PHerc. 698 Cr. 3-4: A New Edition

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PHerc. 698 Cr. 3-4: A New Edition

Justin Asay Barney

A thesis submitted to the faculty of
Brigham Young University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

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ABSTRACT

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The following is a new edition of PHerc. 698 cr. 3-4, including an introduction, English translation and commentary. An in-line reprint of PHerc. 19, including a new English translation, is also included for continuity of thought and language.

Keywords: PHerc. 698, PHerc. 19/698, On Sensation, Philodemus, Perception
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INTRODUCTION

Taken together, *PHerc.* 19 and *PHerc.* 698 contain an Epicurean theory of perception. As a result of the damaged state of the subscription, there is no textual evidence for the title of the work. However, the content of the text clearly sets it apart as a treatise on the topic of sensation. Accordingly, Walter Scott hypothesized that the text contained a work by Philodemus, entitled Περὶ αἰσθήσεως.\(^1\) This title has been adopted, since it is viewed as appropriate for the content of the work. Historically, Philodemus’ authorship of the text has been argued for primarily by appeal to style. Stylistic similarities between *PHerc.* 19/698 and known treatises of Philodemus provided grounds for the attribution.\(^2\) However, recent scholarship on the subscription now corroborates these conjectures regarding the author, and provides an additional hint as to the title of the work. Gianluca Del Mastro reads the phi of what was probably ‘ΦΙΛΟΩΜΟΥ’.\(^3\) And while no ink can be discerned that indicates the title, the text likely belongs to the same treatise of Philodemus that is preserved in *PHerc.* 1003 and *PHerc.* 1389, fully titled Περὶ αἰσθήσεως ἐκ τῶν Ζήνωνος σχολῶν or *On Sensation, from the lectures of Zeno.*\(^4\)

At some point, the papyrus roll was broken horizontally into two pieces, and so each piece is identified by a discrete catalogue number. *PHerc.* 19 contains the upper portion of the text, whereas *PHerc.* 698 contains the lower portion. Scott was the first to demonstrate that the

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\(^{1}\) Scott 1885, 19. Monet misprints the genitive plural (περὶ αἰσθήσεων) in place of the singular, and accordingly names the treatise ‘Sur les sensations’ (Monet 1996, 55).

\(^{2}\) Scott 1885, 256; Monet 1996; 55, 62-4.

\(^{3}\) Del Mastro 2014, 41.

\(^{4}\) Hereafter, simply *On Sensation.* The probable authorship, together with the similarity in content provides the basis for associating the text with *PHerc.* 1003 and *PHerc.* 1389. Cf. Del Mastro 2014, *ad loc.*
two pieces belong to the same papyrus scroll, and he partially joined them together in order to produce a more complete reconstruction.

The first edition of the text was made by Scott, whose readings were determined by consulting primarily the Oxonian disegni. The next edition is also the most recent, and was completed by Annick Monet in 1996. Monet’s edition is more thorough and comprehensive than that of her predecessor. She provides detailed orthographic information that had not previously been made available. Additionally, her edition includes readings of the more difficult sections of the papyrus, which Scott made no attempt to edit. Therefore, Monet’s edition comprises the sole reference for the fragments contained in P Herc. 698 cr. 1-2, and a substantial improvement upon the early columns of the papyrus, which are presented in cr. 3.

I have found Monet’s readings of P Herc. 19 to be largely without flaw. Thus, Monet’s work should remain the standard edition for this papyrus. However, with the help of improved microscopes and digital imagery, I have found that some improvement can be made upon her edition of the lower portion of the scroll, P Herc. 698. Therefore, I present a new edition of P Herc. 698 cr. 3-4, which contains all the columns of text found in the papyrus, and some dispossessed fragments.

HISTORY OF THE MANUSCRIPT
The archive of 1781, which was compiled from Piaggo’s notes, informs us as to the condition of P Herc. 698 prior to svoglimento. The entry reads:

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5 Scott 1885, 254-5.
6 Due to restraints on time, I have chosen to ignore the fragments of P Herc. 698 for this study, though my consultation of the relevant cornici (1-2) leads me to suspect that some improvement could be made upon these as well.
According to the later 1807 catalogue, \(^8\) PHerc. 698 was «dato per insvolgersi a detto [11 Ottobre 1805] di svolti». \(^9\) Comparetti reports that the papyrus was unrolled in 1805, although this information probably reflects the date that the papyrus began the process of *svoglimento* rather than the date that this process was completed. \(^10\) Hence, Comparetti’s data on this papyrus is redundant with the 1807 catalogue, and we are left ignorant as to when the *svoglitore*, Luigi Catalano, had finished his work. Unfortunately, the 1807 catalogue does not give, as it does with other papyri, the date that unrolling was complete.

Whatever the date, seven so-called Oxonian disegni were made soon afterwards, and they appear in an 1806 inventory of Herculaneum disegni. \(^11\) The disegnatore was Casanova, and his disegni were never copied onto copper plates for inclusion in Herculaneum Voluminum (*HV*).

After Hayter’s departure from Naples in 1809, the Neapolitan disegni were created to replace the Oxonian copies that accompanied him. The Neapolitan disegni have three authors: Giovanni Battista Malesci, Carlo Malesci, and Alfonso Cozzi. The earliest disegnatore was G.B. Malesci, who produced the disegni for fragments 18-27. His work was approved by Bartolomeo Pessetti with the marking ‘V.B.’ (*visto bene*), and so must have been completed by 1811, when

---

\(^7\) Blank and Longo 2004, 64. An *onica* equals approximately 2.2046 cm (see Blank and Longo 2000, 136 n. 19; Knight and Jorio 1980, 59 n. 16).

\(^8\) The ‘Catologo de’ papiri ercolanesi dati per isvolgersi e restituiti, com la indicazione di quelli donati da S.M. a personaggi esteri’, in Blank and Longo 2004, 139-48.

\(^9\) *Ibid*, 143.

\(^10\) Comparetti 1883. Comparetti also records that PHerc. 19 was unrolled in 1804. However, in the 1807 catalogue we read that although it was «dato per insvolgersi a’ 20 Novembre 1804» it was «svolto nel Febbraio 1805» (See Blank and Longo 2004, 139).

\(^11\) Blank and Longo-Auricchio 2004, 131. The shelf mark of the inventory, which is preserved at the Archivio Storico del Museo Nazionale di Napoli, is A.O.P.B.\(^5\) XVII 6.
Pessetti was formally dismissed from the Officina.\textsuperscript{12} Between 1825 and 1832, C. Malesci, the son of Giovanni Battista Malesci, drew up fragments 1-17. His work was supervised by Antonio Ottaviano. Domenico Bassi reviewed the drawings in July of 1907, making corrections and adding marginal notes with a red pen. Sometime during the same year, one of Bassi’s colleagues in the Officina,\textsuperscript{13} Antonio Cozzi, redrafted C. Malesci’s work on fragment 17, and produced a new disegno. To this drawing, Bassi added his approval, and in April of 1911 Bassi wrote a cover sheet to attend the collection of disegni at the Officina in the National Library of Naples.

The concordance of the disegni with the papyri’s content, as well as with Monet and Scott’s edition, is presented in TABLE 1 below. Unless otherwise noted—in the first few columns—my enumeration agrees with that of Monet.

\textbf{TABLE 1: Concordance}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Content</th>
<th>Cornice</th>
<th>Monet</th>
<th>Scott</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>O</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cornice 3</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fr. i-ii</td>
<td>Col. 7a</td>
<td>XI (B)</td>
<td>- - -</td>
<td>- - -</td>
<td>- - -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fr. iii-xvii</td>
<td>Col. 7b</td>
<td>XII (B)</td>
<td>- - -</td>
<td>- - -</td>
<td>- - -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XI (B)</td>
<td>Col. 7</td>
<td>XIII (B)</td>
<td>fr. 7</td>
<td>fr. 7</td>
<td>361 Γ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XII (B)</td>
<td>Col. 8</td>
<td>- - -</td>
<td>- - -</td>
<td>fr. 8</td>
<td>- - -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIII (B)</td>
<td>Col. 7</td>
<td>XIII (B)</td>
<td>fr. 7</td>
<td>fr. 7</td>
<td>361 Γ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIV (B)</td>
<td>Col. 8</td>
<td>fr. 8</td>
<td>fr. 8</td>
<td>- - -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XV (B)</td>
<td>Col. 9</td>
<td>fr. 9</td>
<td>fr. 9</td>
<td>- - -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XVI (B)</td>
<td>Col. 10 (ε)</td>
<td>fr. 10</td>
<td>fr. 10</td>
<td>- - -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XVII (B)</td>
<td>Col. 10 (→)</td>
<td>- - -</td>
<td>fr. 10 (→)</td>
<td>- - -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XVIII (B)</td>
<td>Col. 11 (ε)</td>
<td>fr. 11</td>
<td>fr. 11</td>
<td>361 Χ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIX (B)</td>
<td>Col. 11 (→)</td>
<td>- - -</td>
<td>- - -</td>
<td>- - -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XX (B)</td>
<td>Col 12</td>
<td>fr. 12</td>
<td>fr. 12</td>
<td>- - -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXI (B)</td>
<td>Col.12 (→)</td>
<td>- - -</td>
<td>- - -</td>
<td>- - -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXII (B)</td>
<td>Col. 13</td>
<td>fr. 13</td>
<td>fr. 13</td>
<td>- - -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXIII (B)</td>
<td>Col. 14</td>
<td>fr. 14</td>
<td>fr. 14</td>
<td>- - -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXIV (B)</td>
<td>Col. 15</td>
<td>fr. 15</td>
<td>fr. 15</td>
<td>- - -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textbf{Cornice 4}

