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The Lemhi Indians of Eastern Idaho, 1860 to 1907

Dean M. Green

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THE LEMHI INDIANS
OF EASTERN IDAHO
1860 TO 1907

A Thesis
Presented to the
Department of History
Brigham Young University
Provo, Utah

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Science

by
Dean M. Green

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INTRODUCTION

The epic of the building of America has not been one of peaceful and uninterrupted transition from a foreign way of life to that condition of uniqueness which characterizes the nation today. Rather it has been a saga of conflicting interests: in governmental, religious, and educational philosophies; in domestic and foreign relations; in music, art, and science; in peace and war. In all of the areas the story has been the same, one of conflict. There has been no simple or easy reconciliation of opposing ideas and concepts. Yet in this opposition lie the seeds of greatness or the roots of mediocrity. The methods by which the nation has attempted to reconcile or has reconciled conflicting interests serve as a measuring stick of the greatness of the country. In our history we have experimented with the good and the bad, the moral and the unethical. The question that must ultimately be answered is this: Which has predominated? The nation must eventually stand before the bar of history, for only history can answer the question fairly and honestly. There is no immediate verdict available; it can only be anticipated. America, knowing the inevitability of such a judgement, must take those steps necessary and essential to earn a favorable decision.
In one particular area of conflict, we as a conquering people earned little credit or distinction. This was in our relations with the native races of this land. Most thinking people will agree that here is a story too often marred by broken promises, by injustice, and by the philosophy that might makes right.

In recent years, however, an effort has been made to salve the national conscience. We have completely reversed our attitude toward this conquered people. Instead of the idea that the "only good Indian is a dead Indian," the pendulum has swung its full cycle and we have adopted the "Noble Redman" concept that was first proclaimed by the early romanticists. Instead of being blood-thirsty renegades, such Indians as Sitting Bull, Geronimo, Tecumseh, and Red Cloud have become paragons of virtue, unselfishly leading a tormented people against the ruthless white invader. Unfortunately neither concept is entirely correct. In the search for the spectacular or the colorful, which too often proves to be the exception, the relatively unexciting and commonplace aspects of life are relegated to second place or completely ignored. This has definitely been the case in our dealings with the Redman. Everyone is familiar with the accounts of Custer's Last Stand on the Little Bighorn or with the "Trail of Tears" or with the terrifying accounts of the Indians' attack on a frontier settlement or upon wagon-trains. The movies are replete with accounts of such episodes. But who has heard of Chief Tendoy and his Lemhi Band? The story of this group,
while never very spectacular or dramatic, gives a truer picture of the American Indian, his weaknesses and strengths, than can be found in any movie, T.V. program, or dime novel. Tendoy, who was considered by the white men to be one of the "noblest Indians" in America, proved himself to be their steadfast friend, while at the same time serving as a shrewd and dynamic leader of his own people.

Just who were the Lemhi Indians who were led and dominated by this great leader? In actuality there is no such thing as a Lemhi tribe. The name, Lemhi, is a derivation of the name, Limhi, a Nephite King in the Book of Mormon. This was the name given by the Mormons to a mission they established on the Lemhi Branch of the Salmon River in June of 1855.1 After a short and stormy existence the mission was abandoned on April 1, 1858. However, the name continued to identify the area, and within a very short time had been corrupted to its present form.

Several small bands of Indians roamed through the Lemhi valley. It was one of the areas of the Snake River Basin where Bannock, Shoshoni, Flathead, and Nez Perce tribes were accustomed to meet in early summer each year to gamble and trade horses.2 Of the small bands which roamed the valley, none was large enough or important enough to attract the interest or attention of the government. Several of the groups,

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1For an account of the creation and abandonment of this mission see Appendix A of this paper.

2Ibid. p. 173.
however, did organize themselves into a confederacy under Chief Tendoy in 1863. This confederation was composed of members of the Shoshone, Bannock, and Sheepeater Tribes. It was often referred to in government reports as the "Mixed Band of Shoshone, Bannock, and Sheepeater Indians." The most common appellation by which it became known, though, was the Lemhi band.

Except for the realization that such a group existed, roaming between Montana and Idaho through the Lemhi valley, the United States Indian Department knew very little about them and failed to provide for their needs for many years. A treaty was negotiated at Virginia City, Montana Territory, on September 24, 1868, but it was never ratified by the government. By the terms of this treaty the Mixed Band was to give up all its lands except for two townships situated on the north fork of the Salmon River (the Lemhi) about twelve miles above the abandoned mission. In return, the Indians were to receive thirty thousand dollars

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3 The estimates of the size and distribution of the Lemhi band vary greatly. According to the 1875 estimate and "the most reliable one yet obtained" the number of Indians receiving supplies at Lemhi numbered Shoshones, 500; Sheepeaters, 340; Bannocks, 210; for a total of 1050. However, estimates of subsequent years gradually lowered this number. In 1878 there were 950 Lemhis, in 1882 they totaled 750 persons, in 1885 the number had dwindled to 557. From that year on the estimates remained fairly constant ranging between 450 and 600. It was difficult to get an accurate count because of the wandering propensities of the Lemhis. The 1905 census showed the tribal population as being 462—285 Shoshones, 95 Sheepeaters, and 81 Bannocks. However, by this time there had been so much intermarriage among the Lemhis that it was difficult to tell the predominant blood.

4 There was no opposition to this treaty. The lack of opportunity was the only thing that held up ratification. Cong. Globe, Vol. 16, Pt. 1, Dec. 19, 1884, p. 349.
for the first year, twenty thousand dollars the second year, and twelve thousand dollars a year for the eighteen succeeding years. Goods and supplies were to be given in lieu of cash. Because the Senate refused to ratify this agreement, the Lemhis were forced to rely upon their own resources for survival, and oftentimes they were hardpressed to accomplish this.

Not until J. A. Viall took over the Superintendency of Indian Affairs for Montana in 1871, was there a definite move to provide for Tendoy's people. Viall first attempted to transfer the Lemhis to the Crow reservation in Montana. This move was agreed to until hostilities broke out between the Crows and the main Bannock tribe over some stolen horses. As a result of this conflict, it was deemed wise not to consummate the contemplated move. Instead Viall ordered A. J. Simmons to locate the Mixed Band on the Lemhi River about twenty miles above the mouth of that stream and requested that an annual appropriation of five thousand dollars for agricultural implements and seeds be made for their use.

In 1872 an annual gift of twenty-five thousand dollars was being given to the Lemhis. In 1873 a special Indian Commission to the Indians of Idaho and adjacent territories recommended to the Commissioner

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6Annual Report, 1872, p. 49.
of Indian Affairs that inasmuch as they did not have a permanent reservation, that the Mixed Band be sent to Fort Hall. Accordingly he issued instructions to Lemhi Agent, Harrison Fuller, to have this recommendation carried out. Fuller, in turn, called a council of his Indians and explained the Commissioner's request. The Lemhis adamantly refused to move to that place. The refusal of these Indians to move from their traditional homes and their apparent desire to have a reservation of their own resulted in the issuance of a Presidential Executive Order, dated February 12, 1875, which formally set aside about one hundred square miles on the Lemhi River as a reservation for the "mixed tribes of Shoshone, Bannock, and Sheepeater Indians."

After years of wandering as a 'lost tribe' the Lemhis were finally successful in obtaining for themselves a permanent home and a sense of security in the assistance rendered them by the government.

This paper will present a picture of the struggles of the Lemhis prior to and during their residency on the new reservation with a brief follow-up on their ultimate removal to the Fort Hall Reservation. Consideration will be given to the methods by which the Lemhis earned their

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living, gained their educations, and accomplished their personal con-
quests. Also included will be accounts of the Nez Perce and Bannock
Wars as they related to the Lemhis.

Predominant among individuals considered will be Chief Tendoy,
with accounts of his great services, sometimes counteracted by his
acts of spite and childishness. Throughout it will be seen that the
Lemhis were not the "noble redmen" of romantic fame, nor will they
prove to be a completely worthless lot. It will be found that Tendoy's
band had one main characteristic that is common of all mankind—they
were all human. The Lemhis were well endowed with many human
frailties and with many human virtues which were continually in conflict
with one another.
PART I

LEMHI BACKGROUND

Indians of the Rocky Mountains

In the days before the white man's invasion, the Rocky Mountain area was inhabited primarily by branches and offshoots of the great Shoshonean family. This family of Indians could be considered the predominant group west of the Rocky Mountains in the same manner as the Sioux nation was predominant east of these mountains. The Shoshonean family had twelve subdivisions according to Phillip Ashton Rollins, which included the following: the Shoshone proper, also known as the Snake;¹ the Bannock or Bannack, also known as the Pannock, Pannack, Panaiti, or the Po-nah-ke; the Tukurika or Sheepeater; the Paviosto; Saidyuka; and seven other subdivisions known as Chemehuevi, Comanche, Goisute, Paiute (alias Plute or Digger), Tobikhar, Tusayan (alias Moki

¹There is much conjecture as to the reason the Shoshones were called Snakes. Alexander Ross claims it was due to the characteristic manner in which these natives, when confronted with a foe, concealed themselves, gliding like serpents through the sagebrush. Father De-Smet said they were "called Snakes by reason of their poverty, which reduced them to burrow in the ground like those reptiles and to live upon roots." Captain William P. Clark said that in his investigations he was unable to ascertain why they were called Snakes, but one of their old men claimed that it was because they formerly ate serpents.
or Moqui), and Uta (alias Ute or Utah). The country which these tribes claimed as their own and over which they roamed was very extensive. It was bounded on the east by the Rocky Mountains, on the

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Alexander Ross, who was associated with these Indians from 1811 to 1825, divided the Snake nation into three subdivisions, namely the Sherry-dikas, or Dog-eaters; the War-are-rec-kas, or Fish-eaters; and the Ban-at-tees, or Robbers. They all went by the general appellation of Shoshones, or Snakes. The word sho-sho-ne means in the Snake language "inland." According to Ross, the Sherry-dikas were the real Sho-sho-nes, living on the plains hunting buffalo. Ross described the Sherry-dikas as: "generally slender but tall, well made, rich in horses, good warriors, dressed well, clean in their camps and in their personal appearance bold and independent." Of the other two groups he was not so generous in praise: "The War-are-ree-kas are very numerous; but neither united or formidable. They live chiefly by fishing and are to be found along all the rivers, lakes, and water pools throughout the country. They are more corpulent, slovenly, and indolent than the Sherry-dikas. Badly armed, badly clothed, they seldom go to war. Dirty in their camps, in their dress, and in their persons, and differing so far in the general habits from the Sherry-dikas that they appeared as if they had been people belonging to another country." The Ban-at-tees were described as follows: "The Ban-at-tees, or Mountain Snakes, live a predatory and wandering life in the recesses of the mountains, and are to be found in small bands, or single wigwams among the rocks and caverns. They are looked upon by the real Sho-sho-nes themselves as outlaws. Their hands against every man, and every man's against them. . . They are complete master of what is called the cabalistical language of birds and bezsts, and can imitate to the utmost perfection the singing of birds, the howling of wolves, and the neighing of horses, by which means they can approach, day or night, all travelers, rifle them, and then fly to their hiding places among the rocks. They are not numerous, and are on the decline. Bows and arrows are their only weapons of defense." Kenneth A. Spaulding (ed.), Alexander Ross: The Fur Hunters of the Far West (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956), pp. 166-67.
south by the Spanish waters, or the Colorado River Drainage. The western boundary was an imaginary line running parallel with the Pacific Ocean about 150 miles inland from the west end of the spur of the Blue Mountains to approximately the forty-first latitude. The boundary on the north ran due east from the said spur of the Blue Mountains to a point near the southern end of the Bitterroot Valley, referred to by Alexander Ross as the "Valley of Troubles."3 This area includes 150,000 square miles and was inhabited, in the estimation of Ross, by 36,000 Indians.4 Other tribes living in the Rocky Mountain area were the Nez Perces, occupying eastern Washington, northern Idaho, and western Montana, and the Flatheads, who dwelt primarily in western Montana.

In general the Rocky Mountain Indians were of medium size, though they were usually straight and well proportioned. They possessed fine limbs and flowing black hair which sometimes reached the ground while they were standing erect. Warren Angus Ferris, who visited these Indians in the 1830's, described them as seldom having ugly features (except for the older women), and except for those who subsisted principally on fish, as having "beautiful, white, even set teeth."5

The wearing apparel of the warrior was made up of a long shirt, reaching down to the knees which was open on each side from the

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3Ibid., Ross, p. 167. 4Ibid.

5Warren Angus Ferris, Life in the Rocky Mountains (Salt Lake City: Rocky Mountain Bookshop, 1940), arranger, Herbert S. Auerbach, p. 233.
armpits to the bottom. They also wore leggings, breech-cloth, and moccasins. Over all this a light buffalo robe or blanket was thrown, resting on the shoulders. The garments were usually made from the skin of Rocky Mountain sheep, dressed specifically for the purpose with "peculiar care," and were ornamented with small blue and white beads, colored porcupine quills, and leather fringe at the seams. Sometimes substituted for the latter was human hair dyed in various hues, which was obtained from the scalps of their enemies. The Mountain Indians painted their faces with vermillion, white earth, ochre, and powder. In their hair they fastened beads, shells, buttons, and other trinkets, with feathers.²

The dress of the women consisted of long gowns also made from the skin of the Bighorn. This apparel was finely decorated about the neck and shoulders with all the beads that the proud wearer could procure. These mountain maidens also wore short leggings and moccasins with a light robe thrown over all. Eight or ten pounds of large cut glass beads often decorated the dresses. The women, like the men, were fond of decorations, vermillion, trinkets, shells, etc., but they attached these things to their dresses instead of to their hair, as did their opposites. The stylish Indian lady also followed the practice of painting her face.³

That Indian who was fortunate enough to own horses in adequate

²Ibid., pp. 233-35. ³Ibid.
numbers to carry himself, his family, and his belongings, was considered to be wealthy. The animals were carefully attended to. During the day bands of twenty or more were herded by the boys and during the nights they were tethered to stakes near the lodges for security against robbers.

Those who did not own a sufficient number of horses were forced to walk or load the poor animals they did own to a point of utmost endurance. Ferris reported seeing a

mare, loaded with, first--two large bales containing meat, skins, etc., on opposite sides of the animal, attached securely to the saddle by strong cords; secondly--a lodge, with necessary poles dragging on each side of her; thirdly--a kettle, ax, and sundry other articles of domestic economy; fourthly--a colt too young to bear the fatigue of traveling was lashed to one side; and finally this enormous load was surmounted by a woman with a young child; making in all sufficient to have fully loaded three horses, in the ordinary manner.8

The men were excellent horsemen who rode without saddles generally, and always when they pursued game. Their saddles were made of wood, or elk horn and wood, covered with rawhide, which made them strong and durable. The stirrups were also made of wood. Instead of a bridle they used a long cord tied under the jaws with strips of rawhide or the long hair from the scalp of a bison, twisted into a neat firm rope. The saddles used by the women were equipped with a waist high pommel, both back and front. This was for greater convenience in carrying the children.9

8 Ibid., p. 339-41. 9 Ibid., p. 242.
While on a hunt nothing could divert an Indian from his purpose, but while in camp he presented a picture of indolence. However, the bravery of the Rocky Mountain Indian was not questioned and he displayed both intelligence and cunningness in stratagems to surprise and conquer his enemies. When they engaged in hand to hand combat or in group skirmishes, quarter was neither given nor expected.

The Indians of the mountains, as was typical of almost all Indians, were very superstitious. They put good or ill omens on their dreams and attributed all the phenomena of nature to the favorable or unfavorable disposition of their deities. These Indians also demonstrated great devotion and faith in their medicine men, who often forewarned them of coming events and attempted to cure the afflicted of their ailments.

The medicine man would perform his ritual

by wearing the skins, assuming the characters, imitating the voices, and mimicking the actions of bears and other animals; accompanying his demoniac capers by discordant yells, and deafening sounds, extracted from a kind of drum by violent thumpings, alone sufficient, one would imagine, to frighten away both the demon of distemper and the spirit of the affected together.\(^\text{10}\)

The women of the Rocky Mountain tribes, while attractive in their youth, were soon reduced by great hardship to a state of appearance quite in contrast to their fairer years. "Decrepit and ugly" adequately describes the large majority of them. Actually, this was no less than could be expected when one considers the life these unfortunates were

\(^{10}\text{Ibid., pp. 233-35.}\)
forced to lead. To the male portion of the tribes a woman was esteemed as being no better than a beast of burden. Rarely treated as the companions of their "tyrannical husbands" the mistreated Indian wife was selcom valued on the same plain as a favorite horse. It was their station in life to perform all the camp labors such as "drying meat, dressing skins, collecting fuel, bringing water, cooking, making clothes and moccasins, packing and driving horses from one encampment to another." 11 In addition to this, the poor wretches often accompanied their men on the hunts to dress and prepare any game that might be obtained. In spite of the wearisome prospect, which was all they had to look forward to, most of this unemancipated sex appeared satisfied and cheerful. Their work was accompanied by singing in a "wild mournful" air, which act undoubtedly filled the same need for them which the modern "soap opera" fills for the modern-day housewife. The great patience which the Indian women exhibited and the hardships which they so nobly endured stirred no sympathy or pity in the hearts of the tribal drones. All the quiet, long-suffering served only as an added inducement to the brave to rain more and more abuse upon his feminine companion. 12

When a young brave decided to marry and take some young maiden "away from it all," he made application to the prospective

11 Ibid., p. 236. 12 Ibid.
bride's parents. They would, if they were agreeable to the match, usually demand a horse. If the hopeful candidate thought the girl was worth a horse, and he had one to spare, the contract could be completed. The new bridegroom was then invited to come and sleep with his chosen partner at her father's lodge. These arrangements could be completed without his ever having had any conversation or acquaintance with the girl. In many cases, however, the wishes of the young woman were ascertained by her mother. Those who expressed a willingness and/or a desire for the particular union were soon married. If the girl opposed the match, that was unfortunate; for in most instances she was soon married anyway.13

Another marriage practice which was sometimes followed saw the brave send one or more horses, depending on how great was his desire, to the favored damsel's parents. If this gift was accepted, another horse would be sent to the same place. The first time the Indians moved camp after the completion of this ceremony, the young girl would ride the additional horse sent by the brave. From that moment on she was considered to be his wife and encamped with him henceforth.14

The Rocky Mountain Indians had various ways of mourning the death of a friend or family member. It was the custom in some nations

13 Ibid., p. 237.  14 Ibid.
to cut off a joint of the finger. In others, a mourner would clip off his hair and stay in mourning until it grew back to its normal length. Some would blacken their faces with a substance that only wore off with the skin and would cease mourning only when it had all disappeared. Practically all, in case of a death, would show their grief in a "piercing, wild monotonous lamentation, commencing at a high key and gradually falling to the lowest notes, in continued repetition," that sounded extremely melancholy and filled the hearer with great solemnity.\textsuperscript{15}
CHAPTER I

AN HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE LEMHI INDIANS

Shoshones

The Shoshones, to which tribe the majority of the Lemhi-confederation belonged, dwelt in the upper portions of the valleys of the Green and Snake Rivers and in the northern portion of the Bear River Valley. These areas are in their entirety located in the present day states of Idaho and Wyoming. The Shoshones were essentially a nomadic tribe, this being a necessary characteristic in order to obtain food which was sometimes in very meagre supply within their domain. These Indians subsisted in part on the local supply of roots, seeds, berries, insects, reptiles, and rabbits. This scant fare was supplemented when the bands made excursions to the headwaters of the Columbia River to catch

1 Rollins, op. cit., pp. 355-57.

2 This was not always the case however. Ross reported that according to their own testimony the Rocky Mountain Indians had plenty to eat. "We never want for plenty to eat, at all seasons. We often suffer from cold, but never from hunger. Our winter houses are always built among the rocks and the woods, and when the snows are deep we kill as many deer as we please with our knives and spears, without using our bows and arrows." It was further noted that the natives of that area were abundantly supplied with various kinds of nutritious roots, berries, and all kinds of uncultivated vegetables suited to the Indian palate. The only reason for starvation would be negligence on the part of the Indians themselves. Ross, op. cit., p. 278.
salmon and periodic hunts to the plains of the upper Missouri River in quest of the buffalo. On the excursions to the buffalo plains the Mountain Snakes were forced to invade the territory of the Blackfoot Indians. As a result, the relations with this plains tribe were often very strained.  

Among the earliest white men to visit the Shoshones were Meriwether Lewis and William Clark who, while on their journey of exploration through the Louisiana Purchase to the Pacific Coast, were told by the Minnetarees, in what is now North Dakota, that the Shoshones could be of great aid and assistance to them. The explorers were informed that these Indians could supply them with the mounts and pack animals which would be necessary if they were to reach the Columbia watershed. Of superlative assistance and aid to Lewis and Clark were the services of the young Shoshone wife of their French-Canadian guide, Toussaint Charbonneau. This was Sacajawea, or "Bird Woman." Sacajawea was not only a Shoshone by birth, but the sister of the Shoshone chief, Cameahwait. In the early part of August, 1805, the American explorers reached the homeland of the Mountain Snakes. However, actual contact with the Indians themselves was

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4 For an account of this exploration and its contact with the Rocky Mountain Indians, see Reuben Gold Thwaites (ed), *Original Journals of the Lewis and Clark Expedition 1804-1806* (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1904), Vols. II and III.
not made until August 13. After some natural hesitation, based on suspicion and fear on the part of the Indians, the white intruders were made welcome and treated very cordially. Within a very short time the American party obtained the needed animals from the Shoshones, which acquisition made their success possible.

Warren Angus Ferris describes the Shoshones as being "brave, robust, active and shrewd, but suspicious, treacherous, jealous, and malicious. . . ." The differences between the experiences of Lewis and Clark and Ferris can be accounted for by the fact that Ferris didn't visit these Indians until twenty-five years after the former party had left. During the intervening time relationships between the Shoshones and the whites had not been, in many instances, as congenial as between the explorers and these Indians. As a result, the Shoshones would frequently plunder and sometimes kill and rob the early trappers and mountain men if they thought their acts would not be discovered.

The mountain country was rich in game, at least in the early days, and the Snakes proved to be efficient producers of furs. This fact induced the whites to overlook many serious offenses committed by the Shoshones. Indulgence was also granted in an effort to prevent the exposing of small white trapping parties to vindicative attacks that

5 Ibid., II, pp. 337-45. 6 Ferris, op. cit., p. 248.
might characterize an open war.\textsuperscript{8}  

In the art of stealing, the Shoshones, though not as adept as the Crows, were "tolerably expert." Ferris reported seeing one of them steal a knife without stooping from his upright position or even so much as slightly changing facial expression. The culprit in this instance was barefooted and by careful manipulation managed to get the handle of the instrument between his toes. He then drew his foot up under his robe where his hand was ready to receive the booty.\textsuperscript{9} This type of thing would happen on almost every visit made by the Shoshones to a white man's camp if the opportunity presented itself. These inveterate thieves robbed not only the white man, but their own neighbors and associates and anyone else who was careless enough to leave valuables around to test the skill of the Indians. Stealing was their master passion and their pride. So incorrigibly addicted to the practice were they that they were known in some instances to steal in the most adroit manner imaginable even their own horses, mistaking them as the property of others.\textsuperscript{10}  

Although the Snake camps were usually well organized, they most often lacked order and cleanliness. In some instances it was necessary to carry clubs to beat off the numerous barking dogs which tried to bite a visitor's legs. Naked and dirty children and filthy but industrious women dotted the scene. The women were employed in

\textsuperscript{8}Ferris, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 248-49.  \textsuperscript{9}\textit{Ibid.} \textsuperscript{10}\textit{Ibid.}
dressing skins, cutting and drying meat, gathering fuel, cooking and other domestic labors. On the other hand, the men were living examples of indolence and idleness. They spent their time in sleeping, gaming, or keeping guard over the horses. In spite of the indifference and cruelty with which the women were treated, the Shoshone brave was extremely jealous of his wife. One might wonder, as Ferris did, at the queer taste of cupid "if he could find marks for his arrows among the she members of the serpent tribe" after reading his description of them as being "wrinkled, smoke-dried, and unprepossessing, surrounded by dirt and filth." 11

There was usually little cause for alarm or jealousy on the part of the proud husband. The females were usually chaste. In one rare instance where adultery occured, the enraged husband punished by death his unfaithful spouse and her lover. The latter was murdered and his lifeless form placed upright on a high cliff as a warning to all to walk the narrow path and as a fearful monument to an injured husband's revenge. 12

In general the Shoshones were at peace with the whites and, except for isolated incidents, there was very little open warfare or bloodshed between the two groups. This does not necessarily mean that the Shoshones had any unusual like or respect for the whites. It was due at least in part to the looseness of the tribal relationships and

11Ibid., p. 44. 12Ibid., pp. 248-49.
to the lack of a strong, unified leadership in opposition to them. Characteristic of these people was the practice of living in small groups, each being independent of the other. The reason for living in this manner was twofold. In so doing there was less chance of detection by enemy raiding parties. For this same reason the Shoshones did not keep great herds of horses. Had they lived in large bands or kept large herds of horses it would have been much easier for their enemies, the Blackfeet and the Piegans, to discover them. These tribes of the plains had early acquired guns from the Hudson's Bay Company's trappers, giving them a great advantage over the Mountain Snakes. Having this advantage no doubt encouraged the plains tribes to execute raids on their mountain brethren, perhaps in reprisal for the excursions which the Shoshones made into the buffalo country.

The second reason for living in small groups would be to make the acquisition of food easier, it naturally being much less difficult to find sustenance for a few than for a large group.

To a large degree these were the conditions which existed when Tendoy formed the Lemhi Confederation. However, by that late date the fast dwindling supply of game made it very difficult for even the small roaming bands to find adequate food for themselves. That burden was ultimately to fall upon the United States government.
Bannocks

The Bannock Indians inhabited the country bounded on the north by the Snake River, on the south by Great Salt Lake, and had as their center the present day Bannock Creek and Bear River in southeastern Idaho. They were usually classed with the Shoshones, but as a result of a meeting with the Bannocks and Shoshones in June, 1868, the Indian Commissioner was able to report that there was no such thing as the "mixed bands of Bannacks and Shoshones" theretofore referred to in government communications. This was not a completely true statement for by that time the Lemhi Confederation had been organized. However, it constituted only a small segment of the entire picture, and in addition, there was but little information concerning the Lemhis available to the government. Nevertheless, from that time on the two groups were treated as distinct and separate tribes by the Indian Department. The background of the Bannocks and their early contact with the whites was practically identical to that of the Shoshones, so much so that, as has been previously mentioned, the government considered them in the same general classification and referred to them as though they were one group.

13Rollins, op. cit., p. 357.

