, a solution to the difficulty might be to insist on “intercultural communication” rather than on “intercultural translation.” In other words, what is required is a more modest intention in the interpretation of Indian thought and culture.

The question of intention aside, however, the difficulties remain and should be considered a caveat to scholars engaged in comparative civilizational analysis. If Sanskrit is truly untranslatable, then all interpretations of classical Indian thought are, in a sense, misinterpretations; all readings of Sanskrit (and other Indian languages), misreadings; all translations, mistranslations. One cannot overstate the challenge that these essays and debates present to comparative civilizational work. How much does our practice of comparative civilizational analysis depend on fitting other cultures, other civilizations, into our own hermeneutic practices and traditions? Is this not another form of colonization? Of course, comparative civilizational work must continue. The issue then becomes, how?
Madhuri Santanam Sondhi, *Intercivilizational Dialogue on Peace: Martin Buber and Basanta Kumar Mallik*  
New Delhi: Indian Council for Philosophical Research, 2008

Reviewed by Michael Palencia-Roth

What grounds for comparison concerning Martin Buber (1878-1965) and Basanta Kumar Mallik (1879-1958) would inspire a book of more than 400 densely argued pages? Buber and Mallik never met. There is no evidence that either read the other or even knew of the other’s existence. Buber was born a Jew in Vienna and spent much of his professional life in Germany before immigrating to Israel in 1938 due to the nazification of Germany. He lived and worked in Jerusalem more or less continuously until his death. Mallik was born a Hindu in India, where he was educated; he arrived at Oxford as a “mature student” of 33. He divided his time between Britain and India until he came back to Oxford to live during the last decades of his life.

The ground for comparison, for Madhuri Santanam Sondhi, is the tertium quid, the third thing to which they are both related: they are both dialogical thinkers concerned with peace whose ideas are relevant to comparative civilizational analysis as well as to more limited studies of individual human beings in relation to their social contexts. Beyond that, Sondhi is concerned with a specific question. How might peace in today’s world be achieved, especially in cultures with conflicts at their center, Jewish and Arab (or the State of Israel and the Palestinian territories) in one case, Hindu and Muslim (or India and Pakistan/Bangladesh) in the other? Buber and Mallik, however different in their critical approaches, think about “peace” in ways that Sondhi finds fruitful for possibly reducing the tensions between nation states (Russia and the USA, China and Japan, India and Pakistan), between religions (Christianity and Islam), or even between the West and the Rest.

This book is divided into five long chapters, bracketed by an introduction and a conclusion. The chapters are, in order, “Relationism as Existentialism and Metaphysics,” “Ethics,” “Social Philosophy: Philosophical Anthropology and Social Change,” “Political Philosophy – I,” and “Political Philosophy – II”. At the heart of both Buber’s and Mallik’s work are two interestingly similar concepts: “I and Thou” for Buber; “relationism” for Mallik.

Sondhi presents the core of their philosophies in the final paragraph of her introduction: “Mallik believed that all individuals as centres of instances of ideas and actions were in relationship across time and space, and that only an abiding sense of relatedness could be the foundation for building a new global society. Buber sought to provide existential depth to that relatedness, which he also believed to be the basis of ideal community, and by extension, internationalism. Both sought to answer the craving of modern man for a secure home in the universe, a home founded on mutual acceptance and relationship. Despite the renewal of warfare and existential anxiety, the problematic posed by Buber and Mallik has
not disappeared, and their suggestions can form the basis for further investigation and action” (50).

For Buber, “I and Thou” is a dialogical relationship of inter-subjectivity (as opposed to the “I-It” relationship, which is a subject-object relationship) at the heart of interpersonal relationships and of the relationship of “Man” with “God” that forms the basis for a spirituality with the potential to transform human communities from exploitative groups (based on I-It relationships) into more compassionate ones. Buber’s ethics thus becomes an ethics of responsibility (made concrete in action and politics) of the Self for the Other and then for society in general. The largest extension of society is the “civilization,” hence the reference in the title to an “intercivilizational” dialogue.

In Sondhi’s interpretation, Buber’s central concern is the moral history and health of western civilization, especially in two of its incarnations: Europe (through Germany) and Palestine (the Jewish and Arab experience). Behind Buber’s thinking looms the ultimate exaggeration of the I-It relationship, the Holocaust. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is characterized as an I-It relationship that can only become an I-Thou relationship through dialogue, and through each side recognizing, and respecting, the subjectivity of the other. Peace becomes possible only through the relinquishing of absolutist positions and recognition of the human worth of the opponent. The intra-civilizational conflict playing itself out in Israel is analogous to other international and inter-civilizational conflicts in history.

