Philosophers as Rulers: The Literati in Early Western Images of Confucianism

Edmund Leites
Queens College of the City University of New York

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In surveying the early Western images of Confucianism and the Confucian elite, one is faced with two distinct but related problems: What did Europeans know or believe about Confucianism? How did their beliefs function in their intellectual and, more particularly, philosophical development? I propose to treat both questions in the following pages, although limitations of space prevent my remarks from being more than schematic, sketchy, and suggestive.

Europeans owe the formation of their first well-defined image of Confucianism (as distinct from an image of China in general) to the Jesuit mission to China. With varying degrees of success, the Jesuits maintained a presence in China, beginning with Matteo Ricci’s arrival in the 16th century. By the early 18th century they had sent back to Western Europe a great deal of information, for example, knowledge of social and political institutions, of geography, botany, and philosophy. Most typically this knowledge was transmitted by means of letters from Jesuits in the East to their colleagues in Europe. Published collections of these letters were widely read by educated 18th century Europeans. Bibliographers have studied the actual spread of these books (who bought them, what libraries had them, what booksellers stocked them), and the map is quite impressive—they were found from Poland to Spain. The more than twenty volumes of the *Lettres edifiantes et curieuses*, published by the French Jesuits, went through numerous editions over thirty or forty years (including abbreviated and translated editions), and the information it contained was quite detailed.

There were also books which attempted to integrate all this new knowledge about China. They were miscellaneous in character, covering all aspects of
Chinese society. The educated person of the time was supposed to have some acquaintance with their contents and to have a general idea of the China which they presented. Boswell once asked Dr. Johnson whether he ought to read one particularly famous work, that of Pere Du Halde, and Johnson advised him to pick out a passage here and there. Knowledge of China was part of the common culture; Boswell should not be without it. It may well be the case that the educated person of the 18th century had a better understanding of Chinese culture than the generally educated person of today.

Ezra Stiles, professor of ecclesiastical history and seventh President of Yale College was reputed in his own circle to be one of the most learned men of his time, a view he may well have shared, as is suggested by the portrait which he commissioned of himself from Samuel King, completed in 1771 and now hanging in the Yale University Art Gallery. On his right-hand side appear two images, which Stiles chose to illustrate his spiritual and scientific convictions, on his left, a selection of books from his library, which are meant to convey the character and extent of his learning. The upper shelf contains Newton's *Principia*, Plato, Isaac Watts, Dodsworth, Cudworth, and the New England Puritan Divines, Hooker, Chauncy, Mather, and Cotton. On the lower shelf are Eusebius, Livy, a volume containing both the Babylonian Talmud and Maimonides' *Moreh Nevochim* (with its title in Arabic)—and Du Halde's *History of China*. "By these," Stiles wrote in his *Diary*, "I denote my Taste for History, especially of the Roman Empire, of the Church in the 3 first Centuries and at the Reformation—the State of China as containing a systematical view of an ancient people for 4000 years, being one Third or more of the human race and different from all the rest of the Orientals—the Rabbin." His pairing of the Chinese with the Rabbis was no accident, both, for him, being learned peoples.

Stiles also grades the authors on the upper shelf for their learning and says, for example, that he considers Chauncy to be "the most truly & extensively learned of all the N Engld Fathers." Richard and Cotton Mather were but of a second Class for Learning, but greatly useful." It is reasonable, then, to take the inclusion of a work on Chinese history as a way by which he could show the comprehensiveness of his own intellectual interests. In doing so, however, he simply emphasized the degree to which some knowledge of China was expected of anyone in his time who claimed to be well-read.

Incidentally, it was not only through books that knowledge of China travelled to the West. Inasmuch as Chinese culture had anything to do with what might be called proto-Romanticism in the first half of the 18th century, it had not to do with philosophy but with the design of gardens, objects, buildings, etc. All sorts of objects were brought over, and there was a significant attempt to imitate their style. The Chinese-English landscaped park, very much the expression of a Romantic sensibility, owes something to paintings of Poussin and Lorrain, but was also truly indebted to China, as were, more obviously, the pagodas sometimes placed in these parks.

But this is an aside. My main concern is the European reception of Confucianism. The intellectual setting for this reception was distinguished, above all, by the conflict between the claims of Christian revelation and the claims of what
was in the 18th century called "natural morality" or "reason," which found its roots in non-Christian classical Greek and Roman philosophy. This was an indigenous issue, but it was the indigenous issue which set the tone for the reception of Chinese thought.