However, in their personal traits the Bannocks were different in many respects from their more numerous brothers. When compared to the Shoshones, the Bannocks were described as being "more enterprising and restless," given more to athletic exercises and the chase. They appeared very anxious to get away from any restraint which would interfere with the "wild freedom" they enjoyed. The Bannocks were also much more given "to martial displays, dancing, beating drums, etc."^15

As late as the 1860's relatively little was known of this group and of their condition. The Bannocks were considered to be a mysterious people who lived in rude lodges made of willow brush. They existed in a state of ignorance and displayed very little initiative in gaining their own subsistence by any other means than the chase. Much more war-like than their Shoshone neighbors, they were frequently guilty of committing depredations on small parties of men who happened to travel through their country. One extremely undesirable characteristic which they acquired was a propensity to adopt the traits of bad white men, refugees from justice, who often lived among them.^16 Even after the Bannocks were placed on reservations, they retained many of their peculiar notions. The Lemhi Bannocks were described as being "war-like,


^16 Annual Report, 1879, p. 54.
disagreeable, exacting, and selfish both to those of their own race and to the white." They continued to possess a "sly cunning and an innate restlessness of disposition" which did not bode good for them personally or agreeable to their nearest neighbors.17

When Ferris visited a group of Bannocks in the 1830's, he found them to be mounted on poor jaded horses, illy clad with shirts and leggins and old buffalo robes, which were half divested of their hair. He described them as being generally ugly and wretched in appearance, comparing very unfavorably with their bold and handsome, well-clad neighbors, the Flatheads. Trappers represented them "to be miserable in the superlative sense of the word."18

Captain Benjamin L. E. Bonneville was considerably more charitable in his accounts of this mysterious tribe. He credited them as being brave and cunning warriors. They were deadly foes of the Blackfeet and easily overcame them in battle when the forces were equal. The Captain also describes the Bannocks as not being vengeful or enterprising in warfare, reporting that they seldom sent war parties to attack Blackfeet towns. They were merely content to defend their own territories and homes.19

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17 *Annual Report, 1883*, p. 55.  
Bonneville highly praised the honesty of this mountain tribe. Occasionally the deep snow and want of fodder would oblige his party to turn out their weakened horses to search for their own sustenance. At times these poor animals would stray into the camps of the Bannock Indians. With a display of good faith that was rare among Indians, they would immediately return the animal to its proper owner. However, if the wandering horse happened to be in a strong, vigorous condition when discovered by the Bannocks, it would likely be several days before they would manage to return the beast, and when they did he would be in a very guant and jaded state. The standard explanation given for the horse's poor condition would be that he had been found at a far distant place and the long journey home had adversely affected him. Even though, it was considered a singular bit of honesty that the animal should be brought back at all.\(^\text{20}\)

Bonneville also offered a plausible explanation for the hostile attitude which the later whites found the Bannocks to have. At the time of his visit to the homelands of this tribe, the Bannocks were all in mourning for their chief, surnamed The Horse. This chief was said to have possessed a charmed life inasmuch as he was supposedly invulnerable to lead. Even though The Horse had been in numerous battles and had often been shot at by the surest marksman, no bullet had ever hit him. He had shown great magnanimity in his relationship with

\(^{20}\text{Ibid.}, P. 314.\)
white men. One of the great men of his family had been killed in an attack upon a band of trappers passing through the territories of this tribe. Vengeance had been sworn by the Bannocks but this noble chief interfered, declaring himself the friend of the white men. Having great influence and authority over his people, The Horse compelled them to forego all vindictive plans and conduct themselves amicably whenever they came in contact with the traders. This chief had at last fallen while resisting an attack made by the Blackfeet upon his people. His fall had not lessened the faith of his followers in his charmed life, for they declared that it was not a lead bullet which had felled him but a bit of horn fired by some Blackfoot marksman who was no doubt aware of the inefficiency of lead. Following his death there was no one with influence enough to restrain the wild and predatory propensities of the young men. The result was that this group became troublesome and dangerous as neighbors, openly friendly but disposed to commit secret depredations and to molest any small party that might happen to fall within their reach.  

Sheepeaters

The Sheepeaters or Tukuarikas (eaters of mountain sheep), so called because they lived in the mountains frequented by the wild sheep, occupied the country around the Salmon River, the upper Snake, and the

21Ibid., pp. 185-87.
mountains around the Boise Basin.\textsuperscript{22} They were an offshoot of the Shoshone tribe who had been driven to and held in the mountain fastness by other tribes. They did not advance intellectually as their kinsmen and, therefore, exhibited more of the primitive nature of the savage than any other tribe of the northwest. Because of the isolation of its home, the tribe was so unprogressive that it restricted its clothing to skins and furs till long after they had obtained blankets and other wearing apparel from the white traders. The Sheepeaters were also dilatory in acquiring firearms and horses. The result of this was that the tribe for many years unnecessarily limited itself to the bow as its principal weapon and continued to travel afoot.\textsuperscript{23}

Even after being removed to the Lemhi Reservation this backward group of Indians were naturally quieter and less demonstrative than either the Shoshone or Bannock portion. They were also much more inclined to take life easy and let things happen as they would.\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{22}Rollins, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 357. \textsuperscript{23}\textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{24}\textit{Annual Report, 1883}, p. 55.
CHAPTER 2

THE CREATION OF THE LEMHI RESERVATION, 1871

The Indians living in the northeast portion of the Shoshone homeland, which included those which amalgamated to form the Lemhi Confederation, were referred to in the government reports as the Mountain Snakes or the Snake River Indians. These designations were continued until the late 1850's and the early 1860's, after which reference to them was made in more specific terms. Prior to the 1850's little light had been shed concerning the activities and manners of the tribes living in the Snake River country. It was not until later years that the experiences and journals of the Mountain Men and other early western travelers were brought to light. About all that was known was that they lived in small bands roaming over this vast area, being tied together primarily by a common language.

In 1842 in his Annual Report the Commissioner of Indian Affairs reported that the Snake River Indians numbered 200 lodges of 1000 souls and were a poor tribe in the Rocky Mountains. This was the extent of the government's knowledge concerning this aboriginal group. This state of ignorance on the part of the government had not to a great degree been improved as late as 1857. In that year John W. Nesmith,
Superintendent of Washington and Oregon Territories, reported that "very little" was known of the Rocky Mountain groups except that they were considered an "indolent thieving degree of the Indian race living upon all species of insects and sometimes eating one another."¹ The darkness which enveloped the government regarding the mountain tribes can be at least partially accounted for by the lack of any consistent intercourse between them and the white race. A step was taken in 1854 to clear the cloud of ignorance which prevailed. In that year R. R. Thompson, Agent of the Middle Oregon Superintendency, tentatively classified the roaming bands as being branches of the Root Diggers and having a common language with them. Much more was known at that time about the Root Diggers, they presumably being the lowest order of the aboriginal race. Thompson reported that the Snake River Indians occupied the country on the north and to the east of Fort Hall, and to the south to include the Bear River Valley. He also reported that these Indians gradually improved in their habits and intelligence as they approached the northern and eastern extremeties of their country.² By this token, the Indians who were later to be referred to as the Lemhis, would be of the highest order of the Mountain Indians.³


³Indian Commissioner A. B. Greenwood was careful in making the distinction between the Rocky Mountain Snakes and the Snakes found further to the west. In referring to the marauding bands in Oregon he reported: "These Indians, though known as 'Snakes,' must not be
In spite of this superiority, the Snake River Indians were forced to live on practically the same plane as their Root Digger cousins. Living conditions in their home area, which had provided so abundantly at the time Alexander Ross visited them, had deteriorated a great deal. Game had rapidly disappeared and eventual starvation faced this people. For many years the federal government did little or nothing to alleviate the situation. These difficult circumstances oftentimes forced the roaming bands to commit depredations on the stock of white settlers and travelers in order to survive. This statement can be substantiated in the letters of Major John Owen, who had established a trading post in the Bitterroot Valley of Montana in 1850 and was later made agent to the Flathead Indians of the Washington Territory. In 1859 he brought to the attention of the Indian Department the fact that there was no agent over the Snake and Bannock Indians in the area. This situation provided a natural breeding ground for trouble. It would only stand to reason that a starving group of people, lacking firm controls or leadership, would stoop to almost any level to satisfy their hunger. The settler's stock was the most readily available source, so it was taken. Owens used this as an argument for the acceptance by the government of his advice that an agency be provided for these Indians. He even recommended a point on

confused with the 'Sho-sho-nees' and 'Bannacks' or 'Snakes of the Rocky Mountains.' The latter are well mounted and procure a subsistence by hunting the buffalo on the headwaters of the Yellowstone; while the former are a miserable race who subsist upon roots and insects, except when successful thieving expeditions furnish them better food." Annual Report, 1862, p. 22.
the Salmon River as an ideal location for such an agency. 4

Owens' advice was followed, at least in part. However, it was in a way the concerned trader had not anticipated. On May 23, 1860, E. R. Geary, Superintendent of Indian Affairs for Washington Territory, placed the "Rocky Mountain Tribes of Shoshones and Bannacks" under Owens' supervision and ordered him, at the earliest practicable moment, to visit their chiefs in the region of Fort Hall, present them with gifts, and arrange for a treaty council to be held the following July. 5 Unfortunately, due to unforeseen circumstances, Geary was unable to meet with the Indian chiefs with whom Owens had arranged the meeting. The failure of this council caused a loss of faith in the white man's word and continued depredations upon his stock. 6 The actions of the Indians following this were at least partially justified. In most instances they did not commit their misdeeds out of malice to the whites, but out of sheer necessity. "Poor, Miserable, Naked, Starving Wretches. Language is inadequate to describe their truly destitute condition, is the manner in which Owens described them. So great was his pity for them


5Ibid, p. 209.

6The hostile attitude of these Indians was not lessened by the treatment they received from unprincipled white men passing through the country. Owen reported that they had "been robbed, murdered, their women outraged, and in fact, outrages have been committed by white men that the heart would shudder to record." Ibid., p. 243.
that he, without authorization, issued to the tribal members small amounts of beef and flour and provided them with what tents he could supply. 7

The necessity of obtaining additional agents and assistance for the Snake River Indians can readily be understood when one realizes the extent of their numbers. In September, 1861, Owen reported that under his jurisdiction there was a total of 12,043 Indians, including his Flatheads. Of this number 8,600 were Shoshones and Bannocks, none of whom were party to any treaty with the United States. 8

It was under these conditions that Chief Tendoy succeeded in organizing the Lemhis. His ascendancy to chieftainship came as a result of the brutal murder of his uncle, Chief Snag. Snag was the leader of one of the roaming bands of Snake River Indians. While on a visit to Bannock City, Montana, in the summer of 1863, he with two others of his followers were murdered by a group of drunken miners, reputedly led by the notorious highwayman, Buck Stinson. 9

Snag, with some of his followers, had gone to Bannock City to surrender what was supposedly a white child who had been living with them. This was in response to a demand made by the citizens of Bannock City. While sitting quietly in a street at that place, the Chief

7Ibid. 8Ibid., p. 263.

and two companions were fired upon by a dozen white men. Superintendent James D. Doty, upon hearing of the tragedy, paid a visit to Bannock City to ascertain the facts surrounding it. He found that which was reported to him to be true. In addition he discovered that the child, who had been the innocent cause of the incident, was a half-breed who was rightly living among the Indians. Unfortunately no legal action could be taken against the offenders because there were no civil officers at Bannock City and no laws except such as had been made by the miners themselves.  

Through this deplorable act by unscrupulous white men, Tendoy became chief of his uncle's band. He was able to unite this band and add to it small parties of Bannocks and Sheepeaters.  

There is no clear account of the activity of the Lemhis from the time of its organization in 1863 until 1869. However, in 1866 Governor Thomas F. Meagher of Montana Territory reported that a tribe made up of "Shoshones (or Snake) and Bannacks" lived along the southwestern border of the territory. He described this band as one that had never been recognized by the government and one which was in a "truly wretched and desolate condition." Their lodges contained "as much misery and filth and dire want as might be exceeded only by the huts of the Terra del Fuegans."  

To help remedy this terrible condition Meagher

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11 *Annual Report, 1866*, pp. 199–200
recommended that an agency be established for the band. Heeding this recommendation, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs instructed Agent Luther Mann of Fort Bridger to investigate conditions of this tribe with the intent of establishing an agency for it. Mann reported that there were 100 lodges of Bannocks plus a few lodges of Shoshone in the group living in an area occupied by a tribe of "Tuo-ree-reka" or Sheepeater Indians.  

As a result of these recommendations and investigations, treaty negotiations were undertaken with the Lemhi band which culminated in a treaty concluded at Virginia City, Montana Territory, on September 24, 1868. By the terms of this agreement the Lemhis were granted two townships near Fort Lemhi as a reservation and were to be paid the sum of thirty thousand dollars the first year, twenty thousand dollars the second year and twelve thousand dollars a year for the eighteen succeeding years in goods as provided by the President of the United States. This treaty was never ratified by the United States Senate.  

The failure of the government to uphold the actions of its treaty commissioners in this case resulted in a continued state of desolation and hunger for the main portion of the Lemhi band. In 1869 Agent Alfred

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12 Annual Report, 1869, p. 189.

13 For a copy of this treaty see Appendix B, this paper.

14 Tendoy and some of his men would visit the settlements and mining camps in Montana, and by "his friendship and sagacity in trade" they would be able to make themselves more comfortable than the majority of the tribe. Annual Report, 1874, p. 264.
Sully of Montana Territory described the group as living in a deplorable condition, many without lodges at all and a few with only "miserable cotton affairs." At the same time he pointed out the contention held by the Lemhis that they had never spilt the blood of a white man.\footnote{In 1861 Owen reported that he had been visited by a band of Snakes who made this same claim. It is conceivable that these were the same Indians who became known as the Lemhi band. Dunbar and Phillips, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 252-53; \textit{Annual Report}, 1869, pp. 289-90.} Because they had always been on good terms with the whites, it was difficult for the Lemhis to understand why they could not get the assistance and help that other tribes of Indians enjoyed. At this same time Agent Sully recommended as the most suitable place to locate the Lemhis, the Fort Hall Reservation. However, he also reported that they expressed a great aversion to that place and would absolutely refuse to move there.\footnote{\textit{Annual Report, 1869}, pp. 289-90.}

The very precarious subsistence that could be gained in a country where game was rapidly diminishing made it imperious that immediate steps be taken by the government to insure the survival of Tendoy's people. This action was finally taken in 1871 when, without the benefit of a treaty, Superintendent J. A. Viall of Montana Territory directed that the Lemhis be gathered in a little valley about twenty miles above the mouth of the Lemhi Fork of the Salmon River and there be settled under...
the charge of an agent. A. J. Smith was appointed agent with orders to immediately begin the task of preparing the land for agricultural endeavors and the provision of homes for this so long "unrecognized, unprotected and outlawed," band of Indians. Thus were the Lemhis taken into the care and custody of the United States government.

17 This is at least the approximate location which the treaty of 1869 set aside.
CHAPTER 3

CHIEF TENDOY

Who was the man who, before reaching the age of thirty years, was able to organize a disunited and roaming people into a coherent group and at the same time earn for himself the reputation among the white men of being "one of the noblest Indians in America"?

Tendoy was born on the Boise River in about 1834. His father Boneparte, a Shoshone, was a chieftain over both Bannock and Shoshone Indians. His mother was a Bannock. He was also the nephew of the murdered Snag, who was a nephew of Cameahwait, the Shoshone chief who had rendered such valuable service to Lewis and Clark on their expedition of 1804-06.

He first came to the attention of the white men in 1858 when he was in the service of C. H. Miller, who headed a Pacific wagon road surveying party through the Lemhi area in that year. The next year Tendoy

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2Tendoy's name means "marrow of bone." He was fond of bone marrow as a child.


4J. A. Harrington, Notes on Idaho Indians, taken from John Rees' History of Lemhi County, Idaho State College MS 115.
was once again employed by the government surveyor and received very high praise from him. At that time the young brave was engaged by Miller to secure the return of some mules stolen from a Mormon wagon train which had traveled to Fort Hall with supplies for the mountaineers at that place.  

Miller described Tendoy as "a celebrated young Indian . . . of great influence in the country as a successful warrior, having distinguished himself in wars against the Blackfeet." He was not at that time a chief. This would appear to eliminate him as the "old chief Tendoy" mentioned by Granville Stuart in 1862.

Reference to Tendoy as a chief was first made in 1863 as far as official government records are concerned. In that year a treaty "of peace and friendship" was made at Soda Springs, Idaho Territory, between the United States and the "mixed band of Bannacks and Shoshones occupying the valley of the Shoshonee River, . . . ." Although Tendoy did not attend the council, he sent word to Superintendent James D. Doty that he and his people would abide by the terms of the agreement. Even though the terms of the treaty were never directly applied to the Lemhis, the fact that they were willing to adhere to its provisions would

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6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.


9 Annual Report, 1864, p. 320.
imply that this band was eager for the aid and recognition of the government.  

An account of the early years of Tendoy is found in an interview with John Williams, a Shoshone Indian who was living at the Fort Hall Reservation at the time of the interview. ¹⁰ Williams claimed to be a lifelong friend and companion of Tendoy. From an account of the interview the following information was obtained.  

Tendoy was the elder of the two. In fact when Williams first remembered him he (Williams) was too young to do much except help pack meat home after the kill on the hunting expeditions of the tribe. One of his earliest recollections of Tendoy was an experience involving a battle with the Blackfeet Indians which took place near present day Lima, Montana. The Blackfeet would often invade the Lemhis' country to raid their camps and steal their horses. In this particular battle Tendoy, then about twelve or thirteen years old, was captured. His people gave him up for lost when they saw the Blackfeet withdraw with the young Indian among their prisoners. However, they were very much astonished when, early the next morning, Tendoy rode back into camp on a very fine Blackfoot pony. He informed his friends that the raiders

¹⁰ Idaho State College MS 156, Radio Addresses from Station KSEI on the North American Indians, Coordinated by J. A. Youngren, Part IV, "Lemhi Indian," an address by Judge O. R. Baum. In gathering information for his address Judge Baum interviewed John Williams in 1938. In this paper Baum's interview was used as a source of information for the life of Tendoy.
had not only released him, but had given him the best horse in their
herd. Tendoy's companions never understood why such a thing occurred.

On another occasion after the chief had grown and married, a
band of Nez Perces raided a Lemhi camp on the Salmon River and stole
some of their horses. About daybreak the theft was discovered and the
sacked Indians immediately set out in pursuit of their property. When
they came upon the Nez Perce band, everyone expected a battle to the
death because horse stealing was considered a very serious offense.
It was "about the only reason for fighting among the different tribes."

Horses were the primary means of travel and the measure of a man's
wealth. To be set afoot in the wilderness without horses often meant
death. Nevertheless, even though the battle lasted most of the after-
noon, no one was killed. Tendoy was slightly wounded in the calf of
his leg. However, this did not prevent him from successfully retrieving
all the stolen animals. Killing for killing's sake did not interest Tendoy.
He went after his horses and got them with as little bloodshed as pos-
sible.

Tendoy recognized the inevitability of the white man's advance
into and eventual conquest of the Indians' traditional homelands. Wil-
liams remembered hearing the chief make the statement time and time
again to individuals and in tribal councils, that 'in time to come the
white men will be as many as the leaves on the trees--therefore, we

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\[11\text{Ibid.}\]
must be friends with the white men or soon they will drive us out of our homes."\(^{12}\)

The high esteem in which Tendoy was held by the white officials was very clearly revealed in 1873. In that year, after the death of Chief Taggee, the Fort Hall Bannocks lacked the strong leadership essential to maintain good order. A government Indian Commission headed by J. P. C. Shanks recommended that Tendoy be made chief of the Fort Hall Indians as well as of his own Lemhi band and any other Indians who might be induced to remove to that reservation. The Commission pointed out that through his mother and father Tendoy was tied by blood bonds to both the Shoshone and the Bannock tribes. This tie, in addition to the many qualities of leadership which he also possessed, could have made the chief an even more important factor in determining the Indian affairs of Idaho. The above mentioned Commission described Tendoy in the following glowing terms:

> We believe Tin-a-dore [Tendoy] to be one of the noblest Indians in America. [His] father, Boneparte, was a Shoshone; his mother was a Bannack. So by blood he is entitled to be chief of both tribes, as his father was chief of both. Tin-a-dore is thoroughly imbued with a desire to mental and moral improvement. His inquiries concerning civilization are pressed in a way both interesting and valuable. He is a recognized and devoted friend of the white people and their progress.

> He is one of the finest-looking men in the country. He talks business as a business man . . . . Tin-a-dore is a man of strict integrity, great bravery and firmness, and worthy of the confidence of the Government.\(^{13}\)

\(^{12}\text{Ibid.}\) \(^{13}\text{House Ex. Doc. 129, p. 2.}\)
Unfortunately Tendoy could not be persuaded to accept this position of leadership. Had he done so, his constant friendship to the whites and his firm determination to remain on friendly terms with them may have been enough to prevent the futile Bannock uprising of 1878.

Tendoy's social and financial status in his tribe can be gauged from the number of wives he had, as it was a tribal custom to allow a brave as many wives as he could properly support and care for. Tendoy managed three, the first two of whom were twin sisters. His third wife survived him by several years and after his death remarried, living at Fort Hall for a number of years. He had a total of fifteen children, only five of whom lived. He enjoyed his family, playing and talking with them whenever the pressure of tribal business allowed him to. Williams said he never recalled seeing Tendoy's children punished in any way.

Tendoy loved ceremony and pageantry. From an eyewitness account of a meeting between the chief and Idaho Senator George L. Shoup, it is possible to see this characteristic in Tendoy. Here is the Lemhi leader as the "Noble Redman."

The most spectacular scene I ever saw was the time I witnessed an official meeting of Chief Tendoy and Senator Shoup. Tendoy was chief of the Lemhi Indians and the reservation was about thirty miles from Salmon. When Shoup came back from Washington, the flag was flown for a few days. Very soon after the flag was up Chief Tendoy would arrive in all his finery—a war bonnet that dragged at least three feet on the ground, with fine buckskin clothing artistically beaded, attended by several gaily dressed bucks.

I saw this from a second story window so could not hear any of the speeches. It was a still lazy afternoon and the meeting
occurred on a side street. Several men of the white trash variety looked on and scoffed. The Indian attendants were stoic and a part of the stage setting. Chief Tendoy and Senator Shoup stepped out toward each other with hands extended in a glad welcome and yet with dignity, for this was a meeting of two ambassadors of great powers. Chief Tendoy for the Indians of Idaho and Senator Shoup for the American government at Washington. Both were large, finely formed, handsome men who could recognize true worth in each other and had a fine sense of the dignity of the occasion. The rest of the summer when Tendoy came to town or when Shoup visited the reservation, they met and visited as neighbors, but this first meeting of each year was an official visit.  

On another and less solemn occasion Tendoy can be seen as a very human individual to the extent of appearing slightly ridiculous.

On this occasion in 1877 Bishop Tuttle, Episcopal Bishop of Utah, Wyoming, and Idaho, arrived in Salmon City to hold services:

Driving up in front of the hotel, the horses without a command from the driver stopped and the passengers began to descend from the coach. All eyes were centered on the bishop, who because of his portly figure, had some difficulty getting out.

Finally reaching terra firma, he shook the dust from his linen duster, stroked his dusty long white beard, and strode with dignity into the office or "bar-room."

While making himself ready for dinner, Chief Tendoy, chief of a band of Indians known as "Tendoy's band" came with his two wives, for he too had heard of the bishop's arrival, and cordially presented himself and his wives to the bishop, who acknowledged the introduction with the same gravity with which it was performed.

After a few words of good will, Chief Tendoy began telling the bishop he would always be safe when passing through his territory, for had he not prevailed upon his band to refuse to join in wars with other tribes against the white settlers.

In glowing terms he painted the loyalty of his band and ended by saying, "now heap big eat."

It had been the custom at this particular station to entertain Tendoy, who was usually accompanied by one or more of his

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14 Idaho State College Trego Collection (uncatalogued) Newspaper Clipping, "Shoup Political Power and Beloved Citizen," Miss Douglas Hill, name of paper and date of publication destroyed.
wifves, gratis, because of the great good he had done in maintaining peace in the Lemhi Valley now becoming settled.

Entering the dining room Tendoy insisted upon sitting next to the bishop, but was finally prevailed upon to take the far end of the table with a wife on either side, while the bishop faced him at the other end. This was a most amicable settlement and all went merrily on, the chief declaring at the end of the meal that it was "wayno" (good).15

One of Tendoy's primary aims, even amid the turmoil and strife of the time, was to maintain peace and friendship with the whites. Throughout the period under consideration there were occasions, some justified, when different groups of Rocky Mountain Indians either went on the war path openly or committed annoying depredations. On no occasion did the Lemhi band follow this course. There were times when Tendoy's personal intervention prevented such action and he was often commended by agency officials for the services he rendered in preventing useless bloodshed. In the Annual Report of 1874, Agent James D. Fuller stated that Tendoy often related in the tribal councils that the Indian chiefs with whom he had associated in the buffalo country had advised him to slaughter a few whites. Then the Great Father in Washington would think more of him, give him a greater appropriation, and grant him a reservation. Tendoy always replied, "I have not the blood of a white man in my camp, nor do I intend such, so long as properly treated by the whites."16

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16Annual Report, 1874, p. 264.
In June of 1872 Tendoy performed an act of singular courage and statesmanship which greatly enhanced the respect and devotion in which he was already held by the whites. At this time he and some of his people were at Soldier Creek near Boise, Idaho, for the purpose of trading robes and furs to the Nez Perces for horses. Two bands of Bannocks—one Major Jim's, the other Bannock Jim's—were assembled at Wood River, seven miles distant from Tendoy's camp on Soldier Creek. On June 23, Bannock Jim's band attacked three white men who were on their way to Boise City. They killed one, wounded another, and drove the third into the brush where he was able to conceal himself. The renegade Indians then took the horses of their victims. Two days later the same band attacked a mule train of forty-seven head near the same place, fired on the mule drivers and succeeded in making prisoners of these drivers and in stealing their mules. Tendoy, on learning of the above incidents, set out immediately to render aid to the beleagured white men. This effort met with immediate success. Tendoy then ordered the hostile Bannock leaders to surrender the stolen stock. This they refused to do, at the same time denouncing the chief and his followers as traitors to the red man's cause. In a test of confidence the Lemhi chief called upon those of the insurgent band who were friendly to the white men, and who were willing to stand by the Lemhis, to join him. The chief then explained that the white men were his friends and that he was ready to fight for them. A portion of Major Jim's band joined Tendoy, thus
enabling him to retake the stolen stock. This was done in spite of the threats and avowed hostility of the marauders. Tendoy then conducted the white men and their stock to Boise City. For his gallant service the great leader was presented with an American flag and some provisions by the governor of Idaho and the citizens of Boise.\(^{17}\)

Another incident showing the greatness of this chief and his loyalty to the whites was related by his son, George Tendoy, at a celebration at Fort Hall years after the old chief died.

Once while in Montana, a nephew of Chief Tendoy was killed by the white people. Some of the Indians got together and planned an attack on a white settlement, but Tendoy would not allow them to carry it into effect. He said that while he was greatly grieved over the loss of his nephew, he would not allow innocent white people who had nothing to do with the murder to suffer for it. Once when some of his own people captured a white man and were going to put him to death with a gun shot, Chief Tendoy stepped between the white man and the gun and said there was just as much reason for shooting him as there was for shooting this white man out of revenge for what someone else had done.\(^{18}\)

Tendoy not only commanded the respect of the whites, but also that of his own people. He was the acknowledged chief of his band.

There were lesser chiefs among the Lemhis such as Pegge, Major Jim, Hungry Joe, and Toshotsy; but even these men looked upon Tendoy as the chief.

As a reward for the meritorious service rendered by him, the Government of the United States by a Special Act of Congress approved

\(^{17}\)Annual Report, 1872, p. 282.

\(^{18}\)Ibid., Trego Collection, Newspaper Clipping, "Chief Tendoy Tells of Father," name and date of publication destroyed.
on December 18, 1892, granted Tendoy a pension to help provide for his well being so long as he should live. 19

The control which Tendoy maintained over his people was almost absolute. So completely did he dominate them that practically nothing could be accomplished at the reservation without his personal sanction. This was, unfortunately, not always conducive to good relationships with the agency officials or with sound and efficient administration by them.

As the chief advanced in years, the cooperative attitude so long characteristic of him disappeared to a degree. He often outrightly refused to accept and obey the orders of the agent. This contrary attitude eventually became so severe that Tendoy was held to be the primary barrier in the path of the Lemhis toward attaining civilization and self-sufficiency. In the Annual Report of 1901 is found the following statement: "Their progress, heretofore, has been retarded by their non-progressive chief, who has used every effort to prevent them from advancing or exercising individual thought, in order to hold them under his tyrannic and uncivilized power." 20 A year earlier Senator Shoup received a letter from Agent John Yearian in which the following statement was made.

I desire to state, Senator, that the Agent is powerless to enforce the rules laid down by the Department or to have order and

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19U. S. Statutes At Large, Vol. XXVII, p. 810.

20Idaho State College, Lemhi Collection, MS 315, Outgoing Correspondence, 1901, Annual Report, August 15, 1901, p. 259. Hereafter referred to as ISC MS, Number, Title, Date, Page.
discipline at this place. These Indians have been petted, etc. . . . It seems to me that the time is at hand when these Indians should be made to obey the law as others do, and they never will until forced to. They are absolutely under the control of Tendoy, and there is not a single Indian on this reservation that will oppose him. He is non-progressive and a barrier against the civilization and advancement of this tribe, more especially in the school work. . . . The Indian police are absolutely worthless and will not even return a runaway pupil unless sanctioned by Chief Tendoy. 21

In spite of this statement and others like it, even though true, the great service which Tendoy rendered during the critical early years in maintaining peaceful relationships with the whites far outweigh any disservice he might have rendered in his wanning years. He justly deserves the respect and honor of the people of Idaho and of the United States Government.