Mallik approaches the topics of war and peace, ethics, and political philosophy from the perspective of an Indian born and raised in India who came to intellectual and philosophical maturity in Oxford, his “home” for much of his professional life. Mallik’s central concept is what he calls “relationism.” He departs from the insight that “relatedness is universal, ever present through space and time” and that “there can be no isolated, unrelated beings in the universe” (175). A human being cannot choose not to be related. He is “embedded” in a “relational network” (360-361). It is thus almost inevitable that issues of conflict and power arise. Moreover, at the heart of western logic itself is the issue of conflict; that is, logic progresses by the friction between contraries (‘A’ and ‘not-A’). Everything takes place, Mallik would say, in the “between”, between the two poles of an argument, between two people, between a person and the group, between two nations.

For Mallik, the key to avoiding conflict and achieving peace is “abstention,” a concept that turns out to be similar to non-action in the Buddhist sense and to pacifism and non-violence in the Gandhian sense. Although that may incline one to consider Mallik a religious thinker, his notion of “abstention” is secular. Mallik does not depend, as Buber does, on divinity as the ground of intersubjective harmony; instead, Mallik depends on the desirability of avoiding conflict and of establishing equality among people. In his mind, his theory is not “spiritual” but “logical”.
The ethics of abstention is part of a process that disarms absolutist thinking in the process of peace-making. “Reality” itself, according to Mallik, is “multiple”; it cannot help but be at least “dualistic,” representing both positive and negative characteristics (217). Since this is so, it is a mistake to consider “the absolute” as the representation of the one true “Reality”. Therefore, any absolutist belief is illusory. Conflicts and tensions are caused by adherence to “absolutes”. The recognition of the non-absolute nature of absolutes should make it easy to abstain from acting on the basis of such contradictory notions. But, obviously, as history has repeatedly demonstrated, such an “abstention” is not easy.

Each of the five major chapters of the book explores “relatedness” and the “between” in the disciplines signaled by the chapter titles. While Sondhi cannot place these two thinkers in a dialogue that they did not actually have with each other, she does place in dialogue their thoughts, their theories, their terminology, and their strategies. For Sondhi, the dialogue is “intercivilizational” because both Buber and Mallik think in terms of culture as well as in terms of a personalist psychology. While India and Israel are not directly compared with one another, both countries have internecine conflicts as well as tensions with their neighbors that have flared up into wars in the past and might well again. In every instance, the conflicts and the tensions are caused by the adherence to “absolutes”.

Finally, therefore, one must ask the question that haunts the pages of this book and the lives of its two protagonists. What are the real possibilities for peace, any peace? Both Buber and Mallik seem resigned to the realization that peace is merely the interval between wars (383). This may not be what we want to hear, or want to believe about humanity. But it seems to me to be the hard truth. The goal of an irenic world remains elusive, even unreachable and yet, as both Buber and Mallik insist, mankind must attempt to reach it. To present a possible blueprint for that attempt, and the role that the thought of these two philosophers might play in it, is the main raison d’être of this lucid and profound book.
Aside from endemic dysfunctional governance, the Muslim world’s most pressing dysfunction is the treatment of half their populations: women. As some Muslim women living in the western world become educated and freed from the restraints of their Muslim birthplaces, a growing number are speaking out. This is an extremely bold thing to do, considering the murderousness of militant Islamists who kill for any perceived criticism of Islam and its values.

The two women whose books are the subject of this review come from different countries and have followed different paths in the New World. Farzana Hassan is a Pakistani-born professor and newspaper columnist now living in Canada. Wafa Sultan is a Syrian-born psychiatrist, in itself a rare profession for either men or women in the Muslim world.

Farzana Hassan has taken on the task of confronting Canadian Muslims with the misogyny that has taken root among these new immigrants in a country that, while very modern and free, tiptoes around not offending new immigrants. Hassan wants to reform her religion, a religion which she feels still has value. Wafa Sultan, now living in Southern California, has gone through the same process of calling for changes to Islam, but, despite death threats, has taken the dangerous step of rejecting Islam altogether.

