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THE UTAH WILDERNESS DEBATE: Interest Group Influence
and the Utah Public Lands Management Act
By David Hymas
Photography by Ricardo Rosas
While the issue has had a long history in Utah, it came to a head in 1995 with Rep. James Hansen’s (R, UT) Utah Public Lands Management Act (H.R. 1745). The bill looked to have an easy road to passage as Hansen had just become chairman of the House Subcommittee on National Parks, Forests, and Lands, and the newly elected Republican 104th Congress focused on an admittedly less stringent environmental agenda. Yet, despite an easy ride through the subcommittee, Hansen pulled the bill from a full floor vote because it lacked votes. Its Senate counterpart, S. 884, was brought down by a filibuster from Sen. Bill Bradley (D, NJ). Given the initial support for the bill and the Republican majority this outcome was curious. Indeed, the debate over the fate of some obscure redrock areas in Utah became one of the biggest environmental debates of the 104th Congress. This paper will seek to explain how environmental groups achieved this victory. More specifically, it will explore the relationship between the bill’s defeat and strategies used by the Utah Wilderness Coalition (UWC) and the Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA). It will look at the history of the bill and wilderness in general, the origins of these groups, and strategies they used to defeat HR 1745. Finally, it will build a theoretical framework around their origins and strategies and how they relate.

HISTORY OF WILDERNESS DESIGNATION

Wilderness designation began as a government policy in the 1920s with the Forest Service designating some forest lands as wilderness. Wilderness received Congressional protection with the passage of the Wilderness Preservation Act of 1964. The act stated “it is hereby declared to be the policy of the Congress to secure for the American people of present and future generations the benefits of an enduring resource of wilderness” (Wilderness Preservation Act 1964). It originally set aside nine million acres of federal land as wilderness and outlined a system whereby more wilderness could be added. Since the act’s passage, the federal government has designated more than 100 million acres as wilderness areas (about 4 percent of the nation’s land) (Hamilton 1994,47).

According to the act, land qualified as wilderness under the following conditions: (1) the land “appears to have been affected primarily by the forces of nature with the imprints of man’s work substantially unnoticeable” [essentially meaning it is roadless]; (2) “has outstanding opportunities for solitude or a primitive and unconfined type of recreation”; (3) it must be at least 5,000 acres in size (4) there are areas of “ecological, geological, or other features of scientific, educational, scenic, or historical value”; (5) there is a possibility that the land will return to a natural state if left alone (Wilderness Preservation Act 1964).

Under the Wilderness Act (and later the Federal Land Policy Management Act), the federal government commissioned studies on the land it managed to help determine how much land qualified as wilderness. The Forest Service inventoried Utah lands under its jurisdiction in the early eighties, and a bill designating 800,000 acres passed in 1984. The Carter administration, and later the Reagan administration, commissioned the BLM to study about twenty-two million acres it managed in Utah. Out of the twenty-two million acres, the Bureau found about 3.1 million acres they thought might qualify as wilderness. In its final recommendation, the bureau proposed designating 1.8 million acres as wilderness (Bureau of Land Management 1980). Green groups, like the Sierra Club, SUWA and the UWC, complained that in addition to the Wilderness Act’s criteria, the BLM added their own, such as excluding large amounts of land because of possible mineral resources, findings from field research teams being rewritten by the state agency, reduced opportunities for solitude because of lack of vegetation, and excluding land
because of periphery development next to roadless areas (Utah Wilderness Coalition 1990). The agency also excluded land with roads, while the environmental community wanted to extend wilderness boundaries around some of them. The BLM defended their inventory process as being in accordance with the Wilderness Act's guidelines, while conservationists said the process was flawed, leaving out many areas that should have qualified.

Wilderness designation hurts business interests more than other designations because no other policy has proved to have such a far reaching effect at stopping development. "National parks can be developed to accommodate motorists; wildlife refuges can be logged, or drilled, or ravaged by speedboats and snowmobiles; wild-river designation protects only narrow bands of habitat" (Hamilton 1994, 46). A wilderness designation, on the other hand, only allows visitors to use non-mechanical transportation, i.e., hiking, canoeing, horseback, etc. Thus, grazing can continue, for example, as long as ranchers do not use mechanical means of transportation.

