The Pi Sigma Alpha Review, edited and published by students at Brigham Young University, features the winning student papers submitted in the annual Beta-Mu chapter writing contest. The purpose of The Review is to provide the deserved exposure to noteworthy student research. By providing this exposure it is hoped that The Review will encourage high quality student political science research and writing.

Students from any discipline may submit papers for consideration in the writing contest and publication in The Review. Students may submit papers in the following categories: American Government, International Relations, Comparative Politics, Political Philosophy, and Public Policy. Writing contest information, rules, and application forms are available in the Political Science Department, 745 SWKT.
The Editorial Board of The Review express their appreciation to the BYU Department of Political Science, the David M. Kennedy International Center, and the College of Family, Home, and Social Sciences for their financial assistance. The Board also thanks the staff of the College of Family, Home, and Social Sciences Faculty Support Center for typing the manuscript and formatting the journal, and the members of the Political Science faculty who judged the contest entries, often under severe time constraints.
ENTERING THE MODERN WORLD: THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT  1
Amanda L. Blanck

NUCLEAR PERPLEXITY  . . . . . . . . . . 37
Mark Field

THE FEDERALIST AND THE FOUNDING: TWO VIEWS OF THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS  . . . . . . . . . . 81
Nathan Webster Jones

THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF SCANDAL IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS  . . . . . . . 107
George C. Landrith

NATO: THE U.S. COMMITMENT  . . . . . . . 151
Spencer Tall

PI SIGMA ALPHA ACTIVITIES  . . . . . . . . . . 181

FACULTY NOTES  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
ENTERING THE MODERN WORLD:
THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

Amanda L. Blanck*

Introduction

Choosing paths is a part of everyone's life. Few are restricted to one road, to one choice. Sometimes the element of choice involved is greater than at other times. Almost 30 years ago, many Third World countries decided to increase the element of choice in their development paths. They won their independence and started down their respective paths toward modern industrial nationhood, waiting to assume their place among the more established industrial powers. Tunisia was one such country. Tunisia's leaders have accepted a strong, interventionist role in their nation's industrial development, and the character of Tunisian industry today is very much the result of government actions. Out of the various developmental models to choose from, Tunisia's leaders have selected a path already traveled by other developing nations (most notably the Asian nations) by encouraging industrialization through a combination of outward-looking growth policies, the exploitative approach, and especially a process called off-shore production. As with all methods, there are advantages and disadvantages to this particular combination of approaches. The

*Amanda is a senior majoring in Political Science and Anthropology. She was a 1982-83 Rotary Scholar to Tunisia. She plans on interning with the U.S. State Department's Bureau of International Organization Affairs this summer.
problem that arises is that of assessing the government's industrial development methods as a strategy for Tunisia and its people and to see it in that context rather than evaluating it from an American perspective. By examining the strategy and the policies for implementing it, we can see that the Tunisian government has chosen a useful path for its nation's industrial development, but that some of the long-term consequences of this approach might potentially overshadow the immediately apparent benefits.

In order to assess the validity of the government's approach to industrial development, this paper will first look briefly at Tunisia to provide some background. Then, the foundations of the Tunisian strategy will be discussed by examining outward-looking growth policies, the exploitative development approach, and especially the phenomenon of off-shore production. The industrialization process itself will be discussed in order to determine why countries actively seek it, some of its limitations, and some of its consequences. The paper will next turn to the role of the Tunisian government in promoting industrial development, looking at the different laws, plans, and agencies that the government has used to build Tunisia's industrial sector. The Tunisian economy will then be examined in the areas of employment, existing industry, and investment, with special emphasis given to off-shore industries. Finally, some of the pros and cons of this combination—outward-looking growth policies, the exploitative approach, and off-shore production—as an industrial development strategy will be examined.

Industry, as the term is used in this paper, refers to manufacturing as in the production of goods by hand or by machine from raw materials at any stage of the process, rather than to heavy industry, like steel production. This study
assumes that Tunisia uses as its ultimate goal a Western model of industrial development. It examines the government's role in encouraging industrial development, emphasizing that aspect of the government's role aimed at attracting foreign participation in the Tunisian economy. While all aspects of government policy in this regard will be examined, special attention will be given to the phenomenon of off-shore production. This phenomenon is emphasized because much of the foreign investment in Tunisia can be described as off-shore production. This choice has been a deliberate one on the part of the government, and as such, many of the remarks made about Tunisian industry have special reference to that particular phenomenon.

Background

The country of Tunisia lies between Algeria and Libya in North Africa. 7,202,000 people populate its 164,206 kilometers. The population is evenly divided between men and women. In 1980 the population of 6,369,000 was divided between 3,204,100 men and 3,164,900 women. Approximately two-thirds of its population is under thirty years of age. Since independence in 1956, Tunisia has worked hard to modernize and become relatively self-sufficient. This has included developing agricultural areas as well as urban areas.

Like many Third World countries, Tunisia has the problem of having more people than it can employ. Some of its labor force works outside of the country (200,000 in Europe with more scattered throughout the Middle East, particularly in Libya), their earnings providing a valuable source of foreign exchange. In addition, the government has promoted an aggressive industrial development program. As a French protectorate,
Tunisian manufacturing was dominated by French companies. After independence, the French left, and some of the firms were nationalized. The French left Tunisia with a "well-advanced economic infrastructure" that now includes railroads connecting port cities and most major cities, roads "providing easy access to all cities and villages," six seaports, an "adequate supply of electricity for the major cities," and a modern telephone system. Although caught up in the national cooperative movement of the 1960s, Tunisian industrial policy in the 1970s has focused on encouraging private investment to develop an industrial sector that is labor-intensive and export-oriented. Since independence, "industry has made the sharpest growth of all economic sectors," with manufacturing undergoing the greatest expansion.

Outward-Looking Growth Policies

Countries wanting to attract foreign investment generally feature outward-looking growth policies. The elements of such a policy include a liberal trade policy and payments regime, an unfixed exchange rate system, fiscal incentives to export production, and tight domestic monetary and fiscal policies. For these elements to take effect and make an outward-looking growth policy successful, a country needs to have "i. a disciplined, educated and skilled urban labour force, ii. an active and efficient entrepreneurial class, and iii. a stable political system." Tunisia possesses the first and third elements.

The Exploitative Approach

Richard Cooper describes the exploitative approach as using legal (under GATT—the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) border tax adjustments to improve a country's trade position and to avoid exchange rate adjustments. Some
examples of this approach are flags of convenience on shipping, light registration and disclosure requirements on securities, tax havens, subsidies to foreign investment, and tax concessions. These last two are this paper's primary concerns. The exploitative approach "attempts to take advantage of the growing interdependence in ways which are successful if pursued by only a few countries." Herein lies the heart of the problem with the exploitative approach which prevents its having usefulness as a more general development approach. Small countries are really the only ones who are in a "favorable position to exploit international rules and the increased mobility of firms and funds." Countries with larger economies engaging in similar behavior, granting subsidies to foreign investment, for example, would disrupt the international economy too much, if only because its peers would see such behavior as unfair and possibly retaliate. At the same time, this approach works only if a few small countries utilize it. Too many following the same policies defeat the purpose of the special incentives to attract foreign industries. The approach then works for no one.

Off-Shore Production

Both of these ideas come together in a phenomenon known as off-shore production. Off-shore production involves an industry that "imports a substantial proportion of its semi-finished imports and exports the bulk of its output. The supply of technology and design by the ultimate user is frequent." The off-shore plant is generally used for one particular phase in the production process, such as sewing jackets together. Generally such plants are located in "countries with a comparative advantage in labour-intensive activities." Imports of this nature accounted for 25 percent of manufactured imports from developing countries in 1977. (This
figure includes only items covered under certain tariff provisions. Imports outside these provisions, licensing agreements, and management or marketing contracts with independent firms are not represented.)

Off-shore production is based on the concepts of comparative advantage and internationalization of production processes. The doctrine of comparative advantage states that "a country will gain by specializing in the production of those commodities in which its comparative advantage is greatest, exporting these goods in exchange for ones where its comparative cost advantage is less." The "commodity" which most Third World countries have the greatest comparative advantage in is low-cost labor. As a result, the main industries that have established off-shore plants in Third World countries have been labor-intensive ones like textiles and electronics. These industries help absorb the country's unemployed. In addition, countries like Tunisia offer the advantages of proximity to major markets (Europe, Africa, and the Middle East), the existence of basic infrastructure, and relative political stability.

Off-shore production activities have become a "dynamic factor in industrial development" in developing countries. Governments have encouraged this. (This will be discussed in depth later.) The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) reports that these off-shore processing zones that the governments encourage have "been increasingly integrated into the domestic economy." This indicates that the policy of attracting off-shore industries can have more long-term economic benefits for a country other than its initial "exploitative" value.
In terms of a labor force, industrial activities require workers and operatives; clerical, administrative and executive officers; and entrepreneurs. In the case of off-shore production enterprises, the host country provides the first three types of workers and sometimes a few administrative officers, while foreigners serve as executive officers. This tendency holds true for Tunisia.

Statistics on two industrial countries, West Germany and the United States, show that the phenomenon is growing. Over the past decade, a substantial increase has occurred in the imports entering these two countries under special tariff provisions on off-shore processing. In 1962, West Germany imported 386 million deutsche marks worth of goods under these provisions. In 1976, this figure rose to 216 billion deutsche marks. In 1966, U.S. imports under these provisions totaled $61 million. In 1976, they increased to $2.8 billion.

**Industrialization**

The phenomenon of industrialization itself requires examination. Why will countries adopt methods like attracting off-shore plants to gain an industrial foundation for itself? What benefits does it see itself accruing as a result of industrialization? The reasons are numerous and varied.

**Benefits of Industrialization**

Keith McLachlan observes in "Development Strategy--The Need to Industrialize?" that "the need for rapid industrial growth in the area tends to increase in direct proportion to size of population and/or lack of exportable primary commodities." The size of population and the need to
employ that population are major reasons behind industrialization in the Third World. Industrialization promotes general economic growth and infuses more efficiency into the whole economy. Developing countries see industrialization as a means of raising their citizens' standard of living. Additionally, industrialization allows the stabilization of national income through production diversification. It also improves a country's balance of payments position through the product's exportation.

Manufacturing processes are generally more flexible in terms of methods and output than is agriculture. Industrial production is less susceptible to fluctuations from uncontrollable circumstances, like rainfall, than agricultural production. Control can be exercised over production, and supply can be correlated to demand. Faster growth rates are possible in industry. The greater degree of control, the introduction of new processes and technology, and the greater flexibility make this increase in productivity possible. Factories also deal with operating costs which are more controllable than fixed costs. Industrialization introduces modern technology into the general economy as well as into the specific industry. The country also gains access to foreign technology and expertise as well as foreign capital.

The benefits of industrialization extend beyond easily measured economic benefits. Industrialization builds national prestige. It brings Third World countries closer to the level of the advanced industrial countries, serving as a sign that a country has become modern. Levels of education, skills, and life styles generally rise as a result of industrialization. It also serves as a viable method of changing attitudes toward development and changing life styles.
Nations also have more overtly political reasons for desiring industrialization. Some leaders see industrialization as necessary for political sovereignty. Industrialization provides a domestic base to service a national military machine. It also is necessary for economic sovereignty by making them less economically dependent on First World nations. The industrial base and the economic growth that industrialization provides can also help place Third World countries in a better bargaining position in international financial negotiations.

These at least are the hopes that industrialization inspires. An alternative perspective on the employment questions demonstrates that these hopes are not always realized. Ghazi Duwaji points out that "the significance of this objective [industry's employment potential] may be easily exaggerated because of the relatively small numbers required to operate a modern factory."22 Keith McLachlan airs a broader doubt when he observes that "the educated for the most part acknowledge that domestic industrialization has the effect of making the Middle East states more rather than less reliant on the advanced countries."23 Industrialization is not the cure-all its supporters claim.

Considerations in Industrialization

A statement found in "Development Strategy--The Need to Industrialize?" exemplifies the attitude of many Third World leaders regarding industrial development. "Once the deadening hand of the outside powers is removed and once the local economies have ample technical and managerial cadres available, then industrialization may proceed on a more or less steady course."24 The problem is how does a country develop the necessary technical and managerial cadres without assistance from "the
deadening hand," and once it has, how does the country remove "the deadening hand" without disrupting its economy?

A desire for industrialization is not sufficient to bring it about. There are constraints on industrial development, certain requirements that must be met. Simply having hordes of people is not enough to make them employable in a factory. Industrial work requires certain skills, and it is not necessarily always economically worth training a population to do the work. (Tunisia, with a literacy rate of 62 percent is considered to have a fairly well-skilled and educated work force.) Besides, training cannot always compensate for experience.

Capital is another requirement often in short supply in Third World nations. The construction and outfitting of the factory require capital. Capital is needed to obtain the materials to initially produce goods. Lack of capital in developing countries is a partial explanation for Third World willingness to engage in off-shore production enterprises. In some countries, there are also problems of inadequate energy sources and resources needed for some production processes. Another concern is that wage rates do rise over time and as countries develop, thus eroding one of the main advantages of Third World countries to First World industries.

The existence of an adequate infrastructure is also a determinant in a country's ability to support industrial development. This includes considerations like utilities and services (waste disposal for example) and transportation—railroads, roads, and ports. Modern factories require this infrastructure to operate, but it is expensive to develop and maintain.
Another consideration is the need to differentiate between the needs of small states and the needs of large states. Small states do not offer the size and breadth of markets that large countries do, so almost all industries will have to produce for export to differing degrees.

**Effects of Industrialization**

The actual effects of industrialization for any given country are hard to predetermine, but there are some that have previously proved themselves as likely consequences. Industrialization has been shown to raise the marriage age, particularly for girls. The availability of employment allows young people the opportunity to contribute to, rather than drain, family finances. Postponing children's marriages is no longer an economic hardship. Raising the marriage age affects population growth, a significant factor in developing countries, by cutting into the reproductive years of women.

Another effect of industrialization is urbanization. Factories tend to locate near large, developed population centers, which in turn cause these centers to attract more people from the rural areas. Urbanization has its own set of benefits and disadvantages.

Not all consequences are necessarily positive. Keith McLachlan notes that industrialization can lead to the "creation of unpredictable political forces of uncertain loyalty." He goes on to point out that industrialization, particularly the off-shore variety, can also result in "a deepening reliance on foreign suppliers of technology and foreign markets, not without its political implications." McLachlan sees another major problem with development of industrial capacities, raising questions about the ultimate benefits of industrial strategies that depend on outside economies. He
observes that "rapid and effective creation of industry is feasible. Sustaining progress, however, may be difficult." This is the question that all Third World countries engaged in practices like off-shore production must ask themselves. Solutions are hard to give since the newly industrializing countries really have not been in operation long enough to provide empirical data.

**Government Policy**

Industrial development in Third World countries seems to require government intervention. This is especially true when the country utilizes a development strategy based on foreign investment. The Tunisian government has been especially active in this area. Some of the major policies are reviewed below.

The main goals of the Tunisian government in promoting industrial development have been to boost manufactured exports and to create employment. Dimitri Germidis states that Tunisia likes to "compare herself to Singapore or Hong Kong, endeavoring to attract foreign investment on account of its abundance of low-priced manpower . . . and its [Tunisia's active work force] high level of qualification." The government plans aim to obtain the capital necessary to raise industrial investment and to increase the productivity of existing enterprises. The government has engaged in a certain amount of import restriction and protectionism to encourage indigenous industries, but has placed most emphasis on encouraging foreign companies to establish factories in Tunisia.
Incentives

The government has offered a variety of incentives to companies willing to locate in the country. In general, these include accelerated depreciation of plants and machinery, duty-free entry of capital goods, and tax concessions for large investments. The government has also adjusted internal freight rates, provided low interest rates on loans and subsidies, and granted companies preferential treatment by government order departments.

New investments do require advance permission from the Minister of Planning and Economics "to regulate the industrial development in the country as well as to maintain harmony within the industrial sector vis-a-vis the rest of the economy." The Investment Code divides investments into three categories: Category A, for investments under $95,000; Category B, for investments between $95,000 and $475,000, with at least 10 employees; and Category C, for investments over $475,000, with at least 50 employees. Category A investors receive reductions in taxes. Category B offers three tax-free years with a five-year extension available. The government guarantees facilitory inventory financing, loans, and tax- and duty-free importation of equipment. The conditions are the same for Category C except that these investors receive five tax-free years with a possible five-year extension. Individual companies can negotiate separately with the government for a more favorable depreciation schedule, a guaranteed level of taxation for up to twenty years, free land for construction, government-provided site preparation, a limited-time monopoly position, and protection from imports. The availability of these additional advantages depends on the development priority of that particular industry, its location, the number of employees, the amount of foreign exchange
imported, the value added in the manufacturing process, and the percentage of products exported. In addition, foreign investors specifically receive the guaranteed transfer of invested capital and profits after justifying the transfer to the central bank.

Tunisia has negotiated private investment guarantee treaties with the governments of the United States, Switzerland, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and France. Tunisia was the first country to sign the World Bank International Investment Arbitration Agreement, which specifies compensation procedures in case of nationalization. The government has also established a national investment society so "individuals would have a chance to invest in an institution which would accelerate the industrialization of the country and thereby raise the standard of living of the people." 33

Laws

Since gaining independence, Tunisia has passed many laws concerning foreign investment, particularly concerning investment in industry. Most of the laws apply to enterprises that export at least 20 percent of their production. Tunisia began in 1957, immediately after independence, with the Guarantee Fund for Foreign Investment. This allowed investors placing foreign currency in the fund to transfer the profits as well as the original investment back out of the country. Capital placed in the fund was invested in new enterprises or improvements to existing enterprises. The transfer was subject to certain conditions such as a two-year waiting period and the enterprise's designation by the government as a "productive" enterprise. A law passed on February 10, 1958, guaranteed investors stable tax rates for at least fifteen years with five-year extensions possible. Provisions of the fund have
been modified by subsequent laws and policies, such as the investment code discussed previously.

In addition, Letters of Guarantee and Letters of Establishment were instituted. (Letters of Establishment were actually begun in the late 1940s under the French.) Letters of Guarantee allow firms to obtain medium- and long-term credit for investment and to qualify for state loan guarantees. Letters of Establishment are granted to any industrial enterprise "whose creation or extension is of interest to the economic development of Tunisia." These Letters allow for a five-year tax exemption with a five-year extension available if profits are reinvested in the enterprise. The Letters also grant carry-over for five years of deficit balances from the first five years. This provision is for tax purposes. Income from stocks and shares due for loans establishing or extending an industry is tax free. With this Letter, taxes levied on the following can be deducted: 1) raw materials or other materials for manufacturing new products; 2) materials, products, or objects not a finished product which are destroyed or lose special qualities in the manufacturing process; and 3) containers and packages for delivery. Finally, firms holding Letters of Establishment are exempt from taxes and duties on imported agricultural, industrial, and commercial equipment.

More recent laws passed to promote industrial development are Law 72-38 and the 1981 investment law. Law 72-38 (April 27, 1972) provides tax incentives for industrial enterprises operating solely for export. These include 20-year tax holidays from customs duties and turnover taxes and a ten-year exemption from corporate taxes; taxes for the second ten years are limited to one-tenth the normal rate. Those industries are also "exonerated from taxes on the turnover for purchases in the domestic market for
products necessary for manufacturing." They are reimbursed for "fees and taxes to local concessionaires, sellers of outfitting goods or products bought by the enterprises." The basic goal of this law is to "establish conditions adequate for the establishment and the taking advantage of enterprises producing for export."

Law 81-56 (June 23, 1981) is the most liberal of all Tunisia's investment laws. This law provides incentives for industries that locate in underdeveloped regions, that engage in high-tech manufacturing, and that are oriented towards export. This law provides for customs exemptions on imports and reduced taxation of profits dependent on the number of employees. In addition, the government assumes the cost of infrastructure development for industries locating in specially designated underdeveloped regions.

Government Plans

Industrial policy, like agricultural policy, is subject to government planning. These plans are important only in that they give some sense of the direction the government sees for industrial development. The plans tend to be broad statements which are more important for the policies and programs that they initiate than for the results they produce.

The Three Year Plan of 1962-64 had as its goal "industrialization which is adapted to the needs of the national economy, which is somewhat more evenly distributed throughout the territory and which interacts harmoniously with other economic activities." The Ten Year Plan of 1962-71 established priorities regarding industry and set criteria for selecting industrial projects. Industrial project selection was to emphasize "investments involving a minimum amount of capital per worker to be employed and industries
exposed to the least competition from foreign industries. Additional objectives were increasing industry's share in the GNP from the then current 21 percent to 28 percent, developing heavy industry, and reducing imbalances between the different regions. To achieve these goals, the Plan proposed increasing the state's role in industrial development and developing an industrial infrastructure. During this time, investment in industry on the government's part accounted for 15.6 percent of the total spent.

The Three Year Plan of 1965-68 again set goals for investment in industry, this time at 150 million dinars ($300 million). The Second Ten Year Plan extended from 1972 to 1981 and looked for increased investment from the level at that time of 27 percent to 33 percent. The Five Year Plan for 1982-86 set as its priorities employment, decentralization, and balance of payment equilibrium. It looks for investment of $146 billion, 40 percent of which is to come from overseas. Other goals include building factories in the interior and raising the minimum wage.

Agencies

To help encourage Western companies to locate in Tunisia, the government has established the Agence de Promotion des Investissements (API). This agency promotes Tunisia's advantages abroad with offices in the United States, West Germany, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. In addition to making companies aware of Tunisia's advantages, the API helps the companies deal with the Tunisian bureaucracy. Between January and June 1978, the API obtained 413 new projects for Tunisia under Law 74-74 (which assists companies producing primarily for the domestic market) and 37 under Law 72-38. These new projects resulted in a total of 15,694 new jobs and 98 million dinars ($196 million) worth of investment. However, by the fall of
1979, no major international corporation had established a plant in Tunisia. Examples of industrial arrangements made include deals with La Societe des Foyes de La Lorrie to manufacture tools for export and with a German firm to produce fruit juices and vitamins (firm unnamed in source).45 Connected with the API is the Industrial Land Agency which acquires industrial land sites and sells or rents them at subsidized prices.

