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Differences in German Youth Gender Ideologies: The Relationship Between
Family Structure and Doing Gender

Alyssa Jane Alexander

A thesis submitted to the faculty of
Brigham Young University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Science

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ABSTRACT

Differences in German Youth Gender Ideologies: The Relationship Between Family Structure and Doing Gender

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Master of Science

Gender ideologies, which are constantly changing, are important for many outcomes in life, but the majority of gender ideology research focuses mainly on adults. Past research studying adult gender ideologies finds that adults' current relationship status affects their ideologies. For instance, divorced adults hold egalitarian ideologies more than stable married adults do (Davis, Greenstein and Marks 2007). Researchers attribute this finding to the types of gender behaviors adults perform with their partner or alone. What about youth? Understanding how these ideologies develop earlier in life is important, yet research rarely focuses on youth gender ideologies or their development. My research looks at the effects of family structure on youth gender ideology in Germany (Germany National Educational Panel Study (NEPS); Cohort One N=4,181; Cohort Two N=9,913). I argue it is through doing gender that family structures operate to influence the development of youth gender ideology, since parents' doing gender behaviors performed with their children vary by family structure. My findings suggest family structure does not matter for doing gender behaviors that parents perform with their children, thereby affecting their gender ideologies. As a result, it is more about other ways adults do gender outside of the home or about the youth themselves. I also find significant effects for females, suggesting females may invest more in the outcomes egalitarian gender ideologies produce. Future research should look at shifts in family structure and duration in various family structures in order to understand family structure's impact on gender ideology for youth.

Keywords: gender ideology, doing gender, family structure, youth, Germany

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Differences in German Youth Gender Ideologies: The Relationship Between Family Structure and Doing Gender

In recent years, there has been rapid change in family formation and romantic partnering (Mather 2010). Furthermore, this rapid change has been associated with shifting gender ideologies among adults (Mason and Lu 1988). This shift in gender ideologies can vary in intensity and direction, and can have a significant impact on societal and individual level outcomes (John, Shelton, and Luschen 1995; Christie-Mizell et al. 2007). Much of past literature focuses on how family structure affects how adults do gender with their partners, not how they do gender with their children. Even with shifts in gender ideologies and family formation among adults, little research has studied how these changes in doing gender behaviors may affect youths' gender ideologies. This is especially important because youth may be more vulnerable to these shifts since they spend more time with their parents than older individuals (Kiecolt and Acock 1988).

With my research, I aim to uncover whether family structure influences youth gender ideologies. Family structure can affect how parents model behaviors and attitudes at home, in turn influencing their offspring's gender ideology. In order to look at youth gender ideology differences, I analyze German youth across an array of family structures and ages. I predict youth in single-parent families will have the most egalitarian gender ideologies, and youth with stepparents or social parents will be more egalitarian than those youth with two-parent biological married parents. Furthermore, I predict that girls will be more sensitive to the potential effects of family structure on gender ideology than boys will, and will be more egalitarian. Overall, I find that youth with stepparents are more egalitarian, but my biggest finding suggests support for the final hypothesis – that girls are more egalitarian than boys are.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Gender Ideologies

From the women's social movements to the battle for same sex rights, gender, and gender ideologies, permeate all aspects of life. Gender ideology refers to the, "system of values, beliefs, and attitudes a person holds about the meaning of biological sex and gender" (Halpern and Jenkins 2016:1). Furthermore, gender ideologies often include attitudes about how individuals believe men and women should act in society. For example, if an individual believes that women should stay at home and only have children, this reflects their traditional gender ideologies. Egalitarian ideologies reflect equality between the sexes, in that people believe that men and women should be allowed to do the same things in society, hold the same jobs, act in similar ways, and not be treated badly because of it. The majority of research studying gender ideology looks at beliefs about women working, such as whether people believe women should work outside the home (Ciabattari 2001). In recent years, scholars have begun including gender ideology measures that look at other areas that primarily affect women, such as child care, fertility, relationship quality, and abuse. (Davis and Greenstein 2009). This research has primarily focused on married women. These measures of gender ideology are important to look at because they can influence societal policies including women's work, women's education, and child care, as well as individual-level decisions about fertility and relationship quality.

Gender Ideologies' Influence on Society

Gender ideologies can affect how a society views women in both beneficial and detrimental ways. For example, a society that holds more traditional gender ideologies may be more accepting of particular forms of discrimination, like sexism (Brandt 2011). Gender ideologies vary based on the country of study (Lavee and Katz 2002; Kaufman and Bernhardt

2012; Kim and Choi 2012). These potential differences influence the opportunities women have in their society, with some countries placing more importance on egalitarian ideologies while others place more importance on traditional ideologies (Alesina et al. 2013; Twenge 1997). For instance, in some countries women lead governments, while in others women are discouraged from driving a car. Gender ideologies also help drive cross-national differences in percentages of women in the workforce or in higher education (John, Shelton, and Luschen 1995; Kaufman and Bernhardt 2012). One example of this takes place in Rwanda, where after their mass genocide, policy makers implemented egalitarian laws that required a higher number of women in parliament (Kristoff and WuDunn 2010). This implementation of egalitarian gender laws actually helped to make their country grow and prosper (Kristoff and WuDunn 2010).

Most past research on gender ideologies focuses on the United States, or other Western countries like the United Kingdom and Sweden. However, since women's opportunities may vary depending on the country of residence, it is important to understand the impact of gender ideologies in other countries. There may be cultural or class differences within countries that are different from the United States. In addition, since gender ideologies can have an impact on the societal level, it is also important to look at the other impacts they can have.

Gender Ideologies' Influence on Individuals

In addition to the impact that gender ideologies have on broader societies, they can also have an impact at the individual level. For example, individual women's feelings about gender affect their choices concerning educational attainment, work force participation, and health. Holding egalitarian views not only increases opportunities for women, but also benefits the holders of these views, both male and female, resulting in more positive life outcomes. For instance, individuals who hold more egalitarian views expected to gain more education (Davis

and Pearce 2007), had higher self-esteem (Weiss, Freund, and Wiese 2012), and were more supportive of their partners in their personal goals (Tichenor 2005; Braun et al. 2008; Boudet et al. 2013).

On the other end of the spectrum, individuals with more traditional gender ideologies tended to be more negative towards others, and, among women, are less likely to seek opportunities to advance their position in both the home and the workplace. For instance, scholars have found that men who hold traditional gender ideologies are more likely to be discriminatory or violent towards others (Totten 2003; Magallares 2016). Women with more traditional gender ideologies tend to have lower earnings at work (Christie-Mizell et al. 2007), suggesting they may not seek advancement. Since gender ideologies help shape opportunities for later in life, it is important to understand why people hold the beliefs they do, and how they develop these beliefs. Family formation, or romantic partnering, plays an important part in what gender ideologies an individual holds.

The Impact of Family Structure: A Doing Gender Perspective

When looking at why adults hold particular ideologies, scholars have found that adults' partnering is associated with their gender ideologies (Morgan and Walker 1983; Batalova and Cohen 2002; Barber et al. 1989). These scholars believe this may have to do with the way adults do gender with their partners. Doing gender is, "a complex of socially guided perceptual, interactional, and micropolitical activities that cast particular pursuits as expressions of masculine and feminine 'natures'" (West and Zimmerman 1987:126). In other words, the doing gender perspective suggest that individuals construct their gender through their behaviors in everyday situations by performing roles fitting of their sex. The majority of past research that has looked at how doing gender in the home impacts adult gender ideologies focuses mainly on the

division of labor between partners since the division of labor is often a measure of doing gender between partners (Davis, Greenstein, and Marks 2007). This measure often looks at how partners do gender together, such as with women doing housework or caring for a child, traditionally feminine tasks, while men work outside the home (West and Zimmerman 1987; Deutsch 2007). There may be something biological about the types of doing gender behaviors an individual does, but for the most part, this doing gender process is largely a social construct (Goffman 1977). What goes on in the home, specifically the division of labor, impacts gender ideologies, and doing gender can vary based on the family structure an individual resides in.