This idea of protection is critical to understanding the issue in Utah and other states. Conservationists realize that the best way to keep land from being developed is to have it designated as wilderness. As a result, wilderness has become a kind of "holy grail" for green organizations. Moreover, once land is designated as wilderness, it takes another act of Congress to change it, which can be a difficult proposition.

FORMATION, STRATEGIES AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance was formed partly in response to the 1984 Utah Wilderness Act, which designated wilderness in Forest Service lands. The founders of SUWA saw 800,000 acres as a paltry number and vowed to not allow the same thing happen on BLM land. The Utah Wilderness Coalition was formed to combat the BLM's inventory process. The UWC did not agree with the BLM's findings, so they completed their own inventory of Utah's public lands. After months of field checking, map making, and photographic documentation by a network of volunteers, the UWC proposed 5.1 million acres be set aside as wilderness (this later increased to 5.7 million).

These events would seem to point to Truman's disturbance theory (1951) or Salisbury's homeostatic mechanism theory (1969) with the Utah Wilderness Act and the BLM's 1.8 million acre recommendation acting as the shocks to the system. Truman would see the early members and later growth of these groups as latent groups. However, the interesting thing in this situation was not how the two groups reacted to other interest groups, but to the executive agency. Environmental groups have traditionally argued the BLM favors grazing, mining, and other development interests over environmental interests.

This fact involves several iron triangles or power triads (McFarland 1992) that have developed over time. Outside of small uncoordinated efforts by national environmental groups like the Wilderness Society, previous to SUWA and the UWC there had not been any interest groups to form any kind of countervailing power in Utah. According to McFarland, these groups would give the BLM more autonomy to make decisions and be the power broker between business and environmental interests. Without countervailing power, the BLM only heard one side of issues on land it managed.

The BLM's favoritism to business and ranching interests also influenced the attitudes of early group founders and members. The experience of some of SUWA's early founders, most notably Clive Kincaid, greatly aided this process. The Wilderness Society had hired Kincaid to review the BLM's wilderness inventories in the four corners areas. He became so disgusted with the process, he and a small handful of others started SUWA to combat the BLM's efforts (Smith 1998, 6). While Salisbury would probably classify Kincaid as a political entrepreneur, it was some time before he began to receive large benefits from the exchange with early members (Salisbury 1969). Residents of Escalante burned him and other founders in effigy and used their pictures to sight in their rifles (Smith 1998). One could classify the early foundations of SUWA as a grassroots victim organization (GVOs), despite the perceived harm was to the environment, not the founders. Foreman would see Kincaid as an organizational entrepreneur because he had experienced the BLM's "threat" firsthand and organized a group to do combat it. Early leaders could use their anger and frustration with the BLM's "lack" of consideration for their views to drive the beginnings of SUWA. Foreman also differentiated between community based and condition based GVOs (1995, 33-53). SUWA is an example of a community based GVO because the group formed in the Southern Utah areas around the most intense conflict.

Early leaders were inexperienced, however, in grassroots organization, so in 1988 SUWA hired Brant Calkin and Susan Tixier. This fact presents an interesting addition to Salisbury's political entrepreneur theory, which describes how entrepreneurs set up organizations. When political entrepreneurs, e.g. Kincaid and other early founders, lack skills needed to keep a group growing rapidly, they recruit other political entrepreneurs. Calkin and Tixier were experts in national grassroots organization, strategies the original political entrepreneurs had not worked a lot with. Calkin had been board president of the Sierra Club and Tixier had been involved with several different public inter-
est causes. Calkin and Tixier took SUWA in a different direc-
tion as they began to branch out across the nation in search
of members and patrons, rather than concentrating on Utah.
In their six years with the group, SUWA went from
1,000 to over 10,000 members. They also established a full-
time presence in Washington to oversee Congress and the
Administration. These strategies were to pay large dividends
in future battles over H.R. 1745.