\textsuperscript{12} On the dismissal of Pessetti, see Cerasuolo, Capasso and D’Ambrosio 1986, 52-3.
\textsuperscript{13} For some background on Antonio Cozzi’s role in the history of the Officina and his connection to Bassi, see Capasso 2003, 286-8.
Many papyri were displayed on the walls of the Officina from 1812 until Bassi assumed control of the Officina in 1906.\textsuperscript{14} The only record of which papyri were displayed is a single 1865 inventory, which shows that all four cornini of \textit{PHerc.} 698 hung on the walls of stanza 2 during this year.\textsuperscript{15}

\textbf{STATE OF THE MANUSCRIPT}

Overall, \textit{PHerc.} 698 is in worse condition than its partner papyrus \textit{PHerc.} 19. This may be because the bottom half of the scoll was more directly exposed to the destructive forces of the eruption. Regardless of the cause, this evident asymetry might explain why the roll was eventually broken into two pieces.

\textit{PHerc.} 698 consists of four cornici. The first two contain a heap of fragments, that were first edited by Monet. In cr. 3 we begin to read from one principal layer of papyrus, and hence we start to see discernable columns of text, though the layer problems of cr. 1-2 are evident also in the beginning of the first pezzo of cr. 3. Cr. 4 is in the best condition and displays nearly

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|l|l|l|}
\hline
XXV (B) & Col. 17 & fr. 17 & fr. 17 & 354 a \\
XXVI (B) & Col. 18 & fr. 18 & fr. 18 & 354 b \\
XXVII (B) & Col. 19 & fr. 19 & fr. 19 & 360 c \\
XXVIII (B) & Col. 20 & fr. 20 & fr. 20 & 360 d \\
XXIX (B) & Col. 21 & fr. 21 & fr. 21 & 355 e \\
XXX (B) & Col. 22 & fr. 22 & fr. 22 & 355 f \\
XXXI (B) & Col. 23 & fr. 23 & fr. 23 & 356 g \\
XXXII (B) & Col. 24 & fr. 24 & fr. 24 & 356 h \\
XXXIII (B) & Col. 25 & fr. 25 & fr. 25 & 357 i \\
XXXIV (B) & Col. 26 & fr. 26 & fr. 26 & 357 k \\
XXXV (B) & Col. 27 & fr. 27 & fr. 27 & 359 l \\
XXXVI (B) & Col. 28 & fr. 28 & - - - & 359 m \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

\textsuperscript{14} Capasso 1986, 177.
\textsuperscript{15} For the archive, see Essler 2006, 132-4 which prints AOP XVII 14. Cf. De Jorio 1825, 96, where we read that in his day 16 cadres were hanging in stanza 2.
unbroken columns from beginning to end. The papyrus, which rests of blue cartoncino, is dark and brittle. Cr. 3 in particular, being in worse condition generally, is deteriorating. A good deal of material has fallen from the papyrus and can be seen in a heap in the top of the cassetta.

Cr. 3 is divided into two pezzi: one is glued to the upper portion of the cartoncino and another to the lower portion. The first 11 cm. of pezzo 1 contain multiple layers of papyrus, and thus report fragments similar to those found in cr. 1-2. Originally, this is the point at which columns began to be numbered on the cartoncino, beginning with col. 7. However, someone has subsequently marked the beginings and ends of columns with vertical strokes, including what was believed to be two columns in the first 11 cm. of pezzo 1. These columns are designated ‘7a’ and ‘7b.’ The two pezzi are more or less held in their proper position with goldbeater’s skin, with one exception that is explained below.

Cr. 4 also contains two pezzi, which are oriented in the same manner as cr. 3. It was unrolled much more cleanly, and so the ink is more visible and hence easier to read. However, because the pezzi in cr. 4 are shorter that those in cr. 3, the columns in cr. 4 preserve fewer lines of text.

### TABLE 2: Measurements Of Pezzi In Pherc.698

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cr.</th>
<th>Pezzo</th>
<th>Dimensions (cm.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1 (superiore)</td>
<td>36.9 x 7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 (inferiore)</td>
<td>37 x 7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1 (superiore)</td>
<td>36.3 x 4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 (inferiore)</td>
<td>35.5 x 4.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LAYOUT OF THE TEXT

Establishing the layout of PHerc. 698 entails two related studies. (1) The order and distribution of the fragments must be established, and (2) the papyrus must be brought into correspondence
with its upper portion, *PHerc.* 19. If (2) is accomplished successfully, the work of (1) is complete. But as a check on my own work, I will first complete (1) and then use my findings in (2) to either confirm or refute my findings.

Overall, the papyrus was laid down in a continuous and intuitive manner, and so each segment is currently configured on the *cartoncino* as it would be read in relation to the others, from left to right, top to bottom. But there are some instances, of course, in which intervening text is lost between two stretches of papyrus.

Scott hesitates to match the columns of cr. 3, largely as a result of his uncertainty about how much papyrus was lost between the end of cr. 3 (fr. 15) and the beginning of cr. 4 (fr. 17). Although it is possible both to establish the length of missing papyri and to match cr. 3 with *PHerc.* 19, Scott is vindicated in his suspicion that some intervening papyrus was lost.

Specifically, one *sezione* is likely missing between cr. 3 and cr. 4. This can be deduced from the fact that the space of one *sezione* would be necessary in order to maintain the standard column format of the papyrus. Col. XXIV (B) breaks off at the end of cr. 3, only approximately 23 mm. into the line. The first *sezione* of cr. 4 contains the first half of col. XXV (B), and if restored it would also contain an intercolumnium of approximately 5 mm. to the left of the column. Therefore, in order to account for the missing text, we must posit an intervening space of approximately 30 mm. This corresponds with the measured length of *sezioni* at this point in

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16 Scott 1885, 254-5. The *svoglitore* similarly (and rightly) suspected intervening text, presumably on the basis of a rift between the two *cornici*: cr. 3 ends midway through a column (col. XXIV) that is not completed at the beginning of cr. 4. Hence, to be sure, they gave the last column of cr. 3 the number 15, and the first column of cr. 4 the number 17. Alternatively, this could be a mistake, as Bassi appears to believe, judging from his marginal notes in the *disegno Napolitano*.

17 In this papyrus, line widths average approximately 5 cm and a typical intercolumnum is 1 cm in length.
the scroll. Moreover, the difference in length between the last complete *sezione* of cr. 3 and the first complete *sezione* of cr. 4 seems to comport with average length changes between *sezioni*.

A similar method can be used to establish the absence of another *sezione* in cr. 3. As it stands on the *cartoncino*, the *cornice* seems, prima facie, to present a continuous stretch of papyrus. When breaks occur in the papyrus, unbroken strips of membrane connect the two pieces. This inspires confidence that the space between the pieces is approximately equal to the space that existed between them as they were unrolled on Piaggio’s machine. However, this confidence is challenged in coll. 12-13. If the papyrus of col. 12 is contiguous to that of col. 13, then columns XXI (B) and XXII (B) are much too close together, since there is almost no space where the bulk of column XXI (B) should be read. There are two possible explanations: (i) the current position of the *pezzi* on the *cartoncino* is accurate. Therefore, each piece must display text that is written on a discrete layer of papyrus. Hence, there are no such problems with the column measurements, since the two columns are not to be construed as consecutive. If this is the case, the papyrus in coll. 7a-12 should be conceived of as falling one circumference previous to col. 13. By moving the papyrus in this way, the proper amount of space would be made for the columns to appear as they would had the papyrus been unrolled in one continuous layer.

Alternatively, (ii) the current placement of the *pezzi* is deceptive, and we should posit a space between them that corresponds to what standard column measurements require. Although the two pieces are attached with an unbroken stip of membrane, the *svoglitore* must have placed the two pieces onto the *cartoncino* next to one another, despite the fact that some intervening papyrus was lost.

