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The Japanese Attempt to Solve the Mongol Question in Manchuria, 1931-1945

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THE JAPANESE ATTEMPT TO SOLVE
THE MONGOL QUESTION IN MANCHURIA,
1931-1945

A Thesis
Presented to the
Department of History
Brigham Young University

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

by
Richard D. S. Kwak
August, 1966
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For any errors of interpretation or representation of facts that may be found in this work, the author alone is responsible.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

In the 1930's and 1940's, there were essentially three Mongolias: Outer Mongolia, Inner Mongolia, and Eastern Mongolia, with Soviet Russia's pre-eminence in Outer Mongolia, China's in Inner Mongolia, and Japan's in Eastern Mongolia.

For clarity, the area in Barga, or Hsisingan region, will be referred to as Eastern Mongolia or Western Manchuria. Also, its people will be referred to as Manchurian Mongols, Eastern Mongols, or Hsisingan Mongols, as distinguished from the Western, or Inner, Mongols of Inner Mongolia and the Outer Mongols of Outer Mongolia.

Following the successful Manchurian Incident on September 18, 1931, the Japanese Kwantung Army commenced a sustained drive into North and North-western Manchuria. By the early part of the following year the Japanese found themselves occupying a vast expanse in Eastern Mongolia, principally inhabited by indigenous Eastern Mongols. It covered some 200,000 square miles, as compared to 3,600,000 square miles in the whole of Manchuria. According to Lattimore, there were about 5,000,000 Mongols in the three Mongolias, and he estimates that of this number 1,500,000 were Mongols of Eastern Mongolia.¹

¹No reference will be made to the Buryat Mongols of Siberia or other Mongols within Soviet Russia's sphere of influence except those in Outer Mongolia, since they do not occupy any significant role in this study.

²Owen Lattimore, Studies in Frontier History (London: Oxford University, 1962), p. 327. Lattimore says there is no reliable figures on Mongol population.
Evidently the Japanese intervention in 1932 in Eastern Mongolia boosted the morale of Eastern and Western Mongol nationalist leaders. For example, Soviet and Chinese exploitation of Mongol lands and suppression of Pan-Mongolism provided the Japanese with a problem to be resolved. Self-determination, undoubtedly, was a deep-seated Mongol aspiration. In 1932, then, the creation of the Hsingan Province was an attempt to solve this important phase of the Mongol question.

Although the appearance of Japanese troops in Eastern Mongolia was a disturbing factor to Soviet Russia and China, it was an encouraging one, as far as the Mongols were concerned. An analysis of this situation, including the significance of the Hsingan Province, is given by Lattimore:

The recognition of a regional Mongol interest by the creation of Hsingan Province is important because it means instead of two nations, each treating its Mongol subjects as auxiliaries or victims as seemed expedient, three nations are now bidding for power. This in turn means that the Mongols can no longer be disposed of arbitrarily; they must be courted, and thus they have once more become to a certain extent agents to their own destiny. Until a year ago, they had only the choice of extinction under Chinese rule or drastic social revolution under Outer Mongolia, affiliated as it is with Soviet Russia. Now they have at least a margin of bargaining power, for any concerted action, or even the action of a minority, can profoundly effect the policies and strategic positions of Russia, China and Japan.

In their effort to promote Pan-Mongolism, the Japanese were soon to learn that Soviet Russia would be a major obstacle, more than she had been in the past. Pan-Mongolism, as such, was neither a positive Russian nor a Chinese policy as it was with the Japanese. Earlier attempts in this

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3Since the fall of the Manchu Dynasty in 1911 and the subsequent rise of the Chinese Republic, the Mongols, as a whole, were imbued with the idea of independence. The Japanese evidently were aware of this and intended to capitalize on this deep-seated national spirit.

4Lattimore, op. cit., p. 329.
direction were made by Japanese militarists and Buddhist scholars (in the name of Pan-Buddhism) but Tsarist and Soviet Russian intervention ended the scheme, as shall be discussed later.

In reality, no ideal of a Pan-Mongolian state could be realized as long as Soviet power was left unchallenged in Outer Mongolia and China's power in Inner Mongolia. Both Japan and Soviet Russia had ambitiously mobilized their respective Mongol forces, including their own troops, within their spheres of influence. Japanese-Soviet confrontation along the Outer Mongolian border in 1935 demonstrated that the Japanese promotion of any aspiration of Pan-Mongol movement would be but a dream. The Nomonhan War in 1939 proved this to be so.

In Inner Mongolia, however, the Japanese succeeded in establishing an Inner Mongol autonomous government, a counterpart of the autonomous Hsiningan provinces. But this also was not a fulfillment of the Mongol dream of a Pan-Mongolian state.

Internally, the Japanese tried to solve the many facets of the Mongol question. The mere possession of Eastern Mongolia did not simply solve the Mongol question, and neither did the establishment of an autonomous region. Therefore, the Japanese, noted for their pragmatism, realized that perhaps a people steeped in tradition and influenced by growing nationalism could hardly be useful as tools in the promotion of Japanese aims in Asia. Therefore, the institution of reforms, in such areas as Lamaism, education, medical services, economy, etc., became one of expediency.

Like the government of Manchukuo, the Hsiningan provinces were staffed mainly by local people. Ordinarily leaders were assigned to the various key positions with Japanese "advisors" holding the "secondary positions". Again, like Manchukuo, the autonomous Hsiningan provincial administrations were merely facades of Japanese imperialism.
The purpose of this paper, then, is to study and evaluate the Japanese program relative to the Mongol question. Some questions to consider would be: What relationship was there between the Hsingan provinces and the Manchukuo government and why? What specific Mongol programs did the Japanese promote and why? What were the results? How did the Mongols react? What designs did the Japanese have in Outer Mongolia and Inner Mongolia relative to her key position in Eastern Mongolia? Why and how did China and Russia react to Japan's plans and what were the results? How did the Mongol react to the three Asiatic Powers at this period? In an overall view, what were the successes and failures of the Japanese in their attempt to solve the Mongol question?
CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A brief study of Manchu-Mongol, and Chinese-Mongol, relations, including the Mongol autonomous movement, the Manchurian incident, and the establishment of "Manchukuo" should help the reader to comprehend the Mongol question with which the Japanese were confronted, particularly in the 1930's and 1940's.

The very fact that the Japanese had chosen a former Manchu monarch as the "Emperor" of Manchukuo and of the Mongols of Hsingan suggested that the Japanese had a knowledge of Manchu-Mongol relations, as we shall soon observe. The reader is reminded that references to Manchu-Mongol relations are generally applicable to both Eastern and Western Mongols, but perhaps, with the exception of the Dagor Mongols of the Nonni River Valley, this latter group did not have an hereditary nobility or a priesthood which was common among most Western and Eastern Mongols.

Chinese-Mongol relations unlike those of the Manchu-Mongol is a record of bitter experiences. Chinese colonization policy and suppression of Mongol aspiration for self-government were, in a large part, responsible for the rise of a "Mongol question". Therefore, following the Manchuria Incident, the creation of Manchukuo was a significant move.

In 1644 the Manchus conquered China with the aid of the Mongols of

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Manchuria. Manchu sovereignty over the Mongols was accomplished by concessions and alliances made with various tribal groups in Manchuria.

To retain the loyalty of the Mongols the Manchu Dynasty extended privileges. For example, the Mongol princes were given Manchu princesses as wives. As a result, the princes "tended increasingly to take a Manchu and dynastic, rather than a Mongol and tribal point of view . . . and they aspired, inevitably, to the same kind of career and position that appealed to the rich and highly born Manchu". However, the Manchus took precautionary measures. For one thing, although steps were taken to preserve the Mongol tribal system, the Manchus did not hesitate to prevent any resurgence of a tribal leadership that would call for any semblance of a racial and national unity. Such being the case, the

Mongol princes and nobles were therefore barred from political and civil careers within China, and restricted to military and administrative careers within their own regions of the frontier. They were given important honors and subsidies; but if the career of any Mongol became too "creative", and his power among the Mongols too constructive, he was promoted to some supervisory position in Peking, which kept him in contact with the Court and away from the main current of tribal affairs; and heirs grew up with the social ideas of Peking Manchus, and the growth of coordination among the Mongols was inhibited.

Although the Dynasty was mainly interested in securing Mongol loyalties, centrally, it left the problem of autonomy on the local level largely in the hands of the nobility. In this regard, Chinese policy during the Republic was generally the same except for creating separate provinces to

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3Also, during the Japanese occupation (1931-1945), the Mongol tribal system was generally preserved.

4Lattimore, *op. cit.*, pp. 70-71.

inhibit political integration. The Japanese policy, in the 1930's and 1940's, somewhat in line with the self-seeking policy of the Manchu Dynasty, went one step further, it granted the Mongols their "autonomous" governments.

However, as a primary objective, the Manchu policy was directed against any political coalition between Mongols and Chinese or between Mongols themselves. During the peak of the Manchu Dynasty period, the Chinese were prevented from mingling with the Mongols in the steppes. In the declining years of the Dynasty the Manchus were not able to control the migration of Chinese colonists, especially into Western Manchuria; in fact, the Dynasty undertook to encourage it despite an earlier edict which had outlawed the transfer of Mongol land titles to the Chinese. Also, a Manchu edict in 1801 forbidding intermarriage became a dead letter.

Since local differences became a problem as soon as territorial ties assumed great importance in a given area, disparate groups would join together and cause the league to become a powerful political unit. In such a situation the Imperial government would weaken the league so that it would not become "a supra-local organization". 6

However, with some important exceptions, Manchu-Mongol relations was generally one of mutual relations. 7 Perhaps, for this reason the Japanese had desired to have a Manchu emperor be received by the Mongols as an overlord.

Chinese-Mongol Relations

During the Chinese period, the trend was primarily to offset any likelihood of a secessionist movement and to assimilate the Mongols econom-

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6 Ibid., pp. 3-4.
mically, culturally and politically.

However, the failure of the Chinese Republic to satisfy Mongolian aspiration for autonomy led to movements in the Barga region of Western Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. The Mongols of Manchuria were jurisdictionally under the Chinese provincial governments, and the Mongols of Inner Mongolia in 1928 were partitioned into the Chinese provinces of Ningshia, Suiyuan, and Chahar. Therefore, this made it difficult for the Mongols to organize themselves into a unified political group. Nonetheless, this set up gave the provincial governments headed by Chinese warlords more power than the Nanking government would have liked them to have. Besides, it made the lot of the Mongols more unbearable under unscrupulous provincial governors.

During the peak of Chinese colonization in 1929-1930, railroad development increased the misery of the Mongols of Manchuria, thus further intensifying the Mongols' hatred for their Chinese overlords.

Colonization

The attitude of the Republic toward its right to claim Mongol territories is expressed by Lattimore:

The tendency to assert as a definite principle the sub-ordination of Mongol to Chinese interests began to appear as early as 1914 or 1915, when the Chinese authorities established precedents for the theory that Mongol land belonged neither to Mongol prince nor to Mongol tribe but to the Chinese nation. This theory, as applied, meant that the Mongols were not allowed to divide up their own tribal land and settle down on it in private ownership as farmers.8

However, beset with internal and external strifes, the unstable Chinese government was unable to control the exploitation of Mongol lands among unscrupulous government officials, warlords, land speculators, merchants, and

collaborating Mongol nobles.

Two land booms which increased the demand for Mongols land and thereby aggravated the Manchurian Mongols' plight were those of 1916-18 and 1926-28. In the first land boom, because of the need for Manchurian foodstuffs by warring nations of World War I, more pastoral lands were converted into farmlands; and in the second land boom, in order to counteract the competitive economic position of Russia and Japan in Manchuria, the Republic undertook the reclamation of Mongol lands.9

In the 'twenties the complexion toward Chinese colonial penetration took on a modern character. With the belated adoption of railway construction of the Western Powers, the Chinese were able to penetrate further into Mongol lands. Indubitably the Mongols, accustomed to primitive ways, were helpless. Moreover, the expropriation of Mongol lands facilitated the construction of railways and the influx of Chinese farmers into Western Manchuria. The effect:

... The construction of the Peking-Mukden Railway into Manchuria and the Peking-Suiyuan Railway into Western Inner Mongolia had been followed immediately by swarms of Chinese farmers who staked out lands within the jurisdiction of the Mongol leagues. In the north, the Chinese Eastern Railway crossed the Hsiaing Mountains into areas occupied by the Barga tribes. The line pushing northwestward from T'ao-nan, as well as the Cheng-chia-t'un line, thrust into the Land of the Jerim League. To further colonization, the Chinese launched the Great Hsiaing Reclamation Project in 1929, employing the Reclamation Army as a spearhead to extend the line from T'ao-nan to Solum, and eventually by way of the southern Hsiaing Mountains, to link with the Chinese Eastern Railway at Hailar. ... It was only in the fall of 1931, after forty miles of the railway had been built, that the Japanese seizure of Manchuria brought an end to the project.10

Thus it was during this period that large-scale migration and the newly constructed railway had pressed the Mongol frontier almost to the Hsiaing

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10 A Regional Handbook on the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, op. cit., p. 44.
Mountains. Formerly the Mongol perimeter had extended into the central plain as far as Hsinking and Seupingkai and the most part of Jehol. However, Barga, west of the Hsingan range, escaped the full impact of Chinese colonization because of its remoteness; the Russian interests in the Chinese Eastern Railway there; and the relative less number of railway lines running through that region.

In brief, then, Chinese railway construction and colonization project became the alienating factors in Mongol-Chinese relations. Probably there was never a more suitable time for Japanese imperialism to capitalize on this situation as it did in 1931.

Nationalism

Mongol nationalism, as such, was a budding political factor even before the establishment of the Chinese Republic in 1911. However, one of the essential roots of this is found in Mongol self-identity. Mongols have thought of "themselves as world conquerors, great warriors, and brilliant organizers; in short, a superior people". They usually spoke in terms of the "good old days". When Chingghis Khan, their great leader, extended his power and influence as far as the gates of Vienna in the Twelfth Century. Robert Rupen says that:

The memory of Chingghis Khan continues to be a political factor throughout Mongolia. He represents the glorious past when all Mongolia was unified and when Mongolian influence spread through the world of the day. . . . He captured the imagination of all Mongols, and of many Westerners as well. His name continually reappears in Mongolian nationalist movements, in all Mongolian areas; he represents the one truly

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universal Mongolian symbol. 13

Peter Hume also comments on the idealization of Chingghis Khan by Hsingan Mongols in 1931 to remind them of their past glory and the hope of another:

... they still have the idea of uniting themselves and becoming once a great nation. You will see an enormous number of Mongols wearing buttons with Genghis Khan's head on them, which is a symbol of their fond belief that one day they will attain to those thirteenth-century heights again. 14

Concepts of political nationalism for the uneducated Mongol was vague, however, during the 1930's, under the Japanese educational program, exposure to them was made available to him. 15 "The Chinese government, on the other hand, undertook a far more ambitious educational program, probably to encourage the development of Mongolian nationalism acceptable to the present regime." 16

Ironically, prior to 1931 deterrents to Mongol nationalism came largely from the ruling Mongol and high lamas who preferred the luxurious life of high Chinese officials to that of the nomadic life of their compatriots. Such life was made easy by collaborating with warlords during the period of Chinese colonization. For example, Lattimore cites a deplorable situation in the 'twenties:

... Power passed from the princes who manipulated the tribal ownership of land to the Chinese officials who controlled the railways. The most powerful of these officials became regular barons. A general who controlled a strip of railway and a corps of troops could do as he liked with the Mongol hinterland. The best that even a relatively strong prince could help to prevent his tribesmen from organizing


16 Ibid.
and rebelling (though he did not always succeed), and for this he would receive Chinese backing and a commission on land deals. The rest of the Mongols got nothing at all. They were herded together in a diminished part of their tribal territory, in a condition worse than that of American Indians on reservations. 17

For profit, then, the aristocratic class were not slow to be in collusion with other provincial leaders and speculators. By such arrangement it would be difficult for the Mongolian aristocracy to be the vanguard of a Mongol nationalist movement, for they had everything to gain in protesting their vested interests. 18 For this reason, the lesser nobility deprived of their former power and privileges in the face of Chinese exploitation provided the leadership of the early rebellions in Western Manchuria. However, these rebellions characterized by a lack of a concerted movement ended abortively. As a result the Mongols were treated severely by the warlords and their lands subjected to further expropriation.

The outburst of local rebellions

... were not really nationalistic, though pro-Mongolian.

