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Greeks and Romans: Paradigms of the Past in Arendt and Heidegger

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If we are to compare Arendt with Heidegger—or indeed with any philosopher—it is best, I think, to take as our clue or guideline a fact which she herself continually stresses. "I am not a philosopher," she insists, not even "a professor of political philosophy," but rather "a professor of political theory" or of "political thought." Or again, using the terminology of Kant (who represents in her eyes the grand exception to the normal relationship between philosophy and politics), she writes: "I am not a thinker by profession." Thus in a television interview made in 1964, Günther Gaus introduced her as a philosopher. She retorted: "I'm afraid that I must protest at the very beginning: I do not belong to the philosophers' circle. My profession—to put it in general terms—is political theory. I don't think of myself in the least as a philosopher, and what's more I don't believe that I have been accepted into the circle of the philosophers." Gaus was unconvinced and asked her to explain the difference between political philosophy and her work as professor of political theory. She replied with complete assurance: "The difference, you see, depends on the thing itself. . . . [Philosophers] do not behave neutrally towards politics—since Plato's time that has not been possible. . . . It is in the very essence of the thing—I mean, in the question of politics as such—that the hostility lies."

This sharp distinction between political philosophy and political thought determines the structure of her essay "Martin Heidegger at Eighty". "We who wish to honour the thinkers, even if our own residence lies in the midst of the world, can hardly

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*Translated from the French by Jonathan Barnes.
help finding it striking and perhaps exasperating that Plato and
Heidegger, when they entered into human affairs, turned to
tyrrants and Fuhrers. This should be imputed not just to the
circumstances of the times and even less to preformed character,
but rather to what the French call a \textit{déformation professionnelle}” (p.
303).

This repulsion—in the proper sense of the word—is set out
more analytically (if not more philosophically) in \textit{Thinking}, the
first volume of \textit{The Life of the Mind}. In Chapter 3 Arendt raises the
question: “What makes us think?” Sections on “The pre-
philosophic assumptions of Greek philosophy” (§14) and “The
answer of Socrates” (§17)—which is itself less philosophical than it
seems—enclose the two ‘professional’ answers of Plato (§15) and
of the Romans (§17). Plato’s answer is contained in a single word:
\textit{θαυμάζων}, “wonder.” Philosophy, according to the \textit{Theaetetus}
(155D), is “the daughter of Thaumas.” Arendt adds: “The
Platonic wonder, the initial shock that sends the philosopher on
his way, was revived in our own time when Heidegger, in 1929,
concluded a lecture entitled ‘What is metaphysics?’ with the words
. . . ‘why is there anything at all and not, rather, nothing?’ and
called this ‘the basic question of metaphysics’ ” (LM, I, p. 145).
Heidegger’s conceit of connecting \textit{denken} (“to think”) with \textit{danken}
(“to thank”), which leads to the untranslatable notion of \textit{Gelassenheit},
is evidently not Platonic. Nonetheless, for Heidegger, to
philosophise, or to wonder, is quite certainly a matter of looking
for the invisible in the visible.

The answer given by the Roman philosophers, of whom the
Stoics are the paradigms, turns for its part on the ‘divorce’ be-
tween man and the world: “The trick discovered by Stoic philos-
ophy is to use the mind in such a way that reality cannot touch its
owner” (LM, I, p. 156). That is why Hegel, who relocates the
whole world inside consciousness, is in the end their legatee. As
Arendt subtly observes, whenever philosophy is construed as
science, we find ourselves back in the old Stoic position.

These two factors—Platonic wonder and the Stoic divorce be-
tween man and the world—are “different to the point of being
opposites” (LM, I, p. 162). Yet at the same time they are closely
related to one another; for in both cases, “thinking leaves the
world of appearances.” Thus from Parmenides to Plato, and from
the Stoics to Hegel, “this bracketing of reality . . . has remained
one of the great temptations of the professional thinkers" (LM, I, p. 157). Hence the déformation professionnelle.

It should be noted that Heidegger does not merely echo Plato. At bottom, he represents the intersection of the two answers. From Parmenides to Plato—and to Heidegger: philosophy is a matter of looking for the invisible in the visible, of seeking the Being of being. And yet from the Stoics to Hegel—and to Heidegger: philosophy is also found in "the merging of acting and thinking" (LM, II, p. 186). In her "Conclusions," Arendt analyses "Heidegger's will-not-to-will" and his "reversal," which she places between the two volumes of his Nietzsche. She writes of Heidegger's "History of Being"—in which the main event is the change in the concept of truth which must be accepted, and not the invention of the telescope—that it simply looks like "another, perhaps a bit more sophisticated, version of Hegel's ruse of reason . . ., or divine Providence" (LM, I, p. 179). The difference is, if anything, to Heidegger's disadvantage: "With Heidegger, this Nobody, allegedly acting behind the back of acting men, has now found a flesh-and-blood incarnation in the existence of the thinker, who acts while he does nothing, a person, to be sure, and even identifiable as 'Thinker'—which, however, does not signify his return into the world of appearances. He remains the 'solus ipse' in the 'existential solipsism,' except that now the fate of the world, the History of Being, has come to depend on him" (LM, II, p. 187). 3

Despite her revulsion from professional thinkers, Arendt is herself a thinker. She conducts, as she puts it, "exercises in political thought" (the subtitle of Between Past and Future). And it is here that the past—that antiquity—comes in.

In the preface to Between Past and Future, Arendt describes the activity of thinking as a matter of "settling down in the gap between past and future" (BPF, p. 13). Moreover, she defines the modern era as the age in which the condition of the thinker becomes the condition of everyman: "When the thread of tradition finally broke, the gap between past and future ceased to be a condition peculiar only to the activity of thought and restricted as an experience to those few who made thinking their primary business. It became a tangible reality and perplexity for all; that is, it became a fact of political relevance" (BPF, p. 14). It follows simply enough that Arendt, inasmuch as she is a modern, is herself "like the rest of us, in the condition of the thinker. That is
how we must understand her favorite appeal to Char's epigram: "Our inheritance was left to us by no testament."

Nevertheless, when, at the end of the first volume of *The Life of the Mind*, Arendt wishes to draw attention not to her method or her criteria or her values but rather to what she calls her "basic assumption" (*LM*, I, p. 211), this is how she gives substance to the activity of thinking: "I have clearly joined the ranks of those who for some time now have been attempting to dismantle metaphysics, and philosophy with all its categories, as we have known them from their beginning in Greece until today. Such dismantling is possible only on the assumption that the thread of tradition is broken and that we shall not be able to renew it" (*LM*, I, p. 212). In referring to the attempt to dismantle metaphysics, she is in effect calling herself a Heideggerian; for it is Heidegger, and Heidegger alone, to whom she pays tribute for the fact that the dismantling or "collapse took place in a manner worthy of what had preceded it" ("Martin Heidegger at Eighty," p. 297.)—and here she is a thinker and nothing but a thinker. However, she continues, "historically speaking, what actually has broken down is the Roman trinity that for thousands of years united religion, authority and tradition. The loss of this trinity does not destroy the past, and the dismantling process itself is not destructive; it only draws conclusions from a loss which is a fact and as such no longer a part of the 'history of ideas' but of our political history, the history of our world" (*LM*, I, p. 212). Arendt expresses her fundamental difference from Heidegger immediately after her tribute to him: she does not think, she thinks politics—she thinks our political history.

Out of antiquity

Only on this basis, I think, can we compare Arendt and Heidegger with regard to their relationship to antiquity.

First, for both Arendt and Heidegger, the relationship can only be a 'free' one: no philistinism, they say, no scholarship, no philology. Arendt pays tribute to Heidegger in the following terms: "There was someone . . . who, precisely because he knew that the thread of tradition was broken, was discovering the past anew. . . . Thinking has come to life again; the cultural treasures of the past, believed to be dead, are being made to speak, in the course of which it turns out that they propose things altogether different.
from the familiar, worn-out trivialities they had been presumed to say” (“Martin Heidegger at Eighty,” p. 295). And she speaks of her own work in the same way: “With the loss of tradition we have lost the thread which safely guided us through the vast realms of the past, but this thread was also the chain fettering each successive generation to a predetermined aspect of the past. It could be that only now will the past open up to us with unexpected freshness and tell us things no-one has yet had ears to hear” (“what is Authority?”, BPF, p. 94). Culture is “a field of ruins:” that is “the great chance” which allows us “to discover the past for ourselves,” to “read its authors as though nobody had ever read them before” (“The Crisis in Culture,” BPF, p. 204; cf. “Tradition and the Modern Age,” BPF, p. 28).

Moreover, for both Arendt and Heidegger, the free relationship with the past is allied to the fact that interpretation and criticism are forms of experiment. Thus in the Preface to Between Past and Future we hear an echo of what Heidegger, in §7 of Sein und Zeit, calls “the phenomenological method of inquiry:” we must, Arendt says, “discover the real origins of traditional concepts in order to distill from them anew their original spirit which has so sadly evaporated from the very key words of political language . . . leaving behind empty shells with which to settle almost all accounts regardless of their underlying phenomenal reality” (p. 15). The “original spirit” is necessarily tied to phenomenal experience and to a phenomenological attention.

This, moreover, is why the constant focus of attention is language—key words and their etymologies. We shall find examples aplenty in both authors. Yet there is still the same difference between them, and it must be stressed. In Men in Dark Times, referring to Walter Benjamin, Arendt observes that “any period to which its own past has become as questionable as it has for us, must eventually come up against the phenomenon of language, for in it the past is contained ineradicably, thwarting all attempts to get rid of it once and for all.” Thus far, Arendt is Heideggerian. Then she speaks in her own voice: “The Greek polis will continue to exist at the bottom of our political existence—that is, at the bottom of the sea—for as long as we use the word “politics” (p. 204). The Aristotle whom we hear at this point in Arendt’s text is not the descriptive phenomenologist: “Wherever the relevance of speech is at stake, matters become political by definition, for
speech is what makes man a political being” (HC, p. 3). Thus the term logos is not taken, either uniquely or primarily, with the same tone and sense.

This attention to language implies that, for Arendt as for Heidegger, we may finish up with fragments. At the end of the first volume of The Life of the Mind, the “empty shells” which constitute our key concepts are found to be echoed in some lines from Shakespeare’s Tempest:

Full fathom five thy father lies,
Of his bones are coral made,
Those are pearls that were his eyes.
Nothing of him that doth fade
But doth suffer a sea-change
Into something rich and strange.

“It is with such fragments from the past,” Arendt comments, “after their sea-change, that I have dealt there. . . . If some of my listeners or readers should be tempted to try their luck at the technique of dismantling, let them be careful not to destroy the “rich and strange,” the “coral” and the “pearls,” which can probably be saved only as fragments” (LM, I, p. 212).

Here, however, the difference between Arendt and Heidegger can once again be seen. For Arendt, the crucial point about fragmentation is that it involves a story: what we need is not eyes for the phenomena but ears for the past. With this, we touch upon Arendt’s conception of history, which is made explicit in, for example, “Understanding and Politics:” “Whenever an event occurs that is great enough to illuminate its own past, history comes into being. Only then does the chaotic maze of past happenings emerge as a story which can be told, because it has a beginning and an end.” The crises of the modern age allow us to transmute the sublime chaos of empty shells and pearls into a story. The past becomes a story: Arendt does not offer us a history—whether historial or historical—of concepts or of thought; she tells us the stories or histories of concepts and of thought. Out of Antiquity—as one says Out of Africa.

Greeks and Romans

The thread I shall follow is the contrast between political thought and professional thought or thought about thought. And
with its help I shall analyse more closely the different dealings which Arendt and Heidegger have with the past.

We must, I think, begin with the most impressive piece of evidence: Arendt and Heidegger refer to different pasts. Arendt makes a double reference—to the Greeks and to the Romans. For Heidegger there is only one reference point: the Greeks—and again the Greeks.

One may say, with only a little exaggeration, that for Heidegger the relation between Rome and Greece is one of translation and betrayal. When Heidegger invokes Latin it is usually to show how the translation of Greek terms betrays the Greek experience of aletheia. Veritas bolts the door on aletheia, and Heidegger’s intellectual journey takes him “upstream” (by what René Char calls a *retour amont*) from the Latins to the Greeks—and then from the Greeks to what is more Greek than the Greeks.

To indicate the tone and substance of this relation, one quotation may suffice. It comes from Heidegger’s essay “The Origin of the Work of Art.”

"By these [Greek] determinations . . . the Western interpretation of the Being of beings [is] stabilized. The process begins with the appropriation of Greek words by Roman-Latin thought. ἕνωσείμενον becomes subiectum, τὰ σωτηρία becomes substantia, συμβεβηκός becomes accidens. However, this translation of Greek names into Latin is in no way the innocent process it is considered to this day. Beneath the seemingly literal and thus faithful translation there is concealed, rather, a translation of Greek experience into a different way of thinking. Roman thought takes over the Greek words without a corresponding, equally original experience of what they say, without the Greek word. The rootlessness of Western thought begins with this translation."

Heidegger’s *Parmenides*, written in 1942/3, treats expressly of the repercussions which this rootlessness has had on political thought: “We think politics in a Roman way, that is to say in an imperial way” (p. 63). “Since the imperial age, the Greek word “political” has meant something Roman. Nothing of the Greek remains but the bare sound” (p. 67). Imperium (im-parare, “to provide oneself with”); “Thou shalt;” ius, which no longer derives from dike, the goddess who shows, but from iustitia: all these terms point to the transformation of aletheia into veritas. And the difference emerges even more markedly with the transposition of pseudos (what dissembles) into falsum (what fells or lays low). Eliane
Escoubas rightly suggests an analogy between *imperium romanum* or *pax romana* (from *pango*, “to fix”) and *falsum/verum*. In fact, “if we consider more closely the process by which the Romans took over the language, thought, and culture of the Greeks, we can see how *falsum* (what lays one low) has changed the sense of *pseudos* (what dissembles), assimilating and thereby supplanting it. Such an assimilation is always the most dangerous—and also the most enduring—form of domination. From then on, the West has known *pseudos* only in the form of *falsum*” (*Parmenides*, p. 67).

Thus in every area at once the Latin translation of Greece constitutes a first and decisive check on disclosedness.

The reaction against Latinity and the concern for the Greek original hidden beneath the translation is certainly one of the elements in Arendt’s attitude to the past. Here are two particularly fine examples. First, her analysis of the notion of a ‘spectator’ in *The Life of the Mind*. The passion for seeing, a fundamental Greek attitude which at one and the same time determines the *polis* as the space of appearances and philosophy as a theoretical concern, loses all its sense in Lucretius’ celebrated line: “To see from what troubles you yourself are free is joy indeed.” Seeing is here simply a matter of being present in safety at the unleashing of a storm. “Here of course the philosophic relevance of spectatorship is entirely lost—a loss that befell so many Greek notions when they fall into Roman hands” (I, p. 140; cf. p. 154, n.72).

A second example, more strictly Heideggerian, bears on the Latin translation of Aristotle. To render *zoion politikon* by *animal sociale*, as Seneca and Aquinas do, completely suppresses the Greek experience: instead of the distinction between public and private, *polis* and *oikia*, to which Aristotle alluded, it invokes the fellowship of the human species, of a biological rather than a political entity. “More than any elaborate theory, this unconscious substitution of the social for the political betrays the extent to which the original Greek understanding of politics had been lost” (*HC*, p. 23). The translation of *zoion logon echon* by *animal rationale* “rests on no less fundamental a misunderstanding” (*ibid*, p. 27).

For once again—for Aristotle and for all the Greeks—the definition was exclusively political. This is plainly indicated by the fact that barbarians and slaves can be called *aneu logou*, “deprived, of course, not of the faculty of speech, but of a way of life in which speech and only speech made sense” (*ibid.*). So too Heidegger, for
example in his *Parmenides*, observes that \( \zeta \omega \rho \nu\), “living thing,” should be thought of in its relation to \( \phi \omicron \sigma \varsigma \) or “nature,” and not in its relation to biology, as has been the case since the Roman era (p. 100).

Thus the Romans had no ear, whether philosophical or political, for Greece. But their deafness, according to Arendt, can be explained. In her view, the Roman experience cannot be analysed as a modification of a single and fundamental original experience, namely the experience of the Greeks. Rather, it constitutes in its own right an experience no less fundamental. The experience, however, is not an experience in thinking—it is not theoretical or philosophical. It is an exclusively political experience—and indeed it is precisely here that its originality lies.

“Common opinion on philosophy was formed by the Romans who became the heirs of Greece, and it bears the stamp, not of the original Roman experience, which was exclusively political, . . . but of the last century of the Roman republic” (*LM*, I, p. 151). In fact, in the conservation of “the Greek heritage, which the Romans, but never the Greeks, knew how to take care of and how to preserve” (“The Crisis of Culture,” *BPF*, p. 212), we may trace with precision the nature and form of the betrayal which the Roman trans-lation signified; for it may be said that Rome conserved Greek political philosophy as if it were the whole of philosophy. And this is the basis on which we now live. “Even today we believe that Aristotle defined man primarily as a political being endowed with speech or reason, which he did only in a political context, r that Plato exposed the original meaning of his doctrine of ideas in *The Republic*, where, on the contrary, he changed it for political reasons.” In spite of the grandeur of Greek political philosophy, it may be doubted that it would have lost its inherent utopian character if the Romans, in their indefatigable search for tradition and authority, had not decided to take it over and acknowledge it as their highest authority in all matters of theory and thought” (“What is Authority?”, *BPF*, p. 120).

Now the slide from Greek political philosophy to philosophy *simpliciter*, and the subordination of Rome to Greece, are merely consequences of the original Roman experience of politics: the experience of foundation. The ‘tradition,’ which is defined by the Roman trinity of authority, culture, and religion, and which the modern age sees in crisis, derives precisely from the decision to
Barbara Cassin

subordinate Roman culture to Greek thought; or in other words, to ‘found’ it. In “What is Authority?” and also in The Human Condition, Arendt contrasts *polis* and *patria* term by term, in an incomparable piece of analysis. “There is no more elemental difference between Greece and Rome than their respective attitudes toward territory and law” (*HC*, p. 195, n.21). “Wherever you go, you will be a *polis*”—that is the motto of the Greek colonists” (*HC*, p. 198). On the other hand, *ab urbe condita* roots in the soil; it is the motto of an empire which would make the western world Rome’s hinterland. There are several *poleis*, several cities: there is one *Urbs*, one town. The founder and the legislator in a Greek city are foreigners, sometimes barbarians; for the laws are never more than a rampart behind which a *polis* may shelter itself. It is only after the foundation and after the legislation that political life begins. For Rome, on the other hand, the founder and the legislator are *patres patriae*. In the same way, Roman religion “ties back,” *re-ligat*, to the foundation; *auctoritas*, from *augere*, ‘increases’ the foundation. Political authority at Rome lies with the Senate, which is characterised by its *gravitas*, that is to say, by its ability to carry the weight of the past and to provide ballast for the ship of state. To grow old is to lean towards the past, to lean towards the source of authority; and when you are a Roman, you aim to imitate. But if you are a Greek, then—to borrow Goethe’s epigram which Arendt herself cites in this context—to grow old is “to withdraw from the world of appearances.” A Greek does not imitate: he rivals and competes.

This fundamental opposition between the two political experiences—the space of appearances in the *polis*, the foundation of the *patria*—leads us to the “historically all-important fact” that “the Romans felt they needed founding fathers and authoritative examples in matters of thought and ideas as well, and accepted the great ‘ancestors’ in Greece as their authorities for theory, philosophy, and poetry” (“What is Authority?”, *BPF*, p. 124). This is the way to explain the paradox inherent in the Roman idea of foundation. Unlike the Jewish foundation, whose chronology begins with the creation of the world, it was necessary—to avoid breaking the thread of tradition—that the Roman foundation should be at one and the same time primary and non-primary. This is how Virgil’s *Fourth Eclogue* must be interpreted: the foundation of Rome is also a rebirth of Troy.
The subordination of Rome to Greece was a consequence of this search for authority, which was itself a consequence of the fundamental political experience of the Romans. This is why Greece silenced Rome no less than Rome silenced Greece. "The Greek concepts, once they have been sanctified by the Romans through tradition and authority, simply eliminated from historical consciousness all political experiences which could not be fitted into their framework" ("What is Authority?", BPF, p. 136). All political experiences—and certainly the experience of foundation. The great chance given us by the ruin of culture—to return to Between Past and Future—is that we can at last "look upon the past with eyes undistracted by any tradition, with a directness which has disappeared from Occidental reading and hearing since Roman civilisation submitted to the authority of Greek thought" ("Tradition and the Modern Age," BPF, p. 28). We can at last listen to the Romans: we can hear them, with Arendt, alongside the Greeks—two fundamental experiences which do not form a sequence, two irreducible events. We need no longer think of the Romans, with Heidegger, as, following the Greeks, a mere running out.

Greeks and Greeks

Here, too, we should no doubt first stress the similarity. For Arendt and for Heidegger alike, there is an opposition internal to the Greek corpus itself—a divide within the Greek world, a sort of relationship between Greeks and Greeks.

I deal briskly with Heidegger inasmuch as I am concerned here only with the comparison between him and Arendt. For Heidegger, the relationship between the Presocratics on the one hand and the other Greeks, like Plato and Aristotle, on the other, is analogous, mutatis mutandis, to the relationship between the Greeks and the Romans. Marlene Zarader's paper, "Le miroir aux trois reflets, histoire d'une evolution," helpfully distinguishes three phases in Heidegger's thought. First, there is a period in which the Greeks are opposed to Rome and to the tradition which Rome represents: "the Greeks thought what the later tradition would forget." No divide yet between the Presocratics and Plato; and when, during his Marburg period, Heidegger speaks of a "step back" it is a question of returning to Greek
ontology, i.e., essentially to Aristotle. In a second phase, the distinction comes, on the contrary, to be made between the early Greeks and Plato or Aristotle: preference is given to “the Greek dawn,” when “the first Greeks experimented in ways which no-one had thought before”; Being was expressed in its original terms—οὐσία, ἀλήθεια, λόγος, μορφα—and thus displayed its true form as presence. “Platons Lehre von her Wahrheit,” which shows how already in Plato mimesis functions as adaequatio, thus furnishes a parallel for the way in which veritas was to bolt the door on aletheia. I leave aside the third phase, marked by “The end of philosophy and the task of thinking,” when aletheia would at once be homoiosis, and when nothing but a side-step could show how everything original is derived without mediation. It must suffice here to underline Aristotle’s fascinating ambiguity: he is at the same time Presocratic and Platonic, concerned both with ‘unveiling’ and with ‘adequation,’ as Heidegger showed in his repeated and contrasting analyses of Metaphysics and the de Interpretatione. The divide within Aristotle—just like the divide between Greeks and Greeks, and between Greeks and Romans—always represents a running out—or a running down—in this History of Being which is also the History of Truth.

For Arendt, there is indeed a divide, and an analogous appeal to the Presocratics. But here too we find—and easily—the thread which we are following. For Arendt does not talk about the same Presocratics. Her Presocratics are the paradigms of an experience which is not original but rather “prephilosophic.”

Insofar as it is ‘philosophical’ or ‘theoretical,’ the Greek corpus stretches—for Arendt—from Parmenides to Plato and Aristotle, and then to Heidegger. It is characterised by the primacy of truth, theoria and the vita contemplativa. Heidegger’s Presocratics, including Anaximander, are modern in Arendt’s eyes. The only genuine Presocratic experience is political experience (an echo of which can still be heard in Aristotle), where the focus is not truth but freedom. For freedom, by definition, is not a philosophical concept: it is “an exclusively political concept, indeed the quintessence of the city-state and of citizenship. Our philosophical tradition of political thought, beginning with Parmenides and Plato, was founded explicitly in opposition to this polis and its citizenship. The way of life chosen by the philosopher was understood in opposition to the βίος πολιτικός, the political way of life” (“What
is Freedom?”, *BPF*, p. 157). The entry of freedom into philosophy was not made until very much later, with St. Paul and the Christian identification of freedom and free will. It culminates magisterially in Heidegger’s *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit* with the affirmation that the essence of truth is freedom.

*Arendt's Socrates*

The point of contact between what is prephilosophic and political and what is philosophical in the strict sense is represented by Socrates. Or, to put it more pointedly, Socrates, for Arendt, is a Presocratic. Francoise Collin\(^{12}\) observes that “the history of western philosophy is a ‘sequence of footnotes’ not to Plato’s works but rather to those of Socrates—or rather, since he wrote none (and in this he is eminently political), to his trial and his condemnation.” The trial of Socrates is the event which marks the division between the prephilosophic (the *bios politikos*) and the philosophical (the *bios theoretikos*).

Arendt, it must be confessed, offers us a very odd Socrates—a split personality who is already philosophical and yet still Presocratic. Insofar as he is Presocratic (in Arendt’s sense, not in Heidegger’s), Socrates seems to me to have all the characteristics of a sophist. This emerges, I think, from “the answer of Socrates” to the question “What makes us think?” (*LM*, I, pp. 166-79), an also from the short essay on “Philosophy and Politics.”\(^{13}\)

Indeed, if in Plato we get a little Heidegger, in Socrates we see a great deal of Arendt. Socrates is the non-professional thinker, whose position Arendt claims for her own. He is a thinker, “who always remained a man among men, who did not shun the market-place, who was a citizen among citizens, doing nothing, claiming nothing except what in his opinion every citizen should be and have a right to” (*LM*, I, p. 167); and he “decided to lay down his life . . . simply for the right to go about examining the opinions of other people, thinking about them and asking his interlocutors to do the same” (*LM*, I, p. 168).

To say of Socrates that he is a non-professional thinker is to make two assertions at once: it is to say that he is a thinker and to say that he is a citizen. In the thinker, we have Plato’s Socrates or the platonizing Socrates. In the citizen, Socrates the sophist.

Socrates is certainly a thinker, given what Arendt, in her
Barbara Cassin

analysis of Plato’s *Gorgias*, takes to be his two key assertions: two replies to Callicles, and hence two professions of anti-sophistic faith. The first assertion is that “to commit an injustice is worse than to suffer one.” It cannot be the citizen who here speaks through Socrates’ mouth but only the thinker; for as far as the citizen is concerned, crime is a transgression of the law and therefore demands punishment. The second assertion is *homolegein auton heautoi*. According to this maxim, it is better to be in disagreement with everyone else than to be in disagreement with everyone else than to be in disagreement with yourself. And this constitutes the essential structure of thought, that relation of a thinker to himself which Arendt calls “the two-in-one.” The philosopher stands alone against his judges, alone against his friends—but in agreement with himself. In this way, it was Socrates who discovered of the principle of non-contradiction, upon which Aristotle grounded western logic and which still finds echoes in Kant’s categorical imperative. “Because I exist, I shall not contradict myself. And I can contradict myself because in thinking I am two-in-one” (“Philosophy and Politics” [CG, p. 90]; cf. *LM*, I, p. 188).

But in itself the ‘two-in-one’ is more complicated than this; for when we are thinking, we are not thereby philosophising. The criterion of the two-in-one is not truth but agreement; and the duality inherent in agreement points toward a plurality, and hence to the essential condition of politics. “As the metaphor bridges the gap between the world of appearances and the mental activities going on within it, so the Socratic two-in-one heals the solitariness of thought; its inherent duality points to the infinite plurality which is the law of the earth” (*LM*, I, p. 187). It is perhaps worth remarking here—although Arendt does not mention the fact, and no doubt did not know it—that *homologia* (literally “identity of discourse”), along with *homonolia* (“identity of thought”) is a keyword in the political thought of the sophists. There it means at the same time “concord” between states, “consensus” among citizens (something which must be continually renewed and which constitutes the very life of the city), and also the “agreement” between me and myself which was to become characteristic of Socratic thought.14 Thus despite appearances—Socrates sitting in a corner preoccupied by his *daimonion*—in the very act of thinking Socrates is a citizen.

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Thus I think it is illuminating to suggest here a series of analogies which are not made explicit by Arendt but can be read between the lines of her text: the analogies hold between Socrates the citizen, Socrates the sophist, and Socrates the Aristotelian (or at least, Socrates the political animal in Aristotle's sense).

A Sophistic Polis

As Arendt insists, Aristotle's celebrated definitions of man as a "political animal" or an "animal endowed with logos" do no more than articulate the common view in the polis of man and political life. Thus our whole comparison of Arendt and Heidegger could be organized in terms of their different perceptions of Aristotle. Heidegger has two Aristotles, one of them Presocratic and the other already modern. Arendt has two Aristotles, one of them prephilosophic and political and the other Platonic and theoretical. But as Jacques Taminiaux has well shown, Arendt gives an Aristotelian and not a Platonico-Heideggerian interpretation to the bios theoretikos which therefore does not absorb all the characteristics of praxis. Praxis in Aristotle is tied to human plurality and to doxa: Arendt, as Taminiaux stresses, revives the Aristotelian concepts of the polis, of politics, and of citizenship.

For the sophistic movement, I think, shares certain features of great significance with what Arendt thinks of as Greek political thought and ascribes in particular to Socrates and to Aristotle. This is true even though, as I have already said, it is sometimes difficult to discern it in Arendt's writings; for she—like Heidegger, and indeed like us all—writes under the spell of Plato's philosophical fiction which made the word "sophist" so repellent that it still seems perverse or scandalous to give it an honourable sense.

The first feature is constitutive and structural. It is so prominent that one is liable to overlook it. It was precisely against the sophists and against the bios politikos that Platonic theoria was developed.

Again, in order to define the polis, Arendt adopts Aristotle's phrase: "the interchange of words and deeds;" and this is how she characterizes "the Greek solution" to the fragility of human affairs. Now the distinctive elements in this solution are so many sophistic topos. First, there is the distinction between the public
and the private, between the domain of nature and the domain of necessity. Long before Aristotle wrote the first book of the *Politics*, and before Callicles and Thrasymachus had spoken in their Platonic personae, Antiphon, in his *On Truth*, had already expressly discussed this contrast and its consequences: in the city, we play the citizen; and the private is defined as that which escapes the public grasp.

Secondly, there is the difference between *doxa* and *aletheia*, between the plurality of *doxai* and the single and solitary constraint of truth. In the Greek *polis*, *aletheia* exists only as the product of *doxai*, with which it is identified. It is this idea which Plato attacks—but it is the very essence of the political thought of the sophists and also, to some extent, of Socrates. Compare what Arendt says of Socrates when she contrasts him with the sophists in “Philosophy and Politics,” with what she says of the sophists themselves in “The Concept of History.” “In contrast with the sophists, [Socrates] had discovered that *doxa* is never a subjective illusion or an arbitrary distortion, but that truth is invariably tied to it” (“Philosophy and Politics” [CG, p. 90]). In other words, when Socrates brings to birth a *dokei moi* or an irreducibly singular “It seems to me” from one of his interlocutors, he nevertheless indicates that it is the same world which shows itself differently to different men, and that therein lies the truth of *doxa*. And “this sort of understanding—seeing the world . . . from someone else’s point of view—is political perception *par excellence*” ([CG, p. 89]). Now in *Between Past and Future*, it is thanks to the sophists and by “an inexhaustible flood of arguments which the sophists offered to the citizens of Athens” that the Greeks learned “to exchange their own point of view and their own ‘opinions’ . . . with those of their fellow-citizens . . ., and to envisage the same world from the perspective of another Greek” (“The Concept of History,” *BPF*, p. 51). In this sense, Homer is the first sophist as well as the first historian; for he sings both of Achilles and of Hector, and Hesiod and Thucydides follow in his footsteps. In other words, like anyone who can reveal the truth in each point of view and thus create a common world, Socrates is a thorough-going Protagorean.

The third element is inseparable from the second. It is the distinction between appearing and being, a distinction of the last importance to the philosophers and of absolutely no concern to
the politicians. In the polis, being is produced from the plurality of appearances. Here Arendt observes that Gorgias was a very early critic of the schism between being and appearing; for he pointed out that each is impotent without the other. She cites a text which Proclus ascribes to Gorgias (82B26 DK, II, p. 306; cf. LM, I, p. 25): “Being is invisible (δυνάμενος) when it does not hit upon appearing, and appearing is weak (δυνάμενος) when it does not hit upon being.”

All these elements converge on a fourth, the status of logos as the condition of politics. Arendt follows Burckhardt and maintains that the polis is “the most talkative of all bodies politic” (HC, p. 26). There is a ceaseless competition among logoi and an effort to secure conviction by adapting your logoi to the kairos or occasion. For a logos uttered at its kairos is a praxis, an action—it is political action par excellence. The trial of Socrates thus marks a turning-point, introducing a distrust of peitho or persuasion—that is to say, of logoi in its political form. But Socrates, for his part—“gadfly, midwife, electric ray” (LM, I, p. 173)—“was the greatest [of all the sophists] because he thought that there are or could be as many different logoi as there are men, and that all these logoi unite to form the human world, insofar as men live together through the medium of speech” (“Philosophy and Politics” [CG, p. 901]).

Socratic discourse, then, insofar as it is sophistic, is for Arendt a paradigm of unity: not the unity of uniqueness, but a unity constituted from divergent singularities, in such a way that plurality can appear as the condition of politics. Here, in contrast to the organic and hierarchical structure of Plato’s republic, we find Aristotelian metaphors, which give both equality and individuality their due. Individual faults may even work to the advantage of the whole, as in a choir or a ship—or with meals to which, as to modern picnics, “many bring their contributions” and which are “better than those supplied at one man’s cost” (Politics III 11, 1281b2-3). Now we know—from Plato himself—that the practice of persuasion, which can confer power and even riches, is not philosophical: on the contrary, it is the practice which made the sophists, in Hegel’s phrase, “the masters of Greece” and, according to Grote, the inventors of democracy and the precursors of the Enlightenment.

More radically, Socrates the sophist, and the Socratic sophists
who practise “the sophistry of noble lineage” (in Plato’s phrase: *Sophist*, 231b; cf *LM*, I, p. 173) apply a powerful purgative and introduce us to “the most political of human faculties”—the faculty of judgement. It was Socrates who took the step from thinking to judging: the liberating force came from his critical activity, and it was linked to the two-in-one and to the demand for agreement with oneself. Arendt cites the one passage—in *Was heisst Denken?*—in which Heidegger speaks explicitly about Socrates: “Throughout his life and up to his very death, Socrates did nothing other than place himself in this draft, this current [of thinking], and maintain himself in it. This is why he is the purest of the West. This is why he wrote nothing. For anyone who begins, out of thinking, to write must inevitably be like those people who run for shelter from a wind too strong for them” (*LM*, I, p. 174). But she cites Heidegger the better to confute him: “The manifestation of the wind of thought is not knowledge; it is the ability to tell right from wrong, beautiful from ugly. And this, at the rare moments when the stakes are on the table, may indeed prevent catastrophes, at least for the self” (*LM*, p. 193). In other words, Socrates poses the question of meaning, in contrast to the question of truth. At the very beginning of her book, Arendt stresses that “the need of reason is not inspired by the quest for truth but by the quest for meaning. And truth and meaning are not the same” (*LM*, I, p. 15). Heidegger thus provides “the latest and in some respects most striking instance” of “the basic fallacy:” it occurs in *Being and Time*, “which starts out by raising anew the question of the meaning of Being. Heidegger himself, in a later interpretation of his own initial question, says explicitly: ‘Meaning of Being’ and ‘Truth of Being’ say the same” (*ibid*). The same holds when, in the role of professional thinker, he identifies the faculty of knowing with the faculty of judging under the name of “the wind of thought.”

And yet it is Protagoras rather than Socrates who ought here to serve as the model.

In *The Human Condition*, Arendt suggests a complicated and ultimately critical interpretation of ‘man the measure.’ Protagoras appears there initially as “the earliest forerunner of Kant, for if man is the measure of all things, then man is the only thing outside the means-end relationship, the only end in himself who can use everything else as means” (p. 158). And yet Plato’s
paradoxical retort in the *Laws*, according to which not man but "the god is the measure [even] of mere use objects" (716d, quoted on p. 159), suggests that Protagoras is in the last analysis the forerunner of Marx; for whether he means to or not, he extends the concept of *homo faber* to the world as a whole, thereby running the risk of transforming the world and public space into a simple market-place (see p. 166).

Protagoras could be defended in more ways than one. According to Heidegger, we may interpret the proposition as a limitation on—or a proper measure of—disclosedness or Parmenidean truth. But it may be feared that in Arendt's eyes this amounts to a further accusation against Protagoras—the accusation of professionalism in thought. It would be better, then, to observe that the proposition deals exclusively with χρήματα (taken very literally the word means 'use objects': goods or property which you use); it does not deal with πράγματα (the word means "things" in general, and refers both to works and to actions). Yet there is a more radical and a better defence of Protagoras. It was given by Socrates himself in Plato's *Theaetetus*. Neither Arendt nor Heidegger, so far as I know, has ever taken note of it, even though Socrates-Protagoras there takes the political stand which Kant, on Arendt's reading, takes in the *Critique of Judgement*. Protagoras, who expresses himself through the mouth of Socrates, claims to care for others by the therapeutic force of his discourse, and to help them undergo a "change of condition:" he does not of course convert them from false beliefs to true beliefs (that, he says, is neither possible nor desirable), but rather from less good beliefs to better beliefs. Protagoras is mindful of the distinction between meaning and truth as he teaches us how to make better judgements; and in doing so he exhibits two features characteristic of Kant's thought. For "he woos the consent of everyone else" (παθειν and not διαλέγεσθαι, as Arendt notes; and he thinks of judgement in terms of taste. And in this way, since "for judgements of taste the world is the primary thing, not man, neither man's life nor his self," the supposed arbitrariness of taste is a feature of public life and the common world—in short, of the mutual dependency of culture and politics which is the city itself ("The Crisis of Culture," BPF, p. 222).

In the end, we might maintain, following the analysis of Etienne Tassin, that Protagoras pushes the Socratic view to its
extreme—or rather, that he goes beyond Socrates, and as far as Machiavelli. In the celebrated myth of the Protagoras, aídos and dike constitute political virtue in the strict sense, and this virtue was bestowed by Zeus as a supplementary gift to be shared equally among all men: Protagoras concludes the myth by asserting that we learn this virtue as we learn our mother tongue—we suck it in with our nurse’s milk. As for those who do not possess it, if they do not even pretend to possess it, then they are madmen who thus exclude themselves from the human community (Protagoras 323bc). Hence politics is necessarily a politics of appearance; and Greek politics speaks the language of the sophists and deploys all its possibilities: plurality, the space of appearances, persuasion, judgement.

To end this discussion of Arendt and the sophists, I shall note the fluctuation of her thought on politics which is sometimes bold and sometimes not. This can be explained in terms of the influence of the philosophical. It is noteworthy that once she sets foot outside politics, the judgement she passes on persuasion changes. The best evidence for this is her assessment of lying in “Truth and Politics.” On the one hand, the liar is “an actor by nature;” for “he takes advantage of the undeniable affinity of our capacity of action, for changing reality, with this mysterious faculty of ours that enables us to say ‘The sun is shining’ when it is raining cats and dogs” (BPF, p. 250). Thus our capacity to lie is a confirmation of human freedom. On the other hand, persuasion is a form of violence, used by those who have power. “Persuasion and violence can destroy truth but they cannot replace it” (p. 259), since truth “is the ground on which we stand and the sky that stretches above us” (p. 264). One might almost say, Arendt remarks, that “to consider politics from the perspective of truth . . . means to set foot outside the political domain” (p. 259). It is in philosophical Latin that one says: Fiat veritas et pereat mundus.

Of the transcendental in politics: Sophocles or Pericles?

If in politics judgement must be thought of in terms of taste, then there arises in an acute form the problem of the relationship between aesthetics and politics, between works and actions in the city. Here the difference between Heidegger and Arendt reaches its peak. We shall best see this if we compare their interpretations.
of the first chorus of Sophocles’ *Antigone* and of Pericles’ funeral speech in Book II of Thucydides’ *History*. (And note at the outset, as a pointer of some significance, the different natures of the works they choose: tragic poetry, historical prose.)

Man, who is “the most strangest thing of all” and who is “everywhere journeying, inexperienced and without issue,” is at the same time ὑπόπολις ἄπολις (*Antigone* 370). “Πόλις is usually translated as city or city-state. This does not capture the full meaning. Πόλις means, rather, the place, the There, wherein and as which historical Being-There is. The πόλις is the historical place, the There in which, out of which, and for which history happens. To this place and scene of history belong the gods, the temples, the priests, the festivals, the games, the poets, the thinkers, the ruler, the council of elders, the assembly of the people, the army and the fleet. All this does not first belong to the πόλις, does not become political by entering into a relation with a statesman and a general and the business of the state. No, it is political, i.e. at the site of history, inasmuch as the poets (for example) are only poets (and truly poets), the thinkers only thinkers (and truly thinkers), and inasmuch as the priests are only priests (and truly priests), the kings only kings (and truly kings). Now, “are” here means “use force”—inasmuch as they are actively involved in force and become eminent in historical being as creators and men of action. Pre-eminent in the historical place, they become at the same time ἀπολίς, without city and place, lonely, strange, and alien, without issue amid Being as a whole, at the same time without statute and limit, without structure and order, because they themselves as creators must first create all this.”

By way of this long quotation we may see how essential it is for Heidegger that the city should be thought of what is behind and beyond it—of its negation. This is Heidegger’s ‘apoliticism.’ Agents, creators, founders: all are one. It is their violence which is explained in “The Origin of the Work of Art,” which dates from the same period: “The temple-work, standing there, opens up a world and at the same time sets this world back again on earth, which itself only thus emerges as native ground.”

Here we also see that the Greek experience of the *polis*, insofar as it is thought of as the experience of a ‘location’ or a ‘There,’ is always bound to be identified with the Roman experience of a *patria*, giving it its tone or lending it its metaphors, as you will. In any event, politics
is, as far as possible, thought of as, or in terms of, a work of art.

The non-political essence of politics is confirmed when Heidegger reinterprets the same verse in his Parmenides, written eight years later. Here he proposes to understand πόλις in terms of πέλειν, the archaic verb for εἶναι. The city is in itself the place for the total unveiling of Being; and "the difference between the modern State, the Roman res publica, and the Greek πόλις is essentially the same as the difference between the modern essence of truth, the Roman rectitudo, and the Greek ἀλήθεια" (p. 132). Unveiling, unlike disguising or forgetting, essentially involves conflict: it is manifested in terror, in horror, in unhappiness, which, as Jacob Burckhardt saw, were features of the Greek city. "It is not by chance that these thoughts about man occur in a Greek tragedy. For it is from the unique source of the conflictual essence of ἀλήθεια that the possibility and necessity of 'tragedy' itself arise" (p. 134). If the πόλις is in itself only the πόλος τοῦ πέλειν, the "pole" of being, then "it is because the Greeks are an absolutely non-political people" that they both could and had to found it (p. 142).

In order to give us an understanding of what a polis is, Arendt for her part likes to adduce the Periclean epigram: ϕιλοκαλούμεν τε γάρ μετ' εὔτελείας καὶ ϕιλοσοφούμεν ἀνευ μαλακίας. She suggests something like the following translation: "We love beauty within the limits of political judgement, and we philosophize without the barbarian vice of effeminacy." To the Hellenist, Arendt's interpretation will seem no less forced than Heidegger's. The central point is this: she boldly understands "limit" and "effeminacy" as two "strictly political" terms (BPF, p. 214). Malakia, which means in the first instance softness (of a bed, of a fabric, of a meadow, of skin, of a face or a look), often does connote weakness (of shell-less molluscs), physical or mental feebleness, effeminacy. "We philosophise like men and not like pansies"—that is Pericles' thought. But it is much harder to understand euteleia as a positive term. The word is grand enough in itself: eu, "well" or "in a good fashion," and teleios, "complete" or "finished" or "perfect" (from telos, "end" or "aim"). It is this etymology which leads Arendt to see behind euteleia "the faculty to take aim in judgement, discernment, discrimination, in brief . . . that curious and ill-defined capacity we commonly call taste" (BPF, p. 214). But if the privative term ateleia regularly denotes a
state of imperfection, nevertheless *euteleia* too seems most often to have strongly negative connotations: “mediocrity,” “parsimoniousness,” “cheapness.” This in Aristotle’s “nature does not imitate those craftsmen who, for economy’s sake, make a spit and lamp-holder in one” (*Parts of Animals*, 683a24). According to the *Metaphysics*, no-one would dream of counting Hippo among the natural scientists, like Thales, “because of the mediocrity of his thought” (A 3, 984a4). In the *Poetics*, *euteles* is predicated, in contrast to *semmos* ("grave," "dignified"), of poets who represent low people and actions which lack grandeur (4, 1448b26). (The low, *phauloi*, contrast with the *spoudaioi*, noble people whose actions are fine: the contrast governs the whole of Aristotle’s ethics and politics.) The *Poetics* also applies the word to a style or mode of expression (*lexis*) which is ‘flat’ and not elevated (22, 1458b22). Liddell and Scott suggest “without extravagance” for the Periclean passage. And no doubt the sense should be looked for in the financial domain; for just as *ateleia* can mean exemption from a charge or tax, so *euteleia* may also indicate that something is cheap or a ‘good buy.’ (In modern Greek *telos* means “tax.”) Pericles, I think, means to assert that the Athenians “love beauty without ruining themselves,” i.e., without making it a cause of excessive taxes or even—more simply—a financial matter at all. After all, that is the very best way to have taste: in a democracy one does not act in the way they do in the extravagant and hybristic Empire of the Great King. “Taste debarbarizes the world of the beautiful by not being overwhelmed by it” (*BPF*, p. 224). In the end, then, Arendt is right to understand Pericles’ epigram as a subordination of work to action, of love of beauty and love of truth—items which occupy the first place in the hierarchy of souls described in the myth of the *Phaedrus* (248d)—to the sphere of politics.

That is why Arendt also likes to cite, again selectively, another passage from the Funeral Oration: “We shall not need the praises of Homer or of any other panegyrist whose poetry may please for the moment, although his representation of the facts will not bear the light of day. For we have compelled every land and every sea to open a path for our valour, and have everywhere planted eternal memorials of our friendship and our enmity” (*The Human Condition*, p. 206, Arendt translates as follows: “everywhere everlasting remembrance of [their] good and [their] evil deeds”). Athens has no more need of poets. The cities which
she has founded take over Homer’s baton. She can produce geographers and historians.

But Thucydides and Pausanias do not produce an engaged art, any more than Homer did. “Athens . . . never settled the conflict between politics and art unequivocally in favour of one or the other,” and “the Greeks, so to speak, could say in one and the same breath: ‘He who has not seen the Zeus of Phidias at Olympia has lived in vain’ and ‘People like Phidias, namely sculptors, are unfit for citizenship’ ” (BPF, pp. 216, 217). Arendt repeats the paradox, and it fascinates her: “This conflict [between art and politics] cannot and must not be solved” (BPF, p. 218); or again: “We need not choose here between Plato and Protagoras” (HC, p. 174). Politics needs art: if the world is to be what it is always deemed to be, the fatherland of men during their life on earth, then human ingenuity must avail itself of actions and also of words. Without Pindar, no Olympic Games. Nonetheless, the polis dethrones art; for it elevates action, without of course reifying it, to the first place in the hierarchy of the vita activa, and it characterises speech as the decisive difference between men and animals—“both of which bestowed upon politics a dignity which even today has not altogether disappeared” (HC, p. 205). This paradox is a corollary of the paradox inherent in the status of works of art themselves. For a work of art is a work in the fullest sense—that is to say, it is the most intensely tangible object in the world, an object which belongs to the same public space as politics. And at the same time it is also a non-work, which frees itself from the goals and designs of homo faber no less than from the biological necessity of toil.

Hence—and with all these qualifications made—it seems to me that the difference between Plato and Protagoras remains. It is, if you prefer, the difference between a powerful tendency on Heidegger’s part and a powerful tendency on Arendt’s part.

A final example—the example of tragedy—may serve to sum up. Tragedy, which is essentially Greek, is for Heidegger, as the Parmenides explicitly avows, the tragedy of aletheia. For Arendt, it is “the political art par excellence” (HC, p. 188)—not because it necessarily represents the conflict between private and public but because it is the imitation, with a minimal reification, of action, of drama, and of those non-generalisable individuals who are the “acting people”—the “agents” or “actors” of history. (And the
chorus, which extracts the meaning of the piece, is thus less tragic
than the drama itself). That is why, pace Aristotle, tragedy and
history are equally philosophical—or equally unphilosophical.
They are equally resistant to universalisation, equally averse any
ruse of reason.

Thus in Heidegger's case, the dignity of politics consists in not
being itself—while the philosopher runs the risk of Syracuse. And
in Arendt's case, the dignity of politics consists in being nothing
but itself—and the 'philosopher' (if Arendt is one) must think
only of the conditions under which politics, in its specific form, is
possible.

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NOTES


2. In Michael Murray (ed), Heidegger and Modern Philosophy (New Ha-
ven, 1970); written in 1969.

3. I pass over Arendt's difficult analysis of "Der Spruch des Anaxi-
mander," where she attempts to do justice to another reversal (which
Heidegger, for his part, does not mark as such): here there would no
longer be room for a History of Being but only for a sequence of ages of
errancy broken by privileged moments of transition or crisis.


23 (the essay dates from 1935/6).

6. Text in volume 54 of the Gesamtausgabe (Frankfurt, 1982). See E.
Escoubas, "La question romaine, la question impériale. Autour du

7. It was in order to defend the very life of the philosophers after the
trial of Socrates that Plato invented the philosopher-king and substituted
the Idea of the Good for that of the Beautiful. On this, see the odd
analysis advanced in "What is Authority?, BPF, pp. 107-15; see also LM,
I, p. 152.


10. For the term "prephilosophic" see LM, I, pp. 129ff ("The Pre-
philosophic Assumptions of Greek Philosophy"); BPF, p. 165 ("What is
Freedom?"); HC, p. 207.


p. 174.
13. This lecture, given in 1954, is unpublished; there is a French translation in Cahiers du Grif 33, 1986, 85-94.
14. Note especially Philostratus' comments on Gorgias (82A1 DK, II, pp. 271f), and the significance of Antiphon's title Περὶ ὀμουμαῖς (esp. 87B44a DK, II, p. 356).
16. Nicomachean Ethics IV 12, 1126b11f; cf HC, pp. 197f.
17. See 87B44 DK—or better, A. Battegazzore and M. Untersteiner (edd), Sofisti: testimonianze e frammenti IV (Florence, 1962), pp. 72-105.
19. The proposition, preserved both by Sextus and by Plato, runs like this: ἡμῶν χρημάτων μέτρον ἐνβρασας, τῶν μὲν οντῶν ὡς εστῖν, τῶν δὲ οὐκ οντῶν ὡς οὐκ εστίν (80B1 DK, II, p. 263).
22. Thucydides, History II 40; cf. HC, pp. 197-9, 204-6; LM, I, pp. 133, 178; BPF, pp. 71f, and esp. pp. 213-26. Compare Benjamin Jowett's translation: "We are lovers of the beautiful, yet simple in our tastes, and we cultivate the mind without loss of manliness."