21 ISC MS 314, Outgoing Correspondence, 1900, Agent Yearian to George L. Shoup, March 15, 1900, pp. 2-3.
PART II

RESERVATION YEARS, 1871-1889

General Statement

The Lemhis are "intelligent, industrious, peaceable, and friendly to the whites" and "during the time I have been in charge not a single act of misconduct has been reported or come under my observation," 1 glowed Agent J. C. Rainsford after having been in charge of the Lemhi Indian Reservation for over a year. This Utopian condition at least partially resulted from a solemn promise of friendship made by the Lemhis to the whites shortly after the reserve was created. They kept that promise inviolate throughout their history despite the urgings of hostile tribes to join in the struggle against the white conqueror.

Agent A. J. Simmons found this friendly tribe almost destitute of lodges, tents, or clothing when he settled them on the Lemhi Reserve in 1870. This same condition continued to exist in 1873 when James Fuller took charge. Fuller found the Lemhis very poorly provided for and out of supplies, the year's appropriation having been spent and the farm produce entirely consumed. Such a deplorable state of affairs among these Indians resulted from the failure of the government to appropriate

1Annual Report, 1872, p. 282.
sufficient funds to adequately provide for their welfare. So difficult was
their situation that these poor creatures were forced to go to the moun-
tains in search of ever-dwindling and elusive game in order to supple-
ment their fare. Tendoy and his people became disillusioned over the
seemingly poor faith in which the government held its contracts and
arrived at the conclusion that "the Great Father at Washington did not
look after their welfare, but gave them presents as a matter of policy."

The dissatisfaction the Lemhis expressed in regard to the amount
of aid they received from the government was aggravated by their visits
and intermingling with other more fortunate tribes during their excursions
to the buffalo country. From these tribes Tendoy's band learned of the
more liberal quantity of supplies issued at other agencies. There was
undoubtedly ample justification for their complaints. For example, during
the year 1878 there were in average attendance at the reservation, 442
Indians. For this number there was the annual appropriation of $20,000
or $45.25 per person per year or 87 cents per person per week. This
appropriation was to provide for "such goods, provisions, and other
articles as may be required in instructing the Indians in agricultural and
mechanical pursuits, in providing employment, educating children, pro-
curing medicine and medical attention, care and support of the aged,
sick and infirm, for the helpless orphans of said Indians, and in any

\(^2\)Annual Report, 1874, p. 64.
other respect to promote their civilization, comfort, and improvement. 

To accomplish all that was expected with this pittance was an absurdity, and in actuality created a paradox. On the one hand it was the desire and policy of the government to civilize the Indians by making them give up the chase and instead follow constructive vocations, primarily agriculture. On the other, because the government either would not or could not supply the necessary funds to accomplish this objective, it forced the Indians to do the very thing opposed in order to survive.

To add to the difficulties, the Lemhi Agency became a crossroad at which various roaming bands of Indians congregated. The Umatillas and Nez Perces came into the Lemhi Valley to trade, sell horses, and gamble. The Flatheads gathered there to catch fish and the Bannocks and Shoshones from Fort Hall passed through enroute to the hunting grounds in the Yellowstone country. The accumulation of these neighboring tribes became an added burden to the already burdensome situation that existed at the agency because the agent was often compelled to issue them rations from the meagre store allotted to the Lemhi. This was sometimes carried on to such an extent that the unfortunate hosts were, to an even greater degree, forced to rely on the chase as a means of survival. 4

3Annual Report, 1878, p. 51. 4Annual Report, 1876, p. 44.
Notwithstanding the difficult conditions that existed, the early reports regarding the Lemhi Agency were so optimistic that Edward P. Smith, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, was prompted to report to the Secretary of Interior in 1875 that if the appropriation to these Indians could be increased for the next two years so that houses and agricultural equipment could be provided for them, all problems of civilizing the Lemhis would be settled in a very short time. Unfortunately this ideal condition did not materialize. There were two reasons for such a failure. One, the increased appropriation was not forthcoming; and two, the desire of the Lemhis to take up the white man’s way of life was grossly overestimated. As it turned out, so slow were these Indians in advancing toward civilization in some respects that it was 1886 before the first log houses were built and occupied by them. Even then there were only five constructed; and to get this number built the agency carpenter, a white employee, had to put in the doors and windows and each house had to be equipped with an iron cooking stove at government expense as an added incentive.

Instead of the rapid transformation from savagery to civilization which had been so hopefully predicted in the early stages of reservation occupation, the Lemhis settled down into a much slower, and probably more typical, advance toward a self-sustaining constructive way of life.

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5 Annual Report, 1875, p. 46. 6 Annual Report, 1885, p. 68; 1886, p. 110.
CHAPTER 4

INDUSTRY OF THE LEMHIS

Agriculture

The primary objective of the Federal Indian Policy was to convert the Indian from his wandering and primitive way of life to the white man's so-called civilization, with the view in mind of making him a useful, self-sustaining citizen. Undoubtedly one aim in this altruistic gesture was to centrally locate the Indian, thereby more easily controlling his actions. However, one must keep in mind that in so doing, vast stretches of land would become available to white conquest and settlement.

The utilization of the land in agricultural pursuits was the easiest and most logical means by which any individual, white or red, could become self-sustaining. It was therefore natural that great emphasis would be placed on teaching the government wards the more advanced and scientific methods of the whites.

This was very much the case with the Lemhi Band.

Not until 1871 was an agent sent to them to serve their needs. In obedience to instructions given him in the latter part of March of that year, A. I. Smith
proceeded to the camp of the mixed band of Bannack, Shoshone, and Sheepeater Indians, numbering in all about 700, in a valley about twenty miles above the mouth of the Lemhi Fork, suitable for agriculture and grazing purposes, and immediately made preparations for building, fencing, plowing, and making such other improvements as were necessary for the comfort of the Indians, and to provide as far as possible, for their sustenance and maintenance during the coming year.¹

During the first six months three log dwelling houses for use of the employees, and two root houses for storing away vegetables raised on the farm for use of the Indians were erected. The condition of the farm and its products were as good as could have been expected considering the small appropriation provided for its improvement and the fact that it has been only six months since work was commenced to reclaim it from wild lands.²

For several years after the Lemhi Reservation was established, there was no survey of its boundaries. It was not until June of 1887 that this was accomplished. As a result of the survey it was found that the reservation contained 164 square miles of which 100 square miles were mountainous and rugged and not suitable for anything of an agricultural nature. The remaining sixty-four square miles were composed of rolling foothills and a long narrow valley, through which ran the Lemhi River. It was rightly believed that only the valley was fertile and could be cultivated. Because of the limited area of tillable land (eight miles in length and three fourths mile wide³) it eventually became obvious that

¹Annual Report, 1871, p. 432. ²Ibid. ³Annual Report, 1883, p. 84.
all the Indians on the reserve could not become independent farmers. However, for the first few years the lack of tillable land did not present a serious problem. This was undoubtedly due to the slowness with which the Indians were supplied with farming implements and also the lack of enthusiasm for agricultural pursuits which many of them seemed to manifest.

All crops were dependent upon irrigation, and because of the ruggedness of the terrain, only a relatively small area could be reached by water. Before the first farming enterprise could be undertaken, the land had to be cleared of sage brush which the Indians "grubbed and burned." The first season (1871), sixty acres were planted in wheat, turnips, barley, and other vegetables. "There will be about 3000 bushels of potatoes, 160 bushels of wheat, and about the same in barley" was the agent's hopeful prediction, and "in another year at least one half the heads of families will be cultivating on their own account." One Indian had ten acres of fine crops that first season. Unfortunately, however, the predictions proved to be too optimistic and in the case of the latter, such a goal was not achieved for a good many years.

The Lemhis almost immediately showed great interest in agriculture. This can be accounted for because of the bitter destitution they suffered in the years of 1867, 1868, and 1869. These years may

4Annual Report, 1887, p. 70. 5Annual Report, 1871, p. 416.
6Ibid.
have been a lesson to them which they did not want repeated. So great was their interest in 1871 that Superintendent J. A. Viall of Montana Territory in a bit of misguided prophecy stated, "I am satisfied that these Indians will be self-sustaining in three years, with proper care and management." It was undoubtedly obvious to many of the tribe that the chase was becoming less productive each year, and it was equally obvious to them that some other means of gaining a livelihood was necessary if they were to survive. This argument was used to encourage the more reticent to abandon the indolent ways of the past and take up the white man's habits. In the frequent tribal councils held, the willingness of the Indians to engage in agricultural pursuits was often expressed.

However, the desire and the accomplishment were two different things. Because of the impoverished and isolated condition of the Lemhis, it was impossible for them to accomplish anything concrete without the aid of the government. Unfortunately, the government's appropriation to the Lemhis was so meagre as to make impossible immediate help to all who desired it. Consequently, only a few additional families each year could be assisted in becoming independent farmers.

It is important to note that not all the Indians were desirous of turning to the land. The chase had been the way of life too long for

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7 Ibid. 8 Annual Report, 1871, p. 416.
9 Annual Report, 1875, p. 311.
many of them to willingly give it up. Often it would be the case that
the Indians would be in the mountains hunting game during the planting
or harvest season. Consequently, in many instances, crops were not
even planted, and even if they were, the harvest would often find the
erstwhile agrarian reverted back to the old, more exciting way of life.
Meanwhile, his crops waited in the field. It was almost impossible to
get many of the Indians to understand the benefits derived from farming
and raising their own subsistence. The "majority of them are of a roamin-
disposition and are not contented unless they are strolling over the
country." 10

The first growing season began with high hopes and the prediction
of great success, with many of the Indians showing a willingness and
disposition to work and become civilized. It was realized, however,
that too much was to be expected until the neophyte farmer had received
instruction and experience. In that year 400 acres of land were fenced,
of which about sixty acres were plowed and cultivated. From this was
received a "very good yield of potatoes, wheat, and turnips." Also con-
structed during that season were two miles of irrigating ditch to carry
water to the part of the farm then under construction. 11

10 Idaho State College MS 311, Lemhi Collection, Outgoing Cor-
respondence, 1888, p. 237-38. Also see Annual Report, 1879, p. 55;
1883, p. 55, for accounts of the unwillingness of the Indians to give up
the chase for farming.

11 Annual Report, 1871, p. 432.
During the first years the farming was done on a co-operative basis on large community farms. It was not until 1880 that the Indians began to farm independently, although as early as 1871 certain individuals farmed sections of the community farms independently. (In 1878, Tendoy and Teatobe, subchief, cultivated about six acres of potatoes but with little success.) The community farms were under the supervision of the agency farmer (a white employee) but the Indians performed the labor. In this way the Indians obtained valuable experience which would help them in their own farming later on. Great stress was placed on training the Indians as is evident in the statement, "in accordance with your instructions I paid diligent attention to the working of the farm and the employment of as many Indians thereat as possible."13

By 1874 farming operations were well under way. In that year the farm produce doubled over the preceding one, showing that progress was being made. By 1878 two farms had been established with a total area of 200 acres of which approximately 140 acres were being cultivated. There was much more land that could have been utilized, but the limited resources on hand prevented much expansion even though there were Indians desirous of farming it.14

Eighteen hundred and seventy-nine was a year of uncertainty.

12 Annual Report, 1884, p. 66.  
14 Annual Report, 1878, pp. 51-52.
The expectation that they were to be transferred to Fort Hall plus the unsettled condition resulting from the Bannock uprising coupled to discourage the Indians from sowing crops which might have to be abandoned. It was not until May 22 that Agent J. A. Wright was notified to proceed with the farming operations. At this late date there was no chance of obtaining a harvest by planting grain of any kind, and so only potatoes, peas, rutabaga, and similar vegetables were planted.15

In 1880 there were three community farms with a total of 260 acres, of which amount only sixty-three acres were being cultivated. There were two independent farmers, Pegge and Peawam, actively engaged in the work and the chief reason that there were not more so engaged was due to the lack of farming implements. Had there been the necessary tools available, there would have been at least a score of Indian farmers. However, the hopes for the next season were much brighter in that several of the men were engaged in clearing land and cutting timber to fence it. Included in this group was Chief Tendoy.16

This hope was not a vain one for by 1881 there were twenty-one families engaged in farming17 and in 1883 there were thirty families who had "their little patches of oats and garden stuffs." Several of these expressed their desire to have a milch cow, which desire Agent John

15Annual Report, 1879, p. 54. 16Annual Report, 1880, pp. 63-64.
17Annual Report, 1881, p. 64.
Harries eagerly endorsed, stating that "a little money spent in this direction would be one of the best investments that could be made for them." 18

This rapid expansion in farming prompted the realization that there was insufficient farming land on the reservation to supply all the Indians with an area large enough to make them self-supporting. This was first brought to the attention of the Indian Department by Harries in 1882, when he stated that "judging from recent progress and present interest manifested by our Indians in this direction, it will not be many years before they will have all the available land under cultivation." 19 When the question of granting them land in severality came up in 1887, J. M. Needham reported that "if the same were allotted to the number of Indians on this reservation, the amount of agriculture land received by each would be entirely inadequate for farming purposes, ... and ... I am fully of the opinion that there is not sufficient quantities of land that is accessible to water ... that could be cultivated. ..." 20

The Indian farms were located on the banks of the Lemhi River and on McDevitt and Old Agency Creeks. The Indians worked their lands equally as well and quite as profitably as the same acreage would be by a white man. In the year 1884 there were thirty-three families cultivating 171 acres. 21


20 Idaho State College MS 311, Lemhi Collection, Outgoing Correspondence, 1888, pp. 79-80.

During the years between 1885-1889, similar progress was maintained. New farmers "entered into the work with a considerable amount of energy and zeal." In 1886 Woodayoga, an Indian farmer, became the first person in the Lemhi Valley to sow winter wheat. The wheat "look[ed] elegantly" and it was hoped that Woodayoga's action would prove an incentive for others to follow. This would prove advantageous because "farming by irrigation is a little too scientific to be accomplished by the average Indian. . . ."  

By 1888, forty-eight families were engaged in farming 275 acres. In 1889, practically all the cleared land was taken up and "unless there is an appropriation made to clear up the farming land and construct irrigating ditches, those who have not farmed will be slow to take it up."  

The forces of nature, alone or coupled with the ignorance of the Indians, during these early years often caused considerable distress in the agricultural endeavors of the Lemhis. The biggest obstacle to overcome was the land itself. Of the area of 164 square miles within the reservation, only a narrow strip running along the Lemhi River eight miles in length and three quarters of a mile wide was suitable for farming operations, and in order to grow crops in this limited area irrigation was necessary. Also the land was covered with thick brush which required  

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22 Annual Report, 1885, p. 67.  
24 Annual Report, 1885, p. 84.  
a great deal of hard labor to remove. The prospect of having to clear this land plus having to construct irrigation ditches to it served as a deterrent to some of the more indolent braves. Many of them were naturally opposed to anything that smacked of manual labor. This type of work, according to their views, was to be performed by the squaws only.

The men were much more enthusiastic when it came to hunting or racing their ponies and gambling. The excitement of the chase led them from more civilized pursuits and even though the agent "endeavored to persuade these Indians to throw aside their old habits and engage in pursuits of industry," he found "this a task not to be accomplished in one or two years" but one that would "require a generation and then the work will only have begun." 26 This statement was made in 1888 or seventeen years after the early prediction had been made that the Lemhis would be self-sustaining within three years.

The climate played havoc with the crops at different times. Because of the high altitude (5500 feet), the growing season was relatively short, with frosts in the late spring and early autumn often damaging the crops. 27

In addition to the climate, periodic visitations of grasshoppers destroyed promising harvests. In 1872 a June invasion totally destroyed the vegetable crop and two thirds of the grain. Only the potatoes escaped with minor damage. Again in 1875, nearly everything was

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26 Annual Report, 1888, p. 84. 27 Annual Report, 1883, p. 55.
TABLE 1  
AGRICULTURAL RECORD OF THE LEMHIS 1871-1889

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. Engaged in Agriculture</th>
<th>Acres Cultivated by Indians</th>
<th>Acres Cultivated by Government</th>
<th>Wheat (Bushels)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1874</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1875</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>125</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1876</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>105</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1878</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1879</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1882</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1883</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>700</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1886</td>
<td></td>
<td>265</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>1000 (Est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1887</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1888</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1889</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a 50% gained subsistence by the chase; 50% were government sustained.

b 55% by chase; 18% by civilized pursuits such as farming, day labor, and employment by whites; 27% by government.

c 25% by chase; 15% by civilized pursuits; 60% by government.
TABLE 1 - Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bushels</th>
<th>Rye</th>
<th>Oats</th>
<th>Barley</th>
<th>Potatoes</th>
<th>Vegetables</th>
<th>Stock and Hay</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>160</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
<td>10 Ton Hay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>540</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>1057</td>
<td></td>
<td>1000 Cabbages</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>80 716 Horses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1155</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>830 Horses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1000 Horses 8 Cattle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2250</td>
<td>600</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6 Ton Hay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>150</td>
<td>10 Ton Hay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>105</td>
<td>12 Ton Hay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>25 Ton Hay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15 Ton Hay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>300</td>
<td>(Est.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1500 Horses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5400</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1775</td>
<td>50 Cattle 50 Sheep 35 Tons Hay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>875</td>
<td>3001 Horses 60 Cattle 70 Ton Hay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3400</td>
<td></td>
<td>2200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3003 Horses 75 Cattle 75 Ton Hay</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^d^{25\%} \text{by chase; } 15\% \text{ by civilized pursuit; } 60\% \text{ by government.}

\(^e^{25\%} \text{by chase; } 50\% \text{ by civilized pursuit; } 25\% \text{ by government.}
destroyed by the voracious creatures who "emigrated just as the grain was turning into bloom."²⁸

In spite of the hardships and difficulties which confronted them, the Lemhis accomplished a great deal in their farming endeavors throughout the period covered in this chapter. So well did they do that Agent J. M. Needham was prompted to report in 1889, that "notwithstanding the backward condition of these Indians, it is but justice to say that under the circumstances they have done remarkably well in the way of farming."²⁹

Non-Agricultural Pursuits

The tilling of the soil was the most important means by which the government attempted to make the Indians self-sustaining citizens. However, inasmuch as it was impossible for everyone to become farmers, other pursuits were followed. The chase, which had been the traditional profession of the Indians, continued to be one of the most important and one that proved to be an absolute necessity in order to supplement the government annuities and agricultural produce.

An important phase of this profession, and one of the principal sources of food which proved relatively easy to acquire, was the catching of the salmon that abounded in the Lemhi River. Even though it was so far inland, at proper seasons of the year, this river would yield huge quantities of this succulent fish. At times the catch ranged as high as

30,000 to 60,000 pounds in one season.\textsuperscript{30} During the very successful years the agent would suspend the issuance of beef, the salmon being a very acceptable substitute.\textsuperscript{31} However, owing to indiscriminant fishing and to obstructions erected by fisheries along the Columbia River, this source of food gradually diminished in amount and importance. This is clearly evident in view of the catches made in 1871, 1872, and 1874. The first year mentioned there were 30,000 pounds caught. In 1872 less than 10,000 pounds were caught and by 1874 the catch had dwindled to 4,000 pounds.\textsuperscript{32}

It had also been the traditional practice of the Lemhis to spend the autumns and winters in the Yellowstone country hunting buffalo.\textsuperscript{33} This practice, after the reservation was established, kept a good many of the Indians away from the reserve during the planting and harvest seasons. To make these excursions unnecessary, Agent Fuller recommended that appropriation be increased from $20,000 annually to $30,000 annually.\textsuperscript{34} However, this recommendation was not approved and so the excursions continued.

As late as 1887 the Lemhis obtained 25 percent of their subsistence from the chase. The following chart show the relative importance of this way of life at different times up to 1887.

\textsuperscript{30}\textit{Annual Report, 1872}, p. 286. \textsuperscript{31}\textit{Ibid.} \\
\textsuperscript{32}\textit{Annual Report, 1871}, p. 432; 1872, p. 282; 1874, p. 265. \\
\textsuperscript{33}\textit{Annual Report, 1871}, p. 415. \textsuperscript{34}\textit{Annual Report, 1874}, p. 265.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percent Sustained By the Government</th>
<th>Percent Sustained By the Chase</th>
<th>Percent Sustained By Civilized Pursuits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1878</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1887</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By 1885 game in the vicinity of the reservation had become so scarce that practically all hunting was done in Montana. Buffalo becoming increasingly scarce, the kill consisted primarily of deer, elk, antelope, mountain sheep, and bear in limited quantities. The Lemhis also trapped a few beaver. The animal pelts were either sold or gloves and moccasins made from them to be sold as a source of income for the tribe. In 1886 there was marketed $1200 worth of leather goods.35

In addition to hunting and fishing, some of the Lemhis worked as laborers for wages. Most of the work performed around the agency was accomplished by the Indians. They were instrumental in the construction of the agency buildings, roads, the saw mill, the mill race, fencing, rail-cutting, and ditch digging. At times it was difficult to get the "bucks" to work regularly. In 1881 Agent John Harries was hard-pressed in getting more than two or three to work several days in succession, "but by dint of encouragement and persuasion" he was able to increase this number to fifteen during the next year.

The early unwillingness of the Lemhis to work around the

35Annual Report, 1885, p. 68; 1886, p. 110.
reservation can be accounted for by the pay they received, or by the lack of it. This wage amounted to only fifty cents per day; and when this sum is compared with the $1.00 or $1.50 per day, plus board, which an industrious Lemhi could earn by working for the white farmers throughout the valley, the refusal of many to work is partially justified.

Besides those working for the agent or for the white farmers, there were other enterprising Indians who stayed in Salmon City, Junction, or other nearby towns and worked for the citizens by chopping wood, doing washings, and similar pursuits. The labor shortage at the agency was substantially improved in 1883 when the Office of Indian Affairs authorized Harries to increase the wage of a laborer to a more equitable $1.00 per day. As a result of this increase, the Lemhis exhibited a greater inclination toward performing constructive labor and the difficulty at first encountered in getting them to work was to a degree at least overcome. 36

One pursuit in which the Lemhis showed particular interest and even demonstrated an eagerness to participate was the freighting of annuity goods from the Red Rock, Montana, station of the Utah and Northern Railroad to the agency. 37

37 Annual Report, 1885, p. 66; 1885, p. 69.
From 1883 on, the Indians were the major haulers of the annuity goods from the Red Rock station. In that year there were twelve of the Lemhis who owned wagons and there were twelve more who desired wagons who, the agent believed, would make good use of them. The round trip to and from Red Rock was 140 miles over a bad road which took five days to complete. The average load hauled per wagon was 1050 pounds, for which the freighters were paid $1.00 per 100 pounds for the entire distance. In 1885, 73,433 pounds of goods were hauled. 38 In 1886 the Indians freighted 33,930 feet of lumber, 6,250 shingles, and 19,265 pounds of other supplies. They were paid ten dollars per 1,000 feet for the lumber, $1.50 per thousand for the shingles, and, as before, $1.00 per 100 pounds for the remainder of the supplies. 39

The over-all result of the attempts by the Lemhis to imitate the industry of their white brethren was a slow but gradual progress toward that way of life desired of them by the "Great Father" in Washington. The period between 1871 and 1889 was characterized by a mistrust and suspicion on the part of the Indians, of the white man's system, and a desire on their part to maintain the "old way" of life.

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38 Annual Report, 1885, p. 69.
CHAPTER 9

INDUSTRY OF THE LEMHIS

Agricultural Pursuits

After the passage of the Dawes Act in 1887 the general policy of the United States government toward its Indian dependents was to grant the reservation lands to the tribal members in severality, that is, each eligible Indian would receive a certain section of his tribe's holdings to exploit and improve. At the end of twenty-five years the official title of ownership would be granted to the individual. It was the aim of the Indian Department to encourage the transition from savagery to civilization in this manner, the thought being that tribal ownership of reservation lands had acted as a link with tradition and the past which served to keep the majority of the Indians in their primitive condition of dependence upon the government. It was hoped that pride of ownership would encourage the individual to improve his land and produce those things necessary to make himself an independent and self-sustaining citizen.

This policy was not followed on the Lemhi Reservation. There were two reasons why it was not. First, few of the Lemhis were advanced far enough to be considered capable of becoming independent as farmers, or for that matter, to be completely independent in any pursuit they followed. A second and a more justifiable reason was the limited amount of
land available and suitable for cultivation. ¹ Nevertheless, the rights and holdings of those few who were engaged in agricultural endeavors were respected and upheld.²

Although there were about 3000 acres of tillable land on the Lemhi reserve, only 1000 acres were located on the river and creek bottoms where they could be easily irrigated and cultivated. The remainder was high table land which could be reclaimed only by constructing an intricate system of irrigation ditches at an almost prohibitory expense.³ During the early stages, as a result of this limited area, farming was undertaken only upon a small scale and usually on a cooperative basis. Three or four of the more enterprising braves would combine their efforts to fence an area of four to fifteen acres, the land then being divided among them, each cultivating his own share. Gradually, however, the tracts under cultivation were increased in size until 1904 when there were some as large as 120 acres.⁴ In 1890 there were 640 acres of land fenced and by 1895 the amount had been increased to 800 acres. It must be pointed out that of these amounts one hundred per cent was not being cultivated, rather a large portion of it either lying fallow or serving as grazing land.⁵


³ISC MS 309, Outgoing Correspondence, Annual Report, July 11, 1893, p. 91; Annual Report, 1892, p. 239.

⁴Annual Report, 1890, p. 79; ISC MS 317, Outgoing Correspondence, Lemhi Agent to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, January 3, 1904, pp. 136-34.

⁵Annual Report, 1890, p. 79; ISC MS 310, Outgoing Correspondence, Annual Report, August 16, 1895, p. 254.
As soon as all the river and creek bottom lands were taken up, it became imperative that an irrigation system be constructed in order to reclaim the less accessible land necessary for the expansion of farming operations. This was done in 1899 when some 800 additional acres of reservation land was brought into use. This area provided farms for thirty-five to forty Lemhi families. The work was done by the Indians themselves. Those who participated were collectively paid one thousand dollars for their efforts. In this same year the Lemhis cultivated 750 acres, which represented an increase of fifty acres over the preceding season. This amount could probably have been further increased had the necessary "equipment, wagons, plows, harrows, harnesses, and other implements" been available.

Shortly after the turn of the century the Lemhis finally awakened to the advantages of farming. At that time they exhibited, as Agent Yearian reported, a "renewed energy" in the manner in which they carried on their work. That there was an improved attitude toward farming is evident in a comparison of statistics. For example, in 1899 there were only 750 acres under cultivation while in 1903 eighty families operated farms which averaged almost twenty-five acres each in size. This represents a sizeable increase in the total area cultivated.

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6ISC MS 313, Outgoing Correspondence, Annual Report, August 23, 1899, pp. 132-35.

7Ibid.

8Annual Report, 1903, p. 158.
With this achievement Tendoy's band attained their agricultural pinnacle at Lemhi. The limitations of the reservation acted as the main obstacle to further expansion. Nevertheless, even at this time only a few of the Lemhis could be classified as being completely independent, the majority only partially so. It was estimated that an industrious farmer could support his family on forty acres of tillable land, providing he had an additional 120 acres of grazing land for his stock. (If he were fortunate enough to own stock). At this rate only sixty-seven of the 135 families at Lemhi could be supported on the reservation. In 1904 at least one half of the tribe had no land possessions.\(^9\)

In addition to the limitations of the land itself, other forces of nature continued to harass the struggling farmers. In 1890 the grass-hoppers made another of their frequent visitations, causing considerable damage to the crops.\(^10\) At the same time the country was seized by a serious drought which wracked havoc with the range land that served as grazing land for the Indians' livestock.\(^11\) Further, the unpredictable frosts which often struck in the late spring or early autumn many times did damage to the domestic crops.\(^12\)

\(^9\)ISC MS 314, *Outgoing Correspondence*, Lemhi Agent to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, January 3, 1904, pp. 130-34.