The issues that both women criticize in Islam is Sharia Law and the concept of Jihad, issues that have introduced a spate of violence that is roiling the world today. Sharia Law was frozen in the 12th century and has not changed since that time. Jihad has been with Islam from its beginnings in the Arabian Peninsula, a call to war and conquest that prompts today’s militant Islamists to continue the struggle against all other religions.

Farzana Hassan notes that while most ordinary Muslims regard Islam as a peaceful faith seeking only a spiritual commitment from its adherents, the Islamists insist that Islam is political with global ambitions and that it seeks to establish its social, moral, economic, and political systems across the globe. Unfortunately for the secularists, the militants are conducting a rampage of death and destruction across the world. Paris has had several tastes of this as I write this review.

Hassan bemoans the trajectory of her native land, Pakistan, in which her upper-class family lived, practicing a hybrid and tolerant sort of Islam, much influenced by British values. Pakistan, however, has been moving step by step into a fundamentalist version of Islam,
bringing death and destruction not only to its own citizens, but to its neighbors, Afghanistan and India. Many fleeing this dysfunction have found new homes in Europe, the US, and Canada. They have, however, brought contentious practices with them: particularly religious and tribal notions of how women are to be controlled.

She notes: “According to the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, in 2011 alone 675 women and girls were murdered by their family members for allegedly bringing dishonor to their families.” 71 of these victims were children under 18.

Her chapter about The Burka Debate is particularly important reading. This garment is not only debasing women, but is currently being used by criminal Islamists in bank robberies and jihad attacks. In December 2011, Canadian Minister of Citizenship Jason Kenney announced that Muslim women would be required to unveil at citizenship ceremonies to affirm gender equality as core Canadian values. (Unfortunately, the new liberal government has reversed this order under the notion that women should be “free” to wear what they like.)

Her final chapter is a warning of how Islamists are trying to change Canada. It requires constant vigilance to oppose them. Women’s groups are called upon to fight back and identify calls for “diversity” for what they are: practices eating away at Canadian values of equality and tolerance.

Wafa Sultan has a different battle on her hands: living with the threat of death at any time. She writes: “Most Muslims, if not all of them, will condemn me to death when they read this book. They may not even read it. The title alone may push them to condemn me. That’s how things are with them. They don’t read, or, if they do, they don’t take in what they read. They are much more interested in disagreement than in rapprochement and they are---first and foremost---supremely interested in inducing fear in others with whom they disagree.”

She knows whereof she speaks. This book traces her biography from childhood in Syria, teen-aged religiosity (Farzana Hassan went through this phase too), through university education and experience working with doctors whose scorn for women was not hidden. She and her husband fled to the United States, where bit-by-bit she began the process of studying and ultimately rejecting Islam. She is fearless.

At the end of her book, she takes on the issue of should a practicing Muslim become president of the United States, a question that has turned up in the Republican primaries. Her unequivocal view is: “No one can be a true Muslim and a true American simultaneously. Islam is both a religion and a state, and to be a true Muslim you must believe in Islam as both religion and state. A true Muslim does not acknowledge the U.S. Constitution, and his willingness to live under that constitution is, as far as he is concerned, nothing more than an unavoidable step on the way to that constitution’s replacement by Islamic Sharia law.”
She defends this analysis by quoting the Koran: “Believers, take neither Jews nor Christians for your friends. They are friends with one another. Whoever of you seeks their friendship shall become one of their number. Allah does not guide the wrongdoers.”

She concludes: “And only in America could a girl be born of mixed races, then acquire a new citizenship totally unconnected with her origins. America is the land of dreams---and what’s more, it is the only country where every dream can come true.”

She imagines a future in which her granddaughter could be elected president. She also imagines that at that distant time, muezzins will announce from the minarets of Syria: “Wafa Sultan’s efforts have been crowned with success, and a new god has been born: a God who loves.” En Shallah.
Naohiko Tonomura, *Eight Major Civilizations*. Translated by Jeremy Breaden
Tankobon hardcover, 2013

Reviewed by Vlad Alalykin-Izvekov

In his 241-page work the Japanese scholar Naohiko Tonomura distinguishes between “eight major civilizations” which “added their distinct flavor to world history,” and the so-called “common civilizations.” In order to substantiate his concept, the writer offers an elaborate scholarly apparatus.