The UWC is also an interesting organization. Its
administrative base is quite small because its early founders
set it up as an umbrella organization to coordinate the activi-
ties of other green groups like the Sierra Club, Wilderness
Society, Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA) and
others from behind the scenes. The UWC has grown to
more than 35 member organizations, each of which is a
tremendous asset because each brings established resources
that the UWC can use in its campaigns. The UWC has
focused on gaining Congressional support for their 5.7 mil-
lion acre proposal. As Berry pointed out, the success of a
coalition is more likely if it allows member organizations to
claim credit for successes (1997, 194). The UWC has been
effective at coordinating efforts without being seen in the
public eye as much as member organizations.

In his essay on coalition formation, Kevin Hula
pointed out several interesting ideas that seem to hold with the
UWC (1995, 239-58). He divided members of coalitions into
core groups, specialists (or players), and periphery members.
Core groups are those groups forming strategy for the coali-
tion, founders, and resource rich interest groups. Specialists are
groups who want to shape specific policies within the broad-
er context of larger policies. Periphery groups are those who
join simply to be seen with the coalition.

In this case the Sierra Club, SUWA and even the
UWC itself could be classified as core groups. Groups like the
Wilderness Society would be specialists because they were more
interested in the specific idea of wilderness, rather than the
broader issue of other kinds of environmental protection with­
in Utah. The Wilderness Society was formed in the 1920s and
1930s around the goal of preserving wilderness on U.S. Forest
Service Lands, making it a more nationally based organization.

There were also a number of periphery groups that
wanted to tag along with the cause. Smaller interest groups,
especially in the West, began to advertize the issue in order to
lend support and gain exposure. For example, through their
limited efforts, the Western Ancient Forest Campaign
(WAFC) has gained exposure from the issue. Currently, they
are pursuing strategies similar to ones used by the UWC to
get more wilderness designation on Forest Service lands. By
associating with the UWC, WAFC could gain credibility and
contacts in their wilderness endeavors. There were also cor-
porations that could be considered periphery groups.
Companies like REI and Patagonia used money, publicity, and
supplies for the reinventory process to support the coalition
rather than any particular lobbying resources. They were able
to gain exposure through the UWC's efforts by linking their
names with the coalition. Finally, to broaden the coalition's
base, several sportsmen's organizations joined. For example,
the Utah Bowhunter's Association is a member of the UWC.

This is important because these groups are outside the nor-
mal scope of environmental groups. Indeed, many see the
members of hunting groups opposed to most environmental
agendas. Because they represented a larger set of interests,
these groups could give more credibility to the UWC.

Hula also points to the large problem, similar in
nature to membership within interest groups, of freeriding in
coalitions. Larger coalitions may even reach a point where they
resent periphery members. The UWC, on the other hand,
needed support in large numbers in order to "get the word
out." They did not have the luxury of being selective about
those who wanted to join the coalition. The UWC also differs
from other coalitions with the autonomy they retained given
the larger groups, like the Sierra club, within the coalition.
Hula claims the resources individual groups bring to the coali-
tion determines group strategy. If this is true, the Sierra Club
and other large members would likely play a larger role in the
group and could hinder some of the coalitions autonomy. One
explanation for the UWC's autonomy is the fact the wilder-
ness is completely within Utah. National environmental group
membership within Utah is not large. These groups may lend
resources and help to the UWC because their ideologies and
goals are similar, but their membership base outside of Utah
probably would not drop significantly if they lost the issue.
Contrasted with the Headwaters Forest (an attempt to protect
a large section of Redwood trees) campaign outside San
Francisco, where a large portion of the Sierra Club's members
live, Utah wilderness is probably not as high a priority. In addi-
tion, the Sierra Club cannot call upon a large member base
within Utah to help with the issue, forcing the UWC to look to
other organizations to augment its support.