Adult gender ideologies: family structure and doing gender. Looking even further at why family structure may affect adult gender ideologies, scholars have turned to doing gender and found that doing gender behaviors vary depending on the family structure an adult resides in, which then affects their gender ideologies. With marriage, divorce, and remarriage come norms about doing gender behavior. There are differences in gender ideologies across stable coupled adults, uncoupled adults, and re-coupled adults (Kiecolt and Acock 1988; Vespa 2009), likely attributable to the distribution of doing gender behaviors, such as the division of labor, that adults perform with their partners (Davis, Greenstein, and Marks 2007). Traditionally, scholars have studied gender ideologies through the division of housework among couples. In other words, the division of gender roles, and ultimately the gender ideologies adults hold vary based on their relationship status because their division of housework varies based on relationship status.

There are differences between the types of gender ideologies adults hold if they live in traditional marriages or if they reside in more egalitarian cohabiting relationships. Much of past research has found that married individuals are more likely to be traditional in all aspects of life

(Morgan and Walker 1983; Mason and Lu 1988; Wilkie 1993). Some research has found that this traditionalism has lessened over time, but an effect remains (Harris and Firestone 1998). A possible reason that many individuals in married relationships hold more traditional gender ideologies is because of the traditional divisions of labor between partners.

While a single person must accomplish household tasks regardless of their gendered position in society, married individuals divide household tasks in a much more traditional gendered way (Vespa 2009). One example of this is that women in married households may be more likely to perform housework while men are more likely to work outside the home (Wilkie 1993). As a result, if adults in these marriages split up labor in traditional ways, men are much more likely to hold traditional ideologies than single men are (Wilkie 1993). While these patterns may show a selectivity effect, it may very well be that the act of doing gender in ways that are more normative cements gender ideologies on an everyday basis. However, people who have egalitarian ideologies shift towards traditional ones after being married, often seen through their division of labor, and this goes against the possible selectivity argument (Gupta 1999). This is an important example of how family structure can lead to changes in behavior and beliefs. Past research has found support for this when they have found that marriage brings with it a shift in roles; for example, women who marry often do more housework while men who marry do less housework, a reflection of more traditional gender ideologies (Gupta 1999).

Married people may hold traditional ideologies because they have a partner with whom to do gender with, but what types of ideologies do people who cohabit hold? Cohabiting adults also have a partner with whom to do gender with on a daily basis, so one might expect that they will hold more traditional ideologies and will do gender in ways that are more traditional. However, by choosing to cohabit instead of marry they are eschewing traditional means of doing gender.

As a result, these cohabiting couples appear to be going against traditional means of doing gender, and therefore demonstrate more egalitarian ideologies than traditionally stable-married-two-adult couples do. For example, scholars have found that cohabiting men contribute more to housework, reducing the housework their partner would have to do and ultimately promoting equitable living arrangements (Shelton and John 1993; Batalova and Cohen 2002; Davis, Greenstein, and Marks 2007; Dominquez-Folgueras 2013). Other research has found that being in a cohabiting relationship decreases the amount of hours of housework for women, but that it matters less for men (Shelton and John 1993). Overall, scholars have found that cohabiting women are not like married women, but are actually much more like single women in terms of both their egalitarian ideologies and division of labor (Shelton and John 1993).

In addition to coupled adults, research also suggests that uncoupled adults hold different gender ideologies. For instance, single women may go against traditional ways of doing gender by eschewing settings that reinforce traditional gender ideologies. They do so by moving toward more egalitarian gender ideologies, both by entering the workforce and gaining more education. Scholars have found support for this claim as single women who have never been married spend the least amount of time doing housework, suggesting a shift towards more egalitarian ideologies (Shelton and John 1993). Looking at another type of single parents, scholars have found that divorced women hold more egalitarian ideologies, especially about the division of labor in the home, than married women do (Kiecolt and Acock 1988; Barber et al. 1989; Amato and Booth 1991; Moors 2003). Going deeper, scholars have found that divorce brings with it stressors such as a restructuring of gender roles or changes in the levels of support outside the home (Lucier-Greer and Adler-Baeder 2016). Since divorced women experience these particular stressors, they may be less likely to enact traditional doing gender behaviors, thereby shifting their own gender

ideologies towards egalitarian ideologies. As a result, women who have divorced or chosen not to marry may exhibit a willingness to break away from traditional means of doing gender, such as getting married or raising children in a two-parent home (Ellman 2000). This suggests that these divorced and single women may hold more egalitarian ideologies than women who are married. Overall, single women, regardless of how they got there, tend to hold more egalitarian ideologies compared to married or cohabiting women (Lucier-Greer and Adler-Baeder 2016).

In my research, in addition to looking at the potential differences between people who have a partner with whom to do gender and those who do not have a partner, I also look at adults who have both lived with a partner and been single. For these individuals, I expect that they will be more egalitarian than married stable adults will because they did not always have a partner to do gender with, similar to both single and divorced women. I also expect that they will be more traditional than single adults will because they have been in coupled relationships where two individuals split the housework and labor in traditional ways. Research on these re-coupled adults tends to be limited, or looks more explicitly at how parents interact with children, not how adults interact with each other (Sullivan 1997; Lucier-Greer and Adler-Baeder 2016). For instance, some scholars found that women in remarried households actually do less housework, which represents egalitarian forms of doing gender (Sullivan 1997). Other scholars have found that this particular relationship structure is more complex, since these adults are more egalitarian than if they were still single, but they also exhibit similar doing gender behaviors as married couples (Lucier-Greer and Adler-Baeder 2016). Taken as a whole, regardless of the fact that remarried adults are a more complex case, the idea that family structure has a powerful impact on adult gender ideologies because they have a partner with whom to do gender is a very powerful argument that warrants further research, especially for groups other than adults. I argue

that these doing gender behaviors of couples are both similar to and different from the doing gender behaviors of parents. Parents do gender differently than couples, and since these doing gender behaviors matter for gender ideology development, children may develop their ideologies differently depending on the family structure they live in. Before I can argue that youth are affected by the doing gender behaviors of their parents, we must first understand how doing gender operates differently for youth and their parents than it does for couples.

Doing gender among parents and children. Doing gender can operate similarly for parents and children as it does for couples in a few different ways. For example, partners may negotiate with each other on whether women will perform traditionally feminine tasks such as housework or child care; similarly, parents negotiate with their children when deciding whether to have girls perform indoor chores while boys perform outdoor chores (Duckett, Raffaelli, and Richards 1989). One example is that girls are more often likely to help in housework as a whole than boys are, and much of girls' involvement in the home is influenced by the mother's work outside the home (Gill 1998). Mothers working outside the home may impact the doing gender behaviors they perform with their children; this is similar to how divorced women often work outside the home more, an example of a less traditional doing gender behavior, and how this may make them more egalitarian (Shelton and John 1993). Another example is that parents may negotiate with their children when deciding whether their girls will wash dishes while their boys will make home repairs (McHale, Crouter, and Tucker 1999). Much of this decision comes from the influence of the father over his children (McHale, Crouter, and Tucker 1999).

As a result, it makes sense to assume that these doing gender behaviors and the negotiation of them—for both couples and parents and children—may be influenced by family structure. For example, single parents may need more child labor around the house, so they may

not have the luxury of choosing whether their children perform traditionally gendered tasks. This is very similar to how single parents may be doing gender. Past research has shown us that single adults do gender differently, possibly by choosing to be single or by working outside of the home and, as a result, they hold more egalitarian ideologies (Kiecolt and Acock 1988; Barber et al. 1989; Shelton and John 1993).