\(^{10}\) *Annual Report*, 1890, p. 79. \(^{11}\) *Ibid.*

\(^{12}\)ISC MS 309, *Outgoing Correspondence*, Lemhi Agent to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, October 21, 1893; *Annual Report*, August 15, 1894, pp. 342-43; ISC MS 312, *Outgoing Correspondence*, Annual Report, September 7, 1897, pp. 115-16; *Annual Report*, 1898, pp. 144-45. All the above give accounts of frost damages.
Added to the difficulties which were beyond man's power to control, was the human element. Many of the Lemhis continued to be as "much adverse to farming or any other pursuit involving labor" as they ever had been. Many were not convinced that farming was the best way of life and continued to live the traditional life they loved. Tendoy was held responsible, to a large degree, for the indolence of many of his people. In him they had implicit faith and confidence, the result being that they followed his advice and council, often to their own disadvantage. Consequently, the progress of the Lemhis toward civilization was slowed and hindered by the actions and words of their chief. It was not until 1901 that a partial breaking of his power was evident. This can be attributed to the fact that the new generation, which at that time was coming into power, had received some education and many, though not all, recognized the merit of industry and achievement.

There was one phase of agriculture for which the Lemhi Reservation was admirably suited and one in which the Lemhis showed a natural inclination and even a desire to engage. This was stock raising. It was the opinion of Agent George H. Monk "that if cattle were issued to these Indians they would be assisted to the desired state of self-support more quickly and at less expense than by any other means."

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13 *Annual Report, 1892*, p. 239.


15 *Annual Report, 1892*, p. 240.
the expense of stocking the range was considered to be too great by the government and so this recommendation was not followed through. It was impossible for the Lemhis to stock the ranges themselves because of their destitute condition and the government was not willing to do it for them. However, the tribe did own a large herd of ponies but they were small and of a poor quality. Because of their small size, most of these horses were not capable of performing the heavy work required in most phases of farming. 16 The net result of this situation was that the animals acted as an economic liability, eating most of the hay crop raised by the Lemhis, contributing no worthwhile service in return. This sometimes created a shortage of food for the limited amount of useful stock which the tribe did own. As a partial solution to their dilemma, Agent Yearian encouraged the would-be stockmen to sell their ponies and buy good stock with the proceeds. This proved to be a limited success, but inasmuch as it was not begun until 1903, the effort amounted to "too little, too late." 17 The move to Fort Hall settled the problem of stocking the Lemhi range permanently.

16 ISC MS 319, Incoming Correspondence, 1892-94, Commissioner of Indian Affairs to Lemhi Agent, March 7, 1894. Lemhi Agent Julius A. Andrews made a request for $600 to purchase stallions to improve the Lemhis' horse herd. In this letter the Indian Commissioner refused the request stating that "if the Lemhis owned 3000 horses, they should be in position to buy their own stallion." The herd the Lemhis owned diminished in number from 3000 to 2000 between 1891 and 1903.

17 Annual Report, 1903, p. 157. Evidently the horses sold quite well. From September 11 to October 10, 1903 the Lemhis sold 449 head to different individuals. ISC MS 318, Incoming Correspondence,
### TABLE II

**LEMHI AGRICULTURE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Farmers</th>
<th>Area Cultivated</th>
<th>Produce Sold</th>
<th>Horses (Est.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>49</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1892</td>
<td>49</td>
<td></td>
<td>80,000 lbs. oats @ 85¢ per cwt.</td>
<td>3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1893</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>70 ton hay; 2100 bu. grain @ 50¢ per bu.; 1000 bu. vegetables</td>
<td>2800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td></td>
<td>420</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td></td>
<td>400</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>210 ton hay; 10,000 lbs. oats; 200 lbs. potatoes; 125 bu. vegetables</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td></td>
<td>700</td>
<td>170 ton hay; 370 lbs. oats; 125 lbs. potatoes; 25 bu. vegetables</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td></td>
<td>750</td>
<td>1000 lbs. wheat; 2020 lbs. oats; 900 lbs. potatoes; 650 bu. vegetables; 302 ton hay</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>1375 lbs. wheat; 3625 lbs. oats; 4750 lbs. potatoes; 3245 bu. vegetables; 3300 head cabbage; 355 ton hay</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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*1892-94, Outgoing Correspondence, 1896-1903, Lemhi Superintendent to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, September 11, 1903, p. 191; September 28, 1903, p. 232; September 29, 1903, p. 235; October 10, 1903, p. 262. All the above give accounts of sales.*
Non-Agricultural Industry

The same industries the Lemhis pursued up to 1899 were, in the main, followed after that time. One industry which had been followed became increasingly more important. This was the cutting and hauling of wood, which as a source of income for the Lemhis rated next to agriculture. For example, in 1893 $700 was paid to the Indians for this service and in 1894 $500 was received. This occupation alone employed about thirty of the Lemhi men. For their services the men received $5.00 per cord, cut and hauled. In addition to hauling the wood, those fortunate enough to own wagons continued to haul the agency's freight for which they received one dollar per one hundred pounds.

About twenty of the Lemhi braves made their living by working for white farmers residing in the neighborhood. They were employed at "herding, tending stock, and farming," for which they received $1.00 to $1.50 per day plus board.

The care of the tribal pony herds provided activity for thirty of the more indolent braves of Tendoy's tribe. The various estimates of the size of the herd number it from 900 to 3000, the most common ranging

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1 ISC MS 309, Outgoing Correspondence, Annual Report, July 11, 1893, p. 96; Annual Report, August 15, 1894, pp. 343-45.

2 Annual Report, 1892, p. 359.

3 ISC MS 309, Outgoing Correspondence, Annual Report, August 15, 1894, pp. 343-45; ISC MS 317, Outgoing Correspondence, Lemhi Agent to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, January 3, 1904, pp. 130-34.
between 1800 and 2700 head. Because of the small size of the ponies themselves they were not well suited to the heavy work required in farming. The result was that these ponies were a constant strain on the economy of the Lemhis, demanding the services of thirty braves and much valuable feed, giving nothing in return.

A more productive activity was carried on by the Indian women in the manufacture of buckskin gloves, which they sold at prices ranging from fifty cents to one dollar per pair. These gloves were sold on the line of the Union Pacific Railroad and to the inhabitants of the surrounding towns and mining camps. In 1895, as testimony of their industry, the Lemhi women manufactured about 2800 pairs of gloves and gauntlets.

Even though some of the Lemhis did exhibit the characteristics of industry and ambition desired and expected of them, this remained a minority group. The majority did not demonstrate any willingness to become self-sufficient and independent. They placed their entire reliance upon the government for support. In 1894 Agent Andrews reported that the amount of labor performed was limited to a very small scale and was carried on by only a few, who were occupied in the planting and harvesting of oats and potatoes and in the production of hay. Further, this productive activity required only about one month in the spring and another in the fall, the intervening period requiring very little effort on the part of

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5 ISC MS 310, Outgoing Correspondence, Annual Report, August 16, 1895, p. 359.
even those inclined to the agrarian pursuit. Hunting and fishing pro-
vided further distraction for the would-be farmers.

Unfortunately, there was very little improvement evident during
the few remaining years that would find Tendoy's people in their Lemhi
home. Time to them

was nothing except as it could be consumed in eating, gambling or
given to vice and idleness. Many felt no sense of responsibility,
their principle [sic] care being to live without work, having no
regard for the future. Generally speaking every effort put forth for
the betterment of these people is met with opposition on the part of
the Indians. 6

When the agent explained to the Lemhis that they were expected to render
labor, either for themselves or for the benefit of the tribe, in an amount
equal to the value of the supplies received, some stubbornly protested
and even became quite hostile saying they would never work for supplies
sent by the government.

In all fairness to the Lemhis, credit must be given to their worth-
while efforts. Some were self-reliant and industrious and appeared very
anxious to become self-sustaining. For the supplies received, a few
performed labor in full value and others in part. By 1901 for his work,
an industrious brave received $3.00 per day if he had a wagon and a
team. A man without this received $1.50 for a day's work. 7

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6 ISC MS 315, Outgoing Correspondence, Annual Report, August 15, 1901, p. 256.
7 Ibid., p. 257.
CHAPTER 5

EDUCATION

The importance of education in the advancement of the Indians toward civilization was often stressed by the Indian Department and this policy was upheld by Rainsford when he "earnestly recommend[ed] the establishment of a school for the children of these tribes believing it would be productive of good results." 1 The children were "obedient, intelligent, and possessed of good capacity," and there were "over fifty between the ages of seven and sixteen, nearly all of whom would attend." 2

However, a year and a half elapsed before a school was finally provided for those promising young students. Harrison Fuller, who assumed charge of the agency in April, 1873, found no school nor school-house. The first step had been taken by his predecessor, though, who had submitted an estimate of expense for the construction of a school in September, 1872. 3 Fuller explained to the Indians, in their councils, about the "excellency and the great and enlightening influence and advantages of education." 4 The tribal members were very much impressed with the agent's reasoning and appeared anxious to have their children

1 Annual Report, 1872, p. 283.  2 Ibid.
3 Annual Report, 1874, p. 265.  4 Ibid.

72
receive this "enlightening influence." They therefore urged the immediate establishment of a school to accomplish this. In compliance with their requests and with the policy of the government, a school-house was constructed and on March 1, 1874, class-work was begun.

All the children were required to attend. They learned rapidly, showing a susceptibility and desire for learning useful knowledge far beyond that which was expected of them. Unfortunately, this ostentatious beginning was almost immediately plagued with adversity. In May, 1874, just two short months after the school was opened, word was received ordering the removal of the Lemhis to the Fort Hall Indian Reservation. This order, although later rescinded, acted as a disturbing influence on the school. In the opinion of Agent Fuller, it seemed to have a demoralizing effect on the students and the desire to attend and to learn which they had earlier manifested was sharply curbed. To make matters even worse, the civilization fund from which the school was supported was soon depleted, thereby forcing the closure of the school on September 30, 1874. Consequently, what had appeared to be a very promising beginning deteriorated within a few short months, into an abysmal failure.

Following this belated venture to establish an educational institution among the Lemhis was a period of eight years during which no

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5This particular removal order was based on the recommendation of the commission headed by J. P. C. Shanks to Idaho and adjacent territories in 1873. *Annual Report, 1873*, p. 61.
further attempts were made to provide for the scholastic training of the Indians of that tribe.

There were two reasons for the failure to immediately re-establish the school. The first was the lack of interest which the Indians themselves demonstrated. The early enthusiasm which was displayed cooled considerably after the newness of the situation had worn off. It will be recalled that classroom work was begun on March 1, 1874 and continued until September 30 of that year. For the first two months all went well, but in May the early interest began to wane and the attendance dropped. It is likely that the same ailment afflicted the Indian students at that time which afflicts most students today when summer arrives. Fuller undoubtedly placed too much emphasis on the removal order as a cause for the sudden lack of interest and attendance, when actually the season probably played as great or an even greater part. Agent J. C. Rainsford had the right idea which supports this contention, when in his report recommending the establishment of a school, he "respectfully" suggested "the coming winter as an opportune time for its commencement, as the children will all be here and can be trained to attendance much easier than in the spring or summer when they are inclined to roam." 6

Fuller discussed the lack of interest exhibited by the Lemhis when he reported rather bitterly that he found "it less difficult to get the Indians to work than to send their children to school. They think

more of money than of education. The refusal of the parents and Tendoy to support the school was, and continued to be, a source of trouble in agency affairs.

The second and more important reason at this particular time for not re-establishing the school immediately arose from the seemingly ever present inadequacy of the funds allotted to run the reservation. The need and desire for a school were often expressed both by the agents in charge and by the Indians themselves; although they, the Indians, had not demonstrated good faith in the first endeavor. It must be realized that the greater need at the time was to see that the Lemhis were fed and clothed. Therefore, the major part of the appropriation was directed toward attaining that goal until such time as the Indians should reach that point of self-sustainment when the funds used for food and raiment could be expended in their education. Nevertheless, it was felt to be "a burning shame that they were permitted to grow up in ignorance when the ability to read and write, if nothing more, could be procured at a nominal expense." At that time there was not one Lemhi assigned to the reservation who could either read or write in his own or the English language.

In spite of the lack of formal educational facilities and of the inability of any of the Lemhis to read or write, marked improvement by

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7 Annual Report, 1875, p. 311.

8 Annual Report, 1878, p. 52; 1879, p. 55; 1880, p. 64; 1881, p. 65.

9 Annual Report, 1878, p. 52.
these Indians toward civilization was achieved. Living as they did, among the whites and having daily contact with them, Tendoy's people did acquire, to a limited degree, those habits of industry and cleanliness to which they had in earlier years been complete strangers. Notwithstanding the improvement made, contact alone was not sufficient to bring the band to that degree of civilization desired and so the need for educating them formally continued to exist.

In 1881 there were 175 children of school age on the reserve and, unless a school was provided for them there was nothing before them but the same condition of gross superstition and unmitigated ignorance in which their parents then existed. In this same year Chief Tendoy, in an address welcoming John Harries, the new agent, to the reservation and in reply to the agent's remarks concerning the desirability of education, the evils of whiskey, and the advantages of farming, spoke of his desire to see the people receive the benefits of education.

Harries' remarks had been translated a few sentences at a time. When he concluded there was a general conversation for a few minutes between the chief, subchiefs, and headmen. Then Chief Tendoy replied to Harries in a "most eloquent speech" in which he said:

they were all glad they were learning something about farming; he believed it was good, and a great many of the Indians who did not think so formerly, were getting to think so now. As to a school they were all in favor of having one, but he (Tendoy) had asked for one so often that he was nearly tired of asking. He had mixed...

10Annual Report, 1881, p. 64.
a good deal with the whites when a child and had learned a great deal from them, and wanted his children to learn to read and write like white children. He and his people had always been friends of the whites, and he thought the big fathers at Washington ought to give them a school that their children might have a chance to learn the same as the children at other agencies. He concluded with the assurance that he would be happy to be my friend, and would give me all the help he could: and this sentiment was heartily indorsed (sic) by all the sub-chiefs and headmen. 11

One result of this council, in which most of the Indians present on the reservation took part, was the discovery that every person, with the exception of one very old man, favored the establishment of an agency school.

Finally, the school which was so much needed and which the Lemhis appeared anxious to have, was opened in July, 1882. Difficulty arose almost immediately. This was in consequence of an element of opposition which had not been anticipated, viz., the unwillingness of the mothers to allow their children to attend the school. The doting mothers had a fixed belief that their children would die if they attended school; and it was not unusual, after a few of the children had been gathered together, for some of the mothers or grandmothers to rush into the school and take away their children as if they were removing them from some imminent danger. This superstition proved to be a stumbling block in the progress of education. 12 However, a limited success was achieved. Five of Agent Harries' children attended the school regularly and this appeared to ease the fears of some toward the school. There

11 Ibid. 12 Annual Report, 1883, pp. 55-56.
were nine Indian boys in regular attendance and very often a few men from twenty to thirty years of age would come into the school and take part in the exercises, showing particular interest in the "object lessons." 13

Unfortunately this school too was of short duration. The superstition that if the Indian children learn to read and write they will die had a fast hold and this plus the fact that the winter of 1882-83 was especially severe, caused the attendance to drop to such a degree that it was deemed best to close the school in March, 1883. This marked a second futile attempt to establish among the Lemhis the civilizing medium of education.

The failure of this latest attempt to provide schooling for the tribe can largely be attributed to their superstitious attitude. With the recognition of this fact, the importance of isolating the students, at least partially, from the detrimental influence of the reactionary older group was realized. It was decided that the best method of gaining this objective would be the creation of a boarding school. Not only could a school of this type achieve a substantial degree of isolation, but it would also insure that the students would receive an adequate diet.

It was the practice of Agent Harries to issue the annuity goods to the tribal members on Saturdays for the following week. However, as is characteristic of most people, the Indians were not particularly concerned

13Ibid.
about where the next meal was coming from just so they had plenty for the present one. Because of this trait, they ate well for two or three days but by Monday or Tuesday their rations had usually been consumed and for the remainder of the week a scarcity of food prevailed. Under such conditions it is quite understandable that the young pupils could not hope to achieve all that was expected of them. It seems that the pangs of physical hunger, in the great majority of cases, tended to deaden any desire for fulfillment of mental hunger which they may have had. It was hoped that by establishing a boarding school, both the physical and mental appetites could be satisfied.

On September 14, 1885, two and one half years after the closing of the last day school, classes were once again commenced, this time in a new boarding school. There were several reasons for the delay, among them being: the lack of sufficient funds, the refusal of the Indians to cooperate because of their superstitions, the difficulty of finding teachers who would "enter into the work zealously and manifest an interest in it," and the inability of the agents themselves to make the Indians realize the advantages of education.

The first year of operation met with relative success. There was an average attendance of eleven and one-fourth students. The cost of maintaining the school was $2,246.44. The girls were instructed in sewing and general housework; the boys in stock care and agriculture.

\[14\text{Annual Report, 1885, p. 68.}\]
Three hours a day, five days a week were spent in the classroom, in the study of the three R's. The students made good progress and exhibited considerable interest in their work.  

Nevertheless, all did not proceed smoothly. That many of the Lemhis continued their opposition to education and failed to support the school is evidenced by the recommendation of Agent Robert Woodbridge for the passage by Congress of a compulsory educational bill, with a provision making it a misdemeanor, subject to fine and imprisonment (one or both) at hard labor for any person committing an act deterrent to the interests of Indian education, and providing a similar punishment for parents and guardians of Indian children who refuse to send their children or wards to school or hinder their attendance.  

In spite of the fact that there were at times as many as thirty students in attendance, over-all conditions were very discouraging. In December of 1886 Woodbridge requested that inasmuch as the school was not properly supported by the Indians, that the nine students in attendance at that time be transferred to Fort Hall and the Lemhi school be closed.

The first boarding school, as had the preceding day school, was destined to failure from the beginning. The conditions under which it was begun were responsible for this. Although the idea of isolating the children from their parents was a logical one, the condition and location

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15 Annual Report, 1886, p. 110.  
16 Ibid.  
17 Idaho State College Manuscript 321, Lemhi Collection, Incoming Correspondence, 1886-1887, Letter from Commissioner J. D. C. Atkins to Woodbridge, December 17, 1886.
of the school buildings made this impossible to accomplish. The buildings were inadequate and were situated right among the Indians' "wicketups," some of which were not more than one hundred yards distant. The natural result of this closeness was that as soon as school was out for the day the children would immediately run to their homes and the only way in which many could be induced to return was through the efforts of the police force. Even this means often failed because the police, before acting, would consult Chief Tendoy, who in spite of his earlier pleas for the provision of educational opportunities for the children, appears to have made a diametrical change in his attitude toward education. He would tell the police not to force the children to attend school and his word was unquestionably obeyed. It is possible that Tendoy's attitude was based on the Indians' characteristic not to punish their children or force them to do anything they did not want to do.

Another obvious reason for the failure of the boarding school was the fact that many of the students were full grown Indians who had been "purchased" just to fill up the school. They proved to be a very detrimental factor in its operation. They would often leave the school at their leisure, taking the smaller children with them if they could be influenced to go. The "medicine men" contributed their share to the

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18 Annual Report, 1889, p. 18; 1888, p. 84; 1887, p. 90. ISC MS 311, Outgoing Correspondence, 1887-88, Letter Feb. 3, 1888, p. 211-12, indicates Tendoy's opposition to the school and difficulties encountered in operating schools.
failure of the school. Whenever the children became a little sick they would use their influence to have the ailing student removed from the school and care of the physician no matter what the argument might be to the contrary.

Practically every effort that could be expected, within the power of the agent, was exerted to make the school a success. Even the payment of some compensation to the parents for sending their children to school was considered. However, for obvious reasons this was not attempted; but it was the opinion of Agent J. M. Needham that the parents were preventing their children from attending school hoping for just some such arrangement.\(^{19}\)

In the face of these difficulties and obstacles, it was recommended by Inspector F. C. Armstrong, who had arrived to negotiate the removal to Fort Hall, that the school be closed.\(^{20}\) This was done June 30, 1889. As a result, the Lemhis were destined to continue in their ignorant and superstitious ways until such time as they could be made to understand the advantages of education.

\(^{19}\) ISC MS 311, *Outgoing Correspondence*, Letter April 6, 1880, pp. 240-41.

CHAPTER 10

EDUCATION

One of the first acts of Agent E. Nashold upon his assuming charge of the Lemhi Agency in April, 1890, was to reopen the agency boarding school which had been closed in June of the previous year. This act marked the genesis of an educational institution which was destined to continue with varying degrees of success until the transfer of the Lemhis to Fort Hall.

To manage and run the school there were: a superintendent and principal teacher, a matron and seamstress, a cook and laundress, an industrial teacher, and varying numbers of female Indian assistants.1 The instruction given was in the fields of "reading, all grades from chart and primer to third reader; numbers to addition and subtraction; spelling, both written and oral from their readers; writing, on slates and copybook. Picture making was practiced . . . but no method or system was attempted."2

1Annual Report, 1892, p. 239. However, in December, 1893, the positions of Superintendent and Principal Teacher and Matron and Seamstress were abolished. The Agent thereafter acted as Superintendent and a teacher was hired at $600 per annum. ISC Ms 319, Commissioner of Indian Affairs to Lemhi Agent, December 22, 1893.

2Annual Report, 1894, p. 133.
There were several problems which the school had to meet and attempt to overcome if it was to be successful. One of the most serious of these was the lack of adequate facilities to meet the needs of that institution. By 1892 the number of students in attendance at the boarding school had reached thirty, which was the seating capacity of the classroom and also the number which the dormitory could healthfully accommodate. The shortage of space became more acute with the passage of time. The following chart will clearly reveal this.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Enrollment</th>
<th>Average Attendance</th>
<th>Months in Session</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>1891</td>
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<td>22</td>
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<td>1892</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>21</td>
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<td>1893</td>
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<td>32 1/4</td>
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<tr>
<td>1894</td>
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<td>1900</td>
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<td>1901</td>
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<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>64 1/3</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The inadequacy of school facilities is further indicated by a comparison of the scholastic population between 1892 and 1902. In the former year there were eighty children qualified to attend school; in the

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3 Annual Report, 1892, p. 239.

4 ISC MS 309, Outgoing Correspondence, 1893-94, Lemhi Agent to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, August 21, 1893, pp. 128-29. ISC MS 287 Lists of School Children Lemhi.
latter one hundred twelve were eligible. Had there been sufficient room and equipment, it is very likely many more students could have been induced to obtain the benefits of a formal education.

An indication of the seriousness of the situation can be seen in 1897 when the agency temporarily abandoned the policy of sending the Indian police to return a truant to the school. At that time the number of children voluntarily attending classes proved to be more than enough to fill all the space available.  

The abandonment of this agency policy was only a temporary one. Generally, even though there was extreme overcrowding, the students were forcibly taken or returned to the school if they were eligible. The only non-eligible children were those ill or those who married very young. The Indian Department set up a ruling that the agent could arrest anyone who hindered or prevented a child from coming to school.

There were other conditions which interfered with the progress of the school. One of the most serious of these stemmed from the practice common among the Lemhis, especially the girls, of marrying at a very early age. These marriages usually took place during the vacation periods when the students left the boarding school and returned to their homes. In so doing they were usually subjected to the unwholesome and

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5ISC MS 312, *Outgoing Correspondence, 1897*, Annual Report, September 7, 1897, pp. 121-22.

6ISC MS 321, *Incoming Correspondence, 1897*, Ed. Circular No. 3, Department of the Interior, Office of Indian Affairs, September 9, 1897.
reactionary influence of the non-progressive camp Indians who saw little reason or use in the white man's educational endeavors. Consequently, many of the most promising students dropped out of school via the altar. In an attempt to curtail this practice the Boarding School adopted the policy of keeping many of the older (twelve to fifteen years in age) students at the school throughout the vacation periods, thereby limiting as much as possible any contact they might have with the camp group.  

Another problem which had to be overcome was that of parental opposition. Although the Indian parents gradually became reconciled to the fact that their children would have to attend school, this reconciliation did not develop spontaneously. In 1890 Agent E. Nasholds reported that a large attendance at the school was difficult to achieve because most of the parents were superstitious and opposed the idea of education for their sons and daughters. This peculiar attitude was further manifest in their absolute refusal to allow promising scholars to leave the Lemhi Reservation to attend better equipped Indian schools or non-reservation schools. This was first attempted in 1893 when the Indian Department recommended that a number of Lemhi students be transferred to the larger and better equipped Fort Hall Indian School. This recommendation

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7 ISC MS 309, *Outgoing Correspondence*, Lemhi Agent to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, August 17, 1893, pp. 119-20; Annual Report, August 15, 1893, pp. 88-90; ISC MS 313, *Outgoing Correspondence*, Annual Report, August 23, 1899, pp. 136-40; *Annual Report, 1903*, pp. 158-59. All these sources give accounts regarding the early marriages of school children, particularly girls.

met with an immediate and hostile reaction on the part of the Indian parents. The opposition was so violent that Agent George H. Monk, who had replaced Nasholds in 1892, felt that the only way it could be accomplished would be by the use of force. As it was the policy of the Indian Department not to move Indian children against the wishes of their parents, the recommended transfer failed to materialize. Eventually, however, the Indian Department reversed its policy of not separating children from their parents. In 1901 five boys asked for, and were granted, permission to attend the Lapwai Indian School in northern Idaho. This permission was granted despite parental wishes to the contrary.

The transfer to schools away from the Lemhi Reservation resulted in at least two beneficial services. First, it alleviated to a degree at least the crowded conditions at the Lemhi School, and second it gave the affected students greater opportunity to attain worthwhile advancement through better facilities of other institutions.

In 1900 in an effort to induce the obstinate parents to forsake their hostile attitudes toward the school, a new means of coercion was attempted. At this time Agent E. M Yeanian began withholding rations from all those Indians who had children eligible to attend the school and

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9 Annual Report, 1890, p. 80; ISC MS 309, Outgoing Correspondence, Lemhi Agent to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, August 21, 1893, pp. 128-29. ISC MS 287, Lists of School Children Lemhi.

10 ISC MS 309, Outgoing Correspondence, Lemhi Agent to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, August 21, 1893, pp. 128-29.
refused to send them. Within a short time this came to produce the desired results.\textsuperscript{11}

Throughout this period Chief Tendoy maintained an uncooperative attitude toward the school and did nothing to guarantee its success. Despite his early utterances in favor of educating the Lemhi children, in actual practice he demonstrated a demeanor which could in no way be considered constructive. His attitude was clearly revealed in March, 1901, when one of his grandsons left the school without permission. When the Indian police were sent to secure the return of this truant, they met with physical resistance from Tendoy and other members of his family and an outright refusal to return the child. However, Tendoy's resolve weakened as soon as Agent Yearian began withholding rations from those involved in the fracas. The boy was promptly turned over to the Indian police at Bannock City, Montana, where Tendoy had taken him.\textsuperscript{12}

The chase continued to contribute to the difficulties of the school operation in spite of its declining importance as a way of life for the Lemhis. It would often take the hunters long distances from the reservation and consequently the children would sometimes be tardy in returning to the school. This condition existed as a source of annoyance until

\textsuperscript{11}ISC MS 314, \textit{Outgoing Correspondence}, 1900, Lemhi Agent to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, October 23, 1900, p. 352.

\textsuperscript{12}ISC MS 315, \textit{Outgoing Correspondence}, Lemhi Agent to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, March 15, 1901, p. 57; March 18, 1901, p. 70; March 11, 1901, pp. 44-46. This correspondence concerns Tendoy's opposition to the schools and the episode of his grandson.
the removal to Fort Hall was finally accomplished. 13

Once the Indian students acquired the habit of attending school
they, in the majority of instances, became quite happy and contented
with school life. The young students showed a capacity for learning and
an interest in study that was equal to that of the average white student.
They were also very easily controlled, problems of discipline being all
but non-existent. 14 Extra curricular activities were not ignored. The
Lemhi students exhibited a natural fondness for music and to accomodate
this a small instrumental band was organized. 15 In addition to the
interest revealed in the field of music, the Lemhi students displayed an
"uncommon aptitude" for drawing and art work. 16

A comparison between the boys and the girls showed that the boys
were more inclined to accept the civilizing influence of the white man's
customs than were the girls who, due primarily to the practice of

13 ISC MS 309, Outgoing Correspondence, Annual Report,
August 15, 1894, p. 338; ISC MS 312, Outgoing Correspondence, Annual
Report, September 7, 1897, pp. 121-22. These reports give accounts of
the hunting excursions of the Lemhis.

