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Heideggerian Authenticity in La Celestina and Don Quijote de la Mancha

Stevenson George Smith

A thesis submitted to the faculty of
Brigham Young University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

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ABSTRACT

Heideggerian Authenticity in *La Celestina* and *Don Quijote de la Mancha*

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This study explores the intersection of the philosophy of Martin Heidegger and Spanish literature. The study examines the Heideggerian authenticity and inauthenticity of two characters in the literature: Melibea in *La Celestina* by Fernando de Rojas and Grisóstomo in *Don Quijote de la Mancha* by Miguel de Cervantes. Heidegger's concept of authenticity is the ability of the individual to live in the world according to her own desires, outside of the influence of others. Both die by suicide, but Melibea is an authentic character in Heideggerian terms and Grisóstomo is inauthentic. At the end of her life, Melibea has resolved all anxiety into resoluteness and is determined to live life in her own terms. Grisóstomo, however, dies inauthentically, full of anxiety and subject to the will of Others. He never leaves the influence of others to live a life of his own determination.

Keywords: Martin Heidegger, authenticity, inauthenticity, phenomenology, *La Celestina*, Fernando de Rojas, Melibea, *Don Quijote de la Mancha*, Miguel de Cervantes, Grisóstomo, Marcela

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Heideggerian Authenticity in *La Celestina* and *Don Quijote de la Mancha*

Introduction

Martin Heidegger's philosophy is based on a phenomenological approach. He purports to describe the concept of Being with the focus on the individual experience of Being. His concept of existential authenticity is the ability of the individual to live in the world according to her own desires, outside of the influence of others. We see the influence of Heideggerian authenticity in Spanish literature from medieval times until now. Heidegger explains the philosophy, but it is through the literature that it is understood.

This study will examine two protagonists from Spanish literature using the lens of Heideggerian authenticity. The two examples are Melibea in *La Celestina*, by Fernando de Rojas, and Grisóstomo in the episode of Marcela and Grisóstomo in *Don Quijote de la Mancha*, by Miguel de Cervantes. Both die by suicide, but we will see that Melibea is an authentic character in Heideggerian terms and that Grisóstomo is inauthentic. No study is needed to show the inauthenticity of Grisóstomo—it is obvious using feminist criticism alone. However, the authenticity of Melibea is not as obvious. Critics have written of Melibea in terms of authenticity and of inauthenticity. Does she act under her own will, or is she subject to the wills of others? Some say that she is subject to a spell and acts according to the wills of other people. Other critics claim that she is merely playing the role of courtly love which prescribe her actions in accordance with long-established rhetoric. Still others write that Melibea acts according to her own self-determination. This study argues that Melibea lives an authentic life subject only to her own will and desires and is an authentic character according to the philosophy of Heidegger. Putting the question of Melibea's authenticity in Heideggerian terms and contrasting her with the inauthenticity of Grisóstomo provides a clear focus on her authentic character.

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger explains his existential philosophy. He describes the human being, whom he names *Dasein*, in phenomenological terms. The essence of existence is explained in relation to the experience of an individual human being who finds herself as a “Being-in-the-world.” In the world, she encounters other beings like her, which Heidegger calls “the they,” “*das man*” or “the Other.” The natural experience of the human being is to live under the influence of Others. Heidegger says that such a life is not authentic. He views the collective voice of Others as falseness and as the source of anxiety in the individual being. To have an authentic life requires a modification of the natural life. To do so, one must reject the voice and control of Others.

We see the authenticity of Melibea clearly, her resoluteness and her complete lack of anxiety, upon comparing her with the inauthentic character of Grisóstomo. Grisóstomo’s final poem shows a man filled with anxiety and inauthenticity—whereas Melibea’s final speech shows a woman full of resoluteness. Anxiety and self-determination are markers that Heidegger uses to denote inauthenticity and authenticity. A comparison of Melibea with Grisóstomo through the lens of Heideggerian authenticity shows the self-determination of Melibea and the lack of self-determination of Grisóstomo. Furthermore, Melibea’s death is the death of one who sees her potentiality for Being and is an authentic death. Grisóstomo’s death, on the other hand, is inauthentic—he never sees his own potentiality.

From the very beginnings of philosophy, philosophers have dealt with the question of Being. All philosophers prior to Heidegger viewed the concept of Being from the purely scientific perspective of describing the Being of things in terms of their existence. For example, the philosopher would describe the Being of an object in terms of its size or other physical features. Their ontologies were oriented towards nature (Heidegger, *Being* 47). The ontology of

Parmenides was that things show themselves for what they are and that the resulting truth about the entity is its Being. He associated Being with a “...perspective understanding of Being” and truth (256). Plato and Aristotle continued this ontology by looking at Being as an investigation of the nature of objects (21, 30). But they did not differentiate the human being from other types of entities. Their views of Being were based on an approach whereby objects were first described using an understanding of the principles of natural science. St. Augustine realized that such an approach was unsatisfactory, leaving him to proclaim, “But what is closer to me than myself?” Yet his efforts to describe Being in other terms left him frustrated. He concluded, “I have become to myself a land of trouble and inordinate sweat” (69, 489). In modern times, Descartes described Being using the same ontology. His *cogito ergo sum* concept of Being involved two different structures. First, there is that which thinks or the “I” that thinks. Second, there is that which exists. But Descartes did not examine the thinking being further in terms of its Being (44). Heidegger claims that Descartes got the *cogito* part right but failed to even attempt to explain the *sum* part (71).

Heidegger set out to “...destroy the traditional content of ancient ontology” (44), and he describes the concept of Being using a different approach. Rather than describing Being in scientific terms, he describes it in terms of the phenomenon of the individual who experiences what it is like to be. To Heidegger, the essence of existence is explained in relation to the life experience of the individual who finds herself as a “Being-in-the-world.” Being in the world is the totality of what one finds in life. He based his analysis on the concept of phenomenology, as developed by Edmund Husserl, and the concept of the lifeworld, as developed by Wilhelm Dilthey. His main concern was not to discuss the Being of all things; rather he focused on the

Being of the human individual which is the being that is concerned about her own Being (236). As such, the individual views her Being only in phenomenological terms.

Dilthey looked at life from a historical, social and humanistic viewpoint in which human life cannot be separated from the world. Husserl expanded on Dilthey's work and wrote of a new philosophy of phenomenology, which seeks a method of investigation of a subjective conscious state. Husserl taught that all philosophical questions must be looked at from a phenomenological point of view. Heidegger defines phenomenology as looking at something directly and discussing it as is (59). With such a view, one describes an object in terms of "how" it is rather than what it is (50). For example, one may understand color through a scientific explanation of light rays; but a phenomenological understanding of color is obtained by discussing what it feels like to the individual who sees color. Heidegger writes that "Only as phenomenology, is ontology possible" (60). By looking at the question of Being from a phenomenological approach, the essence of Being can be discovered for what it is (60). Heidegger's method is to look at each fundamental aspect of the human individual and break it down to the existential item from which individual cannot be separated. Only in phenomenology can the Being of the individual be seen and understood ontologically. He maintains that one must view Being through the lens of the life experience to gain any meaning at all.

For an analysis of Being to be meaningful, one must distinguish between different entities to determine to what entity the significance of Being is the most important. To Heidegger, an "entity" is "something which is" (22). But the Being of inanimate objects is not the Being of a human being. We must be able to distinguish between entities in the discussion of Being. Heidegger focused his enquiry to the Being of the human individual, whom he names *Dasein*, and not about that of other entities. Philosophy before Heidegger did not distinguish between

entities in its ontology. To Plato and Aristotle, the Being of a human is no different than the Being of a stone. Because of that, Heidegger wrote, the basic state of *Dasein* is still “covered-up” (248). Heidegger describes the concept of Being using a different approach. He puts the question of Being in the context of how *Dasein* phenomenologically experiences it and indicates that an ontological analysis of a Being cannot be accomplished by considering the individual human being as just another entity; rather, the individual is a being that understands its Being (244).

Heidegger’s investigation into the Being of *Dasein* is centered on the existential structures of *Dasein*. The existentials refer to those fundamental aspects of *Dasein* that are *a priori* to *Dasein* and which cannot be separated from her. No discussion of the Being of *Dasein* can be had without consideration of the existentials. Heidegger discusses the existentials that together form the basis for the ontological understanding of the individual human being. He writes that the greatest of all the existentials is Being-in-the-world (78). The world is not to be thought of as the planet Earth or the physical world in which we live; rather, the world is only understood in the context of an existential of Being. Scientifically, Being-in-the-world means that the individual exists physically. But, the world is an ontological structure rather than something that we see and touch. Heidegger describes the concept of the world to be “...the totality of those entities which can be present-at-hand within the world” (93). The world is the place wherein the individual lives.