At the same time, there are dynamics that differ across these kinds of relationships, so we can see that doing gender may operate differently for parents and children than for couples. The very doing gender behaviors that parents performed when they did not have children may shift when there is another person in the picture, particularly a child (Katz-Wise, Priess, and Hyde 2013). In addition, individuals in coupled relationships may have different reasons for doing gender with their partner than they do once they become parents, or they may have different reasons for doing gender than their children. For example, women in coupled relationships may be more willing to do gender in a traditional way in order to maintain their desirability to their more traditional partners. On the other hand, youth are not likely to have similar reasons when dealing with doing gender; their main reason stems from having a model within the home of gender appropriate behaviors. This difference in reasons, as well as the shift in doing gender that occurs when partners become parents, leads to the conclusion that doing gender operates differently for partners than it does parents. For instance, within romantic relationships, doing gender may be more of a push-pull relationship, in that partners give and take while they are negotiating doing gender behaviors between each other, affecting the types of gender ideologies they hold. On the other hand, doing gender in the home between parents and children is not a push-pull relationship. Instead, this may be a more hierarchical relationship because children look up to their parents as role models, not that parents pull their ideologies or behavior from

their children. In this hierarchical relationship, parents hold more of the power, which may make them more influential concerning their child's modeling behavior or ideologies.

While we see that there are differences and similarities between the doing gender behaviors of couples and the doing gender behaviors of parents and their children, much of this area is unexplored. It is important to study youth because this is the period where they embody these gender ideologies, and this is when the socialization process is occurring. By studying them, I can come to understand how and why they adopt particular views. It is also important to study youth because youth may be more susceptible to the doing gender behaviors of their parents, especially since youth look to their parents as models for their own attitudes and behaviors and these models for behavior vary based on the types of doing gender parents perform. For instance, youth may be more vulnerable to their parent's gendered behaviors since they spend most of their time within the home and, at such a young age, are more likely to look to their parents as models for appropriate gender behavior and attitudes, whereas older youth may look more towards other models of behaviors (Davis and Greenstein 2009). In addition, since more youth today are living in diverse family structures, such as living with cohabiting parents, divorced parents, or with parents who married after the child was born, it is important to understand the differences between these family structures (Bumpass and Lu 2000; Mather 2010). Past research has only looked at youth gender ideologies on a basic level, examining briefly both the types of ideologies they hold and how they developed, finding that parental beliefs play a part in the ideologies a youth may hold (Davis and Greenstein 2009; Davis and Wills 2010; Boehnke 2011; Goldberg et al. 2012). However, there has been limited research focusing specifically on how family structure creates an environment for the doing gender

behaviors that parents perform with their children and how that influences the youth's gender ideologies (Kiecolt and Acock 1988; Russell and Ellis 1991).

Youth gender ideologies: the impact of family structure and doing gender. Since we know that doing gender behaviors operate differently for parents and children than for couples, and since family structure affects the doing gender behaviors of adults, it makes sense to assume the same for adults. Research suggests that family structure the youth resides in affects their gender ideologies (Kiecolt and Acock 1988; Russell and Ellis 1991). Gender ideologies seem to vary from more traditional to egalitarian as family structure changes from two-parent bio to a single. For example, if a youth resides with two biological parents who have always been married, they are more likely to experience exposure to traditional ways of doing gender. Past findings suggest that women with traditional beliefs are more likely to get married, have children, and stay married to their child's biological father, which are all actions reflective of traditional ideologies (Kaufman 2000). Since these biological two-parent married families are more likely to be traditional (Morgan and Walker 1983; Mason and Lu 1988; Kaufman 2000), youth may be more likely to hold similar traditional ideologies because two parents of opposite sexes expose them to traditional ways of doing gender in the home. These traditional parents may be more likely to enact traditional means of doing gender with each other, but they are also more likely to enact traditional means of doing gender with their children, thereby affecting their child's ideology.

Whereas for children raised by single parents we would expect to see the opposite, that they would be more likely to hold egalitarian ideologies. For example, if a youth resides in a single-parent family, they may hold the least traditional gender ideologies. This may be because children experience less exposure to traditional types of doing gender because the parent with

whom they live has no partner with whom to enact traditional gendered roles and behaviors. In addition to experiencing exposure to less traditional ways of doing gender, these youths may have less reinforcement because they spend less time with their single parent because of their single parent working. These youths may have less reinforcement because they have seen their single parent restructure his or her life because of a divorce or separation. Past research has found that youth with single mothers held egalitarian ideologies (Russell and Ellis 1991), since less traditional women head them and expose them to this dual-role of doing gender (Kiecolt and Acock 1988; Russell and Ellis 1991).

In addition to studying stable two-parent biological married families and single-parent families, having stepparents or social parents may expose youth to alternative ways of doing gender. While these youth have parents of both sexes who perform traditional means of doing gender with their children, residing in stepfamilies may result in egalitarian ideologies since stepparents may be less physically or emotionally available to stepchildren and less willing to parent a child that is not theirs (Lampard and Peggs 1999; Carlson and Knoester 2011). This can lead to weaker reinforcement of traditional ideologies since children are not modeling after their stepparent with whom they may have no relationship. As such, youth in these families experience more exposure to less traditional examples of doing gender than they would if they lived with both of their biological parents. However, some past research finds that having stepparents results in more traditional child gender ideologies than having a single parent, but results in more egalitarian ideologies than if the youth lived in a stable biological married family (Janning, Collins and Kamm 2011; Carlson and Knoester 2011; Halpern and Jenkins 2016). Others have found that there is no difference in gender ideologies when children have either a

biological father or a stepfather, since these children have a same-sex model in the home (Kiecolt and Acock 1988).

Youth residing with cohabiting parents may hold more egalitarian gender ideologies than those in stable two-biological married parent families, and may hold gender views closer to youth residing with stepparents. These youths may have more egalitarian gender ideologies because their primary role models for doing gender, their cohabiting parents, have made choices in their life to reject traditional family formation norms. Cohabiting individuals are more likely to share housework equally (Lye and Waldron 1997; Davis, Greenstein, and Marks 2007), and since this is a reflection of more egalitarian ways of doing gender in the home. Children exposed to that lifestyle may be more likely to model their attitudes similarly. I do not measure housework, but instead I examine family structure as a representation of these doing gender behaviors, which then affect their children's gender ideologies.

Some past research has found support for my current research project, in that they have found that family structure does matter for the development of youth gender ideologies. When looking at single parents for example, past scholars have found that youth with single parents are more likely to hold egalitarian ideologies (Russell and Ellis 1991). I argue that most of this research may not reflect current trends in gender ideologies and family structure, hence why current research is necessary. Past research has also tended to lump together parents who have been single since the birth of their child with parents who become single after the birth of their child (Kiecolt and Acock 1988); this conflation may miss important nuances regarding the impact of stability on doing gender behaviors. In addition, some research has claimed that family structure and social background do not matter for youth gender ideology especially as they age, but these were smaller sample sizes and may also not be reflective of current gender ideology

trends (Davis 2007). Past research has primarily focused on single parents, two-parent families, or stepfamilies, did not look at all family structures in one model, only included small-scale studies that do not lend power to their argument, or found mixed results on whether or not family structure matters (Kiecolt and Acock 1988; Davis 2007; Janning, Collins and Kamm 2011). Overall, few recent studies have looked at how family structure affects doing gender behaviors, or parents influences and how they do gender with their children, ultimately affecting their child's gender ideologies. Since there are few studies that look at this specifically, what is especially about my research is that because I have access to better data it allows me to examine family structures beyond the dichotomy of married, single, or recoupled. It allows me to get at the nuances that exist within past research's broad categories.

Youth gender ideology: what about gender? Another formative component of youth gender ideology that may be affected by family structure and the doing gender behaviors of parents is gender itself. Girls experience the world differently than boys do, and have different outcomes. For example, when looking at popularity, scholars have found that girls tend to gain popularity because of feminine and ascribed characteristics such as their looks, while boys tended to gain popularity because of their athleticism, toughness, or success (Adler, Kless and Adler 1992). In addition, women are less likely to be in leadership positions, partly because men wanted more power in their lives (Schuh et al. 2014). Another example is that in recent years, females have become more likely to finish college (Buchmann and DiPrete 2006); this may be a reflection of their gender ideologies.