14 ISC MS 313, Outgoing Correspondence, Annual Report,
August 23, 1899, pp. 136-40; ISC MS 315, Outgoing Correspondence,
John F. Mackay, Teacher, to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, June 30,
1901, p. 266.

15 ISC MS 288 presents a list of musical instruments available at
the Agency School. The list includes: 1 B♭ Clarinet; 1 F♭ Cornet, Brass;
3 B♭ Cornets, Brass; 1 B♭ Slide Trombone; 2 B♭ Tenor Valve Trombones,
Brass; 3 E♭ Altos, Bell Upright; 1 B♭ Baritone; 1 E♭ Tuba; 1 Bass Drum; 1
Snare Drum; 1 Set Ripleys Beginners Band Books. The total value of the
above was estimated to be $350.00.

16 Ibid., ISC MS 309, Outgoing Correspondence, Annual Report,
p. 338; ISC MS 312, Outgoing Correspondence, Annual Report, pp. 121-22.
early marriage, were 'to all appearances no better than their grand-
mothers in any respect' as late as 1901.  

All in all, the boys showed a 
more favorable disposition toward improvement, willing to dress in the 
costume of civilization, taking more readily to farm work, and in general 
appeared better for having attended school than did their feminine 
counterparts.

By 1902 ten of the students at the Lemhi Boarding School had 
advanced as far as was possible at that place. It was, therefore, con-
sidered advisable to send them to a larger, better equipped school.  
The group was sent to the Fort Shaw, Montana, Indian School where they 
proved themselves to be excellent students. Superintendent F. C. Camp-
bell, of the Fort Shaw School, reported to the Lemhi agent that he took 
"great pleasure in informing" him "that the detail of children from" his 
"reservation have proven one of the most satisfactory details as a whole 
that has ever come to the school. As far as we have been able to learn," 
said the Superintendent, "there has not been anything of an unsatisfac-
tory nature concerning them. They are well spoken of in every depart-
ment, all of which shows the result of careful home training on which 
account I wish to congratulate and thank you."  

17 ISC MS 315, Outgoing Correspondence, 1901, Lemhi Agent to 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, July 1, 1901, p. 268.

18 ISC MS 326, Incoming Correspondence, 1902, Assistant Indian 
Commissioner to Lemhi Agent, January 20, 1902.

19 ISC MS 326, Incoming Correspondence, 1902, F. C. Campbell, 
Superintendent of Fort Shaw, Montana, Indian School to Lemhi Agent, 
July 11, 1902.
Again in 1903 when requesting for more Lemhi students for his school, Superintendent Campbell highly praised the Lemhi students, reporting that the detail from that school continued "to be the banner class ever attending the Fort Shaw School. 20

That progress was being made is evident in a comparison of the Indian Inspector's reports for the years 1898 and 1904. The 1898 report had the following to say concerning conditions at the Boarding School.

... for two weeks ... not a day has passed without painted blanket Indians taking part in their [the students'] games, which consist almost exclusively in throwing spears; that the squaws mingle with the school girls in the same manner; that he has not heard a word of English by any of the school children at play on the school grounds, that they converse entirely in their native tongue; that after a boy or girl has left school and gone to their homes you cannot get them to answer a question addressed to them in English. 21

The 1904 report stated the following:

As to school matters proper, they have progressed greatly here the past few years, practically every child on the reservation eligible to admission being in the school, and the parents generally feel very favorably toward the school and its management. ... The school plant and grounds have been greatly improved and much work has been projected that will, if carried to completion still further advance the interests of the Indians and the school generally. ... 22

By 1904 every child of school age not disqualified by marriage or ill health had been placed in the Lemhi School or non-reservation

20 ISC MS 327, Incoming Correspondence, 1903, F. C. Campbell to Lemhi Agent, January 28, 1903.

21 ISC MS 322, Incoming Correspondence, 1898, Commissioner of Indian Affairs to Lemhi Agent, May 27, 1898.

22 ISC MS 328, Incoming Correspondence, 1904, Part 1, Commissioner of Indian Affairs to Lemhi Agent, June 6, 1904.
schools. Agent Yearian rightly stated at that time that "the salvation of the Lemhi Indians depends more upon the training and education of the young than of the old."

The children had proved themselves to be bright and intelligent and much more apt to respond to the demands of the white man's civilization and so upon their training and education great stress and importance was placed.

It is a little ironical that after the great difficulties experienced in establishing a successful and progressive school that all was to be abandoned just at the time when the greatest accomplishments were being made. Nevertheless, the long needed and often postponed removal to Fort Hall was in the end inevitable, and the habits acquired, the precedents set, and experiences obtained at the Lemhi School would serve as an excellent background and perhaps make the necessary readjustments much easier.

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23 ISC MS 317, Outgoing Correspondence, 1904, Lemhi Agent to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, January 3, 1904, pp. 130-34.
CHAPTER 6

THE LEMHIS IN WAR

It was the contention of the Lemhi band that it did not have the blood of a white man on its hands; and though there were undoubtedly individual cases to the contrary, the band was conspicuous in its peaceful relationship with the whites. This relationship did not exist unchallenged. The geographical location and the close ties which the Lemhis had with other tribes caused them to choose between their own and the white race on at least two different occasions. One was the Nez Perce War of 1877 and the other was the Bannock War of 1878. In both instances the Lemhis, under the firm leadership of Tendoy, remained loyal and friendly to the whites. There were, however, certain small elements of the band that did desire to join the hostiles, but in both cases this group was relatively small and unimportant. To understand the situation of the Lemhi band in each of these conflicts, the background of each must be explained.

The Nez Perce War

The Nez Perce Indians had originally inhabited a large portion of northern Idaho, but by the treaty of June, 1855, signed by fifty-eight of the chiefs and headmen of the tribe, a large portion of this area was
relinquished to the whites and a reservation was created for them on the remainder of their land.¹

In the fall of 1860 gold was discovered in this area and within a very short time the reservation was over-run by whites rushing to the mines. In an attempt to stave off unnecessary trouble, a further agreement was entered into on April 10, 1861, which opened a portion of the reserve to whites and Indians alike for mining purposes. However, this agreement did not avert the trouble that had been contemplated. In defiance of and despite the protestations of the Nez Perce agent and the Indians themselves, the township of Lewiston was laid out in October, 1861, in the center of the Nez Perce Reservation, and within a very short time had a population of 1200 people. Other misunderstandings arose, primarily over the failure of the government to meet its obligations in regards to the distribution of annuity goods. For example, in 1862 only 247 blankets were furnished the tribe, or one blanket for every six Indians; and at the same time, the amount of calico cloth distributed amounted to less than two yards per person.²

By the spring of 1863, due to the unsettled and changing circumstances prevailing in the area, it became evident that a new agreement was necessary. Subsequently a new treaty was drawn up which further reduced the limits of the reservation. At the conclusion of these

¹Annual Report, 1877, p. 9. ²Ibid., pp. 9-10.
negotiations, the tribe divided into two groups, the peace or treaty faction and the war or non-treaty faction. Chief Joseph was the prominent leader of the non-treaty group. He and his followers ignored the Treaty of 1863 and continued to roam over the area that, theoretically at least, had been surrendered by the 1863 treaty. The government elected to overlook this infraction until white encroachment into the area of Joseph's wanderings threatened to create trouble. This finally forced the government to take some definite action respecting the band of non-treaty Nez Perce. 3

In 1873 a commission consisting of J. P. C. Shanks, T. W. Bennett, and H. W. Reed was assigned to investigate and report upon the Indian affairs in Idaho. At the same time another commission consisting of Superintendent T. Odeneal and Agent J. B. Montieth was designated to hold council with Chief Joseph with the view to accomplishing his removal to the Lapwai reserve where the treaty Nez Perce were located. The commission headed by Shanks reported that the trouble existing with the Nez Perce resulted from the encroachment of the whites on their farming, hunting, and fishing grounds, as well as the actual settlement of four white men on the reservation proper, in violation of treaty stipulations. The other commission held that the removal of Joseph and the roaming bands to the Lapwai reservation was impracticable at the time. 4

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3Ibid. 
4Ibid.
As a result of the findings of these commissions, the Wallowa Valley, or the area that Joseph and his followers occupied, was set aside as a temporary home for him until such time as the government could take decisive action in removing white interlopers from the Lapwai reserve and the settling of the non-treaty band at that place.\(^5\) Until a definite agreement was reached, Joseph and his followers could remain on the Wallowa reservation so long as they remained peaceable and committed no depredations on the white settlers by their improvements.

However, the failure of the government to achieve the removal of the white settlers from the Lapwai reserve plus the refusal of Joseph to settle on the Wallowa reserve or to respect the rights and property of the whites he encountered in his wanderings, resulted in the revocation of the 1873 agreement in June of 1875.\(^6\)

Conditions went from bad to worse. In October of 1876, owing to the threatened conflict between the settlers and Joseph's band arising out of the murder of an Indian by the whites and of the depredations committed by the Indians upon the stock and crops of the whites, another commission was sent to attempt the negotiation of a settlement with the dissatisfied element of the Nez Perce tribe. It was, if possible, to secure their permanent settlement upon the reservation, and their early entrance upon civilized life, and to adjust the difficulties then

\(^5\)Ibid., p. 11. \(^6\)Ibid.
existing between them and the settlers.  

The commission submitted its report December, 1876. It recommended: first, the return of the "dreamers" or medicine men to the reserve and, in case of their refusal, to the Indian Territory; second, the speedy military occupation of the Wallowa Valley by a force adequate to suppress any outbreak, the agent in the meantime to attempt to persuade the Indians to settle on the reserve; third, in the case persuasion failed, the use of force to place them on the reserve; fourth, depredations or overt acts of hostility should be met by sufficient force to bring the Indians to subjection and to place them on the reserve.  

As a result of the councils held, the non-treaty Nez Perce agreed to take up lands on the Lapwai reservation within thirty days. However, on the day prior to the expiration of the agreement time (June 14, 1877), twenty-one white men and women were murdered on White Bird Creek near Mount Idaho by the Nez Perce in revenge for the murder of one of their number. This was the precipitating act of the Nez Perce War. A series of battles ensued in which heavy losses were sustained by both sides. The Nez Perce hostiles began a classic retreat which took them across the Bitterroot Mountains into Montana, then back into Idaho by 

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7 Ibid.

8 Joseph was under the influence of the "dreamers" who held that man was part of the earth and, therefore, he could not surrender it as he would be giving up part of himself and by the same token he was free to roam where he wished. *Annual Report, 1877*, p. 10.

9 Ibid., p. 11.
way of Bannock City, Montana, and the Lemhi Valley. After passing into Idaho the hostiles again turned eastward toward Yellowstone Park, thence north toward the Bear's Paw Mountains near the headwaters of the Missouri. In this area, as they were coming out of the mountains, Joseph's band was surprised by General Nelson A. Miles, and after a fierce battle, forced to surrender.10

While the Nez Perce were raiding through the Lemhi Valley they did not disturb the agency, and the only depredations committed in the valley itself were "a few small bands of horses taken, and a few heads of cattle killed for food."11 The position taken by Tendoy was a major factor in the decision of the Nez Perce not to raze the Lemhi Valley. He told them that if they did not keep away they would not only have to fight against the whites, but also against the Lemhis.12 After the war had ended, he expressed no sympathy for the defeated Nez Perce stating:

"It is Joseph's own fault that he is now so far away."13 Although the

10 Ibid.

11 J. P. Clough, Recollections of the Nez Perce Indian War of 1877, and Their Entrance Into the Lemhi Valley, written Feb. 9, 1936 when Clough was ninety years old. ISC MS 2.

12 Eleventh Annual Report of the Bd. of Ind. Com., 1879, p. 66. In a letter written by W. H. Shoup, son of Col. Geo. Shoup, it is mentioned that about fifty Lemhis joined the Nez Perce for a short time, but the author could find no other reference to substantiate this. Letter is found in a newspaper clipping, no date, in the uncatalogued Trego Collection, ISC Library, MS.

13 Ibid. At the time Tendoy made this statement Joseph and his followers were being detained in the Indian Territory in protective custody until such time as the public reaction in north Idaho against him died down.
Lemhi band, as a group did not join in the hostilities against the Nez Perce, Tendoy, with a few of his braves did assist the white settlers in the valley and the army in repulsing the hostiles. When a small garrison of white settlers were threatened with annihilation, Tendoy and about forty braves accompanied a rescue force led by Col. George Shoup. The Nez Perce withdrew before the arrival of this party, without harming the endangered group.

On another occasion Tendoy and fifteen of his braves, including his sons, served in a scouting party against the Nez Perce for General O. O. Howard, and were successful in stealing about sixty-five horses. The accounts of these two occurrences give a fairly clear picture of the part played by Tendoy in the Nez Perce War, and the conditions as they existed in the Lemhi Valley as a result of these hostilities.

Recollections of the Nez Perce War of 1877, and Their Entrance Into the Lemhi Valley
by J. P. Clough

When the news reached us that the Nez Percie Indians of North Idaho were on the war path, had left their reservation and started south or east, and government troops seemingly unable to check them, that they were murdering and pillaging the homes of the white settlers, the ranchers of upper Lemhi Valley erected a very strong bullet-proof stockade, 60 feet square of logs, situated about one half mile below the little town of Junction and moved in at once, reorganized a company, and elected Edward Swan Captain.

But as usual, where two or more persons assemble, differences arose. Some thought they would be much safer in Salmon, the County seat, fifty miles distant. Others preferred to remain in the stockade, believing we were perfectly safe from attack.

A vote was taken resulting in about an equal division. That night our neighbors left for Salmon where according to reports they
found an abundance of excitement without seeing an Indian.
This left us with about 15 men and boys who were able to
use firearms. We were well armed with guns, and ammunition
received from the government at Boise. . . .

On the night of August 12th which by the way was my 32nd
birthday H. C. McCreery was on guard at the mouth of the Road
Canyon until midnight when I relieved him. About 8 o'clock the
next morning, August 13, I thought I heard some unusual sound and
thinking that it might be Red MacDonald who had promised to come
that way if possible with news for us, I rode into the Canyon a
short distance. Not hearing anything more I turned and headed my
horse for the stockade. I had ridden perhaps a mile when looking
back I saw the advance guard of the Indians coming out of the mouth
of the Canyon. I put the spurs to my horse, rode through Junction,
notified those there, and then on to the stockade. Some of our
neighbors who lived near by were at home feeding the chickens, and
etc. In a short time they were all safely gathered in the stockade.
By that time the advance guard had passed through Junction, and
made camp across the Lemhi, at the mouth of Timber Creek. They
were soon followed by the main body. I saw no stragglers, and
before noon all were in camp. About two o'clock P.M. Ed Swan and
John Hays, if I remember correctly, met half way between the two
camps, Chief White Bird and one other for a parley. The Chiefs
wished to assure us of the great love they had for ranchers, especi-
ally, and asked that we return to our homes that they might come
and eat with us as an evidence of their friendship.

Captain Swan declined their kind invitation. They asked
about the number of men in the stockade and Captain Swan replied
about one hundred.

We did not know at that time that they had murdered six men,
well known to us the day before on Horse Prairie, Montana. That
night after the Indians had moved on John Clark volunteered to carry
a message to General Howard . . . .

About four o'clock P.M. on the same day of their entrance
they broke camp forming a procession, squaws and families leading,
next quite a number of drags or litters carrying the wounded, then
came 1500 or more ponies, ending with 300 warriors.

That evening they camped in the mouth of what has since
been known as Nez Perce Canyon, into which they drove their horses,
and made camp for the squaws. To a considerable extent they forti-
fi ed the entrance with rifle pits and barricade of rocks. The next
morning they resumed their march on Birch Creek met the freighters,
Green, Coombs and Hayden who were camped I believe for the
night. Two men never identified were with them. They made a
brave fight for their lives. All met death . . . .
One of the wagons was loaded with whiskey, and by midnight the Indians were all drunk. Two Chinamen were with the freighters, their lives were spared and they were soon busy gathering sage brush and cooking flapjacks and bacon. About midnight the Chinamen slipped away and hid in the willows. They were soon missed, search was made for them, but not found. Early the next day they reached our stockade and reported the massacre. On the 15th of August Col. Shoup and about 40 men from Salmon reached our camp to aid or assist us in any way. Rumor in Salmon was that we were all killed so they were exceedingly happy to find us all safe. About the same number of Indians from the Reservation came with Col. Shoup, and men. The Colonel ordered a steer slaughtered for them. That night they put on a war dance and strange as it may seem some of us wives attended, for we had implicit confidence in Chief Tendoy and his tribe. He always was a good friend to the whites. He made good and for nearly fifty years ruled his tribe. . . .

On the following day the men from Salmon, and a few from Junction went to Birch Creek and buried the dead near their burned wagons. Their bodies were afterwards removed to Salmon Cemetery and a monument erected in their memory.

The only depredation committed in the valley was a few small bands of horses taken, and a few heads of cattle killed for food.14

An Account Written by Alex Cruikshank, A Scout of General Howard’s During the Nez Perce War of 1877 In Which He Tells of Tendoy’s Services

. . . As I had been sent out by General Howard to follow and collect all the information possible about the Nez Perces, I wanted to proceed, so I rode up to the crowd and asked if there was anyone who would go with me, if so I could go, to the freighter’s camp yet that night. Chief Tendoy spoke up and said he would go; then William Falkner said he would go too. Before starting Colonel Shoup came to me and said he felt a responsibility for the men under his command; that they all had families, and no experience in Indian fighting, and in fact were not enough in numbers to put up a fight against such a large force as the Nez Perces had, and as the party was too large to act as a scouting party, he would take them back, but the next day he would go over to Birch Creek himself. He told me to be careful, but that Chief Tendoy could be depended upon. Colonel Shoup then turned back with his party and we proceeded on our way, it being almost sun down at the time we parted.

14ISC MS 2, Lemhi Collection (Unpublished), Op Cit.
Tendoy had about fifteen Indians with him, among whom were his two sons, Jack and Tedim. Jarvis joined us and we traveled single file Indian fashion up the Creek and over Eighteen Mile Divide to Mud Flat which is at the head of Birch Creek. Here we found a nice meadow and dismounted to rest. Our Indians were smoking and jabbering among themselves until I finally fell asleep. I was soon awakened by the sound of a whistle some distance away. I immediately "pulled myself together" and made ready for action as I noted that it was a warning made by a scouting party. My Indians were very still. Then we heard another whistle in another direction answer from a considerable distance. I felt pretty sure we were being surrounded. It was a ticklish position and Tendoy joshed me afterwards about my nervousness that night, then he would whistle, make some Indian signs and we had many a laugh about it. But the whistle from the distance was the one which called the Nez Perces away, for it being a dark night they were unable to see who we were, but knew something was around which they could not make out. Suddenly we heard the sound of horse-hoofs passing over the rocks and knew they were making their getaway. With great caution we followed them for a distance of ten miles when we came near their camp. We could hear their horses feeding. Tendoy then sent his son Jack away and informed us that we were in the midst of the Nez Perces, and that Jack had gone to make a raid on their horses in an endeavor to capture some. Horse stealing from an enemy puts pep in the life of an Indian. He advised us when attacked to fire and then make the fastest speed possible for the mountains. He then arrayed himself in his fighting clothes after which he mounted his war horse and we were certainly expecting a murderous attack at any instant. Presently we heard the clatter of horses hoofs. It sounded as if there were a thousand and in the midst of the turmoil Tendoy shouted, "heep run." We didn't let the grass grow under our feet. It was a chase in the dark. And we saw no Indians we concluded that if the Nez Perces didn't kill us, our own Indians would. After going quite a distance and getting entirely away, we checked up to see what the stampede amounted to and found that Jack had made away with sixty-five head of the Nez Perces' horses, some of which were mine.

Just as daylight was breaking we saw eight Nez Perces on horseback in the low foothills. Tendoy stripped his sons naked, putting them astride their fleetest ponies bareback and started them out to head off the Indians while we went down the road to intercept them. But the Nez Perces percieved, at once, what we were about and lost no time in eluding us. While an Indian looks hideous, perhaps, with his war bonnet and other paraphanalia on, yet when he starts to fight and means business, he removes all clothing but his breech-clout. By the time broad daylight had come we were
about two miles from the Nez Perces' camp and could see their camp-
fires still smoking, they having moved on. We could also see the
burning freight wagons. We were quite hungry. Tedim and myself
rode around the camp and finding no Indians about we went to the
burning wagons and secured a scorched ham and some canned goods
which we took back with us and upon which we all breakfasted. . . . 15

The Bannock War

The escapade of Chief Joseph and his Nez Perce followers contributed indirectly to a similar situation among a portion of the Bannock tribe in southern Idaho centered on the Fort Hall Reservation. Although this reservation was officially established by an Executive Order on June 14, 1867, actual occupation and operation did not begin until April 13, 1869, when Agent Charles F. Powell arrived in company with 1150 Shoshone and 150 Bannock Indians. 16 The major portion of the Bannock Tribe did not agree to accept this reservation as a home until a short time later, desiring one for their exclusive occupation. However, they were finally induced to settle there and by an Executive Order dated July 30, 1869, they were officially located at Fort Hall.

At first the Bannocks got along very well with the Shoshones. They outnumbered the various bands of that tribe, and as they were a race of buffalo hunters, spent a good deal of time off the reservation hunting in the Yellowstone country. As a result of these absences, many of the annuity goods rightfully belonging to them according to

15 Ibid.

16 Madsen, op. cit., p. 167.
treaty stipulations were issued to the Shoshones. This did not become a problem until the Nez Perce outbreak caused the Office of Indian Affairs to issue an order prohibiting all the neighboring Indians from leaving their reservations for the duration of that conflict to prevent the hostilities from spreading. This enforced restriction placed a heavy strain upon the limited amount of annuities to be distributed, the result being that there were not sufficient supplies for all. The Bannocks justly complained that the supplies furnished for them by treaty were given to the Shoshones. Consequently there developed an alienation of affection between the two groups. To further agitate this condition, the Bannocks, restless in their confinement, became very quarrelsome and irritable and consequently committed petty thefts against the Shoshones. The news of the Nez Perce War filtering through to them also contributed to their dissatisfaction and unrest.  

Their smouldering disaffection finally burst into flame during the summer of 1877 when an inebriated brave, armed with a Winchester rifle and a revolver, shot and seriously wounded two unoffending white teamsters who were passing the agency.  

On the 23rd of November the guilty party was arrested and turned over to civil authorities, without resistance or opposition. However, on the same day another Bannock, a friend of the arrested man, out of bitterness and resentment resulting from the arrest, shot and killed Alexander Rhoden, the agency butcher.  

17 Ibid.  
18 *Annual Report, 1878*, pp. XII-XIII.  
19 Ibid., pp. XIII, 49.
Troops were immediately called for by Agent A. H. Danielson, and on December 5, 104 men of the 14th Infantry arrived from Fort Douglas, Utah, to reinforce the agency. On December 26 Colonel John E. Smith arrived to negotiate with the Bannocks for the custody of the murderer. The negotiations came to no avail. However, on January 9, 1878, Rhoden's murderer was captured by the military. He was subsequently tried, convicted, and hanged. 20

The excitement and threatening demonstrations following this action were of such nature that Colonel Smith, with the 14th Infantry and three companies of calvary, which had arrived the day previous, on January 16 surrounded two Bannock villages near the agency and captured fifty-three warriors, thirty-two guns, and about three hundred ponies. The prisoners, except for the father and two brothers of the hanged brave, with a word of admonition were released. It was recommended that their property be restored to them. 21

On April 13, 1878, General George Crook, after investigating the conditions at Fort Hall, contended that the Indians were pacified and that no further trouble need be anticipated. He was of the opinion that the whole affair had been greatly exaggerated by the Fort Hall agent and, therefore, recommended that the military reinforcements be withdrawn. This recommendation was carried out in April, with the exception of a small detachment of twenty-five enlisted men and one officer, despite

20 Ibid., p. 50.  
21 Ibid., p. XIX.
the protests of Danielson, who feared a general Bannock uprising should the troops be withdrawn. In the light of later events, Agent Danielson's fears proved justified.

Early in the spring of 1878 most of the Bannocks left the reservation and went to Camas Prairie to gather the Camas Root. Danielson reported that he could not keep [the] roaming Bannocks here when the amount of supplies was scarcely enough to feed [the] Indians engaged in farming. 22

While at Camas Prairie the Bannocks, under Buffalo Horn, displayed a very surley mood resulting primarily from the actions of the previous year. They engaged in a council of war which eventually resulted in the decision of a portion of the tribe (about 200 warriors) to take the warpath against the whites. There had been a great deal of excitement aroused resulting from the unwarrented shooting of two white cattlemen at Camas Prairie by a whiskey sodden young brave. This foolhardy act almost caused fighting to break out among the Indians themselves. A part of the tribe was for peace and resolved to return to Fort Hall so as not to become involved in the hostilities. Tendoy and his band, who were at Camas Prairie at the time, immediately left for Lemhi to avoid trouble. 23

The war was short and decisive. By the end of August all organized Indian resistance had been broken and the survivors of the hostile

22Ibid., p. XX.

23General I. McDowell to General W. T. Sherman, June 7, 1878, Copy AGO TO USDI OIA, General Files Idaho, W1004/1878 (as quoted by Madsen).
bands, either by capture or surrender, were held as prisoners of war; the number including men, women, and children, amounting to one thousand.\textsuperscript{24}

Conditions at Lemhi during this period, while of a peaceful nature, were filled with anxiety. This was in consequence of a threatened outbreak by the Bannock portion of the band. So great was the fear on the part of the outlying white residents of the Lemhi Valley that they abandoned their homes and for a short time moved into stockades at either end of the valley which had been hastily constructed.\textsuperscript{25}

For some time before the actual outbreak of the Bannock Indians of Fort Hall, the Lemhis were tempted by the persuasion of Major Jim and his following to join the Bannocks. Tendoy was alert to the situation and kept the government official informed of its developments. The danger of an outbreak by the Bannock portion was averted when a large portion of the Lemhis left the reservation in July for the Yellowstone and Muselshell for the purpose of hunting buffalo.\textsuperscript{26}

In the middle of August word was received at the agency that a group of hostiles were on the nearby Lost River and "had begun their work of death and destruction;" and that Jesse McCaleb, one of the territory's leading men, had been ambushed and murdered. The renegades were approaching nearer to Lemhi and so, having no military protection

\textsuperscript{24}\textit{Ibid.}, 1878, p. XXI.  \textsuperscript{25}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 51.

\textsuperscript{26}\textit{Ibid.}, 1879, p. 54.
or means of obtaining it, Agent Wright deemed it advisable to remove the remaining Indians to Salmon City until the danger was past. On the 17th of September word was received that the raiding party had passed toward Yellowstone National Park and so the agency was reoccupied. Upon returning, Wright discovered numerous indications of the presence of the hostiles during his absence. 27

The feelings of the white people toward the marauding Indians and the depredations and murders they committed were very strong. The death of McCaleb was especially disquieting to them as is shown in an account of the lynching of two hostiles suspected of taking part in the outrage.

I am going to relate to you what happened to two Indians who said they were in the Lost River Battle and no doubt they were.

It was the custom of these renegades who roamed the country doing their devilry during the summer to disband when cold weather came on and go to the various Agencies, draw some blankets and their winter rations. Two of this band came to the Lemhi Agency for that purpose. They had not been there very long until they were boasting to the Indians there about being in this fight with the freight outfit and how badly they wanted to kill them all but could not do so. This talk soon reached Chief Tendoy's ears; he immediately reported to Agent Mr. Wright, who had the sheriff from Salmon arrest them and take them to jail until he reported to the authorities at Washington and received orders what to do with them. . . . In due time he received orders to take them to Fort Hall Reservation, where they would receive their punishment. About this time the body of Mr. McCaleb had been taken up and brought to Salmon for funeral and burial, and this was announced for a certain Sunday afternoon. Mr. Wright, thinking to kill two birds with one stone, made his arrangements to attend the funeral and next day depart with his two Indians to Fort Hall. Mr. Clough, now of Los Angeles, California, and myself attended the funeral from Junction, (now Leador) [sic]. Mr.

27Ibid.
McCaleb, having been a man of highest type citizen, the friends from afar and near who could do so were present for this last tribute to a friend.