(i) cannot be the case, since restoring one circumference (ca. 69 mm.) of papyrus would leave us in nearly the same perdicament in which we currently find ourselves. From beginning to
beginning, a columnn in this papyrus measures ca. 60 mm., and the remaining 9 mm. is not nearly enough to account for what needs to be restored in col. XXI (B). According to (ii), we should posit a complete sezione (ca. 34 mm.) in addition to the 8 mm. that seems to have been lost from col. 12 (→). If 42 mm. of papyrus is restored, sufficient room is made for the insertion of col. XXI (B).

Outside of these two instances, little papyrus is lost between fragments. Breaks between pezzi are the result of deliberate cuts by the svoglitore, and so very little papyrus is lost. The maximum amount lost between cuts appears between pezzo 1 and 2 in cr. 3, where 2 cm. are missing.

In his edition, Scott matched the columns of cr. 4 to its corresponding columns in PHerc. 19. However, he did not join PHerc. 698 cr. 3 to the columns of PHerc. 19. Monet does matches these columns, using coll. XVIII and XXIII as points of connection. The similarity in content and vocabulary between col. XVIII (A) and XVIII (B) leads her to believe that they belong to the same column of text. In addition, she finds that the text of XXIII (A) naturally introduces the text of XXIII (B). By establishing these points of correspondence, she attempts to join the columns of cr. 3 with those in PHerc. 19 cr. 5-6.

The collocation of the tops of PHerc. 19 and the bottoms in cr. 4—which Scott performed and Monet confirmed—seems correct. However, we cannot accept Monet’s matching of the columns in cr. 3 based upon the evidence she provides. Similarities in vocabulary and plausibility of continuous argumentation do not constitute sufficient evidence that two pieces of

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18 When discussing the text proper, I use Monet’s column numbers. Her numbering system is determined by PHerc. 19, as it contains a larger stretch of columns than PHerc. 698, and therefore none of my emendations require a revision of her system. When referencing attributes of the papyrus, I use the numbers as they appear on the cornici.


20 Monet 1996, 34.
papyrus do in fact contain text from the same column. As Blank notes, «joining columns by finding similarities in thought and diction and then conjecturing the sense and the grammar is, of course possible, but dangerous». More appropriate is evidence derived from the physical remains of the papyrus itself, by which «an objective check on the reconstruction of conjectural contexts may be obtained».

Because κολλήσεις run vertically down the entirety of the papyrus, each κολλήσις presents an opportunity to join the two papyri and restore their original relationship. When a κολλήσις is found in PHerc. 19 that also appears in the same position, relative to the column, in PHerc. 698, a join can be successfully established. In each instance where a join is identified, the two joined papyri present the same layer of papyrus, and hence the column read on PHerc. 19 is continued on PHerc. 698. If the conclusions presented above are correct, the κολλήσεις of PHerc. 698 and PHerc. 19 should naturally align when they are distributed based upon the proposed physical reconstruction of the papyrus.

In fact, the presence of κολλήσεις do provide the evidence to substantiate the claims made above. Two κολλήσεις fix the position of the papyri on either side of the relevant breaks. The situation can be viewed in FIGURE 1. Three sections of papyrus are labelled (a), (b) and (c) and I have digitally repositioned (b) appropriately. The break from (a) to (b) constitutes the break between col. 12 and col. 13, and the break between (b) and (c) constitutes the break between col. 15 and col. 17 (cr. 3 and cr. 4). The text on (a) and (c) can be read continuously across the papyrus, and no significant change on layer can be detected. Being a part of cr. 4, (c)

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21 Blank 2008, 259.
22 Ibid. The following method for establishing joins is taken from Blank’s work.
23 While (b) does in fact contain two separate pieces of papyrus, they are held together by a taut strip of goldbeaters skin and so the validity of their arrangement will not be questioned here.
continues in an unbroken stretch of papyrus for the remainder of the treatise. There is no space either before or after (b) to reposition it as a sottoposto or sovraposto, respectively, should it belong to a lower or higher level. They must belong to the same level, and hence must be repositioned to fit into their appropriate columns, as reflected in FIGURE 1.

FIGURE 1: Coll. XXVIII – XXV
Images have been manipulated to account for the joins in the papyri

FIGURE 2 details the correspondence of PHerc. 19 with PHerc. 698, taking into account all the joins that can be made in the papyrus. The column numbers, as seen on the cornici of each papyrus, are provided, as are the column numbers of the text.
The relationship between \textit{P\textsuperscript{Herc} 19/698}, as indicated by the disposition of \textit{coxafo	extsuperscript{e}s}. Digital images have been manipulated to bring the papyrus into proper alignment.
As can be seen above, my own investigation of *P Herc.* 19/698 shows that the way in which Monet matches the two papyri is correct.\(^{24}\) However, her matching of some of the first textual columns is less secure, and I have had to alter her distribution of coll. XI (B) -XIII (B). It is clear from the stratigraphy that while the *sezioni* can be paired with *P Herc.* 19 the way Monet imagines, unfortunately the text upon them cannot so easily be put into place.

**COMPOSITIONAL FEATURES AND FORMATING**

Cavallo designates the hand of *P Herc.* 19/698 as belonging to group K, and estimates that the text was written in the second half of the first century.\(^{25}\) Monet provides a rigorous description of the hand, scribal signs (*paragraphos, diple, coronis, asteriskos*), notes on the scribes’ method of marking abbreviations, corrections and deletions, and supplies a thorough listing of *spatia vacua,* and so I defer to her treatment of these matters.\(^{26}\)

Monet estimates that *P Herc.* 19/698 is approximately 20 cm. in height. This figure is based upon Cavallo’s general observation that the ratio between the height and width of columns tends to be around 3:1 for columns between 5-6 cm. in width.\(^{27}\) The total height, then, is achieved by multiplying the average column width (5 cm) by three and adding the height of the top and bottom margins (T: $\geq 2.5$; B: $\geq 2.3$). However, the height of the column is the most important, for it is with reference to this figure that we can attempt to establish the number of lines that are lost between *P Herc.* 19 and *P Herc.* 698. Unfortunately, Cavallo’s observation cannot be taken as very precise, and if the column format in 19/698 diverges from Cavallo’s ratio.

\(^{24}\) For Monet’s table of correspondences, see Monet 1996, 53-4.

\(^{25}\) Cavallo 1983, 53.


\(^{27}\) Cavallo 1983, 19. For her explanation, of which the following is only a summary, see Monet 1996, 27-8.
at all (which is likely the case), the result will be significant in establishing the height of, and hence the number of lines in, a column.

Regarding the height of the papyrus, since margins cannot be seen in their entirety, the measurements provided must be taken as minimum measurements, and thus all we can say of the papyrus’ height (if the ratio of column width-height is accurate) is that it is at least 20 cm.

Since the text contains no discernible stichometric signs, the length of the papyrus cannot be determined precisely. However, an estimate can be given based upon several rough figures: the average decline per circumference ($\delta$), the outer radius and the inner radius of the scroll.\(^{28}\) The average decline per circumference is around 2 mm. From the 1781 archive, we know that the outer radius was 26.4 mm. And the inner circumference is around 3.18, a figure that can be deduced from the final circumference of the papyrus (10 mm). Using Janko’s equation, the length of \textit{PHer}. 698 should be approximately 7.127 meters.\(^{29}\)

THE CONTENTS

Philodemus’ \textit{On Sensation} fits naturally in the historical progression of Hellenistic philosophy. After the deaths of Plato, Aristotle and their immediate successors, the Epicureans and the Stoics were the only groups to take much interest in perception as a subject to be analyzed systematically.\(^{30}\) The \textit{peripatos}, for example, largely focused its efforts on ethics, and gave little attention to philosophy of mind generally. Thus, Philodemus should be viewed as contributing to a dialogue between Epicurean and Stoic theories of perception, along with interpretations of Aristotle and Plato. While the emendations I have made to cr. 3-4 will provide readers with an

\(^{28}\) For the method used to approximate the scroll length, see Janko 2011, 43-6.

\(^{29}\) When $L_{\text{roll}} = 2\pi [ir_1 + (t \div 2)i^2]$. Provided the above figures, in \textit{PHer}. 698, $t \approx .3$ mm and $i = 77$ layers.

\(^{30}\) Annas 1992, 10-2; Lynch 1972, 139-40.
improved text, they do not require great revisions to our understanding of Philodemus’ argument. Thus, Monet’s general outline of the papyrus’ content remains adequate, and the virtues of previous studies endure. Nevertheless, I present here some aspects of the text which should be of interest to students of the Hellenistic philosophy, and which may, in my view, comprise fruitful areas for further study.