In addition to experiencing socialization through societal influences, family, especially parents, also influences boy and girls and, consequently, their ideologies. Fathers and mothers may parent their children differently based on sex (Raley and Bianchi 2006; Davis and

Greenstein 2009). For instance, research shows that parents teach their boys to take more risks while they teach girls to take fewer risks (Morrongiello and Dawber 1999). In addition, past research has shown that same-sex role models are incredibly important (Bozett 1985). Since boys and girls have different outcomes in life, and are treated differently based on their gender, it is important to look at how gender influences gender ideology—since gender ideology can influence their outcomes, and is affected by family structure and doing gender. I argue females will be more susceptible to the effects of doing gender and family structure. This may tie back to the power division between parents and children; perhaps parents have more power over their daughters, which would then give them more influence over their daughter’s gender ideologies. It may tie back to how parents do gender differently with their children than with their partners. Furthermore, I believe that females will be more likely to hold egalitarian ideologies because females may invest more in the outcomes of gender norms, such as workforce participation, household division of labor, and educational opportunities. By providing a setting for doing gender, family structure affects youth gender ideology; these ideologies may in turn affect the opportunities youth encounter. This may be especially true for girls who wish to enter higher education or find higher paying jobs, as traditional ideologies can become barriers to doing so and as they may experience exposure to different doing gender behaviors from their parents.

Overall, we can see that family structure does influence doing gender behaviors of couples, which affects the gender ideologies they hold (Kiecolt and Acock 1988; Vespa 2009). They find that single adults tend to be egalitarian and married adults tend to be traditional (Amato and Booth 1991; Wilkie 1993). In addition, some research has also shown that family structure matters for youth gender ideologies, though this research is limited (Russell and Ellis 1991; Kaufman 2000). What they have found reflects what researchers have found for adults. We

also see that females may have different gender ideologies than males will because of their family structure and their parents' doing gender behaviors (Bozett 1985). However, this past research does not really look at how family structure may operate in different ways for couples than it does for parents, especially concerning doing gender behaviors in the home. I argue that it makes sense to assume that family structure operates through doing gender behaviors in slightly different ways with parents and children than it does with couples. To examine the potential relationship between family structure and youth gender ideology through the lens of doing gender, I look at married two-parent families, single-parent families, stepparent families, and two-parent cohabiting families.

HYPOTHESES

Since I believe that opportunities to do gender vary based on family structure, and since youth are more vulnerable to these effects as they develop, I lay out the following hypotheses:

1 – *Youth living in single-parent families will have more egalitarian gender ideologies than youth in stable two-parent married families.* Youth exposed to only one parent have less exposure to traditional ways of doing gender than if they experienced exposure to both sexes.

2 – *Youth living in stepfamilies will have more egalitarian ideologies than stable two-parent married families.* Youth exposed to two married parents will have traditional gender roles reinforced more frequently and intensely, but because stepparents may be reluctant to parent a child who is not biologically theirs (Lampard and Peggs 1999), they may present a weaker version of traditionally gendered family roles than would two married biological parents. In addition, exposure to a single-parent lifestyle, where their ideologies may become more egalitarian, may create effects that last into the remarriage or re-partnership of their parents.

3 – *Youth living in cohabiting families (social parents) will have more egalitarian gender*

ideologies than youth in stable two-parent married families. While cohabiters have access to another person to do gender with, they have made an affirmative choice to reject traditional family formation norms, many of which come with gendered role expectations already attached.

4 – Girls will be more sensitive to these family structure and doing gender effects than boys will, and will therefore be more egalitarian than boys will. Family structure may affect girls more strongly than boys since societal pressures revolving around gender norms may personally affect females, and since they may be more susceptible to parental doing gender behaviors.

DATA & METHODS

For this project, I use the German National Educational Panel Study (NEPS), a nationally representative study, which surveyed and interviewed students at German schools using a longitudinal design. The NEPS dataset has two youth cohorts: one starting in fifth grade and ending in eighth grade and another starting in ninth grade and ending in twelfth grade. The survey focused mainly on educational pathways and outcomes, but information on gender ideologies is also available. Students and their parents participated in the survey through their school systems. I use the NEPS dataset because not only do they capture ages that are vulnerable to the effects of family structure on gender ideology development, but they also include interesting measures of gender ideology. My current research project studies gender ideology by looking at perceptions of division of labor, technical skills, and career types. I also use NEPS data because Germany is an interesting case to study in that Germans tend to have more egalitarian ideologies than Eastern countries or the United States, and these more egalitarian ideologies have led to more national-level childcare and welfare opportunities (Dirksmeier 2015). In addition, gender ideology research tends to focus mainly on the United States, so Germany is an interesting case to study.

From the first cohort, I use the second wave (average age 11); from the second cohort, I use the third wave (average age 15). I use both cohorts because I wanted to see if the socialization process occurs differently as the youth age. After excluding cases that were missing information on gender ideology outcomes and family structure, the total sample size for the first cohort is 4,181, and the total sample size for the second cohort is 9,913. I analyze each cohort separately and compare the effect sizes across the two age groups as a partial test of how gender ideologies develop as children age.

Gender Ideology Measures

Gender ideology can refer to “the underlying concept of an individual’s level of support for a division of paid work and family responsibilities that is based on the notion of separate spheres” (Davis and Greenstein 2009:89). The cohorts I use touch on beliefs about gender in education or the workplace, femininity, and household labor divisions, which is similar to previous work (Davis and Greenstein 2009). Within the NEPS, I measure gender ideology through a set of questions that ask respondents to record their responses on a scale of 1 “disagree completely” to 4 “agree completely.” NEPS gender ideology statements for 6th and 10th graders include statements such as “boys and girls should have the same chores at home,” “girls can handle technical devices just as well as boys,” “girls should be able to learn the same professions as boys,” and “for some professions, men are better suited than women.” I reverse recoded the last statements so that higher values reflect more egalitarian gender ideologies. I then constructed a gender ideology scale by using the row means of the gender ideology statements and dividing by the total number of statements, resulting in a final scale of 1 to 4: “completely disagree” to “completely agree” where higher values represent more egalitarian gender ideologies. Finally, I

dropped any cases that were missing information on more than two of the questions. See Table 1 for a full description of all gender ideology measures, as well as other variables used in analysis.

[Table 1 about here]

Family Structure Measures

To capture family structure, I created my own categories from available NEPS data. To do so for each cohort, I use the available parent data (including marital status, whether the parent lives with a partner, relationship to the youth, and the year they began living with a partner); if parent data were missing, then I used information on youth (including household composition and role of parents) to fill family structure. If both information on the parent, the parent-child relationship, or household composition data were missing, but the main parent was living with the same partner as before, I filled in missing data using family structure data from the previous waves. After completing that process, if family structure was still unknown, I dropped the case. Cohort two family structure questions varied slightly from cohort one family structure questions. Within cohort two, family structure questions, such as parental marital status, parent-child relationship, household composition, and role of parents, are present in some waves. As a result, I used all of the questions available in waves one through three to create these family structures. The final family structure categories I created using the NEPS include “biological married stable,” “biological cohabiting stable,” “biological single stable,” “post-birth single,” “post-birth stepfamily,” “post-birth social family,” and “post-birth biological cohabit/married family.”

Three categories capture stability within family structures. “Biological Married Stable” applies to youth who have lived, and continue to live, with two married biological parents. “Biological Cohabit Stable” captures whether the youth currently lives with two cohabiting

biological parents, and has lived with them since birth. “Biological Single Stable” applies to youth who have lived, and continue to live with one single biological parent.

Four categories capture instability within family structures. “Post-Birth Single” captures whether the youth currently lives with a single parent who became single after the youth was born, through divorce, separation, or death. “Post-Birth Stepfamily” applies to youth who currently live with one biological and a stepparent. For example, a youth living with a biological father who remarried someone other than the biological mother fits this category. “Post-Birth Social Family” applies to youth who live with one biological parent and one social parent who started cohabiting after the youth was born. This is similar in nature to the “post-birth stepfamily” with the sole difference being that the parents in the previous category are married. My final family structure variable, “post-birth biological married/cohabit,” includes children who reside with their biological parents but whose parents began living together after they were born. Table 2 presents the percentages of youth within these family structures.

Youth Gender

I also include youth gender as part of my interaction effect because I believe females are more likely to hold egalitarian gender ideologies since societal laws revolving around gender norms in the home and workplace may affect females more personally. In addition, I include gender because past research has shown that parents parent their sons and daughters differently (Morrongiello and Dawber 1999), and I believe this affects the development of gender ideologies. I recoded child gender so that 0 equaled “female” and 1 equaled “male.”

Control Measures

In addition to including gender as a separate control, I also include parental education, parental employment status, household income, child age, youth religious affiliation, and youth

religiosity as general controls. Since parents provide a role model for youth, I control for parental education. For example, adults with more education tend to have more egalitarian gender ideologies (Alwin 1989; see also Davis and Greenstein 2009). As a result, parental education may influence child gender ideologies, so I control for it and other factors in my final models. I constructed maternal education to reflect major credentials: “lower general education – less than high school,” “high school equivalent,” “some college (or other similar qualifications),” “bachelor’s degree,” and “doctoral degree or similar.” In addition to education, occupation and income are two indicators of socioeconomic status that can influence parental gender ideologies (Alwin 1989).

I use maternal employment instead of both partner and main parent employment because I focus mainly on attitudes about female equality and opportunities. Maternal employment was recoded to indicate levels of participation in the paid work force: “full time,” “part time,” “unemployed but looking for work,” “student/in training,” “homemaker,” and “no mother in home.” Income in the NEPS is a continuous variable that I logged due to skewness. This resulted in a range from about 7 to about 14. In addition, I also include religious denomination since some religions may subscribe to more traditional gender ideologies than others. I also included a measure of religiosity because individuals who actively participate in religious activities may hold more traditional gender ideologies. Religious denomination categories include “Roman Catholic,” “Protestant,” and “other,” while religiosity categories range from “not at all religious” to “very religious.” I originally included youth nationality because I believed that individuals who are immigrants into Germany might have different gender ideologies, but due to small cell size, I was unable to use this measure. I attempted to get at nationality through language spoken

at home, but it left me with the same problem as mentioned above. I do acknowledge there are limitations associated with not including nationality measures in my models.

Missing Values

As with all research, missing values can affect the accuracy of estimates. I fill in missing values for family structure using available parent data, such as marital status and relationship to youth; if parent data was missing, then I filled in missing using youth data, such as household rosters and role of parent data. If both youth and parent data was missing, these family structure cases were dropped. For missing values on the gender ideology measure, I dropped if they were missing two or more items from the scale. For control variables that had missing information, I performed single imputations where I used other variables to predict missing values on controls such as education or occupation. I compared means of control variables before and after imputations and found similar distributions before and after.

Analysis Plan

I perform separate analysis for each of the two cohorts. I first present the percentage of youth in various family structures; I also present descriptive statistics on the gender ideology scale, as well as other variables, across family structures (Table 2). This allows me to examine whether there are differences in average gender ideologies scores across family structures. I then conduct multivariate analyses (Table 3) using ordinal logistic regression, presented in odds ratios. To calculate the percentage of the likelihood of holding more egalitarian gender ideologies, I subtract the odds ratio coefficient from one and then multiply by 100 $((1 - \text{odds ratio coefficient}) * 100)$. As a result, odds ratios higher than one have a positive effect while odds ratios lower than one have a negative effect. First, I present a model with only family structure and gender ideology (Model 1). I then present a model with only youth gender and gender

ideology (Model 2). The third model includes family structure, youth gender, gender ideology, and all controls (Model 3). I also run another model with an interaction term between youth gender and family structure (Model 4). I do this in order to see whether girls are more sensitive to the effects of family structure on the development of their gender ideologies than boys are.

RESULTS

My first analysis looks at the number and percentage of youth in various family structures (Table 2).

[Table 2 about here]

My findings suggest that the majority of youth in this sample (about 70 percent) reside in a stable two-parent biological married family, regardless of cohort. The next largest percentage (about 13 percent) captures youth who reside in post-birth single families—in families where the child’s main parent was divorced, separated, or widowed after the child’s birth. When looking at other research, results suggest that Germany has a different distribution of youth across family structures than other countries (Dufur et al. 2016). This could mean that any potential differences we see in the effects of family structure on gender ideology may occur because of cultural differences in Germany. It also reiterates the point that Germany is an interesting case to study since youth are living in different families than youth in other countries are. Older youth are more likely to reside in post-birth stepfamilies, biological cohabit stable families, post-birth single families, or post-birth biological families than younger individuals are (Table 2).

My second analysis looks at the means of gender ideologies across family structures for both cohort one and two (Table 2). I found that the majority of youth, regardless of their family structure, have middle-range gender ideologies in both cohort one and cohort two (Table 2).

There is little variation across the family structures, calling into question my assertion that family

structure would help shape youths' gender ideologies. However, I do see that younger kids (the first cohort) have less egalitarian ideologies in biological cohabiting families, stepfamilies, and post-birth biological married/cohabit families (Table 2). On the other hand, older youth in post-birth stepfamilies and biological cohabiting families are more egalitarian (Table 2). Regardless of cohort, youth residing in single families tend to be the most egalitarian, and that those in post-birth social families are less egalitarian compared to those residing in stable biological married families (Table 2). This suggests that perhaps there are cultural factors in Germany that shape both family formation practices and gender ideologies that differ substantially from otherwise similar countries, making Germany an even more intriguing setting for future study. Older kids, cohort two, are more likely to hold egalitarian gender ideologies regardless of family structure, except for post-birth social families where the gender ideology mean is similar across both cohorts (Table 2).

I then examine the number and percentage of females, slightly religious youth, as well as the number of youth with mothers working full time, mothers with bachelor's degrees (Table 2). The majority of youth across both cohorts in biological two-parent married stable or in post-birth single parent families are female (about 50 percent). Females may be more susceptible to the doing gender behaviors of their parents, so if more children in these traditional family structures are female, they may be more likely to hold similar traditional gender ideologies. In addition, mothers in single parent families are much less likely to hold bachelor's degrees. In post-birth social families, single stable families, and cohabiting stable families, youth are more likely to have mothers who are working full-time than in other family structures (Table 2). I do find that the older cohort has a higher percentage of mothers working, suggesting that there may have been a shift in gender ideologies towards more egalitarian views as the youth age, or that women

with older children are more likely to work (Table 2). From my sample, it seems that a majority of youth in Germany tend to be slightly religious, but that youth in biological two-parent stable married families are more likely to be “slightly religious” than youth in other family structures. This may affect the socialization process in the home. However, the older cohort is slightly less likely to be “slightly religious” than the younger cohort is (Table 2).

My multivariate analysis (Table 3) provides little support for my hypotheses. Before including controls, within cohort one, children residing in a post-birth biological cohabit/married family are less likely to have egalitarian gender ideologies, and children in post-birth stepfamilies are more likely to hold egalitarian gender ideologies (Model 1). Not only did I find no support for hypothesis four from these results, but I also found the opposite. Children residing in post-birth biological cohabit or married families are actually less egalitarian than those in stable biological married families are. I do find initial support for hypothesis two for cohort one when I find that youth in stepfamilies are more egalitarian than youth in stable biological married families. On the other hand, in cohort two, before including controls, no family structure was significant (Model 1). This suggests that there is a change in the socialization process within families as youth get older, or that younger youth are more affected by family structure and their parents’ doing gender behaviors than older youth are.

[Table 3 about here]

After including controls, I find that living in a post-birth biological cohabit/married family significantly results in a youth being less egalitarian, and living in a post-birth stepfamily results in the opposite for cohort one (Model 3). Once again, I find no support for hypothesis four, but do find support for hypothesis two. For cohort two, living in a biological cohabit stable family results in youth being more traditional (Model 3). I do caution the reader because this is a

small group. This result initially rejects hypothesis 3, though I believe there are limitations associated with this result that I will discuss later; I originally claimed that living in a cohabiting family would make youth more egalitarian, but it actually does the opposite. For cohort one, having a mother who works part time results in a youth being more traditional compared to youth living with a mother who works full-time. This result makes sense when considering that women who work full-time are more likely to hold more egalitarian gender ideologies that they model for their children. Surprisingly, greater maternal education was not associated with more egalitarian gender attitudes among youth for either cohort. In addition, having an older mother increases support for egalitarian gender ideologies, while being slightly non-religious, slightly religious, and very religious decreases support for egalitarian gender ideologies as compared to being not religious. Both of these results are significant only in cohort two (Model 3). This suggests that family structure matters less for older youth, and that other parental and youth characteristics matter more. Overall, my first multivariate analyses suggest support for hypotheses two and three, and rejects hypothesis one and four. Hypothesis two claimed that residing in a stepfamily would result in youth holding egalitarian gender ideologies than if they lived in a stable two-parent biological married family. Hypothesis three claimed that youth living in cohabiting families would be more egalitarian than if they had been in stable two-parent biological married families, but I found the opposite was true for the older cohort. This category is smaller than the other categories, so if future research was to look at this category with a larger sample size, the results may support the original hypothesis.

The most notable effect comes into play with youth gender. Females, even before including family structure or other controls, are more likely to hold egalitarian gender ideologies than males (Model 2). After including family structure and controls, for cohort one, females are

five and a half times more likely to hold egalitarian gender ideologies than males; in cohort two, females are eight and a half times more likely to hold egalitarian gender ideologies than males (Model 3). This gender effect remains strong after controlling for maternal employment and education, as well as family income, religiosity, and religion, suggesting that gender itself is a large motivating factor in whether an individual will hold egalitarian gender ideologies. This shows partial support for my final hypothesis that females are more egalitarian.

Another part of my final hypothesis was that females would be more susceptible to the effects of family structure and doing gender. We assume that since gender mattered for previous models, that it would matter with combined with family structure. In other words, I assumed that parents would parent their sons and daughters differently, since past literature has shown similar results (Raley and Bianchi 2006; Davis and Greenstein 2009), and that this would then affect their youth's gender ideology. After running models with the interaction between youth gender and family structure and performing various statistical checks, I found that the cell sizes of the interactions prevented me from finding support for my original claim. Therefore, I do not present those results.

DISCUSSION

Looking back at the past research, we see that there are a few main arguments that are important to reiterate before delving into what this all means. One is that gender ideologies matter for a variety of outcomes, both at the societal and individual level (Christie-Mizell et al. 2007; Brandt 2011), and this is why gender ideologies are so important to study. Second is that the family structure adults currently reside in affects the doing gender behaviors they perform with their partner, which then affects their gender ideology. Past scholars have found support for this claim when they found that single adults are more egalitarian while married adults are less

egalitarian (Kiecolt and Acock 1988; Amato and Booth 1991; Wilkie 1993; Vespa 2009). The third argument is that this argument from adults can also apply to youth, but in slightly different ways. I argued that the family structure a youth lived in affected the doing gender behaviors that their parents perform with them, which then impacts the youth's gender ideology development through both reinforcement and exposure to traditional or egalitarian ideologies. Some scholars have found results to support parts of this claim, but the majority have focused on very limited family structures or does not delve deeper into the doing gender argument (Russell and Ellis 1991; Kaufman 2000). The final argument I made, which scholars found support for, is family structure affects youth gender in different ways, which then affects the development of youth gender ideologies. Scholars have found that parents raise females differently than males, and that this can affect their gender ideology development (Bozett 1985). Overall, I originally argued that family structure would matter for the development of youth gender ideologies because of the doing gender behaviors that parents perform with their children. My results show support for some of these arguments, but does not show support for my main argument – that family structure matters.

My second and third argument revolve around the idea that family structure affects gender ideology through doing gender behaviors. When looking at adults, previous research has found that parental coupling affects doing gender, which in turn affects gender ideology (Wilkie 1993; Lucier-Greer & Adler-Baeder 2016). For instance, some past research found that married adults are more traditional than single, divorced or cohabiting adults are which is evident when looking at their division of housework (Morgan and Walker 1983; Wilkie 1993). Furthermore, past research has also found that some family structures exert an egalitarian influence on youth gender ideologies through the doing gender behaviors, mainly division of housework (Shelton

and John 1993; Vespa 2009; Lucier-Greer and Adler-Baeder 2016). Doing gender operates through family structure for couples like mentioned above, so one would assume that it does operate through family structure for parents and children, even if it was in slightly different ways. I did find that youth living with stepparents are more egalitarian, which supports one of my original hypotheses. This result may occur because children are more likely to have exposure to less traditional doing gender behaviors with stepparents, or because they do not have a relationship with the stepparent which allows for the doing gender behaviors to translate to gender ideology development (Carlson and Knoester 2011). However, my results overall suggest that other than for younger adults living in stepfamilies, family structure really plays no part in affecting the doing gender behaviors parents perform with their children, or that it does so in other ways, and, therefore, family structure does not affect the development of gender ideologies among youth in Germany. This is interesting because it goes against what I thought would happen based on past research (Russell and Ellis 1991; Kaufman 2000). My null findings shows us that because society is constantly changing, that socialization can occur through different pathways, and that perhaps family structure operates in different ways than how past scholars have imagined.

What my null findings do suggest is that what couples do in their home with their children to do gender does not affect youth gender ideologies. These shifts in partnering that adults experience may force them to confront how they do gender, but this does not pass down to their children. Even using the most comprehensive family structure models, family structure still explains very little of the differences in gender ideologies for youth in Germany, which goes against past research (Russell and Ellis 1991; Kaufman 2000). This allows us to rule out family structure, and to look elsewhere for why gender ideologies vary across youth. Perhaps this null

finding has to do with how we are describing the relationship of doing gender between parents and children— maybe this relationship is not hierarchical, but actually much more push and pull like for adult couples. Perhaps the relationship between parents, doing gender, children, and youth gender ideology is similar to the relationship of couples – a push-pull relationship between individuals instead of a hierarchical one. This gap is one area where future research could shed more light on.

Furthermore, it makes sense to claim that what actually matters for the development of youth gender ideologies may be how adults do gender in other ways, specific personal characteristics of the youth or parent, or even societal influences I cannot capture. In addition, a youth's characteristics, such as their gender or religion, matters more than family structure for the development of gender ideologies. For instance, I found that having a mother who works part or full time increases the odds that the youth will hold egalitarian gender ideologies. Past research echoes this result, because women working has often been associated with egalitarian ideologies (Brewster and Padavic 2000). It makes sense to assume that this effect may transfer to the child through modeling that occurs in ways other than doing gender negotiation between parents and children. In addition to having a working mother, my results suggest that having an older mother also increases the odds that the youth will hold egalitarian ideologies. One theoretical explanation for this is that women who put off having children may be choosing to eschew more traditional doing gender behaviors since what much of society expects of women is to have children or to have them earlier. These results are prime examples of showing that the ways adults do gender outside the home, such as having children later or working outside the home, matter more than the ways they do gender in the home or with a partner. These doing

gender behaviors outside of the home or relationship may still provide models for children in ways I did not capture.

In terms of finding that youth characteristics matter for the development of gender ideologies, I find that individual youth characteristics such as religion and religiosity influence gender ideology development of youth in Germany. For instance, compared to those who are very not religious, those who are more religious are more likely to hold traditional gender ideologies. Past scholars agree that those who are less religious are more likely to be supportive of LGBTQ relationships, one marker of an egalitarian ideology (Harbaugh and Lindsey 2015). In addition, I also found that older kids, who are a part of an “other” religion, which includes more conservative religions like Muslim or Jewish, are more traditional than those who are Roman Catholic. The fact that this finding is only present for the older cohort suggests religiosity and religious identity matter more as youth get older. Furthermore, the finding that religion and religiousness matter suggests that the experiences youths have in their own lives may be more important for developing their ideologies than the family structure they lived in growing up. It also suggests that perhaps religion is more of a socializing agent than family, at least in this context. Past research echoes this, finding personal experiences of daughters matter more than their mother’s ideologies (Moens, Erickson, and Dempster-McClain 1997). This may show support for the first part of my argument, in that family structure of adults does matter for their gender ideologies, since the family structure they currently reside in may reflect personal experiences that have affected their gender ideology, as opposed to the family structure they lived in growing up.

Concerning my final argument, I found support for it when I found females are more egalitarian. As I discussed earlier, one theoretical explanation for this result may be that females

invest more in the outcomes of gender norms, such as workforce participation, household division of labor, and even educational opportunities (John, Shelton, and Luschen 1995; Kaufman and Bernhardt 2012). Past research has shown that more egalitarian gender ideologies result in higher educational attainment, higher self-esteem, more involvement in the workforce, in government, and in education, especially for women (Davis and Pearce 2007; Weiss et al. 2012). For instance, females may be more likely to benefit from higher educational attainment or more involvement in society. Since females may be more invested in these outcomes, may benefit more from them, and are more likely to hold egalitarian gender ideologies, researchers should be aware of the bigger impact gender has on gender ideologies. I will mention more specific policy implications later on. Policy makers should be aware that gender plays a huge part in the acceptance of particular gender ideologies, which can influence the opportunities individuals have in society. If females are more likely to hold egalitarian gender ideologies, politicians and lawmakers should be conscious of this when creating laws that involve gender.

This gender component transcends cultural barriers as well, given that our results are for youth in Germany, but we may see similar trends in the United States. Perhaps these findings are occurring in Germany because of factors I cannot measure. German culture may be more accepting of women as a whole, or that women in Germany may have more opportunities open to them, so they become more egalitarian. Perhaps socialization in German families is different from American families. This is one area future research can explore further.

Another part of my original argument dealing with youth gender revolved around family structure and gender. Since I found that being female influences the ideologies one holds, I also thought that youth gender would specifically play a part in how parents do gender. Past research has shown that fathers and mothers parent their children differently depending on sex (Raley and

Bianchi 2006; Davis and Greenstein 2009). For example, as I discussed earlier, parents teach their boys to act differently than they teach their daughters to (Morrongiello and Dawber 1999). I had expected that females living in less traditional families would be more egalitarian, or that males living in stable married families would be more traditional. After running these interactions between youth gender and family structure, I find that youth gender on its own plays a part in the ideologies a youth holds, but that family structure does not interact with gender to influence gender ideology. In other words, I found no support for the idea that parents raise their children differently based on sex, or that living in particular family structures has more impact on females than males. This result may be because my cell size may have caused problems with the analysis, so this does not suggest that future researchers should not study gender and family interactions, only that they need better data so that they can still capture the detail of various family structures, while still being able to run analyses.

I acknowledge that there are limitations to my research; for instance, missing control variables, such as nationality/race, may also play a part in the development of gender ideology for youth. If future researchers were able to create surveys that captured both measures of gender ideology as well as control variables connected to ideology development, such as nationality, then perhaps scholars could get a more complete picture of how gender ideology develops. In addition, while my results suggest that family structure does not play a part in the development of gender ideology, I acknowledge there are other aspects of family structure I cannot capture with my dataset. For instance, shifts in family structure or the time spent in various family structures may influence gender ideology development more than the actual family structure. I was also not able to include cross-sex analysis between parents and children, and I was not able to know much about non-custodial or joint custody arrangements. These may have impacts on

the doing gender behaviors that children are exposed to. Future research may be able to help resolve my research's limitations. In the future, I would like to study these extra areas relating to family structure, but my current data are not set up for studying other aspects of family structure. In addition, my research does not look at the intergenerational transmission of gender ideology, mainly because I do not have data on how the parents themselves grew up. As a result, I suggest that future research looks at whether adults are more susceptible to gender ideology shifts as their relationships and family partnering change.

Overall, when looking back at the outline of my arguments (that family structure affects adult gender ideologies through gender behavior, that family structure does the same for youth in slightly different ways, and that youth gender matters for gender ideology development), I find limited support. Family structure does not appear to affect gender ideology through doing gender. However, due to important limitations, future research on the impact of family structure on gender ideology, should examine how societal trends influence families and ideologies over time. The fact that previous research has found effects of adult romantic coupling on gender ideologies, but has claimed family structure effects, is an important distinction that much of the research has not made clear. In addition, my null findings suggest family structure does not matter for gender ideology development, but it is possibly some other way of doing gender that matters. What I mean by this is that the doing gender behaviors that parents perform with their children, such as how they split the division of labor or even other sex-typed modeling, may not matter as much as the doing gender behaviors they do outside of the home, such as having a more educated mother or having a working mother.

My findings have important consequences for policy makers as well. For instance, policy makers should be aware of religious differences in the implementations of gender policies,

possibly making more religion-specific gender policies in the workplace. In addition, we know that parental characteristics really matter for the development of gender ideologies among youth. I believe that policies can be implemented (or improved) that can influence parents, which can then affect their children. For instance, if society implements policies so that more women entered the workforce, then perhaps when women become mothers, their egalitarian ideologies will trickle down to their children because they provide a model of egalitarian doing gender outside the home. In addition, they could implement laws that allow women to return to the workforce after having children, or policies that allow women with younger children to work, such as having childcare facilities available. In addition, one of my other findings was that older mothers are more likely to have egalitarian youth. One possible implication from this revolves around birth control and pregnancy policies. I am not advocating that all women have children later, but that gender oriented policies should make this option available to women. In less developed societies, many women have children earlier in their life course, which may prevent them from gaining an education or from working (Kristoff and WuDunn 2010). If other countries could implement similar policies that allow women to gain an education, or work while they are mothers, this modeling can then affect their children. This intergenerational transmission could possibly resulting in a more egalitarian society as a whole. These are just a few examples of policy implications that can come from my research findings, but this only goes to show that society need to make more strides in making things equal for all.

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TABLES

Table 1. Description of Variables in NEPS (Germany) Data

		Range	Cohort One Mean	Cohort Two Mean
<u>Dependent Variable: Gender Ideology</u>				
Consists of a 4-item scale with response categories ranging from “completely disagree” to “completely agree.” Statements include "Boys and girls should have the same chores/duties at home," "girls can handle technical devices just as well as boys," "girls should be able to learn the same professions as boys," "for some professions, men are better suited than women." Higher values equal more support for egalitarian gender ideologies.		1=Completely Disagree	CD=0.13	CD=0.07
		2=Disagree	D=0.37	D=0.39
		3=Agree	A=0.44	A=0.50
		4=Completely Agree	CA=0.07	CA=0.04
<u>Independent Variables: Family Structure at Current Wave</u>				
<i>Stable Biological Married Family</i>	Two biological parents married from birth to current wave	0-1	0.72	0.71
<i>Stable Biological Cohabiting Family</i>	Two biological parents cohabiting from birth to current wave	0-1	0.01	0.02
<i>Stable Biological Single Family</i>	Biological parent single from birth to current wave	0-1	0.02	0.01
<i>Post-Birth Single Family</i>	Biological parent who “divorced,” “widowed,” or “separated,” and is not living with a partner at current wave	0-1	0.12	0.13
<i>Post-Birth Stepfamily</i>	Biological parent said they “married” the non-biological partner after the birth of the youth.	0-1	0.07	0.08
<i>Post-Birth Social Family</i>	Biological parent said they began “living with a non-biological partner (who was not a stepparent)” after the birth of the youth.	0-1	0.03	0.01
<i>Post-Birth Biological Family (married or cohabit)</i>	Biological parent said they began “living with the biological parent” after the birth of the youth, but I was unable to determine marital status.	0-1	0.03	0.04

Table 1 cont. Description of Variables in NEPS (Germany) Data

	Range	Cohort One Mean	Cohort Two Mean
<u>Youth Gender</u>	0=Female 1=Male	0.51	0.49
<u>Controls</u>			
<i>Mother Education</i>			
Highest education achieved by mother; High School equivalent is the reference category.	1=Less than HS	0.10	0.09
	2=High School	0.05	0.04
	3=Some College	0.64	0.68
	4=Bachelors/Masters	0.18	0.17
	5=Doctoral/Similar	0.02	0.01
	6=No Mother	0.02	0.01
<i>Mother Employment</i>			
Current employment of mother, based on number of working hours and type of job; Full time is reference category.	1=Unemployed	0.04	0.03
	2=Homemaker	0.17	0.22
	3=Student/In training	0.01	0.01
	4=Side Job	0.09	0.001
	5=Part Time	0.50	0.41
	6=Full Time	0.18	0.32
	7=No Mother	0.02	0.01
<i>Mother's Age at Birth</i>			
Measured in years at time of interview	Cohort One: 11 to 50 Cohort Two: 14 to 47	30.41 (<i>sd</i> =5.14)	29.89 (<i>sd</i> =4.41)
<i>Religion</i>			
Youth religious denomination; categories include "Roman Catholic," "Protestant," and "Other Religion." Roman Catholic is the reference category.	1=Roman Catholic	0.36	0.44
	2=Protestant	0.45	0.46
	3=Other	0.19	0.10
<i>Household Income</i>			
Reported as total monthly Euros, but multiplied by 12 to change to yearly income; logged because of original variable skewness	Cohort One: 7.01 to 13.71 Cohort Two: 6.93 to 13.77	10.46 (<i>sd</i> =0.71)	10.46 (<i>sd</i> =0.69)

Table 1 cont. Description of Variables in NEPS (Germany) Data

	Range	Cohort One Mean	Cohort Two Mean
<i>Youth Religiosity</i>			
Youth religiosity measures; categories include “not at all religious,” “slightly not religious,” “slightly religious,” and “very religious.” Not at all religious is the reference category.	1=Not at all religious	0.18	0.25
	2=Slightly not religious	0.27	0.34
	3=Slightly religious	0.42	0.34
	4=Very Religious	0.13	0.07
<i>Age</i>			
Measured in years at time of interview	Cohort One=10-13	11.48	16.64
	Cohort Two=15-19	(<i>sd</i> =0.58)	(<i>sd</i> =0.66)

Cohort One N=4,181 & Cohort Two N=9,913

Table 2. Number and Percentage of Youth (and other controls variables) across Family Structures, and Means and Standard Deviations of Gender Ideology across Family Structures (Cohort One N=4,181) (Cohort Two N=9,913)

	Biological Married Stable	Biological Single Stable	Biological Cohabit Stable	Post-Birth Stepfamily	Post-Birth Single	Post-Birth Social Family	Post-Birth Biological Married & Cohabit Family
Number and Percentage of:							
Youth Cohort 1	3003 (71.82%)	88 (2.10%)	57 (1.36%)	290 (6.94%)	516 (12.34%)	109 (2.61%)	118 (2.82%)
Youth Cohort 2	7010 (70.72%)	205 (2.07%)	57 (0.58%)	836 (8.43%)	1315 (13.27%)	87 (0.88%)	403 (4.07%)
Mean and Standard Deviation for:							
Gender Ideology Cohort 1	2.45 (0.80)	2.52 (0.84)	2.39 (0.86)	2.41 (0.79)	2.48 (0.77)	2.44 (0.83)	2.25 (0.81)
Gender Ideology Cohort 2	2.50 (0.68)	2.61 (0.65)	2.51 (0.66)	2.54 (0.71)	2.52 (0.70)	2.48 (0.68)	2.54 (0.67)
Full-time Working Mothers Cohort 1	462 (15.38%)	27 (30.68%)	21 (36.84%)	62 (21.38%)	120 (23.26%)	43 (39.45%)	29 (24.58%)
Full-time Working Mothers Cohort 2	2136 (30.47%)	69 (33.66%)	34 (59.65%)	310 (37.08%)	436 (33.16%)	33 (37.93%)	165 (40.94%)
Mothers with Bachelor's Cohort 1	573 (19.08%)	12 (13.64%)	12 (21.05%)	32 (11.03%)	72 (13.95%)	22 (20.18%)	16 (13.56%)
Mothers with Bachelor's Cohort 2	1214 (17.32%)	27 (13.17%)	14 (24.56%)	116 (13.88%)	174 (13.23%)	15 (17.24%)	72 (17.87%)
Youth Slightly Religious Cohort 1	1339 (44.59%)	27 (30.68%)	17 (29.82%)	106 (36.55%)	195 (37.79%)	27 (24.77%)	49 (41.53%)
Youth Slightly Religious Cohort 2	2587 (36.90%)	38 (18.54%)	9 (15.79%)	218 (26.08%)	334 (25.40%)	16 (18.39%)	119 (29.53%)

Table 3. Ordinal Logistic Regression (Odds Ratios) of Gender Ideology Scale by Family Structure (Model 1), Gender (Model 2), and Controls (Model 3) (Cohort One N=4,131) (Cohort Two N=9,913) (Standard Errors in Parentheses)

	Cohort One			Cohort Two		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Family Structure</i>						
Biological Single Stable	0.88 (0.24)		1.11 (0.33)	1.31 (0.25)		1.24 (0.23)
Biological Cohabit Stable	0.51 (0.30)		0.63 (0.31)	1.03 (0.25)		0.61* (0.11)
Post-Birth Stepfamily	2.83* (1.38)		4.39** (2.15)	1.15 (0.10)		1.11 (0.11)
Post-Birth Single	1.07 (0.22)		1.25 (0.21)	1.02 (0.07)		1.05 (0.08)
Post-Birth Social Family	0.77 (0.22)		0.88 (0.25)	0.89 (0.19)		0.69 (0.17)
Post-Birth Biological Married & Cohabit Family	0.34*** (0.06)		0.48* (0.14)	1.14 (0.12)		1.2 (0.14)
<i>Female</i>		3.30** (1.51)	5.46*** (1.16)		8.21*** (0.42)	8.64*** (0.46)
<i>Maternal Employment</i>						
Unemployed			1.1 (0.43)			0.91 (0.14)
Homemaker/Househusband			0.98 (0.30)			0.89 (0.06)
Student/In training			0.54 (0.21)			1.19 (0.35)
Side Job			0.6 (0.20)			0.87 (0.79)
Part Time			0.48** (0.13)			0.96 (0.06)
No mother in home			0.43 (0.22)			0.5 (0.31)
<i>Yearly Income (logged)</i>			1.28 (0.21)			1.03 (0.04)
<i>Maternal Education</i>						
Less than High School			1.19			0.86

			(0.49)			(0.12)
Some College			1.01			0.97
			(0.31)			(0.12)
Bachelors or higher			0.96			1.02
			(0.36)			(0.14)
Doctoral or similar			1.26			1.54
			(0.52)			(0.35)
<i>Mother's Age at Birth</i>			1.01			1.02**
			(0.02)			(0.01)
<i>Youth Age</i>			0.97			1.02
			(0.14)			(0.05)
<i>Youth Religion</i>						
Protestant			1.11			1.05
			(0.11)			(0.05)
Other			1.34			0.78*
			(0.31)			(0.08)
<i>Youth Religiosity</i>						
Slightly non-religious			1.32			0.78***
			(0.22)			(0.06)
Slightly religious			1.38			0.75***
			(0.25)			(0.06)
Very Religious			1.37			0.55***
			(0.40)			(0.06)
Cut1	-2.28	-1.91	0.90	-2.57	-1.95	-1.16
	(0.17)	(0.33)	(2.39)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.84)
Cut2	-0.18	0.19	3.29	-0.13	0.88	1.71
	(0.13)	(0.51)	(2.38)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.84)
Cut3	3.08	3.47	6.87	3.12	4.61	5.47
	(0.57)	(0.29)	(2.50)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.83)
Pseudo R-Squared	0.03	0.04	0.12	0.00	0.12	0.13
N	4,181	4,181	4,181	9,913	9,913	9,913

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Males were the reference group for gender. I do not control for nationality because of dataset limitations. I also do not include “no mother in home” under mother education because of multicollinearity issues.