The early organization of SUWA and the UWC
combined with the slow process of getting the BLM recocme-
dendations to Congress in legislative text allowed SUWA

In the interim between the BLM's recommendation and
congressional action, the UWC swelled to over
100 environmental organizations and SUWA's memberships well
exceeded 10,000.
and the UWC to mature slowly and gain support gradually in Congress and from citizens. By the time Rep. Hansen proposed his Utah Public Lands Management Act in 1995, SUWA and UWC were strong enough to bring to light many of its inadequacies. If the bill had come immediately after the BLM’s 1.8 million recommendation in 1991, its fate may have been different. The issue was localized and obscure nationally, and the Democratic majority may not have had enough information to be familiar with it. Senator Bradley may have still filibustered the bill, but his incentive for filibustering would have been less clear. By the time he filibustered the bill in the spring of 1996, it had become national news allowing him to branch out beyond his New Jersey constituency. In the interim between the BLM’s recommendation and Congressional action, the UWC swelled to over 100 environmental organizations and SUWA’s membership well exceeded 10,000. This may have been very important for Sen. Bradley because many had speculated that he was interested in running for president, and indeed, his recent declaration that he will oppose Al Gore for the Democratic nomination for president in 2000 lends credence to this idea. The Utah issue allowed him to get his name out to more people.

Following the BLM’s recommendations, Rep. Jim Hansen (R, UT) wrote a bill that would have designated 1.8 million acres of federal land as wilderness (later increased to 2.1 million) and released 1.4 million acres of land protected as temporary wilderness study areas (WSAs) to development (U.S. Congress, House 1995). Environmentalists saw Hansen’s bill as one that favored industries over preservation. Beside the lack of acreage, they objected to language in the bill that returned any land in Utah not set aside as wilderness to multiple-use designations. Multiple-use designation allows development, off-road vehicle use, and many other uses wilderness designation would preclude. Federal lands in Utah could never be considered for wilderness again. Normally, the bureau manages land in WSAs as wilderness unless it is designated something else or until Congress acts. H.R. 1745 took that power away from the BLM and gave some of it to state agencies. This prevented federal agencies from protecting land with other designations like national parks and monuments, despite the fact that the BLM had seen enough redeeming value in them to designate them as WSAs. This “hard release language” angered most green groups. The bill also protected any projects or developments that were in the “public’s best interest”; an inclusion aimed specifically at protecting water projects already planned in the wilderness areas. Environmental groups claimed that this would violate the intent of the ‘64 Wilderness Act and significantly alter its meaning (Nyhan 1995, 2178).

For SUWA and the UWC, Hansen’s bill loomed like disaster on the horizon. They had to pool their resources and make an all-out effort to defeat the bill. Their efforts were aided by the fact the UWC had written their 5.7 million acres citizen proposal into bill form in 1989. Rep. Wayne Owens (D, UT) sponsored the bill, but in 1992 he was defeated in a run for the Senate. America’s Redrock Wilderness Act, H.R. 1500, was reintroduced by Rep. Maurice Hinchey (D, NY) in 1993, but republican opposition, especially from the Utah delegation, kept the bill from ever leaving the subcommittee. With Hansen as chair of the Subcommittee on National Forests, Parks and Lands, members of the Subcommittee defeated 1500 21-9, choosing instead to concentrate on Hansen’s proposal (Benson 1995, 2359).

The UWC had to concentrate on what could be considered an outside-in strategy. This is a combination of Wright’s inside and outside strategies. Wright examined interest group roles in lobbying legislators as they wrote bills and how those lobbying efforts help formulate policy within the bill (1996, 39-40). These kinds of lobbying practices would be considered by most to be an insider strategy. The citizen’s proposal, however, was written entirely by the UWC. It was not watered down with various markups or compromises. Once it was written, the UWC shopped it around until they could find a sponsor. This enabled them to hold firm on specific issues, but has, more than likely, hindered more widespread support. So while the Coalition did use Congress members to get their bill to the floor, it would pursue a route not often taken n trying to get the bill passed.

With Hansen as chair and a Republican majority, the UWC could not muster enough support for H.R. 1500 within the subcommittee, so they took it to the rest of Congress. This is where Calkin and Tixier’s efforts really paid off. By establishing a Washington office years before and focusing on a national membership, the UWC could bring acute attention on the bill on a national level. Legislators who did not know where most of these lands were received calls from constituents within their districts, grabbing their attention more quickly. The UWC also used this advantage in fighting H.R. 1745. Members across the nation could call their Congress members in opposition to Hansen’s bill and suggest an alternative, H.R. 1500. Environmental groups recognized there was no way to get their bill through Hansen’s subcommittee, so they focused on an outside-in strategy inside Congress to get the necessary 218 votes (a majority of the House) to bring the bill directly to a floor. By the end of the 104th Congress, SUWA and the UWC had amassed 116 cosponsors in the House. Pursuing this kind of strategy has a huge cost of time, but according to the UWC, “we are lining up support now for America’s Redrock Wilderness Act, so we will have something to build on in the future” (Utah Wilderness Coalition 1997, 1).

This time constraint provides a possible advantage to environmental groups. Hansen noted that policy makers will prefer interest groups over political parties when interest groups have a comprehensive advantage over political parties in providing electoral information and mobilizing constituents and when an issue is recurring (Hansen 1987). The wilderness question in Utah has dragged on for more than a decade with no end in sight. This fact aided SUWA and UWC because policy makers have turned to them in larger numbers as they demonstrate their ability to provide electoral information and mobilize the electorate. Despite their differences in opinion, recently even the Utah delegation has proposed including SUWA in forming a compromise bill. This points to the...
stature SUWA has achieved over time.

SUWA has focused intensely on motivating the electorate and organizing grassroots efforts. They initiated a number of successful strategies in bolstering opposition to Hansen's H.R. 1745. As noted before, the time between the origin of SUWA and the UWC contributed significantly to their success in defeating the bill. Using a mix of outside and inside strategies, SUWA and the UWC were able to mobilize members and the public to speak out against Hansen's bill.

First, Rep. Hansen and Governor Mike Leavitt held hearings on the bill in five different Utah cities. Only one of these meetings was held in an urban area, despite the support wilderness enjoyed along the Wasatch Front. Using an outside strategy, environmental groups put out the call to arms and packed the meeting houses, causing many rural locals to accuse SUWA of "fixing" the hearings. Pro-wilderness Utahans turned out en masse at all five public hearings. "Wilderness advocates were in the majority at each of the meetings even though four were held in remote rural areas.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER OF ACRES</th>
<th>SUPPORT (IN PERCENTAGES OF UTAHANS POLLED)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Wilderness Acres</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Million Acres</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.9 Million Acres</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(approx. amount in 1745)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.9 Million Acres</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Million Acres</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.7 Million Acres</td>
<td>30.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree With None</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on National Parks, Forests, and Lands

Of the 22,000 comments collected by the governors office, 73% were in favor of [H.R. 1500]" (SUWA 1995, 5).

Second, SUWA also initiated a huge public campaign against 1745. Using another outside strategy, they urged members to target papers in Utah and across the nation with editorials and letters to the editors. Papers across the nation began to run letters on an issue many people had never even heard of. Articles and editorials against 1745 appeared in western papers like the Salt Lake Tribune, Deseret News, Las Vegas Sun, the Santa Fe New Mexican, and the Denver Post. This was followed by coverage from national publications and news organizations like the New York Times, Washington Post, Newsweek, Time, Rolling Stone, USA Weekend, CBS, CNN, and NBC News (SUWA 1995, 4). Utah public opinion also turned on the bill. The following poll from 2 News in Utah showed most Utahans did not agree with the wilderness acreage contained in H.R. 1745. A clear majority, 63.9 percent, of Utahans preferred more wilderness than was designated in 1745. 30.6 percent preferred the previous bill, H.R. 1500, that Republicans had so easily defeated in subcommittee.

This proposal was based on environmental group numbers, and neither the BLM nor any other government agency ever proposed such a large number. In fact, the BLM could only find 3.5 million acres that even qualified for wilderness, yet the public supported the 5.7 number.

This public opinion gave environmental groups the power to go before Congress members and lobby more effectively. By demonstrating to them that they had support in Utah, and that the bill had become extremely unpopular in the Congress as a whole, they could offer them a political prize by placing them on "their side." Once on the environmentalist's "team," groups could identify the Congress member with the support in the West.

Third, as the pressure mounted and H.R. 1745 gained momentum, using an inside strategy SUWA staffers swarmed to Washington to lobby Congress (SUWA 1995). Again the fact they had already established a Washington office, combined with the continual efforts of members of the UWC, enabled SUWA to step quickly into the fray. In addition, members of the UWC, such as the Sierra Club and Wilderness Society, were able to mobilize their resources in opposition to 1745. As Berry noted, different niches existed for the particular resources of a given group (1997, 204). Different groups in the coalition used their particular strengths and contacts to fill these niches and lobby Congress more efficiently and effectively.

The Sierra Club and Wilderness Society, among others, both appeared before the Subcommittee to testify against the bill. The Sierra Club is famous for its lobbying of Congress members by professional lobbyists (Wenner 1990, 285–6). The Wilderness Society divides its energies into the following three areas: "research and analysis of issues, education and constituency building among the public, and policy advocacy within Congress and...[its] agencies" (321). While the Wilderness Society may not have qualified as a specialist group under Hula's definition, testifying before Congress and providing information on wilderness was not a difficult stretch. Because they had these kinds of resources prior to the UWC, the UWC was able to use them when they were needed most. These groups' resources were greatly augmented by the specialized resources of the UWC and SUWA who had concentrated on the specific Utah issue. The UWC and SUWA were able to relate information to other members and aid them in their statements against the bill.

Finally, SUWA staged an impressive grassroots campaign, a classic outside strategy. Letters from across the nation began to pour into Congressional offices. SUWA also encouraged and helped pay some of the costs to fly active members to Washington to personally lobby their respective Congress members. Berry noted that grassroots campaigns often combine mail and member visits to Washington with a
group's lobbying efforts prior to a close vote (1997, 134–5), and this case was no exception. "Authors Terry Tempest Williams and Stephen Trimble traveled to D.C. to give Congress copies of Testimony, a collection of poems, essays, and stories defending Utah wilderness, written by twenty western writers including a Pulitzer Prize winner, a National Book Award winner, and a former U.S. Poet laureate. A coffee table book on Utah by author Brooke Williams and photographer Tom Till was donated for distribution to U.S. Senators" (SUWA 1995, 4). Other high-profile, outspoken members, like Robert Redford and former Rep. Wayne Owens, used their connections in Washington to lobby Congress members as well. SUWA also developed a high-tech, interactive Internet site coupled with an e-mail action alert list to inform members instantly about changing developments in the debate.

With this increased member activity and mobilization, House and Senate members had to declare their support or opposition to 1745. With the decline in strength of political parties, the electorate is less likely to solidly identify themselves with the platform of a given party. As a result, parties prefer to remain more ideologically vague and less issue-oriented. In Berry's words, interest groups are policy maximizers and political parties are vote maximizers (1997, 47). Single-issue interest groups have helped define the issues with politicians. They have served to put the candidate on their side or "the other side." This is especially disheartening for candidates who want to avoid declaring themselves on the issues (Oberstar 1983, 616-23).

Environmental groups have used this fact to define issues to their advantage, as was the case in defining the support and opposition to 1745. By placing candidates in "their camp" or the opposing camp, the UWC and SUWA helped the electorate know who supported what. Oberstar, Berry and Wright have all pointed out how modern technology has made this ability even more powerful with the advent of television, computerized mail techniques and professional public relations experts. These mediums allow interest groups to bypass political parties and reach the electorate directly. This contact was especially important in the opposition to 1745 because Republicans had a majority in Congress. SUWA and the UWC needed effective ways, such as e-mail, newsletters, faxes, etc, to communicate directly with supporters.

Furthermore, use of wilderness areas has increased since the 1970s (Lucas 1989, 41-55). This is particularly significant when one considers that this use translates into more voters being able to understand what is in some of these wild lands. The task, then, for the UWC and SUWA was to motivate and alert this section of the population to the Utah issue and help them understand how it would affect them, despite the fact they may never visit Utah. Newsletters, newspaper campaigns, and the Internet were all effective ways to help those outside Utah know about the issue and see how it would affect them.