The little town was full of people, and the funeral and those responsible for it, the Indians, was the topic of conversation on the street, in the stores, restaurants, and saloons. Mr. Wright soon gathered from the conversations that it was not favorable toward the Indians, now in the jail not far away. His decision was to quietly slip them away and drive to the Lemhi Agency that night, so he had his guards secure the Agency rig and drive around to the jail, he would find the sheriff and be there waiting, which he did. Then with the Indians in the rig and guards to hold them, they started for the Lemhi Agency. Out of town some mile or so he noticed a bunch of men on horseback standing in the road; this looked very suspicious to him so he turned his team and returned to town in great haste, stopped in front of the livery stable, hurried his prisoners into the office and left them in care of the guards while he found the sheriff and arranged to get them back in jail. Of course, the curious were not idle while he hunted the officer; the crowd disarmed the guards and led the Indians out to the edge of town some two blocks, stood them up against a board fence and shot them.

Of course, no one knew who killed the Indians, and a better satisfied crowd than this one would be hard to find anywhere. All was quiet. It just had to be done. Mr. Wright, of course, reported the affair to Washington. Later some half dozen of the crowd were arrested and they with another half dozen or so as witnesses were taken to Malad for trial, but not a witness could swear the absolute guilt of any of the accused so nothing came of it. And that was the final for these two Bannocks. The County authorities buried the bodies the next day, but there was no funeral ceremony.28

The fact that the Lemhis remained peaceable and that conditions did not become much more serious there can largely be attributed to Tendoy and the control he exercised over his band. Although there were those who undoubtedly favored joining the Bannocks, the number was small and from the Bannock portion of the tribe.29

28H. C. McCreery, The Lynching of Two Bannock Indians in Salmon at the Funeral of Jesse McCaleb, ISC MS 399.

29Wright also reported that "there are doubtless some of the
Wright blamed all the troubles encountered on this "warlike, disagreeable, exacting and selfish" portion of the Lemhi band. He stated that "though comparatively few in number they are responsible for the disturbances of the peace of the valley, for the immense loss of crops to the settlers in 1878 in consequence of being obliged to abandon their homes to insure their personal safety, and for retarding the work of other Indians by throwing down fences, turning horses into the fields under cultivation, and other similar conduct.  

To prevent any further repetition of events that prevailed in the summers of 1877 and 1878, a request for the establishment of a military post in the Lemhi Valley was made by the citizens there. In April, 1878, Lt. George S. Wilson of the 12th Infantry was detailed to make a tour of exploration of the valley in connection with the proposed establishment of a post there. His operations were much impeded by the Bannock uprising, and though he made his report, nothing was done at the time.

Indians who would join the hostilities had they the means and the facilities for doing so, but . . . their number is comparatively small, and these are securely held in check through the persistent efforts and widely spreading influence of Tendoy, . . . who under council of the whites appears to have proven himself master of the situation. Annual Report, 1878, p. 51.

In footnote 12, Chapter 6 herein, the letter referred to mentions also that the same fifty Lemhis who joined the Nez Perce for a short time also joined the Bannocks, although they were not of Tendoy's clan. The author could find no further reference to this. ISC MS Trego Collection.

30 Annual Report, 1879, p. 54.

Again in 1879, at the request of George L. Shoup, who indicated the possibility of further Indian hostilities, possibly as a result of the removal order and rumor that troops were enroute, a definite decision was made. It was decided that under the existing circumstances, that to build a military post at Lemhi would be impossible and the only "military protection from depredating bands in Eastern Idaho must be extended from the existing posts of Lapwai, Mount Idaho, and Boise City." 32

In spite of the opportunities the Lemhis had to enter into hostilities against the whites they had always elected to remain at peace with them, and never again were conditions serious enough to warrant any military action or open warfare in the Lemhi Valley.

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CHAPTER 7

RESERVATION MISCELLANY

The conduct of the Lemhis, both among themselves and in their relations with the whites, was often the subject of praiseworthy remark by the agents in charge. This was especially true during the early years of reservation life. In 1876 Fuller reported that "as usual with these people the year had passed away without witnessing any scenes of violence or disturbance. They have no contentions, quarrels, fights, or murders among themselves or with the whites."¹ However, the Lemhis were not without their faults and weaknesses.

Gambling and Intemperance

The two principal vices of which the Lemhis were guilty parties were gambling and intemperance, but even these "two vices were not protracted to any alarming extent among the majority; . . . still they are indulged in to a greater or lesser degree."² Of these two, gambling was at first the more serious problem and one which was so ingrained in them that it seemed to be a second nature to them. While taking the

¹Annual Report, 1876, pp. 44-45; 1874, p. 265.
²Annual Report, 1885, p. 68; 1886, p. 111; 1889, p. 181 states that "the desire for strong drink and card playing are the two dominant social evils which exist to a great extent and are hard to overcome."
census in 1878 Agent Wright visited the different lodges and discovered thriving games of chance going on in several of them. The stakes were "rather formidable-looking metallic cartridges," and continued Wright, "an earnestness was exhibited worthy of better cause." ³

The Lemhis, as is typical with all peoples, had a natural craving for excitement of some kind, which condition was undoubtedly agitated by the relative inactive reservation life. As a means of satisfying this craving they gambled either in "card-playing, stick-hiding, or horse-racing." To further complicate the situation parties of Flathead and Nez Perce Indians made annual summer visits solely for the purpose of participating in this unwholesome pasttime. ⁴

So much a part of their lives was gambling, that the agency police refused to take any active part in its suppression and this, coupled with their desire for strong drink, was considered the greatest obstacle in the road toward civilization and Christianity. ⁵

As serious a problem as gambling was among the Lemhis, it eventually took second place to the more nefarious evil of alcohol. This degrading habit did not become an immediate problem, but once started, made rapid progress. In 1881 Harries reported that the "degrading vice of intemperance . . . has scarcely any hold upon the Lemhi Indians." ⁶

³ Annual Report, 1878, p. 52. ⁴ Annual Report, 1884, p. 66.
⁵ Annual Report, 1885, p. 68. ⁶ Annual Report, 1881, p. 65.
The primary reason for this was undoubtedly that whiskey was not easily available to them at the time. There was none to be had at the agency and in order for a thirsty brave to obtain succor, he would have to make a day's journey to the nearest saloon and then take the calculated risk that he might not receive satisfaction once he reached his destination.

This uncertain condition did not last long. There were too many unscrupulous individuals desirous of exploiting the Indians' weakness for whiskey. In the case of the Lemhis, a principal source for obtaining intoxicants, was from the Chinamen who had filtered into the west as miners or railroad laborers. A small colony of this people established themselves at Salmon City and some of them developed a lucrative trade selling whiskey to the Lemhis. The Chinese proved very adroit in this business and it was difficult to catch them at it. Consequently, the Lemhis obtained a steady and ready supply of "fire-water" which began its inevitable work of destruction upon them. An attempt to convince the Indians that whiskey was bad for them, and that it was the desire of the

7At times the authorities were successful in catching guilty parties. "On the 14th instant I had a clear case against the worst of the lot, one named "Ah Pew," and by the night of the 15th he had been tried under territorial law, found guilty by the jury, and sentenced ... to a fine of $100 and 30 days imprisonment ..." Annual Report, 1882, p. 52.

Not all the suppliers were Chinese. In 1884 two white men and one Negro were arrested, and in 1887 some prominent men of Salmon City were found involved in the illicit traffic. Annual Report, 1884, p. 66; ISC MS 311, Outgoing Correspondence, 1887-88, Lemhi Agent to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Jan. 17, 1887, pp. 200-02.
government that they should not use it, was met by the argument aptly expressed by one of the headmen of the band to the effect that 'if the Great Father in Washington did not want the Indians to have any whiskey, he would stop it from coming into the country, and then they would not get it.'

One young brave learned of the evils of whiskey in a hard but amusing way:

Jack Grouse, while under the influence of whiskey supplied to him at Spring Mountain, attempted to imitate some of his white brethren, who had robbed the stage a few days previous. He stopped the stage and struck at the driver, but was scared off before the robbery was committed. He was arrested by the county officers next day and sent to the county jail to amuse himself with a bucksaw and a wood-pile for two months. The white man who supplied him with whiskey was arrested and sentenced to imprisonment for six months in the county jail.

As is evidenced by this event, whiskey was one of the prime causes for the deterioration of relations between the Indians and the whites in the Lemhi Valley. This is further substantiated in the shooting and seriously wounding of a white woman in Salmon City by a drunken brave. This incident created a great amount of excitement at that place and resulted in a petition from the white citizens to the Lemhi agent requesting a tighter and more stringent control of the Indians under his jurisdiction.

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8Annual Report, 1883, p. 56. 9Annual Report, 1884, p. 66.

10Annual Report, 1887, p. 70; ISC MS 311, Letter to James B. Kirtly, Salmon Citizen, p. 26; Letter to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, January 17, 1887, pp. 200-02.
The primary difficulty in obtaining a conviction of a person suspected of selling liquor to the Indians, was the refusal of the recipient to expose his source. It was probably not so much the moral principle involved that prevented the Indian from testifying against the supplier as it was his desire to protect his future supply of whiskey, which would be cut off if the culprit were in jail. As a result, the traffic continued to be profitable to the business man and degrading to the Indians.

Indian Police

The Indian Police Force was organized in 1878 and, as was typical of most other phases of Lemhi life, met with successes and failures, mostly failures. Because of the peaceful disposition of the tribal members, there was actually very little for the police to do. Their work consisted generally of arresting Indians wanted for various crimes, of which there were few, of patrolling the reservation, of returning unauthorized absentees, and serving as truant officers for the school. The police force was, for the first time, discharged in 1883 by Agent John Harries for incompetency. He felt that, inasmuch as the police had very little to do because of the exemplary behavior of the Lemhis and that what little they did do was not done particularly well, they should be discharged. This was not the opinion of Robert Woodbridge. He reorganized the police shortly after he took charge of the agency in 1885, believing that the police would be a great benefit and support to him. However, J. M.
Needham, who succeeded Woodbridge, was of the same opinion as Harris had been. In June, 1888, he once again discharged the force en masse because they would do nothing without being governed by the dictates of Tendoy. Needham was convinced that Tendoy's influence had "beyond a doubt proved detrimental to the advancement of the Indians," and it was "impossible to get one of the police to do anything against his wishes..."¹¹ This incident was the result of Tendoy's order to the police telling them that they should not force the children to attend the agency school.

That a regular police force was not absolutely necessary is shown in the following:

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The main complaint against and mischief of the Lemhis was their roaming disposition. In 1886 and 1887 there were complaints against bands of Lemhis for making nuisances of themselves in Yellowstone Park, from which place they were ordered to stay away.¹² In 1888 a petition

¹¹Annual Report, 1888, p. 84.

¹²ISC MS 311, Outgoing Correspondence, Lemhi Agent to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, May 30, 1888, pp. 277-79.
was received from the citizens of Huston, Idaho, complaining the Lemhis were killing a great deal of game in the area and also accusing them of killing stock. This petition requested a tighter control of the Lemhis. 13 It proved to be very difficult to keep the Lemhis from roaming and Agent Wright was of the opinion that the only way this could be done was through the use of force. 14 However, this extreme measure was never taken although complaints continued to be reported.

Court of Indian Offenses

In April, 1883, the Department of Interior gave its official approval for the establishment of law courts at each agency (with the exception of the agencies of the Five Civilized Tribes) to be made up of certain reliable Indians. The purpose of the court was to aid the government in abolishing "certain old heathen and barbarous customs, such as the sun dance, scalp dance, war dance, polygamy, etc. 15

As late as 1889 no court had been established at Lemhi. It was impossible to organize such a court among these Indians because practically all the leading men engaged in polygamy and were, therefore, disqualified. Also, the fact that they committed very few offenses reduced the need of a court. In case a Lemhi did commit an offense against one of his fellow tribesmen he was to be tried before a jury composed of

13Ibid., May 31, 1888, pp. 274-76. 14Ibid.

15Annual Report, 1885, p. XXI.
"disinterested and impartial" Indians. In case of conviction the guilty party was to perform some work commensurate with the crime for the benefit of the agency or the tribe.  

Health

The health of the Lemhis was subject to sad neglect until the arrival of an agency physician in October of 1885. Prior to that time, the only attention they received was from the somewhat dubious skill of their agents and the even more dubious antics of the "medicine man." The agents seldom had any special medical training and all the medicine man did was "chant or howl or stretch" himself "over the patient and by drawing deep breaths, endeavor to get the bad spirit from the place where the pain was."  

As a result of the long delay in giving the Lemhis professional treatment, venereal diseases, fevers, consumption, and rheumatism prevailed among them. Because of this neglect long and patient treatment was necessary to even partially stamp out these diseases. The Lemhis, however, were willing patients for the most part, and so gradual improvement was made.  

Missionary Work

The period intervening from the time the reservation was created

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17 Annual Report, 1882, pp. 51-52.

18 Annual Report, 1886, p. 111.
110

until 1889 was characterized by a complete absence of training the Lemhis in Christianity per se. The work performed by the Mormon missionaries in the 1850's had little of permanent value and by the time the reserve was established the Lemhis were living in a state of blissful ignorance. Agent Wright said he did "not know of a better field of labor" than his agency and also that there was "no minister of the gospel of any denomination nor any church structure to be found in this valley, either among the whites or the Indians." 19

The Lemhis had scarcely any comprehension of a God of any kind. A few had a dim notion of the existence of a "Great Spirit" but took no interest in it and expressed not the least concern for their religious or moral well-being. 20 The example set by an element of the white population undoubtedly served as a contributing factor in the Indians' distaste of Christianity. It was even suggested that missionaries should be sent in sufficient numbers to work in the neighborhoods of the various agencies with "their efforts to be especially directed to Christianizing the bad white element where low moral status acts as a perpetual barrier to the progress" of the Indians. 21

The first attempt to help the Indians, after the Mormon efforts, was made in 1886. At this time The Reverend O. W. Mintzer, a pastor of the Methodist Episcopal Church at Salmon City, was holding religious

19 Annual Report, 1878, p. 52; 1879, p. 55.

services at the agency once each month; although primarily for the benefit of the white employees. At the same time regular Sabbath Day Services were being conducted at the boarding school for the edification of the students. These services were directed by the agency employees.²²

The first significant step taken toward Christianizing the Lemhis was made in the summer of 1888, when the Presiding Elder of the Methodist Episcopal Church, under whose authority the Lemhi reservation fell, requested and was granted permission to establish a missionary work among the Indians of that reservation.²³ However, there was little immediate success gained through this endeavor.

²²Annual Report, 1886, p. 110.
²³ISC MS 311, Outgoing Correspondence, 1895-96, Lemhi Agent to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, June 24, 1888, pp. 290-91.
CHAPTER 8

REMOVAL ISSUE

The proposal to remove the Lemhis from their home in the Lemhi Valley to the reservation at Fort Hall was a continual source of controversy from the time the agency was established until the move was finally accomplished in 1907. At first arrangements had been made to transfer the Lemhis to the Crow reservation in Montana and Agent A. J. Simmons was sent to Stinking Water Valley, Virginia City, Beaverhead, and other places to gather the scattered remnants of the mixed bands with the purpose in mind of taking them to that reservation.\(^1\) This plan came to an abrupt halt when hostilities broke out between the Crows and the main Bannock tribe over some stolen horses. The result of these hostilities was that the Bannock portion of the Lemhi band refused to go to the Crow reserve and asked for a home in the Idaho country.\(^2\)

In 1872 the Commissioner of Indian Affairs recommended that, inasmuch as there had been no reservation set aside either by treaty or by executive order, and since they were so few in number, it would be

\(^1\)The Crows were willing and anxious to have the Lemhis join them because it would give added strength in repelling the attacks of the Sioux. Annual Report, 1870, p. 657.

\(^2\)Brigham D. Madsen, op. cit., p. 195.
wise to move the Lemhis, with their consent, to the Fort Hall Reserva-
tion. In 1873 the recommendation for the removal to Fort Hall was reit-
erated by the J. C. P. Shanks Commission which had been sent to inves-
tigate Indian affairs in Idaho, and in May of 1874 the Commissioner
ordered Fuller to take the "necessary steps to affect the same." Fuller
immediately called a council of all the Indians present at the agency,
and sent for Tendoy and other headmen who were absent, in order that
he might read the communique to them and explain fully the wishes of
the Department. There was an instant and angry reaction to the order
and the Lemhis demonstrated their dissatisfaction by "positively"
refusing to go.

In the face of this resistance Fuller was placed in the embar-
rassing situation of trying to reconcile the wishes of the Indian Depart-
ment and the diametrically opposite wishes of the Lemhis. He tempor-
arily sidestepped the issue by writing to the Department for further
instructions. In the meantime Agent J. N. High, at Fort Hall, had made
preparations to receive the Lemhis and when they failed to appear he
blamed "evil minded or interested men" for influencing them against
the move.

3Annual Report, 1872, p. 49. 4Annual Report, 1874, p. 265.

In his accusation Agent High may have been at least partially
correct as far as the "interested men" part is concerned. In a letter
from Idaho's Territorial Representative, John Hailey to George L. Shoup
and E. J. Beatty, dated June 27, 1874, is the following statement: "Your
letter in reference to the removal of Tin Doys band of Indians received
The Indian Commissioner recognized that Tendoy and his band were "utterly adverse" to the removal. So strong were their feelings in opposition to it, that rather than submit to the transfer, the Lemhis were willing to forfeit all aid from the government and gain their livelihood entirely from the chase. The Lemhi Valley was their home and in it had been buried their ancestors for many generations. This was a tie that could not easily be broken. Cognizant of the feelings of this people, the Commissioner reluctantly reversed his order of removal, stating that "they probably can be provided for with as little expense, and brought to civilization more rapidly, if allowed to remain where they are now than if forced to submit to a removal."  

In response to the wishes of the Lemhis and of the white citizens of the Lemhi Valley and upon the recommendation of the Indian Commissioner, President U. S. Grant, on February 12, 1875, issued an "Executive Order Relating to the Lemhi Agency" which thereby ordered that the tract of country in the territory of Idaho lying within the following described boundaries, viz: commencing at a point on the Lemhi River that is due west of a point one mile due south of

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several days ago, which I presented to the Honorable Commissioner of Indian Affairs the same hour that I received it. The Commissioner has decided to let the Indians remain for the present where [sic] they are . . . . Had I have known that the white settlers in Lemhi river [?] so anxious to have these Indians remain, I could have had the appropriation different. . . ." ISC Lemhi MS 570, Original. In another letter written by Hailey years later regarding this subject dated April 13, 1917 is found the statement "that the white settlers wished them [the Lemhis] to remain there for they acted as a protection to the Settlers against other Indians who were not good." ISC Lemhi MS 521. Copy.

6Annual Report, 1874, p. 51; 1871, p. 342.
Fort Lemhi; thence due east about three miles, to the crest of the
mountains; thence with said mountain in a southerly direction about
twelve miles to a point due east of Yeunun [Yearian] bridge on the
Lemhi River; thence west across said bridge and Lemhi River to the
crest of the mountain on the west side of river; thence due east to
the place of beginning, be, and the same hereby is, withdrawn from
sale and set apart for the exclusive use of mixed tribes of Shoshone,
Bannock, and Sheepeater Indians, to be known as the Lemhi Valley
Indian Reservation.

Said tract of country is estimated to contain about one hun-
dred square miles, and is in lieu of the tract provided for in the
third article of an unratified treaty made and concluded at Virginia
City, Montana territory, on the 24th of September, 1868. 7

This order, for a short time only, postponed the question of
removal. By 1879 the question had once again become a controversial
issue.

On January 7, 1879, another order was issued for the consolidating
of the Lemhis and the Fort Hall Indians at Fort Hall. This order was
issued without consultation with either the agent or the Indians prior to
its being received at Lemhi. As a result of this unexpected command, the
tire of the Lemhis was once again raised to a fevered pitch. Tendoy, who
had been in the buffalo country, returned to the reservation early in May.
By this time all preparations for the removal had been made. 8 He bitterly
protested against the change and Pegge, a subchief, "the evil genius of
the tribe," declared that he would go to war rather than submit to the
removal. The conditions became even more serious when a false rumor


8 The preparations for the removal had been accomplished as early
as February 15, but due to the inclemency of the weather, it was deemed
advisable to postpone the move until spring. Annual Report, 1879, p. 54.
began circulating among the tribe that the soldiers were enroute to force
the move if necessary. There ensued immediate preparations for armed
resistance. In view of this strong sentiment and opposition against the
order, it was at least temporarily suspended, but the question remained
unsettled and was, in the future to again become an issue. 9

In an attempt to peacefully and justly settle this issue, a dele-
gation of chiefs of the "Shoshone, Bannock, and Sheepeater tribes of
Indians belonging to the Fort Hall and Lemhi agencies" were invited to
Washington, D. C., to meet with the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to
try to negotiate a settlement. The result of these negotiations was an
"Agreement with the Shoshones, Bannock, and Sheepeaters of Idaho"
which was approved and signed by the several chiefs present on May 14,
1880. According to the provisions of this treaty, the Lemhis were to move
to Fort Hall and there take up lands in severalty. It also provided that
they would receive a compensation for the land ceded of $4,000 a year
for twenty years for the land ceded at Lemhi. Section four of the treaty
provided that the act would go into effect, as it applied to the Lemhis,
only when the President had received satisfactory evidence that the
agreement had been accepted by the majority of all the adult members of
the tribe. 10

9Annual Report, 1879, p. 54; U. S. Dept. of the Interior, Eleventh
Annual Report of the Board of Indian Commissioners (Washington: GPO,
1879), p. 65.

10Even had the Lemhis ratified the agreement it would not have
gone into effect for several years because it did not get congressional
Contrary to the anticipation and wishes of the Indian Department, the Lemhis did not sustain the actions of their chiefs and headmen. As a result, that part of the agreement pertaining to them was, at least at that time, held inoperative and continued to remain so until the majority of the tribe finally ratified it in 1907.

The failure of the Lemhis to uphold the actions of their chiefs and also of Congress to immediately approve the agreement postponed any immediate action toward the fulfillment of the contemplated move to Fort Hall. However, in spite of the absence of official action, in 1882 thirty-two members of the Lemhi band did voluntarily move to the Fort Hall reserve.\(^{11}\)

On February 23, 1889, Congress finally approved the 1880 agreement and once more an effort was made to effect a removal.\(^{12}\) To facilitate this move and to impress the Indians with the importance placed upon it by the Indian Department, a recommendation was made and approved that a United States Indian Inspector be sent to the Lemhi Agency to secure the removal.

In compliance with this decision, Inspector F. C. Armstrong was sent to Lemhi to explain to the Indians the provisions of the 1880 agreement,

\(^{11}\) Madsen, op. cit., p. 280.

\(^{12}\) In 1888 a rumor was circulating concerning the impending removal. This caused ill feeling toward the agent, who the Lemhis accused as being responsible for the proposed move. However, the rumor was started as a result of a letter from the territorial governor to the citizens of Salmon City.
and if at all possible, obtain their consent to transfer to Fort Hall. A careful presentation of the entire matter was made to the Lemhi council. Nevertheless, when a vote was taken to determine the feelings of this band, not a single vote was cast in favor of the move.\textsuperscript{13}

It is difficult to understand just what it was that held the Lemhis to their valley and made them refuse to move. Traditionally, the valley had served primarily as a gathering place where the band congregated for short periods when they were not in the buffalo country hunting or at Camas Prairie gathering the Camas Root. It is possible to assume that more than a strong attachment to the Lemhi Valley was their inability to more than momentarily comprehend the advantages of such a move. This contention can be supported by the fact that in the winter of 1888–89, when Tendoy and other headmen, accompanied by a band of their followers, visited Fort Hall, the entire group appeared "not only willing but anxious" to take up more and better land at Fort Hall. Yet, during the council called by Inspector Armstrong the following spring, not a single Indian consented to the move.\textsuperscript{14}

It is important to point out that not all the Lemhis were completely satisfied with the reservation. In 1878 Agent Wright reported that "the Indians are dissatisfied with it (the Lemhi Reserve) and have earnestly requested that the reservation be extended or they be removed to the

\textsuperscript{13}\textit{Annual Report, 1889}, p. 78

\textsuperscript{14}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 78, 180.
Madison in Montana." This statement raises the theory that perhaps it was not the move itself which the Lemhis so strongly opposed as it was the place to which they were to be transferred. Lieutenant Colonel Alfred Sulley, Superintendent of Indian Affairs in the Montana territory, as early as 1869 reported concerning these Indians and their contemplated settlement at Fort Hall that "they expressed the greatest aversion to that place; for what reason I could not learn." It is also possible, that by a bit of shrewd reasoning, the Lemhis saw an end to their traditional way of life tied up in a move to Fort Hall. In Lemhi, because of lack of resources, they had an excuse for not becoming farmers; at Fort Hall this excuse would no longer be valid.

As a result of Inspector Armstrong's visit, the final decision concerning the removal was once more put off, and the Lemhis were allowed to remain in their valley. Because of this the "constant dread which they entertained of being moved from their old homes. . . ." was alleviated and the spirit of the Lemhis greatly improved. They became more willing to do constructive work such as farming, construction of fences, houses, and so on, as soon as their fears that they might be removed and have to abandon their accomplishments were allayed. 17

15 Annual Report, 1878, p. 51.
16 Annual Report, 1869, p. 731-32.
PART III

RESERVATION YEARS, 1890-1907

General Statement

The policy followed by the government of issuing goods almost indiscriminantly to the Indians proved to be an obstacle in the advance of the Lemhis toward civilization. The progress they did make in the fields of education and agriculture can largely be attributed to the efforts and diligence of the white employees and agents. The number of persons achieving this progress was limited, the main portion of the tribe continuing to live in a manner which could not, by any stretch of the imagination, be considered progressive. In fact, the contact these Indians had with the whites and the gratuitous allotments presented by the government often had an effect exactly opposite of the purpose intended. Some of the Lemhis, as a result of the aid rendered them, reverted to a behavior which combined the bad characteristics of both the redman and the white. The total effect was a retrogression in the character and habits of many of the mixed band to a state very low in existing standards of civilization and morality.  

1As late as 1904 Agent Claude C. Covey made the following statement about the Lemhis: "These Indians are the most backward I have ever seen . . . the majority still wear long hair, paint their faces, engage in
This condition of degradation was found principally among a certain segment of the young men, who having been wards of the government for the major part or all of their lives, were not the least bit inclined to attempt to better their condition through any worthwhile industry. So long as they were able to gain government subsistence without effort on their own part, they did so. These slovenly braves did nothing but "run horses, gamble, eat, sleep, and drink intoxicants." It was the opinion of Agent George H. Monk that this group of Lemhis would starve rather than engage in labor of any description.

Agent E. M. Yearian reported of the tribe in 1898 that they were "as degraded and ungrateful a set as one finds;" they had, according to him, been humored and spoiled like children. The conditions under which they lived, their mode of living, and the barbaric practices which they indulged in were an indication to Yearian that these people had been granted undue concessions by preceding agents. Few availed themselves of the opportunity of earning a living in a civilized manner, the majority continuing to lead a lazy, vagabond life that was marked by begging and constant complaining. They were only satisfied when they had plenty to eat, but would exert little effort to acquire this succor.  

Indian dances, patronize medicine men. . . . ISC MS 317, Outgoing Correspondence, 1904, Agent to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, September 20, 1904, p. 461.  

2ISC MS 309, Outgoing Correspondence, 1893, Annual Report, July 11, 1893, p. 97.  

3Annual Report, 1898, p. 145.
In describing the Lemhis in his annual report for 1899 Agent Yearian had the following to say:

They are addicted to gambling, horse racing and dancing, all of which have a demoralizing effect and are attended with more or less superstition. They make much ado over the loss of their friends, frequently squaws may be seen at Indian burials with their limbs lacerated and bleeding, howling with the wildest manner like maniacs. The best mourners are presented with a horse or something of value at the close of the burial, which accounts for their wounds and bitter expressions of sorrow. With the deceased is usually buried all articles of clothing, etc., that will be needed in the "Happy Hunting Ground" where all good Indians will sooner or later go.

Frequently property of their lost ones is destroyed and usually the tepee in which an Indian dies is burned. If a near relative dies, the squaws and sometimes men cut off their hair through some superstitious idea, though ordinarily they are very much opposed to having their hair cut, which probably accounts for their protests against sending boys to school. All they want is plenty to eat at present; something to satisfy their immediate hunger. They live to enjoy today. For many years they have been in contact with civilized life. Yet, many cling tenaciously to their old time customs. If asked when they expect to settle down and go to work, they say "Naba-shy" (meaning by and by) they intend to do something for themselves. Not now, unfortunately; however, tomorrow never comes. This has been their cry for years. Procrastination seems to be second nature with them and in part accounts for their present dependent condition.  