Confucianism stood for pure philosophy, philosophy without an admixture of revelation, the result of nothing other than human reflection and inquiry. The West therefore made the Confucian the paradigmatic philosopher. The imaginary Chinese scholar in Oliver Goldsmith's *Citizen of the World*, who wrote letters back to China about his visit to the West in the manner of Montesquieu's *Les Lettres persanes*, was in fact often called "the philosopher."

A morality or a philosophy achieved by human effort alone, without divine aid, was hardly something novel to the West. The 18th century thinkers saw it in Stoicism, in Epicurus, in Plato and in Aristotle. So one might well ask, what made the apparent presence of a similar enterprise in China so important? Why was it not just one more item in the catalogue of natural philosophies? The answer is that in China this natural philosophy was the apparent basis of an actual civilization, being the public and private ethic of the literati who ruled it. The importance of China was not that its natural morality was novel but that it was perceived to be the basis of a functioning civilization, a large and flourishing one at that. China was not a philosopher's dream. It was a reality.

The European wars of religion of the 16th and 17th centuries had left many intellectuals with the sense that society and government had to be ordered on something other than supernaturally revealed doctrines. Divisions over what was true revelation had contributed to massive civil disorder and the devastation of large parts Europe. A strong and stable state, superior to the factors of religion and founded on a natural morality, was a way to avoid a continuance of the wars of religion, and many philosophers and political theorists of the 17 and 18th centuries hoped for such a state. But was it possible? China revealed that it was.

One might say that Europeans conflated a variety of ethics into one ethic when they identified the Confucian ethic with the natural moralities of the West. It is worth noting, however, that because of their interest in natural morality, Westerners often conflated the philosophies of their own past as well. Hence one finds 18th century lists of philosophers who are said to share the same ethic which include Plato, Epicurus, Marcus Aurelius, Jesus and Grotius. The failure to distinguish features of Confucius' philosophy was no more a sign of misinformation than the conflation of late and early Stoics or Christian humanism of the 16th century and the humanism of 5th century B.C. Athens.

Julia Ching has recently argued, following a long line of Chinese thinkers, that the true morality of Confucius was not something one needed a book to know, but something that one's heart and mind could discover. This was the same view that was taken of natural morality in 18th century Europe, and there was therefore no interest in pitting the different natural moralities against one another. If one wants to stress the universality of natural morality, why emphasize what is distictively Chinese or Western about the form in which it is expressed? One would want, on the contrary, to stress just how similar the Confucian ethic was to its European counterparts, in spite of the vast differences between
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Chinese and Western cultures. What better way to illustrate the trans-cultural truth of natural morality?

The idea of natural morality in the West had one feature which bore particularly upon the reception of Confucian morality and teaching; it did not include divine reward or punishment for being good or bad. Marcus Aurelius's justification of virtuous behavior did not involve these sanctions. Neither did Aristotle's. When the teachings of Jesus were treated as a natural morality, the doctrine that those who do good will be rewarded in an after-life while those who are bad will be punished was notably excluded. Those who were attracted to natural morality in the West—and this goes back to the classical period—generally took the position that the motivations internal to natural morality (that is, virtue is its own reward; reason requires us to be virtuous; our true humanity is only achieved through virtue, etc.) were not sufficient for most people and alone could not assure adequate social behavior. Christian revelation, therefore, was typically seen as a necessary supplement.

The certainty of natural morality was, however, often accompanied by uncertainty about the world to come. Were there really a Heaven and Hell? If wars of religion were to be avoided by founding a society and the state on natural morality, revelation was not a suitable basis on which to found expectations of divine reward and punishment. Reason alone, however, created more uncertainty than certainty. This led some, such as Voltaire, to take what from the modern point of view seem to be hypocritical positions. He thought that the popular belief in a punishing God, however dubious from the rational point of view, was necessary for the health of society. The existence of Heaven and Hell may have been uncertain, but Europeans were still unable to envision a society which did not depend upon these incentives, except in their most utopian moments, as with Sir Thomas More. Intellectuals generally rejected Hobbes' substitution of fear of the sovereign for the rewards of Heaven and the punishments of Hell.