Dilthey was the first to describe living in the world as one of the fundamental categories of human life. He wrote of the experience of the reality of the world and expressed reality in terms of resistance (252). Resistance of the world is how *Dasein* experiences the world. The world of Heidegger is expressed in the “average everydayness” of the world of the individual

(37-38). The individual always understands her existence in a certain way and that way is Being-in-the-world (245). Her reality is that she cannot be separated from the world, she and the world are together from the beginning. The sense that the individual has of Being-in-the-world is *a priori* to any other understanding. Her consciousness which is inside herself and the reality of the external world both constitute her essence.

Authenticity and inauthenticity to Heidegger relate to how the individual reacts to other people she associates with in the world. As a Being-in-the-world, the individual finds that she is not alone and that she lives with other beings like herself, whom Heidegger calls “Others,” “*das man*,” or “the ‘they’” (149-50). These Others are different from other entities in the world because they are of the same nature as the individual. As an individual interacts with Others, differences appear in the interaction, and a distance—what Heidegger calls a “distantiality”—develops between them. The individual notices the distance and attempts to shorten it by moving herself towards the Others, causing the individual to lose part of herself and become subject to them. Her manner of living in the world is subjugated to them and she acts as they do. She does not have her own individual experience of the world.

The individual views her relationship with Others either as being behind them and trying to “catch up,” or as being ahead of them and trying to keep them suppressed. Heidegger writes:

But this distantiality which belongs to Being-with, is such that Dasein, as everyday Being-with-one-another, stands in *subjection* to Others. It itself *is* not; it’s Being has been taken away by the Others. Dasein’s everyday possibilities of Being are for the Others to dispose of as they please. These Others, moreover, are not *definite* Others. On the contrary, any Other can represent them. What is decisive is just that inconspicuous domination by Others which has already been taken over unawares from Dasein as

Being-with. One belongs to the Others oneself and enhances their power. 'The Others' whom one thus designates to cover up the fact of one's belonging to them essentially oneself, are those who proximally and for the most part 'are there' in everyday Being-with-one-another. The "who" is not this one, not that one, not oneself, not some people, and not the sum of them all. The 'who' is the neuter, *the "they"* [*das Man*]. (164)

The Others become a dictatorship. The individual is judged not by what the world gives to her but by what she gives to the world. The individual has lost her ownness and is entangled in a world of useless understanding. Heidegger explains, "We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as *they* take pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art as *they* see and judge; likewise we shrink back from the 'great mass' as *they* shrink back; we find 'shocking' what *they* find shocking" (164). This is the kind of Being that the individual becomes in her everydayness. The "they" are the basic state of her Being-in-the-world. The "they" maintains itself based on the averageness of everyday life which averageness Heidegger calls an existential characteristic of the "they." This averageness "levels down" every possibility of Being (165). By becoming part of the "they," the individual "disburdens" herself of all agency and responsibility. Heidegger states that thereby the "who" of *Dasein* becomes "nobody" (166). But the fact that the everyday average life is attributable to nobody does not mean that the "they" is nothing. Heidegger maintains that this is the reality of the Being of *Dasein* (166).

The human individual leads an inauthentic life by being part of the "they." The group holds power over the individual. While succumbing to that power, the individual loses her ownness. This is what Heidegger means by inauthenticity. The inauthentic life is the natural state in which the individual finds herself. Heidegger describes the everyday inauthentic life of the "they" as the falling of the individual because she is lost in the "they" (219-20). She likewise

is thrown into the world and must work to gain an authentic life by taking charge of her own life while she awaits her death. *Dasein* can find freedom by fleeing from her fallen state. She does so by facing herself and turning away from Others. An authentic life requires the individual to modify the natural state and take charge of her own self (166-168). To live authentically, she must reject the influence of Others and take charge of her own life while she seeks her own potentiality. Releasing oneself from the power of Others towards one's self-determination is Heideggerian authenticity.

Heidegger argues that the individual lives in a state of anxiety, which is part of Being-in-the-world. He distinguishes anxiety from fear. Fear is the state of mind of concern for some harmful entity within the world that may come from a definite possibility. On the other hand, anxiety does not arise from any entity in the world. Anxiety arises from the individual seeing that authenticity is a possibility. He states that "Anxiety individualizes *Dasein* for its ownmost Being-in-the world, which... projects itself essentially upon possibilities" (232). The projection of possibilities comes only through anxiety. Anxiety makes it conceivable for the individual to be free to choose her own Being. The individualization that results from that freedom separates her from Others and, in Heidegger's words, it brings "Dasein face to face with its world as world" and to "itself as a Being-in-the-world" (233).

Heidegger states that anxiety is a state of "uncanniness," by which he means "not-being-at-home" (233). The human being is not at home in the "they," or she is not authentic.

Heidegger further states:

This uncanniness pursues *Dasein* constantly, and is a threat to its everyday lostness in the "they", though not explicitly. This threat can go together factually with complete assurance and self-sufficiency in one's everyday concern. Anxiety can arise in the most

innocuous Situations. Nor does it have any need for darkness, in which it is commonly easier for one to feel uncanny. In the dark there is emphatically “nothing” to see, though the very world itself is *still* ‘there’, and ‘there’ *more obtrusively*. (234)

The uncanniness that *Dasein* feels in its anxiety is the source of *Dasein*’s possibility for authenticity. Heidegger explains, “But in anxiety there lies the possibility of disclosure which is quite distinctive; for anxiety individualizes. This individualization brings *Dasein* back from its falling and makes manifest to it that authenticity and inauthenticity are possibilities of its Being” (235).

While anxiety makes it possible for the individual to be aware of her falling into the “they,” it is resoluteness that helps her choose her own authenticity and her own kind of Being. If the individual is to throw off the inauthentic life, she must allow anxiety to lead to resoluteness and bring herself to make a choice. In her basic state of Being-in-the-world, no choice is needed because Others have made all the decisions. Anxiety may or may not lead to resoluteness; but if it does do so, the individual finds truth in her own authenticity and thus becomes free. Heidegger writes:

When *Dasein* thus brings itself back from the “they”, the they-self is modified in an existentiell manner so that it becomes *authentic* Being-one’s-Self. This must be accomplished by *making up for not choosing*. But “making up” for not choosing signifies *choosing to make this choice*—deciding for a potentiality-for-Being, and making this decision from one’s own Self” (313).

Howard N. Tuttle explains it this way:

Dasein must be resolved to the fact that it is at once its own possibilities *and* a falling short of them. This condition creates in *Dasein* an anxiety over its own imperfections and

finitude—and this very anxiety provides a ... means ... for authenticity and retrieval of the self from the nullification by the crowd.... In anxiety and guilt, through resoluteness and conscience, *Dasein* appropriates its freedom to become its authentic own-ness; its bondage to the crowd is released through its disclosure of its finite possibilities. In the call of conscience, guilt, and anxiety it resolutely creates a life that belongs to itself and not to the “they.” Released from the distractions of the “they,” it becomes a freedom toward its own death. (76)

It is through anxiety, conscience and resoluteness that *Dasein* finds truth in her own authenticity and thus becomes free.

The individual is a being in time and her life is connected to time. One cannot understand Being by ignoring time. As the human being lives through time, she interprets the world to gain an understanding of meaning and truth. Because she is thrown into her circumstances, the past and the present of her understanding of the world has been interpreted already for her by Others. Her possibilities have been “dimmed down” and her concern has become “blind to its possibilities.” However, the future still belongs to her. Heidegger argues that the tranquilization of *Dasein* by the opinions of the “they” does not mean that *Dasein*’s possibilities are gone, merely modified (239). The understanding of the individual is always ahead of herself. Heidegger referred to this as “...understanding as self-projective Being towards its ownmost potentiality-for-Being” (236). The past and the present are set by the “they” while the future is in the control of the individual.

There are three dimensions of time: the past, the present, and the future. The past is an existential part of the Being of the human individual. She deals with her past to understand it. The totality of her past is what brings her to the present. The present is fleeting and constantly

turning into the past, and the future is constantly turning into the present. But she is always considering the future with anticipation. The future is the horizon. She uses the present to correct her past as she considers the future and its possibilities.