The book consists of eight chapters. In the first chapter Prof. Tonomura reviews approaches of some of the classics of comparative civilizations theory such as Danilevsky, Breysig, Spengler, Toynbee, Bagby, Ito, his own approach, and S. Huntington’s concept.

In the second chapter the author offers an analysis of the existing criteria to separate “major” civilizations from the other ones. The chapter includes a description of the author’s sole criterion, which appears to be a “Procrustean bed” of mandatory requirement for a “major civilization” to progress through a sequence of stages of certain duration.

In the third chapter the author describes evolution of the thus chosen eight “major” civilizations. This review includes them in the following order: Japanese, Chinese, Sumer, Egyptian, Indian, Greco-Roman, Andean, and Western European civilizations.

In the fifth chapter Prof. Tonomura reflects on the so called “common civilizations,” and the rest of the book is dedicated to various supporting considerations, for example, the styles of civilizations are described in chapter seven.

While reading the book, the reader may find that the author’s definition of a “civilization” is somewhat difficult to come by; however, an attentive reader will eventually derive the notion of a relatively advanced social entity with a distinctive culture.

In the author’s view, a “major” civilization is one which has gone through a four-stage progression, each stage spanning four or five centuries 1) a tribal confederation state or parallel tribal states; 2) a unified state or parallel city-states; 3) a “time of disturbance”; 4) a “world-empire.”

Needless to say, this teleological concept appears somewhat restrictive. Other criteria, such as, for example, Bagby’s benchmark of the degree of cultural borrowing, originality, and influence, Tonomura dismisses on the “hermeneutic” grounds of its relativity. Perhaps that is why when the author asks whether there will ever be another “major” civilization, there is no answer. Indeed, it is not easy to imagine a brand new civilization that would fit the author’s exacting and austere specification.
That said, the book is written in a succinct, transparent, and accessible style. The author’s approach is fresh and original. The monograph, therefore, may serve as an excellent introduction into the comparative theory of civilizations, with a special accent on Asian civilizations.

Reviewed by Lynn Rhodes

Ashok Kumar Malhotra has created a beautiful, illustrated, *transcreation* of the original, classic *Tao Te Ching* by the Chinese sage, Lao Tzu, a philosophical and religious Chinese text from around the 6th century BC. Like the original *Tao Te Ching*, Malhotra’s *Wisdom of the Tao Te Ching* contains 81 brief chapters or sections. Malhotra has written in a conversational style that is easy to understand. The artwork on each accompanying page illuminates the text of each chapter.

The chapters are very short and the full text can be read through in an hour or two. The *Tao Te Ching* is sometimes known as The Way or The Power of the Tao and the Te. Tao literally means “way” and was known as “the Way” by numerous Chinese philosophers, but had special significance in Taoism. Te means “virtue,” “personal character,” “inner strength” or “integrity,” with implications of “divine power.” Ching means “canon,” “great book,” or “classic.” Hence, the *Tao Te Ching* is often described as “The Classic of the Way’s Virtues.”

Malhotra takes the challenge of transcreating the *Tao Te Ching* by grappling with the ineffability of the original text itself. In other words, he dares to illuminate or transcreate ideas that are often considered to be beyond expressed or spoken words or language itself. From my perspective, i.e. without knowing the original Chinese language, and relying only on English translations, Malhotra adapts and moves an artistic message from one language to another with ease.

When Malhotra opens the first chapter in his book with: “Words that describe the Tao, do not capture the real Tao; Names that represent Tao, do not express the eternal Tao,” it is not meant as a literal translation. But it captures the essential meaning of the original first two lines.

A literal translation says:

*The Tao that can be spoken is not the eternal Tao*

*The name that can be named is not the eternal name*

The nameless is the origin of Heaven and Earth

The named is the mother of myriad things

Thus, constantly without desire, one observes its essence

Constantly with desire, one observes its manifestations

These two emerge together but differ in name

The unity is said to be the mystery

Mystery of mysteries, the door to all wonders
The Chinese text of the *Tao Te Ching* uses only numbers for titles of each chapter. Malhotra provides a theme title for each chapter that delightfully sets the stage for deep engagement of the poetic prose that follows. Each chapter’s theme is poetic in itself. *The Great Mother; Highest Good is Like Water; Usefulness of Emptiness; Sense Versus Inner Vision; Evil of Weapons; By Doing Nothing, Everything is Done; Government and People (particularly apt today)*; are but a few.