China offered a civilization in which moral elements played a different and more successful role than they played in the West. Chinese culture was presented as one which did not rely on a fear of the hereafter to keep people on the straight and narrow. It was a culture presented, by and large, as based on natural morality itself. That is not to say that the Jesuits withheld reports of punishments, executions, fear of administration, of the emperor, etc. That information was available. The Jesuits also brought back reports of what they called superstitions (meaning Buddhism and Taoism), which often involved fears of punishments and hopes of rewards. They presented Chinese civilization as nonetheless having, unlike Western civilization, natural morality as its basis.

Why did the Jesuits do this? It is not enough to say that the Jesuits were trained to appreciate the civilized aspects of exotic cultures, as they still are today. They were indeed sympathetic both to advanced cultures, such as the Chinese and Japanese, and to relatively undeveloped societies, such as the Guarani Indians in Paraguay, but they were, after all, the representatives of the Roman church which had, as one of its essential elements, the notion of God's rewards and punishments. Many Jesuits, however, also were in the vanguard of Enlight-
enment culture, which had, as one of its core visions, the wish for a social order founded on natural morality. China answered this vision.

There were, however, many variations and divisions within the conceptions of natural morality in the West, divisions which bore upon the treatment of knowledge of China and the Confucian literati. These caused difficulties, particularly in the application of morality to politics. The conception of natural morality that goes back to Socrates in the West takes as its beginning point what might be called the person or rational agent. This concept of the rational agent transcends the differences between male and female, poor and rich, young and old, Greek and barbarian; for its supposes that each and every human being, except children and the mentally infirm, is in his or her own right a rational agent at the start, whether or not this rationality is used effectively. We all start off in the same position.

This is made particularly clear in the work of the Dutch jurisconsults Grotius and Pufendorf, but it is a much older tradition. Its integral element is the notion of the equality of all rational beings. The problem raised by this position is how one then accounts for hierarchy. This issue provoked European culture from the 16th century onward. Various positions were taken on the question, not only with respect to governmental elites (how is it that some groups rule and others are ruled?) but in respect to the relations between men and women (if we are all equals, why do men have more rights than women?).

The Chinese case offered an interesting and provocative opportunity for people interested in this question (as the Jesuits were), because it presented what was seen to be a hierarchy of merit and true public service rather than a hierarchy founded on inherited title, wealth or pure power. The Jesuits revealed instances of corruption, but they presented the Chinese as by and large true to the principles of merit and service. It is not surprising that the Jesuits were attracted to the Chinese Mandarinate. Their own order was built on ideas of service and promotion through merit and they wished to function as advisers to monarchs, as they saw the literati functioning in China.

The Jesuit experience with Confucianism is paralleled by their history in South America during the same period, particularly in the region of Paraguay. The community which the Jesuits designed for the Guarani Indians was built on a non-profit basis; income from agriculture was returned to the Indians for communal purposes. There was a level of self-government, much investment in education, and no slavery. The Jesuits got into a great deal of trouble in both South America and Rome because of their opposition to the enslavement of Indians. Their desire to create a thoroughly just world among the Guarani was not unlike the concern for the common good which they thought characterized the Mandarinate in China. Thus, the Jesuits in China and in Paraguay had a common social philosophy which allowed them, in the one case, to build a community and, in the other case, to appreciate an already existing civilization for somewhat the same reasons. The common "utopianism" at work in Paraguay and China was not lost on Voltaire, who was as skeptical (in Candide) of the Jesuit experiment with the Guarani as he was of their admiration of the Mandarinate.
A hierarchy of merit and service was of particular importance to 18th century Europeans because they were faced on all sides with what they considered irrational or unjustified hierarchies. One such apparent inequity in early 18th century English political life was the new importance of money. In the 1690s the English state had almost no debt, but by the 1720s it had borrowed a great deal. As a consequence, the English court had a very intimate relationship with the financial community of London. Political figures gave their favors to one or another financier, and financiers had a great deal to say about what happened in political life. This engendered resentment among the country gentry, who perceived their power in English political life to be drastically reduced by the rise of “the City.”