The individual is in the process of dying from the moment of her birth, and if she is alive, she has potential for being something she is not (276). When Heidegger speaks of death, he does not refer to anything beyond the world or to any life after this life. He speaks of death at the end of the experience of this life as part of Being-in-the-world. Additionally, he does not speak of death as a goal or of anyone who is looking towards an end. Rather, Heidegger's *Dasein* is a "Being-towards-death" when she seeks her potentiality before she dies (277). Such a Being is looking to her end as she looks to her potential, a possibility for each person and a representation of the individual's authentic state. Heidegger writes that once confronted with her death, the individual flees from it (297-98). "Fleeing in the face of death" means to be a fugitive from that fact; it is always someone else who dies, but never "me." The individual publicly denies her own death, knowing that it will come. Each case of death is that of someone else—it is never her death. That which dies is "nobody" (297). Her own death will come, but not yet. A Being-relative-to-death is a fugitive relative to its death. Heidegger writes:

To maintain oneself in this truth— that is, to be certain of what has been disclosed— demands all the more that one should anticipate. We cannot compute the certainty of death by ascertaining how many cases of death we encounter. This certainty is by no means of the kind which maintains itself in the truth of the present-at-hand. When something present-at-hand has been uncovered, it is encountered most purely if we just look at the entity and let it be encountered in itself. *Dasein* must first have lost itself in the factual circumstances (this can be one of care's own tasks and possibilities) if it is to

obtain the pure objectivity—that is to say, the indifference—of apodictic evidence. If Being-certain in relation to death does not have this character, this does not mean that it is of a lower grade, but that *it does not belong at all to the graded order of the kinds of evidence we can have about the present-at-hand.* (309)

The result is the same in each case. Each falling leads to an existence that is “towards-death.”

It is in the lifeworld and phenomenology of Dilthey and Husserl where the philosophy of Heidegger intersects with literature. Heidegger writes of Being in terms of the reality of the life experience of real human beings, whereas literature sometimes departs from reality. However, the two meet in the lifeworld where literature rarely departs from the phenomenon of the Being-in-the-world. Even when literature departs from the reality of natural law, it does not depart from the existential phenomenon the human being experiences in its Being. Heidegger explains Being in a piece of art, writing, “The art work opens up in its own way the Being of beings. This opening up, i.e., this deconcealing, i.e. the truth of beings, happens in the work. In the art work, the truth of what is has set itself to work. Art is truth setting itself to work” (“Origin” 38).

While a piece of literature may depart from the reality of physics, it does not depart from the reality of Being. We see examples of this in fantastic literature as well as in science fiction. For example, in *El Burlador de Sevilla*, Tirso de Molina describes the death of Don Juan Tenorio in fantastic terms—he dines with the statue of Don Gonzalo who subsequently pulls him into his tomb (196-99). This is totally contrary to how death happens in nature. The literature departs from reality; however, the phenomenon of how an individual faces death does not. Don Juan denies the reality of his death, or as Heidegger wrote, he flees “in the face of death” until the very moment of that death. At that moment he proclaims, “¡Muerto soy!” (199). Before that moment, Don Juan is an inauthentic character in that he sees no potentiality of change as he

awaits death—he is not a Being-towards-death. Throughout the work whenever anyone discusses death, Don Juan declares “¡Qué largo me lo fiáis!” (119). He knows that he will die, but not for a long time—it is not a reality to him at that time. Clearly Don Juan denies his death. He is a character placed in fantastic literature who flees from his death the way Heidegger argues that the inauthentic human being does.

A second example of the departure from reality in literature while maintaining truth in the lifeworld is found in *Cien años de soledad* by Gabriel García Márquez. At the death of José Arcadio Buendía, “Un hilo de sangre salió por debajo de la puerta” (163). His blood ran through the street until it came to the door of his mother, Ursula, where it took a right turn and entered her house. This is how Ursula became aware of the death of her son. This is literature of magical realism, and it describes a scene that does not occur in reality. However, the symbolism of blood running through the street as testimony of death is truth to the experience of the human being in the lifeworld. We may see news of someone dying in war or in a school shooting; however, it is the fact of their blood that brings the truth of their deaths to us.

A final example comes from science fiction in the novel *Lágrimas en la lluvia* by Rosa Montero where Bruna Husky is an android. Her life is almost like that of a human being, but not quite. One major difference is that she knows the exact moment of her death and counts down the years, months, and days periodically throughout the text. She knows the date of her death because the androids in the novel are all programmed to die at a certain point of their existence. In reality, human beings do not know the exact moment of their deaths. However, in the science fiction world of the novel, Bruna Husky is an authentic Being-towards-death. The first line of the text reads, “Bruna despertó sobresaltada y recordó que iba a morir” (11). She sees the potential for change and pursues her life to make changes that she sees as important.

These are just a few examples from Hispanic literature where fictitious characters living in a fictitious world act in ways congruent with the lifeworld of the human experience. Certainly, the same can be said for *La Celestina* and *Don Quijote de la Mancha*, which are examples of Golden Age literature in which the literary art departs from the reality of the physical world yet bears truth of the human experience. The remainder of this study will examine these two latter works.

The chapters that follow examine the authenticity of Melibea in *La Celestina* and the inauthenticity of Grisóstomo in the episode of Grisóstomo and Marcela in *Don Quijote de la Mancha* using the language of Heideggerian authenticity as outlined above. Chapter 1 examines the role of Melibea and demonstrate that her death, by her own hand, is an act of Heideggerian authenticity. At the end, Melibea has the complete absence of any anxiety and she acts out of resoluteness. Chapter 2 considers the role of Grisóstomo and argues that his death, also by his own hand, is an example of Heideggerian inauthenticity. Grisóstomo ends his life with an overwhelming amount of anxiety and a complete lack of resoluteness, as explained by Heidegger. The chapter then contrasts Melibea's words and actions with those of Grisóstomo to demonstrate that Melibea's acts and death are authentic, that she acts according to her own will and desires, and not subject to the wills of any other person or influence. On the other hand, Grisóstomo's acts and death are inauthentic; his actions are influenced and controlled by Others.

Chapter 1. The Authenticity of Melibea in *La Celestina*

Melibea from *La Celestina* is an example of an individual who exhibits authenticity from a Heideggerian viewpoint. At the beginning of the work, Melibea gives ambiguous signals, both to Calisto and to the reader. At the end of the work, she dies of her own hand. However, prior to doing so, she has resolved all anxiety into resoluteness. She is the Heideggerian example of a Being-towards-death.

There are, however, many interpretations of an inauthenticity relating to Melibea's actions. Not only do other characters in the work wish to control her, but even we, five hundred years later, want to have a say in how she acts. Some critics interpret Melibea as an inauthentic individual. Examples of interpretations of inauthenticity include those that claim that the work is a commentary on the cultural society of the times (Round), that it is literature of courtly love (Green), or that it is literature of spells and magic (Deyermond). Other critics say that Melibea is authentic in that she determines her own destiny and not that chosen by others (Calvo). This study argues that Melibea exemplifies Heideggerian authenticity and that she leaves the influence of those around her, determining her own destiny. She does show signs of inauthenticity at the beginning of the work; however, the fact that one begins in a state of inauthenticity does not preclude one from ending authentically. Indeed, Being-in-the-world makes it impossible to not begin with an inauthentic life. Heidegger explains that all individuals begin in inauthentic states and that it is the process of anxiety leading to resoluteness that allows the individual to see the future as a potential for authenticity. This is certainly true in Melibea's case.

The first act of the tragicomedy in Melibea's garden is an allegory for the rest of the work. The garden is surrounded by a wall and Melibea is enclosed in this space. She does not have her own space in life; she is enclosed in the space prescribed by her father. As such, she

lives innocently. The garden is a *locus amoenus* and a metaphor of Melibea's innocence.

Calisto enters the garden in pursuit of his falcon and finds Melibea there inside. He enters without an invitation and invades the space provided for her by her father. Calisto immediately falls in love with Melibea, elevating her to a goddess. He speaks of her perfect beauty as a gift to him. Ostensibly, this is the first time Calisto has seen Melibea and he only sees her for a few moments. Yet later, as he describes her to his servant Sempronio, he gives complete details of all aspects of her face and body. Calisto idealizes Melibea and falls in love with her illogically.

Melibea rejects Calisto's advances but gives him ambiguous signals. Her first rejection is with these words: "Pues aun más ygual galardón te daré yo si perseveras" (212). Calisto is indeed there seeking a prize. Peter Russell explains that Melibea uses the term "prize" as a threat and that Calisto intentionally misunderstands her (Russell, note 18, 212). There is no doubt that Russell is correct in his interpretation. However, one must not miss the ambiguity and irony of Melibea's reference to the greater prize. In the end, she does give Calisto the greater prize that he pretends to expect. Dorothy Severin makes a slightly different interpretation of Melibea's rejection. For Severin, Melibea is playing a role pertaining to courtly love and refers to the gift the lady gives her pursuer. Severin writes, "Aquí Melibea parece hacer un uso sarcástico de uno de los elementos primordiales del amor cortés, el del galardón o prenda de amor que premia la devoción del amante" (Severin, note 6, 87). These different interpretations of Melibea's words demonstrate that she speaks ambiguously; not only does Calisto interpret them as he wishes, but readers and critics do so also.