It is difficult to select a favorite. When turning from chapter to chapter, one is immersed in a completely new and whole sense of being and timeless thought. I open the book randomly, to chapter 27 titled *Wondrous Secret*:

> A skillful traveler leaves no traces.
> A good speaker speaks without any flaws.
> An excellent reckoner needs no aids.
> An expert door hanger requires no bolts.
> And a good binder needs no threads.
> Thus, a sage helps all people without discrimination and resolves problems without turning away from them.
> This ability of the sage is called “insightful wisdom.”
> The sage is the teacher of the un-sage-like person and the un-sage-like person is the subject-matter for the sage.
> One who does not respect one’s teacher or the teaching, though is learned, has gone astray.
> This is a “wondrous secret.”

While Malhotra cannot take credit, nor has he attempted to, for the original lessons of the *Tao Te Ching*, he deserves full credit for delivering a spiritually robust, poetic transcreation that provides scholars, students and philosophers, heightened insight into the profound lessons described by Lao Tzu. Malhotra’s work is also strengthened by his command of Daoism, without which the transcreation would simply fall flat.

I recommend this book.
G. Reginald Daniel, *Machado de Assis: Multiracial Identity and the Brazilian Novelist*

*University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania University Press, 2012*

Reviewed by Pedro Geiger

The long and excellent book by Reginald Daniel, *Machado de Assis*, of 338 pages, focuses on two related issues. One deals with racial questions in the USA and in Brazil, detailing their historical development.

Racial problems were established in both countries by the encounter of the European colonization with the prior Colombian population and by the colonial introducing of African slaves in the American continent. The book deals with the behavior and the perceptions of the racial issue by the different social sectors of the American and of the Brazilian societies, and with the evolution of the legal policy measures taken by both states in regard to it. Brazil has earned the reputation of being a racial democracy for the reason of not having had legalized social barriers based in race. However, discrimination among sectors of the population existed and still exists there.

The opportunity of dealing with racial questions was taken by the author to cover with accurate studies the full Brazilian history. Based on a large and good bibliography, he discusses a wide variety of themes, comparing interpretations of known Brazilian historians, like the ones made by the Marxian Caio Prado Júnior with the ones made by the Weberian Raymundo Faoro, or describing cultural traits brought by the slaves (like their religions), how they influenced Brazilian culture, and how they were treated by the government institutions.

The second theme of the book deals with the Brazilian novelist Machado de Assis (1839-1908) an icon of Brazil’s literature and the founder of the Brazilian Academy of Letters. The linkage between the two themes treated in the book is the fact that, like Reginald Daniel, Machado de Assis had an African ancestry.

On both themes Reginald Daniel presents a vast number of references via a very long bibliographical list, which includes a large number of Brazilianists and Brazilian authors. The descriptions of the steps following the introduction of slavery in the Americas, their economic development, and the construction of a racial order in both countries are illustrated by much statistical data. These racial orders, which also encompassed the Pre-Columbian populations, established complete racial rules, as for family linkages or for participation in work.

The author details the American principle of the “one-drop rule” and emphasizes the “more attenuated dichotomization of blackness and whiteness” in Latin America and in Brazil. The result of this fluidity in Brazil brought an order of racial layers based on color blending, distinguishing whites, mulattos (*mulatos*) and Negroes. During Brazilian history, mulattos were even used to catch and return fugitive slaves.
This order, which established a racial scale in which one saw the development of racial prejudices from mulattos against blacks, helped the introduction of class and cultural values, over ancestry, as defining the racial status of an individual in Brazil. It gave rise to the belief that, after the Abolition, Brazil turned into a racial democracy.

In Brazil, during the Colonial Era, at some moments, the number of African slaves was higher than the number of the white population. The census conducted in 1890, after the beginning of a wave of European migration, still indicated a majority of African Brazilians, of about 56%. During the last quarter of the 19th Century, the Brazilian Empire adopted a policy of whitening the country. Adding its financial sources to the attraction exercised by the expansion of agricultural commodities for export, the State played an important role in the European colonization of the, then, provinces, of São Paulo and others in the South of Brazil.

The movement against any kind of discrimination is currently very strong in Brazil as in the United States, but a look at Brazilian society shows that, in correlation with their lower economic development, people of color made less advances in the social hierarchy. A lower percentage of colored people appear in the media, the arts and the politics.