... It is almost impossible to determine whether these "rebel" leaders or those Mongols who followed them in rebellion were motivated by aspirations for Mongolian political unity, but such incidents supplied the foundation for a later development of nationalism. 19

However, it was with the Manchurian Incident that positive action toward Mongol autonomy became stronger. The Japanese promoted Mongol nationalism in order to counteract Chinese national aspirations in Manchuria and Russian imperialism in Outer Mongolia. Moreover, Japanese sponsored Mongol

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18 During the Manchu Dynasty it was the practice of the regime to solicit the support of the ruling princes in the administration of Mongol affairs and the enforcement of Imperial decrees; in return the ruling princes were subsidized and their territorial hegemony guaranteed by the government. The object was to prevent national unity. See A Regional Handbook on the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, op. cit., p. 342.

19 Ibid.
nationalism would foster Pan-Mongolism, a device to extend Japanese hegemony on the Asian continent.

Chinese colonialism was the major factor for the alienation of the Mongols; it bred a deep animosity between the Chinese and the Mongols. Numerous local rebellions were expressions of this animosity; and of course, oppression, injustice and collusions of unscrupulous profit-seekers compounded the problem.

Essentially, the lack of a positive Chinese policy to alleviate the Mongol plight made it necessary for the Mongols to turn to the Japanese for support. Inability of the Nanking government to restrain the exploitatons of provincial authorities further worsened Chinese-Mongol relations. Simply, China failed to solve realistically the Mongol problem. Her attempt "to guarantee [Mongol] immunity from further colonization was too late."20 Besides, the provincial authorities would "object strongly to a 'generous' policy toward the Mongols".21

It is essential to stress at this juncture that for many years the Japanese were familiar with Mongolian social life and its developing national aspirations. As Lattimore asserts:

... Japanese policy toward the Mongols was influenced by a small body of Japanese experts, most of them military officers, who had travelled and lived among the Mongols for years, knew their language, knew the tribal divisions and leading personalities, and were minutely informed about the cross-influences of tribal and religious politics among the Mongols, and about provincial and central government politics among the Chinese, which had prevented theoretical Mongol nationalism from cohering into a genuine national movement.22

Having thus understood Mongol aspirations, the Japanese militarists were

21 Ibid.
22 Lattimore, Studies in Frontier History, op. cit., p. 418.
ready to promote a Pan-Mongol movement which will be discussed in the next section.

Autonomous Movement

Before the fall of the Manchu Dynasty in 1911, a growing feeling for self-determination was felt among some segments of Mongolian leadership. Although Inner Mongolia was the genesis of Mongol unrest against Chinese sovereignty, it was in Outer Mongolia that an independence movement sprouted.

As in Inner Mongolia, there was a movement for autonomy in the Barga region of Eastern Mongolia. The circumstance is related as follows:

Since 1906 Chinese troops had gradually been introduced, new taxes and customs dues had been instituted, land had been set aside for settlement by the Chinese, the general provincial system of administrative divisions and a post of Tao-t'ai were introduced, and lastly, in 1911, it was decided to institute a number of schools at which the Barguts were to be taught Chinese. In September, a Bargut "National Congress" called the Chinese to withdraw their troops, stop colonization, and recognize local autonomy.23

Thus on January 2, 1912, spurred on by the Chinese takeover of the Manchu Dynasty, the Barga Mongols revolted. This resulted in the removal of Chinese officials and soldiers from Holumbier, or Barga, and the joining of Barga with the new Autonomous Government of Urga. Rebellions in Barga, as in Inner Mongolia, ended abortively because of unconcerted planning and leadership. Besides, Russian and Japanese self-interests frustrated Bargut plans for a Pan-Mongol movement with Outer Mongolia. In 1912 Tsarist Russia concluded a secret agreement with Japan reaffirming the former's exclusive sphere of influence in Outer Mongolia and the latter's in Manchuria.24


The meridian was set at Peking as the line of demarcation corresponding vaguely with the Outer Mongol-Hsingan border, which was to become a bone of contention in the 1930's.

Following the fall of the Manchu Empire in 1911, Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu, the politico-religious leader of the Khalkha Mongols of Outer Mongolia, appointed Sheng Fu, a Bargut leader, as his emissary in Hailar. However, Russia was not inclined to support a union between Barga and the Autonomous Government of Urga. Because of Tsarist Russia's opposition, the Barga Mongols decided to solicit Japanese intervention.

In 1915, Babojab, a respected Inner Mongolian prince, told Russia, in no uncertain terms, that her refusal to support Mongolian aspiration for an Inner Mongolia and Barga union with Urga would make it necessary for him to seek Japan's aid. For a show of strength Babojab had some 7,900 well armed men. Before the end of October, Babojab was in Barga with about ten Japanese. At the meantime Tasa Shubu, one of his lieutenants, was sent to Tokyo "to negotiate for armed assistance". Moreover, the Russian Vice-Consul at Hailar conjectured "that Babojab together with other princes were aiming at a revolt 'in which, apparently, the Japanese will participate'".

In November 1915 China regained her influence over the Barga Mongols. Russia in a treaty concluded with China "awarded" Barga to the central government of the Republic; it was apparent that Russia desired to exercise sovereignty over the Chinese Eastern Railway because of her in-

25 Rupen, op. cit., p. 72.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Priters, op. cit., p. 225.
terests in North Manchuria.

Babo jab was relentless in opposing the Chinese. After his death in 1916, "his separatist movement continued and ultimately merged with the Japanese-sponsored Semenov-Neisse Gegen Pan-Mongol movement". 29

Like Tsarist Russia, Soviet Russia's aims by the 1920 were to frustrate any kind of a Pan-Mongol movement, particularly Japan's. With Japanese-backing, Semenov, an ambitious White Russian leader, made Manchul, which is near the border of Outer Mongolia, his base of operations. From there he launched a drive to Chita on February 1918, but was driven back by a Bolshevik offensive. In the meanwhile, Zhevchenko, Semenov's deputy, was sent to Japan on a successful negotiation for support of military arms. 30

Then, in a new offensive in April, Semenov was able to proclaim in May a "Provisional Government of Transbaikal Territory" near Chita. 31 Semenov's "Special Manchurian Detachment," officered mainly by Russians, were comprised "of Inner Mongols, Barguts, Buryats, and other scattered nationality groups". In April 1918 its detachment strength of some 2000 men included: 32

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Officers</th>
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<td>Cossacks</td>
<td>350</td>
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<td>Russians</td>
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<td>Other Mongols</td>
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<td>Chinese</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koreans</td>
<td>50</td>
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</table>

With Semenov as the vanguard, the Japanese hoped to fulfill their Pan-Mongolian aspiration:

... Through Semenov, the Japanese broached an appeal

29 Rupen, op. cit.
30 Rupen, op. cit., p. 132.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
to the Mongols which they thought could win over all Mongolian groups and effectively separate Buryats from Russia, simultaneously furthering larger Japanese aims for influence on the Asian mainland. "Pan-Mongolia" became their slogan, and this movement crystallized at Dauria at a conference in February 1919. ... 33

On February 25, 1919, at a preparatory meeting at Chita, Siberia, "Semenov, the Japanese Major Suzuki, six Buryats, five Barguts, and three Inner Mongols," were in attendance; 34 then on February 28, a "Great Mongolian State" was proposed to embrace Mongol territories "from Baikal to Tibet and from Manchuria to Eastern Turkestan". 35 This state was to be nominally headed by Neisse Gegan, an influential khutukhtu from Inner Mongolia, with Hailar, in Barga, as the capital.

But this movement was to end in failure. Admiral Kolchak, the anti-Bolshevik, who assumed leadership in Siberia, had refused to support Semenov's idea of a Pan-Mongolian state. Moreover, Kolchak was not sympathetic toward an autonomous movement for the Buryats of Russian occupied Buryat Mongolia. However, in December, 1919, two leading Buryat Buddhists did support him in opposing "the national revolutionary socialist movement among the Buryats". 36 Earlier in April the "Dauria Government," 37 through its delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, appealed for international recognition in accordance with the principle of "self-determination of its people". However, Kolchak protested strenously, characterizing this movement as Japanese-inspired and led, and an instrument of Japanese aggression

33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Rupen does not indicate the geographic location of "Dauria" nor the reason for its appellation "Dauria Government". See Ibid., pp. 132, 135, 160, 479.
in East Asia; Kolchak's agents in Paris managed to side-track the proposal.\(^{38}\) As a result, the Dauria Government was not recognized. Besides, the Jebtsundamba Khatukhtu, the Panchen Lama, perhaps suspicious of Semenov's motive dared not support the Dauria Government. Eventually the Japanese seeing the futility of the movement, withdrew their support. The repercussions following Japanese non-support is given by Rupen:

Failure to gain international recognition at Versailles, and failure to obtain substantial indigenous support due to Outer Mongolia's non-participation, led the Japanese to disavow all connection with Neisse Gegen and those surrounding him, and to claim that the Japanese army officers with Semenov's forces had undertaken the whole thing on their own initiative, without the knowledge of their superiors or of the Japanese Government. Withdrawal of Japanese support caused the barely suppressed opposing tendencies within the movement quickly to break out into violence; Inner Mongols and Buryats fought openly, a Manchu leader (Fusengge) was murdered, and the whole affair ended ignominiously when the Chinese garrison at Maimaicheng captured the "Special Manchurian Detachment" (OMO) in January 1920. The Chinese immediately shot Neisse Gegen and twelve brigade commanders, and sent 200 other prisoners to Urga to do forced labor there. Semenov himself escaped.\(^{39}\)

Barga, too, in 1920, was troubled. The Chinese Government "cancelled the autonomy of Barga, moved it into the jurisdiction Heilungkiang Province, and coerced the Barguts into 'requesting' incorporation into the Chinese provincial system".\(^{40}\) In August 1928, the young Barga party, yearning to revive Barga autonomy and probably in another attempt to affiliate with the Mongolian People's Party, as in the past, revolted against Chinese suzerainty. However, the revolt was soon suppressed by better equipped Chinese troops.

By 1921, the Japanese lost prestige as promoters of Pan-Mongolism in Inner Asia. Only Japan, among the foreign powers, had demonstrated an

\(^{38}\) Ibid., p. 132.

\(^{39}\) Ibid., p. 136.

\(^{40}\) A Regional Handbook on the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, op. cit., p. 47.
"interest" in Mongol autonomy. Before this, Inner Mongol and Barga Mongol leaders had turned to Urga as the only base for Pan-Mongolism but Russia's intervention shattered the dream. Then, too, China, a traditional obstacle to any form of Mongol autonomy, saw Mongols turning to Japan as their last hope.

In the 1920's there were some active Mongol affiliates of the Kuomintang who had "looked forward to a Kuomintang-guided regional and racial autonomy . . . under the principles laid down in the San Min Chu I, but even this hope failed".41 It was not until the Manchurian incident that another opportunity for Mongol autonomous rule was more favorably considered.

Manchurian Incident

Victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 secured Japan's entry in Manchuria and relegated Russia's sphere of influence to the Barga region. Moreover, Japan's foothold in South Manchuria was established by the Sino-Japanese Treaty of May 25, 1915. This treaty extended to Japan the Leased Territory in Liaoning Peninsula to a ninety-nine year lease and finalized her possession of the South Manchurian Railway as well as the Antung-Mukden railways. In addition, the Sino-Japanese commercial treaties granted to Japanese subjects rights of residence and trade in the treaty ports of Manchuria and China itself. In short, Japan was given the advantages of military, administration and jurisdictional rights in South Manchuria.

Therefore, from a secure position in South Manchuria, the Japanese military could launch an attack and thus threaten China's and Russia's interest in North Manchuria. Taking advantage of the confused politically-military situation in Tokyo, the Kwantung Army, without the consent of the

civilian government, instigated an "incident" in Mukden on the night of September 18, 1931. This resulted in the immediate invasion of North Mancuria. By 1932, the last vestige of Chinese forces was overcome. No doubt, factors such as the Chinese Nationalist attempt to incorporate Manchuria as an integral part of China prompted the Kwantung Army to act. Moreover, "as economic conditions worsened in Japan, ultranationalists found a receptive audience for their grandiose plans of conquest which promised prestige, wealth, and power for the Empire". In brief, the "incident" itself reflected:

... the schismatic character of the Japanese government. Fear, uncertainty, and paralysis gripped the top branches of the government. The cabinet helpless to prevent the initiation of an independent foreign policy by a small overseas clique aided by various forces at home. Exhorted and counseled by the high officials, surrounding the throne, and given moral support by the Emperor himself, the cabinet still could find no solution.

Thus, under such conditions the Kwantung Army came into prominence as a dominant force in the external and internal affairs of Manchuria.

Creation of Manchukuo

Motive and Objective

The basic reasons for the creation of the Government of Manchukuo can be traced to the period before the Manchurian Incident; fundamentally, Manchuria was considered an important sphere of interest. First, Manchuria, as a vital interest, was rich in natural resources, essential for Japan's survival as a world power. Since taking over Russia's position in South Manchuria in 1905, Japan lost no time in exploiting the resources of this

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area. By 1931 considerable headway had been made in heavy industry, thus accelerating Japan's threat as another world power. Second, Manchuria, as a strategic area, commanded a vast perimeter confronting Siberia, Outer Mongolia and Inner Mongolia, thus serving ideally as a natural barrier against possible invasion. No doubt, in this regard, Manchuria would serve as an excellent buffer; for "with Russia growing stronger month by month, Japanese militarists felt that Japan would lack adequate security unless she completely dominated Manchuria". Finally, the tremendous loss of lives and wealth on Manchurian soil, as the result of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-05 and, even more so, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, had perhaps aroused the false assumption that Japan had a right to all of Manchuria, "because of the blood and treasure the region had cost them".

Since the Manchurian Incident, a vast region soon to become increasingly a vital concern to the Japanese militarists was the acquisition of Hsingan, in Eastern Mongolia; here was another opportunity to renew their effort for another attempt at Pan-Mongolism with Hsingan as the base of operations. The politico-military significance of this region will be discussed later. However, it is important to state that Japan had recognized Sovietized Outer Mongolia, not only as a menace to her newly acquired sphere of influence in Hsingan but also as a stumbling block to her territorial aims in Inner Asia. Moreover, Japan, apprehensive of communism, would, if possible, shut off Outer Mongolia, as a bulwark of Russian communism in

44David N. Rowe, Modern China (New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand, 1959), p. 50.
45Ben Dorman, "'The Manchurian Incident' of 1931," Harpers, CLXI (September, 1934), 450.
46Ibid.
Asia. Having thus forcefully acquired Manchuria, the Kwantung Army chose to retain possession of it; therefore, a facade of an "independence" movement was soon undertaken.

Under the auspices of the Kwantung Army Headquarters, the Self-Government Guiding Board, following the occupation of Mukden, was set up to foster an independence movement. It was headed by Yu Chungchan, a Chinese, with Board members comprising of Japanese officials who actually directed the activities of the Board. As soon as the Japanese were able to get a foothold throughout Manchuria, local boards were established in the provinces. On February 16-17, a conference at Mukden was attended by Chi Motsei-mu-pei-lo and Kuefu, Mongol princes representing the Barga Mongols and the Jerim Leggau, respectively. Also, present were the pro-Japanese governors of the three northeastern provinces and the Mayor of Mukden. Apparently, the support of the Mongols was important for the creation of an independent "Manchukuo". On February 18, 1932 at a convention in Chenchiatung (Teikaton), representatives of Eastern Mongolian banners met. At this time there was a general expression for autonomous rule. At this stage, the Mongol leaders hoped that the Japanese, unlike the Chinese, would grant them autonomy. Also, on February 18, the Northeastern Supreme Council, which was organized after the meeting at Mukden, issued a Declaration of Independence from China. The next day it agreed to establish a Republic with Ch'angch'un, later renamed Hsinking, as its new capital,

50 Jones, op. cit., p. 21.
51 Moko Taikan, op. cit.
52 Jones, op. cit.
and P'u Yi, the last Manchu Emperor, as its Chief Executive. Following the customary initial refusal, P'u Yi, who was residing at Port Arthur at the time, accepted to "head" the new State.53

The inauguration of P'u Yi as "Chief Executive" of the Republic on March 1, 1932 was timed to coincide with the "exact anniversary of the establishment of the Manchu dynasty in Peking in 1644";54 however, two years later on the same month and day, the Kwantung Army elevated Chief Executive P'u Yi to the status of an "Emperor".

W. G. Woodhead comments that "there can be little doubt that considerable numbers of Mongols, especially in the Barga region, favored the reinstatement of Mr. P'u Yi, not merely as Chief Executive, but as Emperor".55 The formal precedent and legal aspect of this was demonstrated in 1635 at which time

... all the Mongols living south of the Gobi desert accepted suzerainty of the Manchu ruler and gave him the State seal of the former Yuan (Mongol) emperors; by this act they recognized him as the legitimate heir to the overlordship of Genghis Khan.56

The overthrow of the Ming Dynasty in 1644 was accomplished principally through alliance of the Manchus and Mongols of Western Manchuria; for this reason the latter had never considered themselves as inferiors but as mutual partners. Owen Lattimore comments on traditional Manchu-Mongol mutual relations:

They [Manchus and Mongols] are all so equal in status and lineage that there is no obvious leaders by right of

53 Ibid.
54 Ibid., p. 40.
56 Jones, op. cit.
birth. Allegiance to, or alliance under, a Manchu Emperor would solve the problem. Under the Manchu Empire the Mongols never regarded themselves as a conquered, subject people, but as allies. It is true the Manchus made impossible the rise of an independent Mongol power. Yet they granted the Mongol privileges, honors and a degree of tribal autonomy which made them in their own estimation peers of the Manchus and superior to the Chinese.\textsuperscript{57}

But Charles Bell's interview with Prince Te Wang, a Mongol leader in Inner Mongolia, gives a different view regarding P'iu Yi as Emperor. Bell writes:

I asked him whether he would welcome the Emperor of Manchoukuo as Emperor of the Mongols, maybe as a somewhat shadowy sovereign who would not interfere with their programs of self-government. De Wang replied: "It would be good to have an Emperor, but the Emperor should be a Mongol. We are not connected very closely with the Manchus."\textsuperscript{58}

However, following his reinstatement as Emperor of Manchukuo, P'iu Yi kept in touch with the Mongol princes. As a result, many of them sent tributes and letters, expressing their devotion and loyalty to him.\textsuperscript{59}

Proclamation of "Manchukuo" (Manchu Empire) on March 1, 1934, with P'iu Yi as Emperor Kang Te, was undertaken with the Kwantung Army experts' keen awareness of East Asian historical experience. Instead of adopting the Korean experience in which Japan had forcefully implemented the annexation of Korea, the Kwantung Army realized that a dynastic form of government would be more preferable and acceptable to the Manchus and Mongols of Manchuria, because of their historical orientation toward monarchism. Elucidating on the dynastic form decreed for Manchukuo and the demise of the dynasty, Lattimore makes this observation:

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{57}{Lattimore, \textit{Studies in Frontier History}, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 334-335.}
\footnote{58}{Charles Bell, "The Struggle for Mongolia," Reprinted from the \textit{Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society}, XXIV (January, 1937), 54.}
\footnote{59}{Hsiao-Hsin Chen, \textit{The Development and Transition of Public Administration in Inner-Mongolia (Mengchilang) from 1930 to 1945} (Master's Thesis, Brigham Young University, 1966), p. 58.}
\end{footnotes}
Thus, the Kwantung Army endeavored to conceal the true design of "Manchukuo" in order to accomplish its dream of an extension of the Japanese Empire.

Wangtao, or the "Imperial Way," was a device designed to encourage the Manchurian Mongols, Chinese and minority groups rendering their allegiance and loyalty to the Manchu Emperor Kang Te (P'u Yi) and thereby bettering Manchukuo-Japan relations. The concept of the "Imperial Way," extracted from the Confucian classics,

... represents the Confucian ideal of the upright sage, who rules not by force but by the persuasive effect of his gracious benevolence on all within his realm. It is the "Way of Right" as contrasted with "Fa Tao", the "Way of Might". 61

Transference of this principle to confirm the "Imperial Way" status of Emperor Kang Te, as "the virtuous ruler who governs in accordance with the 'will of Heaven' ", 62 suited the grand design of the Kwantung Army.

For obvious reasons, the Kwantung Army never attempted to reveal the other facet of Confucian political philosophy -- the Mencius theory of the right to revolt, which virtually empowered subjects the prerogative to overthrow a tyrannical ruler. Such a political philosophy, foreign to Japanese dynastic concept, would undoubtedly challenge and therefore threaten the Kwantung Army's dream of expansionism.


62 Ibid.
The Concordia Association (Kyowa-kai), an unofficial propaganda organ of the government, whose primary role was to "ease the execution of the government's plans by smoothing relations among the several races", promoted the program of the "Imperial Way".

Central Government

There were two protocols which effected the machinery of government, at least in its outward appearance; the first, on March 1, 1932 and the second, on September 15, 1932. In the first, Japan recognized Manchukuo as an independent state, "organized in accordance with the free will of its inhabitants"; and, in reciprocation, "Manchukuo" recognized Japanese interests and rights within its jurisdiction. The second protocol was a mutual agreement on national defense with the stipulation "that such Japanese forces as may be necessary for that purpose shall be stationed in Manchukuo". Thus by her position of power, Japan was able to extend its influence on the continent.

The transition of Manchukuo from a "republic" to a prototype of the Japanese imperial system was intended to stabilize the government and enhance Japan's hegemony. An analysis of this will be seen as we examine the nature of its governmental structure.

Under the Organic Law of the Manchu Empire of 1934, the State was "completely centralized in the Throne". The Manchu Emperor's entourage of "aides" were: the Imperial Household, the Committee on Imperial House-

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63Ibid.

64Quoted in Aziz, op. cit., p. 32.

65Quoted in Hugh Byas, "Rift in the War Clouds," Asia, XXXIV (September, 1934), 521.

hold Law, the Office of the Privy Seal, the Office of Aides-de-Camp, and
the Privy Council. Ministers of these offices were invariably non-
Japanese officials. The Emperor's vested powers were executive, legisla-
tive, and judicial; but, like the Emperor of Japan, he "did nothing without
the advice of ministers, who in turn were controlled by [Japanese] vice-
ministers". The Kwantung Army made certain that the Manchu Emperor would
serve his usefulness only as their puppet.

In addition to the Emperor and his "entourage," there were also the
State Council, the Legislative Council, the Courts of Justice, and the Su-
pervisory Council. The State Council, virtually the Cabinet in charge of
all administrative affairs, was headed by the Prime Minister who controlled
the Ministers of the following nine departments: Civil Affairs, Foreign
Affairs, Defense, Finance, Industry, Communications, Justice, Education,
and the Department of Mongolian Affairs.

In 1937 "a complete reorganization of the national administrative
organ was effected". Of the four independent branches, the State Council,
the Executive Council, the Courts of Justice, and the Supervisory Council,
the latter was eliminated, leaving three. Then, too, the number of nine
departments was reduced to six. These were: Public Peace, People's Welfare,
Industry, Finance and Commerce, Communications, and Justice. However, the
Department of Industry was abolished in June 1940 and at the same time the
Department of Agricultural Development was established. Also in 1937 the
Offices of Foreign Affairs and Hsingan Affairs were created. The latter
which replaced the Department of Mongolian Affairs, was created "to coordi-

67 Aziz, op. cit., p. 31.
68 Manchoukuo Year Book 1942 (Hsinking: Manchoukuo Year Book Co.,
69 Ibid., p. 157.
nate matters concerning the administration of the Mongols." 70

The purpose for the reorganization in July 1937 was as follows: 1) to subject the political administration under the supervision of the Prime Minister; 2) to merge or abolish the administrative departments in order to consolidate the administrative structure; 3) to unify the military and police organizations in order to improve public peace and order; 4) to facilitate the communication between the central and the local governments; 5) to expand and consolidate the functions of the local governments; 6) to eradicate the evils of standardization; 7) to facilitate plans for economic and industrial development; and 8) to improve plans for attaining racial harmony. 71

A study of the operation of the government in respect to authority and control is revealing, in that surveillance was of such a nature that Japanese officials were without question the masters. For example, the Director-General, the key administrator of the General Affairs Board under the State Council, was invariably held by a Japanese. Then, too, the heads of the respective Bureau heads under the General Affairs Board were Japanese officials. 72

In reality, the Director-General . . . was the real director of policy and controller of all governmental activities; it appointed and dismissed officials, prepared the budget, and constituted what one Japanese officer of the Kwantung Army's General Staff termed "as a steel frame" holding together the whole regime. The General Affairs Board was the stronghold of Japanese internal control over the "Manchukuo" Government, but, to make assurance doubly sure, each of the ministries, or departments had a Japanese as vice-minister and each also had its own General Affairs Bureau, or

70 Ibid., p. 159.
71 Ibid.
72 Jones, op. cit., p. 25.
secretariat, in which the controlling personnel, including the Bureaux heads, were Japanese.\textsuperscript{73}

We have thus observed that the unquestionable administrative authority was in the hands of the Director-General of the General Affairs Board, who in theory was responsible to the Prime Minister (a Japanese puppet) but in practice responsible to the Kwantung Army. Department heads, or Ministers, who were invariably Chinese, were governed by their respective Japanese "advisers," the Vice-Ministers. P'u Yi, in his former role as a puppet Emperor, gave his testimony before the Tokyo War Crimes in regard to what has already been said:

On paper, in order to fool the people of the world, Manchukuo was made to look like an independent state but in fact it was administered by the Kwantung Army. Nominally there were Ministers and Vice-Ministers in charge of the various departments of the government. Practically every one of the Vice-Ministers was a Japanese. Ministers were Chinese. On the surface the Chinese were put in charge, but underneath the Japanese ran the show. There was a Fourth Section in the Kwantung Army in control of Manchurian Affairs. All ordinances and enactments would be preferred by the Vice-Minister who were all Japanese, and then all had to be approved by the Kwantung Army.\textsuperscript{74}

The foregoing testimony indicates: 1) that the distinction of "Minister" exercised by the Chinese official was a facade as the Government of Manchukuo itself was; 2) that the subordinating office of Vice-Minister, held by a Japanese, was one of policy-making and administrative control; and 3) that the Kwantung Army was the decision-maker inasmuch as all policies created by the Vice-Ministers had to be subjected for approval.

In Chapter IV we shall observe that what ordinarily was the case under the Manchukuo administration in the conclusions enumerated above could likewise be said of the Hsingan Provinces under Japanese administra-

\textsuperscript{73}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{74}Quoted in Aziz, op. cit., p. 45.
Provincial and Local Administrative Units

In a thorough program of reorganization of the provincial and local administrative units, the "Local Administrative Research Commission," appointed in February 1934, subdivided the three provinces -- Liaoning, Kirin, and Heilungchiang -- into fourteen new provinces. This number was increased to nineteen in which five were added during the years 1937-45. Of the nineteen, four were "autonomous" Mongol provinces -- East Hsingan, West Hsingan, North Hsin, and South Hsingan.\textsuperscript{75} Technically, the underlying principle of reorganization "was to ensure the complete subordinations of the local governmental bodies to the central government in Hsinking".\textsuperscript{76}

The provincial government which theoretically administered the affairs of the province was the highest administrative unit in the state. Each province was subdivided into hsien or districts\textsuperscript{77} which in turn were subdivided into chu or counties and, in turn, into tsun or villages. Districts were, in essence, the fundamental local units of the nation and the counties and villages, the lower administrative units.

There were some differences in leadership composition of the provincial administration, evidently based on population, development, and ethnic status of the provinces. In each of the well-populated and developed provinces there was a governor, a vice-governor, a secretariat, and the following Boards: Police Affairs, Public Welfare, Industry, and Public Works.

\textsuperscript{75}A discussion of these provinces, especially the East Hsingan, will be discussed in Chapter IV.

\textsuperscript{76}Jones, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 26.

\textsuperscript{77}However in the Hsingan provinces the banner system was retained; a banner was roughly equivalent to a Chinese Hsien.
The last two named Boards were eliminated in the less developed provinces. In Heiho Province, a sparsely populated northern frontier, had a special administrative system, with General Affairs, Police, and Public Welfare sections as well as hsien, or district offices serving as branches of the provincial government.78

According to Lattimore, the highest officials of the Hsingan provinces were given a favored position in terms of communication; they dealt directly with the Privy Council at Hsinking by-passing the ministries which was not a privilege extended to the other provinces.79 Also, the Hsingan provinces were under the direct control of the Office of Hsingan Affairs and not the Department of Civil Affairs, as was the case with the others. This can be readily understood since the Hsingan provinces were strategically vital as far as the Japanese militarists were concerned. By judiciously extending certain amount of privileges to the Mongols, the Japanese hoped to eventually penetrate Inner Mongolia and at the same time undermine the Russian position in Outer Mongolia. This would then promote their plans for territorial expansion on the Asian Continent.

In the provinces, including Hsingan, troops, finance, and the judiciary were controlled by the Central Government. For example, the "Manchukuo" troops posted in the provinces were under the jurisdiction of the "Manchukuo" National Army whose commanding officers were appointees of the Central Government. Revenue officials, assigned to the provinces, collected all taxes; and administrative expenditures were defrayed by the Hsinking Government Treasury. Also, as life-time appointees of the Central Government, judges held the prerogative to exercise their judicial office in the

78 Jones, op. cit., p. 27.
79 Lattimore, Cradle of Conflict, op. cit., pp. 141-42.
provinces.

Aside from the nineteen provinces there were two Special Municipalities, one in the capital city Hsinking and the other in Harbin, with each having its mayor appointed by the Government and its city council hand-picked. Since both municipalities were under the control of the Central Government they were independent from provincial jurisdiction. However, as of July 1, 1937, the Special Municipality of Harbin was abolished and Harbin was assimilated as a unit in the Special Municipality of Hsinking. The latter was under the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister.

On the other hand, the ordinary municipality was under the supervision of the provincial governor who in turn was responsible to the Prime Minister. The municipal system affected only fourteen cities outside of the Hsingan perimeter, since the Mongols were given an autonomous status apart from the "Chinese" local administrative system. "A councilor System was later established for all local governments." Describing the system, a Japanese writer in 1938, said:

The state of Manchoukuo is politically divided into many local administrative units which are called counties and banners, and to every office of the county magistrate or banner chief there is attached a Japanese councillor whose duty is to give counsel to the Manchu unit administrator and to render assistance in every possible way.

Conclusion
In short, the establishment of the government of Manchoukuo was

\[80\] Jones, op. cit., p. 27.

\[81\] S. M. R., op. cit., p. 6.


\[83\] Ibid., p. 338.
merely a facade; although it was nominally a constitutional monarchy following a short period of experimentation on "representative" government, the real manipulators "behind-the-scenes" were men of the Kwantung Army. A switch to a monarchical system suited the Japanese design in winning over the collaboration of the Manchus and the Mongols, since both have had an historical orientation toward Chinese monarchism.

In actual practice, the central, provincial, and local powers were in the hands of authorized Japanese officials; and no act, regardless of how insignificant was considered valid without the counter-signature of the appropriate Japanese adviser.84

84 Ibid., pp. 336-38.
CHAPTER III

EXTERNAL PROBLEMS RELATED TO THE MONGOL QUESTION

In the 1930's and 1940's no other power perhaps had so directly frustrated and humiliated Japan's imperialistic aims in Inner Asia as Soviet Russia. China, impotent militarily, could not stem the tide of Japanese aggression in Inner Mongolia as Soviet Russia did along the Outer Mongol-Hsingan border. Thus Japan's attempt to solve the Mongol question by a military confrontation with Soviet Russia was a serious mistake.

Pan-Mongolism

Apparently the Japanese were cognizant of the advantages in promoting a Pan-Mongol movement. The Tanaka memorandum, in 1915, although considered a forgery by Japanese statements, and the Sino-Japanese agreement of the same year illustrates the Japanese attempt to use the Mongols as a basis for frustrating Chinese and Russian aims in Asia.¹

Dismissing the possibility of a concerted Japanese effort toward a Pan-Mongol movement, there were, however, some Japanese officers who felt a Pan-Mongolian state, supported by Japan, would effect the exclusion of Bolshevism in Outer Mongolia.² Also, according to Chamberlain, Japanese military authorities would have gone so far as

... to be willing to consent to the detachment from Manchou-

kuo of the Mongolian provinces lying west of the Hsingan Mountains, provided, of course, that Japanese influence of the new state [Mongol] was assured and unchallenged. Nonetheless, in 1931 the Japanese were in a favorable position to use the Mongols as allies against future confrontation with China and Soviet Russia.

Perhaps the takeover of Manchuria on September 18, 1931 and the subsequent occupation of Eastern Mongolia the following year had given the militarists another opportunity to fulfill their dream of a Pan-Mongolian state and thus extend their continental power beyond Manchukuo. Obviously Japanese policy was not to limit Japan's hegemony over the Mongols to Eastern Mongolia itself; its aim was to include "all Mongolia, which would give them [the Japanese] an enormous leverage in any policy toward either Russia or China". The very fact that the Japanese had established "autonomous" Mongol provinces in Eastern Mongolia was suggestive to the idea of a Pan-Mongolian state under Japanese control. Such a policy was an antithesis to Russian aims. Besides, China would not condone such a move. However, a possible Japanese willingness to surrender Eastern Mongolia to a Pan Mongolian state is reported by Fisher in 1936:

The writer related that he had heard near the borders of Inner Mongolia rumors that Japanese agents were riding about among the Mongol tribes urging their princes to declare Inner Mongolia independent. If they fell in with the project, according to the rumors, the Japanese-sponsored State of Manchukuo was ready to make them a handsome gift in the form of nearly one-fourth of its own territory, the entire western province of Hsingan, where many Mongols already live under the Japanese domination. The Tokyo official [unnamed] did much more than merely confirm the rumor.5

"Certainly, Manchukuo stands ready at any time to hand

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3Ibid., pp. 61-62.


over Hsining to an independent Mongolia," he affirmed. "Observe that the government of Mongol provinces never has been made an integral part of the government of Manchukuo. Its administration is quite separate, under a Mongol prince, so that it could be conveniently and painlessly detached at any necessary time. . . .

But such an independent Mongolian State ought to include much more than Inner Mongolia. Into it also should come not only Outer Mongolia but also the Buryat Republic (in Siberia). Those Mongol populations must be inevitably drawn by the magnetism of the independent regime in Inner Mongolia and of the liberated Mongols now living in Manchukuo.6

Lattimore asserts that had the Japanese created a Mengkukuo, or "Independent Mongol Nation," made up of Eastern Mongolia and Chinese Inner Mongolia they could have established Mengkukuo as the training ground for a Pan-Mongol movement, aiming at the conquest of Outer Mongolia.7 However, when the Kwantung Army overran Inner Mongolia in 1937 "it did not unite this region with Hsining area to form a 'Mengkukuo' as a basis for the Pan-Mongol empire of which some of the Mongols dreamed. Instead, a separate Mengchiang, or Inner Mongolian, regime was established. . . ."8 The Inner Mongols were soon to learn as their counterparts in Hsining that their "autonomous" government was very much within the terms of Japanese policy. In short, they found that they were merely puppets and that real power was in the hands of the Japanese.9 The result of this situation, of course, did not encourage a favorable image for the Japanese. Charles Bell gives a reaction to Mongols disillusionment over this matter:

A Mongol who was in a position to know, one in high authority, gave me as his opinion: "The Mongols in Manchoukuo

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9 Ibid.
are better off under the Japanese than they are under the Chi-
inese. But they are not receiving from the Japanese what they
were led to believe they would receive." And this opinion
puts the position in a nutshell.\(^\text{10}\)

Nonetheless, the dream of a Pan-Mongolian state, on the part of the
Japanese militarists, failed to materialize because Japanese policy itself
was shortsighted; it failed to comprehend aspirations of the Mongols. Its
administration was paternalistic, bound and arbitrary. Besides the follow-
ing occurrences hampered seriously any realization of a Pan-Mongolian state:
1) the serious border incidents between Soviet-Outer Mongols and Japanese-
Hsingan Mongols along the Outer Mongolian border in 1935-1936; 2) the Japan-
esian invasion of North China in 1937; 3) the Nomonhan battle between Soviet
Russia and Japan; and 4) the demise of the Kwantung Army in 1945.

Border Incidents

For the Japanese, Eastern Mongolia, following the occupation of Man-
churia in 1931, became a vitally more important strategic area than it had
been in the past. Occupying a vast Mongol domain in Western Manchuria,
Eastern Mongolia could favorably facilitate Japanese imperialistic aims in
Inner Asia. First, the Japanese Kwantung Army could not conveniently mili-
tarize Hailar, in Eastern Mongolia, some 100 miles from the Outer Mongolian
border. Second, as a prelude to a Pan-Mongolian state, the Japanese mili-
tarists could now establish an "autonomous" Mongol region in Eastern Mon-
golia. Also, with the exception of Siberia, Eastern Mongolia could probably
aid in deterring any Soviet threat to the important Japanese industrial and
military installations in South Manchuria.

In the early 1930's, indicative of her military unreadiness, Soviet
Russia did not challenge the Kwantung Army's sweeping drive into North

\(^{10}\) Charles Bell, "The Struggle for Mongolia," Reprinted from the
Manchuria following the "incident" at Mukden. Moreover, in 1935, with the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway to the Japanese puppet regime of Manchukuo, Soviet Russia abandoned North Manchuria, as her sphere of influence. But in Sovietized Outer Mongolia Russia was determined to defend her interests there.

Following the occupation of Eastern Mongolia in 1932 occasional minor incidents along the Outer Mongol border became a serious problem by 1935. As a result, on November 27, 1934 a "gentleman's agreement" was concluded between Soviet Russia and the Mongolian People's Republic "which amounted politically to a military alliance". Again, on March 12, 1936, because of increased border incidents, Soviet Russia and Outer Mongolia concluded the Protocol of Mutual Assistance with both agreeing that "in the event of a military attack on one of the contracting parties to render each other every assistance, including military assistance". Unmistakably, this meant that Soviet Russia, in contrast to her previous retreating position in North Manchuria, would no longer tolerate any actions that would jeopardize her interests in Outer Mongolia.

By 1936 there were noticeable indications of rapid mobilization and military installations in Outer Mongolia and Eastern Mongolia. In 1936, A. T. Steele, a correspondent in Hailar, made this observation:

... Hailar, in brief, has become a mammoth military base. At least a division of Japanese troops is quartered there, highly mechanized and prepared on short notice to move against the adjacent frontiers, where have occurred the most sanguinary of the border "incidents" which have been a source of unending

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11This was done without securing the consent of China, her CER partner.

12Friters, op. cit., p. 143.

13Ibid.
friction between Manchoukuo and its neighbors.14

Also, in 1936, Edgar Snow made the following report:

... While the Kwantung army extends its roads, railways and telegraphs to the frontier and at Hailar builds an immense base suitable for Mongolian operations, the leaders of Ulan Bator are not quiet. ... The Mongol Red Army15 is said to be well armed, well equipped, fully equal to any Asiatic troops. Motor roads have been extended to all frontiers; telegraphic and radio communication has been much developed; fortifications have been erected ... There is (probably largely Russian-flown) a Mongol air force rumored to comprise more than three hundred planes, and based on several modern airdromes.16

Moreover, the increase of Soviet-Outer Mongol troops estimated between 60,000 and 100,00017 and military installations indicated the gravity of Soviet-Japanese relations in 1935-1936.

In January 1935, Lake Bui Nor, located on the fringe of the Outer Mongol Hsingan border, a central area of dispute over the question of border demarcation. The claim of each party was as follows:

... the Japanese considered Lake Bui Nor as a part of Manchukuo and the Khalkha River as 'the natural boundary between the two countries.' The Outer Mongolian maps (and apparently also Soviet maps), however, included the Khalkha


17Ibid. Correspondent Sterling Fisher gives an overall comparison of Soviet and Japanese military preparedness in Asia. "Russia unquestionably has the larger trained land forces, more abundant supplied, resources and equipment and stronger fortifications on her side. Her standing army is 1,300,000 against Japan's 230,000; her air force 3,500 planes or more to Japan's 1,446. In the Far East, she is said to have 250,000 troops on the Siberian-Manchukuoan frontier, which she has protected with an elaborate network of small concrete forts, like the Maginot line guarding France from Germany. She likewise has 600 to 700 tanks and 800 to 900 airplanes east of Lake Baikal. ... Japan, on the other hand has opposite, in Manchukuo, less than 90,000 Japanese soldiers and a smaller number of relatively 'raw' native troops she has few tanks and airplanes and no border forts." Fisher, op. cit.
River and Lake Bui Nor within the Territory of Mongolian People's Republic. 18

In short, the Japanese insisted that the area in dispute was within the Hsingan perimeter but the Russians argued otherwise.

In the early border encounter in January 1935, Snow reports:

The first serious clash occurred last January, when Japanese-led "Manchu" troops encountered a Red Mongol patrol near Lake Boir, west of the Barga district in Manchuria's Hsingan. A Mongol commander and one soldier were killed while slight casualties were inflicted on the Manchukuo side also. Mutual protests were exchanged. 19

The number of clashes in 1935 alone, as reported by Sterling Fisher, amounted to 106 serious ones and in the first three months of 1936, twenty-two. 20 In several of these it seems apparent that there were occasional skirmishes between Outer Mongols and Hsingan Mongols. In a dispatch to the Secretary of State on January 23, 1936, from Tokyo, Ambassador Joseph Grew reported the alleged involvement of more than one hundred Outer Mongols and Manchurian Mongols in the border clashes on January 8, 15, 16, and 17. 21

Encounters between Mongol troops -- Outer Mongol and Hsingan Mongol -- tended to create animosity among blood brothers. Grew makes this one relevant observation:

The cause of these clashes is not clear, but is apparent that neither the Outer Mongols nor Manchurian Mongols of Hsingen Province, each of whom is confident of support from the Soviets and the Japanese, respectively, are at present, willing to show any sign of weakness or of a willingness to compromise. 22

18 Friters, op. cit., p. 235.
19 Snow, op. cit., p. 11.
20 Fisher, op. cit.
22 Ibid.
Perhaps this is not a peculiar situation if we would take into consideration the similar relationship that have existed between North Koreans and South Koreans following the Korean War in 1950 or even between the North and the South in the American Civil War.

In sum, the border incidents were symptomatic of Japanese territorial ambition. Over-confident of her initial victories in North Manchuria, and in Jehol, the Japanese military, in January 1935, thought perhaps that provocation of Soviet-Outer Mongol troops in the Lake Buir Nor perimeter might cause Russia to make some concessions to them. Stiff Russo-Outer Mongol troop resistance, however, gave them after-thoughts; closer coordination between the Russians and Outer Mongols in border defenses was the result. In addition after 1936, the Chinese government, which preferred Russian occupation of Outer Mongolia to that of a Japanese takeover, offered no protest regarding the influx of Russian troops into that country. Moreover, the border incidents reflected Russia's determination to defend her pre-eminent position in Outer Mongolia, as in Siberia; in the past she had tolerated Japan's intrusions as far as they were on Chinese soil.

Manchuli Conference

On June 3, 1935, as a result of the mounting seriousness of the border incidents, a conference was held in Manchuli, North Hsingan Province, near the Outer Mongol border. The Soviet objective in this conference was to settle immediately the question of boundary demarcation along the Outer Mongol-Hsingan border; but, as for the Japanese, they desired primarily to establish a foothold in Outer Mongolia by means of gaining concessions from the Russians. The leading delegate among the Hsingan Mongol officials was

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Ling Sheng, the governor of North Hsingan Province, and Japanese delegates -- Kanki, Saito, and Sakurai -- of the Kwantung Army. Leading the Outer Mongol entourage was Sambowa, the Vice-Minister of War accompanied by Russian officials.²⁴

It should be emphasized here that the appearance of the Outer Mongol and Hsingan Mongol delegates was merely a facade; the actual "men-behind-the-scenes" were the respective Russian and Japanese officials. William H. Chamberlain, who had been an observer during one of the Manchulii conference sessions, makes the following comment:

I was present for a short time during one of these conferences and carried away the impression of a diplomatic puppet show, with Tokyo and Moscow vigorously pulling the strings that controlled the Manchoukuo and Outer Mongolian delegates. The delegates lived in railway cars, surrounded by watchful Russian "advisers" and as inaccessible and uncommunicative as the Grand Lama of Tibet. A Japanese diplomat attached to the Manchoukuo Foreign Office was the moving spirit in the Manchoukuo delegation.²⁵

Boundary delimitation concerning the questionable and vaguely marked Outer Mongol-Hsingan border was not an urgent, issue as far as the Japanese were concerned. The Japanese were primarily interested in an "open door" policy: 1) to open diplomatic relations between Outer Mongolia and Manchukuo; 2) to maintain a Manchukuo military mission in Ulan Bator; and 3) to construct a telegraph line between Outer Mongolia and Manchukuo.²⁶ Obviously, it was the Japanese intention to gain a foothold in Ulan Bator as far as setting up espionage activities were concerned. However, Soviet-Outer Mongolian refusal to comply with the Japanese proposal frustrated the latter's aims in Outer Mongolia.

²⁴Snow, op. cit., p. 11; see also Steele, op. cit., p. 494.
²⁵Chamberlain, op. cit., p. 63.
²⁶Snow, op. cit., p. 12.
Indicative of the futile attempts at reconciliation at Manchuli are the following Russo-Outer Mongol communiques: "Recent events prove that Manchukuo wishes to avoid peaceful settlement of border incidents and prepare the way for further occupation of our territory;" 27 and "Japanese militiam... undertakes more and more risky adventures. It may happen, however, that the reckless investigators of these adventures will break their necks." 28 Also from New York Times:

... A responsible spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office did not conceal the fact the Japanese Government approved... efforts to open Outer Mongolia. He repeated that Manchukuo was now knocking at Outer Mongolia's door as Japan's door in 1858, implying that same result was inevitable. 29

In reviewing the issues that have led to the cessation of the Manchuli conference at the close of 1935, we find that in the June 3rd session the Soviet-Outer Mongols were primarily interested in a settlement of the boundary dispute by delimiting the border. However, the Japanese evidently were trying to evade the question by demanding that "all matters of mutual interest" should be discussed. 30 This referred, of course, to the Japanese "open door" policy for Outer Mongolia. On the October 2 the "open door" policy again became an issue. 31

In a personal interview with Edgar Snow, Chashi, the Japanese Vice-Minister of the Manchukuo Foreign Office, stated "candidly that the border

31 Bisson, op. cit., p. 231.
question was only incidental to issue or wider implication". He regarded the Manchuli conference "as merely preliminary to a determined attempt to pry open Mongolia for the benefit of the world; to enforce the open door in that country, which has so much in common with our empire".32

Stubborn Soviet Outer Mongol resistance on the border revealed the futility of Japanese efforts on the conference table. Besides, by 1936, as was pointed out earlier, there was substantial Soviet-Outer Mongol military build-up in Outer Mongolia, and Kwantung Army experts were aware of this.33 Provocation of an all-out war at this time was most unlikely, for each side recognized, among other reasons, the potential might of the other.

In short, the Manchuli conference in November, 1935 ended in a stalemate; neither was there any solution to the question of delimitation of the frontier nor a Russo-Outer Mongol acquiescence to the Japanese "open door" proposals.

After the adjournment of the July conference in Manchuli there was an alleged rumor referring to the bitter exchange of words between the Outer Mongol and Hsingen Mongol delegates: "The Outer Mongols bitterly denounced the Hsingen Mongol delegates as Japanese 'puppets,' to which the latter replied by calling their relative 'Red slaves'".34 Perhaps this could have been plausible when we consider the charges and counter-charges of the North and South Koreans over the conference table at Panmonjom.

Ling Sheng Incident

In April 1936, as a consequence of the Manchuli Conference, the Kwantung Army arrested Prince Ling Sheng, the Mongol governor of North

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32Snow, op. cit., p. 12.
34Snow, op. cit.
Hsingan Province, and several other high Mongol officials on alleged charges of "plotting subversive movements against Manchukuo . . . with giving military information to Soviet Russia". Governor Ling Sheng and his entourage, among whom were the Mongol Army's chief of staff and the chief of police, were sent from Hailar to Hsinking, the capital of Manchukuo, to be tried by court martial. Shortly thereafter, "All the accused, including the governor, the army's chief of staff, and the chief of police, were brought to trial, found guilty, and executed".

As noted, Governor Ling Sheng was the chief Hsingan delegate at the Manchuli conference. In this capacity it can be assumed that his occasional conversations with Russian and Outer Mongol delegates might have been looked upon with much suspicion by the Japanese. In this respect, the Japanese considered such relations as "treason in its gravest forms".

Among other charges, such as plotting for the secession of Barga, the Japanese further declared that

Ling Sheng had established connexions with the U.S.S.R. in 1929, when Soviet troops invaded Hailar in their punitive expedition against Chang Hsueh-liang, and that he had always been secretly working for the Russians, while professing loyalty to "Manchukuo".

The Russians, however, flatly denied having had any affiliation with Ling Sheng.

A. T. Steele, who had met Ling Sheng and acknowledges him as a man of integrity, does not dismiss the possibility that he could have played


37 Steele, *op. cit.*, p. 494.

38 Jones, *op. cit.*, pp. 67-68.

both sides; however, in what terms Steele does not venture to say. Notwithstanding, Steele comments on the character of Mongol opportunism:

Such opportunism, though reprehensible by occidental standards, is no phenomenon in the Mongolias, where the ruling princes have been the pawns of international intrigue since the collapse of the mighty empire erected by Genghis Khan. I have just completed a journey through Hsingan Province and Chinese Inner Mongolia from Hailar, in northwestern Manchoukuo, to Suiyuan, in northwestern China, and everywhere I found Mongol leaders in much the same mood.40

The Japanese military alleged that Ling Sheng was motivated by a desire "to insure security for himself and his people in the event of a war between Outer Mongolia and Manchoukuo and their powerful allies".41

In his interview with Japanese generals in Tokyo in 1963, Dr. Paul V. Hyer, a student of Mongolian affairs, asserts the possibility that some Japanese officers of the Kempeitai (secret military police) ambitious for promotion and always suspicious of Mongols, sought to use Ling Sheng as a scapegoat. As related to Hyer, Russian agents concealed weapons in such a way as to give the appearance that Ling Sheng had plotted a coup. Whether Ling Sheng was actually framed is difficult to ascertain; but the execution of some Outer Mongol leaders shortly thereafter in Ulan Bator on charges of having plotted with the Hsingan Mongols in a Pan Mongol movement tends to absolve Ling Sheng.42

In reaction to the incident Steele makes the following conclusion as a turning point in Hsingan Mongol-Japanese relations:

. . . Tidings of the event were soon on every Mongol tongue. The execution of four Mongols of high rank for a political offense against the Manchoukuo government may bolster Mongol respect for the gold-braided Japanese who guide the

40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Personal interview with Dr. Paul V. Hyer, July 19, 1966.
destinies of the young, but it is scarcely calculated to stimulate Mongol affection.\textsuperscript{43}

This would not be an unusual reaction, for it is a natural human characteristic of any group of people to side with their own kind in the face of foreign occupation whether the motives were justified or not. However, the incident itself did not generate any serious anti-Japanese reaction in terms of a revolt, particularly when an opportunity later in the defeat of the Nomonhan War could have made it possible. In this regard, F. C. Jones points out:

Some commentators took this event [Ling Sheng] as an indication of the failure of Japan's Mongol policy, but this was assuming rather too much. . . . The hostilities at Nomonhan in 1939, which culminated in a severe Japanese defeat at the hands of the Soviet forces, might have been the opportunity for a large-scale revolt of the Manchurian Mongols; this, however, did not occur.\textsuperscript{44}

**Battle of Nomonhan**

In the period 1931-1939 Russia's position in Northeast Asia was primarily defensive. Although she was able to withhold Japanese attacks along the Outer-Mongol-Hsingan border in 1935-1936, embarrass the Japanese at Changkufeng in 1937, and annihilate the Japanese forces at Nomonhan in 1939, her policy was merely to defend Outer Mongolia as a future buffer and to prevent any possible Japanese invasion of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Russia was not anxious to extend her perimeter of influence to the borders of China nor into newly Japanese acquired Hsingan. She was satisfied in having Inner Mongolia only as a buffer against developing Chinese nationalism.

The Japanese militarists, on the other hand, had plans of their own.

\textsuperscript{43}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{44}Jones, op. cit.
They remembered the abortive attempt for a "Greater Mongolian State" two decades ago. Soviet Russia was the stumbling block then. No doubt in the mind of the militarists no extension of the Japanese Empire can be extended on the Asian continent through a Pan-Mongol strategy without first crushing the Soviet's dominant position in Outer Mongolia.

As it was recounted earlier, the mutual assistance pact signed between Russia and the Mongolian People's Republic in 1936, though not a bilateral agreement, simply indicated, in no uncertain terms, that Russia would come to the defense of Outer Mongolia in the event of an attack. The Kwantung Army took the hint and as a result there were fewer border incidents thereafter. 45

However, in 1937, when Japanese forces were invading China, Russia was undergoing an internal crisis; the great purge engineered by Stalin was denuding the Soviet nation of her leading military leaders, such as Marshal Tukachevsky. In the same year after severe Japanese attack in The Amur River encounter, the Russians evacuated the Russian-held islands there. But near the juncture of the Soviet-Korean border in the following year the Russians defeated the Japanese forces which led to a settlement calling for the withdrawal of troops from both sides. 46

The relative difference between Russia's retreat in 1937 and her victory in 1938 can be attributed to the rather disappointing Japanese drive in China. "The opening of the full-scale offensive against China was at first a source of worry to the Russians, but as the Japanese failed to overrun their adversaries, the Reds were considerably heartened." 47 In

45 Dallin, op. cit., p. 27.
47 Cameron, op. cit.
spite of this set back, the Japanese were making preparations for a major thrust into Outer Mongolia.

Without question, the Japanese for years had been preparing for this thrust. A direct railway line connecting Hsinking with Harunarsan traversing the Hsingan mountain range was completed by 1936; this, of course, would facilitate the deployment of troops in proximity of Nomonhan. Moreover, in July 1938, the Japanese General Staff made preliminary plans for an invasion of Outer Mongolia with Soviet Baikal (Irkutsk) as the ultimate goal. As a result, the Japanese 23rd Infantry Division on Northern Kyushu was transferred to Hailar, about a 100-mile distance north of Nomonhan.

As in the past, it was the practice for both sides to post border guards along the disputed area. The disputed Nomonhan area is located a few miles southeast of Lake Buir-Nor (the disputed area in 1935-1936) and east of the Khalkha River. The Russians insisted that the Outer Mongolian border included the area east of the Khalkha River whereas the Japanese thought otherwise. (In reality, the disputed area had no vital significance; for there were no visible fortifications along its peripheria except for numerous border outposts,.) However, a map from a semi-official Japanese publication in 1932 revealed the disputed oasis area be-

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48 Jones, op. cit., p. 111.
51 Moses, op. cit., p. 42.
52 Ibid., p. 43.
NOMONHAN WAR, 1939

tween Nomonhan and the eastbank of the Khalkha was within the border of the Mongolian People's Republic. Moreover, Mongol patrols of both sides had taken the liberty to patrol the oasis with their respective comrades at out posts observing the routine. It was not unusually for Outer Mongol border guards to patrol the area in sizeable numbers.

On May 11, 1939, a Japanese-Hsingan calvary unit of some 200 men crossed the oasis and attacked a 50-man Outer Mongol patrol near the Khalkha on the eastside. As a result, some Outer Mongols were killed. However, the attackers soon retreated. This was the first large-scale penetration of the border. If the Japanese had actually intended to test the import of the Soviet-Outer Mongol Mutual pact of 1936 they were in for a great disappointment. On May 22, Lieutenant Rykov and his platoon, on orders, crossed the Khalkha but were soon repulsed by Japanese-Hsingan cavalry. The latter consequently occupied the eastbank in violation of the border limitation set forth by Outer Mongolia and Soviet Russia. As of this moment a challenge was set forth for the Soviet Union to keep her promise according to the mutual agreement. The Russo-Outer Mongol forces retaliated.

A few days later, on May 31, as a direct warning to the Japanese, Molotov made the following declaration before the Supreme Soviet:

"... I give warning that the borders of the Mongolian People's Republic, by virtue of the mutual assistance treaty concluded between us, will be defended by the USSR as vigor-

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54 Testimony of Rippel Ogisu as cited in Moses, op. cit.
55 Moses, op. cit.
56 Ibid., p. 45.
57 Testimony of Major A. E. Bykov as cited from Imfite in Moses, op. cit., p. 46.
ously as we shall defend our won borders. . . 58

The skirmishes of May 11 and 22 soon developed into a full-scale modern war, and with the battle line extending from "fifty to sixty kilometers and to a depth of twenty to twenty-five kilometers". 59 But much of the crucial battles were centered in the Nomonhan perimeter.

Briefly, the battle of Nomonhan can be characterized in these terms: in the initial drive until about July 6, the large-scale offensive was generally in Japanese favor; but thereafter the Japanese began to feel the growing strength of the Soviet-Outer Mongol forces; and finally in the latter part of August, Soviet-Outer Mongol forces began a tremendous drive which completely routed the Japanese-Manchukuoan forces. 60

Besides the use of ground forces including tanks and artillery, both sides did not shy from aerial duels. In June the combat overhead took a major part of the action. 61 On June 17, the Japanese admitted that "Outer Mongolian and Russian planes began a series of raids over Manchukuo". 62 Each side reported incredible victories, but it is difficult to rely on any one source. What can be acknowledged, however, both sides were able to test the efficiency of their latest models. 63

No doubt, Soviet planes had probably attempted to bomb heavily fortified Hailar. Dispatch from Hailar, however, discloses that bombing raids did occur in the vicinity of Hailar: "Through the day Soviet aircraft

58Dallin, op. cit., p. 39.
60Moses, op. cit., p. 41.
61Ibid., p. 48.
63Moses, op. cit., p. 48.
ranged eastward, bombing communications centers near Hailar. There were at least four fresh bomb creators thirty-five miles south of Hailar and five others near Changmiao. 64

For some reason the Russians, unlike the Japanese, trained Outer Mongols as pilots. Long before the Nomonhan incident, Japanese knew that the Outer Mongols had a Russian sponsored air force. 65 In August 22, a Ussinking dispatch disclosed that forty Outer Mongol planes were shot down in three battles on the border and five over Halumarshan (sixty miles from the border) on August 21. 66

In the first week of August the Japanese were beginning to get desperate; reinforcements were hurriedly deployed to the front. The composition of the reinforcements were as follows: all of the 23rd Division; part of the 7th Division; the whole Manchurian Mixed Brigade (Koreans, Inner Mongols, Manchurians); three Hsingan regiments; three heavy artillery regiment; and the entire Anti-Tank Batteries of the 1st Infantry Division. 67 By this time, Soviet forces were far superior in modern weaponry as in Chart 2.

From August 20 the Russians opened up a tremendous drive which ended with the defeat of the Japanese forces in August 31. 68 According to Moses, superb Russian military strategy and tactics including the support of su-


65 Tang, op. cit., p. 397.


67 Testimony of Rippel Ogisu, IMFTE, cites in Moses, op. cit., p. 52.

68 According to Tokyo, the Japanese suffered over 18,000 casualties for the entire war; Russian casualties, although unknown, was probably less. Dallin, op. cit., p. 39.
### Chart 2

**Comparison of Forces**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Japanese-Manchukuo</th>
<th>Soviet-Mongol</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Infantry Battalion</td>
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<td>35</td>
</tr>
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<td>Cavalry Squadrons</td>
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<td>20</td>
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<td>Light and Medium Machine Guns</td>
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<td>2255</td>
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<td>Attack Planes</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Bombers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Planes</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>515</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

perior armored vehicles and air power were instrumental in the defeat of Japanese forces which generally were employing World War I tactics.69

A news shocking to the Kwantung Army, at the time of Japanese retreat in late August, was the Soviet-Non-aggression Pact signed on August 23rd; moreover, perhaps, the thought of having to face the onslaught of a Soviet offensive in Manchukuo became ever more depressing. However, at Moscow, a truce was signed on September 15 by Togo and Molotov thus ending the Nomonhan War the following day. This perhaps was welcomed news for both sides.

As Japan, Soviet Russia saw that extending the war would not be an advantage to her. Despite her non-aggression pact with Germany, she still was apprehensive of having to fight a two-front war. Also, logistics would have been a same problem in spite of her victory at Nomonhan.

Japan, too, in effect, was fighting a two-front war, one at Nomonhan and the other in China; and logistics, also, because of the distance involved, was a difficult task as she had come to learn. Soon, Japan realized the blunder her militarists had made. The humiliating defeat of her forces at Nomonhan had convinced her the necessity to negotiate the signing of the truce.

In conclusion, Nomonhan, as far as the Mongols were concerned, had dimmed any hope for a Mongolia for all Mongols; for it ended the image of Japan as patron and promoter of Mongol Pan-Mongolism. Japan was not able to recapture the spirit of a Greater Mongolia. The crushing defeat of the Kwantung Army in 1945 ended Japan's dream of a Greater Mongolian State or any further extension of the Japanese empire on the Asian continent. For Soviet Russia, Nomonhan succeeded in keeping Outer Mongolia isolated and

69 Moses, op. cit., p. 59.
divided from Chinese Inner Mongolia and Manchurian Mongolia. Moreover, in the author's opinion: Nomonhan revealed that Outer Mongolia, by way of Hsingan, can no longer be the pathway to Japanese expansion, thus relegating the Kwantung Army to a secondary position as far as future Japanese strategy of war to be concerned. Finally, Nomonhan made possible for a border demarcation settlement along the Outer Mongol-Hsingan border, a move which the Japanese militarists had long delayed. After preliminary meetings elsewhere, the Mixed Border Demarcation met in Harbin, on October 1941, at which the question of the boundary dispute was settled. However, ratification of the agreement took place in Moscow in May 1942.

Moreover, in granting Outer Mongolia its status as an independent state, the Yalta Agreement (1945) made it ever more impracticable for any hope of a Pan-Mongol movement to take place. Sovietized Outer Mongolia would never condone it.

In one of the preliminary meetings in August 1941, at Chita, the following leading Hsingan Mongol and Japanese officials were present: Nobusade Shimomura, Director of the Political Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Office (Manchukuo) and Po-yen-man-tu, councillor of the Hsingan Office, who later became Governor of the East Hsingan Province. Manchoukuo Year Book, 1942 (Hsinking: 1933), p. 366.

Rupen, op. cit., p. 266.
INTERNAL PROBLEMS RELATED TO THE MONGOL QUESTION

Unlike their previous experience under the Chinese, or even Russian, administration, the Eastern Mongols were granted autonomy under a modern foreign power. The Japanese realized that in order to extend Japan's influence and power into the Mongol regions of Inner and Outer Mongolia, the collaboration and the facade of Mongol autonomy under their beneficence would be to their advantage.

Creation of the Hsingan Provinces and the Office of Hsingan Affairs

Following the February 1932 meeting of the banner leaders at Chenchiatung (Teikaton) calling for a Mongol autonomy, the Japanese established the Hsingan Bureau on March 9, 1932,\(^1\) in Hsingking. It was made responsible to the State Council of the Manchukuo Government. In the same year on August 3 this bureau was renamed the Hsingan General Office. The change was only in name, not in organization.\(^2\)

After the takeover of North Manchuria in 1932, the Japanese created the Hsingan Province, so named after the Hsingan range\(^3\) in Eastern Mongolia. Shortly thereafter it was subdivided into North, South and East provinces.\(^4\)


\(^2\)Ibid.


\(^4\)F. C. Jones, Manchuria Since 1931 (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1954), p. 64.
Then in the invasion of Jehol in 1933, the Japanese sought to integrate the heavily populated Mongol region of northern Jehol within the Hsingan perimeter; therefore, in 1934, in a program of reorganization northern Jehol was detached and renamed West Hsingan Province. Generally, Eastern Mongolia was subdivided with North Hsingan occupying the Barga region; East Hsingan, the Nonni valley; South Hsingan, the Jerim League; and the West Hsingan, the Jo-oda League. In short, uncolonized Mongol areas were set apart to constitute the Hsingan provinces. According to Heissig, the borders of these provinces did not follow the historical spreading of the Mongols but followed the natural population borders dating from 1932 to 1934. Because of this fact nominal parts of the Mongol areas of the Jerim, Jo-oda and Josoto Leagues stayed outside the Hsingan perimeter. The areas in which Chinese population outnumbered the Mongols were not included; however, for Mongols who chose to remain, their interests were "protected by local 'offices of Mongol affairs'."

Although the Mongols were given limited autonomy, the status as a "province" suggested that the Japanese did not intend that the Mongols should enjoy "self-determination". In fact, at no time did the Japanese form an independent Mongol government. Jurisdictionally Hsinking, the seat of the central government, served as a Mongol "capital". However, the Hsingan provinces were given "a greater freedom in internal affairs than other 'Chinese' provinces". In spite of it all, the Japanese ran the state

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5 Ibid., p. 327.
6 Heissig, op. cit.; see also Owen Lattimore, The Mongols of Manchuria (Allen and Unwin, 1934), p. 142.
7 Heissig, op. cit.
8 Lattimore, op. cit., p. 21.
9 Ibid.
of affairs.

By the end of 1934 the Hsingan General Office was changed to the Department of Mongolian Affairs.\(^{10}\) Its jurisdiction was also extended to banner areas outside the confines of the regular Mongol provinces of Hsingan.\(^{11}\) The objectives of this change were: 1) to improve the administration of the Mongols of Manchuria; 2) to improve and develop the cultural and economic needs of the Mongols; and 3) to promote national harmony and cooperation among the Mongols.\(^{12}\) In 1937, as part of the general reorganizational program of the central government, the Department of Mongolian Affairs was replaced by the Office of Hsingan Affairs. As with the other departments this Office theoretically was directly responsible to the Prime Minister of Manchukuo; it operated through the office of the State Council. Additional responsibilities of this new office concerning Mongolian affairs were: 1) to oversee the management of Banner public finances; 2) to oversee the management of the tax system; 3) to effect measures in regard to Lamaist affairs and reform; 4) to deal with matters regarding the nobility and 5) to facilitate a better system of control and communication among the various organs of the provincial government.\(^{13}\)

Provincial Administration

The Provincial Government Office was the highest local administrative organ. In each of the four Hsingan provinces, the level of authority was as follows: The highest official, of course, was the Emperor of Manchu-


\(^{13}\) *Ibid.*
kuo. Directly below him in authority was the Premier (a Chinese) and the State Council of Manchukuo. It was through the State Council that the Office of Hsingan Affairs supervised and directed Mongol affairs and consequently its jurisdiction over the Hsingan provinces. The administrator of the Office of Hsingan Affairs, and also a member of the State Council, was a Mongol, who held the title of "Minister" equivalent in rank and prestige with the rest of the ministers of the Government of Manchukuo; and like the others, he too had a Japanese "advisor". The provincial governor, also a Mongol, likewise, had a Japanese advisor. Equal in rank with vice-governors of non-Mongol provinces, the Japanese advisor, or councillor, theoretically, assisted the governor with matters concerning proprieties and important matters of provincial administration.

In 1938, the North Hsingan, South Hsingan, and West Hsingan provinces operated on the three cho (department) and seven ka (bureau) system. The departments were Police affairs, Civil Administration, and General Affairs; the seven bureaus were Special Affairs, Education, Police, Industry, Local Affairs, Accounting, and General Affairs. (See Chart 3). Also, as was typical, the "heads" of these bureaus were also Mongols assisted by their respective Japanese advisors. These bureaus, though not shown on the chart, were divided and the divisions subdivided. The provincial officers were appointed by the Governor as well as by the government of


15Ibid.


17Moko Taiken, op. cit., p. 247.

18Aberle, op. cit.
Administrative Structure - Hsingan Provinces

Prime Minister

Office of Hsingan Affairs

Hsingan Provincial Governor

Councillor

Department of Police Affairs

Department of Civil Administration

Department of General Affairs

Bureau of Education

Bureau of Police Affairs

Bureau of Industry

Bureau of Accounting

Bureau of General Affairs

Bureau of Special Affairs

Local Bureau

Agency of Municipal Management

Police Headquarters

Procurator's Office

Prefectural Headquarters

Banner Headquarters

Meko Taikan, op. cit., p. 247.
Manchukuo, 19

In the case of East Hsinan Province, the two cho-six ka system was used. Of the principal three bureaus: Civil Administration (Minsel), Police Affairs (Keimu) and General Affairs (Somu) -- East Hsinan Province was without the services of a Police Affairs Bureau, as was prescribed for the others. At this time the Civil Administration Bureau was handling the functions of a Police Affairs Bureau. 20 However, the Police Affairs Bureau was added later. 21

In 1941, the Mongol governors of the four Hsinan provinces were: Po-yen-man-tu, East; Shou Ming-A, South; Ne-la-ko-ehr-ch-pu, West; and Eh-lu-chin-pa-tuh, North Province. 22

Banner Administration

For obvious reasons, in the early period of occupation, the Japanese were careful so as not to disrupt the traditional banner system of the Mongols. During the Manchu Dynasty, the banner was the basic political and administrative unit. Governing authority was in the hands of "the hereditary Mongol nobility and their appointed functionaries". 23 However, unlike the Mongols of the other Hsinan provinces, the Dager Mongols of East Hsinan, had no nobility. The reason for this and the alternative to

19 Ibid.
20 Moko Taikan, op. cit.
21 Aberle, op. cit.
22 Manchoukuo Year Book 1942 (Hsinking: Manchoukuo Year Book Co., 1942), p. 164; also Director-General Affairs of the State Council was pa-ta-ma-la-pu-tan.
it is given by Aberle:

Because of their fealty to the Manchus, the Dagors who
had no nobility, received seven high ranks -- civil statuses,
not patents of nobility -- called siraaka jangin, "inherited
leader". The men who received these titles transmitted them
to their eldest sons, a process which continued until the end
of the Manchu Empire. A stipend was attached to the title.24

Generally, for meritorious services, the Dynasty granted pasture lands to
Mongol banners. Moreover, the Mongol banners were incorporated within the
Manchu Army.25 Following the fall of the Dynasty in 1911, the banner sys-
tem loan degenerated because of the oppression of the warlords.26

Unlike the Chinese, the Japanese granted the Mongols of Manchuria
"rights and privileges" for self-government.27

Next to the province, the banner was the most important administra-
tive unit during the Japanese occupation. As a whole, the banner was made
up of: 1) its area; 2) its inhabitants; and 3) its power to govern itself.28
Any attempt to change the boundary for reasons of administration, finance,
judicatory reasons had to be decided by Imperial decree of the Manchukuo
government.29 Theoretically, the banner had administrative and judicial
powers.30

The Banner Headquarter was responsible to the Hsingan Provincial
governor. The Chief of the Banner Headquarters was, for example, equal in

24Aberle, op. cit., p. 74.
26Ibid., p. 153.
27Ibid., p. 153.
28Moko Taikan, op. cit., p. 247.
29Ibid.
30Ibid., p. 248.
rank with\textsuperscript{31} the heads of the agencies of the Procurator's Office and Police Headquarters.

There were a total of twenty-nine banners\textsuperscript{32} in Manchuria with twenty-five of them within the Hsingan provinces.

From 1932-1935, the banners, like the provinces, held some measure of power, but thereafter the Mongols began to sense the increased curtailment of their power.\textsuperscript{33}

For discussion of the banner administration the author will depend upon Aberle's brief study of the Dagor banner administration of East Hsingan, gleaned mainly from Orgunge Cnon, his Mongol informant.\textsuperscript{34}

There were four Banners in East Hsingan Province: Bayen, Aroon Molitawa, Morin Dawaa, and Botahaa.\textsuperscript{35} The leader of each of these banners was usually appointed by the Provincial governor and confirmed by the central government.\textsuperscript{36}

Since the Japanese were anxious to build a Mongol bureaucracy immediately, it was not necessary for a Mongol to start from the bottom in order to rise to the position of a banner leader. However, education was a basic criterion for selection; the typical Banner leader was usually middle-aged and Chinese-educated. Although this position carried with it prestige and honour, the salary offered was only sufficient to sustain a

\begin{enumerate}
\item[Ibid., p. 247.]
\item Manchoukuo Year Book 1942, op. cit., pp. 155-156.
\item Aberle, op. cit., p. 93.
\item The reader is cautioned that what might have been true in the case of East Hsingan Province might not have been the same for the West, North and South Mongol provinces. However, the pattern of administration was generally similar.
\item Ibid.
\item Aberle, op. cit.
\end{enumerate}
man and his family. The Banner leaders received no formal training, but occasional indoctrination lectures were given at provincial meetings.37

The Banner Headquarters, as such, was never removed upon the release of the Banner leader; and neither was his tamag, or seal of office, ever retained by him but kept in the provincial headquarters.

In level of authority, the Banner leader was subjected to the whims of his Japanese councillor; although, theoretically, the calling of the councillor was presumably to advise the banner leader, technically, his authority was above that of the latter. The restricted authority of the banner leader in relationship to his "advisor" is explained by Aberle:

The Japanese advisor could veto any action of the leader by withholding his own seal from official papers. The advisor, could not initiate independent action. All lines of communication were rigidly bureaucratic. The Banner leader could communicate with the province, but not with the Manchukuo government. . . .38

Unlike their attitude toward former Chinese officials, the Mongols regarded the banner leader and provincial governor with due respect. Then, too, the people were obviously more at ease with Mongol officials than they had been with the Chinese, whom they had feared. (Perhaps this was one of the chief reasons that caused the Dagors, who had been generally known as being "excessively docile and lacking in proper nationalist spirit", to incite a minor insurrection against the Chinese "during the period of disorder immediately prior to Japanese occupation of the area".39

The Banner office, like the provincial level, was divided into three bureaus: General Affairs, Civil Affairs, and Police Affairs. (The latter perhaps was incorporated sometime after 1938). Apparently each of

37Aberle, op. cit., p. 93.
38Ibid., pp. 93-94.
39Ibid., p. 90.
these bureaus was responsible to its respective offices at Chalan-tun, the provincial headquarters. As on the provincial level, each of these bureaus was divided. Heads of Bureaus were Mongols and nearly all officials of the five banner offices were staffed by Mongols.

In general, the banner offices dealt with matters concerning education, public peace, tax collection and work levies. The banner offices had a hand assisting with the administration of the Japanese-sponsored educational system outlined for the Mongols. This program was "for the most part nationally financed". At the banner level there was a police court.

The level of authority below the notog: in Onon's banner there some five notogs. A notog "refers to the territory within which a nomadic unit pastures, moves, and camps". The notog leader was chosen by prominent citizens of the notog and had to be confirmed by the banner; his selection was usually based on his local prestige. His office was located in the notog capital, centrally situated in a larger village unit.

Although the notog was given considerable authority, he had little latitude for action. Officially he received orders from above and transmitted them to lower echelons - matters concerning draft registration, collection of taxes, etc. Unofficially he could act as a spokesman for the villagers on certain matters whenever Japanese demands became too onerous.

The next unit of authority, below the notog, was the gacaa. The nature of the gacaa is given by Aberle:

To understand the gacaa, one must recall the nature of Dager settlements. The effective kinship and administrative

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40 Manchoukuo Year Book 1942, op. cit., p. 156.
41 Ibid., p. 94.
42 Personal communication from Lattimore to Aberle. Aberle, op. cit., p. 96.
BANNER ADMINISTRATION

Banner

Councillor

Chief

Bureau of Police Affairs

Bureau of Civil Affairs

Bureau of General Affairs

Education Section

Taxation Section

Administration Section

Public Peace Section

Special Affairs Section

Police Affairs Section

Accounting Section

General Affairs Section

Moko Taikan, op. cit., p. 249.
unit had been the mokon. A give residential cluster, which appeared to be a single village with subareas, was often a series of mokon. . . . A set of such contiguous mokon constituted a gacaa. Each subdivision constituted an ayl. If a particular village included but one unit, it was not part of a gacaa.43

The duties of the gacaa leader were similar to that of the ayl leader below him; however, the extent of differences, if any, could not be clearly ascertained by Aberle's informant.

The ayl leader, invariably a young man perhaps thirty - was appointed by the notog leader. Unlike his superiors, he received no salary; his rank was low, and much work was expected of him.

As with the gacaa, there were many functions that the ayl leader were responsible for, such as: 1) keeping a census for draft purposes; 2) sending draft registrations papers to the notog; 3) collecting taxes on grain, fur, etc., but tax to be apporioned for local and national functions; and 4) controlling travel permits. The latter perhaps was as a technique of political control.44

Moreover, among the above responsibilities, the ayl leader levied labor for railroad work, supervised the confiscation of certain types of arms,45 distributed rationed goods, enrolled the children for school, etc.

In spite of his many functions, the ayl leader had neither an office space nor a seal. However, he could call a village meeting, communicate with the notog, and, under certain conditions, with the banner.

As logging, a principal industry, came more under Japanese control and goods subject to rationing because of war time conditions the ayl's

43 Ibid., p. 97.
44 Ibid., p. 98.
45 Since hunting was a livelihood for many Dagors, the people in Onon's area were permitted to retain their guns.
responsibility increased commensurately. Under such conditions the ayi leader perhaps had to transmit such Japanese demands on the people who dared not protest "least they be considered anti-Japanese".46

Lamaism

Before delving into Japanese attempts in fostering Pan-Buddhism it is necessary to note briefly the historical background of Lamaism and its relationship with Tibet, the Manchu Dynasty, the Chinese Republic, and Soviet Russia, for it was from this context the Japanese attempted a Pan-Buddhist movement.

Unlike the Japanese, it was not Manchu nor Chinese nor Russian policy to further the cause of Lamaism among the Mongols. In the Japanese context it was useful for Japanese purposes to promote a Pan-Buddhism movement to conform to Japanese imperialism.

Lamaism was first introduced in the Mongolia into Urga during the Sixteenth Century from Tibet, the mecca of Lamaism. Perhaps for this reason, Charles Bell prefers to call Lamaism of the Mongolias "Tibetan Buddhism" or "Mongol Buddhism". He also asserts that Mongols, like Tibetans, would probably resent the use of the "term Lamaism, as implying that their religion is not Buddhism at all".47 For this study, however, we shall use the term Lamaism in reference to Tibetan Buddhism or Mongol Buddhism.

In the Seventeenth Century the Manchus had considered the Mongols as allies in their joint conquest of China and they were aware of the great-

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46Ibid., p. 99.

ness of the Yuan Dynasty under the Mongols. Therefore, to restrict the possibility of a rise of Mongol power, the Manchus supported "the power of the great lamas against that of the princes, in order to split the Mongols into factions. . ."48

Like the Manchus, Chinese and Russian actions toward Lamaism were one of exploitation. During the Republic Chinese officials, in collusion with Lamaist monasteries, exploited tribal lands:

Just as princes frequently sacrifice the interests in special privileges and fixed revenues, so monasteries, to preserve their corporate existence and the privileges of the hierarchy, tend to show their influence on the side of the Chinese when the land passes under the Chinese administration. 49

In Outer Mongolia the monasteries since the beginning of the Soviet take-over in 1921 were subjected to severe Soviet oppression and restrictions; and Lamaism, as an institution was depopularized and divested of its power as a social, political, and economic force.50 In the early 1930's because of Soviet political purges, destruction of monasteries and forced collectivization, hundreds of Mongol refugees, including religious and political leaders, fled into Eastern Mongolia and Inner Mongolia.51

In 1935, the Thirteenth Dalai Lama made the following statement:

The present is the time of the Five Kinds of Degeneration in all countries. In the worst class is the manner of working among the Red (Communist) people. They do not allow search to be made for the new Incarnation of the Grand Lama of Urga. They have seized and taken away all the sacred ob-

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48 Lattimore, "Inner Mongolia-Chinese, Japanese, or Mongol?" Pacific Affairs, X (March, 1937), 65.


jects from the monasteries. They have made monks to work as soldiers. They have broken religion, so that not even the name of it remains. 52

Therefore Soviet, as well as Chinese, blunder was an invitation for the Japanese militarists to implement a positive approach to the Mongolian religious question.

The Japanese idea of Pan-Buddhism did not begin with the occupation of Eastern Mongolia. During the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05, some Japanese associated with the lamas in their monasteries. After the war, the Japanese invited thirty high lamas and dignitaries to Japan to discuss with priests of the Higashi Hongwanji Buddhist leaders concerning the question of Pan-Buddhism. 53 Since Lamaist Buddhism and Japanese Buddhism were of the Mahayana School compatibility in some areas would be possible, it was hoped. In 1918 with the attendance of seventeen lamas a "Buddhist Association of Mongolia and Japan" (Nichi-Mo Bukkyokai) was organized. Then in 1919, the association was changed to the Buddhist Association of Asia, with the founding of a Mukden agency for the promotion of education between Japanese and Mongol students. 54 In 1902-1921, Kudo Tetsusaburo, who ventured as far as Chinghai, Western Inner Mongolia, had an audience with "the 'Living Buddha' of the Labrang Monastery. His objective was to collect funds for the purpose of financing troops and restoring 'the world as it was in the days of the Ch'ing (Manchu) Dynasty." 55

During the 1930's and 1940's Japan considered Communism a menace

52 Ibid. Quoted.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid., pp. 288-289.
to her imperialistic aims. Therefore, Lamaism, if properly exploited, would aid the Japanese in combating Communism ideologically. During their advance in Inner Mongolia after 1937, the Japanese "spread propaganda about a 'renaissance of Buddhism' and tried to organize an actively nationalistic Church, including declaration of a 'Holy War' against Communism."\(^56\)

In the 1930's the Japanese, in terms of reform, took steps to solve the religious question of Lamaism. Education, as an important facet of Japanese imperialistic policy was geared 1) to raise the standard of the Lamaist clergy to a respectable level, even at the risk of relegating thousands of monks to the status of laymen; 2) to eradicate Lamaism of its shamanistic elements; 3) to perfect Lamaism as an efficient corporate structure; and 4) to effect a harmony in ethics and philosophy between Lamaist Buddhism and Japanese Buddhism.\(^57\)

However, attempt to reform the Lamaist religion in Eastern Mongolia was not to be simple. Since the Seventeenth Century the custom of having young boys join a celibate priesthood attributed the removal of 50% of the male population from reproduction.\(^58\) Also, promiscuousness among the lower monks, especially, the spread of syphilis became a scourge.\(^59\) During the Japanese occupation, medical relief parties from time to time were sent in Mongolian areas to assist in controlling epidemic\(^60\) and doctors in make-

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\(^{56}\) Rupen, op. cit., p. 227.

\(^{57}\) Ibid., p. 228.

\(^{58}\) Heissig, p. 59.

\(^{59}\) Ibid., See also Lattimore, "Inner Mongolia - Chinese, Japanese, or Mongol?" op. cit., 65. "Most lamas never worry about the vow of celibacy, and it is because of this, and because they want women frequently and find them in many places, they are one of the worst agencies in spreading syphilis, the most serious factor in the low Mongol birth rate and the high rate of child mortality."

\(^{60}\) Manchoukuo Year Book 1942, op. cit., p. 686.
shift hospitals assisted in treating Mongol patients. Depopulation and decline of traditional Mongol aggressiveness were generally attributed to these factors. Over the years, many abuses, corruption, and shamanistic practices within the Lamaist institution had made it unpopular especially among some princes and young intellectuals who desired to reform the religion. Shiro Yoda, who in 1936, as the Vice-Minister of the Mongolian Administration, having jurisdiction over the Mongols of Manchukuo, indicated that the superstitious, political, and non-religious elements in the monasteries had devitalized the Mongolian people. At that time, in an interview with A. T. Steele, Yoda explained the Japanese attempt to purify and vitalize the Lamaist institution.

... a limited number of Mongols will be permitted to enter the priesthood, and those who do will be required to maintain high standards of learning. In line with this purification process, we have sent ten Mongol lamas to Japan, where they are studying the Japanese Buddhism in churches with a lamaistic trend. Others will follow them. ...  

To reform the Lamaist religion in Eastern Mongolia was a difficult task. In 1936, for example, there were some 17,876 monks in 283 monasteries. Since each family contributed one or two boys to monkhood, and moreover, since the people were bound to the Lamaist religion a consolidated effort to implement reform would be futile. For this reason, among others, on May 22, 1938, the Department of Welfare, in Hsingking, called for a meeting of Japanese Buddhist representatives of Manchoukuo and Lama priests "for counsel and advice". As a result, a Buddhist National Union was organized which included the Lama priesthood of the four Hsingan provinces. There-

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61 Heissig, op. cit., p. 65.
62 Steele, op. cit., p. 496.
63 Heissig, op. cit., p. 80.
64 ibid.
after, on August 16-30, 1938 seventy young Lamaist monks were sent to Hsinking for indoctrination; later more were sent to Japan for the same purpose.  

65  Earlier, in 1934, the Japanese had already sent thirty young Manchurian Mongol Lamas to Japan for a two-year course of study (perhaps indoctrination would be a more suitable term) and in 1936 seven more were sent. These monks, as those of Inner Mongolia, were between the ages twenty and thirty.  

66  According to Japanese intelligence reports, young men of this age group were selected because they favored reform 67 and thus would be more acceptable to the Japanese. Under this program of indoctrination all expenses of the students were paid by the Japanese government and a salary was given them.  

68  In 1939, on an exchange program, fifty Japanese Buddhist scholars were sent to monasteries in remote Mongolian areas.  

69  Another Japanese objective was to bring the Lamaist liturgy closer to Japanese Buddhist liturgy.  

Prior to March 1939, the Japanese militarists, unlike the Mongol laymen, had not made any serious attempt to conscript Lama monks into military service. During the confrontation with Soviet-Outer Mongol in 1935-1936 and the plans for an invasion of Outer Mongolia in 1939, the Japanese militarists might have often though to draw from the monasteries the potential man-power available there. The dilemma whether to take this action is found in Lamaist beliefs. In the four Hsingan provinces, with the possible exception of those of the Tungusic tribes in the northern part of the Gan

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65  Ibid.  
66  Bell, op. cit., p. 58.  
68  bell, op. cit.  
69  Reissig, op. cit., p. 81.
River, killing of animals, or even of insects, was taboo. For this reason, and for other shamanistic beliefs, the Japanese were hesitant to call for a conscription of the Lamaist clergy. As a result there was no conscription until March 1, 1939. An official agreement had been reached in February, in a meeting between representatives of the Manchukuo government and a "Living Buddha," including ten of his subordinates representing the lamas. According to the Japanese, it was agreed that: "the lamas have repented of their attitude of evading conscription, which they had done heretofore because of an evil doctrine or custom."  

A primary objective of Japanese Pan-Buddhism was to promote the education of the Lamaist clergy, particularly the young. Therefore, the government-sponsorship of Lamaist students to Japan and the trek of Japanese scholars to monasteries in Eastern Mongolia and Inner Mongolia were: 1) to teach and promote reform and 2) to set the ground work for a Lamaist National Church whose doctrines would be "purified" and conform as much as possible with Japanese Buddhist theology. But this program was hampered by the Japanese attempt to simultaneously secularize many of the lamas. Moreover, as with Japanese Pan-Mongol movement, the Japanese defeat at Nomonhan in 1939 and the decisive defeat in 1945 of the Kwantung Army ended the Japanese dream of successfully exploiting Buddhism. Even though many of the monks might have had resentment for Japanese attempts to "purify" their religion and subject them to military conscription, some of them, especially the higher hierarchy, regarded the Japanese as protectors of Lamaism.

73. Rupen, op. cit., p. 228.
Education

The Japanese militarists promoted secular education in order to implement Japanese imperialistic aims. Japanese attempts to re-educate Lamaist monks in respect to religion, as we have been, was a step in this direction. Hoping to develop Mongol military talent, the Japanese established the Hsingan Military Academy at Wangyehmiao in July 1934. Capable Mongol leaders were recruited and trained in military discipline arts. As the backbone of the army, graduates would later serve in the Mongolian corps of the Manchukuo Army.

The effort to educate the Mongols in order to raise their socio-economic status was expressed by Shiro Yoda of the Mongolian Administration Department at Hsinking in 1936:

We are trying to convert the Mongols from a nomadic to a settled way of life. . . . We are making over the old feudal system of government . . . the ruling princes are being replaced by qualified young magistrates when the princes prove themselves unfit to hold office under Manchoukuo's stringent civil requirements.

In 1936, there were 314 schools in the Hsingan provinces with Mongolian established and taught as the official language. In accordance with Japanese tradition strict attendance was enforced. Lamas who were trained in Japan and literate elders were selected as teachers in the education of Mongol pupils.

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76. Ibid.
77. Steele, op. cit., p. 496.
79. Ibid.
The following from a Japanese source shows the number of Mongol school children in primary schools in each of the Hsingan provinces in 1938; West Hsingan, 11,434; South Hsingan, 30,312; East Hsingan, 4,735; and North Hsingan, 4,891. Also, there were normal schools established in South Hsingan and East Hsingan; and agriculture schools in all of the provinces by 1941. In the same year in South Hsingan only, a girls' higher national school was established; likewise, in all provinces except North Hsingan a boys' vocational school and in South Hsingan only a girls' vocational school were founded.

What do the above figures indicate? For the Mongols it was the first time an opportunity at mass education, though not extensive, was freely given, a boast the Chinese Republic could never have made.

Lifted from their illiteracy and given the opportunity for education, Mongol pupils, according to Yoda, and quoting from Steele, his interviewer, "have taken to education with a vim". This enthusiastic reaction was similarly noted by Haslund:

The lads were dressed in a sort of cadet uniform with faces to convince myself that they were really Mongols... as soon as the lesson was over they flung themselves upon me with a stream of eager questions.

Similarly, in an interview with a Buryat Mongol officer in Hailar, in 1935, Charles Bell quotes this officer's favorable comment:

Our condition under Japan is splendid. Hitherto our people have lain in darkness, but now we are at the foot of the

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80 Manchoukuo Year Book 1942, op. cit., p. 655.
81 Ibid., p. 659.
82 Ibid., p. 660.
83 Steele, op. cit., p. 496.
84 Quoted in A Regional Handbook on the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, op. cit., p. 275.
staircase and are beginning to climb. Proper schools have been established in which we can learn; we are taught first to read and write our own language, as well as arithmetic, etc., then those who are clever are taught Japanese and the Manchou language, as well as Chinese and English. 

In the early phase of the Japanese occupation, a definite problem for the Japanese bureaucrats was to find educated Mongols to fill national and provincial posts. Among the most educated, though few in number, were those of East and South Hsingan province; but in the North and West Hsingan provinces, the problem of illiteracy was more acute, since the Chinese educational system had been inadequate there. Therefore, in the beginning, Chinese scribes were employed to work on official documents. In East Hsingan Province, most of the administrative posts were held by the more educated Dager Mongols and a few by low-ranking Chinese officials. It was not until 1941 that civil service for Mongol officials was apparently begun.

However, under the Japanese educational system, the Mongols had "a range of opportunities opened up . . . which had been unknown since 1911." As the result of effective establishment of schools from 1932 to 1945, many trained young men, as well as some older men, had job opportunities seen in the Japanese sponsored Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government. Especially among the ambitious ones, some went to Japan to receive university training. The impact of Japanese-sponsored education, without doubt, disrupted traditional Mongol society; but at the same time, it gave the young Mongols new hope for success.

85Bell, op. cit., p. 58.
86Aberle, op. cit., p. 92-93.
87Ibid., p. 92.
88Ibid., p. 100.
In spite of Japanese imperialistic ambitions, an important contributive factor in helping Japanese relations was the educational policy for the Mongol people. Perhaps, too, the Mongols understood clearly the depredations of their former undisciplined Chinese masters as contrasted to the somewhat policies of the Japanese.

Concordia Association

Following the successful overthrow of the Manchu Dynasty in 1911, the new Chinese Republic inaugurated the five-striped flag symbolizing the union of the five races -- Mongols, Manchus, Tibetans, Moslems, and Chinese. However, the Chinese Nationalist Party, during the peak of its power (1927-1931):

discarded the five-barred flag symbolizing a union of races, and undertook to impose Chinese standards on all Mongols, Tibetans, and Moslems under its control or within reach of its propaganda, with the intention of transforming them all, whether they liked it or not, into Chinese-speaking, Chinese-thinking Chinese.

Again profiting from the Chinese lack of insight, the Japanese master-planned the Concordia Association (Jp., Kyowakai; ch., Kung Ho Hui) in 1932 symbolizing the same Chinese aim of 1911. The overall objective was to integrate the harmony of the five races -- Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, Japanese, and Koreans -- and also to gain the loyalty of the races to the principles of Wangtao and Kodo in relation to Manchukuo and Japan, respectively.

As a special arm of the Government of Manchukuo, the Concordia Association was actively reorganized in 1936 by Naoki Hoshino, following

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90 Ibid., p. 103.
91 Manchoukuo Year Book 1942, op. cit., p. 759.
The Japanese-German Anti Comintern Pact of that year, who then was the Director-General of the General Affairs Board of Manchukuo. The nature or the organization is explained by Charles Spinks:

...is a single-state-controlled political party to which all state employees must belong. Party members wear a military-like uniform, salute each other, drill and generally carry on in the fashion of the Nazi party.

Besides aiming to create racial harmony among the races through the Concordia Association, the Kwantung Army sought to maintain one "political party" rather than several, for the Concordia Association is not a body which strives to invest powers to the political parties in parliamentary governments, and to attack the administrative politics of the government.

It was then the aim of the Concordia Association to bring the racial groups in harmony with the political policy of the central government.

The Concordia Association, to which nearly all segments of the population were persuaded to join, was located at the capital city, Hsinking. Affiliated headquarters were found in each hsien (prefecture or district or banner equivalent to a Chinese hsien) and city.

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92 Charles Nelson Spinks, "The Man Behind in Japan," Asia and the Americas, XLIII (April, 1943), p. 218. "In this capacity Hoshino was politico-economic boss of the state, his only superior being the Commander of the Kwantung Army."

93 Ibid., pp. 218-219. John Stewart gives this impression of the use of the uniform: "Those who join are entitled to wear uniform and a great many do so. As a result Manchuria swarms with people in military uniform, just ordinary khaki, with no distinguishing marks or buttons. It gives, the impression to people who have newly come that the place is overrun by soldiers. It is not. It is overrun by people who find this Concordia Association uniform is much cheaper than ordinary Chinese clothes and also that it does not in any way distinguish them from their fellows. ... It is extremely economical and also saves a good deal of time." See John Stewart, "Manchuria Today," International Affairs, XX (January, 1944), 70.

94 Manchoukuo Year Book 1942, op. cit., p. 763.


96 Manchoukuo Year Book 1942, op. cit., p. 759.
Among the Concordia Association's various educational functions, the most important was the youth training program. By 1942, there were some seventy youth training schools with some 7,000 graduates, according to the Japanese. Limit of training, instruction and purpose were given as follows:

At these schools the students, during a period of three months, live under guidance of teachers sent by the Central Headquarters, and receive group spiritual and military training, as well as academic instruction so that they may develop into useful citizens.

Another youth program was the training camps established in 1937. Since then and prior to 1942, there had been a total of fifty training camps organized with some 30,000 completing the program. The object of this program was to have the graduates from these camps return to their towns and villages as civic leaders so that they might promote the aims of the Concordia Association.

An example of the Japanese effort among the Mongols was the experience of Masamori Harada, a Japanese civilian in Manchuria. After his brief assignment with the Concordia Association at the central headquarters in Hsinking, on September 16, 1939, Harada was informed on December 20 of his new assignment to Lintung, West Hsingan, a remote region near the Inner Mongolian border. When he arrived in Lintung, there were only thirty Japanese, but later on there were one hundred. At the Youth Training Center, which was in the vicinity of the Banner headquarters, he called on Naga-matsu, the head administrator. The following day he reported to the Con-

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97 Ibid., p. 759.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid., p. 764.
100 Manchoukuo Year Book, p. 764.
cordia Association Banner Headquarters. He replaced General Ishihara who was transferred to Hsinking.\textsuperscript{101}

Harada's primary responsibility was to organize the youth training program for the young Mongols, as well as the Chinese and Koreans, in that area. He helped train fifty young men, most of them Mongols. Harada's assignment was to organize youth groups. They were taught how to raise the level of their food production, as well as how to purge the villages of criminal elements.

Besides his work with the youth training program, Harada took time between training sessions to travel to the outlying villages and help organize other youth groups in the methods of irrigation, raising of crops, and planting of trees.\textsuperscript{102}

Despite the imperialistic aims of the Concordia's program, the Mongols saw the tangible efforts of a foreign power striving to better their standard of living even at the risk of disrupting their traditional way of life. As of 1941, however, the exigencies of war disrupted whatever further progress the Japanese would have made in their experimentation to better the Mongols' lot.

Economy and Industry

During the occupation of the Japanese in the 1930's the economy of the Mongols in Manchuria were basically pastoral or semi-pastoral. A pastoral or steppe economy was the common livelihood of those Mongol tribes who lived in the vast steppe land of the Barga region. These Barga Mongols, a mixed group of Buryats, Dagors, as well as Eastern and Western Mongols were mainly nomadic herders who lived very much like their forefathers.


\textsuperscript{102}\textit{iibid.}, p. 62.
raising and breeding cattle, sheep, and horses, and some cows and camels for their livelihood. The importance of the steppe nomadic life to the Mongols is shown as follows:

Sheep provide meat, milk, skins, and wool in the steppes and deserts. Camel's hair is used in clothing and is combined with wool to make felt for the yurts, the Mongol dwellings. Mare's milk is an important part of the Mongol diet. Fermented, it is used to make arakhi, a mild alcoholic beverage, which is also distilled into more potent forms. The horse is essential to the Mongol's life. To herd his animals, to hunt, to fight, to go anywhere from the longest to the shortest distance, the Mongol rides on horseback. The horse gave the Mongols the mobility necessary for a pastoral nomad life and also made possible the military cavalry units organized by these horsemen of the steppe. Wealth and power in Mongol society were estimated by the size of the animal herds, especially by the number of horses, which was much greater than economic or military use required.

On the other hand, the Dagor Mongols of the Nonni River area east of the Great Khingan Mountains were semi-pastoral. Their economy was "based on farming, supplemented by logging and hunting, some herding, and a small amount of fishing".