The Tunisian Economy

Employment

A main reason Tunisia encourages foreign companies to locate in the country is to provide employment. As M. Chedli Avari, former Minister of the National Economy, said, "We have thought the raw material that we can produce is not wool or cotton but manpower and wages."46 Unemployment is currently estimated at 15-25 percent.47 The potential for problems that this unemployment rate, especially combined with such a young population, creates is not lost on Tunisian leaders. Tayeb Baccouch, Secretary General of the Union Generale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT) stated in 1982, "Government must find a solution to unemployment because many of those without jobs are young, educated, and politically active. If it doesn't, there will be great social unrest."48

Tunisia offers certain advantages in terms of its labor force. Chief among these is abundance. The total available work force is 1.9 million.49 The work force is available for a low price relative to Europe and the United States. The minimum industrial wage in 1976 was 1.7 francs an hour ($1.25).50 Finally, its work force is also considered to be fairly skilled.
Government policy from the beginning has emphasized full employment. Each of the Ten Year Plans has held that as a goal. The First Ten Year Plan (1962-71) saw industry providing 20 percent of that employment. To reach this goal "the solution advanced by the government is to encourage foreign investors to set up business in Tunisia and thereby mop up the dangerous pools of the unemployed: as Tyani Chelli, the head of the API puts it, 'Our main pre-occupation is to import work rather than export labor.'" 51

Tunisian law requires that employees be over sixteen years of age, but this is not always enforced. Most of the employees engaged by foreign enterprises are women. They work under "safety and health hazards that would provoke any Western union to call an immediate strike." 52

Manufacturing is the nation's number two employer, employing 16.5 percent of the total active work force in 1981. 53 153,800 men, or approximately 30 percent of the male active work force, and 146,100 women, or approximately 40 percent of the female active work force are employed in manufacturing. This is an increase of approximately 50 percent over 1976. Of the manufacturing industries located in Tunisia, the major employers are as follows: wearing apparel, employing 16,277 people; food products with 12,566 employees; non-metal products with 12,637 employees; and textiles, spinning, and weaving with 9,630 employees each (average number of employees based on 1977 figures). 54

The minimum industrial wage was instituted in 1977 after a series of labor strikes. It is adjusted if the cost of living index goes up more than 5 percent and remains at that level for six consecutive months. The highest wages were received in the non-metal products industry, which in 1977 paid 15,552 dinars ($31,104.00);
the industrial chemical industry, where workers received 13,066 dinars ($26,132.00); and the food products industry, which paid 12,451 dinars ($24,902.00). Of the largest employers, the wearing apparel industry paid 11,222 dinars ($22,444.00), and the textile industry and the spinning and weaving industry paid 9,419 dinars (total given in thousands of dinars or $18,838.00). These last three industries are ones likely to be off-shore plants for Western industries.

Industries and Investment

Most industries located in Tunisia are in Tunis and along the coastline south to Sfax. As previously noted, manufacturing has been one of the fastest growing sectors of the economy. The contribution of manufacturing to the GDP was 13 percent in 1974. (Industry as a whole contributed 24 percent of the GDP.)

Under the First Ten Year Plan, investment in the beverage and foodstuff industry was $24,240,000, and investment in the textile industry was $38,160,000. In 1978, 164,900,000 dinars ($329.8 million) were invested in manufacturing industries, accounting for approximately 25 percent of the total investment in the country for that year. Investment is oriented toward sectors requiring manpower and sectors based on exportation. Private investment dominates, in accordance with the government's previous intentions.

Foreign investment has accounted for 69.2 percent of total investment in the Tunisian economy. Mixed projects (between Tunisians and foreign partners) accounted for 22.8 percent. Of this foreign investment, West Germany accounted for 56.6 percent, the Netherlands for 9.3 percent, Switzerland for 1.6 percent, France for 1.3
percent, and Belgium for 0.4 percent. Among the mixed projects, 7.8 percent were with Dutch partners, 6.4 percent with French partners, 3.8 percent with Italian and German partners, 2.7 percent with German partners, and 2.1 percent with British partners. In 1973, of the projects begun in Tunisia, 22.8 percent were foreign and 53.6 percent were mixed. The breakdown on the foreign projects is as follows: Textile Alliance of Hong Kong, 50 percent; West Germany, 27.4 percent; the Netherlands, 18.8 percent; France 2.2 percent; and Italy, 1.7 percent. Of the mixed projects, Italy accounted for 83.6 percent, France for 9.4 percent, West Germany for 3.7 percent, and the Netherlands for 3.3 percent. In the 1973-74 period, 84 percent of the investments were in the textile industry, providing 41 percent of the employment.

**Assessment of Off-Shore Production**

**as a Means of Development**

On the basis of the figures presented in the preceding section, it would seem that, as stated in *Tunisia: A Country Study*, "Tunisia has succeeded in attracting foreign investment in labour-intensive, export industries." Two major goals of the government have been accomplished. Looked at merely on this level, the government's method of building its economy on a foreign foundation seems successful. The subsequent discussion will examine some of the pros and cons of this method.

**Advantages**

Off-shore production provides employment and the accompanying salaries to people who otherwise would not have either. The salaries are small by Western standards. Some textile workers receive one and one-half dinars a day
($3), which works out to $1057 per year, well below the official minimum wage. The argument could be made that any salary would be better than nothing, especially in a nation without the social welfare programs found in most industrialized countries.

Additionally, much of the money goes to individuals who previously made no economic contribution to the household, such as women and teenagers. Economically then, the people gain. The government gains by being able to tax the people's incomes and not having to provide economic relief for them. Some of those employed are also able to acquire useful skills, providing long-term benefits for their country. This advantage only applies, however, for the few that are placed in supervisory positions or positions requiring special training.

Work is an acknowledged way of effecting social change. It takes people outside their family groups and makes them think on a more individual basis. Work places their welfare in the hands of the general society and economy rather than the family. Loosening traditional family ties is another important factor in implementing change (although there are also disadvantages associated with supplanting this family support system). These attitudinal changes are important for a government wanting to replace traditional values and practices with more modern (i.e., Western) values and practices. Governments see these attitudinal changes as being important and necessary in order to become a modern economy on par with established industrial powers.

This attitudinal change can particularly be seen when women work. Generally the phenomenon of women working leads to freer conduct for women and helps develop a more tolerant attitude toward change. Lorna Hawker Durrani points out
that women gain, through working, a new realization of their own ability to support themselves... They must necessarily feel freer as a result of this possible independence."

In addition, working also frees women and society in another way. It has the effect of raising the marriage age (the legal minimum in Tunisia is seventeen for women and twenty for men) because the girl, especially, no longer has to be an economic burden on her family. She can contribute to the family income (as can a boy) and earn money for her dowry. Raising the marriage age in turn helps reduce the reproductive years of a woman. Slowing population growth is a necessary goal for most Third World countries who already find it difficult to support their present populations. This in turn will eventually help the unemployment problem. Without the foreign companies, these girls would be unlikely to find employment in Tunisia.

An additional advantage to off-shore production and related methods is that it results in the development of an infrastructure as well as the actual manufacturing structures. The infrastructure is important for any subsequent development, for attracting new industries, and for tourism. The facilities can also be used for other purposes when they are no longer used by the original company. They can then become a basis for the development of indigenous industries.

Disadvantages

Probably the greatest disadvantage associated with the outward-looking growth/exploitative/off-shore production approach is the question of sustainability. This approach is based primarily on low-labor costs. These cannot last forever. In fact, wages were increased 22 percent in 1981
and 30 percent in 1982. The current Five Year Plan also calls for additional wage increases. Eventually, these industries will move to other countries where labor is cheaper. Tunisian owners could take over the operation, perhaps producing for the domestic market. If they want to produce for export (which, given the size of the Tunisian market, they would almost have to do), however, they will face the problems of access to the raw materials and the need for a sales and distribution network as well as the problem that their products will not be competitive (unless subsidized) with similar products produced in countries with lower wages. What then happens to the people formerly employed? How do they and the government compensate for their loss of salary?

Another side of the unemployment picture is the fact that women are the ones predominantly employed in off-shore industries. This occurs at the loss of jobs to men. (In 1981, with over 83,000 unemployed, over 70,000 were men.) This situation creates social distress because it upsets traditional roles within the family as well as within society. This in turn leads to poor attitudes toward women working and the changes that accompany that phenomenon.

In terms of employment, questions can also be asked about the working conditions of those employed in off-shore plants, which as previously mentioned are dismal. The people seem to feel the salary is worth the conditions. However, as we in the West are well aware, poor work conditions can have dire, long-term consequences for the health of employees.

One can also ask whether the government does not give away more than it gains with its incentive package. With the various incentives offered, it is hard to see how companies opening
an off-shore plant are liable for any taxation. The only obvious form of government revenue is through fees for work permits. Additionally, the government must employ customs inspectors to oversee the entry and departure (or destruction) of all goods used in the production processes to insure that they meet the requirements for duty-free entry. As Dimitri Germidis states, "Tunisia functions, for these enterprises, as a vast free zone." In some cases, the government must also sustain the cost of development of the infrastructure.

A political disadvantage of this approach to industrialization is having a foreign presence in the country and having the national economy tied to its operation, even if in a minor way. Such a situation is always a sensitive issue in recently independent countries, particularly if the foreign presence is that of a former colonial or neo-imperialist power. The government loses some control over the national economy. Even if the national economy were totally "Tunisian," the decisions and policies of the major industrial powers would still affect it.

**Summary and Conclusion**

Looking at the outward-looking growth/exploitative/off-shore production approach in terms of the goals expressed by the Tunisian government, it would seem to be a short-term solution to Tunisia's problems with long-term potential for harm and good. Both of the government's goals in choosing this approach have been accomplished. The approach has attracted labor-intensive, export-oriented industries to Tunisia. The approach's long-term potential for growth can be seen in the Asian countries that Tunisia likes to compare itself with (Hong Kong and Singapore). Its use in the more traditional
Third World countries of Africa and Latin America is too recent to adequately evaluate, although some countries associated with it, such as Brazil, are currently having economic difficulties. Tunisia too is having difficulties in the economically strained 1980s. Perhaps one of the limitations of this mixed development approach is that it requires a strong world economy. Another limitation is that it only works on a small level, and perhaps there are already too many practitioners (for while Tunisia has been apparently successful, its unemployment figures disguise the fact that it still exports numerous workers to other Middle Eastern and European countries).

Most of the arguments against off-shore production as a short-term strategy are primarily intangible, ethical questions, or hard-to-measure economic losses (in the form of tax revenues foregone, for example). Many of these objections have responses that are often just as difficult to measure. In general though, the benefits of Tunisia’s combination strategy are more concrete and quantitatively measurable. The salaries, experience, and facilities provided help the people now and also offer a foundation for the later development of indigenous industries. The more intangible benefit of attitudinal change is also important for the country’s future development since changing people’s attitudes is generally the most difficult part of development. Looking at the government’s goals, which have been achieved (although maybe not to the extent that the government would like) in using the off-shore production approach to developing the country’s industry, Tunisia’s leaders appear to have found a development path capable of taking their country from a traditional, agricultural orientation into the modern industrial world. Whether or not this approach prepares them adequately to cope with the problems that will accompany this
transition, however, gives cause for hesitation in totally supporting off-shore production as a means of development.
ENDNOTES


7 Ibid., p. 48.


9 Ibid., p. 168.


11 OECD, p. 33.

12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.


15 OECD, p. 49.

16 Ibid.

17 "Factories for the Third World, Tunisia" (New York: Icarias Films, date unknown).

18 OECD, p. 33.


20 Ibid., p. 44.


23 McLachlan, p. 43.

24 Ibid.


26 McLachlan, p. 43.

27 Ibid., p. 44.

28 Ibid., p. 45.
29 Ibid., p. 47.


31 Duwaji, p. 152.

32 Nehrt, p. 97.

33 Nelson, p. 129.

34 Nehrt, p. 94.

35 From the Economic Yearbook of Tunisia, quoted in Ghazi Duwaji, p. 159.

36 Germidis, p. 181.

37 Ibid., p. 182.


40 Duwaji, p. 155.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid., p. 191.

43 Dinar conversions are based on the 1982 exchange rate of 1 dinar to $2. Franc conversions are based on the 1983 exchange rate of 1.3 francs to $1.

44 Andrews, p. 379.
45 Germis, pp. 175, 179.
46 Ibid., p. 186.
47 U.S., Central Intelligence Agency, p. 231.
49 U.S., Central Intelligence Agency, p. 231.
51 Andrews, p. 379.
52 Ibid.
53 International Labour Office, p. 36.
54 Ibid., p. 299.
56 Ibid., p. 538.
57 "Factories for the Third World, Tunisia."
58 McLachlan, p. 43.
59 U.S., Department of State, p. 1.
60 Duwaji, p. 156.
61 Andrews, p. 376.
62 Nehrt, p. 73.
63 Germis, p. 188.
64. Ibid., pp. 187-88.
65. Ibid., p. 189.
67. "Factories for the Third World, Tunisia."
70. U.S., Department of Commerce, pp. 4, 8.
72. "Factories for the Third World, Tunisia."
74. Durrani, p. 70.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


NUCLEAR PERPLEXITY

Mark Field*

On Monday, July 16, 1945, the first atomic bomb was detonated at the Trinity test site near Alamogordo, New Mexico. Since that time, mankind has lived under the dark cloud of nuclear weaponry. Each year, the quantity of weapons has multiplied until now there are more than fifty thousand warheads jointly possessed by nations of the earth. Although these bombs were built as weapons for war, their significance extends beyond war and all its various causes and outcomes. If nuclear weapons are ever used, even on a moderate scale, the extent of destruction would be so far-reaching, and its effects on the earth's ecosystem so severe, that the extinction of mankind would be imminent. In the words of Jonathan Schell, these weapons "grew out of history, yet they threaten to end history. They were made by men, yet they threaten to annihilate man. They are a pit into which the whole world can fall--a nemesis of all human intentions, actions, and hopes." It is the risk of complete annihilation, which has arisen from man's ability to avail himself of nature's ultimate destructive forces, that causes us to suspend our judgment concerning the possibility of a victor in a nuclear war. Nevertheless, although it is certainly the case that the actual use of nuclear weapons could never be (morally) condoned, there are many who claim that the very

*Mark is a graduate student in Political Science. His area of emphasis is political philosophy. After graduating with his M.A. in December 1985, he plans to obtain a Ph.D. in Philosophy.
existence of these weapons significantly reduces the probability that a conflict could arise of sufficient magnitude that it would ultimately lead to nuclear war. It is their conclusion that the mutual capabilities of both sides to completely destroy each other not only serve to limit encroachment and the advancement of counter-ideologies, they also serve to deter the use of nuclear weapons. Indeed, since the threat to use such weapons does not require their use and since these threats may prevent great evils, deterrence of unacceptable behavior on the part of foreign powers via the threat of nuclear destruction may be morally permissible. In discussing nuclear deterrence and some of its moral implications, the aim of this paper will be to (a) make an inquiry into the moral permissibility or impermissibility of nuclear deterrence as a means of national defense; (b) describe a (hypothetical) situation which represents (at least prima facie) a perplexing moral state of affairs involving the conclusions arrived at from the above discussion of nuclear deterrence; and (c) attempt to provide an explanation that will free us from this perplexity. To this end, we must begin by establishing an acceptable fundamental moral value which will be able to adequately guide us through the first part of the argument.

There are, of course, a variety of moral values that people recognize as being fundamental in their lives. Among these may be freedom, love, justice, etc. However, there must be a fundamental value which can serve as the ontological basis for all moral values. Life is that fundamental value. Without life (i.e., without the phenomenon of growth aimed at a possibly successful end), the fact that something is good or bad does not seem to make sense. It could not be good for or bad for anything. Values such as freedom and justice apply to human life.
both individually and collectively; and without life, what meaning could these values have? Thus, human life should be regarded as the primary fundamental moral value. The primacy of this value allows us to attach to it supreme moral worth. Our first proposition, then, will be as follows:

(1) Human life is of supreme moral worth (i.e., each instance of human life has exactly the same value as every other instance of human life).

If human life has supreme moral worth, then it follows that it is (a) morally impermissible to take the lives of others and (b) morally permissible to protect one's own life. However, it is certainly conceivable that the protection of one's own life may require that that person take the life of another. Thus, if a person is seeking to protect his own life, then it seems to be morally permissible to take the life of another person. But (a) has already told us that it is morally impermissible to do this. We find, therefore, that our fundamental value tells us that it both is and is not morally permissible to take the lives of others. This conclusion, however, is a contradiction; and it compels us to either reject (1) or find a solution. Given the intuitive correctness of this proposition, we should attempt to formulate a solution. Such a solution will involve two parts. First, any situation in which a person's life is at stake is a situation involving aggression and defense. In any such situation, human life may be either (a) innocent, i.e., not responsible for aggressive or threatening behavior or (b) accountable (not-innocent), i.e., responsible for aggressive or threatening behavior. This means that a person seeking to protect his own life may be in a position to either take the life of an innocent person or a non-innocent person or both. Second, it does
not seem just that a person may take the life of an individual who is not responsible for aggression in order to protect himself. To arrive at this conclusion, however, we must assume the logical priority of the moral impermissibility of taking human life over the moral permissibility of protecting one's own life. Thus, whereas killing innocent human life is absolutely morally prohibited, protecting one's own life is contingently morally admissible (i.e., contingent upon the fact that if he must take the life of a person to protect his own, that person must be accountable or not innocent). We may now continue with our argument and in view of the foregoing discussion, add the following proposition:

(2) If human life is of supreme worth, then it is both (a) absolutely morally impermissible to take the lives of innocent human beings, and (b) contingently morally permissible to protect one's own life.

Human life, however, is more than simply biological. There are secondary values which a person esteems that define him as a human being (i.e., these values define a person's humanity). To deprive an individual of these secondary values is to negate that individual's essential humanity. Therefore, if human life has supreme worth and if a person's humanity is defined in terms of his secondary values, then we may proceed with our argument as follows:

(3) If it is contingently morally permissible to protect one's own (biological) life, then it is also contingently morally permissible to protect those secondary fundamental values which define one's humanity.

(4) If human life has supreme worth, then it is absolutely morally impermissible to
take the life of an innocent person in order to protect one's own life (either his biological life or the fundamental values of his life).

This conclusion seems acceptable enough, but what about threatening to kill innocent people as a means of protecting one's own life? There appears to be a substantial difference between actually killing an innocent person and merely threatening to do so. However, suppose, for example, that A and B are adversaries and that B is intent on killing A. In this situation, A will seek to protect his own life (which we know, by proposition (2), to be morally permissible). But suppose that A can only protect himself if he threatens to kill B's sister, S, who is innocent of the entire affair. This threat will undoubtedly involve the intention to kill S (for if A does not have this intention, i.e., if he is bluffing, and B finds this out, then the threat will be ineffective and A's life will remain in danger). Is this intended threat morally permissible? It appears as though such a threat is not morally permissible; and this stance is justified by the application of the Wrongful Intentions Principle which states that to intend to do what one knows to be wrong is itself wrong. There are three reasons which give this principle plausibility: (1) normally, we regard a person who fully intends to perform a wrongful act and is prevented from doing so merely by external circumstances (e.g., a person whose plan to murder is interrupted by the victim's fatal heart attack) as being just as bad as the person who fulfills a similar wrongful act; (b) we view a person who intends to do what is wrong, but then changes his mind, as having set right a moral failing or error; (c) it is convenient, for a variety of purposes, to treat a prior intention to perform a particular act as the origination of the act itself. Therefore, we are inclined to view
intentions as components of actions and to ascribe to each intention the moral status ascribed to the act "containing it." Accordingly, we can add the following two propositions:

(5) The Wrongful Intentions Principle states that if it is wrong to take the life of an innocent person, then it is wrong to intend to take the life of an innocent person.

(6) It is wrong to intend to (i.e., threaten with the intention to) take the lives of innocent people as a means of protecting one's own life.

To this point we have only been addressing the protection of human life on an individual level. However, the notion of protecting one's own life (commonly called "self-defense") resembles situations on a more encompassing level. For example, there are at least two ways in which the permissibility of a nation to defend itself can be derived from individual self-protection. The first is by means of composition: the permissibility of national defense is composed of an authorized government's exercising, in an organized manner, the combined permissibility of the self-defense of its individual citizens. The second is by way of analogy with the reason being that a nation is similar to a person in morally relevant respects. It is, therefore permissible for a nation to exercise self-protection like that of a person. The significant implication is that just as the permissibility of individual self-defense applies to the preservation of one's biological life and the fundamental values of that life, so also the permissibility of national self-defense applies to its central values (including its morality, independence, sovereignty, and the structure of its basic institutions) as well as the biological survival of its members, especially if it is the
case, as it seems to be, that the fundamental values of those members are inextricably connected with the continuance of the nation and its central values. We shall conclude, therefore, that:

(7) National defense is similar to protecting one's own individual life (i.e., self-defense).

(8) If it is morally impermissible to intend to take the lives of innocent people as a means of self-defense, then it is morally impermissible to intend to take the lives of innocent people as a means of national defense.

(9) Nuclear deterrence is a means of national defense.

(10) However, if nuclear deterrence involves a threat with the intention to take the lives of innocent people, then it is morally impermissible to use nuclear deterrence as a means of national defense.

Proposition (10), though, is not as strong as it might be. That is, it also seems to be the case that if it is morally impermissible to use nuclear deterrence as a means of national defense, then nuclear deterrence must involve a threat with the intention to take the lives of innocent people. This would mean that the intention to kill innocent people is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for the moral impermissibility of nuclear deterrence. In spite of this, nuclear deterrence may be wrong (if it is, in fact, wrong) for reasons other than the intention to kill innocent people. I am not sure what these other reasons might be if, in fact, there are alternative reasons. Nevertheless, we shall re-state proposition 10 as follows:
However, nuclear deterrence is morally impermissible as a means of national defense if, and only if, it involves a threat with the intention to take the lives of innocent people.\textsuperscript{14}

Proposition (10') will now allow us to elicit the following two-part conclusion:

\begin{itemize}
\item On the one hand it is (a) morally impermissible to use nuclear deterrence as a means of national defense when it involves a threat with the intention to take the lives of innocent people, while on the other hand it is (b) morally permissible to use nuclear deterrence when no such intentional threat is involved.
\end{itemize}

This concludes the first part of the essay concerning the moral acceptability of nuclear deterrence as a form of national defense. In the second part of this essay, I would like to build upon this conclusion and attempt to describe a hypothetical situation which represents (at least prima facie) a morally perplexing state of affairs.

To begin, I would like to refer back to proposition (3) which states, in part, that it is contingently morally permissible to protect those secondary fundamental values which define a person's humanity. Among these secondary fundamental values we should certainly find autonomy, i.e., the freedom to choose the end in life that one desires to pursue without the fear that those ends might be frustrated by the arbitrary will of others or coercion by the state.\textsuperscript{15} Thus, autonomy is a kind of freedom; and there is at least a presumption in favor of freedom. This presumption rests on the essential role of freedom concerning the development of individual traits of intellect and character which
constitute the good of persons, as well as its central importance as a means to the progress of society. The supreme worth of human life implies that each human life should realize its fullness. But in order for an individual to realize a fullness of life, it is necessary that certain uniquely human powers, abilities, and potentialities be brought to a full development. This development, however, requires regular and continual practice at making difficult choices among alternative hypotheses, policies, and actions. The justification for this was expressed by John Stuart Mill in his treatise On Liberty:

The human faculties of perception, judgement, discriminative feeling, mental activity, and even moral preference are exercised only in making a choice. He who does anything because it is the custom makes no choice. He gains no practice either in discerning or in desiring what is best. The mental and moral, like the muscular, powers are improved only by being used.

Thus, if a person conforms to custom merely out of social pressure and not from deliberative choice, then he will be led mindlessly along by the crowd and can have no hope of realizing what is best in him. Without autonomy, the realization of human fulfillment does not seem possible. These are the grounds, then, for espousing a presumption in favor of freedom. We can now continue our argument:

(12) The supreme worth of human life implies that each human life should realize its fullness.

(13) The realization of the fullness of human life implies the existence of autonomy.

*(14)* The supreme worth of human life implies the existence of autonomy.
(15) Principles implied by the supreme worth of human life have fundamental value.

.(16) Individual autonomy must have fundamental value.

(17) Fundamental values should be (contingently) protected and promoted (from proposition (3)).

.(18) It is contingently morally permissible to protect and promote individual autonomy.

Suppose, however, that it is contingently morally permissible to protect and promote a particular fundamental value, V, but that the only meaningful way to do this is through a particular institution I. If V should be protected and promoted and I protects and promotes V, then I should be promoted. On the other hand, if I subverts V, then I should not be promoted. This will allow us to expand upon proposition (18):

(19) Institution I should be promoted if and only if value V should be protected and promoted and if it is the case that I protects and promotes V.

.(20) Institutions which protect and promote individual autonomy should themselves be promoted whereas institutions which violate individual autonomy should not be promoted.

Imagine, now, that the following state of affairs applies: There is a world (similar to our own) that is composed of two and only two polities (nation A and nation B) whose powers (politically, economically, and militarily) are, for the most part, equal. Suppose, also, that the people of nation A recognize the fundamental value of individual autonomy and its importance in achieving a fullness of life. As a result, the primary goal of nation A is the protection and
promotion of autonomy. The means by which this goal is accomplished will entail the establishment of specific legal rules. These laws will prevent the subversion of autonomy. However, the establishment and enforcement of law demands the existence of a political institution which can exercise the requisite political power. Thus, the protection and promotion of autonomy requires the existence of a political institution (e.g., a government). There are any number of governmental institutions that could exercise the appropriate political power. However, we shall suppose that nation A creates a political institution such that the people will be able to collectively ensure this fundamental value; they will be able to collectively regulate the decisions and policies of their authorized leaders to the end that individual autonomy might be protected. This collective control of government is achieved by the establishment of the following three legal rights: (a) the right of the people (collectively) to determine who will and will not occupy positions of leadership within government; (b) the right of each person to be informed concerning the opinions, decisions, and policies of their leaders; and (c) the right of the people (collectively) to influence the opinions, decisions, and policies of their leaders. The people of nation A will be able to collectively manage their government, and thereby ensure their autonomy, if and only if these rights are held inviolate. Thus, we may add the following two propositions:

(21) The government of nation A is an institution which protects and promotes the fundamental value of individual autonomy.

(22) The government of nation A should itself be promoted.

We must now turn to a characterization of nation B.
We shall suppose that nation B is a military polity with a hierarchical military institution serving as the central government. The primary goal of the leaders in government is the total domination of the world. As a means to this end, the leaders realize that they must possess military power that is superior to the opposition. In order to secure this military superiority, a central economic plan is formulated that will direct the natural resources and the efforts of the people towards this goal. However, implicit to the success of this plan is the imperative that each individual citizen conform to its various requirements. If the central strategy is not followed, then it will fail, and if it fails, then military superiority will not be attained. As a means, therefore, of ensuring the success of the plan, the military government intervenes and enforces the conformance of each individual. But if the government enforces obedience to the central plan, then it necessarily precludes the private plans of its citizens. This means that if the ends that a person chooses to pursue do not accord with the established program, then the government intervenes and requires that the private plan be modified so that it will agree with the central strategy. However, we mentioned earlier that individual autonomy is the freedom to choose the ends in life that one desires to pursue without the fear that those ends might be frustrated by the arbitrary will of others or coercion by the state. Thus, the government of nation B advances military superiority at the expense of the individual autonomy. We may now conclude the following:

(23) The government of nation B is an institution which neither protects nor promotes the fundamental value of individual autonomy.

(24) The government of nation B should not be promoted.
To continue our description, since neither A nor B are significantly subordinate to each other in any relevant way, we will assume that each is an independent and autonomous political society (although it may be the case that they must sometimes rely on each other for their own well-being and continued existence). As such, both may be regarded as sovereign nations with the right to defend themselves and their interests. We argued, in fact, for this very conclusion prior to our statement of proposition (7). At that point we stated that the right to national defense is derived from principles of individual self-defense. Since an individual has the right (at least contingently) to protect his own biological life as well as the fundamental values which define his humanity (from proposition (3)), and since a sovereign nation also has central aims, goals and values that are essential to its existence as well as the biological lives of its citizens, by analogy we concluded that a nation has the right to protect itself. This conclusion, however, seems to be at odds with the conclusion arrived at in proposition (24). Nevertheless, it certainly seems to be the case that the government of a nation is essential to the realization of that nation’s central aims, goals, and values; and if this is the case, since these central values may be protected, then certainly the government would also be subject to protection. There is no contradiction, however, between the nation’s not promoting a particular government and a (sovereign) nation’s right to protect its own government. For example, consider the following analogy: As we have already stated, a government is essential to the existence of a sovereign nation and the preservation of its citizens’ way of life. Similarly, the mind of an individual is essential to his existence and the preservation of his way of life. Now it may be the case that this individual acts in ways that we feel are morally
contemptible. Nevertheless, although we may be justified in not promoting his particular psychological mind-set, we normally do not deny that he has a right to protect his mind from destruction. Analogously, a particular government may engage in actions which we feel are morally impermissible; but even though we are justified in not advancing this government, we do not deny that a nation has the right to protect what is essential to its existence - even an iniquitous government. Therefore we can proceed as follows:

(25) However, all sovereign nations have a right to self-protection (i.e., national defense).

(26) Both nation A and nation B are sovereign nations.

. . (27) Both nation A and nation B have the right to self-protection (i.e., national defense).

Nevertheless, just as there are moral limitations on what an individual can do as a means of self-protection (see proposition (2)), so also there are limitations on strategies for national defense which define the parameters outside of which a particular strategy is considered to be illegitimate or morally unacceptable. Given a world, as we have imagined it, in which two nations exist with widely divergent ideologies and points of view concerning the ends and means of social, political, economic, and military conduct, conflicts will inevitably arise. As in our own world, minor problems and hostilities will be resolved diplomatically. However, when major altercations arise that surpass diplomatic resolution, assuming only the existence of conventional weapons, ultimate reconciliation will be obtained via the use of military arms. This decision by arms will occur when the strength of one side or the other is exhausted. Normally,
the nation with the greater strength will have the better chance of being victorious. However, let us suppose at this point that the world we have imagined is a nuclear world and that since neither nation has a military capacity which is subordinate to the other, their nuclear arsenals are relatively equal both quantitatively and qualitatively. In a world in which nuclear weapons exist, if both diplomatic and conventional means fail to make reconciliation or deter aggression, then the final means of national defense (i.e., the defense of last resort) will involve the threat to use nuclear weapons. Since proposition (27) claims that both nation A and nation B have a right to national defense, we will assume that as a primary means of protection, each nation threatens the other with nuclear destruction. As we discussed earlier, in order for a threat to be credible, it must involve the intention to actually carry out nuclear destruction (for if one of the nations does not have this intention, i.e., if that nation is bluffing, and the opposition discovers this, then the threat will be ineffective). Obviously, however, if such an intentional threat is made actual, it will unavoidably cause the deaths of a very large number of people. We can continue our argument by restating some of what has just been expressed:

(28) As a primary means of national defense, both nation A and nation B threaten each other with nuclear destruction.

(29) In order for a threat to be credible as a means of protection, it must be accompanied by the intention to carry out the threat.

(30) The threats of nuclear destruction by nations A and B against each other will be accompanied by the intention to carry out nuclear destruction.
(31) But nuclear destruction unavoidably causes the deaths of a very large number of people.

(32) The mutual threats of nations A and B will be accompanied by an intention to take the lives of a very large number of people.

(33) However, a means of national defense is legitimate only if it falls within the parameters set by morality (i.e., only if it is morally permissible).

It is somewhat unclear whether or not a threat with the intention to cause the deaths of a large number of people is morally impermissible. It certainly seems to be. However, there may be circumstances in which an argument could be given in favor of its moral permissibility. For example, suppose a large group of people sought to deprive another group of people of their lives and/or fundamental values. It appears as though a threat with the intention to kill the aggressors might be morally permitted. Nevertheless, even though the permissibility in this case is unclear, it is certainly the case, as proposition (4) has already demonstrated, that

(34) It is morally impermissible to take the innocent life of another in order to protect one's own life.

This, of course, refers to self-defense. However, we also argued that national defense is derived from principles of self-defense. Hence, we concluded in proposition (7) that

(35) National defense is similar to protecting one's own individual life.

(36) It is morally impermissible to take the innocent lives of others as a means of national defense.
In addition, we also concluded, from the Wrongful Intentions Principle, that not only is it morally impermissible to take the lives of innocent people as a means of national defense,

(37) It is morally impermissible to intend (by way of a threat) to take the lives of innocent people as a means of national defense (partial reiteration from proposition (8)).

(38) On the one hand it is (a) morally permissible to use nuclear deterrence as a means of national defense when it involves a threat with the intention to kill innocent people, while on the other hand it is (b) morally permissible when such an intentional threat is not involved (reiteration of proposition (11)).

In order to discover whether or not the mutual threats of nations A and B to use nuclear weapons are legitimate as a means of national defense, we must determine whether or not these threats are morally permissible; and we can determine this in two ways: (a) if there is no intention (to use nuclear weapons) connected with the threat, then that threat will be permissible, or (b) if there is an intention to use nuclear weapons, but there are no innocent people who will be affected, then that threat is permissible. We have already argued and concluded that the mutual threats of A and B involve the intention to use nuclear weapons. Thus, we must pursue alternative (b) and try to determine whether the people of either nation can be considered innocent or not-innocent (i.e., accountable).

Prior to our introducing proposition (21) into the argument, we stated that the people of a community are able to collectively control their government if and only if three specific legal rights are held inviolate. From this statement we
can construct an argument that will help us determine innocence and accountability:

(39) If and only if the following three rights obtain can it then be said that the people of a nation are in collective control of their government:
(a) the right of the people, collectively, to determine who will and will not occupy positions of leadership within the government;
(b) the right of the people, individually, to be informed concerning the opinions, decisions, and policies of their leaders;
(c) the right of the people, collectively, to influence the opinions, decisions, and policies of their leaders.

(40) If X controls Y, then it is within the power of X to guide and direct Y.

(41) If it is within the power of X to guide and direct Y, then it is within the power of X to determine Y.

(42) If it is within the power of X to determine Y, then X can be held responsible for Y.

(43) If X controls Y, then X can be held responsible for Y.

(44) If it is within the collective power of the people (X) to control the decisions and policies of their leaders (Y), then the people can be held responsible (i.e., accountable) for those decisions and policies.

(45) The people of a nation can be held collectively accountable for the decisions and policies of their leaders if and only if these three rights are held inviolate.

If a community of people can be held collectively accountable for a particular action, then each and
every member of that community can be held individually responsible for that action. This is true even if it is the case that certain members had nothing at all to do with the bringing about of the action. To see why this is the case, consider the following argument:

(46) X is subject to punishment if and only if X is accountable.

(47) If a group of people are collectively accountable for a particular action, then the group is subject to punishment.

(48) The only means by which a group may be punished is to punish its members.

(49) If a group of people are subject to punishment, then the individual members of that group are subject to punishment.

(50) But we only punish people who can be held accountable (from proposition (46)).

(51) If a group of people are collectively accountable for a particular action, then the members of the group can be held individually accountable.

However, since the members of the group are not necessarily directly accountable for the action, we say that they are vicariously accountable; that is, the contributory fault is assigned to the person(s) who perform(s) (or directly causes) the act whereas the liability is ascribed to the group as a whole (i.e., collectively). As a result, proposition (51) should read as follows:

(51') If a group of people are collectively accountable for a particular action, then the members of the group can be held individually vicariously accountable; otherwise, there is no vicarious accountability.
From this proposition we may conclude that:

... (52) If the people of a nation can be held collectively accountable for the decisions and policies of their leaders, then each individual member can be held vicariously accountable for those decisions and policies; otherwise, they are not held vicariously accountable.

What proposition (52) seems to tell us is that if there is a community of people that can be considered as a collective whole and if this group holds these rights inviolate, then this community will have collective control over its leaders and the policies they make. Thus, collective accountability assumes (a) that there is community that can be considered as a collective whole and (b) that this community holds these rights inviolate for its members. In order, however, for a group to be considered as a collective whole, three criteria must be satisfied: (a₁) there is a recognition among community members of basic, common values; (a₂) there is a common sentiment (i.e., emotional significance) towards these basic values; and (a₃) the members of the group share a common lot (i.e., the extent to which their goods and harms are necessarily collective and indivisible) with respect to these basic values. In the absence of either (a) or (b), therefore, there can be no collective accountability. Thus, as we attempt to determine whether or not the people of either nation are innocent or not-innocent (i.e., accountable), we must decide whether or not these rights are held inviolate; and, if they are held inviolate, whether or not they are held inviolate for a community of people that can be considered as a collective whole.

Concerning nation B, we said that its military aims are accomplished via the institution of a central economic plan that would direct the efforts of the people toward military superiority.
We also noted, however, that the success of this plan required the government to intervene in the lives of its citizens in order to enforce conformance. Insofar as the state forces an individual to comply with the central plan, it gains control over the life of that individual. If this is generalized to include all people under the government's jurisdiction, then the state gains control over all of its citizens. But if the government controls the lives of the people, then it cannot be said that the people control the government. However, as proposition (39) has already indicated, if the people do not control the government, then the specific rights are not held inviolate. Thus,

(53) The government of nation B does not hold these rights inviolate for its citizens.

(54) The people of nation B cannot be held collectively accountable for the decisions and policies of their leaders.

(55) The people of nation B cannot be held individually vicariously accountable for (i.e., they are innocent of) the decisions and policies of their leaders.

On the other hand, nation A, whose aim it is to protect individual autonomy, does secure these rights for its citizens. What we must determine now is whether or not the people of nation A satisfy the criteria for being considered a collective whole. We will, at this point, assume that the criteria are fulfilled, but for obvious reasons. Since the members of nation A are bound within a society which acknowledges human life to be of supreme worth, there will undoubtedly be a recognition of some common, basic values. This is reinforced by the fact that they seek to protect one of these values (autonomy), which in turn alludes to the notion of a common sentiment. Finally, they all share in
the same lot, for inasmuch as autonomy is subverted, the ends in life that they desire may be overturned. Thus, we shall assume that the people of nation A constitute a collective whole. Therefore,

(56) The government of nation A does hold these rights inviolate for its citizens (which may be perceived as a collective body).

.·. (57) The people of nation A can be held collectively accountable for the decisions and policies of their leaders.

.·. (58) The people of nation A can be held individually vicariously accountable (i.e., not-innocent of) the decisions and policies of their leaders.

In accordance with our conclusions in propositions (11) and (38), we can state that

.·. (59) The intended nuclear threat of nation A against nation B is morally impermissible whereas the intended nuclear threat of nation B against nation A is morally permissible.

If we add to proposition (59) the information arrived at in proposition (22), (24), and (33), then we can state our final conclusion as follows:

.·. (60) Nation A, whose government should be promoted, cannot legitimately protect itself by way of a threat with the intention to use nuclear weapons against nation B, whereas nation B, whose government should not be promoted, can legitimately protect itself against nation A by way of a threat with the intention to use nuclear weapons.
What we have demonstrated to this point is that it is possible for instances to arise in which nuclear deterrence is morally permissible and that we can conceive of a situation which appears to be a morally peculiar state of affairs involving nuclear deterrence and national defense. To conclude this essay, it will be instructive to attempt to find a solution to this perplexing state of affairs. I would like to present three possible solutions. The first two deal with the absolute nature of some critical propositions in the argument whereas the final solution challenges the application of the Wrongful Intentions Principle in the case of deterrent intentions.

We asserted, at the beginning of this essay, that human life has supreme worth. However, we immediately saw that this statement was in need of conceptual qualification, for in circumstances involving aggression and defense, we felt that innocent human life (i.e., life not responsible for aggressive or threatening behavior) was more precious than accountable human life (i.e., life that is responsible for aggressive or threatening behavior). We concluded that even though human life is of supreme worth, there is a logical priority of innocent life over accountable life. Thus, all things considered, it is innocent human life that is of supreme worth. This, perhaps, is the most important statement in this entire essay for it tells us that, vis-a-vis all other objects to which moral value may be imputed, the highest degree of value is bestowed upon innocent human life. There is no other object such that, when juxtaposed to innocent human life, it may take moral precedence. What this means is that, within the context of all other moral objects, innocent human life has absolute worth and as such, cannot be violated. The critical conclusion that we derived from this statement (in combination with the Wrongful Intentions Principle and proposition (7)) was that it is morally
impermissible to intend to take the lives of innocent human beings as a means of national defense (proposition (8)). This, too, is an absolute proposition. We arrive now at a crossroads in which we must either affirm the absolute nature of this proposition or deny it. In either case, there is the possibility of a solution.

First, let us assume (as the argument does) that this proposition is absolute. With this assumption, there are two different ways by which a solution can be approached. We can either demonstrate that nation A can legitimately protect itself (via nuclear deterrence) against nation B or we can demonstrate that nation B cannot legitimately protect itself (via nuclear deterrence) against nation A. Proposition (45) tells us that the people of a nation are collectively accountable if and only if rights (a) through (c) are held inviolate; and proposition (52) tells us that if collective accountability obtains, then the individuals within the collective group are vicariously accountable. We will have a solution, therefore, regardless of the approach we choose, if we can show either that the people of nation A cannot be held individually vicariously accountable or that the people of nation B can be held accountable in this way. The reader will note, however, that we have already established the opposite of what we need to demonstrate in order to arrive at a solution. Nevertheless, there may be a loophole. The people of nation A were seen to be individually vicariously accountable not only because the three rights were protected but also because they formed a collective community. There is in this conclusion, however, an unstated assumption that the people are capable of being held accountable for such a nuclear threat. This assumption seems to be valid except in one particular case. There exists a group of individuals, within the collective group, to whom accountability, by definition,
cannot be ascribed. This is the group composed of little children. This means that there is a group within the collective community of nation A that cannot be held individually vicariously accountable for their nation's nuclear threat. If these little children cannot be held accountable, then they must be innocent; and if they are innocent, then that would preclude the moral permissibility of nation B's intentional threat against nation A, for it would involve the intention to cause the deaths of innocent people. If these little children cannot be held accountable, then they must be innocent; and if they are innocent, then that would preclude the moral permissibility of nation B's intentional threat against nation A, for it would involve the intention to cause the deaths of innocent people. A rejoinder to this might be that little children do not belong within the collective group; and, since the intentional threat is only against the collective group, there would be no intention to take the lives of innocent people. Thus, proposition (8) is not violated. The problem with this rejoinder is that it neglects to distinguish between the conceptual enumeration of who does and does not belong within the collective group and the actual enumeration of the members of the society. Even though the little children may not be within the collective enumeration, they are physically located among the members of this group. Thus, any intentional threat against the collective group will unavoidably entail an intentional threat against innocent children; and this is morally impermissible.

The second approach to a solution ultimately requires that we deny that proposition (8) is absolute. In order to do this we must show that there is good reason to believe that the intentional threat to cause the death of innocent human beings is not absolutely prohibited. This threat can be divided into two separate components: (a) a declarative threat in which a declaration is made to the citizens of the opposing nation that they will be killed if they behave in certain ways and (b) an imposition of risk (i.e., they are put under the risk of death). If both the threat and the content of the threat (i.e.,
the imposition of risk) are shown not to exhibit an absolute prohibition, then we will have good reasons for denying the absolute nature of the intentional threat to cause the deaths of innocent people as a means of national defense; and this constitutes a denial of the absoluteness of proposition (8). We shall begin, then, with the declarative threat. First of all, there seem to be four ways in which declarative threats are thought to be morally impermissible: (a) threats are often counter-productive and sometimes encourage the impermissible conduct they attempt to deter; (b) they may be effective in deterring permissible conduct (thereby restricting the threatened party's rightful liberty); (c) they may cause fear and anxiety; and (d) their use may damage relations between the parties involved. None of these, however, seem to be the kinds of considerations that would support an absolute prohibition. 

There seem to be no compelling reasons why we should suppose that declarative threats should not be permitted when it is the case that the above features are, for the most part, absent. For example, imagine that a declarative threat will probably be effective, is aimed at preventing impermissible behavior, does not cause an extreme amount of anxiety (compared to alternative courses of action open to the threatener) since the people being threatened are accustomed to living with it, and is not destructive of relations between the parties involved because threats of this kind are considered to be a normal element in those relations. It is not likely that this type of threat is impermissible simply because it is a threat. Nevertheless, there are some who would argue that the declarative threat involved in nuclear deterrence is just of this type. It seems unlikely that simply a declarative threat alone is sufficient reason to suppose that it is absolutely prohibited to make a threat to take the lives of a large number of innocent people. It certainly seems
possible that the bad effects that a declarative threat may produce could be overridden by the benefits of the threat. In this case, such a threat would be justified.

This brings us to the second component of deterrent threats and the imposition of risk. It is also the point at which the third possible solution comes in, for the imposition of risk entails the intention to do harm (which will involve the Wrongful Intentions Principle). What we need to demonstrate is that there is at least one set of circumstances in which the Principle does not apply. If we can do this, then not only will we be able to deny the efficacy of proposition (6) is an important instance, we will also be able to deny the absoluteness of proposition (8). To begin, it seems clear that the Wrongful Intentions Principle connects the morality of an intention solely to the moral qualities of the intended act. Thus, if the actual performance of an act is wrong, then to (knowingly) intend to perform it is wrong. As we noted earlier in our discussion, this is not unreasonable since it is typically the case that the only significant effects of intentions are the acts of the agent (and the consequences of these acts) which flow from these intentions. However, it is important to note that there are certain situations in which intention may have effects that are independent of the intended act's actually being performed. For example, intentions to act may have the effect of influencing the conduct of other people. And it may be the case that some of these effects would not be morally impermissible. If so, the Wrongful Intentions Principle would not apply. In order to demonstrate this, it is essential to note that the Principle applies to standard conditional intentions in the same manner that it applies to nonconditional intentions. This means that if it would be wrong to perform an action in certain circumstances, then it is also wrong to intend to
perform that act on the condition that those circumstances arise. However, although the Wrongful Intentions Principle applies, for the most part, to conditional intentions, there is a sub-class of such intentions to which the principle does not seem to apply. These are deterrent intentions, i.e., those conditional intentions whose existence depends upon the person’s desire to deter others from performing the antecedent condition of the intention. The unique nature of these intentions can be explained by the distinction that can be shown between intending to do something and desiring (or intending) to intend to do it. In most cases, an individual will form the intention to perform an act because he either desires doing that act as an end in itself or as a means to other ends. Thus, in these cases, the reasons behind desiring to intend to perform an act are that the agent wants to perform the acts. This is not the case with deterrent intentions. In these situations, the desire to form an intention is entirely distinct from any desire to carry it out. Thus, in these cases, the reasons behind desiring to intend to perform an act are not that the person wants to perform the act, but for other reasons (i.e., to prevent harm). Hence, while it may certainly be the case that the object of an individual’s deterrent intention might be an evil act, it does not follow that, in desiring to adopt that intention, he desires to do evil, either as an end or a means. The central point seems to be that deterrent intentions are not intentions to do harm, rather they are intentions to prevent undesirable circumstances from coming about. And in fact, if a deterrent intention fulfills its purpose, it thereby ensures that the intended (and possibly evil) act is not performed by preventing the circumstances of performance from arising. Therefore, deterrent intentions seem to prevent evil from occurring, and this is an acceptable consequence. The Wrongful Intentions Principle does not apply in this situation.
How does this help us? It is possibly the case that the intentions connected with the threat involved in nuclear deterrence are just the sort of deterrent intentions we have been discussing. This would mean that the reasons grounding the desire on the part of nation A to form an intention to cause the deaths of innocent people would not be to carry out the intention, rather they would be to prevent the circumstances of performance from arising (i.e., to prevent harm). In these cases, the Wrongful Intentions Principle does not apply. Now, if this is the case (and it seems to be), then not only may we deny the absolute nature of declarative threats, we may also deny that the content of the threat is absolutely prohibited. In doing this, we negate the absolute prohibition against the intentional threat to cause the deaths of innocent people as a means of national defense (proposition (8)).

To summarize, we stated previously that we would have a solution if we could either demonstrate that nation A can legitimately protect itself (via nuclear deterrence) against nation B or if we could demonstrate that nation B cannot legitimately protect itself (via nuclear deterrence) against nation A. The foregoing discussion accommodates both of these approaches. First, we just demonstrated that the absolute nature of proposition (8) may be denied. If the intentional threat to cause the deaths of innocent people as a means of nation defense is not absolutely morally impermissible, then the possibility exists that nation A can legitimately protect itself by way of nuclear deterrence. Second, we demonstrated that even proposition (8) remains absolute, since little children cannot be held individually vicariously accountable, nation B cannot legitimately protect itself, by means of nuclear deterrence, against nation A.

In achieving the aims of this essay, we have, in addition, accomplished two important
purposes. First, we have gained, within a specific context, a simple, abstract or conceptual understanding of the moral permissibility of nuclear deterrence. Given the logical method by which we have arrived at this understanding, we can be assured that if our premises are true, then our conclusions must be true, for that is the nature of valid arguments. For some, this simple understanding is satisfying in and of itself. This, however brings us to the second achievement which is that in gaining such a conceptual understanding, we have laid the foundation for its practical application. It is possible, at this point, to analogize the proposition of our imaginary world to situations in our present world. If there is enough similarity in relevant respects, then the conclusions arrived at in the essay will be applicable to current circumstances. Although we will not now attempt to provide such an analogy, this essay may serve as its preface.
ENDNOTES


2 Ibid.


4 The nature of this essay is such that it involves the analysis of concepts and ideas rather than empirical facts. Thus, the adequacy of this paper will depend upon the soundness of the arguments presented, i.e., the validity of the logic and the truth of the premises. As the essay is read, the reader should make sure that these two requirements are satisfied.


6 Ibid., pp. 62-63.

7 Douglas P. Lackey, "Intentions of Deterrence," (Baruch College, SUNY), p. 2 (Typewritten).


13 When we speak of nuclear deterrence, we are not discussing (directly) the significance of nuclear weapons or nuclear war. These concepts, in and of themselves, seem to be value laden and spontaneously evoke moral argument. What we are concerned with are threats—threats that impose a risk of harm to innocent people with the intention to make those threats efficacious. In the context of nuclear deterrence, it is not the threat itself that is of moral relevance, but rather it is the intention to carry out the threat. If there is no intention, then the threat is simply an empty (i.e., harmless) declaration. On the other hand, if an intention is connected to the threat, then (in accordance with the Wrongful Intentions Principle), and only then, does the question of moral permissibility arise. For these reasons, proposition (11) is a bi-conditional statement.
Now, perhaps, is a suitable time to make an important clarification that will be in force throughout the remainder of the essay. Given the veracity of the Wrong Intentions Principle, it seems to be the case that any threat which has conjoined to it the intention to take the lives of innocent people is morally impermissible (we will discuss this notion specifically later in the essay). Therefore, it is highly unlikely that any nation would publicly pronounce such an intentional threat. Nuclear deterrence involves the intentional threat to use nuclear weapons, and the actual use of nuclear weapons may or may not result in the deaths of innocent people. Nuclear weapons detonated among a population of innocent people will unavoidably cause deaths of innocent human beings. In a case such as this, the deaths of innocent people would be an epiphenomenon of the use of nuclear weapons. Thus, the intention to use nuclear weapons (since in this case it would inevitably cause the deaths of innocent people) can be equated with an intention to take the lives of innocent human beings. On the other hand, if there are no innocent people, then it seems obvious that the intentional threat to use nuclear weapons could not be equated with an intention to take the lives of innocent people. The central point is that throughout the essay, when we speak of the intentional threat to cause the deaths of innocent people, what we are implying is that there is an intentional threat to use nuclear weapons and that this use unavoidably causes the deaths of innocent human beings.

Immanuel Kant stated that "freedom, insofar as it is compatible with the freedom of everyone else . . . , is the one sole and original right that belongs to every human being by virtue of his humanity. This is the freedom that allows each individual to pursue his own ends, whatever they may be, provided that this pursuit

16 Machan, "A Reconsideration of Natural Rights Theory," p. 63. According to him, the value that is the end of human conduct is living fully as a human being.


19 If an object has value for us, then that object possesses a degree of importance or significance in our lives; and if an object is important to us, then we should be willing to promote and protect it. Thus, if an object has value for us, then part of what we mean by this is that we are willing to promote and protect that object. Likewise, if we are not willing to promote and protect an object, then that object does not have value for us. In the case of human life, since it is the basis for all other values, it is endowed with supreme worth. Thus, not only should human life be promoted and protected, it should be promoted and protected above all other objects. It seems self-evident, therefore, that an institution that promotes and protects human life should be encouraged (for it is promoting and protecting that object which has no higher value). On the other hand, an institution that neither protects nor promotes human life should be avoided. This, too, seems intuitive. If human life is the basis for all other values, then
if human life is not promoted and protected, then all other values must decline in their protection and promotion; and if these values are neither protected nor promoted, then morality will be undermined; and if morality is undermined, then society will degenerate (see Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals, pp. 10-11). Therefore, not only should institutions that protect and promote human life be promoted, institutions that fail to promote and protect human life should not be encouraged.

Suppose now that X has supreme worth. This means that institution I should be promoted if and only if I promotes and protects X. Suppose, in addition, that a subordinate value V is essential to the worth of X (that is, X is devalued in the absence of V). This means that if V is promoted, then X is promoted, and if V is not promoted, then X is not promoted. Thus, if I promotes and protects V, then I promotes and protects X; and if I promotes and protects X, then I should be promoted. On the other hand, if I fails to promote and protect V, then I fails to promote and protect X; and if I fails to promote and protect X, then I should not be promoted. In addition, we can also conclude that institution I should be promoted if and only if I promotes and protects V. Thus, if X is human life and V is individual autonomy, then any institution, I, should be promoted if and only if I promotes and protects individual autonomy.


22 What is being claimed here is that these rights are analytically entailed by collective control. It is similar to saying that "single adult male" is entailed by "being a bachelor." What we
are saying is that if these rights obtain, then the people have collective control; and if the people have collective control, then these rights obtain. The justification for this entailment is possible by simply analyzing the meaning of certain words:

(1) If the people collectively control the government, then they have collective power over the government.

(2) If the people have collective power over the government, then they have the ability to collectively affect the behavior (i.e., opinions, decisions, and policies) of the government.

(3) But the ability of the people to collectively affect the behavior of the government means that they can (collectively) pick their leaders and influence their opinions, desires, and policies.

(4) If the people collectively control the government, then they have the ability to collectively determine who their leaders will be and to influence their opinions, decisions and policies.

(5) However, rights (a) and (c) guarantee that the people will have the ability to collectively determine who their leaders will be and to collectively influence the behavior of these leaders.

(6) If the people have collective control, then rights (a) and (c) obtain.

This gives us one of the conditionals of the entailment. The second conditional is obtained by simply working through the argument in reverse order:

(1') If rights (a) and (c) obtain, then the people have the ability to collectively determine who their leaders will be and to collectively influence the behavior of these leaders.
(2') If the people have the ability to both collectively determine who their leaders will be and collectively influence the behavior of these leaders, then they have the ability to collectively affect the behavior of the government.

(3') If the people have the ability to collectively affect the behavior of the government, then they have collective power over the government.

(4') If the people have collective power over the government, then they collectively control the government.

(5') If rights (a) and (c) obtain, then the people collectively control the government.

This establishes the second conditional. Thus, we can say that these rights analytically entail collective control.

The reader will notice that right (b) has not been accounted for. Normally, control entails power and this concept of power is supplied by rights (a) and (c). But it is possible for X to have power over Y and yet not know that he has this power. In dealing, however, with the relationship involved with collective control of government, it seems imperative that the people should have a knowledge of their control. This knowledge concept is supplied by right (b). Thus, strictly speaking, the two conditionals of our bi-conditional statement should read as follows: If rights (a), (b), and (c) obtain, then the people (knowingly) have collective control over the government and if the people (knowingly) collectively control the government, then rights (a), (b), and (c) obtain.


25 Schell, Fate of the Earth, p. 187.

26 This hypothetical syllogistic sequence was derived from the word "control." Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged (1969), s.v. "control."

27 Roderick M. Chisholm, "Human Freedom and the Self," in Free Will, ed. Gary Watson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 25, 28. Assuming, of course that free agency exists, if X determines Y, what we are saying is that X brings Y about as a result of certain acts. Thus, there is a particular (causal) relationship between the acts that X performs and the consequence of those acts, Y. Now, when X is held responsible for Y, what is being said is that there is some act, to which Y is causally linked, such that X performed that act.

28 Moritz Schlick, "When is a Man Responsible?", The Problem of Ethics, trans. David Rynin (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1939), pp. 151-154. In this section, Schlick implies both that a person is responsible if it pays to punish him, and if it does not pay to punish him, then he is not held responsible.

29 Joel Feinberg, "Collective Responsibility," Doing and Deserving (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 225-26. A person can be held individually vicariously accountable in two ways: first, he may have the necessary relationship to another individual such that he is
held (vicariously) accountable for the actions of that person or, second, he may be a member of a collective group which is being ascribed liability. Obviously, we are using individual vicarious accountability in this second sense. Thus, if a person is individually vicariously accountable, then it must be the case that he is a member of a collective group which is being assigned liability.


32 In the sense I am using it, the term "little child" may be equated with the phrase "a person under seven years of age." By definition, a child is a person who is not fully developed (both mentally and physically) and lacks maturity with regards to experience and judgement. As a result, children are deficient in the ability to form opinions and evaluate by discerning and comparing. But to be deficient in these respects precludes the ability to understand the complexities of the world. And if a person cannot understand the complexities of his environment, then he cannot be held morally or legally competent. However, if a person is not competent, then he cannot be punished. According to proposition (46), a person is accountable only if he is subject to punishment. Thus, if a person cannot be punished, then he cannot be held accountable. Since part of what it means to be a little child is to lack moral and legal competence, little children cannot be held accountable. Black's Law Dictionary, rev. ed. (1968), s.v. "infancy" and "infants." Webster's Third New International Dictionary, unabridged (1969), s.v. "child" and "childish."

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid.


37 Ibid., p. 289.

38 For example, suppose that I form the intention to take the life of my roommate if he neglects to lock the door again, but fail to kill him only because he happens (fortuitously) to lock the door. It seems to be the case that I am as bad (or almost as bad) as if he had failed to lock the door and I had killed him. My failure to perform the act no more erases the wrongness of the simple (nonconditional) intention to kill him. Ibid.

39 Ibid., pp. 290-91.

40 Ibid.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Holdren, John P. "The Dynamics of the Nuclear Arms Race: History, Status, Prospects." In Nuclear Weapons and the Future of Humanity. Edited by Avner Cohen and


Lackey, Douglas P. "Intentions of Deterrence." Baruch College. SUNY (Typewritten).


National Conference of Catholic Bishops. The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our
NUCLEAR PERPLEXITY


THE FEDERALIST AND THE FOUNDING:
TWO VIEWS OF
THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS

Nathan Webster Jones*

Introduction

The Federalist Papers, written primarily by James Madison and Alexander Hamilton under the pseudonym Publius, have been the focal point for the study of American political philosophy for almost two hundred years. The papers were written as editorials arguing for the ratification of the Philadelphia draft of the Constitution, and appeared in several New York newspapers before being collected in a single volume. They are "America's premier book about politics." Even more important to this study, they are the "premier book" about the politics which shaped America's founding. The authors of the Federalist played key roles in the formation and the enactment of the American government, and the papers are considered by many to be the most profound expression of the political science of the framers. Thus, to study the "science of politics," to use Hamilton's phrase from the Federalist, is to study the "science of politics" that played the key role in the founding of American government. This report, however, is not limited strictly to studies of the Federalist, but will examine several general studies of the

*Nathan is a junior majoring in Political Science. He has been a member of the BYU Honors Program Student Council. His plans are to attend law school after he completes his undergraduate degree.
intellectual origins of the founding and relate them to the Federalist.

The general studies of the founding examined in this report are expressive of a range of scholarly opinion concerning the intellectual origins of American government. Scholars generally, especially when they are not writing biographies, consider the founding's intellectual origins not on the basis of single individuals but on the basis of the group that created the American government. Although a great diversity of opinion may have existed among the framers at the time of the founding, when the thought and motivations of the framers are examined, they are often examined collectively.

The plurality of political opinions which existed at the time of the founding, and which the Federalist predicted would continue to exist in America (while prescribing measures in hopes of diminishing the negative effects of widely divergent political opinions), seem to have only foreshadowed the range of opinions which have developed about The Federalist Papers themselves over the past seventy years. From the publishing of the first paper, individuals of varying political orientations have expressed markedly different opinions about Publius's work. However, in 1913, the publishing of "Charles A. Beard's An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States started a new turn in the debate."

Beard, in his attempt to examine the motivations of the framers, discovered evidence which, he argued, strongly suggested that the major influence upon the framers was material self-interest. Douglass Adair, however, added a second "turn in the debate" and accepted the validity of Beard's theory only in a limited sense. Adair felt "Beard's research threw a brilliant
beam of light on certain facets of the Constitution, [but] his aim was selective, and by highlighting special features of the document he thereby cast others into deep obscurity." Other scholars, before Adair, may have felt similarly about some of the detail in Beard's work. Beard, himself, later allowed that forces other than economics played a significant role in the founding. Adair, however, was the first to actually throw significant "beams of light" into the areas obscured by the shadows of Beard's examination of 1913.

In his attempt to determine what these shadows contained, Adair examined the desire shown by the framers for a sort of eternal fame, their attempt to incorporate the philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment, and the careful study of history made by a few of the framers. These, he believed, were the keys to a more complete understanding of the framers' motivations.

The arguments of these two scholars, and some of those who have followed in their footsteps, as it were, will constitute the main body of this study.

The Founders of the Theories

Charles A. Beard

Charles A. Beard said, "interpretative schools seem always to originate in social antagonisms." This statement is certainly correct with regard to the interpretative school he founded. Richard Hofstadter, who acclaims Beard's Economic Interpretation as "a high point" in modern critical scholarship, describes the context in which the work was written:
The antagonism, long latent, between the philosophy of the Constitution and the philosophy of American democracy again came into the open. Professor Beard's work appeared in 1913 at the peak of the Progressive era, when the muckraking fever was still high; some readers tended to conclude from his findings that the Fathers were selfish reactionaries who do not deserve their high place in American esteem.

If some readers concluded that the framers were selfish reactionaries, then Beard's book served its purpose well, for this was his intention in writing the work. Beard and others felt that reverencing the past, particularly the founding, was affecting the present negatively. It seemed to breed a sort of conservatism that was holding back "social progress"; thus, they sought to debunk the founding in hopes of eliminating some of this conservatism.

Despite its rather pointed intentions, the Economic Interpretation has had a powerful effect on the scholarly view of the founding. A school of political scientists and historians has followed, creating a school of thought which sees the founding as the product of a politically elite group of men responding to the economic and social forces of their times.

Douglass Adair

Douglass Adair, who began the main body of his work in the late 1940s and early 1950s, has, like Beard, been accused of responding to "social antagonisms." James Conniff argues that "Adair . . . sought to dispute the claims of Charles Beard and to reassert the integrity of those who wrote and enacted the American Constitution." Conniff continues, criticizing
Adair for being "more interested in finding some intellectual and philosophic influence on the formation of Madison's thought than in [finding the correct source] or in spelling out the precise nature of its influence." Many, however, would disagree with Conniff's criticisms, and Adair's theory has spawned a number of followers, creating a school of thought which sees the framers as motivated more by the individual desire for fame and by intellectual forces than by the socioeconomic forces which were asserted by the Beardians.

The Theories

Charles A. Beard and Economic Determinism

Charles Beard, in his Economic Interpretation, asserts that Madison and Hamilton were America's premier economic determinists:

The Federalist . . . presents in a relatively brief and systematic form an economic interpretation of the Constitution by the men best fitted, through intimate knowledge of the ideals of the Framers, to expound the political science of the new Government. This is . . . in fact the finest study on the economic interpretation of politics which exists in any language; and whoever would understand the Constitution as an economic document need hardly go beyond it.

Beard also asserts, rather ironically, that the Constitution, which the Federalist authors played key roles in creating and enacting, is the product of economic forces. He argues that there were several powerful economic interest groups who stood to gain materially if the Constitution
were to be enacted and a strong central government created. He concludes that the commercial interests looked "upon the adoption of the Constitution as the sure guarantee" that their property interests would be protected. 12

Beard continues by asserting that the weak central government created by the Articles of Confederation was unfavorable to property rights and that the movement for the Constitution was, at its highest levels, fundamentally a movement to protect property rights. 13

Beard further contends that the delegate selection process to the Constitutional Convention was essentially rigged so that only members of certain economic groups arrived in Philadelphia as delegates. He cites as prime evidence the fact that the delegates were chosen, not by the people, but by the state legislatures, and that there were property qualification laws placed on voters and legislators before 1787. 14

In order to further strengthen his assertions, Beard examines the financial status of each delegate in an attempt to determine if the delegates "represent[ed] distinct groups whose economic interests they understood and felt in concrete, definite form through their own personal experience with identical property rights, or [if they] were . . . working merely under the guidance of abstract principles of political science." 15

This survey brings Beard to the following conclusions:

Not one member [delegate] represented in his immediate personal economic interests the small farming or mechanic classes. The overwhelming majority of members, at least five-sixths, were
immediately, directly, and personally interested in the outcome of their labors at Philadelphia, and were to a greater or lesser extent economic beneficiaries from the adoption of the Constitution.

Having shown that the delegates were, economically at least, a homogeneous group that stood to gain from a strong national government, Beard finally concludes that the Constitution itself, despite its lack of economic terms and no mention of social class, is fundamentally an economic document.

Beard's Assertions and the Federalist

Beard's assertions, as they relate to the authors of The Federalist Papers, are that Madison and Hamilton were not influenced by any historical or philosophical forces, but were only influenced by intellectual forces insofar as those forces were pliable to the economic force which really molded their thinking. Simply put, economic forces created the Constitution and consequently the Federalist; and, as Beard views it, those forces were material self-interest. Thus, the arguments for the Constitution in the Federalist must be the subtle expression of self-interest, and therefore constitute propaganda for the cause of ratifying an economically inspired document—the Constitution of the United States.

Douglass Adair and Fame, the Scottish Enlightenment, and the Importance of History

Adair felt Beard's definition of self-interest in purely economic terms was "simple-minded" and represented an "artful selectivity." He does not directly dispute Beard's assertion that economic forces played a role in motivating the framers. However, the conclusions he draws after studying the framers' motivations severely
limit the role economic forces played in the founding.

Adair did not consider economic and other social or intellectual forces to be mutually exclusive. Beard, however, in his Economic Interpretation founds his theory on a belief that these forces are fundamentally mutually exclusive. He does this by arguing that the power of material self-interest is so much greater than the power of ideas that the power of ideas is negligible in comparison with material self-interest. 19 Beard is essentially arguing that men are never ideologues except when ideology serves their material self-interest. Adair felt that the framers were self-interested, but that their self-interest was much more subtle than the overt economic self-interest depicted in Beard's Economic Interpretation.

Fame and the Founding. Adair, in his examination of the possible motivations of the framers, discovered a profound "sense of history" that seemed to overtake the framers as they worked. He describes them as becoming fantastically concerned with posterity's judgment of their behavior. And since they are concerned with the image that will remain in the world's eye, "that love of fame which is the ruling passion of the noblest minds," to quote Hamilton, becomes a spur and a goad that urges some of them to act with a nobleness and a greatness that their earlier careers had hardly hinted at.

Adair shows that many of the framers did not begin their work with lofty ambitions. However, between the time of the issuing of the Declaration of Independence and the Philadelphia Convention many of these men developed a
growing sense of the potential for lasting fame their situation had provided them. This "sense of history," which Adair describes as molding a change in the Framers thinking, is summarized by the statement, cited by Adair, of John Adams to Richard Henry Lee: "You and I, my dear friend, have been sent into life at a time when the greatest lawgivers of antiquity would have wished to be alive."21 The Founders began to realize that what they were doing would live in history, and that consequently they too, like the famed ancient lawgivers, might be immortal. Adair argues that, as a result, the Founders went beyond themselves in order to achieve a form of secular immortality. He cites as evidence Virginia, which had in 1787 only 400,000 white inhabitants; and yet that small population produced, in the short space of a single generation, a number of men that history will never forget.22

Adair also shows that this desire for fame was not looked upon pejoratively in the eighteenth century. The desire for fame was considered an enobling emotion because it led one to do things which were worthy of remembrance.

Adair concludes: "The love of Fame is a noble passion because it can transform ambition and self-interest into dedicated effort for the community, because it can spur individuals to spend themselves to provide for the common defense, or to promote the general welfare, and even on occasion to establish justice in a world where justice is extremely rare."23

Fundamentally, Adair's argument is that the economic forces, which Beard saw as the prime motivator, were overwhelmed by the force of the framers' desire to be remembered well by history. Thus, the desire for fame is, in Adair's view, the prime motivator.
The Scottish Enlightenment, the Study of History, and the Founding. In Adair's view, what further solidified his assertion that economic forces were only secondary was the link which he discovered between the Scottish Enlightenment and some of the framers, particularly between Federalist author James Madison and David Hume, the eighteenth-century Scottish philosopher. Adair calls Madison "the most creative and philosophical disciple of the Scottish school of science and politics," citing Madison's ability to "set his limited personal experience in the context of men in other ages and times, thus giving extra reaches of insight to his political formulations."

According to Adair, the Scottish system of philosophy rested on one basic assumption, had developed its own special method, and kept to a consistent aim. The assumption was "that there is a great uniformity among the actions of all men, in all nations and ages, and that human nature still remains the same, in its principles and operations. The same motives always produce the same actions; the same events follow from the same causes . . . . Would you know the sentiments, inclinations, and course of life of the Greeks and Romans? Study well the temper and actions of the French and English . . . ."--thus David Hume, present[ed] the basis of a science of human behavior.

Adair believes these elements of Scottish philosophy appear directly in Madison's work. Adair felt his theories were clearly validated by Madison's belief in a science of politics and by Madison's careful study of history, which the Scottish "science of human behavior" prescribed.
Adair's Theories and the Federalist. Adair asserts that the authors of The Federalist Papers were not overwhelmingly influenced by material self-interest. They were, however, overwhelmingly influenced by a desire for eternal fame. This desire led them to strive beyond what might be considered their normal capacities in producing, what they thought would be, a "monument" worthy of lasting fame. His second assertion, that the thought of the framers was directly influenced by Scottish philosophy, gives the Federalist an intellectual base. If one accepts Beard's arguments, the Federalist must be little more than clever propaganda defending the economic interests of the elite; but with Adair's argument the Federalist becomes a profound expression of Madison and Hamilton's interpretation of Scottish philosophy with a careful study of the history of governments thrown in.

The Followers of the Theories

As has been stated, two diverging philosophies about the founding have emerged as a result of the work of Charles Beard and Douglass Adair. If Beard's influence created a scholarly tidal wave, drowning out old notions and pushing new ideas ahead, Adair's work served as a first major dike, slowing the force of this particular rushing wave. Those who have followed have largely sought to add either additional water to the wave or earth to the dike. While all the scholars of the founding may not be the direct intellectual descendants of these two men, their original theories relate to much of the recent scholarship on the subject, as may be seen in the following catalogue of some of the more recent and important work on the founding.
Robert A. Dahl views the founding, as did Beard, as largely the product of material self-interest. Dahl states:

to some extent, they (the Framers) elevated their own privileges into universal matters of abstract right and universal right; groups who might interfere with their privileges were, in their eyes, dangerous factions. In this respect, they carried partisan attitudes into the Convention, yet were usually unaware that they did so. They were not necessarily cynical, merely human.

Whereas Beard sees the Founding Fathers as an elite that came to the Convention as part of economically interested conspiracy, Dahl sees the Convention delegates as "merely human," unable to see beyond the horizon created by their individual interests.

Dahl's argument centers on his belief that the forces which moved the framers were bigger than the framers themselves. Thus, he does not hold them completely responsible for the government they created:

Without seriously qualifying, much less abandoning their universal norms (morals), they nonetheless created a government that would demand obedience to its laws from a majority of adults--women, non-whites, and some white males--who were excluded from active participation in making those laws, whether directly or through their elected representatives.

Thus, Dahl believes that the creation of a self-interested and undemocratic government was
not an act of gross immorality on the part of the framers, but was to be expected under circumstances where the majority in society were unable to express their interests in the Constitution-making process.

Gordon S. Wood feels class interest was a prime motivating factor in the founding. A major element of Wood's thesis is evident in the following statement:

Eighteenth-century leaders took it for granted that society was a hierarchy of finely graded ranks and degrees divided vertically into interests and lines of personal interest, rather than as today into horizontal cleavages of class and occupation."

Despite the fact that Wood divides the eighteenth-century class system vertically, he still contends that a sense of elitist protectionism influenced the framers. He states, "Members of the elite debated endlessly over what constituted the proper character for a gentleman...but they never really questioned the leadership of the society by an aristocracy of some sort." Wood believes that those already in social leadership positions did not question, in any democratic way, their right to rule. Thus, the framers created a government which placed impediments to democracy in order to protect what the elite saw as their inherent right.

Richard Hofstadter seems to have synthesized a number of widely divergent notions about the founding. He believes, as Beard does, that the framers created the government for commercial reasons; as Wood does, that the framers were anti-democratic and elitists; and that the framers were, first and foremost,
influenced by Thomas Hobbes. Hofstadter concludes:

(The framers) accepted the mercantile image of life as an eternal battleground, and assumed the Hobbesian war of each against all; they did not propose to put an end to this war, but merely to stabilize it and make it less murderous. They had no hope and they offered none for any ultimate organic change in the way men conduct themselves. The result was that while they thought self-interest the most dangerous and unbrookable quality in man, they necessarily underwrote it in trying to control it.

Hofstadter felt that the Hobbesian view of man was so powerfully entrenched in the minds of the framers that it was the prime motivating force in their creation of a government. This view of man, Hofstadter theorizes, created in the framers a fear of the other classes of society, which, in turn, led to the anti-democratic, self-interested and protectionist form of government which he feels was created at Philadelphia.

Martin Diamond also takes a rather synthetic view of past scholarship. He, however, unlike Dahl, Wood, or Hofstadter takes as a main source of inspiration not Beard, but Adair. Yet Diamond agrees, in a limited sense, with Beard that economic factors play a role in shaping political structures. However, he believes the key to understanding the founding lies in intellectual development of several of the key framers.

Diamond asserts that the framers, Madison in particular, rejected many of the political traditions based on Classical and Christian political philosophy and turned instead to "such political
philosophers as Machiavelli, Bacon, Hobbes, and Locke," who had developed "a new science of politics" based on a realistic view of man. These political philosophers brought man down from the pedestal of "perfection" as the Classical and Christian philosophers thought he "ought" to be, and viewed him "as he actually is." Diamond argues that the framers, again Madison in particular, wholeheartedly accepted these notions, and they felt that with this new "view of man" the problems of republican and democratic government, which had in the past appeared to have no solution, could now be resolved.

Diamond further argues that it was this "new science of politics" with its view of man "as he actually is" which gave an anti-democratic tilt to the Constitution, a tilt which those of the Beardian school attribute to material self-interest. In direct contrast to Dahl and others, he states that "the American political order was deliberately tilted to resist, so to speak, the upward gravitational pull of politics toward the grand, dramatic, character-enobling but society-wracking opinions about justice and virtue." The new Enlightenment sense of realism required the framers to reject older republican notions about man in relation to "justice and virtue."

However, Diamond contends that simply because the framers rejected older notions "regarding virtue, they did not thereby abandon the pursuit of virtue or excellency in all other possible ways." He asserts this because Enlightenment philosophy, as perceived by Madison and others among the framers, does not reject the possibility for virtue in man; the system, in a sense, plans for the worst and expects to produce the best, not perfection but the best. Diamond concludes:
The Founding becomes more than an arrangement of the passions and interests; when "venerated" by the people, it can serve as an ethical admonition to the people, teaching them to subdue dangerous impulses of passion and interest. This goes far in the direction of genuine republican virtue, but it still rests on the mild and merely declaratory tutelage of the Founding, not the sterner stuff of ancient political science.

Diamond sees an intellectual base for the founding primarily as a result of the assimilation of Scottish philosophy by several of the key framers which produced in these men definite beliefs about what government could be and what it ought to be.

Garry Wills takes the theory of Scottish philosophical influence several steps beyond either Adair or Diamond. He contends, as did Adair, that Hume directly influenced Madison on a number of issues. However, in his book Explaining America, Wills finds a greater number of direct correlations between Hume and Madison than Adair probably ever thought possible and more than many scholars today believe are possible. In order to validate his thesis, Wills points to a number of specific political doctrines espoused by Madison and then points to what he believes are the antecedents to these doctrines in the writings of the Scottish philosopher David Hume.

James Conniff places a slightly different emphasis on the theory of the influence of Scottish philosophy. He disagrees with Adair's thesis that the main link between Scottish philosophy was from Hume to Madison. Instead he asserts that link was from Francis Hutcheson to Madison, and that Madison's own governmental
experience in combination with his Hutcheson-inspired education had much more to do with the shaping of Madison's thought than did Hume. 42

Conniff describes Madison's education, asserting that in that educational process Hutcheson was much more likely to be influential than Hume. He also describes Madison's years of public service before the convention and shows how this may have influenced his thinking. 43

Recent Scholarship and the Federalist. Most of the more recent scholarship relating to the intellectual origins of the Federalist falls in the same two categories created by the earlier work done by Beard and Adair. Those who believe the Federalist is an expression of self- or class-interest must relegate the papers to the class of propaganda. And those who accept the Federalist as having some intellectual base, whatever that base might be, believe that the papers are the interpretation of the philosophical base in an attempt to fit it to the American situation.

Conclusion

Martin Diamond, in his essay Ethics and Politics: The American Way, after discussing Aristotle's views on politics and ethics, asks how might Aristotle rank America? Would he characterize it as a genuine political community, one with its own special moral foundation, or only as "an association of place and of not acting unjustly to one another for the sake of trade"? Would he find it a place where law was only "a compact, . . . a guarantor for one another of the just things, but not able to make the citizens good and just,"--that is, good
and just in the way their characters were formed and not merely in confor-
mity to a compact? Or might he con-
clude that there is an American political ethos, a unique character-forming mix
of ethics and politics? In short, is
there an "American way" by which this republic nurtures in its citizens certain ethical excellences upon the basis of some particular view of what is advan-
tageous and just?

This is a key issue arising between the two schools of thought discussed in this report. Was America founded upon a unique "political ethos" created by the framers, or was it founded upon "an association of place and not acting unjustly to one another for the sake of trade."

If the framers were motivated by the desire to enrich themselves, and thus founded the American republic with this objective in mind, then America is without moral foundation as a nation. If the framers were motivated by the desire to create a nation which would remember them as being worthy of fame, then they may or may not have succeeded in creating a nation founded upon a genuine "political ethos."

A second key issue arises from the fact that the two arguments themselves are fundamentally different. Beard's form of economic determinism has material self-interest controlling America's founding, and Adair's fame argument sees the framers as reacting to a variety of forces but ultimately in control of the founding. Thus, Beard sees the interests ultimately controlling the individuals, and Adair sees the individuals ultimately controlling the interests. Beard also sees the creation of the Constitution, in its particular form, as inevitable given the particular economic conditions of the times. Adair sees the
creation of the Constitution as largely the product of the framers' desire for fame and as the result of the Scottish-influenced intellectual development of the key framers.

A Final Analysis

Each of these theories is based on the view of man held by the individual scholar who authored the theory. Thus, the two primary arguments discussed in this report proceed from completely different fundamental premises: Beard's premise is that the forces within society are more powerful than the individual. Adair's premise is that individuals choose to respond to the forces within society; therefore, individuals are more powerful than the forces. Adair sees material self-interest, which Beard views as the most powerful force upon man, as being less important to the framers than their desire for fame and the intellectual power of Scottish philosophy and the lessons of history. Adair argues that understanding the intellects of the men who made the decisions concerning the founding of America and the writing of the Federalist, is the key to understanding the founding of the United States. In opposition to Adair's assertion, Beard argues that understanding the economic status of society at the time of the Constitutional Convention is the key to understanding America's founding and the Federalist authors' arguments.
ENDNOTES


6 Beard, An Economic Interpretation, p. 4.

7 Hofstadter, p. 84.

8 Adair, pp. 82-83.


10 Ibid., p. 382.

11 Beard, An Economic Interpretation, p. 153.
12 Ibid., pp. 41-42.
13 Ibid., p. 52.
14 Ibid., pp. 64-65.
15 Ibid., p. 73.
16 Ibid., p. 149.
17 Ibid., p. 152.
18 Adair, pp. 23, 84.
19 Ibid., p. 77.
20 Ibid., pp. 7-8.
21 Ibid., p. 21.
22 Ibid., p. 4.
23 Ibid., p. 11.
24 Ibid., p. 12.
25 Ibid., p. 97.
26 Ibid., p. 95.
29 Gordon S. Wood, "The Democratization of the Mind in the American Revolution," in

30 Ibid., p. 106.

31 Hofstadter, pp. 73-74.

32 Ibid., pp. 84-85.


35 Ibid.


37 Ibid., p. 56.

38 Ibid., p. 63.

39 Ibid., p. 71.


42 Conniff, p. 383.

43 Ibid., pp. 387-88.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF SCANDAL IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

George C. Landrith*

Congressional elections are affected by many factors, such as incumbency, personal appeal, issues, party affiliation and scandals. These are not the only factors influencing Congressional elections, but they are among the most important. Possibly the least understood of these factors is scandal. Because very little is known or published about how scandals affect Congressional elections, I became interested in this topic.

Since scandals occur relatively seldom in Congressional elections, they do not often play a major role in the electoral outcome. When scandals do occur, however, and become publicized, they are bound to have some type of effect on the election. Keeping this in mind, my research question became, "What are the political consequences of scandals in Congressional elections?"

In order to answer this question, I had to do original research since I found very little published information. First, I formulated a questionnaire and a cover letter. The cover letter was used to generally explain and introduce my topic to the respondents while the questionnaire was used to gather information upon

---

*George is a senior majoring in Political Science. He will be attending law school at the University of Virginia this fall. George completed an internship in the office of U.S. Representative Frank R. Wolf (R-Virginia).
which I could base my study. Second, I mailed the cover letter and questionnaire to about thirty different people. These people included opponents of former Congressmen involved in scandals, newspaper writers, political pollsters, state party leaders, and the heads of national Congressional Election Committees. Third, I later telephoned the people to whom I had written, hoping to interview them. After several weeks of telephoning, I had interviewed only sixteen of the thirty. Many of the respondents were either too busy or were uncomfortable with the topic since it was an election year and scandals are a touchy subject at such times.

Through these sixteen interviews, however, I was able to collect and compile some rather interesting information. In order to answer my research question, "What are the political consequences of scandals in Congressional elections?" I had to break the topic down into the following sub-questions.

1) How do voters, campaign contributors, and the media rank different scandals in terms of seriousness?

2) Do certain regional areas view any type of scandal either more or less seriously than the nation as a whole?

3) How does the timing of a scandal, in relation to election day, affect the media, the voters, and the campaign contributors?

4) What makes a scandal so serious?

5) How do candidates, party organizations, Congress, the media, and opponents deal with scandals?
6) Is there an increase in media attention to scandals? If so, why?

These sub-questions are taken from the questionnaire that I used in my research. I will deal with each sub-question separately. After answering each individual question, I will then correlate the sub-questions through a conclusion.

**Seriousness of Different Scandals**

**Voters**

In an effort to discover which scandals were of the most concern to voters, I asked the respondents, "How would you rank the following scandals in terms of importance to voters using a zero-to-ten scale (0 = not at all serious, 10 = very serious)?" I then listed six categories of scandals: heterosexual promiscuity, graft, homosexuality, misuse of funds, drugs, and other. On the average, misuse of funds was the most serious scandal with an average rating of 8.2. Graft and homosexuality were second and third with a rating of 7.6 and 7.4 respectively. Drugs and heterosexual promiscuity were the least serious scandals scoring 7.2 and 5.2 respectively. No one ever responded to "other," even though I specifically mentioned it. Graph 1 depicts this information well.

There was a general consensus among the respondents concerning misuse of funds, graft, and drugs. Most of the respondents ranked these scandals very similarly to the average ranking. In other words, few respondents gave rankings that differed significantly from the average. The reason for this general consensus on the misuse of funds, graft, and drugs is that they are perceived almost universally by voters as affecting a Congressman's or Senator's ability
to perform as a legislator. For voters, these types of scandals are very difficult to rationalize by saying, "Well, it's just his personal lifestyle." The fact is that in our society bribes and misuse of funds are not usually considered "personal life styles."

In comparison, however, homosexuality and heterosexual promiscuity lacked a consensus. Some respondents ranked them as eights, nines, or tens. Others ranked them as zeros, ones, or twos, and still others ranked them somewhere in between zero and ten. The reason for this
diversity of opinion can be easily explained. Some voters feel that homosexuality or heterosexual promiscuity are personal matters and do not affect a Congressman's or Senator's performance as a legislator any more than the brand of facial tissue he uses would. However, other voters feel that it is unacceptable for a legislator to be involved in such things because it shows a lack of moral character which they feel is needed by our lawmakers. As a result of these widely divergent viewpoints, the average rankings given to homosexuality and heterosexual promiscuity were very different from the individual responses, since the individual responses tended to be polarized toward either a ranking of ten or zero.

Campaign Contributors

When the respondents were asked to rank the importance of different scandals to campaign contributors, the result changed somewhat. Misuse of funds was still the most significant scandal, scoring 6.9. Graft and homosexuality tied for the second most significant scandal, each scoring 6.5. Drugs followed close behind with a score of 6.4. Lastly, heterosexual promiscuity was the least significant scandal, averaging only 3.5. These facts are illustrated most clearly in Graph 2.

Once again, there was a basic consensus on misuse of funds, graft, and drugs. Surprisingly, there was more agreement on the importance of homosexuality among campaign contributors than among voters. While there was still some disparity on the importance of homosexuality, the disparity was less polarized than with voters. In other words, the individual responses were much closer to the average with the campaign contributors than with the voters.
It is interesting to note that campaign contributors viewed all the scandals except heterosexual promiscuity as relatively similar in their level of seriousness. Over half of the respondents agreed on an explanation of this phenomenon. First, the campaign contributor tends to view his or her contribution to a candidate as a "bet" or an "investment." As a result, any scandal that may damage or lessen a candidate's chances for election will likely influence the contributor's decision on whether or not to support the candidate. Since voters ranked misuse of funds, graft, homosexuality, and drugs as relatively serious scandals but did not view
heterosexual promiscuity as a very serious scandal, it seems logical that campaign contributors with an "investment" or "bet" in mind, view misuse of funds, graft, homosexuality and drugs as relatively serious scandals, while they view heterosexual promiscuity as much less serious.

Media

When the respondents were asked to rank the several scandals according to the media's view of seriousness, the results changed once again. First of all, the three most significant scandals were misuse of funds, scoring 9.4, with graft and drugs closely behind at 9.1 each. Following somewhat more distantly were homosexuality and heterosexual promiscuity averaging 7.9 and 7.6 respectively. Graph 3 illustrates the findings.

A prominent political editor for a large newspaper said that the media views misuse of funds, graft, and drugs as similar in relative seriousness or importance. He stated that these sorts of scandals are widely believed to affect a legislator's performance in office and are, therefore, extremely relevant news items. The scandals involving heterosexual promiscuity or homosexuality are not as clearly linked to performance in office and, therefore, do not usually get quite as much attention. The editor did go on to say, however, that all scandals are relevant to the media. As a result, all scandals will receive some media coverage. The difference is that very serious scandals involving the misuse of funds, graft, and drugs are given more attention and are treated more negatively than less serious scandals like homosexuality or heterosexual promiscuity.
When comparing the importance of scandals to voters with their importance to campaign contributors and the media, two points become obvious: 1) campaign contributors view all scandals as substantially less important than both voters and the media, and 2) the media views scandals as substantially more important than both voters and campaign contributors. The first point is demonstrated by the fact that campaign contributors ranked misuse of funds at 6.9 while the voters' ranking was 8.2 and the media ranked it 9.4. Likewise, drugs, homosexuality, and
heterosexual promiscuity were all ranked as less important to campaign contributors than to either voters or the media. The second point is demonstrated by the media's ranking graft at 9.1 while voters and campaign contributors ranked it only 7.6 and 6.5 respectively. Likewise, the media ranked drugs as 9.1, but voters felt it was only 7.6 and campaign contributors felt it only merited a 6.5. Heterosexual promiscuity, misuse of funds, and homosexuality followed this same trend. These two points are illustrated clearly by Graph 4.

Graph 4: A Comparison of Voters', Campaign Contributors', and the Media's Ranking of Scandals
As shown in Graph 4, campaign contributors consistently viewed all the scandals as less serious than did either voters or the media. When I asked the respondents why campaign contributors consider scandals less serious than do voters or the media, the most frequent answer was that the campaign contributors view the candidates and elections as "investments" or "bets" and as a result, the scandal itself is not terribly important. What is important is whether or not a scandal makes a candidate a "poor investment" or a "bad risk." If the scandal makes the candidate a "poor investment" or a "bad risk," then the campaign contributor would feel that the scandal is serious. However, if the scandal does not appear to damage the candidate's chance of victory in the election, then to the campaign contributor, the scandal is not of great importance.

A somewhat less skeptical respondent explained that campaign contributors are issue voters and thus they base their support or nonsupport of a candidate upon the issues and not his personal characteristics. Several of the respondents who offered this explanation felt that campaign contributors were more politically astute or aware. This political awareness allows the campaign contributors to react less emotionally to a scandal than the average voter would.

As Graph 4 clearly shows, the media considers all of the scandals more serious than either the voters or the campaign contributors. From my research, I was able to derive two explanations for this: 1) the media sees itself as a "watchdog" of government and fulfilling this role of "watchdog" requires the media to view scandals very seriously, and 2) scandals are interesting news; thus, scandals sell newspapers. I will briefly touch upon these two explanations.
First of all, the "watchdog" role of the media means that the media exposes or gives attention to scandals because the media feels that it has a responsibility to present the facts to the public. One point that I want to make clear is that the personal opinions of the members of the media about scandals did not seem to differ significantly from those of any of the other groups of people I interviewed. However, because of their professional responsibility to be "watchdogs," the members of the media feel an obligation or duty to present the facts about the scandals even if they personally think it is trivial. Thus, the media ranks almost all scandals as relatively serious because it feels that the public has the right to decide what is trivial and what is important. I think that this "watchdog" explanation is reasonable; however, it is only part of the answer.

The second explanation states that scandals sell papers or improve ratings; therefore, the media focuses on scandals. This view is more cynical, but it has some truth to it. It has been said that when a dog bites a man, it is not news, but when a man bites a dog, it is news. This saying is analogous to scandals and the news. For example, there are thousands of homosexuals in the United States; yet, in recent months, Representative Studds (D-Massachusetts) has received a lot of attention in the press while few other homosexuals are ever featured in the headlines. In short, when elected officials are involved in "questionable" activities or scandals, the public is interested and people buy the paper and watch the news that tells all of the details of the scandal. Once again, however, this explanation is only partly useful because other factors may be involved.

Another very important factor will be covered in a later section of this paper entitled
"Greater Media Attention." In this section I will give a third explanation of why the media ranks all scandals more seriously than voters or campaign contributors.

**Regional Differences**

In order to determine if the seriousness of scandals varied throughout the United States by region, I asked, "Are there some parts of the country that may consider one or more of these scandals either less or more serious than the nation as a whole?" Every respondent felt that there was a great deal of variance within the country.

First of all, it was generally believed that all five scandals (misuse of funds, graft, homosexuality, drugs, and heterosexual promiscuity) are viewed as more serious in three major areas: 1) rural areas such as the Midwest, 2) the South, and 3) highly religious areas such as the Bible Belt and Utah. I realize that these three categories can be overlapped. For example, much of the South is rural and much of the South is considered a part of the Bible Belt. However, even though these three categories overlap, they are not necessarily redundant. For example, Richmond, Virginia, or Atlanta, Georgia, are Southern, nonrural cities, but they were believed by the respondents to view all of the scandals as more serious than most cities in the Northeast. I will offer explanations as to why these three areas might consider the scandals more serious than the nation as a whole.

First, rural areas, such as the Midwest or parts of the South, might consider scandals to be more serious than the nation as a whole because rural areas tend to be more homogeneous. By definition, a homogeneous society's population is
relatively uniform or similar in its characteristics. This means the people are educated similarly, hold similar opinions, have similar social and economic backgrounds, etc. This lack of diversity in a homogeneous society can lead to intolerance toward people and toward ideas that are different or unfamiliar. As a result of this lack of tolerance, scandals can be viewed very seriously in a homogeneous society. Parts of the Midwest and the South could be considered relatively homogeneous, thus accounting partially for scandals being seen as serious in these areas.

Second, the South might consider these scandals more serious because it tends to be a more traditional society. The rules produced by a traditional society are rules that have been passed from generation to generation and continued for so long that they almost carry the force of law. Since the rules have been in force for a long period of time, they are likely to be morally conservative rules or rules that may be considered "old fashioned" in today's society. When these rules are broken the offense is not taken lightly or quickly forgotten. In contrast, a more modern society (or at least a nontraditional one) seems to have fewer and less strict rules for members of society. Since a traditional society has more strict rules than a modern society, it is not too difficult to understand why an area such as the South—which tends to be traditional—may view scandals more seriously.

Third, the highly religious areas like Utah may view the scandals more seriously because scandals violate moral codes that are considered important in almost all religions. For example, heterosexual promiscuity would be very serious in Utah, as former Congressman Howe (D-Utah), who attempted to solicit two prostitutes on the day after he had won the Democratic primary, could attest. Conversely, the same scandal may
not be very serious at all in New York City where it may not be an unusual happening and where those who practice religion are not as highly concentrated. In short, a scandal in a highly religious area would be interpreted by voters as a sign of moral weakness and compromising standards, which is not usually tolerable to the very religious. Another factor to be considered in religious areas is that they tend to be more traditional and more homogeneous than areas which are not noted as "religious regions."

On the other hand, various scandals were perceived to be less serious in large cities and Northeast. Scandals such as graft or misuse of funds are less serious in large unionized cities like Chicago or Pittsburg. In New York, Boston, and San Francisco, homosexuality is less serious. Likewise, drugs are less serious in New York and California. Finally, heterosexual promiscuity is less serious in almost all large cities, in the Northeast, and in California.

These scandals are considered to be less serious in the large cities and the Northeast because they are more common there. For example, in a unionized town with big business, graft is perceived to be more common and therefore it is less shocking or serious. Likewise, homosexuality is more common in New York and San Francisco than in other areas; thus, it is not viewed as seriously. In short, when a scandal occurs more frequently, its impact and seriousness are lessened. Another factor is that the Northeast, large cities, and California are very heterogeneous. Diversity is extreme in these areas. The people in these areas are willing to accept differences, including scandal. This does not mean that they are amoral. It simply means that they are more tolerant of politicians who are involved in scandals. In short, heterogeneity encourages more tolerance, thus explaining why
scandals are viewed less seriously or more tolerantly in the Northeast, large cities, and California.

**Timing of Scandal**

My next goal was to determine if the timing of a scandal in relation to the election affects its importance to the following groups of people: 1) voters, 2) campaign contributors, 3) opponents of the scandalous candidates, and 4) the media. While the timing of a scandal impacts all four of these groups, the timing has various effects on each of them.

**Voters**

The closer a scandal is to the election, the more seriously it is viewed by the voters. In other words, a scandal that occurs a few weeks before the election is more damaging to a candidate than a scandal that occurs many months before the election. When a scandal occurs right before an election, it is difficult for the candidate to rebound from it. There is little time for the "scandalous" candidate to establish his innocence or to redeem his character. Likewise, a scandal that happens close to an election gets more coverage (mostly negative) than one that occurs a year or two before elections.

A second reason scandals that occur close to elections are considered more serious by voters is the short memory of voters. One leader of the Democratic party said that voters, on the whole, have a limited ability to remember scandals after six months. He referred to this as a "six-month window." There was a general consensus among the respondents that the voters tend to forget or maybe even forgive after enough time has passed. As a result, if a scandal must hit, the best time
would be the December or January right after the election. This would give Congressmen and Senators about two to six years respectively to prove that they are capable legislators despite the scandal, or give the voters enough time to forget.

Campaign Contributors

The campaign contributors are less affected by the timing of a scandal but they are affected nonetheless. If the scandal occurs close to the election, the candidate already has the contributor's money; thus, in one sense, a scandal late in a candidate's campaign theoretically should not drastically hurt his fund raising. However, it could hurt support for subsequent reelection efforts, so a scandal should never be taken lightly. Perhaps more important, however, is the fact that the campaign contributors ranked all five scandals, from misuse of funds to heterosexual promiscuity, as less serious than the voters and the media ranked them. This would seem to indicate that a scandal may not affect a campaign contributor's support nearly as much as it would erode voter support. As explained earlier, campaign contributors look at their contributions as "investments." Secondly, campaign contributors could be more issue conscious and less interested in scandals. For these reasons, campaign contributors are the least affected by the timing of a scandal.

Opponents

One man's loss is another man's gain. For this reason, the political opponent of a scandalous candidate is bound to benefit from his opponent's scandal. The more serious the scandal or the closer it occurs to election day, the better it is for the opponent. A scandal that occurs a year or more before elections may have only a small
benefit for the opponent. The longer time period allows voters to either forgive or forget while allowing the candidate to prove his capabilities as a legislator.

Media

The media's reaction to the timing of a scandal surfaces almost exclusively in the amount of attention given to it. For example, a scandal that occurs two weeks before an election will be a big news item until after the election. This means that the scandal will be front-page news for over two weeks. However, if the same scandal occurred over a year before the election, it would die down after a few days. Even if the scandal remained a news item for a couple of weeks, it would not be the "top story." This means that a scandal occurring long before election time will not be in the news as long, nor will it get the top billing as long nor be treated as negatively as a scandal occurring near an election. In short, an election-time scandal is played up and given special attention by the media, whereas the nonelection-time scandal gets relatively little exposure.

Seriousness of the Act

My next goal was to find out what aspect of a scandal makes it so serious. I particularly wanted to know if voters and campaign contributors differed in what made a scandalous act serious. There was no particular answer that was given most frequently by either voters or campaign contributors. When the information gathered from this question is examined in conjunction with the other information that I obtained from my questionnaire, I feel that I can offer some good explanations to answer the question:
What makes a "scandalous" act so serious to the voters and campaign contributors?

Voters

All of my interviews indicated to some extent that there are so many different factors that could explain why a scandalous act is serious that it would be difficult to pinpoint one specific item. Nevertheless, one theme seemed to be basic to all of the responses. What makes scandals so serious to voters is that they feel as though their trust was betrayed. As a political editor for a newspaper in Virginia explained, voters elect a representative that they think they can trust. Many times a scandal serves to tell voters, "See, you cannot trust him." The reason voters feel that their trust has been betrayed is that a candidate usually tries to create an image of honesty, integrity, and competence. But when voters see scandals, they begin to question the candidate's image of honesty and integrity. Voters feel as though their trust was taken advantage of by the "scandalous" candidate.

In other cases, scandals cause voters to feel that candidates have grossly misrepresented themselves. For example, if a candidate campaigns on values such as family, preservation of the morals of society, etc., the voters expect the candidate to live a life that is in keeping with his campaign ideals. If a candidate is involved in a scandal like heterosexual promiscuity or homosexuality, the voters feel the candidate is a hypocrite and that he grossly misrepresented himself. The scandal involving Representative Robert Bauman (R-Maryland) illustrates this point vividly. He presented himself as a strong conservative against homosexuality and all other "vices of our liberal society." Then he was caught involved in a homosexual act on Capitol Hill. This made him look hypocritical and
dishonest. Because he grossly misrepresented his character, he lost the support of his constituents.

Another factor that helps explain what makes a scandal so serious was given by Patrick Shea when he said that a scandal "rips at the moral fiber" of society. The voters many times feel as though their values are being attacked by the scandal. This attitude makes voters defensive and feel as though they must protect the "moral fiber" of society by voting out the candidate involved in the scandal.

The feelings of betrayed trust, hypocrisy, gross misrepresentation of character, and the "ripping of the moral fiber" of society were all central themes in explaining what makes a scandal so serious to voters.

**Campaign Contributors**

The campaign contributors vary only slightly from the voters in this aspect. As I already explained, campaign contributors do not view scandals as seriously as voters. However, to the degree that campaign contributors do view scandals as serious, one may say that the above-mentioned betrayed trust, hypocrisy, gross misrepresentation of character, and the "ripping of the moral fiber" of society are all important factors.

However, for campaign contributors another important factor in explaining what makes a scandal so serious stems again from the idea that a contribution is viewed as an "investment." For campaign contributors, a scandalous act becomes more serious when it hurts the candidate's chance for reelection. In other words, if the voters seem to be outraged by the scandal then campaign contributors also worry more about it because
their "investment" may not work out. On the other hand, when voters seem to be relatively unaffected by a scandal, then the contributors feel like their investment is safe; thus, the contributor is less troubled by the scandal.

**Jail Sentence**

The second part of this question asked if a jail sentence made a scandal even more damaging. The universal answer was "yes." Richard Ciccone described a jail sentence as "the kiss of death." The main reason the jail sentence is so serious is that the accusation of scandal is no longer alleged—it's final. A conviction and jail sentence leaves no room for doubt of guilt in the minds of the voters. In addition, the media coverage of a jail sentence is not likely to boost any candidate's career.

**How Groups Deal with Scandal**

**Candidate**

When talking with respondents, I found that candidates can react to accusations of scandals in two ways: 1) they can deny any guilt or involvement, or 2) they can admit involvement or guilt. There are many variables that dictate which approach would be most advantageous to the candidate. Some of these include the type of scandal, the candidate's district, the candidate's popularity, the candidate's representation of his district, etc.

I was told by one man on Capitol Hill that if a candidate has deniability, he should deny a scandal (deniability means that the candidate was not caught "red-handed" and that there is some doubt as to his guilt). The Capitol Hill aide reasoned that strong supporters would believe the
accused candidate was innocent if he claimed to be innocent. For example, many Americans refused to believe Richard Nixon had anything to do with the Watergate cover-up because he claimed innocence. (However, after Nixon had lost his "deniability," few believed his claim to innocence.) Therefore, if the candidate has "deniability," he should deny involvement in the scandal. By denying it, the candidate may convince many voters that he is innocent.

However, when "deniability" does not exist and the question of guilt or involvement is not very debatable, most respondents agreed that admitting guilt was the best tactic. By admitting guilt and expressing regret, a candidate can quiet the media and the opposition quickly. For example, if a Congressman admits guilt and expresses sorrow, the scandal will be in the headlines only briefly and will be looked upon more tolerably. But if the Congressman denies guilt when it seems obvious that he is guilty, the media will keep the story in the headlines for a much greater length of time, and will treat the scandal more negatively.

Admitting guilt is particularly effective when the scandal is a personal problem such as heterosexual promiscuity or alcoholism. By admitting it and expressing sorrow, the voters feel the candidate had a problem or made a mistake, but should be forgiven. Likewise, the media and the opposition cannot play up the scandal after admission of guilt and expression of remorse because they do not want to appear cruel or as if they are trying to capitalize on the scandal. Therefore, admitting guilt and expressing remorse is a good way to quiet the opposition and the media. A good example of this is Representative Daniel Crane (R-Illinois). He admitted and expressed sorrow for his "affair," and he recently won renomination within his party. I
was told by several people in the media covering Capitol Hill that Crane is no longer receiving "bad press." As far as the media is concerned, the situation has basically blown over.

**Party Organization**

The party organization's main goal is to win elections. The same thing is true of a party organization whose candidate was involved in a scandal. If the party thinks that their candidate who was involved in a scandal will lose, and if the party thinks it can find another candidate who has a better chance to win, the party organization will likely support the new candidate hoping he will win. Furthermore, as Patrick Shea pointed out, when the scandal is hurting the party, the party will try to isolate the scandal and its complications from the party in order to protect itself from the scandalous image.

Nevertheless, if the local party organization cannot field a better candidate, it will stick with the current one even if he is accused of scandal. While there may be some dissent, chances are that most of the party will support the accused candidate if there is no better choice. If the candidate has been a good representative of his district's interests and is seen by the local party organization as having "brought home the bacon," the accused candidate will likely receive support from the local party despite his "scandalous" image.

**Congress**

The Congress as a whole has two theories about how to deal with scandals: 1) disassociate Congress with the scandal by taking punitive action, or 2) ignore the scandal, thus showing the ability to deal with scandal. Generally, the first method of taking punitive action is used for
the more serious scandals. Conversely, the ignoring method is used for the more "trivial" or personal scandals like alcoholism and heterosexual promiscuity.

There is an underlying theme to both the punitive and ignoring methods: the institution comes first, the individual second. In other words, the Congress feels a need to protect itself, or more accurately its image, from the effects of scandals. This means that Congress' reaction to a scandal is largely determined by what action Congress feels it must take to protect itself.

When the scandal deals with alcoholism or heterosexual promiscuity and the member of Congress has admitted and expressed remorse for it, Congress will not be likely to do anything. If Congress were to take action, it would appear too rigid, heavy-handed, and old fashioned. This is an image that, by and large, Congress does not want.

On the other hand, when the scandal is very serious, as with the misuse of funds, Congress is more likely to take punitive action. Congress wants to let the public know that it does not condone such "dishonesty and corruption in government." If Congress does nothing about a highly publicized, serious scandal, it runs the risk of looking too lax and insensitive to the need of good, honest government. A lax and insensitive image is one that Congress does not want.

The party leadership in Congress protects the party first and the candidate second. For example, when the leadership of a party feels that its candidate has little chance for victory because of a scandal, the leadership will ask him to resign or not to run for office. The leadership's main concern is holding on to that seat in
Congress. Their secondary concern is with the candidate himself. In short, the parties are most concerned with retaining power.

It is difficult to describe exactly how Congress deals with scandal because Congress is really a collection of 535 very different and independent people. As a result, it is difficult to give hard and fast rules that are used on Capitol Hill. This is especially true when dealing with scandals because of the many factors that make scandals either serious or not serious. In short, the information that I have provided about how Congress deals with scandal is by necessity relatively general. But it is accurate to say that as Congress protects itself first, and the individual second, likewise, parties protect their power first, and the individual's second.

Media

The media has a definite interest in publicizing a scandal and making it a headline. First of all, scandals sell papers. Secondly, the press feels the need to be a "watchdog" over the government.

While the media will tend to print almost all "scandalous" events, it does have the freedom or discretion to print or not print a story. The media does not withhold scandals from the public because there is no real motivation to do so. The media stands to lose nothing by publicizing scandals and stands to gain notoriety and influence by publishing them; thus, the media almost always publicizes scandals.

Opponents of "Scandalous" Candidates

The opponents of the candidate accused of scandal would like nothing better than media
coverage of the scandal, so the opponent must be tactful in his effort to see a scandal work to his advantage. For example, if one candidate is accused of graft, his opponent would not be wise to constantly call him a crook or dishonest. A much more effective method would be subtlety. Playing up the theme of honesty and integrity would be effective because the candidate would never actually mention the scandal but listeners would almost automatically think of the dishonesty of the other candidate.

This subtle method of bringing a scandal to the voters' minds is a very effective way to make political gain out of a scandal. For example, if the opponent were to constantly announce in public the scandalous candidate's promiscuous behavior, many voters would feel like the opponent was picking on the "scandalous" candidate. If the voters feel like the opponent is picking on the other candidate, they will think the opponent is petty. When this happens, the scandal backfires and actually hurts the innocent candidate and helps the "scandalous" candidate. The danger of looking petty when playing up a scandal is particularly acute when the scandals are more personal in nature, such as alcoholism, heterosexual promiscuity, and, in some areas, homosexuality. To avoid looking petty, but still play up the scandal, the opponent should portray himself as a good, honest family man, being seen with his wife and children frequently. This would subtly remind voters that he is a man that would never by involved in such scandals. At the same time, he avoids the blacklash effect that can be caused by picking on the other candidate.

More Media Attention

When I asked if there had been greater media attention to scandals in the past ten years,
I received a few nos, but the large majority said, "yes" (13 out of 15 said media attention to scandals had increased). The few respondents who answered "no" felt like the media attention to scandals had remained about constant during the past ten years.

However, the majority felt that media attention had increased. When asked why the media had increased its coverage of scandals, most respondents said, "Watergate." Other less frequently named reasons were 1) new campaign disclosure laws, and 2) the Vietnam War.

Watergate has made the public and the media more skeptical of our government and our leaders. Likewise, the rags-to-riches story, or at least the fame of Woodward and Bernstein, made investigative reporting more popular. Mr. Ciccone, the political editor of the Chicago Tribune, said that "everybody wants to be a Woodstein." This may account for the added attention that scandals receive in the media.

The more strict campaign disclosure laws show the distrust that Watergate generated among the public. Furthermore, they make it easier to find a possible scandal. Therefore, scandals are easier to expose now than they were before Watergate.

Vietnam was cited because it showed the American public the terrible things the government would do for the sake of saving face. (In the late sixties the goals of the war changed drastically until the primary objective had become saving America from embarrassment rather than attaining freedom for the Vietnamese.) As a result, the Vietnam War bred distrust and contempt for the government.
Several newspaper writers said that in the past, the personal lives of politicians were not publicized. They pointed to the fact that Franklin D. Roosevelt was not shown in a wheelchair by the media while in office. While being in a wheelchair is hardly scandalous, it shows that personal things were not publicized. It was told by several respondents that the media, by and large, was well aware of John F. Kennedy's affairs and yet they did not make an issue of it because it was a personal matter. Whether or not these stories of scandal about Kennedy are true is not important. They serve to illustrate that even though the press thought the scandalous stories were true, they did not print them.