The book’s examination of Machado de Assis’ personality covers two main fields. One has to do with interpreting Machado’s political positions in relation to slavery and the Brazilian Abolition movement. The other has to do with the meaning of the contents of his novels and stories, and with their aesthetics.

Reginald Daniel presents the debates within the Brazilian literature about the definition of Machado de Assis’ racial identity; about his behavior in relation to it and to the racial issue; and about how these debates were used in the general Brazilian political debates on the racial problem. He reproduces a portion of a press article after Machado’s death saying that “early criticism nurtured the belief [of] his indifference to the plight of African Brazilians and the cause of Abolition.” Daniel states “Machado refrained from explicit discussion of slavery, racial discrimination, Afro Brazilian themes in general and the mulatto experience in particular” (181).

However one has to consider some of Machado’s ideological and political thoughts and positions. On the one hand, Machado realized the importance of the significant in face of the signification: that it is the form that defines art, not the content of its work. In 1866 he wrote in the newspaper Diário do Rio “our intentions are to see cultivated by Brazilian muses literary novels that unify the state of human passions and feelings with the original and delicate touch of poetry.” This observation shows how he was committed to the future of Brazil’s development.

On the other hand, in the middle of the euphoria related to the Abolition, Machado previewed new social inequalities. He made his character, Paulo, in the novel Esaú and Jacó, declare: “now that the blacks are free it remains for us to free the whites.” In this
novel he criticizes the beginnings, in Brazil, of financial speculation movements, the frenzy of the *encilhamento*, a Brazilian name of a financial game at the beginnings of the Twentieth Century which culminated in a deep crisis. In another novel, *Brás Cubas*, he observes the ascendant urban class starting to employ white servants for their homes. In *Iaiá Garcia* he presents preoccupations with the slave’s fate after being freed.

Actually, what makes Machado de Assis an extraordinary figure is the commitment he made to the future, a commitment recognized by Reginald Daniel. In a country then mostly rural, with an economy based on the export of agricultural products, in large part produced by slave arms, Machado turned his eyes to Brazil’s economic social transformations, to the beginning of an urban development and ascension of an urban bourgeoisie; an evolution that would contribute to the fight against traditional social prejudices, but which would bring new social inequalities.

This behavior of Machado de Assis can help to explain his relative distance from the issues of slavery and race, both born in the rural agricultural mercantile Brazil. He turns to the new relationships in the city, of the patrons with their free clients, or dependents, the *agregados*, or with their adopted kin, the *afilhados*. The inclination of Machado de Assis to deal with the conflict “between individual morality (or conscience) and the dictates of public success premised on egoism, ambition…” is a proof of Machado’s electing the beginnings of the building of capitalism in Brazil as a priority subject.

Chapter Five of the book presents summaries of Machado’s main novels, *Iaiá Garcia*, 1878, *Posthumous Memoirs of Brás Cubas*, 1881, *Quincas Borba*, 1891 and *Esaú e Jacó*, 1904. A look at those novels shows that masters and dependent people appear in all of them, slaves or white servants; as well, in all, the sufferings inflicted on the lower social layers are always present. Therefore, opinions about Machado de Assis’ political positions did change over time, in his favor, finding that he did explore the racial question, even if not in a very explicit way.

In regard to aesthetics, Machado de Assis’ literary writings show two phases: a first one related to French Romanticism and a second one linked to French Realism-Naturalism. In the Epilogue of the book is presented a statement by John Barth: “Located in the late nineteenth and the early Twentieth Century, Machado’s ‘both/neither’ perspective which views black and white as inherently relative and interacting extremes on a continuum of grays, displays (…) a clear affinity with the postmodern sensibility.”

In summary, Reginald Daniel’s book, *Machado de Assis*, is a very important and deep contribution to a complete view of Brazil’s history, and to the knowledge of who Machado de Assis was, in his life and literary production, and his place in Brazil’s culture.
Keith Muscutt, *Warriors Of The Clouds: A Lost Civilization in the Upper Amazon of Peru*
University of New Mexico Press, 1998

Reviewed by Michael Andregg

Dr. Muscutt fell in love with the Chachapoya of the northern Andes Mountains of Peru, sometimes called the “Cloud People.” So he visited the area almost every year for over 20, documenting significant architectural ruins of what he came to believe was a civilization distinct from the Incans who had conquered them shortly before smallpox and other diseases spreading ahead of the Spanish invaders wiped out many of both of these peoples in the mid-1500’s. Muscutt writes that the “last indigenous Chachapoya leader of any importance,” a man named “Guaman,” died in 1551.