First, *PHerc. 19/698* is the first Epicurean text to address self-consciousness unambiguously. While previous Epicurean thinkers made statements that may imply a type of self-consciousness, none address the issue directly, or with enough detail that it could constitute a theory. To my knowledge, little, if any, work has been done on Philodemus’ theory of self-consciousness and how it fits into the history of philosophy.

Typically, self-consciousness is explained as either (1) an essential part of our mental states, or as (2) a higher-order mental state. In other words, when I look at a picture, my perception of the picture and my awareness that I am currently seeing the picture are either discrete parts of the same perception, and are hence parts of the same mental state, or alternatively they belong to discrete perceptions. In this case, my self-consciousness is a perception of my own perception, and the latter directs itself on my perception of the picture. Thus, self-consciousness is of a higher-order mental state.

Epicurus recognized self-consciousness only insofar as having feelings that accompany our perceptions can be said to entail our consciousness of them. This alone does not allow us to

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31 For an outline of Philodemus’ argument in *PHerc. 19/698*, see Monet 1996, 55-72.
32 For a good overview of the strengths and weaknesses of each view, as well as an interpretation of Aristotle’s hybrid view, see Caston 2002.
33 *Her. 38.4-7, 52.5-53.8*. See Glidden 1979. I do not follow Glidden’s translation of ἑπαισθήσις, in opposition to αἰσθήσις, as ‘recognition’, since translating the term thus would seem to contradict Philodemus’ claim that the senses do not have intuitive power (cf. col. XXVIII.A). The synonymy of the ἑπαισθήσις and αἰσθήσις defended in Asmis 1984, 162-4.
place Epicurean theory in either camp, for these texts say nothing of what form the affections take, and precisely how they operate in the maneuverings of the mind. Philodemus seems to make explicit the connection between affections and self-consciousness, and he identifies affections as ‘sense perceptions of themselves’ (ἐαυτῶν ἐπαισθήσεις, col. XII). This is underscored in col. XV, where Philodemus says that we have a perception of pleasure that is discrete from our perception of the object that produces it. In the same column, Philodemus makes another important claim: that “we also have a perception of (ἐπαισθάνεσθαι) the fact of seeing.”

These claims present two descriptions of perception, both of which involve self-consciousness, and each involves two discrete steps. Put in terms of the perception of a (pleasing) picture, they run as follows:

(1) A perceiving subject (i) comprehends the picture, and subsequently (ii) has a perception of comprehending the picture.

(2) A perceiving subject (i) comprehends the picture, and subsequently (ii) has a perception of pleasure.

Not all the details of this scheme are worked out in the extant text. Is step (ii) of each case meant to be in some way equivalent? Philodemus seems to indicate that affections are coterminous with and ‘produced in’ sense perception (col. XI). This would suggest that affections arise as a part of step (i), and hence (1(ii)) having a perception of our comprehending the picture would involve (2(ii)) having a perception of pleasure. But this is not addressed clearly. Further, what prevents
infinite regress? If I perceive my own perceptions, do I not also perceive my second, third, and fourth-order perceptions, and so on *ad absurdum*?

Despite these unanswered questions, what seems likely is that Philodemus is describing a theory that conceives of self-consciousness as a higher-order mental state, which is discrete from the comprehension of perceptible objects, and which directs itself intentionally upon them. This is a new claim in Epicurean philosophy, and one that is first attested in Philodemus.

Philodemus also claims that the senses cannot ‘discern’ (κρίνειν). Discernment seems to involve making intuitive claims about a perception, which are not required by the perceptual data received. The nature of such claims are various, but always unwarranted. Philodemus maintains that hearing cannot discern the suitability of a poem’s style (col. XXXIII), nor can smell discern the identity of an herb from its scent (col. XXXIII), nor can sight discern what will happen subsequent to the event it currently witnesses (col. XXX). This is because the senses do not involve themselves in one another’s domain. Philodemus observes that “although sight does not discern solidity, some err in thinking that it does discern” (XXIX.B). The perception of stones is given as an example. The bulk of the example is lost, but the point can easily be restored: when such people perceive stones, they mistakenly think that their sight reports the stones’ solidity, when in truth sight only reports on the color of the stones. It is not sight itself that discerns the rocks solidity, but rather it is our mental faculties, which intuit their solidity as a result of its previous observations (διὰ παρατηρήσεως, col. XXXI.A) of stones.

This view stands in opposition to the standard Stoic theory, which takes perception to include much more than the reception of data.\(^{34}\) For the Stoic, the perceptive process (αίσθησις)
includes (i) the reception of an appearance, which conveys the sense data of the perceptible object; (ii) the interpretation of such data, relative to the perceiver’s understanding, into a propositional with linguistic form (τὸ λεκτόν), and (iii) an assent to the λεκτόν. Only when the data has been interpreted by the perceiver and formulated into mental language is it assented to. Any discernment that might result from the perceiver’s prior experience occurs during the process of perception, in step (ii), and influences the content of the resulting λεκτόν. In the Stoic view, ‘discernment’ holds a significant place in the process of perception, and so takes place during perception rather than after the fact.

‘Discernment’ falls under the banner of what Aristotle calls ‘incidental perception’. Incidental perception admits of error, but it is nevertheless categorized as a type of perception. So when Philodemus claims that smell cannot discern that the source of the odor is frankincense (col. XXXIII), Aristotle would respond that it can, but only incidentally, and without the promise of accuracy. This response is not entirely satisfying. To what extent incidental involves the intellectual faculties and to what extent it involves the comprehension of sense data by the sense organs is unclear. It seems, however, that whereas, to Philodemus, perception does not include making inferences based upon sensory attributes, to Aristotle, as with the Stoics, ‘discernment’ is built into the perceptive process.

\[35\] Like Philodemus, Aristotle favors the proprietary sensibles, for “of the per se perceptibles those are most strictly perceptible which are proper to a given sense” (De Anima 418a24-5). It is the proprietary sensibles that, as in Epicurus’ scheme, do not admit of error (De insomn. 2, 459b7-13). However, he does delineate two other types of perception that function with less accuracy: incidental perception and the perception of the common sensibles. On incidental perception, De Anima 418a8 ff., 425a14 ff., and 428b18 ff., cf. Owens 1982, Cashdollar 1973.
PHerc. 19/698 also shows how Philodemus deals with the phenomenon which Aristotle calls the ‘common sensibles’ (κοινὰ αἰσθητά). Though theories involving the common sensibles seem not to be limited to Aristotle, his is the only one of which we have any details, and so PHerc. 19/698 serves to illustrate the difference between Epicurean and Aristotelian conceptions.\footnote{Philodemus, for example, does not appear to be reacting to Aristotle’s theory in particular, \textit{contra} Monet 1996, 748. Terminological differences between the two authors, for instance, indicate that Philodemus was likely not commenting on Aristotle’s system.}

Aristotle asserts that while some sensibles are perceptible by only one sense, others are perceptible by all the senses. Thus, he divided sensibles into two categories: (i) proprietary sensibles and (ii) common sensibles. Proprietary sensibles can only be perceived by their proprietary sense organ. For instance, sight alone perceives color, and taste alone perceives flavor. Common sensibles are not associated with a single sense, but are perceivable by all the senses, or at least by more than a single, proprietary sense.\footnote{De \textit{Anima} 418a14-20. Aristotle weakens his claim that the common sensibles are common to all the senses (κοινὰ πάσας) in \textit{De Anima} 425b10-1; \textit{De Sensibus} 422b4-8.} Aristotle includes movement, rest, number, shape and magnitude in his list of the common sensibles.\footnote{De \textit{Anima} 418a14-20; In \textit{De Sensibus} 437a9. Aristotle removes rest from his list of the common sensibles, presumably because it is simply an absence of movement.}

Whereas Aristotle presents a theory in which each sensible is divided neatly into one of two discrete kinds, Philodemus appears to contradict himself in providing his taxonomy of objects of discrimination. He admits that some objects of discrimination can be common (coll. XXV-XXVI). But he simultaneously asserts that objects of discrimination are always proprietary to a single sense, explicitly stating that “one sense does not concern itself with the other’s object of discrimination” (col. XX.A). The trouble may be cleared up by considering the terminology used by these two philosophers.
Philodemus and Aristotle use different vocabulary to identify objects that we perceive, and the terms they use have a different range of uses. Aristotle speaks of ‘sensibles’ (τὰ αἰσθητά), which designate discrete categories of sensible objects, such as movement, color, shape or taste. Philodemus speaks of ‘objects of discrimination (κρίματα).’ Although the objects of discrimination refer to the same kinds of categories that Aristotle calls sensibles, Philodemus does not conceive of all these categories in the same way that Aristotle does. Aristotle divides the sensibles into two categories according to their capacity to be perceived by a singular sense or a plurality of senses, but all the sensibles play the same part in the process of perception. Each sensible is perceived in the same way, directly and individually, since each sensible constitutes a discrete category. However, Philodemus does not seem to think of the objects of perception as playing parallel roles in perception. He distinguishes the objects of discrimination based upon how they are perceived. The common objects of perception are perceived as a part of the proprietary ones. Philodemus’ apparently contradictory remarks in *On Sensation* are clarified when it is understood that he views the ‘so-called common’ objects of discrimination simply as a common quality that inheres in the proprietary objects of perception. Philodemus thinks of the former as a completely different type of perceptible object, a phenomenon that is discriminated but is not on par with the proprietary sensibles, which to Philodemus are the main referent of the term.