Since the beginning of the Twentieth Century, as I discussed earlier, the destructive effects of Chinese colonization and railway construction affected adversely the Mongol economy, particularly in the steppe nomadic area of norther Jehol. Besides encroaching upon the Mongols' self-sufficiency, the Chinese tried to force the Mongols to become farmers. Lattimore asserts that the Chinese, as farmers "had no tradition and no

103 A Regional Handbook on the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, op. cit., pp. 10, 82.
aptitude" for livestock raising.\textsuperscript{107} Also, to typify unwise Chinese exploitation of Mongol lands, Lattimore relates: "first-rate pasture land is ploughed under for crops and exhausted within a few years, by the blowing away of the top soil, after which it is unproductive either for farming or for pasture."\textsuperscript{108}

Although at first the Japanese had promised the Mongols that their lands would be protected from future Chinese colonization, the Japanese themselves were soon to infringe upon the self-sufficiency of the Mongols. The Japanese saw the possibilities for increasing and improving the breeds of Mongolian livestock; therefore, they made ambitious plans for them. The Kwantung Army was especially interested in procuring an ample supply of good horses and mules for military purposes.\textsuperscript{109} However, the Japanese at the same time, realizing that livestock was their source of wealth, did not neglect to provide the Mongols some assistance to the pastoral industry as a means of improving their flocks and herds.\textsuperscript{110}

In the Mongol areas, the Barga region and West Hsingan Province provided the Mongolian cattle; Holunbier district was the chief supplier of horses: According to the Manchoukuo Year Book of 1942, there were about 1,800,000 horses in Manchuria (and this included those in non-Mongol areas, too) the number was not as substantial when compared with 1,448,481 horses raised in Japan, which is little half the size of Manchuria.\textsuperscript{111} Of the number of goats raised in Manchuria, the leading province was Jehol fol-

\textsuperscript{107}Lattimore, The Mongols of Manchuria, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 22.

\textsuperscript{108}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{109}Jones, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 184.

\textsuperscript{110}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{111}Manchoukuo Year Book 1942, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 452.
owed by West Hsingan Province. North and West Hsingan provinces were chief producers of camel and a less scale in South Hsingan and Jehol provinces. However, there are only some 12,800 camels with the number gradually decreasing. Some 1,965,900 head of sheep were chiefly raised in the four Hsingan provinces. Since the wool from the Mongolian sheep was inferior in quality, the Japanese made attempts to improve the breed by experimenting with imported Merino, Corriedale, and other superior strains. The object of this was to sufficiently supply the Japanese woolen industry with Mongolian wool instead of Australian. Apparently this venture "proved chimerical".

With the introduction of modern scientific methods, including the work of veterinary institutes to combat animal deseases and experimental work on sheep farms, the Mongol pastoralists' received some benefit from such endeavors. However, to teach new improved techniques to a people who have been accustomed to conservative and time-proven methods was not an easy task; for this "... tact and persuasion were necessary... But tact and patience towards peoples whom they are in a position to dominate are qualities which few Japanese are apt to exhibit".

In the forested area of East Hsingan, the Japanese interest in the procurement of wood needed especially for railway ties, telephone and telegraphic poles did not engender favorable Dagor-Japanese relations. The Dagors, who did not produce surplus food, depended on the sale of furs and forest products for their livelihood; but with the incursion of Japanese...

112 Ibid.
113 Manchoukuo Year Book 1942, op. cit., p. 455.
114 Jones, op. cit., p. 67.
115 Ibid.
logging enterprises, logging became the dominant economic factor for their sustenance. 116

A Corporation of Wood Procurement, with its head office in Hsinking, controlled all wood cutting and wood prices through the Banner. Procedure and result of the logging enterprise administered by the Banner office as experience in Aberle's Mongol informant is as follows:

In order to go logging, it was necessary to get a license from the Banner, and to inform the Corporation how many people were going to a particular logging party. The leader of the party then received money and, at least as important, clothes, matches, and cigarettes, all of which were hard to get in wartime, and tools, at a low, regulated price. The logs, once cut, were brought down river on a raft, and were counted at the Corporation office, and then taken to Tsitsihar. Two months later, payment, at a governmentally regulated rate, was given. Such a logging party was led by an individual or a family with the means to transport and feed the workers during the logging season; the profits went half to the organizer and half to the loggers. The official rate of pay for logs was low as compared with the black market rate; so there was always some black marketing. 117

In the exploitation of possible mineral deposits there were no significant Japanese accomplishment. Although the Japanese plan called for possible development of such resources, as reported by John Stewart in 1940, 118 it is doubtful that any headway had been made.

Notwithstanding the exploitation of Mongol livestock and logging industry to further their own ends, the Japanese, unlike the Chinese, tried to make some compensation for Mongol losses of lands. For example, "to achieve a permanent settlement of the vexing conflicts over land between Chinese and Mongols," the Japanese evacuated the Dagors of East Bataha from the east of the Nonni River to the west. However, in so doing, the Japanese

116 Aberle, op. cit., p. 95.
117 Ibid.
compensated them for the loss of their lands. Another example: By 1940, there was some friction between Mongols and Chinese in the special Mongol areas of Jehol and Jehol. Moreover, the rapid influx of Chinese settlers due to railway construction and expansion of coal-mining had made it necessary for the Japanese to liquidate Mongols lands which began on January 1, 1940. Japanese plans to compensate the Mongols is commented on by John Stewart:

Where the pressure of the Mongols has resulted in the opening of their land for public use, the 15 Mongol princes of the eight banners are to receive bonds and annual subsidies as compensation for the loss of their privileges. At last report they had already been paid M6,000,000 and were to receive an additional M2,480,000.

In sum, notwithstanding Japanese efforts to compensate for Mongol losses or improve their economy anti-Japanese sentiment gradually rose as the Japanese economic demands became firmer. However, it never seemed to have grown to any serious proportion.

119 Aberle, op. cit., p. 90.
121 Ibid., p. 60.
122 Ibid.
124 Jones, op. cit., p. 68.
CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In order for the reader to better understand the Mongol question during the Japanese period 1931-1945, the author showed some of the historical precedents which influenced the Japanese in their expansion on the Asian continent. As recounted, following the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, some ambitious Buddhist priests (of the militant Nichiren sect) made some contacts with the Eastern and Western Mongols toward a Pan-Buddhist idea.

With the fall of the Manchu Dynasty in 1911, self-determination became an obsession with Eastern, Western, and Outer Mongol nationalist leaders. Taking advantage of this situation and the Russian and Chinese suppression of Mongol autonomous aspirations, the Japanese, through Semenov, attempted to establish a Pan-Mongolian state in 1919. However, this movement was unsuccessful mainly because of the non-support of Kolchak's White Russian regime and the Urga Government of the Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu.

In the 1920's unwise Russian and Chinese policies alienated the Mongols. The religious and political purges, forced collectivization, and so forth, in Outer Mongolia, under Soviet rule, led a number of refugees to flee into Inner and Eastern Mongolia. Chinese aggrandizement of Mongol lands and economy in Eastern and Inner Mongolia furthered Mongol animosity against the Chinese.

As a result, the Mongolian desire for autonomy became intensified. Of course, this "rebellious" course never ever tolerated by either the
Russians or the Chinese. It was not until 1932, following the Manchurian Incident, that Mongol aspirations were "seriously considered" by the Japanese who realized that a formation of an "autonomous" Mongol region in Eastern Mongolia would be to their advantage. Therefore, in 1932 the Japanese created the Hsingan Province, Eastern Mongolia, later subdivided into the North Hsingan, South Hsingan, West Hsingan, and East Hsingan provinces. The governors of these provinces, appointed by Manchukuo government, were theoretically responsible to the Emperor through the Office of Hsingan Affairs of the government of Manchukuo. The Office of Hsingan Affairs, "headed" by a Mongol, directed Mongol affairs in the Hsingan provinces and the Mongol banners outside of the jurisdiction of the provinces. This Office also served as a liaison between the Hsingan provinces and the central government. In all key positions, in the central, provincial, and banner governments, Mongol heads were "advised" by a Japanese councillor. Actual administration was in the hands of the latter.

In the early period of the Japanese occupation in Eastern Mongolia, the Japanese were careful so as not to make any drastic changes in the traditional Mongol society; this was to avoid losing the support of the Mongols. The Japanese permitted limited autonomy as the Manchu Dynasty traditionally had done.

As a whole, the Japanese had more success with the Dagor Mongols of the Nonni River Valley than those of the Barga region, because the former were more educated. For this reason, the Japanese depended on the latter to fill administrative posts in the newly created Mongol provinces.

The significance of the Japanese establishment of Manchukuo from a "republic" in 1932 to a "constitutional monarchy" in 1934 was to solicit the support of the Eastern Mongols whose traditional allegiance to the Man-
chu emperors was known. Ideologically the Japanese patterned the political philosophy of the central government to conform with the concepts of Wangtáo and Kodo which advocated the tradition of loyalty to the emperor.

Stumbling blocks for the Japanese promotion of "Pan-Mongolism" were, Soviet Russia, a formidable power, and China, weak but nevertheless a threat. Although Soviet Russia had been forced to retreat from her sphere of influence in North Manchuria because of the military drive of the Kwantung Army in the early 1930's, she was determined not to relinquish her pre- eminent position in Outer Mongolia. As far as Soviet Russia was concerned, Outer Mongolia was the only buffer that would protect her eastern frontier from Japanese attack and serve as a buffer against the growing nationalism in China. Moreover, with a Communist Outer Mongolia as a base of operations, the Soviets could, in the future, make their power and influence felt in Northeast Asia.

As far as the Japanese were concerned, Eastern Mongolia as a base of operations was basically important politically and militarily. Japanese agents could penetrate into Inner Mongolia and into Outer Mongolia. Also the creation of a Hsingan Mongol cavalry in 1932 and the establishment of Hsingan Mongol academy in 1934 were suggestive of a future expansion. By 1936, Hailar was a key military base. Mindful of the Japanese military build-up, Soviet Russia, too, had mobilized its Soviet-Mongol forces and expanded the combat readiness of its Outer Mongol air force.

In probing the enemy defenses along the Outer Mongol-Hsingan border in the early 1930's, the Japanese were soon faced with Soviet-Outer Mongol border patrols. Numerous but minor skirmishes between Japanese-Hsingan Mongol and Soviet-Outer Mongol troops along the Outer Mongolia border was a common occurrence. In 1935 a conference was held in Manchuli, a border
town in Eastern Mongolia, to settle the dispute and the question of border demarcation. But since Japanese and Russians differed in their objectives, the conference ended abortively. During the conference the Hsingan Mongol delegates were puppets of the Japanese as the Outer Mongol delegates were to the Russians.

A few months after the Manchuli conference the Kwantung Army arrested some prominent Hsingan Mongol high officials on alleged charges of a conspiracy to turn the Barga region to the Russians. As noted, although the full details of the execution in 1936 of the Mongolian Governor Ling Sheng and his compatriots cannot be ascertained at this time, there are some indications that Ling Sheng was "framed". As a result of this incident, some commentators speculated on the possibility that this would soon stir an anti-Japanese movement. Although there was a mounting anti-Japanese feeling, the defeat of the Japanese at Nomonhan did not result in insurrections.

Unlike her retreating and defensive attitude in the early and middle 1930's, Soviet policy in 1939 was counter-offensive. In the Battle of Nomonhan of that year, superior Soviet strategy and tactics and modern weaponry overwhelmed the Japanese forces. Moreover, the Soviet-German Non-aggression Pact of 1939, at the peak of the Soviet offensive at Nomonhan, shocked the Japanese. Thereafter, Japan was in no position to provoke the U.S.S.R. The Russians, although overjoyed by the defeat of the Japanese, would not dare continue the offensive because of the possibility of having to fight a two-front war, one in Europe and the other in Asia. The great distance from Moscow to Eastern Asia was a serious logistic problem for the Russians. Besides, Stalin was concerned in consolidating his power within Russia. From 1939 until the surrender of the Japanese
forces in 1945, the general condition along the Outer Mongol-Hsingan border was a stalemate.

In 1937, the emergence of an "autonomous" government in Mengchiang (Inner Mongolia) was indicative of furthering Japanese expansion into Western Mongolia. These objectives were: 1) to propagandize the Mongol ideal of Pan-Mongolism; 2) to use Mengchiang as a base for future Japanese expansion into Outer Mongolia.

Essentially the Eastern and Inner Mongols were merely puppets of Japanese policy. Without doubt, the Mongols resented this, for they realized that real power was in the hands of the Japanese. However, the Mongols, as noted earlier, did not instigate any concerted anti-Japanese demonstrations or rebellions during the defeat of the Japanese at Nomonhan in 1939 or even before the annihilation of the Kwantung Army in 1945. Although Japanese rule became increasingly demanding and harsh as the exigencies war made Japanese control and restrictions more apparent, the Mongols in general felt better off under Japanese rule than they had been under Chinese rule or would likely have felt under a Soviet regime.

The Japanese attempt to modernize the traditional Mongol society was intended to aid the Japanese in their program of expansion. In terms of exploiting the Mongol question to extend Japan's hegemony on the Asian continent, the attempt ended as a miserable failure. However, it is the conclusion of the author that no other modern foreign power had given more and taken less from the Mongols than Japan had from the Mongols of Manchuria during the Japanese period.
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APPENDIX A

MAPS
APPENDIX B

CHARTS
THE JAPANESE ATTEMPT TO SOLVE
THE MONGOL QUESTION IN MANCHURIA,
1931-1945

An Abstract of a Thesis
Presented to the
Department of History
Brigham Young University

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

by
Richard D. S. Kwak
August, 1966
This abstract of a thesis, by Richard D. S. Kwak, is accepted in its present form by the Department of History of Brigham Young University as satisfying the thesis requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

July 28, 1966

Paul Hyer
Chairman, Advisory Committee

Lee W. Tomsett
Member, Advisory Committee

Eugen L. Campbell
Chairman, Major Department

Typed by Kerstin H. Kramer
Following the Manchurian Incident on September 18, 1931, and the subsequent occupation of Eastern Mongolia, in Northwestern Manchuria, the Japanese were faced with a crucial Mongol question. The question itself was a complex one. It dealt not only with the problem of governing some 1,500,000 Mongols in a vast nomadic region but also the problem of winning their support for the promotion of Japanese expansion.

By 1932, contact with Mongols was not new to the Japanese; as early as February 1919 the Japanese, through the collaboration of Semenov, sponsored the "Dauria Government," an anti-Bolshevik Pan-Mongol movement. However, by January 1920, this movement ended abortively. With the aftermath of the Manchurian Incident, another opportunity arose for the Japanese. In Chenchiatung (Taikataton), on February 18, 1932, the Mongol leaders of the various banners in Eastern Mongolia gathered to express their desire for autonomy. Japanese promise of autonomy and protection from further Chinese colonization aided in winning the support of the Eastern Mongols. Shortly thereafter, an "autonomous" Hsingan Province was created in Eastern Mongolia; within a few years it was subdivided into the North Hsingan, West Hsingan, South Hsingan and East Hsingan Provinces, with each "headed" by a Mongol governor and "advised" by a Japanese councillor. Like the government of Manchukuo, these autonomous Mongol provinces were merely facades; the real administrators were the Japanese. The Office of Hsingan Affairs was the liaison between the central government provinces. As on the provincial and banner level, the nominal head of this Office was a Mongol official.

The Japanese saw that a traditional Mongol society could frustrate their ambitious aims in Eastern Mongolia. Therefore, they decided
decided to modernize the society; in a program of reform, education played a major role. Young Lamaist monks were sent to Japan for indoctrination; schools were established and other programs such as sanitation, medical services, stock-breeding, farming, etc., were instituted. From this context, then, it can be said that the Japanese made some contribution to the general well-being of the Mongols so long as such programs would promote the development of Japanese imperialistic aims.

However, events in the 1930's presaged an eventual military confrontation between Japan and the Soviet Union. In 1932, the Japanese permitted the Hsingan Mongols to have their own army. A Hsingan Mongol academy was established at Wangyehmiao in 1934. By 1936, the massive Japanese military build-up at Hailar and the mobilization of Japanese-Hsingan Mongol troops in that area saw the commensurate build-up of the Outer Mongol air force and fortifications, and mobilization of Soviet-Outer Mongol troops in Outer Mongolia.

Ideally, the occupation of Outer Mongolia would enhance Japanese image as a possible benefactor of Pan-Mongolism. However, Soviet Russia was determined to defend her pre-eminence in Outer Mongolia, in spite of her previous retreating policy in North Manchuria.

In short, the Japanese plans to extend their hegemony into Outer Mongolia through Eastern Mongolia failed because 1) the Japanese miscalculated the strength of Soviet power; border skirmishes along the Outer Mongol-Hsingan border in 1935-1936 led to the defeat of the Japanese forces at the Battle of Nomonhan in 1939 and the final annihilation of the Kwantung Army in 1945 as a result of the Japanese defeat in the Pacific; 2) Japanese policy was short-sighted; it failed to comprehend
Mongol aspirations for self-determination; and 3) Japanese administration of the Hsingan provinces was paternalistic, bound, and arbitrary. As a result, the Japanese sponsored "autonomous" Mongol provinces in Eastern Mongolia came to an end, also.