Muscutt documents this over eight chapters that start with describing Kuelap, the largest city and “Citadel of the Chachapoya,” a description of early Andean Civilizations in general and how they interacted, detailed exploration of the Chachapoya ruins that have been discovered in the modern era, a comparison with modern communities still living there, and commentary supporting Muscutt’s claim that this otherwise relatively small group of mid-highland Andean peoples deserves the title of “civilization.”

Here he runs into a perennial problem for civilizationalists, our lack of any consensus definition of what qualities are required for that august designation. Most agree that the presence of cities is essential, and that at least some monumental architecture typically exists. But others have many other criteria, and Dr. Muscutt selects one of the broader definitions in his preface where he declares that “civilization is community.” That is a sweet definition philosophically, but minimalist, and would result in thousands of ancient communities being considered to be civilizations. We even see scores of modern groups, called “intentional communities” that might qualify that way. Many other scholars want scale, as in LARGE like the Egyptians, Chinese, Greeks and Romans, etc. and duration, as in existed for some centuries at least as a dominant group.

A true scholar, Dr. Muscutt chose to write his opus to the Chachapoya in extremely clear and lucid prose, purposefully stripped of most of the jargon of academic archeology to make it more accessible to general educated readers. But he also does some classical anthropology, and cites most of the others who have ever studied this small group and area. He also includes many photographs that show so much that words cannot (this book has many pictures, diagrams and illustrations of anthropological findings, as well as a good bibliography).
So I enjoyed his book greatly even though I am not convinced that the Chachapoya deserve that civilization title. And I learned a great deal, enough to seek a meeting with Dr. Muscutt himself, recently retired as a VP of classical arts at the University of Santa Cruz, California, USA. Muscutt remains passionate about the people he has come to love and committed to his thesis.

So, for general education about this sliver of the millions of Andean people who developed many things over centuries before being decimated by the conquistadores, his book is an excellent and relatively easy read. But for scholars trying to connect to the mainstream of Latin American research, Muscutt’s book would be of interest but an eddy on the side of current research.
CCR Style Guide for Submitted Manuscripts

Begin the document with title, author’s name, author’s position (e.g. professor, lecturer, graduate student, independent scholar), author’s academic department and affiliation, if any, and the article’s abstract (maximum 200 words).

Do NOT include page numbers, headers, or footers. These will be added by the editors. Do NOT utilize automatic formatting for indents, space following subheads and paragraphs, etc.

Write your article in English. Submit your manuscript, including tables, figures, appendices, etc., as a single Microsoft Word or PDF file. Page size should be 8.5 x 11 inches. All margins (left, right, top and bottom) should be 1-inch, including your tables and figures. Single space your text. Use a single column layout with both left and right margins justified. Main body text font: 12 pt. Times New Roman. If figures are included, use high-resolution figures, preferably encoded as encapsulated PostScript. Maximum length of article is 20 pages including endnotes, bibliography, etc.

Do NOT indent paragraphs. A line space should follow each paragraph. Subheads are in bold, flush left, separated by a line space above and below. Long quotations should be placed in a separate paragraph with a .5-inch hanging indent, no quotation marks, and preceded and followed by one-line spaces.

Except for common foreign words and phrases, the use of foreign words and phrases should be avoided. Authors should use proper, standard English grammar. Suggested guides include The Elements of Style by William Strunk, Jr. and E. B. White; and The Chicago Manual of Style, University of Chicago Press.

Underlining in the text is discouraged. Whenever possible use italics to indicate text that you wish to emphasize. Use italics for book titles, movie titles, etc and for foreign terms. Using colored text is prohibited. However, we encourage authors to take advantage of the ability to use color in the production of figures, maps, etc. To the extent possible, tables and figures should appear in the document near where they are referenced in the text. Large tables or figures should be put on pages by themselves. Avoid the use of overly small type in tables. In no case should tables or figures be in a separate document or file. All tables and figures must fit within 1-inch margins on all sides, in both portrait and landscape view.
Footnotes should appear at the bottom of the page on which they are referenced rather than at the end of the paper. Footnotes should be in 10 pt. Times New Roman, single spaced, and flush left, ragged right. There should be a footnote separator rule (line). Footnote numbers or symbols in the text must follow, rather than precede, punctuation. Excessively long footnotes are probably better handled in an appendix.