The wearing of long hair, the painting of their bodies, and the wearing of their native costume, continued to be a common practice among the Lemhis after the turn of the century. These practices were contrary to the policy of the Indian Department, which felt that they must be abandoned if civilization was to be reached. Painting, besides being considered an uncivilized practice, had a very detrimental affect. A

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4ISC MS 313, Outgoing Correspondence, 1899, Annual Report, August 23, 1899, pp. 120-23.
great deal of the blindness found among the Indians was the direct result of paint getting into their eyes. The Lemhis were slow to recognize this danger, insisting that paint served a very practical purpose. They believed, and perhaps justly so, that it acted as a good insulator keeping them warm in the winter and cool in the summer. 5

Much of the improvement that was made in the years following 1890 was achieved only by means of threats and coercion. This was particularly true in regards to the wearing of citizens' clothing. Prior to 1901 there were only seventy-two of the Lemhis who did this entirely. That year the number greatly increased, one hundred and twenty-seven having abandoned their traditional style completely and one hundred and twenty-one partially. However, this improvement was accomplished only when Agent Yearian threatened to withhold rations from any Indian who refused to conform with the approved clothing styles or who sold or traded any of his clothing allotment for other goods or services. The practice of bartering away clothing reached alarming proportions, often with the result that those involved had nothing to wear but their blankets and leggings. As might be expected, the threat to withhold rations from anyone guilty of such disposal brought the practice to an abrupt halt and even prompted many of the more backward Indians to put their clothing allotment to its intended use. 6 If the Indians had been given more

5ISC MS 326, Incoming Correspondence, 1902, Commissioner of Indian Affairs to Lemhi Agent, January 8, 1902.

6ISC MS 315, Outgoing Correspondence, 1901, Annual Report, August 15, 1901, pp. 258-59.
variety, they may have adapted citizen styles more readily. That they had definite likes and dislikes regarding what they were to wear can be seen in the following statement by Agent E. Nasholds:

They [the Lemhis] say they are sick and tired of the same color, that they never had anything but brown ducking and Kentucky jeans. As far as the material is concerned, they are satisfied, and I feel sure that if their clothing could be made up of assorted colors that at least 50 per cent more of them would wear citizens' clothes. They say that if they could get for overalls blue denims, it would suit them, and would be a change, and I believe such a change in colors would be a great inducement for them to wear citizens' clothes.  

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The Lemhis, in retaining their superstitious beliefs, often added unnecessarily to their miseries. One superstition which was especially detrimental and one which caused undue suffering, was the practice of burning the house or tepee in which a death had occurred. Poorly sheltered as Tendoy's band was, the destruction of a wooden house, in any condition, was a serious blow to the advancement and comfort of the tribe. 8

However, in all fairness to these Indians it must be pointed out that they did make progress in certain undertakings and endeavors, in spite of their seemingly slow advancement toward civilization and self-sufficiency. This advancement was made particularly in the fields of agriculture and scholastic education, as will be subsequently shown in this paper. The Lemhis also possessed certain qualities of character which were very commendable. Their honesty and peaceful disposition,

8 ISC MS 309, Outgoing Correspondence, August 15, 1893, pp. 98-99.
both among themselves and in their relationships with the whites were often commented on and highly praised by the agents. One outstanding characteristic, which was typical of the major portion of the mixed band, and one which would have been considered especially praiseworthy under other circumstances, was the great generosity they displayed. As long as one tribal member had a supply of food, no one would go hungry under his roof. Realizing and understanding this, indolent members of the tribe would take advantage of the situation and, whenever possible, would live off the efforts and generosity of their more industrious brethren. This proved to be one more obstacle in the path of the Lemhi people toward civilization, for as long as they were able to procure adequate food without effort, the parasitical Lemhis would live on the industry and diligence of others.

Tendoy's followers also made marked improvement in habits of personal cleanliness; in caring for their children; in the preparation of food; in the care of their homes, implements, and stock; and in the construction of permanent homes.

9Annual Report, 1898, p. 145; Annual Report, 1874, p. 265; Annual Report, 1876, p. 44. These reports give accounts of honesty and peaceful disposition of the Lemhis.

10ISC MS 309, Outgoing Correspondence, Annual Report, August 15, 1893, pp. 94-95; ISC MS, Outgoing Correspondence, 1894-95, Agent to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, December 6, 1894, p. 35.

11ISC MS 310, Outgoing Correspondence, Annual Report, August 16, 1895, pp. 256-57.
In 1901 the Office of Indian Affairs initiated a much stricter and more realistic policy in regard to the issuance of rations to the Indians. From this time on only those who were unable to sustain themselves—the old, the infirm, the orphans, were to be freely supported by the government. The remainder, all those who were able to work for themselves, were to be issued goods only in amounts equal to the amount of labor they contributed. It was finally realized that pure charity on the part of the government toward the Indians would not instill within them a desire to give service in return. In practice it usually had the opposite effect. The Indian Commissioner lucidly described the effects of the old policy in the following statement: "It produces idleness and destroys labor; it promotes beggary and destroys initiative; it perpetuates pauperism and stifles industry; it is an effectual barrier to the progress of the Indian toward civilization."\(^\text{12}\)

To implement the new policy, the Office of Indian Affairs proposed that the money which was used to purchase the annuity supplies would thereafter be used to pay wages to those Indians who were either willing or could be induced to work at constructive labor. Each was to receive $1.25 per day for eight hours' work. Jobs and occupations were to be provided to all able-bodied male Indians in lieu of annuities and supplies. In compliance with these instructions, the Lemhi agent cut off issuance of all agricultural implements and supplies. However, he

\(^{12}\) ISC MS 325, *Incoming Correspondence, 1901*, Commissioner of Indian Affairs to Lemhi Agent, September 27, 1901.
did continue to issue a limited amount of goods, particularly food, without which Tendoy's followers could not have survived.\(^1\) This action was necessary because the Lemhi reservation was too small to provide full employment and subsistence for all its inhabitants.\(^2\) As a result, many of the Lemhi Indians continued to live on government dole and did not obtain the beneficial results which were hoped for at the institution of the new policy. It was because the new policy could not be fully implemented at Lemhi that the long contemplated removal to Fort Hall was finally accomplished in 1907.

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\(^1\) ISC MS 326, *Incoming Correspondence, 1902*, Commissioner of Indian Affairs to Lemhi Agent, January 7, 1902.

CHAPTER 11

LEMHI MISCELLANY

Gambling and Intemperance

The Lemhis continued to have a strong attraction to gambling. Agent E. Nasholds reported in 1891 that they were "inveterate gamblers, both men and women. They will sometimes gamble the last thing they have. I use every influence I have to break it up, but have met with little success."¹ It was as useless to talk to the wind as it was to Tendoy's followers on the evils of this vice.

The thirst the Lemhis had for whiskey did not diminish with the passage of time, nor did the desire for the profit derived from this unlawful traffic on the part of the unscrupulous bootlegger. Any attempt to curb this menace was effectively countered by the unwillingness of the Indians to provide testimony against the person or persons who supplied the intoxicants. The problem of identifying the culprits was made all the more difficult because a good portion of the trade was carried on by tramps and hoboos who frequented the small towns along the railroad. This class of individuals, being continually on the move, proved very difficult to capture and even more difficult to convict.²

¹Annual Report, 1891, p. 232.

²ISC MS 309, Outgoing Correspondence, 1893-94, Annual Report, 148
By 1895 the consumption of alcoholic beverages among the Lemhis had become so serious a problem as to prompt the agent to post a "reasonable reward" for information leading to the conviction of parties supplying the Indians with liquor. Through continual effort and diligence, the agency officials were able to capture a number of offenders. In 1897 seven parties were arrested and convicted. They were either fined or jailed for the illegal sale of intoxicants to the Lemhis. The method used in tracking down these individuals had a bit of "cloak and dagger" flavor. It involved the services of the Indians themselves. A few chosen "Trusties" would circulate through the areas surrounding the reservation under the pretense of desiring liquor for themselves. Whenever an individual became unwary or careless enough to offer such brew, the Trusty would immediately report this action. After the arrest of the culprit the Indian Agent would testify against him at the trial.

In spite of this ruse, the trade continued to exist. It reached such proportions that by 1901 it was estimated that fully one half of the Lemhis were slaves, in varying degrees, to this degrading vice. Even Chief Tendoy succumbed to the evil. As a result of this weakness, he

August 15, 1893, pp. 101-02.

3 ISC MS 310, *Outgoing Correspondence, 1894-95*, Lemhi Agent to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, September 30, 1895, pp. 294-95.

4 ISC MS 312, *Outgoing Correspondence, 1897*, Lemhi Agent to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, pp. 55-58.


had to suffer the indignity of spending time in jail for getting drunk and beating his wife with a club.\textsuperscript{7}

No matter what precautions were taken, this nefarious trade would continue. As long as an Indian had the money and the thirst for "fire-water," he would encounter little difficulty in finding unscrupulous men ready to supply him with the desired beverage.

Indian Police

The Lemhi police, because of the peaceful disposition of the people, had very little to do. However, in spite of the easy life they could lead, it was difficult to maintain first class Indians in the police ranks. This was due primarily to the low pay which an Indian policeman at Lemhi received. It would only be natural that morale in such a force would be low, as was very definitely the case in this instance. The indifference of the Lemhi police can be seen in an incident which took place in 1892. At that time Agent Monk had a rule in force that one policeman had to be on duty at all times. The members of the force did not see eye to eye with the agent on this particular ruling and so threatened to resign unless it was abolished. Monk, refusing to be intimidated, called their bluff and accepted the resignations of five members of the six man force. He immediately found replacements for the dismissed group. To his dismay, however, the new force did not prove to be one bit more cooperative and

\textsuperscript{7}ISC MS 315, Outgoing Correspondence, 1901, Lemhi Agent to Sheriff of Lemhi County, December 2, 1901, p. 436.
efficient than the previous one had. They were, generally speaking, not energetic in enforcing the regulations of the agency, or in suppressing the minor misdeemeanors that were common. They seldom made arrests of their own volition, almost always needing an express order from the agent before performing this duty. To make matters even more difficult, unless Tendoy would give his sanction to an act, the police would not carry out the orders of the agent.

In order to procure a force which could be relied upon consistently and one which would not be so completely subservient to the whims and fancies of Tendoy, Agent E. M. Yearian on October 20, 1900, requested permission of the Indian Department to import six competent Indians from the Fort Hall Reservation to serve as the Lemhi police force. Contrary to the hopes of Yearian, the installation of the police from Fort Hall did not prove to be as successful a measure as he had anticipated.

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9 ISC MS 309, Outgoing Correspondence, 1893-94, Annual Report, August 15, 1893, p. 100.

10 ISC MS 313, Outgoing Correspondence, 1899, Annual Report, August 23, 1899, p. 141.

11 ISC MS 314, Outgoing Correspondence, 1900, Lemhi Agent to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, October 20, 1900, pp. 346-48.

12 As a matter of fact, this effort caused much more harm than it did good. Two of the Fort Hall policemen were sentenced in the United States District Court to long prison terms for "reprehensible conduct" while on duty by entering the girls' dormitory and "debauching" the girl students. ISC MS 316, Outgoing Correspondence, 1902, Agent to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, February 27, 1902, p. 87-92 and June 30, 1902, p. 321.
However, the act did serve indirectly to ease the difficulty of securing better service from the home police, who within a short time replaced their Fort Hall counterparts. The threat of importing outside members prompted the Lemhi police to perform their duties more willingly and more efficiently.\(^{13}\)

In the summer of 1904 occurred an incident, involving both the members of the Court of Indian Offenses and the police force, which graphically portrayed the uncertainty with which the Lemhi agent was faced in regard to the dependability of his police. On this occasion Agent Claude C. Covey ordered the arrest of an Indian who had been living with a school girl without being married to her. The Indian judges appeared to hold the trial. One of the judges had long hair, a condition which was not sanctioned by the Indian Department as being conducive to the position he held. Covey, according to his instructions, ordered the judge to cut his hair, which order the Indian in question refused to obey. Thereupon Agent Covey ordered a policeman to arrest the man. Not to be outdone in this comedy, the officer also refused to obey. The exasperated Covey had no choice but to immediately disassociate the policemen and demand the judge's shield of office. This action promptly inspired a violent reaction on behalf of three other members of the police force present, who in a fit of pique attacked Covey with the intent of doing him bodily harm. In this precarious position, the bewildered agent

\(^{13}\)Ibid., June 20, 1902, p. 321.
would not have had a chance alone. Fortunately for him, the agency clerk and a white farmer, employed to help the Lemhis in their efforts at agriculture, were present. After what was undoubtedly a very brisk battle, the Indian assailants were overpowered, as all Indians usually were, and forcefully ejected from the building. The remaining members of this mutinous crew, although too timid to join the battle, were not the least bit timid in their refusal to arrest their infuriated brethren. The result of all this action was a new police force. 14

The offenses which were committed by the Lemhis ranged from drunkenness and fighting to cruelty to animals, to adultery, to rape, to homicide, to wife beating, and wife stealing (in order of importance).

A partial list of the number of offenses and the years in which they occurred is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Kinds of Offenses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>One case involved the killing of a brave in a drunken brawl, ruled accidental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1892</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1893</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Suicide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9 cases tried; 7 convictd</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is obvious from this list that members of the Lemhi band were

14 ISC MS 317, Outgoing Correspondence, 1904, Lemhi Agent to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, August 8, 1904, pp. 388-89.
not prone to be trouble-makers or law-breakers. In this respect they deserve much praise and commendation.

Court of Indian Offenses

The Court of Indian Offenses, after long delay, was organized in 1901. It was made up of three of the most intelligent and competent of the Lemhi male Indians. There were several reasons for the delay in its organization. The first, and the most important, was that the Lemhis themselves did not favor such a court. They were willing to abide by the decisions of the agents on minor issues and were willing to take their chances in the white men's court in cases of a more serious nature. A second reason for the delay was that most of the reliable men with the capabilities and qualifications requisite for being judges were polygamists. This condition automatically excluded from the service many of the otherwise qualified Lemhis. The third reason for the delay in the establishment of a court was the unwillingness of those who met all the qualifications to serve in such a capacity.

For the most part, after the creation of the court, the judges conducted themselves and their duties in a satisfactory way, demonstrating intelligence and conscientiousness in their conduct of trials. The case mentioned previously concerning the long-haired judge was the exception.

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15 ISC MS 315, *Outgoing Correspondence, 1901*, Annual Report, August 15, 1901, pp. 263-64.

rather than the rule.

In 1901 the newly instituted court tried and convicted five
offenders. The crimes were of minor nature and the offenders were sen-
tenced to various durations of hard labor by day and confinement in the
agency jail by night.\(^{17}\)

Throughout the next year nine individuals were tried on charges
ranging from drunkenness and disorderly conduct, to assault and battery,
to wife beating, and wife stealing. Seven convictions were obtained and
similar punishments were meted out to the convicted.\(^{18}\)

There were rarely cases involving crimes of a more serious
nature than the preceding ones mentioned committed by the Lemhi Indians.
Because of this, the demands made upon the Court of Indian Offenses
were very light and easily resolved.

Depredations

The peaceable and friendly attitude which the Lemhis had faith-
fully adhered to during the pre-reservation and reservation years up to
1889 was maintained throughout the subsequent period. However, there
did arise the minor frictions which could be expected in any group in
practically any society. The first disturbance, and one which had the
potentiality of becoming very serious, resulted from the disaffection of

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\(^{17}\) ISC MS 315, Outgoing Correspondence, 1901, Annual Report,
August 15, 1901, pp. 263-64.

\(^{18}\) ISC MS 316, Outgoing Correspondence, 1902, Lemhi Agent to
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, June 30, 1902, p. 32.
a certain portion of the Bannock tribe located at Fort Hall. This faction left that reservation in July and August of 1895, situated themselves in the Jackson Hole country of Wyoming, and threatened hostilities against the white settlers of the surrounding territory.¹⁹

There was what proved to be unwarranted fear on the parts of white authorities and settlers that the Lemhis were about to join this outlaw band. This fear was incensed by wild unfounded newspaper reports which stated that the Lemhis were going in groups of one hundred to four hundred to join the Fort Hall Bannocks at Jackson Hole.²⁰ These reports were subsequently proven to be completely unreliable, and by raising the ire of uninformed white settlers against them, committed a great injustice to the loyalty and friendship of Tendoy and his people. Certain of the white citizens apparently attempted to stir up the Lemhis against the whites by telling them that soldiers had been sent to Wyoming and Idaho to kill the insurgent Indians and any others who might happen along. In an attempt to counteract these rumors and to dissuade any Lemhi who might feel inclined to go to Jackson, Agent Julius A. Andrews called the Lemhis into council and read them a letter from Chief Washakie, the great Ute chief, which advised all of them to stay at home until matters were settled at Jackson Hole and also advised them to remain

¹⁹ For a full account of this episode, see Madsen, op. cit., pp. 249–71.

²⁰ ISC MS 310, Outgoing Correspondence, 1894–95, Agent to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, August 5, 1895, pp. 238–41.
friendly to the whites. Upon taking a count of those present, Andrews found that all of the Lemhis assigned to the reservation were present with the exception of three braves.\textsuperscript{21}

Even though falsely accused of hostility, throughout the duration of this trouble, the mixed band continued to profess their admiration of and friendship to the whites. They performed no hostile act nor made any unfriendly gesture toward them.\textsuperscript{22}

In other instances, the Lemhis were not quite so stalwart as they proved to be in the preceding case. On their periodic excursions in search of game and to gather the camas root, these Indians sometimes got themselves involved in minor difficulties. For example, in April, 1898, the citizens of Custer County petitioned the Secretary of Interior to prohibit the Lemhis from fishing and hunting in that county. These energetic Custeronians had "gone to the trouble and the expense of stocking [their] Big Lost River with trout fish and those lazy devils [had] been taking their fish and game..."\textsuperscript{23}

A similar protest had been made the previous year by the citizens around Camas Prairie. It had long been the custom of the Lemhis to

\textsuperscript{21}\textit{Ibid}. Also on August 31 additional correspondence states that three braves unaccounted for at the council were shortly after discovered in the Teton Mountain Range, which is near Jackson Hole by U. S. Troops who ordered them to return to Lemhi. This they did immediately.

\textsuperscript{22}\textit{Ibid}. Correspondence to the Indian Commissioner on July 31 and August 5 bear testimony to the friendliness of the Lemhis.

\textsuperscript{23}\textit{ISC MS 322, Incoming Correspondence, 1898}, Commissioner of Indian Affairs to Lemhi Agent, May 24, 1898.
visit that area every year to gather the Camas Root which served as an important source of food for them. During the summer of the year in question, a party of five families were doing just this. While passing through a deserted village, these Indians entered one of the houses and removed a cloth lining from the walls. Upon discovering this, the owner of the house and other citizens of the area made a strong protest, demanding the revocation of the privilege enjoyed by the Lemhis of visiting this area. The citizens also demanded that the offenders be brought to justice and punished. This petty offense seems very trivial and only serves to reveal the selfish attitude of certain elements of the white population. It is also an expression of the low regard in which they held the Indians in general.24

As a result of these petitions and other like complaints, there was a restriction of the freedom heretofore allowed the Lemhis of leaving their reserve in search for food. However, it proved almost impossible to curtail completely the roaming tendencies of this people.

The actions of Chief Tendoy himself proved to be a source of trouble at Lemhi. As he grew older he became more and more prone to disagree with the agents and to break reservation rules and regulations. While this in itself is not so unusual and can be attributed to old-fashioned ideas and stubbornness, the time he chose to cause trouble was

24ISC MS 312, Outgoing Correspondence, 1897, Agent to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, July 3, 1897, p. 58; and Agent to Fort Hall Agent, August 11, 1897, pp. 62-64 give accounts of this depredation as does a telegram dated July 1, 1897 from the Agent to the Commissioner.
peculiar. By a Special Act of Congress approved December 18, 1892, a life pension had been granted to the chief by the United States government. This pension was a reward for the invaluable service he had rendered throughout his life. The pension had been in effect only a little over a month, when Tendoy's actions became so obnoxious that Agent George H. Monk recommended to the Indian Department that it be suspended until his behavior improved. This recommendation was made when the chief, in defiance of Agent Monk, released several Indian prisoners from the agency jail. The Lemhi agent was instructed by the Secretary of the Interior to inform Tendoy that unless he would submit to the authority of the government that the Indian Department would recommend to Congress the repeal of the act granting his pension. This warning proved, at least for the time being, sufficient to put Tendoy on his good behavior. This can be seen in statements made in a letter from Monk to the Indian Commissioner dated July 11, 1893. Here the agent praised Tendoy's help and the assistance he had rendered in the operation of the agency. He went one step further in appealing to the Indian Department


26Although Monk recommended only a temporary suspension of the pension, the Indian Department reported that it could not legally withhold payment. Monk was therefore advised to inform Tendoy that unless he submitted to the authority of the agent that the Indian Department would recommend out-right repeal of the special act. ISC MS 319, Incoming Correspondence, 1893, Commissioner of Indian Affairs to Agent, March 31, 1893.
to "take no step toward having repealed the special act, granting Chief Tendoy a pension." 27

However, in 1900 there developed another incident which resulted in a serious controversy between the agent and Tendoy. This controversy arose over the destruction of an agency fence by some of the Lemhis under orders from Tendoy. Agent E. M. Yearian reported concerning the incident that

after having nearly completed one and one half (1-1/2) miles of fence which enclosed a tract of land in the immediate vicinity of the Agency to be used as a school farm and pasture, (which land was selected by Inspector McConnel and myself) at the instigation of Chief Tendoy some 20 or 30 Indians deliberately tore down the fence and hauled it out and piled it near the agency. When this depredation was reported to me by the farmer, I immediately sent for Tendoy to ascertain his reasons for ordering his Indians to tear down the fence. I also at once dispatched an Indian policeman to where the Indians were committing the depredations and ordered them [to stop, telling them] that I had sent for Chief Tendoy to have a talk with him. The Indians went on with the work of destruction in open violation to my order.

Tendoy obeyed the summons but the only reason he could give for prompting the Indians to commit this act was that he had not been consulted in the matter of enclosing this land.

I have not yet ascertained the amount of damages, if any, have been done to the fencing, but presume it has been considerable... 28

After having cooled down, Yearian found that very little damage had been done to the fencing. Tendoy demonstrated a repentant mood by promising that he would have the fencing returned so the fence could

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27 ISC MS 309, Outgoing Correspondence, 1893-94, Lemhi Agent to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, July 11, 1893, p. 77

28 ISC MS 313, Outgoing Correspondence, 1899, Lemhi Agent to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, March 14, 1900, pp. 491-95.
be rebuilt. To discourage Tendoy from repeating a similar debacle and warn him of consequences which might follow if he did, the Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs sent him the following letter:

My Friend:

On March 14, 1900, Agent Yeanian of Lemhi Agency, informed me, that in open violation of his orders, some of your Indians deliberately tore down about one and one half miles of fencing that he had caused to be erected to enclose the School Farm, and that it was by your advice that they committed the depredation. He also states that you oppose his efforts to induce the children to attend school.

It is with deepest regret that I learned that you, who have always been considered the white man's friend, should thus wrongfully advise your people to disregard the Agent's orders and destroy the fence.

You must understand that Agent Yeanian is there to enforce the rules made by the Government, for the control and care of your people; he is carrying out my instructions and will be sustained by the Government in so doing. You must obey his lawful orders. If at any time, you have complaint to make, you must make it to me, and I will see that matters are satisfactorily adjusted, but I cannot permit you to take matters in your own hands as you did in regard to the school farm fence.

Now my friend, while in consideration of the friendship you have always shown for the white man, in years gone by, the Government sees fit for this once to overlook your wrong doing, I desire to state that any such action on the part of either you or your people will not be tolerated in the future. If crimes are committed, the guilty parties will surely be punished.

I hope you will not make it necessary for the Government to use harsh measures, for it is my wish that we remain friends, and I ask your assistance in advancing the interests and bettering the condition of your people. The influence you have over them should be exercised for good, and not for evil.

It is my wish that you advise your people to send their children to school, that they may be fitted to support themselves and make their own living as the white brothers do.

The Government knows what is best for you and your people, and is doing all that it can with the funds set aside for that purpose, to better your condition and prepare you to live among your white brothers, and it is your duty to do everything within your power to aid in accomplishing this object.
And now my friend, I will say good-bye, fully believing and expecting that since I have made known to you my wishes, we will be in the future as we have been in the past, the best of friends.

Acting Commissioner  

This letter evidently produced the desired effect, for there was no further serious trouble involving Tendoy in the years he remained as leader of the Lemhis.

Missionary Work

The missionary program that was to have been inaugurated in 1899 failed to materialize with the result that the prevailing condition of spiritual unenlightenment continued to exist among a very large percentage of the Lemhi people. However, a circuit minister did begin to hold Christian services once a month, and though a few of the Lemhis attended the first few meetings, their interest disappeared as their curiosity was satisfied with the result that the congregation soon consisted only of agency employees and school children.

The Sunday School conducted by the school employees continued to be the primary instrument through which religious training was funneled to the Lemhi children. As far as the adults were concerned, they displayed very little interest in the "white man's religion." Their attitude relative to this was indicated in a conversation between Agent Yearian and Chief Tendoy concerning Christ. Tendoy said, "me no savy Christ.

29 ISC MS 324, Incoming Correspondence, 1900. Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs to Tendoy, May 10, 1900.

white man heap smart. Indian no see. The Lemhis' concept of the hereafter consisted of the almost universal Indian theory of the "happy hunting ground" where all good Indians would go and their god was facetiously described by Yearian as being their stomach. Sundays were given to horse racing, gambling, and dancing.  

The first worthwhile step to remedy this situation was taken in 1901. At this time the Right Reverend J. B. Funsten, Protestant Episcopal Missionary Bishop of Idaho and Wyoming, requested permission to establish a mission at Lemhi and to construct a mission house. This request was heartily endorsed by Yearian, who forwarded it to the Office of Indian Affairs. The request subsequently received final approval from that office, authority being granted to set aside five acres of unoccupied reservation land for the use of the mission. The new mission was placed under the direction of Miss Helen C. Stockdell, who devoted "herself with unswerving fidelity to the spiritual regeneration of that people.  

Health

The period between 1890-1907 was characterized by a gradual increase of confidence in the white man's medicine, followed by a corresponding decline in the influence of the medicine man. This

31 ISC MS 313, Outgoing Correspondence, 1899, Annual Report, August 23, 1899, pp. 324-28.

32 Ibid.

33 ISC MS 316, Outgoing Correspondence, 1902, Annual Report, June 30, 1902, p. 320.
confidence led to a gradual improvement of the general health of the Lemhis. 34

Throughout the early part of this period there was no serious outbreak of contagious diseases. However, the hereditary and social diseases that had been common among the Lemhis during earlier periods continued to afflict many of them. 35

After the turn of the century a series of epidemics or threatened epidemics plagued the inhabitants of the Lemhi Reservation. In 1901 a threatened diptheria outbreak was prevented by the prompt action of the agent and physician in vaccinating all the Lemhis. The spring of 1902 saw an outbreak of measles which forced the closing of the school to prevent spreading. In 1903, and 1904, small-pox epidemics broke out, the 1903 one being the more serious, resulting in one hundred and ten cases with six deaths. 36

34 Annual Report, 1890, p. 80; 1892, p. 241.
35 ISC MS 309, Outgoing Correspondence, 1893–94, Annual Report, August 15, 1893, pp. 102–03.
36 ISC MS 315, Outgoing Correspondence, 1901, Lemhi Agent to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, December 6, 1901, pp. 446–47; December 23, 1901, p. 463. ISC MS 316, Outgoing Correspondence, 1902, Lemhi Agent to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, May 10, 1902, p. 216. Annual Report, 1903, p. 158.
CHAPTER 12

REMOVAL TO FORT HALL

The long standing removal problem passed its biggest obstacle on December 28, 1905. At that time Inspector McLaughlin of the Indian Department obtained a formal agreement from the majority of the Lemhis in favor of the transfer to Fort Hall.\(^1\) This vote of approval acted as a final ratification of the "Agreement with the Shoshone, Bannock, and Sheepeaters of Idaho" which had been negotiated in Washington, D. C. by a delegation of Lemhi chieftains on May 14, 1880. According to the terms of this treaty, it would go into effect only when the President of the United States had received satisfactory evidence that the agreement had been accepted by a majority of all the adult male members of the tribe. All efforts to get this majority between 1880 and 1905, when success was finally achieved, had failed.