Philodemus nests the common objects of discrimination inside of the proprietary objects of discrimination. While neither object of discrimination is any less real, and both are perceived

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39 The term κρίμα need not denote a family of objects, such as is suggested by the translation ‘sphere of discernment’, but it may (Sedley 1989, 126). The word αἰσθητός is supplied by Monet in several lacunose passages, but its use by Philodemus is secure in only one instance. In this case (col. XIX), it does not parallel Aristotle’s terminological usage, but functions as an adjective rather than as a substantive.
things (κρίµατα), the former seem to be a part of the latter. In Aristotle’s scheme, each type of sensible is discrete, and each is perceived directly rather than incidentally, as the result of a higher-order intellectual operation.\footnote{De Anima II.6. cf. Owens 1982.} This leads to confusion over the relationship between proper and common sensibles, and why the perception of common sensibles is liable to error when the perception of proper sensibles is not. Philodemus avoids these problems altogether by conceiving of the common objects of discrimination as inherent properties of the proprietary objects of discrimination.

Aristotle needs the various senses to agree on the single nature of the common sensibles, since perception is the process of receiving a body’s sensible form. Philodemus does not imagine the common sensibles as having a single nature. Sight cannot “comprehend the magnitude and shape of body” (XX.A), for an object has many magnitudes and shapes corresponding to the different senses, and the magnitude and shape of and object’s body is different from the magnitude and shape of the same object’s color. The so-called common objects of discrimination are common to all the senses in that they transmit a common quality (κοινότητα, col. XXVI.A), which is manifested in all the proprietary objects of discrimination. But each sense only reports on the quality as it relates to its own proprietary object of discrimination. David Sedley appears to be correct when he says that “when shape and size are observed to be common objects of touch and taste this is no more than a half truth. They are, but not the same shape and size. At best, the author explains with exemplary clarity, the shape and size reported by vision are analogous to the shape and size reported by touch.”\footnote{Sedley 1989, 134.} To Aristotle, all the senses together reported on the singular shape and size of an object. To Philodemus, sight reports on visible shape and visible magnitude, whereas touch reports on tactile shape and tactile magnitude.
Moreover, shape and magnitude are common features inherent in every type of sense perception, not just of sight and touch. Hence, Philodemus must strain himself to describe more unintuitive categories such as the shape of sound (XXVI.B-XXVII.A).

**THIS EDITION**

Because much of *PHerc. 698* was ignored by Scott and the *disegnatori*, in many places Monet’s edition constitutes the first reading of the text. In the more tortured areas of the papyrus, including cr. 3 as a whole, there are many areas in need of improvement. A closer investigation of the stratigraphy reveals a number of ruptures in the text that upset Monet’s readings. Where Monet reads a continuous column as if all the ink appeared on the same layer, it is clear from autopsy that the text she reads appears on multiple layers of papyrus, and hence they really belong to separate columns. Such findings, for example, require that we relegate Monet’s XI (B) into the category of dispossessed fragments. Since the topography is particularly variable at the beginning of cr. 3, the text cannot be placed into its proper column with any certainty.

Additionally, some text can be read now where it has not been read before. The best example of this is in Monet XII (B), where I record fourteen fragments that had not previously been published. To these new fragments are ascribed roman numerals, which serves to differentiate them from the fragments that Monet records in her edition with Arabic numerals. As with any new edition, some new readings are made and old readings are corrected simply by virtue of bringing new eyes to the text.

This edition was created as a result of my consultation of the papyrus, infrared photographs and *disegni* at the Officina. In what follows, I provide a new edition of *cornici* 3 and 4 of *PHerc. 698*, what Monet designated as full columns of text. So that the reader may read the text continuously (rather than reading only the lower portion of columns), I also reprint Monet’s
transcription of *PHerc.* 19 in line with my readings of *PHerc.* 698. Accordingly, what is printed here only comprises the last two-thirds of the treatise, and the preceding upper portions of ten columns are not included. For continuity in language, I provide an English translation of both papyri.

\[\text{\footnote{42 For the details of Monet’s readings, consult the *app. crit.* in Monet 1996. When a departure is made from Monet’s transcription, it is marked with an asterisk and Monet’s reading is noted.}}\]
CONSPECTUS SIGLORUM

\[ P = \textit{PHerc. 698} \]
\[ O = \text{apographum Oxeniense \textit{PHerc. 698}} \]
\[ N = \text{apographum Neapolitanum \textit{PHerc. 698}} \]
\[ \text{Bassi} = \text{in margine apographi Neapolitani} \]
\[ \text{Graham} = \text{privatim} \]
\[ \text{Monet} = \text{Monet 1996} \]
\[ \text{Scott} = \text{Scott 1885} \]
\[ \ddagger \text{Barney} \]

CONSPECTUS SIGNORUM

\[ \alpha \] littera dubia vel valde mutila
\[ \prime \alpha \prime \] littera supra lineam scripta
\[ \lbrack \alpha \rbrack \] littera a librario expuncta
\[ \alpha \] littera supposita vel supraposita ab editore recognita
\[ \lbrack \alpha \rbrack \] littera ab editore suppleta
\[ \{\alpha\} \] littera ab editore expuncta
\[ \langle \alpha \rangle \] littera ab editore addita
\[ \ldots \] litterarum vestigia
\[ \lbrack . \rbrack \] lacuna ubi litterarum deperditarum numerus definiri potest
\[ \lbrack - - - \rbrack \] lacuna ubi litterarum deperditarum numerus definiri non potest
Fragments i-ii
Col. 7a, cr. (XI.B Monet, ---Scott, --- N, --- O)

(i)

1. - - -]νδεμ
   - - -]σχησ
   - - -]περὶ τῶν
   - - -]με
5. - - -]σεξαι[.\ioi
   - - -]εντις εξ[
   - - -]μι διά τοῦ .
8. ][

[Too fragmentary to translate]

(ii)

1. - - -]δο
   - - -
   - - -
   - - -
5. - - -
   - - -]γαν
   - - -]ν
   - - -]νου δὴ τῶ
   - - -]αι[σθήσεις μη
10. - - -]...]...
     - - -]ητω
12. - - -]με

[Too fragmentary to translate]
Fragments iii-xvii
Col. 7b, cr. (XII.B Monet, --- Scott, --- N, --- O)

(iii) - - -βα[ - - -
(iv) - - -χειν[ - - -
(v) - - -ήν(+)τικας ε[ - - -
(ii) - - -φερειν δεμ[ - - -
(ii) - - -λα]μβ]νει[ν[ - - -
(ii) - - -]άπο αγ[ - - -
(vi) - - -α[ - - -
(vi) - - -]ον[ - - -
(vii) - - -εν[ - - -
(vii) - - -]η[ - - -
(vii) - - -]ου[ - - -
(viii) - - -εν[ - - -
(viii) - - -]πεπ[ - - -
(viii) - - -]ον[ - - -
(ix) - - -]οντα[ - - -
(x) - - -]π[ - - -
(x) - - -]ησ[ - - -
(xi) - - -]γκ[ - - -
(xii) - - -]μ[ - - -
(xiii) - - -]...[ - - -
(xiii) - - -]σ κατα[ - - -
(xiii) - - -]εκ...[ - - -
(xiv) - - -]ορ[ - - -
(xiv) - - -]θαμ[ - - -
(xv) - - -]πρ[ - - -
(xvi) - - -]ρσ[ - - -
(xvii) - - -]ως ρα[ - - -

[Too fragmentary to translate]
XI.A


...and a comprehension of comprehension, but it is present even in itself by comprehending. For whenever the affection is present, it is produced in sense perception itself, since the affection is of sense perception and is comprehended in it, but, not as whenever color is present, is perception required in order that it be comprehended. But there is someone who says that we claim that affections are comprehensions of themselves...

XI.B

Col. 7, cr. (XIII.B Monet, fr. 7 Scott N, 361Γ O)

1. - - -]κα[ - - 1-2 desunt O 1 καδία N 2 deest Monet
   - - -]...[- - Bassi 3 α[.]μα Monet καμα N 4
   - - -]αμ[α] - - ήδονή<ν> Monet 5 ζει Monet Scott ιζ
   - - -]δονή[ - - Bassi τιζο N ιζειν O 6 ν τη Monet Ο την N
5. - - -]ζει δ[ - - 7 τους N τοῦ Monet Bassi O
   - - -]τη[ - -
   - - -]του[ - -
   - - -]...

...pleasure...

Monet, Scott and the disegnatori all read this fragments as the beginning of XIII.B. I have separated it and present it as likely belonging to the middle of column XI.B. If the fragments are viewed as a single column, the visible ink necessitates that the column length would be at least 6 cm., which significantly exceeds the standard measurement of 5 cm. Moreover, previous readers saw additional letters to the left of what I print above. While these letter forms can no longer be seen on the papyrus, there is some legible text in line 2, which seems to be on the same layer as the lines below it. These letters appear to the left of the rest of the text beneath it, showing that the column is wider than it currently appears, and even wider than the now-invisible letters would make it seem. The letters in this line appear further left than the letters previous readers
believed initiated a new column, in the space that would have constituted the left margin.

Conceiving the two fragments as a single column, previous readers have struggled to make sense of the text. For example, Scott and Monet read νομίζει (lines 4-5) and Monet reads διαφέρον (lines 5-6), both of which violate the rules of syllabification. If placed one revolution to the left of its present position on the cornice, it would be read in XI.B. In providing his own reconstruction of the Greek, Scott recognizes that “it is doubtful whether the right and the left half belong to the same column” (298).

43 See Janko 2000, 75-6; of particular relevance are rules (i) and (iv). See also Obbink 1996 73-4.
XII.A

...themselves. This is precisely why, whenever we say that qualities are comprehended by affections, we do not make individual comprehensions dependent on the affections themselves, but on the sense organs through the affections. And whenever we say that the affections are sense perceptions of themselves and observations of themselves, we do not leave them sense perceptions, even if we say that sense perceptions perceive…

XII.B

Col. 8, cr. (--- Monet, --- Scott, fr. 8 N, --- O)

[Too fragmentary to translate]

This fragment is pulled from col. XIV.B, in which it appears sottoposto. It was transferred one circumference (ca. 80 mm.) to the left in order to find its proper position in the treatise.
XIII.A

they claim that...presence, and, by giving perception of qualities to the sense organs, that they themselves constitute sense perceptions, so that we do not say that the principal matter is this, namely that the sense organ discerns affections and by this means the same comprehends quality, and all beyond this is to be rejected. For this reason...

XIII.B

Col. 7, cr. (fr. 7 Scott N, 361Γ O)

1. - - -]μη[- - -]ειπα[, _γο]σ.[ - - -] 1 deest Monet N O 2 [.]π [ Monet ειπαισεα
   - - -]μεν την ἰδρ...ν  N ειπασσελ O γο vel π γω πο 3 την [.]ζ]
   - - -] τῆς ἡδον[ης - - -] Monet μεντινδ N μεντηνις O 4 ἡδον[ης ἡ
   Monet ἡδ[ονης]  5 λα]μβανεσθαι

5. - - -] λ]μμβάνεσθαι νο[ι
   - - -]οπε[ρ] ούδεν διαφ[ Monet μκανεωσαι O μηνεσθαι N 7
   - - -]ου την ἡδονη//ν ἡδ[ Monet, lit. //ν ἡδ// O 8 [.]θαιο Monet
   τω O απ N

9. - - -

[Too fragmentary to translate]

* τούτου [τά πάθη τήν] Monet
...concerning themselves...that they (the sense organs) do not bring about the discrimination of affections, because none of them touch and handle the affections. For as, whenever we think that the affections are discerned by the sense organs, we claim that they occur on the exterior and...sensation occurs on the interior upon the affections, just as upon flavor and odor. They say that these things....
XV.A

tʰʰ̣n ὀψ[ν], ἀλλά καὶ τοῦ | ὀρᾶν ἔ[π]αυσθατά | παρα[πλη][σίω]ς δ᾽ ὦδ ἐ[ες] ἡ ἀνεσθα[ι] 
αισθήτηρω[ν]· τοῦτο τῇ[πότῳ] λεγομένου πρὸς | [ἡ] μον ὄντως ὅταν φῶ[μεν καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ | 
[τ]ὰς σιθήσεις κατάληψεις ἑαυτῶν εἰναι | - - - 

…visual impression, but we also have a perception of the fact of seeing, and similarly we do not 
only feel pleasure because of the beautiful color, but we also have a perception of pleasure 
Corresponding to the very presence of pleasure and not by another affection. This analogy 
must be understood also in the case of the other sense organs. This is surely what we really mean 
whenever we say that both affections and sensations [are comprehensions of themselves].

XV.B

Col. 9, cr. (fr. 9 Scott N, --- O)

1. - - -[ε]- - -  
   - - -[ε]- - -  
   - - -[ε]- - -  
   - - -[ε]- - -  
   5. ...[αμ.ν, ταῦτα[ δέ ..-]  
   ...[ντετ]- - -[κοτε][..πα-] 
   ...[και[ικετ]][κα[ι] τοῖς  
   όμοδοξ[ε][ι] ὦ[ς ἀεὶ δυσθε-] 
   τούμεν[οι] πινετETER-  
   10. σα[ν τätzlichοσες ἡδεί-]  
   ας] μόνον τῆς[α[ι]σθῆ-]  
   12. [σεως - - -  

...and some, ever dissatisfied both with the unconquerable and with those of the same 
opinion, said that pleasant sensations alone are…of sensation…
XVI.A

αἰσθητών κρίσις[θν - - ]|λέγομεν εχ[- - ]|ειτικον[ - - αἰσθήμα]νεσθαι δρ̣ας[ - - ]| δὴ τὰ πά[θη - - |
| - - ]αἰσθήσεω[ν - - | - - ]|ποιοῦν [ - - ]| καὶ ύφεστηκ[- - - | - - ]|πλοῦν ἐστὶ [ - - |
γεῦσις ἀντι[λαμβάνεται] τῷ χυλ[οῦ - - - | - - ]| αἰσθήμα[ - - | - - ]

...we say that the discrimination of sensibles [has]...affections...sensation...it is not simple...for
taste does not simply apprehend flavor...but...

XVI.B

锷 Col. 10, cr. (fr. 10 Scott N, --- O)

1. - - -].νονμα[...
   - - -] αὐτὸ[πά-
   θους [...] τοῦ μορίου κα-
   τάλα[μ]βα[νε]θ' ὑπὸ τοῦ
   αἰσθητὴ[ρίου - - -
   - - -] μον[...].ιστόν, τὸ δὲ πά-
   θος οὐ[χ οὗτος ἀλλὰ
   περὶ αὐτὸ τὸ αἰσθήτη-
   ρί]ον ὑπάρχον ἐμ-

5. - - -]...ο[...] ἀλλα
   τὸν τὸν οἰκτήνο
   ἀλλα
   τὸν τὸν

10. - - -]...ἐαυτὸ ἐαυτῶν
     - - -]τ[- - -]α
     - - -]αὐθ[- - -

...of the affection itself, a part is comprehended by the sense organ...and the affection
does not exist in this way, but near the sense organ itself...
XVII.A

...we say...whence they reject...the conceptions of the cause...for the cause...of some...the faculty...sensations...faculty...upon body...

XVII.B

⇒ Col. 10, cr. (--- Scott, fr. 10 in marg. N, --- O)

1. ἦ[--]

1 νη Monet 2 ει Monet 3 αζ[..]η Monet 3-

4 ἐπιφανεστατα[τ] - - -

Macfarlane 6 α[θ]το Monet 7 δη Monet 8 ν δη Monet δη Bassi

5. αν[--]

γ[..]ατο[ - - -]

- - -μα[ - - -]

- - -σα[ - - -]

9. ἐμε[- - -]

[Too fragmentary to translate]
XVIII.A


…times, and that the sense discerns things individually or participates in memory. Apollonides, moved by the plausible argument, felt ashamed to attach memory to them, but accepted the idea that they participate in the analogy, in order to give it a clear perception of what no longer exists, as if in order to retain evidence, we must dismiss other evidence or, if it differs in some way, that we must overthrow some such evidence, or just as we…reject…

XVIII.B

-Cola. 11, cr. (fr. 11 Scott N, 361X O)

1. ...]ως κατα[.][εμ][- -]...
   [μ][- -][νεν][- -][Ε][...]
   τόδε μητέ μνη[μης - -]
   ..]σα[ - -

5. μετέχειν μητ’ ἀναλ[ο-
   γίας μητ’ εἰδοις, ἄλλα
   μηδ’ ὀναρ ὅρκ ἐναργεί[ς]
   ὑμοὶ[ως] ἐστ[1] ....][αι
   εν[ ...]χον ἄλλως [...][εδε

10. - - -
    - - -
    αμ[ - -
    ]σα[ - -
    θ...ερ[- - -

15. - - - θ

…this does not participate in memory, nor in the analogy, nor in form, but neither on the other hand are dreams similarly clear…

* διαφέρον|τι Monet
...if they participate in memory of analogy (?). And...it is clear that memory of reasoning throws all things into confusion. For seeing that it was not easy to refute the argument which was laid down concerning perceptible exterior movement...some, having found in a certain book of Aristobulus...memory...the proof...