Oberstar noted Anthony Downs' theory on beating an incumbent in talking about single issue interest group strategies. According to Downs, an incumbent could be defeated when the following three conditions hold true:

"First, a majority of the citizens are in a minority on at least one issue under consideration. Secondly, when in the minority a citizen has a more intensely held preference. Third, the opposition need not commit itself on any of the issues under consideration until the incumbent has announced his position" (Oberstar 1983, 621).

Downs' theory can also apply to a bill or policy that has a majority backing like 1745 did. This theory is significant
because of the intensely held preferences of the environmental groups and their supporters, especially in the West. Policy makers in opposition to 1745 could identify with these supporters and gain their backing. Congress members did not need to commit themselves to either side of 1745 until after the bill was introduced in Congress and environmental groups had showed its national appeal. Environmental groups were able to operate on their "intense preferences" to help gain support for their side. Rep. Hansen and his supporters, representing the incumbent, had already staked out their position with the bill's introduction. Environmental groups made it next to impossible for anyone supporting the bill to court the "green" vote because they had immediately come out in opposition. They created a dichotomous choice for the electorate and policy makers.

The UWC and SUWA could use 1745 to help other candidates outline their environmental agenda. No longer was the issue unique to Utah or even the West, with the intense lobbying efforts and grassroots work being done, it had become a national issue. Congress members such as Rep. Hinchey (a first term representative) could use the issue to show their constituents their support for the environment. Even Sen. Bill Bradley (D, NJ) became involved, as he eventually filibustered the Senate version of the bill. As noted before, some have speculated this was an attempt to gain national support for a possible bid at the Democratic nomination for president in 2000. He had considered running for president in 1996, and some analysts had even linked him as a possible running mate to Ross Perot in 1992 or with Colin Powell in 2000 (Rose 1995). Environmental groups handed him the Utah wilderness controversy with its national exposure on a silver platter.

CONCLUSION

While H.R. 1745 did skate through the House Subcommittee on National Parks, Forests, and Lands (Beneson 1995, 2359), once it reached the House floor, support dried up, and the bill was pulled to escape an embarrassing defeat, though Hansen and other members of the Utah delegation claimed that it was pulled in order to receive more debate (Woolf 1995, A1). The UWC and SUWA had achieved a victory many did not think possible in the face of the odds against them. The groups showed how a combination of inside and outside strategies can help defeat a bill despite initial support within Congress for the bill.

This issue saw the extensive use of lobbying both at the national and state level. Strategies used by SUWA and the UWC support Wright's theory about how interest groups will approach Congress at different stages of a bill's progress (Wright 196, 75-113). Wright asserted that groups will first try to influence the formulation of a given bill. Second, they will try to influence policy makers by testifying and submitting written comments at hearings and markup sessions. Finally, groups will focus on the floor and conference action in Congress. They do this by heightening their presence in Washington and forming broad based coalitions. Grassroots organization is also important at this stage.

The Utah wilderness debate followed these steps closely. In the early stages groups tried to affect 1745's formulation by pushing for 1500. Admittedly they had a hard time in the Republican controlled subcommittee, but they could use 1500 to try and soften the language within 1745. When this was not successful, as noted previously, UWC members, like the Sierra Club, SUWA, and the Wilderness Society, testified against 1745 in hearings. SUWA and others also submitted letters and other written comments to be entered into the official record in an attempt to influence members (U.S. Congress, House, 1995). Many wilderness advocates were able to attend the local hearings held in Utah, allowing them to testify rather than submitting comments. Finally, after the bill passed the subcommittee, groups swarmed Congress members. SUWA staffers flew to Washington along with different members of the
group. SUWA and the UWC intensified the grassroots campaign to try and bring pressure upon Congress members across the nation. Outspoken members and influential friends lobbied Congress on behalf of the bill. The UWC also intensified its efforts in lobbying. The coalition was aided by the fact it had broadened its base and expanded its membership in the previous years, giving it more resources to use.

The debate also shows the importance of a maturation period for an interest group. Talking about the early days of SUWA, one founder said, "...Working on leads, loans, and favors, [we] met deadline after deadline on environmental assessments and appeals. Our board could wait for its by-laws, a typewritten newsletter would be put off another month, and T-shirts were a good idea, but who had time? We fed off an adrenaline cocktail: the visceral mix of gorgeous country, death threats, and the unwavering support of just about every desert rat living in redrock Utah" (Smith 1998, 5-6).

Early on, the groups simply did not have the resources, members, money, or staff to sustain the kind of grassroots and lobbying effort they did in response to 1745. Gais and Walker call this a strategy of survival, one that is necessary for a group to grow (1991). This is a key lesson. Groups must recognize issues quickly and try to delay them, so they can grow strong enough to combat them. Policy makers, who want to get laws through the process quickly, must try their best to get issues through the system as fast as possible in order to avoid future complications. This debate also points at a glaring problem with pluralist theory. Countervailing power takes time to organize, meaning many issues may get through the cracks before Truman's latent groups can organize.

The 1984 Utah Wilderness Act demonstrated how if latent groups cannot organize fast enough, legislation they might oppose can pass without receiving their input. Unless a dramatic change occurs in Congress (such as occurred in 1994), the UWC and SUWA groups will continue to pursue the status quo and passage of H.R. 1500. They mobilized the constituency effectively enabling them to wield power when dealing with Congress members. This power translated into promises of eventual votes. By turning the issue into a national one, they helped promote their own issues with the help of members outside the Utah. This support was vital considering the Utah delegation's enthusiastic support of 1745. The same techniques will probably decide future public land debates. Whoever can mobilize the constituency the best will attempt to influence candidates with a vested interest in the issue.

The history of H.R. 1745 also lends some credence to Gais and Walker's theory of when groups will use inside and outside strategies. They theorized groups will increase their use of inside and outside strategies as the conflict of an issue increases. This was certainly true in this case. SUWA and the UWC used a combination of lobbying strategies coupled with grassroots organization as the conflict surrounding 1745 heightened. However, this experience would weaken their assertion citizen's groups usually concentrate on outside strategies. Even early on, SUWA was trying to influence BLM policy, and the UWC was trying to counter the BLM's inventory process. They appeared at open hearings held by the agency and consistently challenged their findings. These activities were long before they had enough members to initiate a large grassroots campaign. Gais and Walker did not claim citizen's groups exclusively use outside strategies, yet their static examination of a dynamic relationship may have left their analysis with some holes.

In addition, the coalition created by the UWC contributes to Hula's theory on how coalitions motivate the electorate by using their specific strengths. As discussed earlier, the UWC used different strengths of its members to lobby Congress, support a grassroots campaign, and "get the word out." One interesting side note to Hula's theory is how time was an ally to the UWC. The coalition took time to develop. It was a dynamic process over the space of a decade, allowing members and staff to learn on the job. By the time the showdown with 1745 came, members of the coalition were ready to fight it. More important, they had the resources to fight it.

Finally, a note on the future of Utah wilderness. As of August 1, 1996, Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt announced a new study of 2.5 million federally managed acres in Utah previously deemed unsuitable as wilderness by the BLM. Various "career professionals" will decide the fate of the land and attempt to finish the study in about six months (Woolf 1996, A1). Considering the first study took over a decade and cost millions of dollars, the process will be difficult at best. Rep. Hansen has struck back saying that it illegal to do two studies when the law only called for one. Several firms, like the Utah Counties Association, filed suit against Babbitt, but were defeated in early March 1998 in federal district court. The case is under appeal.

For the near future, no change seems likely. While environmental groups won a battle in 1995, public support might begin to wane as they desire closure. This happened in Montana as the state witnessed sixteen bills concerning wilderness allotments get defeated in just over a decade. The UWC and SUWA have continued to seek cosponsors for America's Redrock Wilderness Act (they currently have over 130) and Rep. Hansen is attempting to introduce several new "compromise" bills. More than likely, Utah citizens are in for a long political fight because as long as an agreement is not reached, Utah will continue to have the government managing over 3.2 million acres as wilderness. Anyone who has studied Congress knows that it is much easier to stop something from passing than to ramrod a bill through to law. This is the irony; compromise has not been considered between the 1.8 and the 5.7 million acre figures, assuring Utah twice the number proposed in 1745. Environmental groups remain quite happy with the results.
Works Cited