It is very likely that Tendoy played an important part at this council which approved the transfer as Judge O. R. Baum\(^2\) made the

\(^1\)Fort Hall Archives, File 253, Claims, Lemhi Indians, Annuity, Letter, Indian Commissioner R. G. Valentine to Secretary of Interior, December 1, 1910. ISC MS 330, Incoming Correspondence, 1906, Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs to Lemhi Superintendent, January 18, 1906.

\(^2\)Judge O. R. Baum, prominent Pocatello, Idaho, attorney and former United States District Court Judge, gave a series of radio lectures
following statement concerning Tendoy's speech at the council:

His conscience accused him of dereliction in the matter, and he felt it would not do for him to pass from this earth with his promise to the Great White Father unfilled, so he told them it was his last and best wish that they help him perform his pledge to the Government by signing the treaty, giving up their homes, their lands, and even the tombs of their forefathers. Those were stupendous things to ask of them, yet so eloquent was his plea that at the end of the speech every member of the tribe except one voted to accept the treaty and to remove to Fort Hall.

Even though there is no documentary proof of the above statement, it would seem only logical that Tendoy, who had always exercised great influence and control over his followers, would have a very great part and voice in any decision that would be made. It would also seem very unlikely that if Tendoy used his great influence against such a move that ratification would not have been obtained.

The President gave formal approval to the treaty on January 27, 1906, and preparations were begun for the removal. It had been the intention of the government and the understanding of the Lemhis that the transfer would take place in the spring of 1906. However, as later events proved, all the necessary arrangements could not be made in time for removal at that time. Instead the actual removal did not take place

in 1938 on the Lemhi Indians. In contacting Judge Baum, this writer found he no longer had his notes but that he had obtained his information with individuals familiar with the Lemhi Indians. He also had access to a copy of the History of Lemhi County by John Rees, an eminent Idaho historian, since deceased. This writer was unable to find this MS, and so in this instance must accept the Judge's account.

3ISC MS 156, Part 4, O. R. Baum, Radio Address, February 14, 1938, Station KSEI, Pocatello, Idaho.
until the spring of the following year. This unexpected delay caused much suffering on behalf of the Lemhis. In the past they had been able to obtain credit from the merchants of the Lemhi Valley to buy supplies and necessary commodities. When news of the approval of the agreement for transfer was spread the Valley merchants withdrew the credit privilege from the Indians, fearing that some might leave without meeting their obligations. This placed an unexpected hardship on the limited cash resources which the Lemhis had. Added to this was another and even more serious situation. Tendoy's people, believing the removal was imminent, did not plant any crops during the spring of 1906. Without this source of food, it fell the government's lot to give extended aid and assistance to alleviate the suffering that resulted among the members of the tribe.\(^4\)

The date for removal was finally set for as soon after March 15, 1907, as weather conditions would permit. In September, 1906, the Lemhi Superintendent was instructed to appoint a delegation of Lemhis to visit Fort Hall for the purpose of selecting a suitable location for their settlement the next spring.\(^5\) The necessity of having good "soil, grazing, water, and irrigation facilities" was considered, as was the

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\(^5\)Fort Hall Archives, File 253, Letter, Commissioner of Indian Affairs to Fort Hall Agent, March 8, 1907.
availability of timber for fuel and improvements. All other matters pertaining "to successful agriculture and stock-raising" were to be considered. The Lemhi delegation was instructed to meet with a similar delegation from Fort Hall and the decision they reached was to be satisfactory to both. 6

It had been proposed that the Lemhis be moved to Fort Hall by rail. However, some of the band were opposed to this proposal because it was the method used by the government to transfer Indian prisoners and they did not want to be classified as such. Therefore, in order to avoid unnecessary delay, the Lemhis were granted permission to remove overland by wagon, driving their stock, and moving in small parties if desirable. 7

The actual movement began in the latter part of April, 1907, at which time eight pioneers began their trek. Shortly after this a group of thirty made the trip, followed by other parties until within a short time the entire tribe had accomplished the transfer. Their farm implements and machinery were hauled by rail, as was the major portion of their stock. 8 In this relatively painless way, the long contemplated and often delayed removal was finally accomplished.

6 Ibid.

7 Fort Hall Records, Lemhi Appropriation 253, Letter from Indian Department to Fort Hall Agent, March 8, 1907.

After the Lemhis arrived at their new homes, they were placed under the supervision and control of the Fort Hall agent, who was to treat them 'in like manner' with the Fort Hall Indians.9

For the actual removal five thousand dollars was appropriated. Superintendent Declos, of the Lemhi Superintendency, furnished the needed provisions, wagons for transportation, hay and grain to maintain the stock, and all other items necessary during the transfer itself. He also was instructed to supply one hundred tents for the Lemhis at Fort Hall.10

Further appropriations for the Lemhis were provided for by the Appropriation Act approved March 1, 1907. Thirty thousand dollars was provided for the support of the Shoshone, Sheepeater, Bannock, and other Fort Hall Indians. An additional four thousand dollars was available immediately after July 1, 1907, for the first twenty installments agreed to in the treaty of 1889. This amount was to be used as the President directed. Not including the thirty thousand dollars above mentioned, nineteen thousand dollars was immediately available for the removal and establishment of the Lemhis on the Fort Hall reserve.11 It was also

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9Ibid.

10Ibid. The Appropriations Act of 1903 provided no salary for a Lemhi Agent. The Agency thereby became a Superintendency and the Agent the Superintendent - ISC MS 326, Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs to Lemhi Agent.

11Even though there was a large sum of money immediately
thought wise to have "one or more employees from Lemhi," in whom the Lemhis had confidence remain with them during their transfer to assist the Fort Hall agent in keeping the tribe together. These employees were to prevent any unhappy Lemhi from straying back to his old home and assist in any way in "contributing to their comfort, to the end that they may be made happy and contented in their new homes."\(^\text{12}\)

To provide for the allotment of both the Fort Hall and the Lemhi Indians, it was necessary to bring more land under irrigation. This reclamation project served a twofold purpose. One, it brought under cultivation more acreage; and two, it provided employment for the Lemhis, thereby helping them to earn money to support themselves during the transition period. In the construction of canals and laterals, the newcomers received one dollar per day. It was also believed that hard physical labor would divert the minds of the mixed band from the discussion of any proposition to return to Lemhi should such a question arise among them.\(^\text{13}\)

available to the Lemhis as a group, when it was distributed to them as individuals, the amounts each would receive was relatively small. This made it difficult for individual members of the tribe to purchase the expensive equipment necessary to maintain farming operations. To help remedy this situation, the U. S. government in 1910 consolidated into larger payments the sums due to the Lemhis in accordance with their 1889 treaty. This made it easier for the Indians to purchase farming equipment. Fort Hall Archives, File 253, Letter, Commissioner of Indian Affairs to Fort Hall Agent, February 24, 1910.

\(^{12}\)Fort Hall Archives, File 253, Letter, March 8, 1907 above.

\(^{13}\)Ibid.
The Lemhi school children received an extended vacation as a consequence of the removal. Because the Fort Hall school could not absorb them all at once, they did not begin school until adequate facilities were provided in 1908.\textsuperscript{14}

Conspicuous by his absence from Fort Hall was old Chief Tendoy. At almost the exact time the removal was being accomplished, this noble Indian lost his life in Agency Creek by drowning. The stories of his death vary. One faction has it that as Tendoy was returning from a trip to Montana with his son, he was accidently thrown from his horse into the creek and drowned. The other version is similar, except that in this case both were under the influence of alcohol. It is told that the son lassoed his father and threw him from his horse into the creek where he was drowned. The latter story does not seem plausible to the majority of the older citizens in the Lemhi Valley who are inclined to accept the first version.

No matter how he died, Tendoy, at least for the major portion of his life, rendered great service to the whites. Even though in his late years he sometimes acted as a barrier to the progression of his people, the great service the Chief performed for them and the whites throughout

\textsuperscript{14}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{15}\textit{ISC MS 196, Statement Regarding the Death of Tendoy}, signed by Mr. Sam Barnett, Tendoy, Idaho; Mr. John N. Tinney, Forest Supervisor, Salmon, Idaho; Mrs. Estelle Carpenter, Salmon, Idaho.
his early life greatly over-compensated for any trouble he might have caused.

Upon his death the grateful settlers in the Lemhi Valley subscribed two hundred dollars toward the erection of a suitable monument for his grave and requested that the burial section, which included the graves of many of his people be withdrawn from entry and established as a permanent resting place for the Chief and his followers. 16

Inscribed on the monument at his grave is the following epitaph:

Chief Tendoy

Died May 10, 1907, Aged 73 Years

Erected by His White Friends

Thus ended the story of a great chief and his people and the life they lived at Lemhi. Today the Lemhi group, per se, is extinct, having been assimilated at the Fort Hall Reservation by the inhabitants of that place.

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APPENDIX A

THE LEMHI MISSION

The practice of the Mormon leaders of establishing Indian missions and settlements along the fringes of civilization in the intermountain west resulted in a call, made by President Brigham Young at the General Conference in Salt Lake City on April 6, 1855, of twenty-seven men to conduct missionary work among "buffalo hunting Indians of Washington Territory." The newly called missionaries were directed to choose a site in the country of the Bannock, Shoshoni, or Flathead nations.

The primary objectives of the mission would be to "teach the Indians the principles of civilization, convert as many as possible to Mormonism, and promote peace among the several tribes."

The expedition set out from Farmington, Utah, on May 15, 1855. It consisted of "eleven wagons loaded with wheat, corn, flour, and other provisions and sufficient tools to begin farming operations." On May 27 this small band of pioneers reached the Portneuf River near its confluence with the Snake River. By June 12 the missionaries had reached a branch of the Salmon River, which they named Limhi after a Book of Mormon.

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1The information for this account of the Lemhi Mission is taken from Madsen, op. cit., pp. 84-110.
Nephite King. Within a short time after the establishment of a camp on that spot the head chief of the Bannock tribe, Sho-woo-koo or LeGrand-Coquin (the Grand Rogue, so named by French-Canadian trappers because of his reputation as an excellent horse thief), visited the newcomers. Sho-woo-koo expressed his friendship to the Mormons by asking them to establish their mission in the Salmon River country. He also offered them as much land as they desired for farming purposes. At the same time he expressed a hope that the Mormons would teach his people how to farm and raise crops. A possible answer for the warm reception given the settlers was that the Bannocks, as explained by the chief, were suffering and in want because the white traders were not allowed to sell them ammunition. It may very well be that the Grand Coquin hoped to remedy this situation by gaining the good graces of the Mormons. Whatever his real intentions, the friendly reception worked. It was decided that the mission would be built on the Lemhi River and construction of a stockade was begun June 17, 1855. The fort was built on a site about two miles above the present site of Tendoy.

The Mormon missionaries were impressed by "the orderly and friendly manner of the many Bannocks camped near by." They were quiet and peaceable, making preparations for their annual buffalo hunt to the Montana plains. On July 15 the majority of the Indians left the mission area for that place. Throughout the remainder of the first year the Indians maintained their friendly attitudes and the honesty they displayed was
greatly praised. One of the missionaries, William Burgess, Jr., had the following to say concerning this:

The Indians are very honest here or have been so far. When we wash we sometimes let our clothes hang days, let our tools lay around anyway, and Indians coming and going daily. Not one has been stolen yet. I wish Christians were this honest. They abhor a thief, comparing him to a wolf and they think a wolf is the meanest animal there is.

The missionaries not only carried on the hard work of construction and farming necessary to operate the mission, but they also attended three sessions of school each week to learn the Shoshone language. So well did they learn it that by the time the Indians returned from their hunt in October, the Mormons were able to converse with them. Meetings were held often and so successful was the proselyting that on October 21, 1855, fifty-five Indians were baptised. This number had increased to one hundred by July of the next year. The majority of the Indians baptised were Bannocks. However, Tio-van-du-sh, or Snag, chief of a local band of Shoshones, was one of the converts. He was evidently one of the few who took the conversion seriously as is illustrated in the following story:

On March 19, Snag came in to settle at the fort, and reported on the winter activities of the Indians. He said that the Bannock and Nez Perce had gambled all winter on amicable terms until a Bannock stole two horses from the Nez Perce. In retaliation, the Nez Perce stole two from Chief Grand Coquin, and planned to go to war against the Bannock, but had been dissuaded through the efforts of Snag. According to the story, Chief Snag preached to both tribes "the words that Brigham Young had told him, that it was not good to fight, that the Lord was not pleased with those that wanted to fight, and... that it was good to talk.

To maintain the mission among the Snake River Indians, it was
necessary to rely on the home base of Salt Lake City for supplies. In November, 1855, the first reinforcements arrived from that place. Included were five women and six children. In the latter part of April, 1857, Brigham Young left Salt Lake "to visit the settlement on Salmon River, to rest their minds, to invigorate their bodies, and to examine the intermediate country." His company consisted of one hundred fifteen men, twenty-two women, five boys, one hundred sixty-eight horses and mules, fifty-four wagons, two carriages, and two light ferry boats.

Heber C. Kimball and Daniel H. Wells urged the young men of the mission to marry the native women because "the marriage tie was the strongest tie of friendship that existed." However, they were cautioned by Brigham Young to marry only young girls "because... if the brethren were to marry those old vanigadoes they would be off with the first mountaineer who came along." Although several of the young men made proposals, the Indian parents usually prevented their daughters from responding favorably. Result, only a few marriages took place between the Indians and the missionaries.

The peaceful arrangement that had been maintained between the Mormons and their Lamanite brethren began to disintegrate with the news of the advance of Johnson's Army toward Utah. While this action was developing, Lemhi felt a growing uneasiness among the tribes. On November 30, 1857, the mission secretary wrote: "There is much movement amongst the Indians. They say they are going to Beaverhead, but
they will not tell us what they are going for."

Indication of impending trouble for the Lemhi Mission came on January 11, 1858. At that time a group of Bannock and Shoshones, who were enroute to fight the Nez Perce for horse stealing, visited the fort and reported that a Bannock Indian, Mattigan, had recommended they fight the Mormons before fighting their red cousins. About two weeks later some Shoshone warriors came into the settlement "all painted up." They were "very saucy and wanted to fight the Mormons." These Indians promised they would leave and not appear again in war paint if they were given six and one-half bushels of wheat. Again on February 16, the Bannock Chief, Grand Coquin, appeared at the fort and demanded some flour. However, he accepted some wheat when told that the former was scarce. Before leaving the mission he entered the horse corral and examined it thoroughly. The mission secretary reported that this was thought queer as he had been there and seen it before.

The Mormons refused to be alarmed by the suspicious activities. The position they maintained proved to be a very disastrous one for in February, 1858, the Bannocks held a war dance and asked the Shoshones to help them raid the white settlement. If these Indians refused, said the Bannocks, then they would be attacked themselves. This threat proved to be sufficient encouragement. On February 24 John W. Powell, a mountaineer living with the Indians came to warn the Mormons of the impending attack. Powell said he had tried to dissuade the Bannocks
but had been unable to do so.

The Mormons thought that Powell was lying. Unfortunately the truth of his statement was made only too vividly true the next day. The 25th of February saw the Indians raid the Lemhi Mission killing two Mormons, wounding five, stealing two hundred fifty cattle and twenty-nine horses. Immediately word was dispatched by messenger to Salt Lake City for advice and aid. The Saints also cut off from the church all Indian members known to be in the hostile party.

The following day three Shoshones came to the settlement seeking terms of peace and promised to return all the stolen cattle, thirty head, in their possession. By March 17 many of the Shoshones were again visiting the settlement, but their presence was held in deep suspicion. The mission secretary wrote concerning these visitors: "Our Fort is again filled with begging natives. The feelings which their appearance causes in the minds of the brethren, cannot well be described."

On March 26 messengers arrived from Salt Lake City with instructions to abandon the mission and return home. On March 31 the advance party set out. One member of this group was killed when hostile Indians attacked the party. This did not, however, cause any undue delay in the evacuation and on April 1, 1858, the mission was completely abandoned.

The Mormons believed that the United States Army and the mountain men were responsible for the Indian attack. They accused Powell of
telling the Indians that the Mormons intended to take their land and drive off the game. Brigham Young went even further, stating that Powell was "most actively engaged with the Indians in the massacre and robbery."

The results of Governor Alfred Cummings' investigation showed that during the winter prior to the raid rumors were rampant among the Indians that they would be employed by American soldiers to drive off the cattle and horses of the Mormons as soon as the passes were open. He also pointed out that there was no misunderstanding between the Indians and the Mormons until a small detachment of soldiers arrived at Beaver Head, Montana, to buy stock. Proceedings from this camp incited the redmen to raid Lemhi and drive off the mission stock.

Whatever the cause of the uprising might be, the immediate result was the abandonment of the Lemhi Mission and the retreat of the Saints to the inner sanctum of Mormonism.
APPENDIX B

COPY OF TREATY WITH SHOSHONE, BANNOCKS, AND SHEEP-EATERS

September 24, 1868 (Unratified)

W. J. Cullen and J. Tufts, Commissioners

Made and concluded at Virginia City, Montana Territory, on the twenty-fourth day of September, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-eight by and between W. J. Cullen, Commissioner, and James Tufts, Secretary of Montana Territory and Acting Governor and Superintendent of Indian Affairs on the part of the United States and the undersigned chiefs and Head Men of, and representing the mixed Tribes of Shoshones, Bannocks, and Sheep-eaters, they being duly authorized to act in the premises.

Article I

The object of the Treaties being the strict maintenance of peace, between the contracting parties the faithful observance of each stipulation is absolutely necessary.

The United States acting in good faith, expect the like conduct on the part of the Indians so that perpetual amity and friendship may be maintained between the parties hereto.

Article II

The Chiefs and Headmen representing the Indians aforesaid do most solemnly promise and agree with the parties representing the United States as aforesaid, That they will surrender to the United States of America, all their rights, titles, interest, claims and demands of, in, and to all lands, tracts or portions of land which they may now or have heretofore possessed or occupied within the Territory of the United States.

Article III

The United States sets apart for the use and occupation of Indian
Tribes parties hereto, the following described section or portion of country. Two Townships of Land commencing at or about a point known as "The Point of Rocks, on the north fork of the Salmon River, about twelve miles above Fort Lemhi. The said Townships and tract of land to be located and surveyed by or under the direction of their agent or the Superintendent of Indian Affairs as the Secretary of the Interior may direct.

Article IV

The aforesaid Tribes of Indians parties to this Treaty, agree and consent to remain within their own country, set apart under this treaty, except when visiting other sections of the country for the purpose of trade or social intercourse.---------

Article V

It is agreed and understood by and between the parties to this treaty, that if any nation or tribe of Indians as aforesaid, shall violate any of the agreements, obligations or stipulations herein contained, the United States may withhold for such length of time as the President may determine any portion or all of the annuities agreed to be paid to said Tribes under the sixth article of this Treaty.

Article VI

In consideration of the foregoing and following agreements, stipulations and cessions and on condition of their faithful observance, the United States agree to expend for the mixed Tribe of Shoshones, Bannocks, and Sheep-eaters, the sum of thirty thousand dollars for the first year, twenty thousand dollars for the second year, and annually thereafter for eighteen years the sum of twelve thousand dollars, in such useful goods and provisions as the President at his discretion may from time to time determine; and the Superintendent or other proper Indian Agent shall each year inform the President of the wishes of the Indians in relation thereto.---------

Article VII

The tribes of Indians, parties to this Treaty desire to exclude from their country the use of ardent spirits or other intoxicating liquor, and to prevent their people from drinking the same. Therefore, it is pro-
vided that any Indian belonging to the said tribes who is guilty of bringing such liquor into the Indian country or who drinks liquor, may have his or her proportion of the annuities withheld from him or her, for such time as the President may determine.

Article VIII

And the United States doth further covenant and agree that in addition to the appropriation heretofore made under article sixth, there shall be made an appropriation of eight thousand dollars for the erection of a saw mill upon the reservation as aforesaid.

Article IX

The United States do further agree that an annual appropriation shall be made for the compensation of one Farmer, one Physician, one Blacksmith, one Carpenter, one Engineer and one Interpreter who are to reside upon the Reservation and to give their exclusive time, care, skill, and energy to the interests of the Reservation in their respective Departments and to the instruction of the Indians.

Article X

The United States doth further covenant, promise and agree for and in consideration aforesaid, to appropriate annually the sum of two thousand, five hundred dollars for the purpose of maintaining a mission school to be under the direction of the Superintendent of Indian Affairs.

Article XI

This treaty shall be obligatory upon the contracting parties as soon as the same shall be ratified by the Senate of the United States. In testimony whereof the said W. J. Cullen, Commissioner, and James Tufts, acting Governor and Superintendent of Indian Affairs on the part of the United States, and the undersigned Chiefs and Headmen of the aforesaid Tribes of Indians parties to this treaty have hereunto set their hands and seals at the place and on the day and year aforesaid.
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APPENDIX C

AGREEMENT WITH SHOSHONES, BANNOCKS, AND SHEEPEATERS

OF IDAHO

1. The chiefs and headmen of the Shoshones, Bannocks, and Sheepeaters of the Lemhi Agency hereby agree to surrender their reservation at Lemhi and to remove to and settle upon the Fort Hall Reservation in Idaho, and to take up lands in severalty on that reservation as hereinafter provided.

2. The chiefs and headmen of the Shoshones and Bannocks of Fort Hall hereby agree to the settlement of the Lemhi Indians upon the Fort Hall Reservation in Idaho and they also agree to cede to the United States the following territory, namely:

Beginning where the north line of township nine south intersects with the eastern line of their reservation; Thence west with the extension of said line to the Port Neuf River; Thence west of said line to Marsh Creek; Thence up Marsh Creek to where the north line of township number ten south intersects with the same; Thence west with said line to the western boundary of said reservation; Thence south and with the boundaries of said reservation to the place of beginning; including also such quantity of land on the north side of the Port Neuf River as H. O. Harkness may be entitled to under the existing law, the same to be confirmed to the public surveys so as to include the improvement of said Harkness.

3. In view of the cessions in the above article, the United States agrees to pay to the Lemhi Indians the sum of four thousand dollars per annum for twenty years, and to the Fort Hall Indians the sum of six thousand dollars per annum for twenty years, the same to be in addition to any sums to which the above named Indians are now entitled by treaty, and all provisions of existing treaties, so far as they relate to funds, to remain in full force and effect.

\[1\text{Ratified in 1889.}\]
4. Allotments in severalty of the remaining lands on the Fort Hall Reservation shall be made as follows: To each head of a family not more than one-quarter of a section. To each single person over eighteen years of age, and to each other person under eighteen years now living, or who may be born prior to said allotments, not more than one-eighth of a section. All allotments to be made with the advice of the agent for said Indians, or such other person as the Secretary of Interior may designate for that purpose; upon the selection of the Indians, heads of families selecting for their minor children, and the agent making the allotment for each minor child.

5. The Government of the United States shall cause the lands of the Fort Hall Reservation, above named, to be properly surveyed and to be divided among the said Indians in severalty in the proportions herein mentioned, and shall issue patents to them respectively therefore as soon as the necessary laws are passed by Congress. The title to be acquired thereto by the Indians shall not be subject to alienation, lease, or incumbrance, either by voluntary conveyance of the grantee or his heirs, or by the judgement, order, or decree of any court of subject to taxation for the period of twenty-five years and until such time thereafter as the President may see fit to remove the restriction, which shall be incorporated in the patents.

Done at the City of Washington, this fourteenth day of May, Anno Domini, eighteen hundred and eighty.

(Signed)  
TenDoy  His X Mark
Tissi Dimit  "  "
Grouse Pete  "  "
Jack Gibson  "  "
TiKee  "  "
Captain Jim  "  "
Jack Tendoy  "  "

Witnesses:
J. F. Stock
Jos. T. Bender
A. F. Gentis
Charley Rainey - Acting Interpreter
John A. Wright - U. S. Indian Agent
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**ISC MS 56.** Beal, Samuel Merrill. *The Salmon River Mission.*

**ISC MS 115.** Harrington, J. A. *Notes on Idaho Indians.*


**ISC MS 196.** Accounts of the Death of Tendoy.

**ISC MS 521.** Letter from John Hailey, April 13, 1917.

**ISC MS 544.** Copy of a letter from U. S. Adjutant General W. T. McCain to Honorable Addison T. Smith on a proposal to establish a military post near Lemhi.

**ISC MS 554.** Copy of a letter to Major General Irvin McDowell, Commander of Pacific Military Division from Adjutant General E. D. Townsend.

**ISC MS 570.** Letter from Idaho Territorial Representative John Hailey to George L. Shoup and E. J. Beatty, June 27, 1874.

**ISC MS 592.** Letter from John Yearian to George L. Shoup concerning abandonment of the Lemhi Agency in 1878.

**ISC MS 593.** Two letters from James K. Fuller, Lemhi Agent, to Colonel George L. Shoup.

**ISC MS 597.** Letter from C. W. Turner to George L. Shoup concerning the return of the Lemhis from Yellowstone in 1868-69.

**ISC MS 606.** Letter from Harrison Fuller to James Glandenning concerning Fuller's resignation as Lemhi Agent.

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ABSTRACT

THE LEMHI INDIANS OF EASTERN IDAHO, 1860 to 1907

Roaming through the mountains and valleys of eastern Idaho and western Montana, prior to and following the advent of the white man into the area, were numerous small bands of Indians living independently of one another, but all belonging to the great Shoshonean family.

The small bands were well suited to the environment in which they lived, for by living in this manner the acquisition of an ample food supply was relatively certain. Also, the small groups could more easily evade the powerful Blackfoot enemy who made periodic raids into the mountains to secure horses and prisoners.

As long as game was plentiful, fortune smiled upon these Indians. However, the supply steadily diminished until by the late 1850's they were faced with acute destitution. Under these adverse conditions, Tendoy, a young Shoshone chieftain, succeeded in organizing several of the wandering groups into a relatively large unit, which became known as the Lemhi Confederation.

The new "tribe" consisted of segments of three distinct branches of the Shoshonean family, the major portion being the Shoshone proper or

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1Lemhi was a name bestowed on the valley in which Tendoy made his headquarters, by the Mormons who established the ill-fated Salmon River Mission in that area.
the Snake. The remainder consisted of near equal numbers of Bannocks and Tukuarikas or Sheepeaters. Early government reports estimated the Lemhi Band to number 1,000 individuals. However, subsequent reports showed this estimate to be too high, the actual count being nearer 500.

A temporary reservation in the Lemhi Valley was set aside for the Lemhis by Executive Order in 1875. However, it was the intention of the U. S. government that they would eventually be relocated at a more suitable place. This removal was accomplished in 1907 when Tendoy's Band took up new homes on the Fort Hall Reservation.

The loyalty and friendship of the Lemhis toward the whites was seldom questioned. A point of great pride was their contention that not a single drop of white blood was in their camp. Ample proof of their friendship was exhibited in the late 1870's when on two separate occasions the Lemhis refused to join their hostile red brethren on the warpath against the whites. These were the episodes of the Nez Perce and Bannock uprisings. In the Nez Perce War, Tendoy himself led some of his followers against the insurgents; and in both instances his firm hand prevented small dissatisfied elements of the band from joining the hostiles.

The chief is the outstanding character treated in the thesis. He was revered by his own people and admired by the whites, and in his early years maintained a very cooperative and progressive attitude. However, as he grew older, this attitude disappeared to a large degree.
There arose on several occasions sharp disputes between the agents and Tendoy. So reactionary did he become that he was accused of being the main stumbling block in the advancement of his people toward civilization.

In the overall view, the Lemhis proved themselves to be basically human, endowed with human frailties and human virtues. They lived in peace and harmony, but not without minor contentions and problems. There were good and bad among them as is the case with all civilizations. Their story is probably of interest to only a few, but in justice to all, should be preserved and remembered. That is the purpose of this thesis.

Date: July 17, 1955

Graduate Committee: