

## CHAPTER 14



# EXPLORATORY NOTES ON THE *FUTUWWA* AND ITS SEVERAL INCARNATIONS

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**I**t is a privilege and a pleasure to participate in this volume in honor of Professor S. Kent Brown, who has been a major help to me at pivotal points in my career. I first went to the Middle East in a Jerusalem semester abroad group that he led during the first half of 1978. And then, when I returned to Egypt in the autumn of 1978 with my new bride, it was Kent Brown who met us at the Cairo airport and allowed us to stay with his family until we found housing of our own. He was also instrumental in setting the stage for my receiving a job offer at Brigham Young University and has remained a valued colleague, a friend, and a model of Christian living ever since.

These notes were first compiled in a 1981 graduate seminar at the American University in Cairo for Professor George Scanlan. Despite my intention of getting back to the subject, however, I had not. So, when I was invited to contribute to this volume in honor of a friend whom my wife and I will always associate with our time in Egypt, it seemed a good opportunity to resurrect something that I commenced there. My hope is either to pursue this topic further myself or, at least, to encourage some other researcher to look at it. Beyond minor mechanical changes (the paper was written on a

typewriter), I have also made explicit some of the similarities that I perceive between the movements described here and the Gadianton robbers of the Book of Mormon—similarities that, for obvious reasons, I left unnoted in that first draft in Egypt.

### A Connection to Mormon Studies

In her imaginative biography of Joseph Smith, *No Man Knows My History*, the late Fawn Brodie explained the Book of Mormon's Gadianton robbers as a fictional echo of nineteenth-century Freemasonry.<sup>1</sup> She has been followed in this by writers such as Robert Hullinger and Dan Vogel.<sup>2</sup> Along with other Latter-day Saint scholars, however, I have objected to the explanation as simplistic, inaccurate, historically provincial, and, of course, wrong.<sup>3</sup> There are, I contend, other parallels to the Gadianton robbers that are superior to the Freemasons and that pick up aspects of Gadiantonism—for example, its character as, first, ideologically motivated urban terrorism and then, frequently, as partisan or guerrilla warfare—that Freemasonry does not.<sup>4</sup> In these notes, I consider a premodern Middle Eastern group (or group of groups) that, in my judgment, offers several analogies to the Gadianton robbers.

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1. Fawn M. Brodie, *No Man Knows My History: The Life of Joseph Smith*, 2nd ed. (New York: Knopf, 1975), 63-65.

2. Robert N. Hullinger, *Mormon Answer to Skepticism: Why Joseph Smith Wrote the Book of Mormon* (St. Louis: Clayton, 1980), 114 nn. 30-31; Dan Vogel, "Mormonism's 'Anti-Masonick Bible,'" *John Whitmer Historical Association Journal* 9 (1989): 17-30.

3. See, among other things, Daniel C. Peterson, "Notes on 'Gadianton Masonry,'" in *Warfare in the Book of Mormon*, ed. Stephen D. Ricks and William J. Hamblin (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book and FARMS, 1990), 174-224, which provides further references; Daniel C. Peterson, "'Secret Combinations' Revisited," *Journal of Book of Mormon Studies* 1/1 (1992): 184-88; reprinted in John W. Welch and Melvin J. Thorne, eds., *Pressing Forward with the Book of Mormon: The FARMS Updates of the 1990s* (Provo, UT: FARMS, 1999), 190-95; Paul Mouritsen, "Secret Combinations and Flaxen Cords: Anti-Masonic Rhetoric and the Book of Mormon," *Journal of Book of Mormon Studies* 12/1 (2003): 64-77; Nathan Oman, "Secret Combinations: A Legal Analysis," *FARMS Review* 16/1 (2004): 49-73.

4. See Daniel C. Peterson, "The Gadianton Robbers as Guerrilla Warriors," in *Warfare in the Book of Mormon*, 146-73.

### The *Futuwwa* Complex(ity)

The study of the movements in the Muslim world known under the general name of *futuwwa* (the term is variously transliterated in the secondary literature) is made very difficult, as the late Claude Cahen noted, by the fact that they have assumed extremely diverse forms in the course of their history. Consequently, the documentary evidence relating to them “often appears . . . to be irreconcilable . . . and, despite the advance that has been made in our knowledge of them, it cannot be said that even now we really know exactly what they were.”<sup>5</sup> The diversity appears in the very word itself: According to Hans Wehr’s standard Arabic/English dictionary, the term *futuwwa* refers secondarily to “Islamic brotherhoods of the Middle Ages, governed by chivalrous precepts,” but primarily to “youth” or “adolescence.” (Adherents of the *futuwwa* are called *fityān* [“young people,” “adolescents,” “juveniles”], whatever their age.) Most puzzlingly, *futuwwa* denotes both “the totality of the noble, chivalrous qualities of a man, noble manliness, magnanimity, generosity, nobleheartedness, chivalry,” and, in Egyptian colloquial, “bully, brawler, rowdy, tough; racketeer.”<sup>6</sup>

Summarizing his findings on the situation in Nishapur between the fifth and eleventh centuries, Richard Bulliet concludes that “there is enough information to demonstrate the importance of the *futūwa* but not really enough to show what it was or what it did.”<sup>7</sup> “The *futūwa* and related groups,” laments Bulliet, “present a puzzle whenever and wherever they’re encountered. Upon certain points there is agreement: the membership consisted of young men,

5. C. Cahen, “Futuwwa,” in *Encyclopedia of Islam*, new ed., vol. 3 (Leiden: Brill, 1960), 961-65, esp. 961.

6. Hans Wehr, *A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic*, ed. J. Milton Cowan (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1971), s.v. *futuwwa*. Curiously, the word is even etymologically connected with the legal term *fatwā*. On the latter, see Daniel C. Peterson, “Fatwā,” in *Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World*, ed. Richard C. Martin et al. (New York: Macmillan Reference USA, 2004), 1:255.

7. Richard W. Bulliet, *The Patricians of Nishapur: A Study in Medieval Islamic Social History* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), 43-44, esp. 44.

usually celibate; special ritual and dress were involved; and there was some sort of connection with Ṣūfism. But beyond these points there is disagreement and mystery. Associations have been sought with banditry, chivalry, the upper class, the lower class, artisan guilds, police, and so forth.”<sup>8</sup> “The term *futuwwa*,” writes Sawsan El-Messiri, “may refer to groups with basically religious orientation as well as to groups with a criminal or outlaw orientation. Generally, it has been applied to the masses but occasionally to members of the elite as well. In all cases,” she generalizes quite inaccurately, “the element of protection has been seminal to the role.”<sup>9</sup> It is difficult for a student of the Book of Mormon not to think, when facing so ambiguous a phenomenon, of the Gadianton robbers, who are perceived by their opponents as violent thugs (see, for example, Helaman 6:18; 11:25-27) but who regard themselves as pursuing a “good” cause according to patterns “of ancient date” (3 Nephi 3:9).

Cahen sees two “incompatible” types of *fityān*—communal (bachelor) mystics on the one hand, and violent ruffians on the other—while Bulliet is able to distinguish patrician, mystic, and artisan/populist components in the *futuwwa*.<sup>10</sup> Elsewhere, Cahen has observed that the duality is so marked that “one might wonder whether it is one and the same organization that is being considered.”<sup>11</sup> It truly seems, at first glance, that the manifestations of the *futuwwa* are connected only by a common name.<sup>12</sup>

I suspect, however, that Helmut Ritter may have been more perceptive in noting the analogies between *futuwwa* and

8. Bulliet, *Patricians of Nishapur*, 43. He overstates the agreement on celibacy.

9. Sawsan El-Messiri, “The Changing Role of the *Futuwwa* in the Social Structure of Cairo,” in *Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies*, ed. Ernest Gellner and John Waterbury (London: Duckworth, 1977), 239–53, esp. 239.

10. Cahen, “*Futuwwa*,” 961; Bulliet, *Patricians of Nishapur*, 44; Paul Kahle, “Die *Futuwwa*-Bündnisse des Kalifen an-Nāṣir,” in *Opera Minora* (Leiden: Brill, 1956), 215–46; see 242, which cites a *futuwwa* exhortation to shun violence.

11. Claude Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, trans. J. Jones-Williams (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1968), 339.

12. Thus Joseph Schacht, “Einige Kairiner Handschriften über *furusija* und *futūwa*,” *Der Islam* 19 (1931): 49–52, esp. 50.

Freemasonry<sup>13</sup>—analogies that merit further examination and that, as has already been alluded to, are comparable to those that have been confidently applied by some writers to the Gadianton robbers. To him, the fundamental characteristic of the *futuwwa* is the keeping of oaths and secrets.<sup>14</sup> I would go further and suggest that it is the shared *ritual* itself that forms the common basis of *futuwwa* phenomena and that *futuwwa* ideology is essentially epiphenomenal.<sup>15</sup> (I am influenced, in this suggestion, by “myth-and-ritual” theory, which sees in at least some ancient myths later explanations for ritual actions whose original signification had been lost.) It is, perhaps, significant that Christians, Jews, Muslims, and others have all participated, historically, in Masonic ritual because its theological content, while undeniably present, is sufficiently underdetermined as to allow adherents of quite different religious views to affirm it simultaneously. The opinions of scholars on the early *futuwwa* are various. The wonderful thing is that they may all be right.

Franz Taeschner, the doyen of *futuwwa* studies, views the *futuwwa* as having originated outside the realm of religion proper and as having adapted itself to Ṣūfism only later (albeit to such an extent that it was essentially *absorbed* by Ṣūfism).<sup>16</sup> Yet the writings of the *fityān* themselves never fail to present *futuwwa* as a kind of

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13. Helmut Ritter, “Zur Futuwwa,” *Der Islam* 10 (1920): 244-50. He is also reminded of medieval European student corporations; see 244.

14. Ritter, “Zur Futuwwa,” 249.

15. This is not the place to go into my reasoning on the matter. El-Messiri seems to assume a similar notion without realizing it; see El-Messiri, “Changing Role of the *Futuwwa*,” 240, when she posits a “*futuwwa* model” prior to the historical *futuwwa* itself, a kind of *Ur-futuwwa* or Platonic idea of *futuwwa* in which the *fityān* of the documents participate, to a greater or lesser degree. I take this seriously in historical terms. Nobody really knows the origin of the *futuwwa*: I am intrigued by the fact that the word *tekmil*, which is used in connection with *futuwwa* initiation (Kahle, “Futuwwa-Bündnisse,” 226-27), is precisely equivalent, in meaning and function, to the Greek *teleiosis*, a term connected with initiation into the famed Eleusinian mysteries.

16. Franz Taeschner, “Futuwwa-Studien: Die Futuwwabünde in der Türkei und ihre Literatur,” *Islamica* 5 (1932): 285.

quasi-religion<sup>17</sup> passed down from prophet to prophet in the Bible—we might justly say that it claims to be “of ancient date”—and arriving finally in the hands of Muḥammad.<sup>18</sup> Corporate *futuwwa* identity was preserved and shared by means of rites that had been passed down, allegedly, from the founding of the order in earliest biblical times.<sup>19</sup> It is, however, far beyond the scope of this paper to enter into a discussion of these fascinating rituals.<sup>20</sup>

In a somewhat comparable manner, Latter-day Saint scripture, too, assigns a very ancient origin to the Gadianton robbers and related “secret combinations”: “And behold, I am Giddianhi,” says one of the group’s leaders in the Book of Mormon, “and I am the governor of this the secret society of Gadianton; which society and the works thereof I know to be good; and they are of ancient date and they have been handed down unto us” (3 Nephi 3:9).

But the scriptural authors judge that origin and the movement itself to be evil, rather than good. “These abominations were had from Cain,” says the Book of Moses in the Pearl of Great Price, “for he rejected the greater counsel which was had from God.”

And Cain was wroth, and listened not any more to the voice of the Lord, neither to Abel, his brother, who walked in holiness before the Lord.

And Adam and his wife mourned before the Lord, because of Cain and his brethren.

And it came to pass that Cain took one of his brothers’ daughters to wife, and they loved Satan more than God.

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17. For example, Kahle, “Futuwwa-Bündnisse,” 244-45; see Bertold Spuler, *Geschichte der islamischen Länder*, part 1 (Leiden: Brill, 1952), 131.

18. Taeschner, “Futuwwa-Studien,” 298; Franz Taeschner, “Eine Schrift des Šihābaddīn Suhrawardī über die Futūwa,” *Oriens* 15 (1962): 277-80, esp. 277-79; Ritter, “Zur Futuwwa,” 245. It was, however, possible for a non-Muslim to be a *fatā*. See Kahle, “Futuwwa-Bündnisse,” 231.

19. Taeschner, “Futuwwa-Studien,” 299-300.

20. Some notes on these can be found in Ritter, “Zur Futuwwa,” 246; Ziadeh, *Urban Life in Syria*, 167; Kahle, “Futuwwa-Bündnisse,” 226-27, 239-40; Taeschner, “Futuwwa-Studien,” 328 (and n. 2). This listing is far, far from exhaustive.

And Satan said unto Cain: Swear unto me by thy throat, and if thou tell it thou shalt die; and swear thy brethren by their heads, and by the living God, that they tell it not; for if they tell it, they shall surely die; and this that thy father may not know it; and this day I will deliver thy brother Abel into thine hands.

And Satan sware unto Cain that he would do according to his commands. And all these things were done in secret.

And Cain said: Truly I am Mahan, the master of this great secret, that I may murder and get gain. Wherefore Cain was called Master Mahan, and he gloried in his wickedness. (Moses 5:25-31)

According to the Book of Mormon, such “secret combinations” took root in the Old World, but were brought from there into the New World via records carried across the sea by the earliest Jaredites. And, very early on, these strangely religious oath-bound conspiracies became intertwined with politics. The account of Ether, for example, tells of an overly ambitious prince, Jared, whose too-long wait for the throne had plunged him into dark depression. “Now the daughter of Jared was exceedingly fair. And it came to pass that she did talk with her father, and said unto him: Whereby hath my father so much sorrow? Hath he not read the record which our fathers brought across the great deep? Behold, is there not an account concerning them of old, that they by their secret plans did obtain kingdoms and great glory?” (Ether 8:9). Plotting together, Jared had his daughter dance for Akish, who then desired her for his wife. The condition Jared laid on that proposal was that Akish bring him the head of his father.

And it came to pass that Akish gathered in unto the house of Jared all his kinsfolk, and said unto them: Will ye swear unto me that ye will be faithful unto me in the thing which I shall desire of you?

And it came to pass that they all sware unto him, by the God of heaven, and also by the heavens, and also by the earth, and by their heads, that whoso should vary from the assistance which Akish desired should lose his head; and whoso should divulge whatsoever thing Akish made known unto them, the same should lose his life.

And it came to pass that thus they did agree with Akish. And Akish did administer unto them the oaths which were given by them of old who also sought power, which had been handed down even from Cain, who was a murderer from the beginning.

And they were kept up by the power of the devil to administer these oaths unto the people, to keep them in darkness, to help such as sought power to gain power, and to murder, and to plunder, and to lie, and to commit all manner of wickedness and whoredoms.

And it was the daughter of Jared who put it into his heart to search up these things of old; and Jared put it into the heart of Akish; wherefore, Akish administered it unto his kindred and friends, leading them away by fair promises to do whatsoever thing he desired.

And it came to pass that they formed a secret combination, even as they of old; which combination is most abominable and wicked above all, in the sight of God;

For the Lord worketh not in secret combinations, neither doth he will that man should shed blood, but in all things hath forbidden it, from the beginning of man.

And now I, Moroni, do not write the manner of their oaths and combinations, for it hath been made known unto me that they are had among all people, and they are had among the Lamanites.

And they have caused the destruction of this people of whom I am now speaking, and also the destruction of the people of Nephi. (Ether 8:13-21)

### The Ideology of the *Futuwwa*

While Muḥammad appeared in the *futuwwa* genealogy, it is nonetheless true that ‘Alī is the actual patron of the movement, and ‘Alī is viewed by the *fityān* as the initiator of their traditions.<sup>21</sup> ‘Alī is also, of course, the pivotal figure in Shi‘ite Islam; the term *Shi‘ite* derives from the Arabic phrase *shi‘at ‘Alī*, or “faction of ‘Alī.” *Futuwwa* handbooks—which date, admittedly, from generally later periods—invariably consist of page after page of quotations from, in this order, the Qur’an, the hadith or authoritative sayings and precedents of Muḥammad and his “companions,” sayings of ‘Alī, and sayings of famous Ṣūfis.<sup>22</sup>

The *fityān* uniformly revere ‘Alī and invoke blessings upon him and upon his sons Ḥasan and the martyr Ḥusayn—which would ordinarily be taken as a sign of Shi‘i orientation. But they also call down blessings upon Abū Bakr and ‘Umar, the first two of what Sunnis often call the “orthodox caliphs,” whom Shi‘is typically reject and often revile.<sup>23</sup> ‘Uthmān, the third of the four “orthodox caliphs” (‘Alī is accepted by Sunnis as the fourth), is conspicuously absent from the list, which makes it no less puzzling. ‘Alī is said to have initiated the early Iranian Muslim Salmān al-Fārisī into the *futuwwa*—that is, to have “girded” him; the ritual involves special clothing—and the latter follows ‘Alī in the *silsila* (or chain

21. Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 260; Taeschner, “Futuwwa-Studien,” 309.

22. Taeschner, “Futuwwa-Studien,” 292, 296.

23. See Kahle, “Futuwwa-Bündnisse,” 240-42. The Zaydi Shi‘ites, a small minority faction now largely restricted to the northern mountains of remote Yemen, are the exception; though there are exceptions, they tend to respect Abū Bakr and ‘Umar. For information on the Zaydis, see the annotated online guide by Daniel C. Peterson, “Zaydi Bibliography” (Oxford University Press, forthcoming). Nicola A. Ziadeh, *Urban Life in Syria under the Early Mamluks* (Beirut: American Press, 1953), 253 n. 151, citing *Al-Fakhri*, Cairo, 1317: 287, likewise seems to link the *futuwwa* with Shi‘i Islam.

of authorities) of the movement.<sup>24</sup> Interestingly, Cahen describes Salmān as “the patron of Irano-Mesopotamian artisans.”<sup>25</sup> (In this context, one thinks of the less than obvious connection between “speculative Freemasonry,” a quasi-religious fraternal movement, and “practical Freemasonry,” a building trade.) It is difficult to know how seriously to take such *isnāds* or chains of transmitters, of course, and it is certainly easy to doubt them. Very likely, the construction of such exalted genealogies began only after the career of the Caliph al-Nāṣir, to whom we shall come presently.<sup>26</sup>

The term *futuwwa* seems to have been invented for the movements under discussion here in about the eighth century.<sup>27</sup> Gustave von Grunebaum sees the *futuwwa* amalgamating with lower-class thugs known as *‘ayyarūn* by the ninth century.<sup>28</sup> Yet by the eleventh century, in the view of Professor Cahen, the *futuwwa* is moving away from violence and the rabble toward a corporate, initiatory mysticism. It is at this point, he says, that intellectuals and the upper classes begin to join up.<sup>29</sup> Marshall Hodgson, on the other hand, views the evolution of the *futuwwa* in a completely different manner. To him, the phenomenon is originally an upper-class one. After all, it was the upper class that first became Arabized in conquered lands, and we must initially look for the origin of the term *futuwwa* among the elite rather than among the inert peasant mass. Only

24. Taeschner, “Futuwwa-Studien,” 307 (and n. 3), 309.

25. Cahen, “Futuwwa,” 964.

26. Cahen, “Futuwwa,” 964.

27. Cahen, “Futuwwa,” 964.

28. G. E. von Grunebaum, *Classical Islam: A History 600-1258* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1970), esp. 104-5, 196. Cf. Cahen, “Futuwwa,” 962, and Ernst Werner, *Die Geburt einer Grossmacht—Die Osmanen (1300-1481)*, 2nd ed. (Vienna: Böhlau Nachfolger, 1972), 76. The philosopher Al-Fārābī was killed by a gang of *fityān* in December of 950. See D. M. Dunlop, *The Fuṣūl al-Madani of al-Fārābī* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961), 14-15. Von Grunebaum suggests the German term *Junker* as an equivalent to *fatā*; see his *Classical Islam*, 104. A *Junker* was a member of the landed nobility of Prussia and eastern Germany, mostly associated with the old feudal aristocracy of the region, the *Uradel*.

29. Cahen, “Futuwwa,” 963.

later, in his opinion, does the *futuwwa* begin to gain acceptance among the lower classes.<sup>30</sup>

We do have one small area and one small fact on the earlier *futuwwa* that seems secure, although of uncertain significance: In his survey of eleventh-century Nishapur, Bulliet finds the *fityān* invariably belonging to the Shafi‘i *madhab* (or “school”) of Sunni Islamic law, never to the rival Hanafi *madhab*.<sup>31</sup> Because of their veneration of ‘Alī, as described above, the *fityān* have frequently been viewed as Shi‘ites—a fact that would not appear to tally with Bulliet’s identification of the Nishapuri *fityān* as devout Shafi‘is. They seem, in fact, to have adopted the efficient organization of the Isma‘ili Shi‘ites. But this need not imply doctrinal borrowings. Indeed, we have at least one example (from Ibn Jubayr) of a violently anti-Isma‘ili group of Sunni *fityān*.<sup>32</sup>

Certainly the most famous phase of the *futuwwa* is that associated with its reform at the hands of the ‘Abbasid caliph al-Nāṣir li-Din Allah, who reigned in Baghdad from 1180 to 1225.<sup>33</sup> In Cahen’s theory, as we have previously noted, the *futuwwa* had been considered “a popular oppositional organization”;<sup>34</sup> under al-Nāṣir it definitely ceased to be such, if it ever really was.<sup>35</sup> What the caliph seems to have done was to consolidate divergent sects of *futuwwa* by systematizing their ritual and dusting off their rules.<sup>36</sup> And, true to the nature of al-Nāṣir’s entire enterprise—which was intended to

30. Marshall G. S. Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam*, vol. 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), 126.

31. Bulliet, *Patricians of Nishapur*, 45.

32. Taeschner, “Futuwwa-Studien,” 311; von Grunebaum, *Classical Islam*, 196.

33. See Taeschner, “Schrift des Šihābaddīn Suhrawardī,” 277.

34. According to El-Messiri, “Changing Role of the *Futuwwa*,” 249, this is essentially its role today. I don’t know that anyone has yet investigated what relationship, if any, obtains between the *futuwwa* and the *Iuvenes*, the semimilitary or athletic youth clubs of the early Roman Empire. On these, see E. Norman Gardiner, *Athletics of the Ancient World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1930), 124–27.

35. C. Cahen, “The Body Politic,” in *Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization*, ed. G. E. von Grunebaum (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), 132–63, esp. 153.

36. Kahle, “Futuwwa-Bündnisse,” 217.

restore real power to the caliphate—the Grand Master of his New *Futuwwa* was the caliph himself.<sup>37</sup> Also in the circle of al-Nāṣir, promoting *futuwwa* and seeming to act the role of court theologian, was the mystic and eventual martyr Suhrawardī (d. 1191).<sup>38</sup> When one comes to study the essential nature of *futuwwa* itself, one is not surprised to learn that a caliph who was bent on strengthening the social fabric under his own patronage would support it.

Among the major aspects of the movement was the ideal of the absolute obedience of the *futuwwa* disciple, or *ṣaghīr* (the Arabic word means “small” or, derivatively, “young”), to his superior, who was, not unexpectedly, called the *kabīr* (the Arabic word means “large,” or derivatively, “old[er]”). The *ṣaghīr* was to be more obedient to his *kabīr* than the *kabīr*’s shoe, and a better follower than the *kabīr*’s shadow.<sup>39</sup> Further, the *fityān* had an obligation to avenge one another.<sup>40</sup> *Futuwwa* could even be called a cult of friendship, for the duty of the *fityān* to one another was held to be valid even in matters offensive to morality and ethics.<sup>41</sup>

Here again, the Book of Mormon offers a parallel. The Gadianton robbers, it says disapprovingly, had “covenants and . . . oaths, that they would protect and preserve one another in whatsoever difficult circumstances they should be placed, that they should not suffer for their murders, and their plunderings, and their stealings. And it came to pass that they did have their signs, yea, their secret signs, and their secret words; and this that they might distinguish a brother who had entered into the covenant, that whatsoever wickedness his brother should do he should not be injured by his brother,

37. Cahen, “Futuwwa,” 964.

38. Taeschner, “Schrift des Šihābaddīn Suhrawardī,” 15. For Suhrawardī’s thought, see Yaḥyā b. Ḥabash al-Suhrawardī, *The Philosophy of Illumination: A New Critical Edition of the Text of Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, with English translation, notes, commentary, and introduction by John Walbridge and Hossein Ziai (Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Press, 1999).

39. Kahle, “Futuwwa-Bündnisse,” 221; cf. 231.

40. Kahle, “Futuwwa-Bündnisse,” 221.

41. Ritter, “Zur Futuwwa,” 245.

nor by those who did belong to his band, who had taken this covenant” (Helaman 6:21-22). Advocates of the identity of the Gadian-ton robbers with nineteenth-century American Freemasonry have tended to see such obligations of mutual assistance as plain and unique pointers to the Masons, but, manifestly, such things are not peculiar to the early American republic.

Moreover, the mixture of good (or purported good) and bad (or reputed bad) that is so characteristic of the Book of Mormon’s Gadian-ton robbers characterizes the *futuwwa* movement(s), as well. The chief *futuwwa* virtue was generosity, which included charity to the poor.<sup>42</sup> This may be an echo of the *Jāhili fatā*, the noble and generous youth of pre-Islamic or *jāhiliyya* Arabia famously celebrated in the figure of Ḥātim al-Ṭā’i.<sup>43</sup> In fact, the ideal of the *fityān*—which seems only fitfully attained in the historical records—was a kind of avowed poverty, a style of life that avoided contamination by riches and by association with the wealthy.<sup>44</sup>

### ***Futuwwa* and Government Power**

If we are speaking in terms of the *futuwwa* of the proletariat, the *futuwwa* flourished in caliphal times during periods when the central government was weak.<sup>45</sup> Likewise, with the decline of the Seljuqs during the thirteenth century in Anatolia, the *fityān* reappeared.<sup>46</sup> The same was true of the so-called *akhis*, who, as we shall see, seem to represent an Irano-Anatolian variant of the popular *futuwwa*. In Iran, at the last of the thirteenth and the beginning of

42. Taeschner, “Schrift des Šihābaddīn Suhrawardī,” 279; El-Messiri, “Changing Role of the *Futuwwa*,” 244-45.

43. El-Messiri, “Changing Role of the *Futuwwa*,” 240. On Ḥātim al-Ṭā’i, see Reynolds Nicholson, *A Literary History of the Arabs*, and, even, Edward Fitzgerald’s “Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam.”

44. Franz Taeschner, “Beiträge zur Geschichte der Achis in Anatolien (14.-15. Jht.),” *Islamica* 4/9 (1931): 1-47; R. M. Savory, “Communication,” *Der Islam* 38 (1962): 161-65; esp. 162.

45. El-Messiri, “Changing Role of the *Futuwwa*,” 240-41; Cahen, “*Futuwwa*,” 961-65.

46. Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 49.

the fourteenth century, fully one-third of the government's budget was devoted to maintaining religious institutions—among them *akhi* lodges (*zawiyas*).<sup>47</sup>

This was the Golden Age of *akhidom*. The quasi-anarchic condition of pre-Ottoman Anatolia allowed the strict organization and rigid discipline of the *akhis* to show itself to full advantage. In fact, the “organization of the towns was . . . bound up with the organization of the *akhis*.”<sup>48</sup> Leaders of the movement, tending to disregard the admonitions to simplicity of life issuing incessantly from the *futuwwa*-theorists, came to form “a kind of bourgeois patrician class.” Indeed, in later writers the term *akhi* becomes synonymous with “patrician.”<sup>49</sup> They sometimes held actual political power, most notably in Ankara.<sup>50</sup> On the other hand, when the rising power of the Ottoman dynasty reached Ankara (in the person of Murad I), *akhi* control there ceased,<sup>51</sup> and the same was eventually true of all of Anatolia. In the reign of Murad II, we hear for the last time of any important political role being played by the *akhis*.<sup>52</sup>

In summary, Anatolian *akhi* lodges blossomed in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and were still to be found in the fifteenth century. Significantly, Turkish guilds, called *futuvvet*, begin to appear in the fifteenth century and then to bloom in the two centuries thereafter.<sup>53</sup> In Syria, under the comparatively strong control of the Mamluks in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, *futuwwa* of the popular kind never developed at all.<sup>54</sup>

Similarly, in the Book of Mormon, the Gadianton robbers tend to rise and fall in inverse relation to the vigor and effectiveness of the central government. Moreover, the robbers seem to have been

47. Bertold Spuler, *Die Mongolen in Iran* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1968), 163 (and n. 2).

48. Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 195.

49. Taeschner, “Beiträge zur Geschichte,” 10.

50. Taeschner, “Beiträge zur Geschichte,” 3, 28; Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 340.

51. Taeschner, “Beiträge zur Geschichte,” 3.

52. Taeschner, “Beiträge zur Geschichte,” 28.

53. Taeschner, “Futuwwa-Studien,” 289.

54. Ziadeh, *Urban Life in Syria*, 168.

plainly aware of that fact, sometimes deliberately acting to weaken the government in order to secure freedom of action for themselves. The Gadianton movement first emerges among the Nephites with a political assassination, committed in roughly 52 BC during a time of division among the people and instability in the Nephite chief judgeship. Strong government actions, however, drive them from their original urban base into the wilderness, rendering them relatively invisible and ineffective (Helaman 1:1-12; 2:1-11). Roughly a quarter of a century later, however, their numbers surge in the wake of another pair of successful political assassinations, but, while they prosper among the Nephites, a vigorous Lamanite response eliminates them from Lamanite territory within a few years (Helaman 6:15-41). Again, around AD 15, social decay, contention, and political dissent again provide an opportunity for the Gadianton movement to rise to prominence (3 Nephi 2:11, 18). In AD 29-30, a Gadianton-style secret combination renders the central government impotent and eventually destroys it altogether, leaving Nephite society in a state of tribal anarchy that allows the conspirators to establish an independent kingdom of their own (3 Nephi 6:27-7:14). The Gadianton movement is invisible during the decades of stability and peace that follow the transformative visit of the resurrected Christ to the New World, but when, about AD 231, “there [is] a great division among the people,” they “spread over all the face of the land” (4 Nephi 1:35, 46). Thereafter, for the next century and a half, they play a crucial role in the decline and eventual death of Nephite civilization. “This Gadianton,” writes the prophet-chronicler Mormon, “did prove the overthrow, yea, almost the entire destruction of the people of Nephi” (Helaman 2:13).

### **The Akhis**

It is quite possible, as we have seen above, to distinguish two distinct strains of *futuwwa*, if not more. Taeschner calls these the

“courtly” (*höfische*) and the “bourgeois” (*bürgerliche*).<sup>55</sup> In view of what we have seen above, and other evidence too vast to enumerate, we might actually be tempted to call the latter a “proletarian” *futuwwa*.

When the Mongol invasion obliterated the caliphate in Baghdad, the *futuwwa* experiment of al-Nāṣir was obliterated with it. Nevertheless, the courtly *futuwwa* was carried on in Cairo, where the Mamluk elite aspired to fill the vacancy created by the fall of the caliphate and even appointed a series of powerless puppet caliphs to give themselves credibility.<sup>56</sup> What occurred there under the Mamluk sultan Baybars was very much an “official revival.”<sup>57</sup> This took place in 1261, and we know that the Mamluk rulers were still granting *futuwwa*-investment to prominent allies as late as 1293. But courtly *futuwwa* wanes in Egypt in the fourteenth century, lingering at the very latest into the fifteenth.<sup>58</sup>

This phenomenon is probably to be explained by the same reasoning with which we account for Baybars’s eagerness to have an ‘Abbasid caliph in Cairo: It gave him badly needed legitimacy. And, after all, *futuwwa* had been an important component in the caliphate of the prestigious al-Nāṣir, whose career was not so long before. It may have seemed to Baybars and his contemporaries that *futuwwa* was a part of the caliphate and that a claim by the new puppet caliph to *futuwwa*-lineage would go a long way toward validating his claim to the caliphal office as well.

Cahen asserts that al-Nāṣir’s *futuwwa* also found its continuation among the *akhis* of Anatolia.<sup>59</sup> Taeschner, by contrast, claims that courtly *futuwwa* had existed in Anatolia under the Saljuqs of Rum,

55. Taeschner, “Schrift des Šihābaddīn Suhrawardī,” 279.

56. Franz Taeschner, “Futuwwa,” in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 3:966–69, esp. 966.

57. Ziadeh, *Urban Life in Syria*, 167–68. Syedah F. Sadeque, *Baybars I of Egypt and Syria* (New York: AMS, 1980), 133, 163, 190, 197, offers several examples of *futuwwa* rites practiced under Baybars I.

58. Taeschner, “Futuwwa,” 966.

59. Cahen, “Futuwwa,” 964.

but denies any connection between it and the *akhis*.<sup>60</sup> “The question of the origin of *akhidom* in Anatolia,” writes Taeschner with sublime understatement, “is a very complicated one.”<sup>61</sup> He suggests that the *akhis* were foreigners and notes that the word *akhi* is an East Turkic one whose connection with the Arabic Ṣūfi term *akhi* (“my brother”) is fortunate but, otherwise, purely fortuitous. Elsewhere, he posits an origin in ‘Ayyubid Egypt (that is, circa the mid-twelfth to mid-thirteenth century).<sup>62</sup> Bertold Spuler thinks it obvious that the *futuwwa* itself began along the Islamic frontier with the Byzantine Empire, among the “march warriors (*Grenzkriegern*), with their various Shi‘ite tendencies.”<sup>63</sup> Analogously, the military character of the Gadianton robbers is obvious in the Book of Mormon, where they hide out in inaccessible areas and are frequently confronted by Nephite and even Lamanite armies. (The Book of Mormon implicitly recognizes them as a military rather than a merely criminal threat and expresses that recognition in a manner that, strikingly, appears to accord with ancient law.)<sup>64</sup>

In still another place, Taeschner notes that *akhidom* can be traced earlier in Iran than in Anatolia, and, accordingly, that it probably traveled from the former to the latter.<sup>65</sup> Ernst Werner is still more positive and informs us that the leader of the *akhis* entered Anatolia from Iran at the beginning of the thirteenth century.<sup>66</sup> If we can accept Werner’s theory, we notice that it accords—just barely—with Cahen’s notion that “the organization of the *akhis* . . . was not clearly revealed in its full vigour until the Mongol regime and later,

60. Taeschner, “Futuwwa,” 964.

61. Taeschner, “Beiträge zur Geschichte,” 14-15.

62. Taeschner, “Beiträge zur Geschichte,” 19 (and n. 3); Taeschner, “Futuwwa-Studien,” 308-9.

63. Spuler, *Geschichte der islamischen Länder*, 103.

64. See John W. Welch and Kelly Ward, “Thieves and Robbers,” in *Reexploring the Book of Mormon*, ed. John W. Welch (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book and FARMS, 1992), 248-49.

65. Taeschner, “Futuwwa,” 966-69.

66. Werner, *Geburt einer Grossmacht*, 77.

but . . . nevertheless was in existence before it.”<sup>67</sup> If Werner is correct, his *akhi* leaders arrived just in time. In fact, the first mention of the term *akhi* dates from 1068 to 1069 in Iran.<sup>68</sup> And a number of *akhis* were prominent among the companions and disciples of Shaykh Ṣafī al-Dīn Ardabilī (1252–1334), the ancestor of the Safavid shahs who ruled Iran or Persia from AD 1501 to 1722.<sup>69</sup> Further evidence of Iranian origins is the fact that the Anatolian *akhis* of the fourteenth century adopted as their companion the figure of Abū Muslim, the Persian patriot.<sup>70</sup>

Still, there is the possibility—not to be entirely discounted—of a relationship between the *akhis* (*ukhuwwa*) and the famous “Brethren of Purity” or *Ikhwan as-Safa*, who flourished in Basra, in southern Mesopotamia, during the tenth century. The groups share the same tight organization. But no line of connection has been demonstrated, and the doctrine of the “Brethren” is distinctly lacking among the *akhis*.<sup>71</sup>

“This institution is of great interest,” writes Cahen of the *akhis*, “but also raises many problems.”<sup>72</sup> At least, says Taeschner, among all the confusion surrounding the *akhis*, there is no question that they belong to the phenomenon known generally as *futuwwa*.<sup>73</sup> But whether *fityān* and *akhis* are identical is quite another matter.<sup>74</sup> At one point, Taeschner confidently places the *akhis* among the *futuwwa* movements “decisively influenced” by al-Nāṣir.<sup>75</sup> Yet elsewhere he

67. Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 195.

68. Werner, *Geburt einer Grossmacht*, 72.

69. Taeschner, “Futuwwa,” 967.

70. Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 340.

71. Taeschner, “Beiträge zur Geschichte,” 15, and Taeschner, “Futuwwa-Studien,” 292 n. 5; 311 n. 1. See Taeschner “Beiträge zur Geschichte,” 5–6, for data demonstrating that the *Akhis* were, in fact, an organization rather than an amorphous mass.

72. Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 195.

73. Taeschner, “Beiträge zur Geschichte,” 27, and Taeschner, “Futuwwa-Studien,” 289. The phrase *akhiyyat al-fityān* occurs in Ibn Baṭṭūta. See Taeschner, “Beiträge zur Geschichte,” 2.

74. Taeschner, “Futuwwa-Studien,” 292.

75. Taeschner, “Futuwwa-Studien,” 308.

is careful to distinguish between the courtly *futuwwa* of the caliph and the *futuwwa* of the court theologian (and *futuwwa*-promoter) Suhrawardī. And, in Taeschner's view, the *akhis* are clearly to be associated with the theologian and not with the caliph.<sup>76</sup>

One characteristic of the *akhi* movement that undoubtedly adds to the difficulty of studying it today is the secrecy in which it functioned. The ideal was that nobody else would know that one was an *akhi*, and we have at least one example of an Anatolian *Futüvvetnâme* (or "*futuwwa* book") that closes with the strict admonition that it not be shown to the uninitiated.<sup>77</sup> Similarly, the Book of Mormon says, the practice of the Gadianton robbers was that "whosoever of those who belonged to their band should reveal unto the world of their wickedness and their abominations, should be tried, not according to the laws of their country, but according to the laws of their wickedness, which had been given by Gadianton and Kishkumen" (Helaman 6:24). Thus, at one point, when the Gadianton robbers were under intense military pressure, they "concealed their secret plans in the earth" (Helaman 11:10). (The reference here is, quite plainly, to written materials, perhaps even to secret books.) Unfortunately, only a few years later, when they had regained their strength and self-confidence, "they did search out all the secret plans of Gadianton" once again (Helaman 11:26).

If there is a difference between the *akhis* and the ordinary *fityān*, it is perhaps to be found in an increasingly craft-and-trade-centered focus among the former. Indisputably, though, in early modern history, the first craft guilds and trade unions in the Arab world referred to themselves as *futuwwa*. (One thinks, yet again, of the peculiar use of the construction term *masonry* to refer to a fraternal/ritual organization.) This is, however, otherwise an area of great controversy.<sup>78</sup> But when we begin to examine the *akhis* closely, we

76. Taeschner, "Schrift des Šihābaddīn Suhrawardī," 279-80.

77. Taeschner, "Beiträge zur Geschichte," 9.

78. Compare Ziadeh, *Urban Life in Syria*, 168, and Werner, *Geburt einer Grossmacht*, 72, to Cahen, "Futuwwa," 961.

are immediately aware of certain very familiar traits. The chief virtue of the *akhis* is said, for example, to be their hospitality.<sup>79</sup> They venerate ‘Alī, but they also venerate Abū Bakr.<sup>80</sup> Finally, their ritual and their hierarchy are virtually identical to those we have encountered earlier among the *fiṭyān*. (The former includes, curiously, the shaving of a tonsure on the head of the initiate, which may well be a relic of Christian monasticism.)<sup>81</sup>

### *Futuwwa* and Mysticism

It is of interest to note that Šihābaddīn Suhrawardī, whom we have briefly met as a promoter and theorist of *futuwwa* with special ties to the *akhis* of Anatolia, was also a Šūfi.<sup>82</sup> Thus we are not particularly surprised to learn that the treatises on the *futuwwa*—secret books, in at least some cases—written after Suhrawardī are themselves “semi-mystical.”<sup>83</sup> And, carrying further with our essential identification of *fiṭyān* and *akhis*, we find, not unexpectedly, that the *akhi* movement is itself considered to be a part of the greater Šūfi phenomenon.<sup>84</sup> Indeed, in Taeschner’s view, *futuwwa* and its related movements represent the vehicle by which Šūfism gained access to the bourgeois strata of Islamic society.<sup>85</sup>

Interestingly, this seems to be the view of many of the *akhi* sources themselves, which explicitly link—and sometimes equate—*futuwwa* and *taṣawwuf* (Šūfism).<sup>86</sup> One source relates that *futuwwa* and mysticism were originally synonymous at the time of their

79. Taeschner, “Beiträge zur Geschichte,” 8.

80. Taeschner, “Beiträge zur Geschichte,” 7, 19.

81. Taeschner, “Beiträge zur Geschichte,” 6–9.

82. He is not, however, to be confused with his fellow countryman and rough contemporary, ‘Umar Suhrawardī, the eponymous founder of an order of Šūfis. See Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 256.

83. Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 350.

84. Taeschner, “Beiträge zur Geschichte,” 10.

85. Taeschner, “Futuwwa-Studien,” 285. Cf. the opinion of ‘Abbās Iqbāl, quoted in Savory, “Communication,” 161–62.

86. See, for example, Savory, “Communication,” 162–63; Kahle, “Futuwwa-Bündnisse,” 229, 238; Taeschner, “Futuwwa-Studien,” 291 (and n. 1).

founding by Seth; it was only at the time of Abraham that *futuwwa* was distinguished as a mysticism for the weak.<sup>87</sup>

The most important literary source to come to us out of *akhi* circles, according to Taeschner, is a late fourteenth-century *Futüvvetnâme* by a certain Yaḥyā b. Khalīlī b. Jubān al-Burghāzī.<sup>88</sup> Significantly, “the ethic which it portrays is a wholly normal mystic one, with the usual requirements of the moderate Ṣūfi ethics, without any kind of extravagance.”<sup>89</sup> Thus we are prepared when Taeschner suggests that *akhidom* survived, after its death among the dervishes, with a kind of bourgeois moderation.<sup>90</sup> (Ritter attempts to counter such a suggestion by noting that, “among the mystics, it is *sunna* to shave the head, but this is not the case among the *fityān*.”<sup>91</sup> However, on the basis of evidence alluded to earlier, we know that he is quite simply wrong.)

Even in terms of its ritual, *futuwwa* can be recognized in later dervish practices. The *futuwwa* rank of *naqīb*, responsible for the *shedd* initiation ceremony, reappears with the same title and the same function in more than one dervish order to this day.<sup>92</sup> And during that ceremony, the initiate makes a familiar promise to “dedicate [himself] zealously to the service of the poor and needy, to the extent of [his] ability.”<sup>93</sup>

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87. Taeschner, “Schrift des Šihābaddīn Suhrawardī,” 278. Seth is a very curious figure in biblical pseudepigrapha and gnostic literature, and his role here fairly cries out for study. Also significant in this religious view of *futuwwa* is the fact that at least one *akhi* rank bears as title an Uighur word signifying, elsewhere, a Buddhist priest. See Taeschner, “Schrift des Šihābaddīn Suhrawardī,” 292-94 (and 294 n. 2). Curiouser and curiouser.

88. Taeschner, “Beiträge zur Geschichte,” 4-5, 40, and Taeschner, “Futuwwa-Studien,” 300 n. 1. It betrays, incidentally, not a trace of Shi‘ism. And, since the book was intended to be secret, this cannot be rationalized as *taqiyya*-dissimulation. See Taeschner, “Beiträge zur Geschichte,” 18.

89. Taeschner “Beiträge zur Geschichte,” 9.

90. Taeschner, “Beiträge zur Geschichte,” 21-22.

91. Ritter, “Zur Futuwwa,” 247.

92. Paul Kahle, “Zur Organisation der Derwisch-orden in Egypten,” *Der Islam* 6 (1916): 149-69, esp. 164-66; Taeschner, “Beiträge zur Geschichte,” 8; and Taeschner, “Futuwwa-Studien,” 296, 326-35.

93. Kahle, “Zur Organisation der Derwisch-orden,” 162.

### Akhis and Mevlevīs

In the second half of the thirteenth century, after the death of Zarkūb, the preeminent disciple of the great Persian mystic Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī was Ḥusām al-Dīn Çelebi, one of the principal *akhi* leaders in Konya. On Rūmī's death, Çelebi became his successor (*khalīfa*).<sup>94</sup> Taeschner argues that, by the beginning of the fourteenth century, the Mevleviyya—the mystical order of the disciples of Rūmī—was still concentrated in and about Konya and that the *akhis* elsewhere constituted a group of what we might term “fellow-travelers.” We know that the *akhis* danced at their meetings, and Taeschner is certain that we must here understand this to be the same as the famed cultic dance practiced by the Mevlevīs, the so-called “whirling dervishes.”<sup>95</sup> Taeschner further notes a certain *baṭīnī* (or esoteric) character—secret doctrine, reserved for initiates—that he sees shared by both *akhis* and Mevlevīs. And, finally, he reminds us that Rūmī traced his genealogy back to Abū Bakr, a fact that would conceivably explain the *akhis*' notorious invocation of the first caliph as a saint along with the predictable ‘Alī.<sup>96</sup>

But there are problems with this connection. We know, for example, that the *akhi* leader Ahmad of Konya was disliked by Aflākī, the hagiographer of the Mevlevīs, as being insufficiently aristocratic and an enemy of Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī.<sup>97</sup> And the feelings seem to have been mutual: Werner is able to detect hostility on the part of the lower- and middle-class *akhis* toward the “feudal aristocratic” Mevlevīs.<sup>98</sup>

### Akhis and Bektāshīs

The well-known Turkish scholar M. F. Köprülüzade considered the *akhis* to be identical with the Bektāshī order of dervishes;

94. Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 351.

95. Taeschner, “Beiträge zur Geschichte,” 16-17.

96. Taeschner, “Beiträge zur Geschichte,” 15-17 (and 17 n. 4).

97. Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 351.

98. Werner, *Geburt einer Grossmacht*, 75. Werner is a Marxist.

he alleged that the term *akhi* died out at the coming of the title *bektāshiyya*.<sup>99</sup> While Taeschner does not entirely agree with Köprülüzade on this point, he does permit substantial identification, noting that the founding fathers of the *bektāshiyya* included several prominent *akhis*.<sup>100</sup> And again, the familiar ambiguity is present, for R. Tschudi comments of the Bektāshīs that, “in their secret doctrines, they are Shi‘is.”<sup>101</sup> One “Great Futuwwetname” of a decidedly Twelver Shi‘i character, written in the sixteenth century, is quoted in Bektāshī ceremonies.<sup>102</sup> And the Bektāshīs, like the *akhis*, are secretive, a fact that has brought upon them accusations of all manner of immorality.<sup>103</sup> Ironically, though, a small group of the Bektāshīs vow themselves to celibacy<sup>104</sup>—as did a similar percentage of the *akhis*.<sup>105</sup>

We know that the Bektāshīs had acquired exclusive spiritual authority among the elite Ottoman military order of the Janissaries, the *Yeniçeri*, by the second half of the fifteenth century,<sup>106</sup> and it is important in this regard to recall that the *akhi*-cap was identical to the headdress of the *Yeniçeri*.<sup>107</sup> It seems, in fact, that the *akhis* were involved militarily on the side of the Ottoman dynasty from its very first days; there is some evidence that Murad I—the third of the thirty-six Ottoman sultans, who reigned from roughly 1360 to his death at the Battle of Kosovo in 1389—was a Grand Master of the *akhis*.<sup>108</sup>

99. Taeschner, “Beiträge zur Geschichte,” 20, 24, 25.

100. Taeschner, “Beiträge zur Geschichte,” 23-24.

101. R. Tschudi “Bektashiyya,” in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new ed. (Leiden: Brill, 1960), 1:1161-63, esp. 11622.

102. Taeschner, “Futuwwa,” 967-68.

103. Hans Joachim Kissling, “Zur Frage der Anfänge des Bektaşitums in Albanien,” *Oriens* 15 (1962): 281-86, esp. 285 n. 1. Compare the experiences of the Masons, the Mormons, the early Christians, etc.

104. Tschudi, “Bektashiyya,” 1162.

105. Taeschner “Beiträge zur Geschichte,” 19 n. 4. See Kissling, “Zur Frage der Anfänge,” 286, on what he calls “Kryptochristianismus.”

106. Tschudi “Bektashiyya,” 1162.

107. Taeschner, “Beiträge zur Geschichte,” 25-26.

108. Taeschner, “Beiträge zur Geschichte,” 25-26; Werner, *Geburt einer Grossmacht*, 99-102, 88.

However, there are problems in associating the *akhis* and the *bektāshīyya*, as one could, by now, have predicted that there would be. Ḥājī Bektāsh “was probably a disciple of Bābā Ishāq. . . . The aristocratic entourage of the rival Mawlawīyya order later laid emphasis on this.”<sup>109</sup> (Werner, by the way, views the Babā’ī revolt as “an expression of the weakness of the central authority and the incipient feudal shattering of the sultanate”<sup>110</sup>—familiar conditions.) But we know that the *akhis* of Sivas defended that city *against* Bābā Ishāq’s siege.<sup>111</sup>

A final candidate for Dervish Continuator of the *futuwwa* is the order of the Naqshbandīyya. They too are known for esoterica and secrecy.<sup>112</sup> They too trace their *silsila* back to both ‘Alī and Abū Bakr.<sup>113</sup>

## Conclusion

It is widely agreed that at least some of the *akhi* tradition continued in the guilds of the Middle East,<sup>114</sup> although the error of supposing that all *futuwwa* organizations were guilds from the very start should be avoided.<sup>115</sup> Werner is reminded, in thinking of this question, of the two broad divisions of *futuwwa* to which we have repeatedly alluded. The quietistic mystics he sees represented in

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109. Tschudi, “Bektashīyya,” 1161–62, notes that the rituals characteristic of the later *bektāshīyya* are not to be found in the writings of Ḥājī Bektāsh himself. My bet is that they are a later contribution, at least in part, of the *akhis*. Incidentally, adepts of the *rasūl*, Bābā Ishāq, wore a cap like that of the illustrious Qizilbāsh. A special relationship exists, in fact, between the *bektāshīyya* and the Qizilbāsh (Tschudi, “Bektashīyya,” 1162).

110. Werner, *Geburt einer Grossmacht*.

111. Werner, *Geburt einer Grossmacht*.

112. Madelain Habib, “Some Notes on the Naqshbandi Order,” *Muslim World* 59/1 (1969): 40–49, esp. 45 (and n. 28), 47–48.

113. Habib, “Some Notes on the Naqshbandi Order,” 40–41; Taeschner, “Beiträge zur Geschichte,” 17.

114. Taeschner, “Beiträge zur Geschichte,” 20; Taeschner, “Futuwwa-Studien,” 301; Raphaela Lewis, *Everyday Life in Ottoman Turkey* (London: Batsford, 1971), 145.

115. Gabriel Baer, “Guilds in Middle Eastern History,” in *Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East*, ed. M. A. Cook (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 11–30, esp. 11.

more recent times by the Şūfi orders, whereas the political activists find their more modern counterparts in the guilds.<sup>116</sup>

In fact, “the rise of the guilds was closely connected with the decline of the free *futuwwa* and *akhi* associations,” which took place in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.<sup>117</sup> As the government came more and more to control the nascent trade associations, the *futuwwa* simply died out<sup>118</sup>—central authority being, as ever, its nemesis. This occurred, at the latest, by the seventeenth century. The guild of tanners retained its *akhi* associations longest and in greatest purity, and was able thereby to achieve a remarkable ascendancy over the other guilds that lasted for a considerable length of time.<sup>119</sup> However, by 1914 Paul Kahle was able to find only twenty-year old memories of the *futuwwa shedd*-initiation in the Cairo guild,<sup>120</sup> and by 1927 “almost none of the traditional ceremonies remained” in the guilds of Damascus.<sup>121</sup>

Still, the *futuwwa* associations of the early guilds are instructive. They teach us, for example, to be wary of the provincial, twentieth-century secularism implicit in such statements as Raphaela Lewis’s remark that “throughout Ottoman Turkey, a man’s allegiances were, in order of priority, to his guild, to his religion and to the Sultan.”<sup>122</sup> It is doubtful that a medieval *akhi* or a later premodern guildsman would have distinguished between guild and religion.<sup>123</sup>

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116. Werner, *Geburt einer Grossmacht*, 75; El-Messiri, “Changing Role of the *Futuwwa*,” 240, is confused by the relationship of the two strands, as in Kahle (“Zur Organisation der Derwisch-orden,” 149), who ought to know better.

117. Baer, “Guilds in Middle Eastern History,” 29.

118. Baer, “Guilds in Middle Eastern History,” 18, 20.

119. Taeschner, “Futuwwa-Studien,” 301; Kahle, “Zur Organisation der Derwisch-orden,” 149 (and n. 2); Taeschner, “Futuwwa,” 968; Lewis, *Everyday Life in Ottoman Turkey*, 145.

120. Kahle, “Zur Organisation der Derwisch-orden,” 149 (and n. 2).

121. Baer, “Guilds in Middle Eastern History,” 23.

122. Lewis, *Everyday Life in Ottoman Turkey*, 145.

123. See Franz Taeschner, “Aufnahme in eine Zunft, dargestellt auf einer türkischen Miniatur,” *Der Islam* 6 (1916): 169-72. The article features a Turkish miniature which distinctly illustrates the *futuwwa*-religious character of reception into a guild.

Likewise, as I have argued elsewhere, although the authors and editors of the Book of Mormon clearly suppress the religious character of the Gadianton robbers (as at Alma 37:27–32 and Ether 8:20), it is unlikely that the Gadiantons saw their efforts as purely secular, let alone as criminal murder and robbery. Although, at this late date and given the nature of our source materials, we can't tell precisely what it was—in which respect, again, the *futuwwa* movements offer a kind of analogy—they were fighting for an alternate religious vision, one that many of the peoples of the Book of Mormon plainly saw, at various times, as quite attractive.<sup>124</sup>

Brodie, Hullinger, Vogel, and others who equate the secret combinations described in the Book of Mormon with the Masons of nineteenth-century America simply haven't read widely enough. The similarities they adduce are neither unique to Freemasonry nor, sometimes, as compelling as are those in other movements. Parallels to the Gadianton robbers are easy to find, from antiquity through the medieval Near East to the mountains of today's Tora Bora. "They are," as the prophet Moroni wrote more than a millennium and a half ago, "had among all people" (Ether 8:20).

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124. Peterson, "Notes on 'Gadianton Masonry.'"