In the 1740s, a revolt by the landed gentry against the court was led by Bolingbroke, who called for a political order in which learning and gentility would count more than money. The reports from China were easily used to support his anti-financial point of view. In 1731, Eustace Budgell, a Bolingbroke supporter, wrote that there was a “Maxim, which ought to be observ’d in every well-govern’d state; . . . viz. that every Post of Honour or Profit in the Commonwealth, ought to be made the Reward of real Merit.” But “if any Modern Politician should take it into his head that this Maxim, however Excellent in itself, cannot possibly be observed in so large and populous a Kingdom as Great Britain; I beg leave to inform such a Politician, that at this very Time, this glorious Maxim is most strictly follow’d and observ’d in the Largest, the most Populous, and the best Govern’d Empire in all the World: I mean in China” (A Letter to Cleomenes, the Introduction, p. 91).

The history of Greece revealed to Budgell that the maxim had successfully been put into practice; he believed that the ancient Spartans owed “all their Greatness” to their practice of making political appointments only on merit. China, however, remained the example of a civilization (a flourishing one, at that) where the rule of merit was presently realized. At the same time it was also the most ancient of all states, a proof of the practical worth of “those excellent Principles” on which “it was at first founded” (p. 96).

England, supposedly governed by a king, was really governed by a party, whereas China was truly governed by an emperor, who was in turn guided by mandarins. These men had real merit. For, as Budgell writes, “no man in China can be made a Mandarine, that is a Gentleman, or is capable of any Post in the Government, who is not really a Man of Parts and Learning.” (p. 97). Samuel Johnson, praising a new English edition of Du Halde’s Description . . . de l’empire de la Chine et de la Tartarie chinoise, tells the prospective reader of this work that “he will be amazed to find that there is a Country where Nobility and Knowledge are the same, where Men advance in Rank as they advance in Learning, and Promotion is the Effect of Virtuous Industry.”

Some of the English admirers of China were impressed by its examination system. Family connections, rather than merit, often determined appointment to public office in 18th century England. (In the 19th century, Trollope noted that people who could not read were routinely appointed to the post office.) But the Chinese case was different—and marvelous. Merit generally governed appoint-
ment and promotion. The civil service examination was rigorously controlled; there were even walls around the examination compound. Skeptics about China naturally said that if everybody was so honest, walls would not be necessary, but enthusiasts cited the scrupulousness of the examination and the fact that its central topic was virtue.

Objections to the arguments favoring the Chinese system were advanced in an anonymous work, published in 1740, *An Irregular Dissertation, Occasioned by the Reading of Father Du Halde's Description of China*. The author is skeptical about China—not because of xenophobia, but because of the political use to which China was being put. He begins by saying that the belief that public offices in China are filled on the basis of merit rests on the Chinese use of literary examinations to select officials. And what do these examinations test? They test one's ability to read. This, the author thinks, is reasonable in China. "The Chinese reading is so very hard, so that it is not as with us, where most Children of both Sexes are taught to read: or as in Germany, where every Inn-keeper speaks Latin." Thus it is not surprising that in China there is a rule that no ordinary man gets preferments either "in the State, or the Law," unless he is a scholar (pp. 10-11).

He goes on to say, however, that the examinations cannot ascertain a man’s moral character (pp. 85-86). (Wang Yang-ming and many others within the Chinese world made the same objection, but this was not known to the 18th century European critics of China.) Men may lack honesty, but this "no Examination can reach." It is easy enough to write about morality, but what does this show? (pp. 85-86). "The Chinese books are very good" in their moral truths, but they are the same as anybody else's—Confucius said them, Plato said them, Plutarch said them, and the local farmer knows them. The problem is not learning the books, or knowing natural morality, but living it, and this no examination can test. What we need in government service are people who are decent, honest, and prudent, who have some sense of how the world works (p. 30). Business sense, basically. This idea was an implicit defense of the political power of the City. Who, after all, had a better sense of how the world worked than those who were masters of finance capital?

A number of very important shifts in the English treatment of Confucianism took place between 1700 and 1800. One of them had to do with the success of Western European capitalism. Through the first half of the 18th century, the assumption was that China was much in advance of Europe, technically and economically. Perhaps, in reality, it was. But by 1800 this idea had drastically weakened. New and much less flattering reports came back. New information, however, was not decisive in the change of attitude toward China, as increased knowledge about the Soviet Union may have disillusioned many Western communists of the late 30s. Changes in the West itself, however, were crucial in creating a new general attitude toward Confucianism. China may have suffered some decline in the 18th century, but what is certain is that Europe had undergone, and was continuing to undergo, a major industrial and commercial advance. China was to become, for many 19th century Europeans, the paradigm
of a static society. Confucianism was ultimately seen as a source of Chinese backwardness.

