Shakespeare's Art and Artifice: Passing for Real in As You Like It

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Shakespeare’s Art and Artifice: Passing for
Real in *As You Like It*

Kristen Nicole Cardon

A thesis submitted to the faculty of
Brigham Young University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

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ABSTRACT

Shakespeare’s Art and Artifice: Passing for Real in *As You Like It*

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Gender performativity, detailed by Judith Butler and accepted by most contemporary queer theorists, rests on an agentive model of gender wherein “genders are appropriated, theatricalized, worn, and done” (“Imitation and Gender Insubordination” 716). This academic orthodoxy is challenged, however, by the increasing presence of transgender persons joining the theoretical discourse, many of whom experience an essential gender as a central facet of their identity. I respond to Katie R. Horowitz’s recent modification of Butler’s theories—a theory of omniperformance to dissolve the distinction between performance and performativity, and thereby between artifice and “real life.” I argue that gender-as-art, a schema that acknowledges both the intention and the intuition of gender, is a more fruitful foundation than omniperformance. I use, as my model, Elisabeth Bergner’s performance as Rosalind in Paul Czinner’s 1936 *As You Like It* and Bryce Dallas Howard’s 2007 Rosalind in Kenneth Branagh’s film adaptation of the same play. In Bergner and Howard’s androgynous gender performances, I argue, a body—a transgender body, an androgynous body, a genderqueer body, a cisgender body—represents an aesthetic ideal, the product of the human drive to create, to beget, to beautify.

Keywords: *As You Like It*, gender performativity, androgyny, transgender
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My first homoerotic experience, a half-conscious one several years ago, prompted a tearful conversation with my mother that served both as a “coming out” and as a pseudo-confession wherein my mother stood in for an ecclesiastical leader and provided pastoral counseling. Her guidance, however, was hardly orthodox; after I described to her what I worried was a grievous sin, she downplayed its significance by undercutting the importance of anatomy itself: “Your body probably didn’t even realize whether the other body was male or female,” she said. “It was a body; gender didn’t matter.” And to me, an inexperienced young Mormon woman, this explanation seemed correct.¹

I share this story to illustrate another dimension of what J. Jack Halberstam terms gaga feminism, with its “more twisty, curvy, more relative notions of time, age, and difference” (*Gaga Feminism* xxiii). He claims that anarchic, un-socialized children might offer insight into a flawed adult world before adults discipline them to obey social norms.² And just as Halberstam productively complicates our notions of feminism, so I am obliged to usefully complicate his views, specifically his claims about religion: Halberstam assumes that religion is antithetical to advancement,³ yet my mother’s response to my confession demonstrates her progressive understanding of gender despite widespread belief in essential gender among Mormons. Relating

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¹ My approach here, while admittedly personal, follows the genre of the confessional poets and the second-wave feminist dictum “the personal is political.” Here I use my personal experience to enter a larger theoretical debate, much like Adrienne Rich’s method for exploring female poetic consciousness by publishing her own poetry along with theory in “When We Dead Awaken: Writing as Re-Vision.” Because of the confessional mode with which I begin this essay, as well as the dual theoretical-critical approach I am taking, this work constitutes a multi-methodical approach to queer studies.

² Though Halberstam’s approach here might seem excessively romantic, he claims that he is “not invested in a misguided and sentimental notion of childhood innocence nor on account of a naive investment in the idea of truth issuing from the mouths of babes” (xxiii-xxiv).

³ I am using “advancement” to allude to a move in contemporary theory, heralded by Halberstam gagapocalypse, Meillassoux’s speculative realism, Lyotard’s inhuman, and Badiou’s event, that in my view has renewed hope for and expectation of progress through social change. I discuss this theoretical stance in my second section.
differently to time, age, and difference may induce us to listen to middle-aged Mormon women for our insights as well as anarchic children; while I might have expected to educate my mother in queer theory, she surpassed me. My mother’s claim is not unlike Rosalind Barnett and Caryl Rivers’s 2004 thesis in *Same Difference: How Gender Myths are Hurting our Relationships, our Children, and our Jobs*: there are more significant similarities between men and women, as humans, than there are noteworthy differences between the sexes. And both theses—my mother’s and Barnett and Rivers’s—align with the theory of gender performativity in opposition to seemingly outmoded claims of gender essentialism. Few feminist and queer theorists advocate for a theory of essential gender, tied as it often is to oppressive, prescriptivist systems. Why dictate behaviors and roles based on anatomy? Freud’s contention that anatomy is destiny seems today to be obsolete.

And yet, both anatomical sex and gender clearly matter, both for sexual identities (what does the term “lesbian” signify without women?) and personal identities (can a trans woman both claim her inborn gender identity and reject gender essentialism?). In this essay, I consider Shakespearean representations of female-to-male (FTM) androgyny, in text and film, to explore the tension between gender identity and performativity. I use the term “androgyny” to refer to a type of cross-dressing that does not “pass”; in this case, women who dress as men and thereby render their gender ambiguous. I argue that, unlike male-to-female (MTF) androgyny, which is most often presented as comic, FTM androgyny generates tension that ultimately moves queer theory forward.\(^4\) I conclude that gender-as-art is a more helpful schema than Katie R. Horowitz’s omnip erformance for articulating gender.

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\(^4\) Here I assume progress as an inherent value, connecting theoretical developments to a general conception of social progress. I will document the theoretical basis for this assumption in my next section.
Gender performativity has had extraordinary influence in queer theory, but dismissing essential gender conflicts with lived experiences from within the LGBT*QIA umbrella. For instance, how could sexual orientation (e.g. gay) remain stable when gender (e.g. “man”) is not? Horowitz summarizes the paradox as follows:

Tomorrow I could shave my head, don boxers, baggy cargo pants, and an oversized T shirt, sit with my legs apart, and perform the ritual markers of masculinity. I could do all these things, but I would feel a bit disingenuous; I would feel, that is, as if I were not being myself. The same general idea structures countless narratives of coming out as gay or transgender…. And yet gender and sexuality are socially generated. And yet we cannot and do not want to change what and who we feel we are. And yet it turns. (315-16)

Horowitz’s reference to Galileo’s (possibly apocryphal) statement at trial cannot resolve the tension of social construction versus their seeming essence, so she suggests an ontology based on action to resolve this paradox: “[O]ne might be gay or masculine or genderqueer but only inasmuch as one does (agentizes) intra actions⁵ that give meaning to gayness or masculinity or genderqueerness” (319-20). In this way, Horowitz proposes to resolve the tension between the artifice of performance and the reality of performativity, a dichotomy wherein “the body is literal matter, [but] the mind is what really matters” (314). Arguing for the social construction of gender must necessarily privilege immaterial social-psychological forces over physical bodies, so when Judith Butler distinguished between artifice (i.e. performance) and reality, it was to insist that gender is real even though it is constructed. Horowitz dissolves that distinction, insisting that “there is no difference between performance and performativity, that the rhetorical

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⁵ Horowitz uses Karen Barad’s term “intra action” as the basis for her agentive ontology; in Barad’s schema, “there are no ontological boundaries between entities; entities only become intelligible as such within the context of antecedent relationships” (Horowitz 318).
distinction between the two has exhausted its utility, and that a performance paradigm based on an ontology of bodily intra action accounts for both the theoretical fluidity and the apparent fixity of individual identity” (321, emphasis in original). Her stance is compelling, offering the solidity of action as a basis for the self, but insisting on omniperformance— that is, a lack of distinction between performance and performativity—to accommodate social construction. Perhaps we can have our cake and eat it, too.

Agentive ontology, however, requires precise definitions for terms like “genderqueer,” “sexual,” and the word with which I began this paper, “homoerotic.” Could an abstinent adult claim a lesbian identity without having any sexual partners? Or is Horowitz perhaps arguing for loose definitions, wherein claiming “masculine” as a label for one’s actions will suffice to make them so—in which case, does this not seem to amount to discourse rather than to action? When can discourse legitimately equate to action? What actions “give meaning” to these terms, and how can this ontology survive without delineating those actions? Indeed, under this reasoning there may be no such thing as a queer (or straight but unmarried) student at my university or other similar institutions, given the behavioral restrictions which forbid extramarital sexual activity and same-sex marriage. My (sexually abstinent) colleagues who identify as queer, gay, bisexual, lesbian, etc. would surely be affronted. Halberstam’s Gaga Feminism broaches this topic as well: “what if sexual orientation could also be read as less fixed, less determined, more negotiated and fluid? What if we actually stopped and recognized the multiple ways in which men and women, boys and girls, exceed and fall short of the definitions that give those categories heft and longevity?” (9). Yet if we did loosen categories of men, women, lesbians, and so forth,

6 Like many all-encompassing theories (e.g. Althusser’s ideology), Horowitz’s omnip erformance carries within itself its own contradiction: if performance were total, her essay would not be possible, since it would be unable to recognize itself. If it is true, it cannot be true.

7 The College of the Ozarks is another example.
what would stop conservatives from insisting that heterosexual monogamy is viable for all persons? Without a “homosexual” category for identity politics, Mormons, for instance, may well continue to insist that sexual orientation is a choice, and that homosexuality is the wrong choice. But surely if gender is unstable, sexuality is, too?

We might encounter similar problems with gender identities. What intra action could give meaning to gender fluidity as opposed to genderqueeress? Ultimately, is there an action, as opposed to a discourse, that produces such an identity? If ontology is an action, such as wearing clothing that is gendered male, can we distinguish between a drag king who performs masculinity (but nevertheless identifies as female) and a trans man? But would we be better off theoretically (and politically, and socially) if we were to affirm Piotr Sadowski’s assertion that “the concept of the social construction of gender is untenable on both logical and empirical grounds, and its persistence is entirely due to the beliefs of its adherents rather than to factual evidence” and describe gender in terms of both nurture and nature (139-40)? Or could we affirm my mother’s claim, that while bodies matter, genders do not—in which case, what can we make of men, women, and sexuality?

Oddly, despite its seeming contradiction with the dominant theory of gender performativity, one recent move in queer theory has been to consider differences between male bodied and female bodied queer people.8 One problem in this discussion, however, is the loss of an endgame—the tendency for academic discourse to continue to exist only for itself, regardless of any tangible objectives outside of the ivory tower. Particularly in light of the increasing momentum of marriage equality in the United States—along with the continuing problems of LGBT*QIA suicide, job and housing discrimination, violence, and homelessness—neglecting

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8 See, for example, Halberstam’s *Gaga Feminism* (87), Halperin’s discussion of gay male culture (qtd. in Horowitz 323), Rupp, Taylor, and Shapiro’s 2010 study of drag queens and kings, and Horowitz’s aforementioned work.
lived experience, political work, and social problems is a serious oversight. Because I am invested in queer theory not for its own sake but as a method of social development, I will first summarize what I see as a composite progressivism in theory, queer and otherwise, before turning to a discussion of FTM androgyny in Shakespeare’s *As You Like It* (a category of culture-and-performance that enjoys broad legitimacy) as a method for intervening in gender’s theoretical ontology.

The Ambition of Queer Theory

Recent philosophers offer a new, empowering foundation from which to read FTM androgyny. I situate these progressive philosophies in relation to their predecessor, anti-humanism, in order to establish contrast between the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Anti-humanist thought, which began in the nineteenth century with Nietzsche and dominated Western philosophy during the subsequent century via Freud, Heidegger, Althusser, and Foucault, is pessimistic in that it insists upon closed systems—linguistic or ideological—that do not change. Moving from the agentive human as the measure of all things to large-scale systems that influence and control those humans was, in many ways, the outcome of Nietzsche’s philology, Freud’s unconscious, Heidegger’s language, Althusser’s ideology, and Foucault’s discourse.9 Since the anti-humanists, however, several philosophical developments have proposed models of changing and changeable systems in which progress is possible. For queer theory in particular, these new theories offer hope for changing sex-gender systems because of their radical politics.

Halberstam’s progressive feminism is among the newest in this trend. In *Gaga Feminism*, published in 2012, Halberstam presents his gaga feminist manifesto, promoting a method of exploiting social and economic turbulence in order to achieve meaningful human change:

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9 My summary here is necessarily brief. For a more thorough explanation of the category “anti-humanist,” as well as these particular figures’ places within it, see Geoffrey Galt Harpham’s *The Humanities and the Dream of America*. 
Welcome to the gagapocalypse! As the environmental crisis turns from bad to worse, as wars break out like wildfire across the globe, as bankers and corporate gamblers take higher and higher shares of the global markets, and as the social rituals that formerly held communities together lose their meaning, it is time to go gaga. In a crisis, do not remain calm, do not look for the nearest exit, do not stick your head in the sand; do agitate, do make things worse, do run screaming through the street, and do refuse to return to business as usual. (132)

Halberstam’s proposed method offers as examples Occupy Wall Street and a group of French anarchists, the Invisible Committee, authors of *The Coming Insurrection* (published in English in 2009). Though both of these organizations seem to have lost momentum since 2012, their radical politics have been gaining support in the academy for decades. What Halberstam terms “the unexpected and the unanticipated” in politics, social structures, and personhood—which requires “big leaps into the unknown” as well as “letting go of many of your most basic assumptions about people, bodies, and desire”—resonates in the work of Alain Badiou, for instance (27). Halberstam’s crisis (with its potential to restructure “business as usual”) is Badiou’s event.

Like the gagapocalypse, Badiou’s theory of events is fundamentally progressive: an event produces truth which was not previously available. For Badiou, inconsistency conflicts with truth, which then pushes the inconsistency “into the light of day”\(^\text{10}\) (106). Jean-François Lyotard’s inhuman is a rough equivalent of this inconsistency, an alterity that “places demands upon our thinking and interrogates our knowledge in a manner that may yet offer us a way to refigure our relations with difference and with others, beyond the system and without prejudice,

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\(^{10}\) An ability to predict such an event and its results would, by definition, mean that the occurrence was not an event in Badiou’s sense. In this way, his theory works best as an evaluative paradigm.
maybe, even, beyond terror” (Curtis 436). This productive tension with difference is the catalyst for change, for improvement, for progress.

Halberstam’s gagapocalypse, Badiou’s event, Lyotard’s inhuman—to this emerging philosophical progressivism we may add Quentin Meillassoux’s speculative realism, wherein “the mathematization of the world [bears] within it the possibility of uncovering knowledge of a world more indifferent than ever to human existence, and hence indifferent to whatever knowledge humanity might have of it” (116). In other words, there exists—outside of current organization, narrative, and conception—an entirely foreign alterity. Like his mentor Badiou, then, Meillassoux conceives of a world that might exist in a radically different form than it currently does. In these alternative systems, mightn’t we remake sex-gender systems? Butler articulates her vision of radical alterity in sociopolitical terms: “[W]e must learn to live and to embrace the destruction and rearticulation of the human in the name of a more capacious and, finally, less violent world, not knowing in advance what precise form our humanness does and will take” (Undoing Gender 35). Ironically, this seeming violence to human identity is, for Butler, the force that ultimately reduces violence: destruction of human identity becomes the force of progress, which dismantles the human in order to remake it (continually) into better forms.

Unlike anti-humanist theory, Halberstam’s gagapocalypse, Badiou’s event, Lyotard’s inhuman, Meillassoux’s speculative realism, and Butler’s “destruction and rearticulation of the human” insist on transforming humans and systems. When Audre Lorde claimed that the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house, she demanded new tools, tools that had not been shaped by problematic systems (Lorde 110). Enter the gagapocalypse, the event, the inhuman, speculative realism, the destruction and construction of the human. Ultimately, the goal
of queer theory is the radical transformation of the human, motion toward a different mode of
being, toward a less violent, more equal alterity.

Each of these progressive philosophies has its reservations about which systems can
change, as well as which systems are worth changing. Halberstam, like Emma Goldman, opposes
gay (and all other forms of) marriage, categorizing marriage as an irredeemable tool that will
forever support the master’s house. Similarly, Badiou’s events must be larger than any human,
Lyotard’s inhuman rejects the limitations imposed by the technological automaton,
Meillassoux’s speculative realism is not accessible in any total sense, and Butler’s progressing
human cannot reach an ultimate form but will be “constantly negotiating sexual difference”
(Undoing Gender 191). While I respect these restrictions, it has been difficult for me to
dismantle the master’s house with anything but the master’s tools. Addressing Mormon
LGBT*QIA suicide, for instance, is basically impossible without insider knowledge of the
culture and that culture’s understanding of authority. Furthermore, while it is convenient to
assume that major cultural systems have been built by the “master’s tools,” it is also reductive;
have not women and other historically oppressed groups also built their own houses with their
own tools? It is possible that their houses and tools were later absorbed into a hegemonic system,
but that does not mean that such tools did not exist, nor that they could not be repurposed to
serve the underprivileged.

Likewise, despite the canon wars, advanced students of literature still study the old
canon—at least for the GRE subject test—and, if they enter the increasingly corporatized
academy, must work with the master’s tools within it. That does not mean, however, that we
cannot find in our academy, in our literature, the tools that may dismantle and remake the
system. Like Halberstam’s gagapocalypse, Badiou’s event, Lyotard’s inhuman, Meillassoux’s
speculative realism, and Butler’s “destruction and rearticulation of the human,” I propose Rosalind/Ganymede’s androgyny is one such tool, precisely because of the productive discomfort it has caused within queer theory.

FTM Androgyny

Oddly, FTM androgyny is routinely dismissed in queer theory. In 1998, Halberstam observed that “there is remarkably little written about masculinity in women, and this culture generally evinces considerable anxiety about even the prospect of manly women” (Female Masculinity xi). Indeed, at that time, two major queer scholars—Marjorie Garber in 1992 and Judith Butler in 1991—had placed drag at the center of their theoretical schemas, but both neglect FTM androgynous persons to some degree. While Garber claims that “transvestism is a space of possibility structuring and confounding culture: the disruptive element that intervenes, not just a category crisis of male and female, but the crisis of category itself,” she also heavily focuses on MTF transgender individuals and only briefly on FTM11 (Garber 17, emphasis in original). For Butler, drag is evidence that gender is “appropriated, theatricalized, worn, and done” (716). That is, performance of gender in drag demonstrates the artifice of gender categories generally; for this reason, performing in drag is a social tool that allows us to detach gender from its presumed essentialism. Nowhere, however, does Butler distinguish between FTM and MTF drag. Even the term “drag” (which came into being in the late 19th century) means “feminine attire worn by a man” (“drag, n.”). That is, drag is MTF, and not the other way around. While “drag queen” has been in use since the mid twentieth century, “drag king” as of 2006 remains only a draft entry in the OED.

11 Her index lists 25 references for “Female Impersonation,” 40 references for “Drag,” and 36 for “Effeminacy,” but only one for “Male impersonators,” seven for “Butch,” and two for “Lesbian, mannish.”
Yet in practice, FTM androgyny differs from MTF androgyny. In Barry Mitchell’s interview with Tina Fey and Rachel Dratch, promoting their 1999 sketch comedy show “Dratch and Fey,” Fey observed that “when a man plays a woman, when a man is in a dress, you're halfway there. It's already funny. When a woman plays a man, for whatever reason, it's not that same instant kind of funny” (qtd. in Mitchell). Consider, for comparison, Tobias Fünke as Mrs. Featherbottom in Arrested Development, Robin Williams as Mrs. Doubtfire, or Harvard’s all-male Hasty Pudding Theatricals cast.12 FTM androgyny, on the other hand, is both masculine and feminine, but not necessarily comedic.13 What does it mean to occupy a viable space between the female/feminine and the male/masculine?

“Passing” is at the heart of this question. In Female Masculinity, Halberstam questioned whether passing was at all a useful term: “What of a biological female,” he asks, “who presents as butch, passes as male in some circumstances and reads as butch in others, and considers herself not to be a woman but maintains distance from the category ‘man’? For such a subject, identity might best be understood as process with multiple sites for becoming and being”--or indeed for not becoming, and not being (21). Nevertheless, Halberstam critiques Tilda Swinton’s performance in Sally Potter’s 1992 Orlando on the basis of her failure to pass: “As a male Orlando, Swinton performs an oddly androgynous character who can be read comfortably as a ‘boy’ but less comfortably as a ‘man’” (214). Because, according to Halberstam, androgyny represents a balanced male and female, only butch female masculinity can upset the status quo (Female Masculinity 214-15).

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12 Though passing MTF persons may experience tragedy, as does Dil in The Crying Game, an androgynous MTF performance is fodder for comedy.
13 A possible exception would be Julie Andrews in Blake Edwards’s Victor Victoria (1982). While Andrews is clearly androgynous, however, the film portrays androgynous drag as a considerably more thoughtful light than, say, Mrs. Doubtfire (e.g. Andrews tells a male character, “Your problem, Mr. Marchand, is that you are preoccupied with stereotypes. I think it’s as simple as you’re one kind of man; I’m another. . . . One that doesn’t have to prove it, to myself or anyone”).
Laurence Olivier launched a similar critique of Elisabeth Bergner’s performance as Rosalind/Ganymede in Paul Czinner’s 1936 film adaptation of *As You Like It*. Olivier's first foray into a film adaptation of Shakespeare, the film's failure to impress both critics and audiences nearly convinced him to abandon cinematic Shakespeare altogether. His friend William Wylar had to coax him to return to the Bard: “Don’t sneer at that *As You Like It* Shakespeare film. Shakespeare can be done as anybody else can be done if you just think out how. Just think and keep thinking. Do it right, and anything can be done on film” (qtd. in *On Acting* 260). What was it about Czinner's film that Olivier so disliked? By his own account, "I was trying to play Orlando in a film version of *As You Like It* to a Rosalind with a German accent, whose impersonation of a boy hardly attempted to deceive the audience" (On Acting 255, emphasis mine). Olivier's biographer notes that “[he] felt extremely foolish because the stage convention which allows Orlando to mistake Rosalind for a boy became quite preposterous in front of the camera.¹⁴ He even made Orlando a trifle mad in the vain hope that this might lend a touch of credibility to an impossible situation” (Barker 94). In short, Bergner was unable to pass as the male Ganymede, and according to Olivier, this was a major flaw in the film (Figure 1). I argue that Halberstam’s and Olivier’s disdain for FTM androgyny is evidence that such androgyny is a site of tension and growth.

A drag performer himself, Olivier’s disdain for Bergner's androgyny grew from his own ability to pass. As a twelve year old in the All Saints boys choir, he played Maria in "Scenes from *Twelfth Night*" and, a few years later, Katherina in *The Taming of the Shrew* (Figure 2). Of this experience, Olivier says, “Father Heald's direction was brilliant, and he injected into my consciousness a conviction that *I was, in fact, being a woman*” (*Confessions* 12, emphasis

¹⁴ Barker’s record indicates an interesting shift in drag performance, wherein the role of media changes the dynamics of “passing” in relation to audience.
By all accounts he performed splendidly. Dame Sybil Thorndike recollects: “He was the best Katharina I've ever seen!—a real shrew but very touching” (qtd. in Darlington 15). Another young actor, Denys Blakelock, thought Olivier’s features well suited to the female role: "He [Olivier] was not good-looking as a boy; he had a rather dark, glowering look, which was admirably suited to the Shrew" (53). Journalist W. A. Darlington likewise praised Olivier's performance: "The boy who took the part of Kate made a fine, bold, black-eyed hussy, badly in need of taming, and I cannot remember any actress in the part who looked better" (17). Olivier’s drag performances as a boy inspired extravagant praise—praise for his appearance as much as his acting. And Olivier himself experienced something extraordinary when he performed as Katharina: a transgender experience, when “I was, in fact, being a woman.” In other words, in this moment, Olivier passed, both in his own gendered experience and in his audience’s assessment.

Later, in her cultural study of cross-dressing *Vested Interests*, Marjorie Garber described Olivier as "the portrait of triumphant transvestism," a tribute to his ability to pass as a woman (34). His success, then, serves to draw stark contrast to what he felt was Bergner’s failure. But perhaps we should consider Bergner’s Rosalind in a separate category from Olivier’s Katherina—and perhaps Halberstam’s and Olivier’s disdain for FTM androgyny is evidence that such androgyny is a site of tension and growth. More specifically, I propose that the simultaneous privileging of drag in queer theory and the dismissal of certain types of drag gives us space—even a physical space, on the FTM androgynous body—to reconsider our theoretical conceptions of gender.

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15 In addition to Garber’s book, see Anthony Holden’s *Olivier*, Thomas Kiernan’s *Sir Larry*, and Michael Billington’s chapter “Lasciviously Pleasing” in Garry O’Connor’s *Olivier: In Celebration* for a discussion of Olivier’s cross-dressing. His experiences with performing femininity and gender expression merit further study than I have space for in this paper.
Despite Halberstam’s and Olivier’s aversion, androgyny remains a significant topic in the humanities. Recent articles in *GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies*, *PMLA*, *Twentieth-Century Literature*, and other journals have explored Shakespeare and Webster’s use of twins to embody androgyny (Way), Woolf’s own opinions of androgyny in relation to *Orlando* (Helt), Leopold and Molly Bloom’s androgyny (Sadowski), and two analyses of early twentieth century autobiographies of MTF androgynes (Meyerowitz, Shaheen). Early modern drama is a uniquely fruitful venue for analyzing FTM androgyny in particular, since FTM drag actually occurs more frequently in the context of the fiction—and considerably so—than MTF. In Shakespeare’s plays, for instance, Viola disguises herself as Cesario, Portia plays Balthazar, and Rosalind passes as Ganymede. Female characters wearing male clothing also appear in the work of his contemporaries. Male characters do disguise themselves as women in early modern drama, including in *The Taming of the Shrew* and *The Merry Wives of Windsor*, but female-to-male disguises are more common. Fundamentally, however, Shakespearean cross-dressing during Shakespeare’s lifetime is male to female, as the male-bodied actors on the public stage play all roles in the original performances. Furthermore, by historical accounts, even though sumptuary laws applied to both men and women, women were disproportionately punished for public cross-dressing. Wealthy women were generally forgiven, but lower class women were assumed to be sexual offenders—accusations ranged from fornication to prostitution to adultery—if they dressed in men's clothing in public. Male-to-female cross-dressing occurred less frequently, if the lack of evidence is any indication, and was punished less harshly (Shapiro 29-30). Robert Chetwyn was, in 1556, accused of dressing as a woman in public, but was shortly pardoned of

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10 Michael Shapiro lists 79 early modern plays in which female characters appear in male disguise, including plays by Lyly, Heywood, Jonson, Middleton, Beaumont and Fletcher, and Massinger.
17 The exception to this rule is closet drama.
18 In the Restoration in 1660, women were allowed on the English stage for the first time and began to play the women's roles. Furthermore, in later stagings and films of Shakespeare's plays, women occasionally played men's roles, such as Sarah Siddons and Sarah Bernhardt who played Hamlet in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
his folly. Elizabeth Griffyn, on the other hand, wore men’s clothing and was punished “upon suspicion of ill and lewd life” (Shapiro 16-17 and 29, see also Shapiro's appendix of legal documents recording punishments for cross-dressers). While playwrights clearly celebrated their cross-dressing (male-to)-female-to-male characters, early modern society forbade the practice on the streets. In contemporary film adaptations of early modern drama, however, female actors play the cross-dressing parts, so Shakespeare remains one of the best sources for FTM drag and androgyny. For this reason, I have chosen Rosalind/Ganymede’s androgyny in two film versions of *As You Like It* to demonstrate its potential for productive discomfort in queer theory.

I began this paper with a discussion of the conflicts of identity and performativity. I must, therefore, account for my decision to focus on a contested category—a “woman” who dresses as a “man.” I begin my particular analysis from empirical observation—female androgynes are received differently than male androgynes (cf. Horowitz’s field work in drag bars and recall Tina Fey’s observation that female drag is not immediately comedic, unlike male drag) and from there observe their singular effect in cultural gender work. I see the tension between the experience of stable—even essential—gender and performativity (which I seem embodied in the debates about FTM androgyny) to be fundamentally productive. To compete with Horowitz’s strictly agentive gender ontology, I propose a new model for understanding gender, one that includes our lived experience as well as gender’s theoretical implications. I use FTM androgyny as it is presented in Czinner’s and Branagh’s films to consider gender as a mode of art.

At this juncture, let’s take a moment to consider that which we call art. James Monaco, tracing the history of art from its classical roots, notes that ancient definitions classified seven activities—history, poetry, comedy, tragedy, music, dance, and astronomy—as arts. It was not until the late seventeenth century that “art” was narrowed to apply primarily to the “Fine Arts”—
previously, visual crafts like painting and sculpture had not been included. By the nineteenth century, art was defined as that which science was not. Monaco celebrates film as the embodiment of all modes of art, from practical (its technology) to pictorial, dramatic, narrative, and musical (22-25, 28-29). I would like to consider an expanded definition as well: art, in the OED, is “Skill; its display, application, or expression”; historically, it referred to a “manner of acting or behaving” circa 1100, both definitions that emphasize the active role of the artist in artistic production (“art, n. I”). In gender-as-art, this definition is the equivalent of gender performativity. Yet this is not the only meaning of “art” and we may well consider another: “senses relating to learning or study” (“art, n. II”). In this sense, art is essential—objects of study, the physical works of art themselves—as well as the senses (sentire, to feel) used to perceive and study them. In order to understand this two part ontology, we might evoke Yeats’s provocative paradox from “Among School Children”: “How can we know the dancer from the dance?” (98). In other words, just as art is both the work and the artist, gender is both performance and performer. Gender-as-art embraces an agentive ontology (including skill, imagination, and creative processes) as well as ontological essence (the words which imagination—and intuition, or senses—inspire). And in art that transcends genre boundaries between artifice and reality, between male and female, we may learn to consider those boundaries as creatively mutable.

We run a few risks in considering gender-as-art. The foremost is the possibility for one understanding of art—be it agentive or intuitive—to take precedence over the other and attempt to disqualify its opponent. We also run the risk of recasting gender as artificial in contrast with “real world” entities—a problem that Butler attempted to sidestep with her distinction between performance and performativity and that Horowitz considers to be passé. The former reflects the
continuing tension between various segments of LGBT*QIA communities and queer theorists, and can only be resolved by paying attention to those voices that contradict and complicate the academic orthodoxy of gender performativity. The latter demands serious consideration of mental health, which seems to require a stable sense of identity, and political activism, which has thrived on identity politics (for a thorough discussion of these critiques, see Beasley 103-13). Part of these difficulties, however, emerge from our contemporary practice of devaluing art, both in its agentive sense and in its intuitive/essential sense. Perhaps unearthing their relationship will promote the uplift of both: as we value our identities, we can also value our artistic expressions, and vice versa. In any case, the pressing need for understanding gender identity and expression compels my proposal here.

In contrast to Horowitz, then, I posit gender as both intended (agentive) and inspired (intuitive)—an important distinction, because of the overwhelming credence offered to theories of gender performativity and their conflict with many persons lived experience with intuitive gender. Much like the nature/nurture debate, wherein the middle ground of dual influence seems to be most fruitful, I propose a dual agentive and inspired understanding of gender—gender as art.

Androgynous Text

In *As You Like It* as a text, cross-dressing and passing (or failing to pass) signifies on two major levels: for the boy actor playing Rosalind in the sixteenth century, and for Rosalind the character, passing as Ganymede, and then, again, as “Rosalind.” In Shakespeare’s day, female drag signified more than donning forbidden clothing. Because breeching was a rite of passage wherein boys transitioned from women’s authority (the disenfranchised) to man’s authority (the fully human, under the law) trading a skirt for trousers represented the progression to
personhood\textsuperscript{19} (Hayward 5). Oddly, women’s clothing was hardly regulated through sumptuary law—unless she donned male clothing, for which (as I noted previously) women were punished more harshly than men, a woman was rarely subject to discipline for clothing: “The lack of concern with female dress meant that their clothing was free from state regulation. As such, monitoring the clothes of women and children was considered to be a domestic matter and so left to their husbands and fathers” (Hayward 45). Rosalind senses the cultural weight of her male costume: “I could find it in my heart to disgrace my man’s apparel and to cry like a woman. But I must comfort the weaker vessel as doublet and hose ought to show itself courageous to petticoat” (2.4.3-6). Having experienced the social rite of passage she was never meant to know, Rosalind begins to embody the privileged status associated with breeches. She hesitates—she still feels able to “cry like a woman”—but understands her “doublet and hose” as requiring an elevated behavior, as holding her to a higher social standard than she had reached in her skirts. Shakespeare presents some of these moments as jokes, playing on the contrast between the male actor and female character, as when Rosalind/Ganymede cries, “Good my complexion! Dost thou think, though I am caparisoned like a man, I have a doublet and hose in my disposition?” (3.2.177-79). Perhaps, however, Shakespeare also refers to the relationship between gendered clothing and gender itself—could Rosalind have a doublet and hose in her disposition, in addition to the doublet and hose on her body? During the Restoration, when women performed on English public stages for the first time, Margaret Cavendish wrote of Shakespeare’s ability to write female characters: “One would think that he had been Metamorphosed from a Man to a Woman” (177). Perhaps, even in Rosalind’s joke here, Shakespeare is probing the relationship between gendered clothing and gender itself—could Rosalind have a doublet and hose in her disposition?

\textsuperscript{19} The most obvious exception to this social norm was Moll Cutpurse, a veritable celebrity who frequently and publicly dressed in male clothing without punishment (Cutpurse).
disposition, in addition to the doublet and hose on her body? Might Rosalind/Ganymede’s androgyny be a reflection of Shakespeare’s seeming ability to write with both a “doublet and hose” disposition and a “skirt and petticoat” disposition?

Or perhaps one disposition can encompass both a doublet/hose and skirt/petticoat. Such seems to be the case when Celia teases Rosalind by delaying the revelation of Orlando as the love note-writer, Rosalind begs her to share the secret: “I prithee, take the cork out of thy mouth, that I may drink thy tidings.” Celia responds with innuendo: “So you may put a man in your belly” (3.2.183-85). This moment is double laden with sexual innuendo. Perhaps the boy actor playing Celia is speaking to Rosalind/Ganymede as a female character? But Rosalind is dressed as Ganymede! And Celia is dressed as a woman, so perhaps the innuendo is reverse. Or, the possibility I prefer, perhaps the many layers of gendered identity signify its irrelevance; after all, keeping track of the iterations becomes difficult after several rounds. Perhaps, as in my opening anecdote, gender doesn’t matter here.20

In any case, this is a moment when both Rosalind and Celia slip between their gendered and sexual identities, obfuscating any certainty regarding their “real” selves. Rosalind then tries to pry the information from Celia with questions:

ROSALIND: Is he of God’s making? What manner of man? Is his head worth a hat? Or his chin worth a beard?

CELIA: Nay, he hath but a little beard.

ROSALIND: Why, God will send more, if the man will be thankful. Let me stay the growth of his beard, if thou delay me not the knowledge of his chin. (3.2.186-91)

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20 In this case, the scene may be instructing both actors and audience about when gender does and does not matter.
Rosalind here slips from her identity as a boy actor by requesting to halt the growth of his beloved’s beard, and thereby projecting femininity to a potential spouse. At other times, however, Rosalind presents her identity in no uncertain terms “Do you not know I am a woman?” (3.2.226). Even while protesting this stable identity, however, Rosalind/Ganymede undercuts herself when she spouts a stereotypes that blurs the boundary between two sexes: “boys and women are for the most part cattle of this colour” (3.2.370). And as Ganymede, he slips back into Rosalind several times, swearing “By my life, she will do as I do” (4.1.135).

Phyllis Rackin, noting this slipping between identities claims,

Shakespeare refuses to dissolve the difference between the sex of the boy actor and that of the heroine he plays; and he uses this boy heroines’ sexual ambiguity not only to complicate his plots but also to resolve them [...]. By playing the boy's part of Ganymede, Rosalind enables Silvius to marry Phebe. By playing the girl's part of Rosalind, she enables Orlando to marry herself. (“Androgyny” 31)

Sexual ambiguity, then, is the centerpiece of Shakespeare’s plot—without it, the quadruple wedding of the resolution could never happen. Rosalind is always both masculine and feminine—boy actor and female character, Ganymede and Rosalind. The play depends on it. And marriage resolves sex-gender conflicts by placing all characters in sanctioned heterosexual marriages (ironically enabled by Rosalind's antics repeatedly subverting gender roles), requiting previously unrequited love, and allowing Rosalind to return to her feminine self after many iterations of gendered transformations. Outside of comedy, then, the FTM androgyne has a unique function in the plot, becoming alternate beings to meet the various demands of a rigid sex-gender system.
Nor does gender seem to matter in the epilogue, which probes and transforms its meaning whether performed by a boy or by a woman. Rosalind first draws attention to her drag: “What a case am I in then,” with case meaning both plight and costume, and commences with her gendered and sexual identity in flux (Epilogue 6). For this reason, the play worked just as well when performed at the beginning of the seventeenth century, with an all-male cast, and at the end of the seventeenth century, with a mixed-sex cast. Rosalind may or may not have a doublet and hose in her disposition, but she can clearly act it, regardless of her anatomy. The speech begins as the female character, saying, “It is not the fashion to see the lady in the epilogue,” but then changes to the male actor, stating, “If I were a woman I would kiss as many of you as had beards that pleased me,” then returns to female character: “And I am sure, as many as have good beards… will for my kind offer, when I make curtsy, bid me farewell” (Epilogue 1-2, 14-15, 17-19). Shakespeare therefore ends his play with a subversion: Rosalind’s androgyny supersedes the heterosexual marriage, her final words leave her gender in flux, despite her marriage. Jean Howard argues that *As You Like It* “reveals the constructed nature of patriarchy's representations of the feminine and shows a woman manipulating those representations in her own interest” (435). Rosalind manipulates femininity, certainly, but she manipulates masculinity just as much, concluding in a subversive androgyny that challenges gender binary norms. She succeeds because she maintains this androgyny in spite of her marriage.

*As You Like It* on Film

On film, Elisabeth Bergner’s epilogue visually emphasizes Rosalind/Ganymede’s androgyny. Czinner cuts from a shot of Rosalind in wedding finery, to Ganymede standing in the same position, wearing his masculine costume, then back to Rosalind (Figure 3). Aside from the clothing, however, Bergner’s appearance remains the same. These cuts reveal
Rosalind/Ganymede’s androgyny to be only a function of clothing and emphasize the transformative power of drag in creating an androgynous body. Set side by side, screen by screen, with Rosalind in wedding dress, Bergner becomes an indisputable androgyne, virtually indistinguishable from Rosalind’s femininity, yet clearly un-feminine.

Czinner’s film also blurs boundaries between male and female and between art and life. When Orlando wrestles Charles, for instance, his moves are graceful and lithe—much more like a partnered dance than like a conflict (Figure 4). The most striking motions are not aggressive wrestling techniques but sophisticated dance lifts. At this juncture, then, the relationship between Bergner’s androgyny and its cinematic context becomes clear: in the same way that Orlando and Charles dance rather than wrestle—in the same way that life becomes, in its artistic reflection, more beautiful, and less “real”—Bergner’s fluctuating gender reveals gender to be not only performed in culture, but as art. Rosalind/Ganymede’s androgynous gender—his body, her clothing—reflects bodies in the same way that Orlando and Charles’s dance reflects a wrestling match. Accepting performativity in gender behavior allows us to consider gendered performance on par with artistic performance—an entity at the center of artifice and life, with potential to move both ways.

Branagh deliberately creates space to question these boundaries by filming his As You Like It (2007) as a brilliant androgyne coup. Branagh’s interpretative frame establishes artifice as his central theme. Branagh opens by spelling out his interpretation in a haiku (Figure 5): “A dream of Japan / Love and nature in disguise / All the world’s a stage.” He places the text on a tricolor curtain that transitions, left to right, from a dark shade to a light one, and together in the final, lightest section are the words “in disguise” and “All the world’s a stage,” together emphasizing gender performance. Branagh adapts the line from Jacques’s musings to emphasize
the complexities of nature in relation to performance. This story, Branagh tells us, will be about the artifice, about disguise.

The tricolor curtain then moves aside to reveal a kabuki actor wearing heavy makeup, an elaborate wig, and women’s clothing. He stands before a stylized screen, but Branagh always keeps the paneled stage floor in the shot, keeping the scene grounded in a “real” physical setting. The kabuki actor moves about the stage in precise, measured steps; he moves his props symbolically and dramatically changes his facial expression at any turn of events. With his makeup, wig, and dress she passes as female (albeit a polished one), but his stylized backdrop and motions emphasize the contrivance of the entire scene (Figure 6).

Having established this obviously stylized scene, Branagh destroys it. Ninja warriors cut through the fabric walls of the room, and the several close shots of a knife proclaim a violent end to the theatrical interlude. The painted screen topples down, and an arrow pins the kabuki actor’s wig to a pole, quickly separating it from his head (Figure 7). Thus, in the first few minutes of film, Branagh seems to undercut his own interpretation: if he meant to show that “all the world’s a stage,” then why did he so quickly and violently dismantle artifice in the first scene?

In fact, Branagh uses this initial artifice—the kabuki actor and her stage—as a red herring. Defacing the stylized actor and stage purports to announce the end of artifice, and Branagh follows the destroyed kabuki theater with a feature length film in which acting, costumes, makeup, and settings are realistic—in keeping with contemporary audience expectations. It seems, at this point, that Branagh is adhering to conventions, and that he is therefore telling a story about real people in the “real world.”

The exception to this rule, of course, is Rosalind’s ability to pass. To contrast with the kabuki actor, whose careful costume, makeup, and wig enabled him to pass for a woman, Bryce
Dallas Howard’s Rosalind merely cuts her hair to shoulder length and dons a hat and breeches. She wears the same makeup as before, and her costume is tailored to her feminine frame. Where the kabuki actor’s appearance has been carefully sculpted to “pass,” Howard’s has not.

The significance of “passing,” however, does not become clear until Branagh’s closing frame. He begins by double-crossing his audience, returning to the stylized set he had destroyed in the first scene and, in turn, forsaking the realistic style that characterizes most of the film. Branagh repeats, in reverse, his opening moves: his characters become illustrations—fictional versions of themselves—painted on a stylized Japanese screen (Figure 8). The screen is reminiscent of the kabuki actor’s backdrop in the opening frame, but the kabuki actor has not returned. In fact, the stage is empty, save for the illustrations of the main characters. The moment is jarring, as the audience realizes that the fictional characters, who are just as well represented by drawings as by actors, are the “real people” with whom they have been engaged for a few hours. They are now no more than drawings of caricatures. Here Branagh invites his audience to recognize Rosalind and Orlando, Celia and Oliver, not as the actors who play them but as fictional, stylized beings who have only been present to you because you believed them to be. He closes the curtain on the stage for good measure, reminding his audience that it was just “play” they watched.

But closing the curtain is not Branagh’s last move. Just after the credits begin to roll, Howard-as-Ganymede interrupts to deliver the epilogue. After the betrayal of the closing frame, Ganymede’s reappearance is a peace offering: Branagh has returned to the realistic conventions his audience expects of him. And yet, something is off. Ganymede delivers the lines while looking directly at, and walking toward, the camera. She initially remains on set in the woods, and there seems to be nothing out of the ordinary. Yet as she walks, she emerges from the trees
into a clearing—and onto the film production site. The camera follows her past crew members, a bus, and a woman dressed in a sweatshirt who hands Ganymede—or is it Bryce Dallas Howard?—a drink. As Ganymede/Howard approaches her trailer she turns and, for the first time, her microphone is visible—she reveals herself to be an actress, not the realistic character of Rosalind as we had thought—but neither is she merely a stylized contrivance. She is something more and something less than any of these things—Rosalind and Ganymede and Howard, but also art, but also artifice, but also human, but also pixels of light. And the final shot of her trailer door, with its unromantic sheet of paper labeled “Rosalind,” serves as the true conclusion of the film—not the “real” Rosalind, not a drawing of Rosalind, but proof that Howard was never Rosalind to begin with (Figure 9). But perhaps she is also always Rosalind; can Rosalind exist except in her performances?

Branagh’s repeated construction and destruction of artifice reflects the Ganymede/Howard/Rosalind role as androgyne. The film cannot pass just like Rosalind cannot pass. And as the film emerges as a self-conscious art, an art that accepts its dual status as sensory experience and as creative production, Rosalind emerges as viable androgyne. Her gender is no less crafted than the kabuki actor; the kabuki actor’s careful costume and makeup makes his disguise more obviously artistic. But Branagh destroys that artifice, presenting the rest of his film as a realistic jaunt in the Forest of Arden. When he reveals the “real” to be artifice—to be a film set, costumes, and actors answering to characters’ names—he does so by means of the extraordinary androgyne Rosalind. And s/he emerges as the victor, collapsing both the gender binary and the art/life binary, existing at the center of both not as a laughable person, but as a triumphant one.
Gender as Art

If we are to seriously consider gender as art, we would be amiss to neglect genre. “Genre” is a kind, sort, or style; in specialized humanist language, genre delineates particular categories of art, such as a dramatic tragedy or smooth jazz music. The etymology of “genre,” however, is French, and in translation “genre” means “gender” (“genre, n.”). While the OED is careful to hedge this etymology in relation to present ideas of gender, noting that “in most European languages, grammatical gender is now only very loosely associated with natural distinctions of sex,” the very old categories that gender/genre evokes were distinctly rooted in sex: Anglo-Norman and Middle French gendre and genre referred both to “kind” and to “sex,” or the “quality of being male or female”--as well as to such categories as “race” and “people” (“gender, n.”). The French term genre (gender) refers to grammatical gender (as opposed to sexe), which in contemporary linguistics is distinguished from “natural gender” that is based on the “real or attributed” sex of its referent (“natural gender, n.” and “grammatical, adj.”). Nevertheless, the categories male/masculine and female/feminine originated in grammatical gender (“gender, n. 3”).

In As You Like It, Shakespeare toyed with grammatical gender in his epilogue: Rosalind exclaims, “What a case am I in then, that am neither a good epilogue nor cannot insinuate with you in the behalf of a good play!” (Epilogue 6-8). As I noted before, “case” is a play on both “pun” and “costume,” but a third possible meaning is relevant here: grammatical case. Because declensions reflect both case and gender, Rosalind may be drawing attention not only to her costume but to the gendered language that places her in one category or another. In doing so, she highlights the mutability of those categories, given that she herself belongs to several in the same moment.
The study of linguistics find that grammatical genders (defined as “classes of nouns reflected in the behavior of associated words” that is both exhaustive and exclusive) range from two to twenty (Hockett 231-2). One of the major insights of the aesthetic application of genre, however, is that as valuable as categories are--for comparison, for understand cultural trends, etc.--some of the most valuable art transgresses the category boundaries. The Victorian social problem novel, for example, is valuable in its own right: it is a unique category that was extraordinarily popular and influential, primarily written by Victorian women, and committed to social change. No less valuable, however, is experimental Modernist literature written in response to Victorian condescension and imperialism. Similarly, Zeffirelli’s 1968 Romeo and Juliet adaptation is a brilliant film and faithful to its source material--but Jonathan Levine’s 2013 version, Warm Bodies, transgresses genre boundaries by remaking Romeo and Juliet into a post-apocalyptic zombie story, and it is all the more compelling because of it. While the dismissive adjective “generic” might privilege innovative transgressions of genre (a method consistent with Lorde’s critique of the master’s house and tools), the close relationship between genre and innovative creativity ensures that genres, genders, categories will continue to exist--even as we reject and work them to produce tragicomedy, for instance, where before there had only been tragedy and comedy.

Genre, then, may help us to understand the nature of gender, since fundamentally, genre is gender. Gender-as-art has the potential to affirm both essential gender identity--by valuing categories of genre for their stability, longevity, and appeal to transcendence--and gender performativity--by emphasizing the creative control persons have over their own generic expression. When I came out to my mother, she proposed that my body could respond to another body regardless of gender. Gender, in her summation, doesn’t matter. What if, however, we
leverage gender-as-art to consider sexual orientation not as an arbitrary relationship to constructed personas but as an aesthetic preference, both chosen and intuited? Could we consider queerness itself to be an aesthetic, and in that sense to be more than both gender and sexuality (Padilla)?

Since Foucault’s *History of Sexuality*, claiming a sexual identity has become dubious, a potential method of reinforcing power hierarchies. Butler, a student of Foucault, likewise problematizes identity and proposes drag as the tool for dismantling its ideology and for unmasking gender as performed rather than essential. Transgender experience is a major challenge to this model, but so are many sexual identities. We could, like Horowitz, opt for an omniperformance model to define identity, but not without its pitfalls. We do have, however, a figure that represents a literal history of sexuality in Rosalind/Ganymede--an androgynous, genderqueer character who has survived for centuries, who has been played by male bodied and female bodied persons, and who remains a significant character in Western consciousness. Even within queer theory, androgyny has been a point of tension, which makes it particularly well suited for theoretical (and practical) intervention into “common sense” understanding of gender and sexuality. In cinematic representations of Rosalind/Ganymede, he appears within a unique aesthetic context, one that borders realistic and artificial. Like Anzaldúa’s mestiza, cinematic Rosalind/Ganymede exists in an aesthetic borderland that complements her gender borderland. Here, his gender comes to exist not just as performance, but as an art form that imbibes the borderland aesthetic of its surroundings.

Rosalind/Ganymede, in her insistent position between masculine and feminine, between art and life, always existing as both and neither, embodies gender-as-art. Rosalind reminds us that we can instead affirm gender both as a creative act of self-expression and as a work of art,
perhaps in the same way that Halberstam imagines gaga feminist gender expression. In this model, a body—a transgender body, an androgynous body, a genderqueer body, a cisgender body—represents an aesthetic ideal, the product of the human drive to create, to beget, to beautify.
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Figures

Figure 1, Bergner in drag (as Rosalind/Ganymede):

Figure 2, Olivier in drag (as Katharina in *The Taming of the Shrew*):
Figure 3, Bergner delivers epilogue as Rosalind/Ganymede:

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Love and nature in disguise
All the world’s a stage

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