XIX.B
⇒ Col. 11, cr. (--- Scott N O)

1. ..]en [- - -] νουσιν [- - -]εκαια π[.].(χρωμ[α- - -]τακα] μενογ[].e[ - - ]ειναι

5. φήσομ[εν - - - κα] τ᾽ ἀριθμ[ο]ν - - - λεγο[ν - - -] σ...μα [- - -]

9. .....τα κ[- - -]

[Too fragmentary to translate]

* προσευρημέν[α Monet
XX.A


For we think that sight comprehends visibles, and touch comprehends tangibles, and that sight is
do of color and touch is of body, and that the one sense does not concern itself with the other’s
object of discrimination. Whereas, if it were to happen that sight comprehended the magnitude
and shape of body, much rather would sight have comprehended body, or much rather would it
have comprehended both body and...

XX.B

Col. 12, cr. (fr. 12 Scott N, --- O)

1. - - -] μ. 1 deest Monet 1-3 desunt N 2 o[ῦδὲ
       ……]ηστον ο[ῦδ’] ἐτε-
       ρ]ουν οῦδ’ ἐτέραν συμβη-
       β]ὴκαν ἀλλὰ τά μὲ]ν ταῦ-
       τοῦ […ος] ρήματος ἐκα-
       τέραν προσπίπτει δη[α]-
       φέροντα δεσ[.] καὶ τά μὲν
       τῆς οὐσίας συμβη-
       κώτα τ[ά] δὲ τοῦ περὶ τῆν
       ὂργιν σ]εμβηθ[κό]τος
       [τά δὲ τοῦ περὶ τῆν ἀφῆν - - -]

…neither the one nor the other occurred, but some attributes of the same thing present
themselves differently to each sense, some are the attributes of substance and others are
attributes of what concerns sight [and others are attributes of what concerns touch]…
XXI.A

...[the sense organ] takes up the outline and often not the thing itself. If then visible shape is nothing other than the outermost position of colors, and visible magnitude is nothing other than the ordered position of several colors, how is it possible that touch, which is incapable of apprehending colors themselves, is able to comprehend the outermost position of colors? Similarly, even if tangible shape is nothing other than the [depiction of body...]

XXI.B

⇒ Col. 12, cr. (--- Scott N O)

1. vo- - -
   ζω[- - -
   κα[- - -
   λαμ[βαν- - -
5. βας[- - -
   στε[- - -
   ουθ[- - -
   - - -
   νε[- - -
10. ναπ[- - -

[Too fragmentary to translate]
Is seems possible that Timasagoras did not agree with Polyaenus but much rather with Epicurus. And even if we want to contend with him in all ways, it would be in conformity with this: after appropriating the doctrines of (other) men, one prides himself as if on his own innovations, and alongside others, who display…and ungrateful imposture…

XXII.B
Col. 13, Cr. (fr. 13 Scott N, --- O)

1. - - -]σ αἰς[- - - 1 deest N 2 Ἐρ]µόδορο[ς † νο. οιει... μοδ...
ζ ὄλλ[ου]µόδορο[ς † νο. οιει... μοδ...
καὶ διὰ τοῦτον [- - - ] sed τούτω Scott τοῦς N...
.....]ν ὅτι τ[- - -]

5. ρας τούναντι[ον - - - 7 νπ[...
λα[...]ν] ὀνδιπερ [- - - εἰ-
µαρµέν[η]ν π.[- - - ]...]-λον [...]η[.]µ[- - - ]

α[...]η [- - -]

10. καν[- - - ]

- - -

1. ν.

τη

3. ηκαλω

A piece of papyrus containing three lines of text is attached to the main body of the column with goldbeater’s skin. The lines of text on this fragment do not align vertically with those of the rest of the column, and so it is difficult to determine to which lines of text the fragment should be appended. Monet doesn’t print the letters in the fragment, and N draws them in lines 7-9. While the proper place of the fragment could be in lines 7-9, they might also be placed in lines 8-10.
XXIII.A

...these things turn out as we indicated at the beginning of our treatment of sight. And it is possible to measure magnitude in Apollodorus, who says that, since body is produced from ten-thousand similar atoms [with...], and skin, which happens to be on the surface, from a thousand to bring these things to be individually. Nothing is unreasonable which appears to harmonize visible shape and tactile shape, and other shapes individually...and...
XXIV.A

...which help complete the outline for other (senses). Insofar as they give color to such shapes, magnitudes, arrangements and positions, since we say that touch is able to distinguish both flavor and odor, because it happens that the things that produce them help to effect the unity of outline. If not, insofar as bodies...the qualities...

XXIV.B

Col. 15, Cr. (fr. 15 \textit{N}, --- \textit{O})

1. τ[...][σαφ[- -
   ἀλλα[ - -
   γεγεννη[--- --- ποι-
   οτήτων [ - -

5. της εκ[ - -
   .][α[ - -
   με[ - -
   ζ[.][λιε[ - -

[Too fragmentary to translate]
…discern color. So that, according to the analogy itself shape and magnitude are objects of discrimination common to these senses: the ratio which the shape and magnitude of color have with regard to color, those of body have the same ratio with regard to body; and the ratio which color has to apprehension through sight, the same ratio has body to (apprehension) through touch…
XXVI.A

...of sight and hearing, except for the highest and most common (senses), which we have previously discussed, we do not think that it (shape) is a common object of discrimination in any obvious way, but in a not-so-obvious way it is a common object of discrimination which transmits a common quality, so that the analogy can be easily expressed. We could say that shape is an object of discrimination common to these senses. For with regard to the shape of color and the shape of written sound, it has some [commonality]...

XXVI.B

Col. 18, Cr. (fr. 18 Scott N, 354b O)

1 νεγ N sed ves corr. Bassi ογου 8 O 3 3
ap.voi N sed ar.voi corr. Bassi ar .. voi O 4
συν N sed συν corr. Bassi 5 [ει]ναι Monet
ποιστη O 7 αμοτα N sed αλλοτρ corr.
Bassi 8 επομεν Monet ek .. ηε O 9 ειν[α]ί
Monet των O

For we say that, the proportion in which the configuration of colors relates to the quality of color, in the same proportion is articulation to the quality of sound. And in this we would say that each of the two sensations is not unlike shape.
...to those who say, in this regard, that voice has shape. If he believes that articulation does not have any kind of analogy with the configuration of colors, he clearly does violence to the facts. But if, after laying this down, he establishes the difference, but allowing that it be called by the name of shape, he argues semantics with those, according to him who follows not after...

The so-called shapes are common to all the senses, but one might say that the discrimination, common to all of the qualities, has, to the extent that the perceiver comprehends the similar (attributes?) and those proprietary (attributes?), proprietary...
XXVIII.A


...we speak with precision so that we identify, of the senses, that which is proprietary to each, apart from the sense perception of that which is discerned. For example, sight has a most peculiar feature in comparison with the others (apart from the discrimination of colors and of those things that relate to them), namely that it comprehends forms at a distance, and it even perceives the distance between itself and them. And hearing, apart from the discrimination of sounds and [those things that relate to them]...

XXVIII.B
Col. 20, cr. (fr. 20 Scott N, 360d O)

- - - 3 καθοκουστόν Ο 5
5. καὶ ε[πι]λογονα - - - καπελεγονα - - - καπελεγονα - - - - κο O 9

...easily on that which produces sound, inasmuch as it is audible and has emitted sound. And smell, apart from the discrimination of odors, both of those which are in it (the form) and of those which are nearby...and on an audible word, making the sense perception...