There was also a concurrent shift in religious sensibility. England, in the 1780s and 90s, saw the rise of a strong evangelical movement: Christ-centered, faith-centered, and Bible-centered—the ultimate source of much of the Protestant mission to China in the 19th century. Evangelical Christianity was hostile to natural morality, both at home and abroad, and no longer needed China to be a model of humane civilization.

The growth of the Romantic movement in the second half of the 18th century also affected the treatment of Confucianism. While the tradition of Confucianism was not without its mystical elements, particularly well-developed in the neo-Confucian tradition, and as highly evolved in the thought of Chu Hsi as in that of Wang Yang-ming, the Jesuits played down these elements in their presentations, and stressed instead the place of natural reason and conscience in Confucian philosophy. Romanticism, with its love of the irrational and ineffable, accounts in part for the decline of interest in Confucianism and the popularity, during the first half of the 19th century, of what were taken to be more mystical elements of Chinese thought, Buddhism and Taoism. In the 1780s and 90s, Romanticism also turned English attention to India, to its mythic and erotic sculptures, its monsters and mystery, and to the apparently irrational aspects of its culture, resulting in a corresponding drop of interest in Confucian China.

The decline can also be attributed to the rise within Europe of a religion of progress, so suitable to the spirit of capitalism. It was inconsistent with the strong, although not unopposed, tendency within Confucianism to praise the virtues of stability and tradition. Hegel denied that the Chinese had a history, a comment rooted both in his own conception of history as the unfolding of spirit and in an idea of China as a civilization of tradition and custom—an idea which Confucians themselves often promoted. The needs of imperialism also encouraged the belief that contemporary Chinese were inferior.

One more change—a most important one—should be mentioned. By the end of the 18th century, Europeans, generally speaking, no longer feared that wars of religion would devastate their lands and undermine the strength of their states. The moral and practical significance of a far-away state in which natural morality appeared to be superior in both fact and in theory to any religious divisions was, therefore, lessened. The Western world now had a state explicitly founded on natural morality—the United States of America—and was soon to have many more. Westerners no longer needed China to persuade them that such a state was possible.

Nor do we who live in the late 20th century need China for this purpose. The moral premises of modern societies across the globe do not depend in any serious way, philosophically or rhetorically, upon divine revelation, nor does the order of these societies depend significantly upon the prospect of divine rewards and punishments. Protestant, Muslim and Jewish fundamentalist counter-movements against secular society are but an acknowledgment from the enemy camp of the worldly success of natural morality. The enthusiasm for China in the 18th century was based upon a different assumption.
century was an expression of an outlook which has scored remarkable and long-lasting triumphs in the 19th and 20th centuries.

Yet these triumphs are fragile. The war against the Jews, not a war between Christians, but a war of religion nonetheless, is within the memory of many of us. The premises of civil society and a common humanity were rejected in favor of the annihilation of the unbeliever. The state was given a central role in accomplishing this, not unlike the role envisioned for it by religious leaders in the wars of religion of the 16 and 17th centuries. Led by the German nation, it could never have been as brutally successful as it was without the active cooperation of most of the states and peoples of Western, Central, and Eastern Europe, and the acquiescence of the rest of the Christian West. Denmark stands as an exception, an exception all the more painful because of its singularity. Traditional China was surely no model, conscious or unconscious, for the recent Western and Christian treatment of the Jew. Nor could it be the model for those modern nations, notably Islamic ones, that have sought to fuse state and revealed religion. Israel itself illustrates the dramatic contradiction between revelation and natural reason as bases of the state.

As I have noted, one of the features of China which impressed 18th century Europeans was its administration by an elite whose learned knowledge of the Chinese tradition successfully sustained its claim to rule. There was also opposition to a European emulation of such an elite, as expressed, for example, in the *Irregular Dissertation*. In England, the admiration for the Chinese system was sustained by an interest in maintaining the power of an aristocratic elite against the claims of commercial, and later, industrial classes. A public school and university education, which had not been seen as necessary for obtaining the few high administrative posts available in Shakespeare's time, became the preferred mode of preparation for the more numerous positions required by the expansion of government in the 19th century. To require such an education, which had as its core knowledge of the languages and literature of the classical tradition, was in fact to demand an analogue of the Chinese demand that its civil servants have a thorough mastery of the Confucian tradition. Like the Chinese requirement, too, was the stress on linguistic skills—a knowledge of, and even a capacity to write, Greek and Latin prose and verse. In England, this demand for a classical education served to maintain the power of the noncommercial classes, since access to the public schools was generally determined by family and descent rather than scholarly merit.

The recognition that making learning a requirement for English public office was analogue of the Chinese system was general in 18th century England. In the 19th century, however, an amnesia took hold with respect to the similarities between English and Chinese requirements for administrative power. The decline in respect for China was no doubt a reason for the unwillingness to recognize the positive role of the idea of China in English thought and institutions.

Curiously, the ethical theory that was standard throughout much of 19th century Oxford included the idea that book-learning was not really necessary for
good moral judgment. The two basic texts in ethics were the *Nichomachean Ethics* and Joseph Butler's *Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel*. Aristotle's belief that good habits, rather than learning, made the moral man was joined to Butler's conviction that if an honest person consulted his own conscience, he would accurately know what was morally required of him. These ethical views were deeply inconsistent with the actual role of English education in restricting access to administrative power. The recognition of the inconsistencies between ethical intuitionism and the requirements for membership in administrative elites was more clearly elaborated in China than in England, however. Figures such as Wang Yang-ming made a point of the inconsistency, an inconsistency which any intelligent and morally-minded Chinese who had failed to succeed in the examination system could easily recognize. They had no route to political power. English ethical intuitionism, however, was not formally taught to students until they were university students and therefore members of the elite. This may account for the absence among educated English of a strong counter-tradition against rule being restricted to their own kind.

The restriction of administrative power to those who had mastered the languages and literatures of the classical tradition had a different fate in the United States. There was an aristocracy in America, which survived the Revolution, although its ranks were weakened by the flight of those who had supported the King. This class, however, did not manage to retain its preeminent place in the face of the rapid expansion of American territory. It did not secure for itself exclusive access to administrative power by making a classical education a requirement for power. Instead, Jacksonian populism, with its antagonism to the moral claims of book-learnings, took a strong hold in American political culture. Lincoln, one of America's great interpreters of the Constitution, never went and never had to go to law school. Although ethical intuitionism never had the academic preeminence that it had in England, the premises of Aristotle and Butler were in fact better exemplified in Jacksonian democracy than they were in Jowett's Balliol.

In the absence of aristocratic claims for a learned elite, American circumstances allowed a fuller development the implicit ethic of capitalism. Although administrative skills are highly rewarded in capitalist societies, the capitalist ethic does not make extensive learning in moral philosophy, moral theology, and the moral traditions of Western civilization a requirement for possession of administrative power, whether in the public or corporate world. Those who do claim such expertise in the United States, notably university professors in humanities and in theology, are not expected to hold positions of power in government or the private corporation, and when they do, as was the case with Woodrow Wilson, their claim to authority does not rest significantly on their moral learning. Bolingbroke's opponent was in tune with the demands of capitalism when he denied the claims of moral expertise in favor of the plain virtues: common sense, decency, and a practical knowledge of how the world really works.

In communist states, however, the requirement that important administrative posts be held by party members has created a system in which a
demonstrated knowledge of Marxist-Leninist doctrine (a form of natural morality) is required of the powerful. The collected works of Stalin, Mao Tse-tung, Kim Il Sung, and Enver Hoxha testify to the notion that a leader ought to have a deep grasp and even develop the philosophical foundations of communism. The capitalist world asks nothing similar of its leaders. However much the Western intellectuals and administrators object to the real cruelties of capitalism, they ought to be thankful for this.

It has been all too easy for scholars to view the admiration of the Confucian literati as a quaint phenomenon of Enlightenment culture. It was clearly more than this. Enthusiasm for China expressed a longing for a political order which would transcend religious differences and be ruled by a morally authoritative elite. The modern state is often an expression of the same ambition for an order founded on a natural morality above creed. The desire for a morally authoritative administration has found its expression in communist cultures. The reports from far-off China in fact announced the coming of new world at home.
Notes


2. The Diary is in the collection of the Yale University Library. Quoted by Josephine Setze, "Portraits of Ezra Stiles," Bulletin of the Associates in Fine Arts at Yale University, XXIII, no. 3 (September, 1957), p. 4.

3. Diary, quoted by Setze, pp. 6-7.


5. The Letter was published in London by A. Moore.