Today personal things are publicized almost indiscriminately. For example, Representatives Crane and Howe saw that "personal" scandals were publicized. This shows a basic change in the attitude of the media toward personal scandals.

An interesting paradox arises when we consider the fact that in the past, people were probably less tolerant of all types of scandals, yet the press only publicized the scandals that dealt directly with performance. Today, when the public is generally more tolerant of scandals (at least ones like heterosexual promiscuity, homosexuality, and alcoholism), the press will publicize any scandal, even a fairly trivial one like former Senator Birch Bayh's (D-Indiana) mishap with the franking privilege. This new treatment of scandals by the media creates a paradox in that years ago, in a more "conservative society," the press was more tolerant of scandals while today, in a society that is more open and uninhibited, the press is rather "intolerant" of scandals.
Conclusion

In my conclusion, I will try to bring together the main points which this study has led me to discover. Everything I learned seemed to center around the idea that there are so many different variables involved in scandals that it is difficult to predict their exact effect. One could say that scandals are like snowflakes--no two are exactly alike.

Some scandals can actually help a candidate. For example, several of the respondents told me that Representative Gerry Studds (D-Massachusetts) has benefited from his homosexuality scandal. His constituency is very liberal and are not bothered by homosexuality. But more importantly, it gave Gerry Studds the image of being his own man, not just following along. That image is believed to have helped Representative Studd's popularity. In another example, George Hansen of Idaho has been involved in tax scandals more than once, but several respondents claimed that it was helping Hansen. He has written a book about how the "Eastern bureaucracy and liberals" are trying to damage his professional reputation. This has given him the image of a hero fighting an almost unbeatable "monster" represented by the government and the Internal Revenue Service.

On the other hand, scandals can be and usually are damaging. Too many candidates have lost elections as a result of a scandal to say that scandals do not hurt a candidate. Take for example Bauman of Maryland; when his scandal became publicized, reelection was out of the question. Perhaps the only question was whether he could avoid spending time behind bars. Likewise with Hinson of Mississippi and Howe of Utah; scandals were "the beginning of the end" of their political careers.
While scandals as a general rule are damaging to election goals, they can in some circumstances actually help or have a neutral effect. There are so many variables involved in what effect a scandal will have that truly accurate information is difficult to accumulate. Therefore, while my findings could not be used to predict the political consequences of every scandal, they are useful as a general guide in understanding the consequences of scandals. These effects can best be summarized by pointing out the following.

1) Voters ranked misuse of funds, graft, drug abuse, and homosexuality as relatively serious while heterosexual promiscuity is perceived as less serious.

2) Campaign contributors ranked all scandals as substantially less important than voters or the media.

3) The media ranked all scandals as substantially more important than voters or campaign contributors.

4) When ranking scandals, regional differences become apparent. The South, the Midwest, rural areas, and highly religious areas viewed scandals more seriously. On the other hand, the Northeast, large urban areas, and California viewed scandals, especially personal scandals, less seriously.

5) The timing of a scandal does affect voters because they have a tendency to forget or forgive. Thus, a scandal right before an election is more serious. Likewise, a scandal right before an election gets more media attention and more negative attention.
6) The breach of trust and hypocrisy make scandals serious to voters. Also, the negative reaction of voters to scandals makes scandals serious to campaign contributors.

7) Candidates can either deny guilt or admit guilt and express remorse for it. By admitting guilt and expressing remorse, a candidate can quiet the opposition and the media.

8) District party organizations' main concern is winning the election, so that goal largely determines how the district deals with a scandal.

9) The Congress's main concern is protecting the institution. Likewise, the Republican and Democratic parties' main concern is maintaining or increasing their power. Thus, a candidate who is likely to lose as a result of a scandal will be encouraged to withdraw.

10) The media has given more attention to scandals because of Watergate, which created a general distrust of government and politicians. Watergate also increased the number of investigative reporters.

These ten points, when considered together, provide an answer to the question, "What are the political consequences of scandal in Congressional elections?" If the answer to this question seems to be complex and influenced by many factors, then I have accurately presented the findings of my research. It may be interesting to see how well these ten points explain the political consequences of scandals in the upcoming Congressional elections.
Dear [Name]:

I am presently taking a course from Dr. David Magleby on Congress at Brigham Young University in Provo, Utah. For my term paper in this class, I would like to analyze the political consequences of "scandal" in Congressional Campaigns. As you know, there has been a seeming increase in scandals, such as: graft (Abscam), homosexuality, heterosexual promiscuity, etc. Despite the importance of this topic, I can find no published scholarly information that will help me in studying the effects of scandals in Congressional elections.

As a [position], you have seen the consequences of scandals and know how they have been dealt with. Your knowledge would help me greatly in my research. I realize your time is limited and valuable. Keeping this in mind, I would like to telephone you in about a week to hold a brief (10-12 minute) phone interview. I have enclosed the questionnaire that I will use during our interview, so that you will be familiar with my research topic.

I appreciate your time and expertise in helping me with this research project. If you would like, I would be happy to send you the results of my research upon its completion. Once again, thank you for your time.

Sincerely,

George C. Landrith
Item #2: Questionnaire

1. How would you rank the following scandals in terms of importance to voters, Campaign Contributors, and the media? (Ranking: 0 = Not at all serious, 10 = Very serious.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Voters</th>
<th>Campaign Contributors</th>
<th>Media</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heterosexual Promiscuity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graft (Abscam)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homosexual Sexuality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Misuse of Funds</td>
<td>Drugs</td>
<td>Other (Specify)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Voters

Campaign Contributors

Media
2. Are there some parts of the country that may consider one or more of these "scandals," either less or more serious than the nation on the whole?

Heterosexual Promiscuity

Graft (Abscam)

Homosexuality

Misuse of Funds

Drugs

Other (specify)

Why?
3. Does the timing of a scandal effect its importance and/or affect the media? (Ex: right before election or 1-1/2 years before election for a Congressman and 4-5 years for a Senator?)

a. to the voters?

b. to campaign contributors?

c. to "scandalous candidates'" opponents?
4. a. What makes the "scandalous" act so serious to the voters and campaign contributors?

   The act itself?  The circumstances?

Voters
Campaign Contributors
   The other party involved  Other? (specify)
Voters
Campaign Contributors

b. Does a jail sentence make the "scandal" even more damaging? Why?
5. How do the following people handle or deal with scandal? Some may exploit it while others may down-play it. How is this done?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scandal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heterosexual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graft (Abscam)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homosexual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promiscuity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Candidates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A) Districts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B) Congress as a whole</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Misuse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drugs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Specify)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of Funds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Candidates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A) Districts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B) Congress as a whole</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Media
Opponents

6. In the past ten years has there been greater media attention to scandals? Why?

Thank You!
Item #3: Mailing List

I wrote letters and sent questionnaires to the following people. (The "X" after the name indicates that either they responded personally or someone in their office responded.)

National Congressional Election Committee:

X Atwood, Brian. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee

Daniels, Mitch. National Republican Senatorial Committee

X David, Marta. Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee

X Franks, Martin. Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee

X Vander Jagt, Guy. National Republican Congressional Committee

State Party Leaders:

Akerlow, Charles. Utah Republican Party

Atkins, Chester. Massachusetts Democratic Party

X Colley, Michael. Ohio Republican Party

X Natfios, Andrew. Massachusetts Republican Party

X Shea, Patrick. Utah Democratic Party

Tipps, Paul. Ohio Democratic Party
THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES

Pollsters:

Hamilton, William
Hart, Peter
X Jones, Dan
Lawrence, Gary
Tarrence, Lance
X Teeter, Robert

Media:

X Ciccone, Richard. Political Editor, Chicago Times
Broder, David. Political Editor, Washington Post
X Eisman, Dale. Political Editor, Richmond Times-Dispatch
X Endicott, William. Political Editor, Los Angeles Times
Nourse, Dick. Anchorman, KSL News
X Parker, Douglas. Political Editor, Salt Lake City Tribune
Webb, Lavarr. Political Editor, Deseret News

Opponents:

X Appelgate, Douglas. Ohio (Representative)
Dowdy, Wayne. Mississippi (Representative)
Dyson, Roy. Maryland (Representative)

Foglietto, Thomas (Representative)

Mariott, Dan. Utah (Representative)

Quayle, Dan. Indiana (Senator)
ENDNOTES

1 The cover letter and questionnaire can be found in the Appendix.

2 For a list of those to whom the questionnaire was mailed, see Appendix, Item #3.


5 Ibid.


Franks, Martin. Executive Director, Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee. Personal phone interview, 6 March 1984.


NATO:
THE U.S. COMMITMENT

Spencer Tall*

Introduction

In the closing phase of the Second World War, seven weeks after the capitulation of Nazi Germany and six weeks before the Hiroshima bomb, representatives of fifty nations signed the United Nations Charter in San Francisco. The date was June 26, 1945, and the world hoped that it had at last learned how to keep the peace. Within four years, however, ten European countries found themselves faced by a threat, the nature of which necessitated some more specific protection than that afforded by the United Nations Charter. Exercising the right of individual or collective self-defense (under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter), the Europeans turned to the United States and Canada to underwrite their pledge of mutual security and, on April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed.

U.S. relations with its major allies, the NATO countries, have in recent years been

*The author wishes to express his appreciation to W. Tapley Bennett, former U.S. Ambassador to NATO, from whom much of the information for this study was obtained.

*Spencer is a senior majoring in Political Science. His plans are to receive a joint M.B.A./J.D. degree at Stanford University. He is a former intern with the U.S. State Department's Bureau of Intergovernmental Affairs.
particularly troubled by differences over what constitutes an appropriate sharing of the burdens and benefits of alliance. The United States initially discouraged its European allies from heavy spending on defense so that they might concentrate on economic recovery instead. In the last twenty-five years, however, the economic growth of the United States has not kept pace with that of its major allies. At the same time global and military responsibilities of the United States have grown while the Europeans have pulled back from global military involvement. Many Americans believe that although our defense efforts are vitally important to our own security, they also contribute a major share of the physical security enjoyed by our NATO allies. Such discrepancies in defense burden sharing were accepted when the Europeans were involved in massive post-war reconstruction efforts and were economically unsteady. But now there is a question as to whether the allies have become too dependent on the United States militarily, while reaping the advantages of the strong economies that have benefited from the United States’ security efforts.

It seems that a lot of the burden sharing problem is inherent in the structure of the alliance systems that the United States developed following the Second World War. During this time the focus of U.S. policy was not a build-up of European national forces. Then Secretary of State Dean Acheson, testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1949, described the U.S. attitude in the following terms:

... economic recovery is a prior necessity; therefore the size of the European forces must be such that they do not interfere with recovery. And it looks as though they will continue to be quite small for some time.
This kind of attitude has characterized the U.S. commitment to Allied defense ever since.

**Original Formation**

After the German surrender, the Western Powers, true to the wartime pledges and to popular demand, began to demobilize. The armed strength of the Allied forces in Europe at the time of the surrender of Germany was about five million men. One year later, following demobilization, their armed strength amounted to no more than 880,000 men. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, continued to keep its armed forces at a wartime level. In 1945, its strength amounted to more than four million men. It also showed no slowing in its war industries. The economic assistance that was offered by the United States during these first post-war years was also open to the Soviet Union and the countries behind the Iron Curtain. Stalin refused all American aid for the USSR and, despite initial interest on the part of both Czechoslovakia and Poland, forced satellite governments to do likewise.

From the outset there were problems with peace treaties. At a meeting in San Francisco, in 1945, the USSR and the Western powers were unable to agree on the composition of a Polish provisional government. At the London Conference of Foreign Ministers in September of 1945, Mr. Molotov blocked any discussion of the United Kingdom's proposal for the opening of an impartial inquiry into the situation in Rumania and Bulgaria.

The Peace Conference opened in Paris on July 29, 1946, and peace treaties with Italy, Finland, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania were among the accomplishments, but they were not
signed until February 10, 1947. In March of that year the Foreign Ministers met in Moscow to discuss the drafting of peace treaties with Germany and Austria. They were unable to agree on what Germany's fate should be. In November of the same year a new Foreign Ministers' Conference was held in London, but it did no more than confirm the impossibility of agreement. Shortly afterward, the Soviet representatives ceased to take part in the Allied Control Council in Berlin. For all practical purposes, the stalemate at the 1947 Moscow Conference put an end to the cooperation which had developed between the USSR and the Western democratic countries during the war.

Soviet territorial expansion under Stalin had already begun during the war by the annexation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, together with certain parts of Finland, Poland, Rumania, North-Eastern Germany, and Eastern Czechoslovakia. This territorial expansion continued after the defeat of Germany and was supplemented by a policy of control over the countries of Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania, Eastern Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia.

Because of these events, the world found itself split into two blocs. In 1948, Mr. Ernest Bevin, the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, suggested a formula for a Western union consisting of a network of bilateral agreements along the lines of the Dunkirk Treaty. This was a treaty signed by France and the United Kingdom promising mutual assistance for fifty years in the event of any renewed attempt at aggression by Germany. Although the idea was warmly welcomed, it was felt that the Rio Treaty would be much better as a model because it was an agreement between the U.S. and Latin America to defend each other against any aggression and provided an example of regional grouping.
On March 17, 1948, the Brussels Treaty was signed by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. These countries pledged themselves to build up a common defense system and to strengthen their economic and cultural ties. Scarcely was this treaty signed when the Soviets started the blockade of West Berlin. It lasted for 323 days and was only countered by the organization of an air-lift by the Western powers. The Berlin blockade had the definite effect of hastening the setup of a total Western defense.

On April 28, 1948, the idea of a single mutual defense system, including and superseding the Brussels Treaty, was publicly put forward by Mr. St. Laurent in the Canadian House of Commons. It was recognized by all the parties involved that it was essential that the United States should be able, constitutionally, to join the Atlantic Alliance. To that end, Senator Vandenberg drew up a resolution which recommended the United States' involvement in the agreement. This resolution was adopted on June 11, 1948, by the U.S. Senate. The text of the treaty was published on March 18, 1949, and on April 4, 1949, in spite of the pressure brought to bear by the Soviet Union on the parties to the treaty, twelve nations joined together and signed the document. Subsequently, three other countries joined the twelve original signatories. Greece and Turkey were invited to join the alliance in September, 1951, and the Federal Republic of Germany was invited to accede to the treaty following the signature of the Paris Agreements in October 1954.

North Atlantic Treaty Analysis

The North Atlantic Treaty is the framework for wide cooperation among its signatories. The
organization is not just a military alliance but one which also provides for continuing joint action in the political, economic, and social fields. It consists of a preamble and fourteen articles.

The preamble outlines the treaty's main features. It emphasizes the fact that it is a treaty for the defense of a way of life, not only by military means, but also through all other aspects of alliance.

The articles define the responsibilities of each of the signatories. They also clarify the fact that the obligations undertaken by the signatories are both external (the bringing about of a better understanding of the principles upon which Western Civilization is founded) and internal (the strengthening of their free institutions and the elimination of disputes or conflicts within the alliance in the economic and social fields). They also contain a very important provision, namely that the parties involved agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all. At the same time, however, each country is free to take whatever action it judges necessary. This way every armed attack does not of necessity call for an automatic declaration of general war.

Also provided within the articles is the possibility of revisions to the treaty or withdrawals from it. After the treaty has been in force for ten years, the parties may agree to revise it. After twenty years any party may put an end to its own participation, giving one year's notice of denunciation. As for the treaty itself, it is of unlimited duration and will remain in force for as long as it is considered useful, irrespective of any decision by any individual member to withdraw.
Changing Perspectives of the Administrations

In the early 1950s, mechanisms were established to provide for scrutiny of the defense efforts of NATO members. Cost sharing formulas were also arranged to provide for financing of NATO "infrastructure" costs such as the expense of facilities, services, and programs regarded to be of common benefit to the alliance members. The cost sharing program has operated essentially on the "ability to pay" principle. In earlier times, the United States agreed to pay the largest share of infrastructure expenses. In subsequent years the U.S. share has been progressively reduced until it now constitutes approximately 27 percent of infrastructure costs.

Since the 1950s, as Europe has become more financially stable, the United States has continually sought a greater amount of participation from its allies. This participation involves not only a military commitment, but an economic one as well.

The Kennedy/Johnson Administrations

The Administration of President John F. Kennedy in the early 1960s advocated a policy of Atlantic partnership with shared responsibilities between the United States and an eventually united Europe. This period witnessed the beginning of the financial arrangements between the United States and West Germany designed to offset the costs of stationing U.S. forces in that country. In 1961, the United States and West Germany agreed to an offset program whereby West Germany would purchase military equipment in the United States so as to compensate for U.S. military expenditures in West Germany. These agreements were renewed and expanded in later administrations to include purchases of U.S.
treasury bonds and, in the 1970s, repair of barracks used by American forces in Germany.

During the Johnson Administration, the problems with the Vietnam experience, French withdrawal from the integrated military structure of NATO in 1966, and U.S. economic problems coupled with general diminished support in Congress for U.S. overseas troop commitments, contributed to the administration's pressures on the Europeans to increase their defense efforts.

All of this prompted the first of the "Mansfield Resolutions" on August 31, 1966. Though these resolutions and similar efforts through 1974 failed to win final passage, they did force Congress and the administration to take a hard look at the various commitments to the treaty by the parties involved. The resolution judged that "the condition of our European allies, both economically and militarily, has appreciably improved since large contingents of forces were deployed"; the commitment by all members of the North Atlantic Treaty is based upon the full cooperation of all treaty partners in contributing materials and men on fair and equitable terms, but "such contributions have not been forthcoming from all other members"; "relations between the two parts of Europe are now characterized by an increasing two-way flow of trade, people, and their peaceful exchange"; and "the present policy of maintaining large contingents of United States forces and their dependents on the European Continent also contributes further to the fiscal and monetary problems of the United States." The Senate was asked to resolve that "a substantial reduction of United States Forces permanently stationed in Europe can be made without adversely affecting either our resolve or ability to meet our commitment under the North Atlantic Treaty."
The Nixon Administration was also concerned about U.S. balance of payments problems. But U.S. efforts to get the Europeans to compensate for the U.S. presence in terms of new offset deals, trade, or monetary concessions made little headway with the Europeans. The allies objected to the prospect of American troops becoming a type of mercenary presence in Europe and argued that the U.S. troop presence was, after all, in America's as well as Europe's interest.

The development of the "Nixon Doctrine," first enunciated in an Asian context in Guam in 1969 and subsequently applied globally, brought a turn away from intensive efforts to get the Europeans to redress financial imbalances caused by the troop presence. U.S. policy began to focus almost exclusively on encouraging the allies to make improvements in their own defense capabilities. This was a sharp refocusing of U.S. policy and set the tone for the subsequent decade. President Nixon felt that NATO's conventional forces should not only be maintained, but in certain key areas, strengthened. He felt that the United States should maintain and improve its own forces in Europe if the allies would take a similar approach, and should not reduce them unless there was reciprocal action from our adversaries.

The main success of the new U.S. policy was the encouragement it gave to the European allies to intensify the work of the Eurogroup. The Eurogroup started as an informal caucus of European defense ministers, meeting originally in 1968, and progressed into a very powerful body. The first major Eurogroup project was the European Defense Improvement Program announced in December 1970. The program represented
about one billion dollars (1970 prices) of European defense improvements over a five-year period. It included increased European contributions to NATO infrastructure costs and special nation force improvements.

These increased European contributions, along with a combination of other events in the mid-1970s, decreased congressional pressure for unilateral U.S. troop reductions in Europe. A major influence was the talks on mutual force reductions which opened between NATO and Warsaw Pact delegations in Vienna in 1973. The Nixon Administration and the successor administration under President Gerald Ford argued that chances of getting the Warsaw Pact countries to reduce their forces would be undermined if the United States reduced unilaterally. In addition, reports of Warsaw Pact force improvements tended to weaken the case for Western troop reductions. On the financial front, U.S. balance of payments improved considerably in 1975, lessening pressure from that quarter. Also, during this time Congress became very aware of the U.S. commitment abroad, and worked on the streamlining of U.S. forces and placed increased emphasis on interoperability and standardization of NATO equipment.

The Carter Administration

The policies under President Jimmy Carter basically continued the policy approaches of the Nixon and Ford Administrations. Efforts focused on encouraging improvements in European forces, promoting efficiencies in alliance defense cooperation, and continuing to improve U.S. forces committed to NATO.

In May 1977, the Carter Administration proposed a new long-term defense program for the alliance. An important part of this program
was that NATO countries pledge to increase defense expenditures in real terms 3 percent above inflation during the life of the program. In May 1978, a summit-level NATO meeting was held in Washington and the program of defense improvements that had been developed over the preceding year, including the 3 percent commitment, was approved.

In 1979 and 1980, a number of factors created renewed concern about European defense efforts. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan reinforced the consensus in the United States in support of major increases in U.S. defense expenditures in Europe. But most Europeans did not interpret the invasion as a direct threat to Europe and were therefore reluctant to see it as requiring additional defense efforts on the part of the allies. Furthermore, economic growth slowed in most European countries in 1980 and 1981, making real increases in defense spending particularly difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.

In 1979 and 1980, Congress showed increasing impatience with the defense efforts of the allies by requiring the Secretary of Defense to report on allied progress toward meeting the 3 percent spending objective, to describe cost sharing arrangements within NATO, and to explain efforts being undertaken to equalize the sharing of defense burdens with NATO allies.

The Reagan Administration

The Reagan Administration transmitted the required report to the Congress in March 1981. The report found that, on the average, the allies had failed to meet the 3 percent objectives in all three years of its existence. The report also stated that while failure of the allies to meet the commitment could be seen by the Soviet Union as a weakening of the collective resolve and could
result in widespread shortfalls in meeting NATO force goals, fixed percentage contributions from allied governments are an issue of somewhat lesser importance than development of a mutually agreed, coherent effort to counter the Soviet challenge. The report concluded that, based on quantitative indicators developed for the report, the allies as a group appeared to be shouldering at least their fair share of the NATO defense burden, with some allies carrying somewhat more than their fair share and others less.

The Reagan Administration has been very diligent about working with U.S. allies and negotiating in good faith toward funding participation at an equal level by all parties concerned. To achieve this it seems that the opinions of both sides need to be considered, and a more accurate method of measuring the commitments of each participating country needs to be implemented.

Measuring Defense Efforts: Opposing Concepts

It seems that there is no one definitive way to measure contributions to Western security. The very selection of measuring devices depends heavily on subjective considerations that can vary according to differing national historical experiences, threat perceptions (particularly prominent in relationships with Europe), world roles, ideological assumptions, and concepts of security. Furthermore, there are a number of more technical questions associated with attempts to compare defense efforts. For example, some items, such as the expense of military retirement programs, are included in some defense budgets while they are excluded from others. Even more confusion is caused when one finds that it is at least possible to assess inputs (defense spending) by using graphs and tables but virtually impossible to quantify the outputs (capabilities of the forces resulting from defense programs).
American Perspectives

It seems that the dominant official and unofficial American perspective on burden sharing is that the allies should do more. Over the years, American observers have used a great variety of arguments to buttress the case for increased allied defense efforts. The following arguments have been among the most prominent:

--By all quantitative measures of expenditures, the United States spends more on defense than its allies. In 1982, the United States spent more on its defense budget than the European allies and Japan combined.

--U.S. strategic forces, which would be essential for U.S. national security even if the United States were not committed to participate in European and Japanese defense, nonetheless are the ultimate guarantee of Western security and are essential to allied security.

--U.S. global military commitments contribute to Western security. The global U.S. naval role, in particular, makes a direct contribution to the security of Western Europe to the extent that it protects Western maritime trade and access to vital raw materials, oil in particular. Military efforts in the Persian Gulf region are of increasing importance and expense to the United States.

--A major U.S. role in the defense of Europe and Japan was warranted when our allies were weak economically with fragile political structures, but the economic and political maturity of the allies now suggests that they should play an increasingly more responsible role in their own defense. Under the protective shield of the United States, our allies have been able to modernize their industrial plant. The U.S. industrial plant is on average considerably older than that
of our allies, contributing to a competitive advantage for our allies in international trade.

--The increased threat of Soviet aggression warrants large increases in defense spending. If the United States is going to make sacrifices to take the lead in this effort, the allies should be willing to put forth at least the same effort.

Allied Perspectives

While some allies agree that their countries should increase their relative share of the Western defense burden, the prevalent feeling is that many American criticisms of their defense efforts are unwarranted.

They feel that the United States is overreacting to the Soviet threat. They feel that the Soviets have in fact been weakened by Afghanistan and the events in Poland and will not be tempted to attack any of the NATO allies if already planned improvements in Western defense are made.

Facts and Figures Put Forth by the Allies

Expenditure. In 1981, Eurogroup contributed about $80 billion to NATO's total defense expenditure. During 1970-78, their real spending rose an average of about 2 percent per year over and above inflation, so that by the end of the 1970s, NATO allies had taken on a proportionately greater share of the common defense burden than it carried ten years earlier.

Force Levels and Manpower. Of the ready forces currently available in Europe, about 91 percent of the ground forces and 86 percent of the air forces come from European countries, as
do 75 percent of NATO's tanks and more than 90 percent of its armored divisions. The size of the armed forces of European countries amounts in peacetime to some 3 million, rising to nearly 6 million when reserves with an assigned role in mobilization are included. The North American figures are 2.15 million, rising to 3 million.

Other Contributions by the Allies. Some allied contributions to Western defense cannot be measured in terms of defense expenditures alone. West Germany, for example, contributes a great deal of real estate to the support of NATO forces. The costs of foregoing other productive uses of that real estate and of lost tax revenues are substantial.

Continuing Arguments by the Allies. The allies argue that Americans cannot understand Scandinavian approaches to defense without taking into account the tradition of small standing forces combined with far more extensive civilian participation in contingency war plans through the integration of reserve and militia forces in territorial defense plans than is the case in the United States. Also, because most continental allies maintain some form of conscription, manpower costs are lower than the costs incurred by the United States for volunteer service.

Both Britain and France continue to maintain strategic nuclear forces which enhance the deterrence effect of U.S. capabilities. Over the last thirty years, the allies have purchased far more military equipment from the United States than the United States has purchased from allied arms manufacturers. U.S. industrial profits, employment, and balance of payments have all benefited from this fairly one-sided trade.

These various arguments coming from both sides have shaped the relationship within NATO
for years now, but in recent times another very important burden sharing issue has come to have a great effect on that relationship.

**Third World Security as a Burden Sharing Issue**

How to interpret and deal with potential threats to Western security arising outside of NATO's boundaries has been one of the most difficult burden sharing issues for the alliance in recent years. With the Iranian crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S. felt that the West had need to strengthen its military posture in the Persian Gulf region. The threat in this region was seen by the U.S. as a continuum of Soviet threats with which Europe had just as much reason to be concerned as the United States. Out of this perception grew demands for European contributions to security in the region through increased European defense efforts in Europe to provide greater flexibility for the U.S. to shift resources to Persian Gulf contingencies.

The Europeans, taking a different point of view, were of the opinion that the instability in the Persian Gulf area was most likely the result of factors indigenous to Middle Eastern countries and conflicts among regional countries (e.g., the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Iran-Iraq war), and not Soviet subversion or indirect involvement in the region (e.g., aid to PLO, Syria, and indigenous Communist parties).

The different perspectives taken by the United States and its allies come from differing national roles, capabilities, and historical experiences. The United States is a global power with global military capabilities while the European nations are, with the exception of France and to
a lesser extent Great Britain, regional powers with military capabilities limited to Europe.

The decline over the last thirty years in Europe's ability to influence events in the Third World was accompanied by an evolving strategic approach to Third World problems. European policies became increasingly dependent on political and economic instruments to influence events in the Third World. The American experience in Vietnam confirmed for many Europeans the wisdom of using military force as a last resort in the Third World.

West European leaders, for the most part, take the position that the West derives considerable security from the needs of Third World countries for access to Western markets and technology. They also believe that similar Soviet requirements for Western technology and other Western goods, such as wheat, tend to constrain Soviet temptations to intervene in Third World trouble spots. They are inclined to believe that instead of a military intervention, in many cases Western interests can be more effectively advanced by developing economic ties with Third World nations. On the whole, the Europeans can be expected to use military power only when political and economic approaches have failed and vital interests are threatened. Both France and Great Britain, however, and a few other European countries, retain some capability for military involvement in the Third World, particularly in Africa and the Middle East, and their use of that capability is not totally excluded. Both France and Italy have demonstrated by their participation in the multinational force in Lebanon that European military contributions to Western interests in the Third World are not out of the question. It seems, though, that the European allies will continue to resist any formal linkage between the NATO commitments and Third World
contingencies, meaning that the Europeans will continue to oppose any formal extension of NATO's boundaries.

Technical Problems with Measuring

The problems with measuring the various commitments to burden sharing within NATO are not only limited to political, social, or economic factors, there are in addition a number of technical difficulties that make measuring these appropriate shares of the Western defense burden difficult. These problems include fluctuating currency exchange rates, differing national approaches to defense budgeting, and the fact that no quantitative methods effectively measure the quality or will of military forces. Therefore, determining what constitutes an equitable sharing of alliance burdens is, ultimately, a very subjective political process.

Policy Options for the U.S.

If the policymakers within the United States decide that, in principle, the allies should make a greater contribution, there are a number of different approaches that need to be taken into consideration. At the level of high policy, the choice of approaches depends on the value attached to alliance relationships by the participants. For example, the U.S. contributions to NATO defenses and security are perceived by the governments of all NATO allies as a vital element of their national security. They therefore want the contribution to continue, which creates a certain amount of leverage that the United States can use to influence the allies' policies and defense spending.

The values that American observers place on our alliance relationships can also influence policy approaches to a certain degree. Those who see
little self-interest in U.S. defense commitments to Europe would likely be willing to risk far more acrimony in relationships with the allies. If one believes that there is no compelling political or military rationale, in terms of U.S. interest, for the presence of sizable contingents of U.S. forces in Europe, then the threat of withdrawal of these forces may be a credible source of leverage. On the other hand, those who see basic commitments to the defense of Europe as clearly beneficial to U.S. interests would presumably want to work within the context of those commitments to encourage larger allied contributions to Western security. Once it is accepted that the U.S. commitment is derived from self-interest rather than from any sense of charity, there are some constraints on the levers available to pressure the allies. The risks of rupturing the alliance relationship are greatly reduced under this assumption, and, for better or worse, the possibilities for fundamental changes in the relationship are diminished. Since World War II this approach has generally characterized U.S. policy toward the defense efforts of its allies.

Legislative Approaches

The U.S. Congress cannot require the allies to increase defense efforts. The Congress can, however, require the administration to take actions to increase pressure on the allies or can provide the administration with levers to "use" the allies. The most direct approach is through the defense authorization process. Amendment of authorization bills has been used in the past to deny funds for activities that the Congress decided should more appropriately be funded by an ally. For example, the FY82 authorization bill on military construction "killed" a 6.4 million dollar authorization to harden logistical facilities for tactical aircraft in Europe, on the ground that NATO as a whole should pay these expenses.
Even if the threat of massive troop withdrawals is foregone as too extreme, some members of Congress might want to use the threat of marginal reductions as a means of pressuring the allies to improve their own defense efforts, to contribute more to the costs of the U.S. presence, or both.

Summary

While it is understood that a subject as broad as this one can take up many volumes, the purpose of this paper has been to explain what the current policy toward burden sharing within NATO is, and to help clarify where those policies may take us in the future.

From this perspective, it seems that the burden sharing problem is inherent in the structure of the alliance systems that the United States developed following World War II. U.S. defense commitments arise from the perception that Soviet dominance in Western Europe would pose a long-term threat to U.S. economic well-being and national security. That perception, plus allied weakness in the 1940s and early 1950s, underlies the structure of our alliance systems and has determined U.S. force structures which give rise to relatively high costs for the United States. If the United States wants to encourage increased defense efforts while simultaneously sustaining a broad base of support for the alliance in Europe, then policies must be designed with great sensitivity to the political and economic circumstances in the allied countries. Forms of pressure that produce friction but no increases in defense efforts would, from this perspective, be counterproductive for U.S. interests.

Self-interest naturally dictates that U.S. officials should try to get the allies to do whatever will relieve the defense burden confronting the
American people. Similarly, European officials see it as their responsibility to pursue defense spending policies consistent with their political mandates and responsibilities.

The view from this perspective is that the allies should do somewhat more than they are now doing, but that the United States should approach this subject with a policy that seeks to understand the European commitment by both input and output. The U.S. should not just consider the dollar amounts that are committed, but the economic capabilities in relation to that commitment as well.

In summary, barring any unexpected and dramatic security threats, the current expectation is for trends in allied spending patterns to continue as they have in the recent past. There will probably be no substantial shifts in the apportionment of Western defense burdens without overall reductions in allied defense capabilities unless they should come as a product of arms control agreements with the Soviet Union. As long as the underlying perceptions and alliance structures remain valid and the United States wishes to remain a global power, the United States will likely continue to spend more on defense than its allies.
Annexed or under Soviet administration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Area (sq. miles)</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Part of Finland</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>17,600</td>
<td>1940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>18,300</td>
<td>1940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>25,400</td>
<td>1940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>21,500</td>
<td>1940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part of Greater East Prussia</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>5,600</td>
<td>1940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part of Poland</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>9,900</td>
<td>1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part of Czecho-Slovakia</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>4,800</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part of Bulgaria</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>19,400</td>
<td>1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>24.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>182,400</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Controlled by USSR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Area (sq. miles)</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>42,770</td>
<td>1940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>91,370</td>
<td>1947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>122,345</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>55,902</td>
<td>1947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Zone of Germany</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>42,900</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czecho-Slovakia</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>48,380</td>
<td>1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>10,629</td>
<td>1940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>91.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>393,547</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The EUROGROUP is an informal grouping, within NATO, and is open to all European members of the Alliance. Those taking part at present are:

Belgium
Denmark
Germany
Greece
Italy
Luxembourg
The Netherlands
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Turkey
The United Kingdom
Table 1: U.S. Forces Stationed in Europe*
(as of September 30, 1982)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>ARMY</th>
<th>NAVY</th>
<th>MARINE CORPS</th>
<th>AIR FORCE</th>
<th>TOTAL DoD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1,469</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>645</td>
<td>2,261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (incl. Berlin)</td>
<td>218,215</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>37,798</td>
<td>256,391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>663</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2,472</td>
<td>3,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greenland</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,708</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>1,052</td>
<td>2,871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>4,538</td>
<td>3,999</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>4,257</td>
<td>13,055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>779</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1,775</td>
<td>2,578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1,083</td>
<td>1,505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3,650</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>5,084</td>
<td>8,950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1,229</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3,837</td>
<td>5,162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>2,291</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>23,084</td>
<td>25,893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afloat</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>26,621</td>
<td>5,932</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>32,553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL IN EUROPE</td>
<td>227,270</td>
<td>39,564</td>
<td>7,224</td>
<td>81,575</td>
<td>355,633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(TOTAL COMMITTED TO NATO)</td>
<td>(227,245)</td>
<td>(12,938)</td>
<td>(1,216)</td>
<td>(81,588)</td>
<td>(322,957)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO FORCES as % of TOTAL</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0.05%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The continuing resolution for FY83 defense appropriations froze levels of U.S. troops "on shore" in Europe at 315,600.
Table 2: NATO Defense Efforts

Defense Spending 1981 (comparisons corrected for inflation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total armed forces</th>
<th>% change from previous year</th>
<th>4-year avg % change</th>
<th>as a % of GDP</th>
<th>as a % of gov't spending</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>109,000 Belgium</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>2.77</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81,000 Canada</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31,000 Denmark</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>578,000 France</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.97</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>495,000 Germany</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>186,000 Greece</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>517,000 Italy</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
<td>1.93</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000 Luxembourg</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106,000 Netherlands</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40,000 Norway</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.48</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91,000 Portugal</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>4.55</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>347,000 Spain</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>769,000 Turkey</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>335,000 United Kingdom</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,189,000 United States</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>3.78</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ENDNOTES


2 Ibid., pp. 20-25.

3 Ibid.

4 See Map #2 reference on Soviet expansion.


7 U.S., Department of State, NATO, Western Security, and Arms Reduction, Address by Kenneth Dam, Deputy Secretary of State, Executive Club, Oslo, Norway, U.S. Department of State Current Policy no. 583, March 21, 1983.


13. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, NATO Today: The Alliance in Evolution, Senate Report, April 1982, p. 82 (also see map #2).


18. Ibid.

19. See tables #1 and #2.

20. Ibid.


22. Ibid.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


NATO: THE U.S. COMMITMENT


Dialogue and Doughnuts

Michael Novak, noted author and newspaper columnist, initiated the year's activities by discussing liberation theology in Latin America. He also provided insights into the role that capitalist pluralism could play in that region of the world.

Duke University professor and specialist on the U.S. presidency, James David Barber, spoke on "The Personality of the President."

The Baroness Lady Cox, a member of the British House of Lords, talked about the influence of Marxism in the English educational system.

Strobe Talbot, foreign correspondent for TIME, addressed the topic of the arms race and the Soviet Union's re-entry into arms negotiations.

Elizabeth Picard, a member of France's National Foundation of Political Science, spoke on "Communal Identities and Political Mobilization in Lebanon."

U.S. Representative Howard Nielson (R-Utah) discussed current political issues.

Thomas E. Cronin, former White House Fellow and aide as well as author of The State of the Presidency, talked about formal and informal power structures.

Jim Kearl of the BYU Economics Department and a recent White House Fellow with the Pentagon, spoke on the current problems surrounding arms technology, methods of troop
training, and the size and cost of conventional forces.

John Ayoade, visiting professor at the University of Pennsylvania and faculty member of Ibandan University in Nigeria, discussed Nigerian foreign policy.

Bishara Bahbah, visiting professor with the BYU Political Science Department and former editor of Al-Fajr Newspaper in Jerusalem, talked about the problems faced by the Palestinian people living in the Israeli-occupied territories.

Gilbert Y. Steiner of the Brookings Institution and the current occupant of the Camilla Eyring Kimball Chair of Home and Family Life addressed the evolution of the Social Security Act and the many-faceted problems of welfare policy.

Ron Hinckley, a member of the National Security Council, spoke on "Presidential Decision Making: Why Facts Don't Matter."

Welches and Cheese

Pi Sigma Alpha members viewed the Bush-Ferraro Vice Presidential debate at Dr. Richard Vetterli's home. Afterward, Dr. David Magleby led a discussion on the debate.

Professor Ray Hillam hosted the annual PSA "Oktoberfest" at his cabin in the Wasatch Alps.

Professor Stan Taylor, Director of the David M. Kennedy International Center, spoke on the topic of "Terrorism."
Dr. David Bohn invited PSA students to his home and discussed possible strategies for lessening tension and costs in the nuclear arms race.

PSA members met at Dr. Ladd Hollist's home and heard him talk about military and economic options in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy.

Having recently returned to BYU from duties as a special assistant to the U.S. Trade Representative, Dr. Earl Fry talked about the pros and cons of increased direct foreign investment in the United States.

The last Welches and Cheese was held at Dr. LaMond Tullis' home. Dr. Tullis discussed the politics of world hunger and food aid.

The keynote speaker at the annual Pi Sigma Alpha closing social and awards banquet was Professor Charles Jones of the University of Virginia. Professor Jones is the current national President of Pi Sigma Alpha.

**Colloquia**

Papers presented this year by the Political Science faculty to Pi Sigma Alpha included the following:

"The Jewish Past and Mormon History: Some Challenges to the Foundations."

--Dr. Louis Midgley

"The Current View on Rural Development: Fad or Breakthrough in Latin America?"

--Dr. LaMond Tullis

"The Political Function of First Nephi."

--Dr. Noel Reynolds

--Dr. Gary Bryner
Donna Lee Bowen presented a paper to the Middle East Studies Association in Philadelphia entitled "Literature as a Pedagogical Device in the Study of Middle East Culture." She traveled to Aix-en-Provence, France, to present another paper, "Paradoxical Linkage of Ulama and Monarch in Morocco," which has been published in *The Mahgreb Review*. Dr. Bowen is also the author of "Women and Public Health in Morocco: One Family's Experience," in *Women and Family in the Middle East*, Elizabeth Fernea, ed., University of Texas Press, 1985.

David Bohn was a fellow at Bern University in Switzerland during the summer of 1984.

Gary Bryner has served during the last year on a grants panel for the National Endowment of Humanities. He chaired two conferences on the U.S. Constitution held at BYU in June 1984 and January 1985. He also presented a paper to the American Political Science Association on "Science, Law, and Regulatory Policy."


Dean Martin Hickman spoke on Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes at the conference on the U.S. Constitution in June 1984.
Ladd Hollist and F. LaMond Tullis have recently had the book they have been editing, An International Political Economy, published by Westview Press. The book is the first volume of a yearbook for the International Political Economy Section of the International Studies Association that will be edited annually by Professors Hollist and Tullis. In addition, Dr. Hollist presented a paper at the International Studies Association conference in Washington, D.C. The paper is entitled "American Foreign Policy and Newly Industrializing Countries."

Earl Fry has had several publications within the last year. One is an article, "Sectoral Free Trade," published in the October 1984 issue of International Perspectives: The Canadian Journal of World Affairs. He has published a book with Lee H. Radebaugh entitled Canada/U.S. Trade Relations through the BYU David M. Kennedy Center. Also, the second edition of Dr. Fry's Canadian Government and Politics in Comparative Perspective has been released by University Press of America.

David B. Magleby presented a paper on "Mail Ballot Elections" at the American Political Science Association meeting. His publications for the year include the study guide that accompanies Everett Carl Ladd's The American Polity, an article on voter apathy that appeared in BYU Today, and a book entitled Direct Legislation: Voting on Ballot Propositions (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984).

Louis Midgley presented a paper entitled "Dogmatic Belief and Public Virtue: Alexis De Tocqueville on the Virility of Religion" at Claremont College at a conference on "Democracy in America: Alexis De Tocqueville Observes the New Order."
Noel Reynolds participated on the National Endowment of Humanities Study Group on the State of Learning in Higher Education. He presented a paper at a conference on George Orwell at Cambridge University and a paper at Notre Dame University. They were titled respectively "Big Brother: The Abuse of Power" and "Families and Markets: Allies or Enemies."

Stan Taylor gave the annual lecture at the Command and General Staff College of Maxwell Air Force Base in October 1984. He was also a participant at the U.S. Intelligence Conference held at C.I.A. headquarters. Dr. Taylor serves as a member of the Charles A. Lindbergh Foundation Grant Panel on the Thrasher Foundation Committee.

Dennis L. Thompson chaired a panel on religion and politics at the meeting of the Western Political Science Association. He presented a paper to the Association for Arid Land Studies entitled "Interface on Culture and Politics in Arid Lands." A second paper presented at the Ogallala Aquifer Symposium at Texas Tech., in Lubbock, Texas, was on the "Interstate Relations of Ground Water." He also organized the International Political Science Association Politics and Ethnicity Round Table at Glasgow, Scotland. He co-edited a book for Westview Press and was Secretary-Treasurer of the International Political Science Association's Research Committee on Politics and Ethnicity. Dr. Thompson also lectured for the United States Information Agency, was a visiting scholar at the C.E.R.D.I.C. Faculty of Common Law, University of Strausberg, and wrote an article "De Chaque Côté de la Porte: L'Entasé et la Sortie de L'Eglise <<Mormon>> - Praxis Juridique Et Religion for the C.E.R.D.I.C. In addition, he authored a chapter, "Legislated Federalism," in a book published by J. A. I. Press which is called
Public Policy and Physical Environment.

Keith Melville served on the panel for Sterling Scholars for the state of Utah.

Richard Vetterli is on sabbatical leave and is serving as a visiting professor at Claremont College and the University of California at Irvine.

Carwin C. Williams presented a paper on "The Two-Party System in Utah" at the Round Table of the 1985 annual meeting of the Utah Political Science Association. He also presented, with co-author Carolynn Garrison a paper on "Urban Housing Initiatives" at the Urban Affairs Association in Oregon.