In a second rejection, Melibea further rebuffs Calisto's advances saying, "Calisto, ha seydo de ingenio de tal hombre como tú haver de salir para se perder en la virtud de tal muger como yo. ¡Vete, vete de ay, torpe: que no puede mi paciencia tollerar que aya subido en coraçón

humano conmigo el ilícito amor comunicar su deleyte!” (213). Russell gives his interpretation of Melibea’s words as, “tu propósito, Calisto, ha sido tal como del ingenio de un hombre como tú se tenía que esperar, pero tus palabras sólo salen para echarse a perder ante la virtud de tal mujer como yo” (Russell, note 20, 213). A. Millares Carlo and José Ignacio Mantecón also comment on this phrase saying, “La frase significa: ‘que a ningún corazón humano se le haya ocurrido que un amor ilícito pueda comunicar conmigo su deleite” (Carlo, note 2, 39). While Melibea’s words contain a clear rejection of Calisto’s advances, they are also ambiguous. Is she saying that no one like him should dare speak with her, thereby spoiling her virtue; or is she telling him that he only needs to have patience and engage a go-between to accomplish his desires? Note that Melibea does not criticize Calisto’s desire for illicit love, only that he communicates it directly to her.

The ambiguity of the opening act enables critics to interpret the text differently. While some critics focus on the control the other protagonists in the work maintain on Melibea, others focus on the liberating actions that she takes. This study will demonstrate that both viewpoints are valid using Heideggerian language. While the work begins with Melibea as a subject totally within the control of Others, it ends with her taking responsibility for her own being.

Nicholas Round comments that *La Celestina* has been interpreted as a moral teaching but that “Alternatively we may take it as testament of raw human experience, whose corrosive doubt and pessimism make nonsense of all traditional categories” (38). His interpretation takes the work in the context of the medieval society in which the story takes place. Round maintains that the text is a parody that is understood by two different perspectives. The moral understanding is that all the protagonists are immoral and that is the cause of all the deaths at the end of the book. Round maintains that there is opposition between moral norms and actual social conduct.

However, he explains that the book has few references to moral values (39). His perspective is that the work is about Celestina and that she is an integral part of her society and an equal with all others in it. The text speaks of greed and fortune and explains that money is what makes society function (50). Calisto has money and his role in the society is to circulate his wealth. The new social order of the era requires it. Celestina's role is important because she ensures that the wealth is circulated. Without her, Calisto's wealth would remain with him and the economy would not advance. This interpretation of the text does not question morality or immorality. Neither does it question authenticity or inauthenticity. It is a commentary on how the society functions. The role of Melibea herself is of little importance in this interpretation.

In a different interpretation, Otis Green writes in "La furia de Melibea" that Melibea and Calisto are actors in roles of courtly love, each playing the roles assigned. Such an interpretation is one of inauthenticity in Melibea's actions. In Heideggerian terms, she is controlled, inauthentically, by the will of Others in a role prescribed by Others. Green attributes Melibea's strong rejections as her acting pursuant to the rules that govern this literature (1). Courtly love was well understood by the readers of the time. From the opening scene, the reader does not really know Melibea's true feelings towards Calisto because both of her rejections are made in accordance with these rules of courtly love. She is merely playing her role. She controls her actions to be in accordance with rules set long beforehand by Others. She does not allow herself to deviate from these rules, possibly hiding her desires. Calisto, however, breaks these rules by conducting his love openly, without discretion (1). Speaking of the coming of his death, Green argues that "Calisto...prepara su propia muerte—sin confesión—por hacer caso omiso, no sólo de las reglas del amor caballeresco, sino también de los pecados mortales..." (1). Calisto's death is mixed up between the death he should have for damaging Melibea's honor and the death he

deserves for confessing to Melibea instead of to God. Melibea on the other hand complies with her role of courtly love. Her death, therefore, must be by her own hand.

Alan Deyermond makes a different but equally compelling argument to show that each of the protagonists, including Melibea, does not act in self-determined ways. Melibea and Calisto are victims of the tragedy just as Celestina is. Deyermond writes of Celestina's threads, Melibea's cord, and Calisto's chain as metaphors, each having similar forms (6-7). Celestina spins her threads to sell to Melibea. Melibea's cord is the belt that she wears around her body to secure her clothing. She gives the cord to Celestina in exchange for the threads. Later, Calisto gives his chain to Celestina in exchange for the cord. These objects evoke the image of hunting and remind us of Calisto with his falcon finding Melibea as his prize. Just as the principal theme of *La Celestina* is Calisto's hunting for Melibea, these objects bring potent images. It is through these instruments that Calisto traps Melibea. He is the hunter, she the prize; and Celestina helps Calisto set the trap. Melibea herself has no say in the matter. Deyermond writes that this is a hunt of lust and greed and each is a victim. After touching these objects, each of the three protagonists changes. At the beginning, Melibea is chaste. She rejects Calisto. She only falls in love with him after touching the threads. Deyermond writes that Melibea symbolically gives herself to Celestina as she gives her cord (8). Celestina has anointed the threads with snake oil and has put a spell on them (Rojas 290). She asks the Devil to be in the threads until Melibea purchases them. Deyermond writes, "The Devil has been told to remain in the skein until Melibea has bought it, the implication being that he can then leave it; and this is what he seems to do. He takes possession of Melibea's will, inflaming her with desire for Calisto...." (7). It is because of the spell that Melibea falls in love with Calisto. Deyermond's interpretation is one of involuntary action on Melibea's part. She acts according to Celestina's will. This is complete

inauthenticity in Heideggerian terms. Melibea is captive to the will of Others; she is completely influenced by them.

These are only a few examples of inauthenticity in Melibea's actions. There are, however, other interpretations of the work that involve authentic actions—interpretations that show that Melibea acts according to her own self-determination. One interpretation of authenticity in Melibea's and Calisto's action is the idea that the work centers on the cultural conflict between Catholic tradition and Jewish *conversos*. Some critics claim that Celestina's service as a go-between is necessary because Melibea's father Pleberio is a *converso* precluding her from marrying Calisto who comes from an old Catholic line. Segundo Serrano Poncela writes of hidden keys in the text itself. He cites passages which note Calisto's "*clara sangre*" and his "*claro linaje*." Serrano Poncela maintains that *La Celestina* "...es la historia de los difíciles amores entre *un cristiano viejo* de 'noble linaje, claro ingenio, gentil disposición y linda crianza' llamado Calisto y una *judía perversa* de nombre Melibea" (493). He contends that both participated in the affair "...voluntariamente en una clara situación de desafío antisocial que, a tropicónes con toda clase de dificultades, termina con la muerte" (491). Serrano Poncela speaks of a secret in the work—that Melibea's father is a *converso*. He maintains that Melibea and Calisto already know each other before the encounter in the garden. Each desires to love the other voluntarily and they keep their love secret (501). Celestina's role is to facilitate the open expression of their love.

Alvaro Custodio, writing in response to Serrano Poncela's arguments, points out that the use of go-betweens was common and natural in these times and was used to merely enable the two lovers to communicate. Custodio sees no need to invent any racial or other impediments in the work (210). He writes, "No creo que haga falta buscar otra explicación a la clandestinidad

de los amores de Calixto y Melibea que la rotunda negativa de la doncella, muy dentro del pudor femenino ante tan brusca e inusitada declaración—tras de saltar las tapias de su huerto—en la primera escena de la obra” (209). Custodio argues that Melibea knows from the first encounter in the garden that Calisto wants an illicit relationship with her. She is not fooled nor is she play acting. She knows from the very beginning what the relationship will be. When she submits to him she does so knowing all the facts. For Custodio, Melibea and Calisto are two lovers who sin and continue doing so until Calisto falls and dies. She is not controlled by others in her actions either by the rules of the courtly love of a previous era or the magic and snake oil of Celestina. Melibea makes her own decisions and lives through the actions of those decisions. In this interpretation, the authenticity of Melibea is undeniable. She moves within the work authentically, in pursuit of her own desires despite the cultural bans of Others. This is Melibea’s manner of Being-in-the-world. It is not about her parents, or her morality, or Celestina’s magic. Melibea is an authentic Being. If her death is the result of her dissent of society, then it is an authentic death.

Calisto’s death came as a complete surprise to him. He never contemplated his own death. His was an inauthentic death much like Grisóstomo’s in *Don Quijote de la Mancha*. Calisto falls from the ladder his servants had placed on the garden wall at the time of his last visit with Melibea. On falling, he calls for confession and divine help saying, “¡O, válame santa María! ¡Muerto soy! ¡Confesión!” (574). He asks for confession at the exact moment of his death. He had not thought of his own death until its occurrence. A significant aspect of Calisto’s death is that it occurred in the same place as the drama began—the wall of Melibea’s garden. At the beginning of the tragicomedy, Calisto does not pay attention to God or to his death. When Sempronio asks if he (Calisto) is Christian, Calisto’s response is “Yo

melibeo soy y a Melibea adoro y en Melibea creo y a Melibea amo” (220). His only focus is Melibea. Only now, at the moment of his demise, does he consider death. Prior to that moment he had no thoughts as to the possibility of his own potentiality-for-Being.

This is not the case with Melibea. Of all the deaths in the work, it is that of Melibea that is authentic. Even as she takes her own life, Melibea is the only character in the work who looks at the future of her life in terms of its potentiality. The fact that her death is by suicide is of no importance in this context. Nevertheless, Melibea does not always manifest this authenticity throughout the entire work; rather, she transforms as the work progresses.

Melibea begins in the work as a two-dimensional character, a beautiful woman, an object to be admired, valued for her physical beauty. Descriptions of her in the work emphasize her body. In Calisto’s mind, she is an object of beauty; but to others, she is repulsive. In act IX, Areúsa describes Melibea using language and images completely opposite to those Calisto had previously used as he described her to Sempronio. Whereas Calisto had said that Melibea’s head was as fine gold and that its beauty is enough to convert men into stones (230-31), Areúsa now says that her beauty comes from her wealth and not from the beauty of her body (408). Calisto had described her breasts as small and now Areúsa describes them saying that they appear as if she had borne three children and that they look like two large pumpkins. Each describes Melibea without really knowing who she is. Françoise Maurizi points out that Calisto has described Melibea in terms of the Medieval archetype of the woman (59). If Calisto’s description is an idealization, then Areúsa’s description is the opposite of the ideal. Maurizi also notes that neither Calisto nor Areúsa have seen the covered parts of Melibea’s body. These ideas of Melibea are different imaginations of her, neither description is accurate. Both Calisto and Areúsa wish to cast Melibea according to their own desires. Celestina wishes to do so also.

Maurizi writes that Melibea transforms herself and that she can be the damsel in the garden that Calisto desires as well as the old ugly woman of Areúsa's liking (60). He writes of the dethroning of Melibea saying, "La doncella 'graciosa y gentil' destronizada por los denuestos viene a ser una figura de carnaval, un espantapájaros, un pelele objeto de las burlas del pueblo que lo puede dejar maltrecho verbal y físicamente" (66). In Heideggerian terms, Melibea is stripped of everything she is to be made into the object of the liking of Others. She is valued, or not valued, by their perceptions of her. The inverse is not true, as her perceptions of herself are of no meaning. She has no right to be what she is to herself.

As the tragicomedy progresses, the reader begins to see beyond the body that Calisto desires and understands other dimensions of Melibea as an individual—as a specific *Dasein*. Melibea changes from an individual controlled by the wills of Others to one who authentically determines her own life. Yadira Calvo gives an interpretation of Melibea as a self-determined individual and notes the point of her transformation. She writes that Melibea is the representation of a woman of her times subjugated by her society. Calvo contends that a chaste woman of the times must also be an inexperienced and ignorant woman. Melibea is the prototype of this chaste woman (83). For Calvo, all the protagonists who interact with Melibea represent the consensus of other people. "Melibea," writes Calvo, "es vista como un ser pasivo cuyo destino depende enteramente de la voluntad de los demás" (85). Everyone asserts the common voice on her. Calvo particularly mentions Alisa, Melibea's mother, in this regard. Pleberio, her father, at least wishes that Melibea has some say in whom she will marry. Alisa counters that Melibea knows nothing about men or marriage therefore she cannot participate in such a decision (83).

Melibea transforms herself from an inexperienced woman to one of self-determination midway through the work, in her first soliloquy. At this point, she realizes that she is not free

and shows signs of anxiety. She worries about the judgment of Others, particularly her servant Lucrecia, who has witnessed Melibea's actions. Melibea expresses regret for her actions saying, "¡O lastimada de mí! ¡O mal proveída donzella!" (Rojas 426). Calvo believes that the anxiety Melibea feels here is caused by society's different treatment of women versus men in this regard. She quotes Melibea speaking to Lucrecia saying, "¿Por qué no fue también a las hembras concedido poder descubrir su congoxoso y ardiente amor, como a los varones? ¡Que ni Calisto viviera quexoso, ni yo penada! (Rojas 427). Melibea's anxiety, in Calvo's view, comes from the subjugation her society has over her. Heidegger would also agree. This is the critical moment for Melibea, according to Calvo, as she begins making her own decisions at this point. She writes, "Melibea ha llegado, pues a un momento crítico: es entonces cuando se subleva contra la moral establecida y toma su primera decisión. A partir de este momento empezamos a sentir respeto por ella: por el valor de enfrentar su propia voluntad a la voluntad del grupo" (86-87). It is interesting that Calvo points out that Melibea's self-determination begins with the expression of her anxiety. Calvo views Melibea as a woman who matures through the course of the work. Her suicide is an act of free will and the culmination of the metamorphosis of her personality. Melibea does not die as an act of her sin, she dies in an act of her liberty (89).

Calvo's analysis of Melibea comes from a feminist viewpoint; however, the anxiety leading to Melibea's self-determination can also be viewed in terms of Melibea worrying about the judgement of Others, particularly her servant Lucrecia. In Heideggerian terms, this self-determination is authenticity and the rejection of the group is the rejection of the "they." Melibea's anxiety works in her to eventually give her resoluteness. Lucrecia has witnessed Melibea's actions. Melibea expresses her worries of Lucrecia's judgement saying, "¡O mi fiel criada Lucrecia! ¿Qué dirás de mí, qué pensarás de mi seso, quando me veas publicar lo que a ti

jamás he querido descubrir? ¡Cómo te espantarás del rompimiento de mi honestidad y vergüenza que siempre como encerrada donzella acostumbré tener!” (Rojas 426). She is looking at her actions through the lens of Lucrecia’s judgement, and she is uncertain about what she has done. This uncertainty does not come from her own point of view; it is true anxiety expressed from the viewpoint of Others. Heidegger writes that it is anxiety that leads the individual to the moment of being able to question herself about her inauthenticity (*Being* 235). The questioning allows the individual to see her potential for an authentic life. This happens to Melibea here in this scene and is a clearing for Melibea. Her anxiety has led her to question herself as an object of Others, and her anxiety diminishes. This is the beginning of her resoluteness.

By the time of her final scene at the end of the work as she speaks with her father, Melibea has resolved her anxiety completely into resoluteness. Lucrecia, however, has not. She wants to hide everything from Pleberio saying, “Llamaré a tu padre y fingiremos otro mal, pues éste no es para se poder encobrir” (578). Melibea will have none of it. She has decided on her actions and she will tell her father everything. Her death is not painful to her. From the top of the tower, she looks down on her father and says, “Mi fin es llegado, llegado es mi descanso y tu pasión, llegado es mi alivio y tu pena, llegada es mi acompañada hora y tu tiempo de soledad” (585). She clearly has no anxiety. She describes her imminent death to her father as an “*alegre partida*” (586). Later she calls her death “*mi agradable fin*” (589). Pleberio is distraught. Melibea, however, is resolute. She tells her father to control himself because she has something to tell him. She continues:

Si me escuchas sin lágrimas, oyrás la causa desesperada de mi forçada y alegre partida. No la interrumpas con lloro ni palabras, si no, quedarás más quexoso en no saber por qué me mato, que doloroso por verme muerta. Ninguna cosa me preguntes ni

respondas más de lo que de mi grado dezirte quisiere, porque, quando el corazón está embargado de pasión, están cerrados los oídos al consejo, y en tal tiempo las frutuosas palabras, en lugar de amansar, acrecientan la saña. (586)

Melibea loves Calisto. Her transformation to authenticity began in her garden. She decided that she wanted a life with him in Act I when she told him, “Pues aun más ygal galardón te daré yo si perseveras” (212). Just after his death, she says, “¿Cómo no gozé más del gozo? ¿Cómo tuve en tan poco la gloria que entre mis manos tove? ¡O ingratos mortales, jamás conocés vuestros bienes sino quando dellos carecéys!” (577). Melibea’s love for Calisto does not come from Celestina’s spell. In explaining her story to her father, Melibea tells him that she herself had told Celestina of her desire. This desire did not come from Celestina; it came from within Melibea. She tells her father:

Muchos días son passados, padre mío, que penava por mi amor un cavallero que se llamava Calisto, el qual tú bien conociste. Conociste assí mismo sus padres y claro linaje. Sus virtudes y bondad a todos eran manifiestas. Era tanta su pena de amor y tan poco el lugar para hablarme que descubrió su pasión a una astuta y sagaz muger, que llamavan Celestina. La qual, de su parte venida a mí, sacó mi secreto amor de mi pecho. Descubr[í] a ella lo que a mi querida madre encubría. Tovo manera como ganó mi querer; ordenó cómo su desseo [de Calisto] y el mío hoviessen efeto. (587-88)

This statement clarifies Celestina’s involvement. Because of the confinement of space, Melibea needed Celestina to make the love affair possible by facilitating the communication with Calisto. It was not Celestina’s serpent oil or Calisto’s chain that caused Melibea to love him; Melibea herself fell in love with Calisto. She was the architect of her own life. She chose to change her life from that of an innocent damsel to that of a woman in love; nobody forced her.

Melibea left a life figuratively enclosed in the garden when she chose to love Calisto. Once outside the garden metaphorically, she continues until she is outside physically. However, her only chance of escaping the garden is with her death. While she was having the affair with Calisto, Melibea was free, but she becomes an enclosed woman once again with his death. She tells her father (and herself) that she takes her life so that she can be with Calisto. However, her soliloquy as she ascends the steps of the tower reveals another motive—that she can only live a self-determined life by dying. Heidegger refers to an authentic being as one who understands her own potential as she approaches death. Death is the horizon, and the authentic individual looks to it as she exercises her own will. In Melibea's case, her father and her society have enclosed her, and she has no ability to change that. The only possibility of freedom other than her own death would be to take her father's life instead. This is what she considers, and rejects, as she walks up the steps to her death. She begins her soliloquy saying, "De todos soy dexada; bien se ha adereçado la manera de morir." How can she be abandoned by everyone? Doesn't she still have her family? As she continues her ascent, she cites various examples from world literature where some have killed members of their family while keeping himself or herself safe. She mentions Bursia, king of Bithynia, who killed his father for no reason at all; Ptolemy, king of Egypt, who killed his father, mother, brothers, and his wife for the love of a young girl; Orestes, who killed his mother, Clytemnestra; and Nero who killed his mother, Agrippina. Melibea reasons that these are guilty acts but that her own death brings no guilt. She speaks of others who killed their children while "quedando sus personas a salvo." The stated reason that Melibea gives for reviewing these murders is as a justification of her own death causing pain to her parents and shortening their lives saying, "Y caso que por mi morir a mis queridos padres sus días se disminuyesen, ¿quién dubda que no aya avido otros más crueles contra sus padres?"

(583). Melibea is reasoning that the pain her death will cause to her parents may shorten their lives, but others have been crueler than that—others have actually killed their parents. However, her reasoning doesn't make logical sense as she has already stated that everyone has left her, which would include her parents. A more logical interpretation of Melibea's thoughts here is that she is choosing to not kill her parents and choosing to kill herself instead. Her transformation to the potentiality of her life is with her own death (583-85).

In the moment that Melibea chooses to love Calisto, she affirms an authentic existence. In Heidegger's words, she becomes a "Being-towards-death" in that she looks to the future in terms of her own potentiality. Melibea rejects the "they." Alisa and Lucrecia had warned her not to see Calisto. Additionally, Pleberio would have prohibited it had he known. Melibea refuses to hear these voices. This is manifested in her confession to her father as she tells him of the affair. She says, "Vencida de su amor, dile entrada en tu casa. Quebrantó con escalas las paredes de tu huerto; quebrantó mi propósito. Perdí mi virginidad" (588). She is not confessing a sin, nor is she trying to hurt her father by repeating to him the very actions that he had prohibited. Rather she is saying that Calisto broke her purpose, but it was she herself that gave it to him. Melibea is saying that she has taken charge of the form of her own life—a life contrary to that which others would have her live. This is the reason why her death is authentic. She looked to the future and saw her own potentiality-for-being.

Chapter 2. The Authenticity of Marcela and the Inauthenticity of Grisóstomo in *Don Quijote de la Mancha*

The episode of Marcela and Grisóstomo, from part one, chapters XII to XIV of *Don Quijote de la Mancha*, can be viewed as an extended metaphor of Heideggerian authenticity. Marcela rejects the voice and influence of Others and decides for herself the life that she desires. Marcela, beautiful and rich, is pursued by many men, including Grisóstomo. Having no desire to marry, she retires from her life in the village with her uncle to live in solitude with the shepherd girls. Marcela is the epitome of beauty and she is idealized as such. There is every reason for Grisóstomo to desire her, and he expects that she will desire him only because he loves her. But she does not wish to marry. He pursues her and she rejects him. Her rejection brings Grisóstomo to suicide. The collective voice of the people is that his death is Marcela's fault; she is ungrateful, his enemy, and without a heart. The influence of Others is forceful against Marcela, but she defends herself. She views herself as completely innocent because she is not responsible for not loving Grisóstomo. Marcela simply does not wish to marry—neither Grisóstomo or any other, and she stands up against the voices of Others (Cervantes 103-09).

Grisóstomo, however, lives an inauthentic life. He is completely influenced by the other people that surround him, and, as Heidegger would predict, he lives a life full of anxiety. Grisóstomo writes a poem shortly before his death which acts as a suicide letter and is informative in understanding his suicide. The poem is included with other papers that are on his burial pallet ready to be interred with his body (117-18). Vivaldo, one of the men who accompanies Don Quijote, takes the poem from the platform and reads it to the group of people assembled. The poem begins with Grisóstomo addressing Marcela using the name “crüel” (119). He then speaks of voices inside his breast which combine into “un son doliente.” The poem speaks of the noisy sounds of animals—lions, wolves, owls, etc., that are so strong that

they kill the sound of Grisóstomo's heart. Included in the voices of the animals are the sounds of the wind and the crowd. The noises of the animals, the elements, and the crowd are comparable to Heidegger's sounds of the "they." These voices are the cause of Grisóstomo's suicide, not Marcela's rejection. The voice is mixed with strange pieces of misery. The sounds he hears are

El rugir del león, del lobo fiero
el temeroso aullido, el silbo horrendo
de escamosa serpiente, el espantable
baladro de algún monstruo, el agorero
graznar de la corneja, y el estruendo
del viento contrastado en mar inestable;
del ya vencido toro el implacable
bramido, y de la viuda tortolilla
el sensible arrullar; el triste canto
del envidiado búho, con el llanto
de toda la infernal negra cuadrilla,
salgan con la doliente ánima fuera,
mezclados en un son, de tal manera
que se confundan los sentidos todos,
pues la pena cruel que en mí se halla
para contalla pide nuevos modos. (120)

Grisóstomo writes that these sounds are confusing: "se confundan los sentidos todos." He is caught in the web of the noises he hears, just as Heidegger's *Dasein* is trapped in the clutches of the "they." Each of the animals make a tremendous amount of noise. Among the nouns and

adjectives used to describe the noise are “roar,” “frightening howling,” “horrendous hiss,” “atrocious scream,” “ominous caw,” “racket,” “relentless bellowing,” “sensitive cooing,” “sad song,” and “sobbing.” Grisóstomo cannot think for himself outside of these sounds that he hears.

The noise of the animals are metonyms for the voices of all the people around him who tell him how to he should act. Grisóstomo does not have his own opinion and is full of anxiety. He is caught in the web of the voice of Others, of the “they.” He says “Mata un desdén, atierra la paciencia, o verdadera o falsa, una sospecha...” (121). Grisóstomo fears an invented world. His friend Ambrosio explains Grisóstomo’s state of mind saying, “así le fatigaban a Grisóstomo los celos imaginados y las sospechas temidas como si fueran verdaderas” (124). Grisóstomo succumbs to his anxiety without allowing it to lead him to resoluteness and an authentic life. Heidegger writes that the individual has a choice in this matter. Grisóstomo did not make that choice. He has left himself listening to the voices of Others, which lead him to suicide. He calls it “inevitable muerte” (121). He is not as Heidegger would say a “Being-towards-death.” His words are, “Yo muero, en fin, y porque nunca espere buen suceso en la muerte ni en la vida, pertinaz estaré en mi fantasía” (122). Grisóstomo does not view his death as the horizon of his potentiality. He cannot see beyond his present pain.

In his song, Grisóstomo hears the collective voices from ten different sources—animals, wind, and crowd. The sounds come from the following ten sources: 1. the lion, 2. the wolf, 3. the serpent, 4. the monster, 5. the crow, 6. the wind, 7. the bull, 8. the turtle dove, 9. the owl, and 10. the crowd. Interestingly, the number of ten voices is also found in the narration of the story. Roberto Ruiz writes of fragmentation which Cervantes intentionally placed within the story of Marcela and Grisóstomo. As part of that fragmentation, Ruiz explains that the story is told by ten different narrators. He explains that the number ten does not correspond to ten different

people because some of them repeat. The different narrators of the story, as counted by Ruiz are:

1. Antonio, a shepherd boy, who tells the story to Don Quijote and the group of goatherds he is staying with;
2. Pedro, a goatherd;
3. Vivaldo, a traveler who meets up with Don Quijote the next day and already knows details of the story;
4. Ambrosio, Grisóstomo's close friend;
5. Grisóstomo himself, through the words of his poem;
6. Vivaldo, again, as he reads the poem;
7. Ambrosio, as he replies to Vivaldo;
8. Marcela, who appears at the end to defend herself;
9. Don Quijote, who defends the right of Marcela to be left alone; and
10. Ambrosio, as the author of the epitaph (366-69). The epitaph has the final word, and it says:

Yace aquí de un amador
el mísero cuerpo helado,
que fue pastor de ganado,
perdido por desamor.

Murió a manos de rigor
de una esquiva hermosa ingrata,
con quien su imperio dilata
la tiranía de amor. (Cervantes 128-29)

The correspondence of ten as the number of both the sounds in Grisóstomo's head and the number of narrators of the story cannot be a coincidence. Ruiz gives his opinion of the use of the various narrators writing, "El narrador plural, presente, identificado, viene a ser delegado de otro colectivo, invisible y anónimo, una vox populi que es en verdad Dei" (69). Cervantes obviously wanted to magnify the impact of those who opposed Marcela. The voice of the entire community is against her. She stands alone, with the exception of Don Quijote. He is the only one who raises his voice in her defense. The collective voice of Others is overwhelming, and it

drives Grisóstomo to his death. The anxiety that he reveals in his poem is exactly what Heidegger describes as “uncanny” or the feeling of not being at home in the “they” (Heidegger 233). Grisóstomo is not at home in his subjection to Others, nor is he authentic. He acts according to the will of Others, not according to his own self-determination. The voices and sounds that he hears cause him to lose control of his senses, and he crumbles.

After the reading of the poem and an exchange of ideas between Vivaldo and Ambrosio, Marcela herself appears at the funeral ceremony. She stands on a cliff above the people and gives her side of the story. She tells the crowd that she has every right to love, or not love, whomsoever she pleases; just because Grisóstomo loved her does not mean that she is obligated to love him also. Marcela will not surrender her will to others, wishing instead to live freely in the company of mountains and streams. She did not mislead Grisóstomo. Speaking of her intentions, she says, “...le dije yo que la mía era vivir en perpetua soledad y de que sola la tierra gozarse el fruto de mi recogimiento y los despojos de mi hermosura” (127). A self-determined woman, Marcela desires to be left alone, not in subjection to anyone. Marcela has acted exactly opposite of how all those in her culture would have expected. She truly is pursuing her own ideas of how to live her life, not pursuing the collective will of Others. There is no anxiety in her discourse, only resoluteness.

To a twenty-first century reader, Marcela is clearly the object of sexual harassment. Despite her lack of interest in Grisóstomo, he pursued her relentlessly to the point that she had to leave the town and live with the shepherd girls. Grisóstomo and others followed her to the country and began to live shepherd lives themselves. To avoid this harassment, she leaves the countryside and flees into the Sierra Morena to be completely alone. One might say that Marcela

is the first of the “Me Too” movement. It would take a great deal of self-determination and resoluteness to do this in the seventeenth-century.

However, it is not clear that literary critics through the centuries have seen Marcela in this role as a feminist. Salvatore Poeta writes that the Marcela-Grisóstomo episode is more about “the embodiment of neo-platonic philosophy in opposition to Christian faith, charity, love and marriage” (67). His conclusion stems from the beginning of the episode where Don Quijote gives his Golden Age speech to the goatherds. Marcela, according to Poeta, contradicts Christian philosophy when she states that a woman has the right to love whomsoever she wishes and that she herself wishes to live a life of solitude. Poeta raises an interesting question as to what Cervantes’s beliefs were on the matter. He writes, “The inevitable conclusion...is that Cervantes, in all probability, had no premeditated far-reaching agenda or vision for Marcela beyond her ‘starring role’ in the Marcela-Grisóstomo episode and even less so as a spokesperson for gender equality from a strictly ‘political’ perspective and whose words would have an echoing effect well into our twenty-first century...” (67). Harry Sieber has thoughts similar to those of Poeta. Sieber speaks of Marcela’s words of freedom and living in solitude saying, “Freedom to love is turned into self-love. She compares herself to a snake and her beauty to the snake’s venom, but what she claims to be her ‘natural’ intellect blinds her to the Judaeo-Christian symbolism in the comparison” (191). This debate aside, it is clear that Marcela exhibits the attributes of Heideggerian authenticity in that her self-determination stems from attributes manifested in the text itself—specifically her manifest lack of anxiety and her complete resoluteness in her decisions. Her motives in giving her speech are unimportant in the discussion of her authenticity. Marcela is the perfect example of Heideggerian authenticity. She plans the future as she wishes it to be, and she is not subjected to the wills of Others.

Grisóstomo's poem is an eclogue and copies the form introduced into Spanish literature by Garcilaso de la Vega, who in turn was influenced by Petrarch and Virgil. Grisóstomo is the poet and puts himself into the poem as the poetic voice of the shepherd boy. He is a *pastor* singing about the pains of his love. He occupies the space of both Nemoroso and Salicio from Garcilaso's *Égloga I* (Garcilaso 56-62). Nemoroso, singing of the loss of Elisa's love, says that he sees the sharp edge of death (60). Salicio says that he is dying because Galatea is as hard as marble and as cold as snow (57). In this case, Grisóstomo assumes the role of both the *pastor* who sings of love and the *pastor* who sings of life in the countryside. But Grisóstomo is a fraud in this role, he only puts on the clothing of a shepherd boy in imitation of Marcela. Not only does he imitate the role of the shepherd boy, he also imitates the artform of Garcilaso. Nothing in his poem is authentic. In this, Grisóstomo resembles the heartsick Calisto in *La Celestina*, whom Sempronio describes as "...perdido el sentido, cansado el cuerpo, ...los días mal dormiendo, las noches todas velando, ...saltando paredes, poniendo cada día la vida al tablero, esperando toros, corriendo cavallos, tirando barra, echando lança, ...haziendo escalas, vistiendo armas, haziendo coplas, pintando motes, sacando invenciones [y otros mil actos de enamorado]" (Rojas 412-13). Calisto does none of these things. Sempronio copies the acts of Others in describing Calisto just as Grisóstomo copies the art form of Garcilaso and the roles of Nemoroso and Salicio.

Both Marcela and Grisóstomo are play acting in assumed roles the same way that Don Quijote does—based on the books that they have read. The irony is that Marcela is split into two different people. First, the idealized woman that Grisóstomo and all the others wish her to be. Second, the person that she is. To be that person, she must physically leave her homeland and retire into the Sierra Morena. Marcela, as an authentic person, does not play act in her role as a

shepherd girl; she leaves the town to live in the countryside to escape the harassment of Grisóstomo and the Others. Ruth El Saffar writes of a paradox in Marcela—she is her own authentic person, yet she remains under the control of others. El Saffar says:

Cervantes' rendering of the story makes it clear that Marcela, like Don Quixote, is not what she thinks she is nor what she appears to be to the men whom her beauty and inaccessibility move to madness. Believing herself to be untroubled by encumbrances of any sort, she is in fact controlled by them, spending her time running away from the constant threat to her 'autonomy' that the flocks of adoring shepherds represent. She is an unwitting but nonetheless active participant in the game of predator and prey hidden in the chivalric and pastoral visions of romantic love. (62)

The control of the men over Marcela that El Saffar refers to is only effective when she is near them. They control her only in the form of harassment. Indeed, it is only as she retires into the Sierra Morena, physically leaving the presence of Others that she can be herself. Marcela escapes twice: firstly, from her life in the town to the pastoral life in the countryside, and secondly, from her pastoral life to a life of solitude in the Sierra Morena. Each of these escapes is to avoid the advances of Grisóstomo. Marcela never intended to live a pastoral life in the literary sense. In this, Marcela does not play act the way Grisóstomo does. She lives authentically by fleeing Others. Sieber explains that, "In sum Grisóstomo perceives too late that Marcela's role is Marcela in fact, that her rejection is not part of pastoral convention" (193). The same can be said of Melibea in *La Celestina*—that she does not play the role of courtly love—she is Melibea in fact. Neither Marcela nor Melibea play act, only Calisto and Grisóstomo do so in their respective texts. Don Quijote protects Marcela as she leaves, prohibiting any of the crowd from following her. In this, it is not clear whether Don Quijote acts authentically or

inauthentically. Is he playing the role of chivalry, learned from the books he had read, or is this an authentic act of heroism?

The inauthenticity of Grisóstomo from *Don Quijote* and the authenticity of Melibea, from *La Celestina*, are understood more clearly when compared with each other. Prior to their respective deaths, Grisóstomo and Melibea each hear voices. Grisóstomo hears the voices of animals while Melibea hears the voices of the city. In her discourse to her father, Melibea mentions these sounds saying, “Bien [oyes] este clamor de campanas, este alarido de gentes, este aullido de canes, este grande estrépito de armas. De todo esto fuy yo la causa” (586). The cause of all the noise is Melibea. The city is clamoring over her actions, but their noise has no impact on her. This is not the cause of her suicide. She is dying to be with Calisto, calling to him, “¡O mi amor y señor Calisto, espérame, ya voy! Detente. Si me esperas, no me incuses la tardanza que hago dando esta última cuenta a mi viejo padre, pues le devo mucho más” (589). Melibea then tells her father that this is her “agradable fin.”

Melibea’s complete lack of anxiety and her resoluteness at the moment of her death are seen clearly when compared with Grisóstomo’s total anxiety and lack of resoluteness. These are the signs of authenticity and inauthenticity as described by Heidegger. Authenticity in Melibea and inauthenticity in Grisóstomo. Melibea’s words speaking of her intended death as “alegre partida” and “mi agradable fin” are contrasted with Grisóstomo’s words, “nunca espere buen suceso en la muerte ni en la vida.” The masses spoke to Grisóstomo, and he shortened the distance between himself and them until there was nothing left of himself. The masses also spoke to Melibea, but she broke away and increased her distance from them. Grisóstomo collapses into the “they,” whereas Melibea escapes from it. She addresses her father asking him to listen to her so that he may know her experiences and the reasons for her death. She tells him

to listen without tears. She has no pain; the pain is her father's. Grisóstomo addresses his friends speaking of nothing other than his own pain. His pain is caused by Marcela's "cruelty;" she has profoundly wounded his heart. Pleberio thinks that Melibea is desperate, but she is feigning that desperation. The "argumento" at the beginning of the Act clarifies this by saying, "Finge Melibea dolor de corazón" (579). Grisóstomo, in contrast, is truly desperate. He writes, "—si ya a un desesperado son debidas—canten obsequias tristes, doloridas, al cuerpo, a quien se niegue aun la mortaja..." (123). Heidegger states that anxiety is the opportunity to see the reality of one's ownness and to decide whether to seek it (*Being* 235). Melibea so decides, Grisóstomo does not. Her anxiety had previously led her to her self-determination. Grisóstomo's anxiety now leads him to his death.

In her final soliloquy, as she ascends the tower, Melibea takes total responsibility for her actions. She states, "Todo se ha hecho a mi voluntad" (583). She further takes responsibility for all the noise round about the city as she speaks to her father. "De todo esto fuy yo la causa," she says about the clamor and alarms (586). But Grisóstomo takes no responsibility for his actions. He is still suspended in the wills and attitudes of Others. He is a victim of Marcela's cruelty. She is the one responsible for all the noise he hears. The roar of the lion and the howl of the wolf are echoes of Marcela's rejection. These are the sounds of Others which pull him further into themselves and that "se confundan los sentidos todos" (120). Grisóstomo does not allow his anxiety to lead him to the resolution of an authentic life. Instead, he allows it to lead to his inauthentic death.

In these writings, Cervantes and Rojas both describe the living experience of Being. Their literary words together with the philosophy of Heidegger give us metaphors for authentic and inauthentic Being. Joseph T. Snow, comparing the characters Melibea and

Marcela with Diego de San Pedro's character Laureola, summarizes the individuality of Marcela and Melibea with these words:

La hermosura entra por los ojos, eso sí. Y amamos el objeto hermoso. Pero el amor no obliga a ninguna hermosa/amada a amar. Y cuando es así, porfiar es inútil. Tal ha sido el caso de Laureola y Leriano; igual que el caso de Marcela y Grisóstomo. El amor de un hombre no obliga. En los dos casos, el objeto, la mujer, quiere vivir libre de tales obligaciones y lo consigue. El vínculo con el caso de Melibea (y su amante, Calisto), a pesar de que allí la situación es distinta, se establece en otras palabras de la sabia Marcela: "el verdadero amor no se divide, y ha de ser voluntario y no forzoso" (102). En *Celestina*, después del rechazo inicial, florece la pasión y el que ama es correspondido por la amada (y viceversa). El amor de Melibea es voluntario y no forzoso. Lo que es también distinto, al menos en el caso de Melibea, es que es el amor paterno que no obliga a la amada, la hija, a corresponder con un amor filial. (1409)

Melibea and Calisto give each other love freely and voluntarily, while Snow argues that the love between Melibea and her father Pleberio is family love and cannot be forced. No love can exist between Marcela and Grisóstomo—his love would divide Marcela from herself.

Both Marcela and Melibea are authentic individual characters. The fact that Marcela does not love Grisóstomo and that Melibea does love Calisto does not change their individuality. The actions of both women are individual and voluntary. As we look at them using Heideggerian concepts, we see that both women are resolute and free of anxiety in their respective matters. Grisóstomo, however is not. His inauthenticity is dramatic in comparison with the calm of the women. In this comparison, we see authenticity contrasted with inauthenticity. Both Marcela and Melibea sacrificed to find their freedom from Others. Marcela

gave up her wealth, her family and her friends to be free, and Melibea gave up her life.

Grisóstomo gave nothing, as his death was not an attempt to free himself from the influence of others but was the result of him collapsing into the “they” further. Marcela and Melibea distance themselves from Others; Grisóstomo draws closer to them.

Conclusion

The intersection between the philosophy of Martin Heidegger and the works of Spanish literature studied herein—*La Celestina* and *Don Quijote de la Mancha*—is expressed in terms of the lifeworld of Melibea, Marcela, and Grisóstomo. These are fictional characters; however, their authors portray them as Beings-in-the-world in the same way that Heidegger's *Dasein* is a Being-in-the-world. Stephen Gilman writes that Fernando de Rojas is “one of the world's great artists of human awareness....” (18). The same can be said for Miguel de Cervantes. Each is a philosopher in his own right. They write of the life experience, and consequently, one might expect similarities with Heidegger who writes of the phenomenon of living. In this sense, literature antedates philosophy. There are limits to the usefulness of this type of analysis. Literature redefines reality in its very nature. While the poet and the philosopher alike have a phenomenological view of the human being, the poet may stretch the dimensions of actions in an artistic expression. Recognizing this limitation, evidence still exists that human life, as described by the philosopher, manifests itself in literature. Indeed, the philosophy of Martin Heidegger shows the true nature of Melibea. Without this clear philosophical method, themes of courtly love and suicide have obscured her true nature. Philosophy has acted as a lens to more clearly read literature.

This study has considered only one episode of *Don Quijote de la Mancha*, which is a small part of the work. A larger study of the character of Don Quijote through the lens of Heideggerian authenticity could be helpful in illuminating the rest of the text. Don Quijote is obviously a character who departs from the mainstream of Others in his society. He acts completely differently from them. However, his life is determined by the rules of the chivalric literature that he has read. Does Don Quijote live an inauthentic life because his actions are determined by the rules of chivalry set out by Others? Does he feel anxiety before his death, and

does he ultimately shorten the distance between him and Others? Alternatively, once he returns to being Alonso Quijano at the end of the work, is he a resolute character, free from the influences of all Others?

The Heideggerian authenticity of Melibea in *La Celestina* and the inauthenticity of Grisóstomo in *Don Quijote de la Mancha* become clear when they are placed under the lens of Heidegger's philosophy. Heidegger explains that the natural state of the human being is to live with Others and to become part of them. As the individual loses herself to Others, she naturally experiences anxiety. The authentic individual uses that anxiety to become resolute and to see that she has potential to live her life as she wishes it to be. The inauthentic being does not do so and continues to her death living as Others dictate. Melibea begins as a Heideggerian inauthentic character; however, throughout the course of the work she transforms into an authentic Being who leaves the influence of Others to live a life of her own determination. She experiences anxiety with the judgement of Others and uses that anxiety to gain resoluteness. Her anxiety and resoluteness cause her to see the potentiality of her possibilities, which she seizes to become a self-determined individual. Her death comes as she looks to the potentiality of such a life. On the other hand, Grisóstomo begins as a Heideggerian inauthentic character and remains so throughout the entire episode. He never pursues life apart from the influence of Others, and he is subject to them and their opinions. He dies tormented by their judgment, never allowing his anxiety to show him any potentiality for self-determination. Heideggerian philosophy helps illuminate the characters of both Melibea and Grisóstomo, providing the reader with examples upon which to base his or her own life. Philosophy and literature inform the reader of the possibility of an authentic life.

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