* καὶ τῶ[- - - Monet
XXIX.A


…it only passes judgment (κρίσιν) on [objects] in itself. But touch, for its proprietary function, doesn’t apprehend the quality of anything, but for its common function (by which flesh is characterized), which is also inseparably connected to other sensations, it apprehends qualities of different types. For being capable of discerning hard and soft, it comprehends also hot and cold, both in itself and beside itself.…

XXIX.B

Col. 21, cr. (fr. 21 Scott N, 355e O)

1. [- - κατ]αψεύ- | 1 αυευ N sed αψευ corr. Bassi 2 νον . α N -
δον[τ]α[ι τιν]ές καὶ κρί- | -- α Bassi εσκαρκρι O 4 στειμι O 5
νειν λέγουσι. τῆς ὀρά- | στητα N O sed στητα corr. Bassi 6
σεως τοίνυν στερ̣ε̣- | καταψευδονται N sed καταψευδονται corr.
νης, | Bassi 7 κηνειν O νει N sed νειν corr.
καταψευδονταί τινες | Bassi 8 υγω O μειν N sed λλειν corr. Bassi
κρίνειν· νομιζόντες | 10 σταν N sed σταν corr. Bassi εταν O
ὑποβ[ά]λλειν γάρ αὐτῆν | τραωρω O
καθ’ ἀπλῆν προσβ[λ]ῆν |
10. ὅταν π[έ]τρας ὀρώμ[ε]ν |
...through a simple application one comprehends that some such man and such a creature are both insentient and sentient, and both living and non-living, and more and the like. They discern all of these things through a simple application, as well as its being a certain shape and tangible magnitude. And not only do they discern unpleasant odor by encountering such a color <that is known to appear in objects of unpleasant odor>...
...they...conceiving of this notion as a result of observation, and whenever [they say that] the sense, which does not even understand generally whether there is a different sense, is able to discern bodies as bodies, and that it distinguishes old things and novel things and that in general it meddles in that which is discerned by the other senses, and whenever [they say that]...excessively...shapes, and in addition it discerns the greater <from the lesser>, and...succulence...

XXXI.B
Col. 23, cr. (fr. 23 Scott N, 356g O)

1. ...]αι[...πρ[...-]αια[- - -
tαπλομο[...].]σαι διαφέ-
ροντα, καὶ ὅταν χρόνον
eιθ’ ἀπλῶς ἐλάχιστον

5. εἴτε τὸν καθ’ αὐτόν, καὶ
ὅταν [ἀ]λγηδόν[α] κατὰ
tὸ ὄρι[σ]τικόν [χ]ρόμα,

>---

9. τ[ῆς δ΄] ἀκοῆς καταψευ-
δο[νται τιν]ές καὶ δ-
[ταν

...which are different... whenever [one perceives] time, either simply the minimal unit or time in itself, and whenever [one perceives] pain by its characteristic color. And others speak falsely of hearing, and whenever....
XXXII.A

...until...it apprehends...and not in the manner in which it happens to be of them. And whenever [one perceives] this man or that man, and whenever one perceives] a Greek or a barbarian, and whenever [one perceives] a tragedian or a comedian, and whenever [one perceives] a boiling caldron, according to apprehensions of this or that kind, and whenever one perceives that] the apprehensions of the experienced are keener and are worn down, and whenever...capable of perceiving...

XXXII.B
Col. 24, cr. (fr. 24 Scott N, 356h O)

1. νης [...]ποις [...]αις ἄντι-

λαμβάνεσθαι καὶ ὅταν

πάντας τής αὐτῆς ἁ-

κούειν ἢ τῆς ὀμοίας,

5. οὐδ᾿ εἶ τις δ[λ]φῶς ἔπε-

ρος ἀκούει καταλαμβα-

νούσης· καὶ δ[τ]αν τήν

αὐτῆν κατ᾿ ἄρτιθιμὸν

9. δισ[ - - -]ή

...[that] it apprehends.... And [they err] whenever [they say that] all hear the same or a similar [sound], if someone else does not hear entirely that which was comprehended. And whenever [they say that]...the same in number...
‎XXXIII.A


...yet concerning this, which is untrue due to the swift destruction of the uttered sound, and whenever [they say that hearing] discerns melody, both rhythm and meter, and a poem and its style to be good or bad, suitable or unsuitable. And concerning smell whenever, speaking in a similar manner, they attribute to this sense the discernment of frankincense or of such odors. And whenever…to other smellings….

XXXIII.B

Col. 25, cr. (fr. 25 Scott N, 357i O)

1. τὸ ὅζων πώρρ[ω]θεν 1 πσερρ.θεν N πωρρ.θεν Bassi 2 καθ N
   ἐλκεσθαὶ καὶ στηθ[α]ν] τοῦς sed καθ Ο 3 χρηστοὺς N
   χρηστοῦς οίνους καὶ χρηστοῦς οίνους καὶ χρηστοῦς N sed Ο 4 μοχθηροὺς N
   μοχθηροὺς καὶ μοχθηροὺς cor. Bassi 5 συμου … οὐσας μοχθηροὺς cor. Bassi 5 συμου … οὐσας Ο 6 ογ N sed op cor. Bassi καισου - - σρ
5. κα[ὶ τὰς] συμφ[ερ]ούσας O 7 τηξ[δ] ῥη Ο τηξ[δ]·. γε Bassi καισου - - σρ
8. ζόντ[ες …]βνηρείν - - - τηνπ [κος Ο κοντ N sed ζοντ cor. Bassi

...that which stinks is inhaled from afar, and whenever [they say that smell] distinguishes fresh and stale wines and pleasing and displeasing odors. And concerning taste, some, thinking…
XXXIV.A

ν[.] ἵδ[ι]α [- -] άξ[- -] | τοῦ σώματος εἰσὶν [- - | ....]μεν [..]ημχο[..]υον | [..]νο[..]δ[..][ζ]

...proprietary [functions]...are of the body...[taste] apprehends others, both of hot and of cold flavors, according to its peculiar function, not because flavor (?) is the same for all tastings...

XXXIV.B

Col. 26, cr. (fr. 26 Scott N, 357k O)

1. .........]ν εἰπεῖν η-
       μ[........]ατικαις
       τη...χεμι ει ἣδοναι
gεφ[σ]εις ἀκριβεστεραι
>--- τη[ζ δ´ ώφ]ης ὄταν φ[ό-
tο/ν ο/[- -
καὶ μ[− −] τοῖς ὅρα-
8. τ]//οίζ// [..]μ[....]νον.
       - - -
1 νε .. πεινη N νε Bassi 2 μ - - - εανρ N μ - - Bassi ατιλαν O 3 τηνεμι Monet τη - - -
       μ - - - δε N τη - - - μ Bassi 4 ἀκριβεστεραν
       Scott γεν . δησακριρεστεραν N γευ .
       εισακβιρεστεραν Bassi 5 φήσο[με?]ν φ
tωνοσ N τω Bassi τω .. νο O N τω .. καλ Bassi
       Scott φι - - - σο - - - νφ N σο - - - ν Bassi
       5-6 φήσο[σι] Monet 6 litt. //ν ο// O N
tωνοσ N τω Bassi τω .. νο O 7 καλ Bassi
       ωςοιν N τοις .. ν Bassi τοις συν O 8 litt.
       //οίζ// O

...to say... if [concerning taste] pleasures are keener tastings, and concerning touch, whenever...of the eyes...and...with visibles....
XXXV.A

[Too fragmentary to translate]

XXXV.B

Col. 27, cr. (fr. 27 Scott N, 3591 O)

1. \[\text{- - -}\] \[\text{φα[ν]ούμενοι τὸ [γίν]εσ-}\]
   \[\text{θαι, καὶ λευκαίνεσθαι}\]
   \[\text{μὲν καὶ μελαίνε[σ]θαι}\]

5. \[\text{λέ[γουσί] τὴν ὄψ[ιν], λευ-
   κό[ῦ] δὲ καὶ μέλα[νος τὴν}
   \[\text{κατάλη[υ]ν] Ἱ[π]ιοείσ-}
   \[\text{θαι· τὸ δ᾽ ἄν[ά]λογον [κ]αὶ}\]

   \[\text{[σ]εων - - -}\]

…seeming…to become…, and they say that sight is lightened or darkened, but that it
does not produce a comprehension of white and of black. And the analogy also [holds
ture] for the other sensations…
XXXVI.A

- - - | ἐγεες[...]σ[...]ν[- - -]εσθαι [- - -]τοσχ[- - -] | - - -

[Too fragmentary to translate]

XXXVI.B

Col. 28, cr. (fr. 28 Scott, -- Ν, 359m Ο)

1. ....]νεπαι[- - -] 1 νεπαιτι Monet
   πο [τὸ]ν α///ी///τ///ιον/// (...)///νε///[- - -] 2 litt. //ί/ O Scott Monet
   τὴν καὶ μη[- - -]εφ [ἐς-] litt. //ιον/// O Scott
   τηκότων [- - -] Monet 3 μη Monet
5. λα[.].ησπ[- - -] 6 εωςκα Monet θωσα
   ....]θως και[- - -] O 7 κρίσιν Monet
8. τες[...]αυ[- - -] 8 τες...καυ O

...the cause...discrimination...
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