The subhead References (denoting Bibliography, Works Cited, etc.) should appear right after the end of the document, beginning on the last page if possible. They should be flush left, ragged right. Use the format with which you are most comfortable, such as APA (American Psychological Association), MLA (Modern Language Association), Chicago/Turabian.

Carolyn Carpentieri Potter
In October 1961, in Salzburg, Austria, an extraordinary group of scholars gathered to create the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations. Among the 26 founding members from Austria, Germany, France, Switzerland, The Netherlands, Spain, Italy, England, Russia, the United States, China and Japan were such luminaries as Pitirim Sorokin and Arnold Toynbee.

For six days, the participants debated such topics as the definition of “civilization,” problems in the analysis of complex cultures, civilizational encounters in the past, the Orient versus the Occident, problems of universal history, theories of historiography, and the role of the “human sciences” in “globalization.” The meeting was funded by the Austrian government, in cooperation with UNESCO, and received considerable press coverage. Sorokin was elected the Society’s first president.

After several meetings in Europe, the advancing age of its founding members and the declining health of then president, Othmar F. Anderle, were important factors in the decision to transfer the Society to the United States.

Between 1968 and 1970 Roger Williams Wescott of Drew University facilitated that transition. In 1971, the first annual meeting of the ISCSC (US) was held in Philadelphia. Important participants in that meeting and in the Society’s activities during the next years included Benjamin Nelson (the Society’s first American president), Roger Wescott, Vytautas Kavolis, Matthew Melko, David Wilkinson, Rushton Coulborn and C.P. Wolf. In 1974, the Salzburg branch was formally dissolved, and from that year to the present there has been only one International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations (ISCSC).

The presidents have been: In Europe, Pitirim Sorokin and Othmar Anderle; in the United States, Benjamin Nelson, Vytautas Kavolis, Matthew Melko, Michael Palencia-Roth, Roger Wescott, Shuntaro Ito (from Japan), Wayne Bledsoe, Lee Daniel Snyder, Andrew Targowski, David Rosner, and Toby Huff. To date, the Society has held 46 meetings, most of them in the United States but also in Salzburg, Austria; Santo Domingo, The Dominican Republic; Dublin, Ireland; Chiba, Japan; Frenchman’s Cove, Jamaica; St. Petersburg, Russia; Paris, France; New Brunswick, Canada; and Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

More than 30 countries are represented in the Society’s membership. Its intellectual dynamism and vibrancy over the years have been maintained and enhanced through its annual meetings, its publications, and the participation of such scholars as Talcott Parsons, Hayden White, Immanuel Wallerstein, Gordon Hewes, André Gunder Frank, Marshall Sahlins, Lynn White Jr., and Jeremy Sabloff.

The Society is committed to the idea that complex civilizational problems can best be approached through multidisciplinary analyses and debate by scholars from a variety of fields. The Comparative Civilizations Review, which welcomes submissions from the Society’s members as well as other scholars, has been published continually since its inaugural issue in 1979.

Prof. Michael Palencia-Roth
CALL FOR PAPERS

“Revolutions” in the Late 20th and early 21s Century

The 47th Annual Conference of the
International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations
Marconi Conference Center
18500 State Highway One
Marshall, California 94940
June 2017*

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During the last three decades after the fall of the Soviet Union, the world witnessed a significant number of revolutions. Most of these were not predicted.

Nevertheless, after the fall of the Berlin Wall many activists attempted to create non-violent revolutions in Europe and the Middle East. Some of these succeeded while others resulted in chaos, superfluous violence and even the return to repressive regimes.

Given this background, what can these late modern revolutions tell us about the conditions that led to success or failure? How do these revolutions compare with earlier examples such as the American, French, Russian or Iranian revolutions? What roles have religion, law, ethnicity, science and technology played in these episodes? What social-cultural and economic conditions have been associated with the success (or failure) of various intentional and intellectually orchestrated revolutions? Not least of all, how does civilizational analysis impinge upon or illuminate this range of phenomena?

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Papers are invited on the above topics and any others with civilizational relevance. Send Abstracts of 300 words describing your proposed paper by March 1, 2017 to the Program Chair, Dr. Laina Farhat-Holzman. Email address: Lfarhat102@aol.com.

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